December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Key signing - LA & SF
by don＠cs.byu.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I will be in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas briefly at the end of April. Anyone who would like to trade keysignatures, please email me. (Unfortunately my ability to get around will be somewhat limited) Don ObCypherpunks: I read cpunks by NNTP from nntp.hks.net. Let me assure you, the apparent noise level has gone down by 90% from when it landed in my mailbox. Many thanks to those who provide this service. - -- <don(a)cs.byu.edu> http://students.cs.byu.edu/~don PGP 0x994B8F39 fRee cRyPTo! "It is not worth an intelligent man's time to be in the majority. By definition, there are already enough people to do that." - G. H. Hardy ** This user insured by the Smith, Wesson, & Zimmermann insurance company ** -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQB1AwUBMV8iosLa+QKZS485AQGVJgL/TED+T/49jMtNRbCAHJdo+IkSOTx7Ajrx Ox7+ABlcbCYKudLE70qh7RDdz9TI2sojB6FZ0vyoLGdVM61ljfd9YzZfq/kVXsyY EZ4HM2nGInXBQFo+rfQcn7JbXAT3agz/ =NZjK -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [NOISE] Cable-TV-Piracy-Punks (fwd)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:54 PM 3/31/96, Jim Choate wrote: >Forwarded message: > >> > Presumedly the state of the EEPROM cannot be deduced by any >> > external examination of the card, and any attempt to >> > incrementally abrade the card down to the relevent circuit >> > elements should completely obliterate the minute charge >> > differences which represent the data. >> >> They aren't immune to the laws of physics. If it can be put together, >> it can be taken apart. I can even surmise HOW it can be taken apart. > >You wouldn't even have to take it apart. Just subject it to analysis using >SQUID's. Using this technology you would not even have to physicaly touch >the card, let alone remove any parts of it. Well, I worked on SQUIDs (Superconducting quantum-interferometric devices) in 1972-3, and also worked on electron-beam analysis of microprocessors and memory device in 1980-84, and I can assure you that SQUIDs cannot do what you want them to do. I'll be happy to supply additional details if there's sufficient interest. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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cryptanalysis questions
by Jack Mott 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

What are the general methods used for statistical analysis of ciphers? Should I just use conventional stat analysis and look for patterns? Does anyone have any source or programs that do some of these kinds of things? -- thecrow(a)iconn.net "It can't rain all the time"

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:14 PM 3/31/96, Rev. Ben wrote: >I won't post my opinions upon whom I think is an Agent Provocateur, but >Uni isn't one. For what it's worth, I don't think there's a single agent provacateur on the list. At least not a vocal one (which sort of defeats the point). While I expect there may be a few government types who subscribe just to see what's going on (and I don't mean more active subscribers, such as Brian Davis, even though he's an Assistant District Attorney--he openly admits his role and makes contributions openly), I've seen no evidence that anyone is a provacateur. We're fairly open in our approaches, and are not plotting in secret, so the role of an agent provacateur is not clear. Disruptors, yes. But one man's disruption is another man's lively debate. So what else is new. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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EMO_ney
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-30-96 Economist, three related E-money reports: "Trials of digital cash and smart cards seem to be going on everywhere. Who will win the race to control tomorrow's money?" "Digitising dollars." Citicorp's Electronic Monetary System could make all forms of physical money redundant, and, if it wins broad acceptance, could help to solve some of the financial industry's most intractable problems. "The foreign exchange market: illiquid lunch." Diminishing liquidity; settlement risk; impact of electronic brokering. EMO_ney

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New release of SFS available
by pgut001＠cs.auckland.ac.nz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have just uploaded version 1.19 of SFS to the grumbo.uwasa.fi FTP site as: 551004 Apr 01 01:19 grumbo.uwasa.fi:/pc/crypt/sfs119.zip This release contains a number of major improvements over previous versions. The most important is that it follows recommendations on the use of encryption software to be released later today in a joint announcement by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and the US State Department. To this end the new version of SFS will abandon the use of MDC/SHS in favour of a classified algorithm which the both NSA and GCHQ are confident will protect non- confidential data. Although the exact algorithm details cannot be published due to its classified nature, it can be revealed that it uses prime number cycle wheels, a system still employed today at the highest levels. This algorithm improves on MDC/SHS by using a massive 2048-bit key, which would take billions of years to exhaust via a brute-force search. However in order to satisfy the requirements of various organizations such as the Chinese government (who need to ensure that no nasty outside influences pollute the minds of their citizens) and to allow the originators of the 83.5% of all Usenet traffic which contains porn to be prosecuted (a recent example being the widely publicised move by the Office of the Bavarian Illuminati to force Compuserve to drop all sex-related newsgroups), SFS 1.19 will store 2032 bits of the key in the clear along with the encrypted data. The head of the FBI Louis Freeh has been quoted as saying that "this will provide adequate protection against your little sister or your mother, while allowing law enforcement agencies to investigate people using encryption for illegal purposes". The head of the French DSSI agrees: "There have been too many cases of industrial espionage by foreign government intelligence agencies. For example in 1993 one such agency acquired over $1 billion worth of business for their own countries' companies in this manner. SFS 1.19 will protect against this problem, while allowing us to maintain control over French national security interests". The German government has tentatively approved SFS 1.19 for public use provided that it undergo a few small changes to comply with an updated form of the the Fernmeldeanlagen Ueberwachungs-Verordung (FUeV), which will require that all German users of SFS be connected to a central system to which copies of all keys used, times of encryption and decryption, identities of users, and copies of all encrypted data, be automatically forwarded. The Minister of the Interior Manfred Kanther stated that "this should fulfil the requirements of the German government for monitoring possible criminal use, although I might change my mind about this in a minute or two". Peter.

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Re: What backs up digital money?
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Mark Neely - accessnt(a)ozemail.com.au said: >Well, doesn't this beg the question - the "desire" by people to own them >is not as a result of advertising, but the fact that society has long >fixed them as standard units of "currency". > >If all those centuries ago marble was decided upon as a central >unit of currency, we'd all be killing ourselves to get some, not because >of any aestetic beauty. I do not think so. The common never holds value because value, especially in a crude civilisation, is related to rarity or difficulty to produce and obtain. AFAIK, gold was considered a value in every civilisation. If some did not consider it a value, then, they either ignored it's existence or had so much that it was not a value. Marbles are easy to make in most civilisations. They therefore cannot be used as a value standard. One problem with e-$, as pointed out by many, is that it has to have a *perceivable* value. Backing it by something physical that is already valued might be the best way to launch it. Otherwise, it will have the statute, if not legally, at least in the mind of the average Joe, the same as junks bonds. JFA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMV7fLMiycyXFit0NAQEGfAf8C3/kwoJ4Fnk7W7UP0P92+TGtgn3HAf/q AJ9V13iZVuX9hI96lP9PPixWryz0olI6D2df6c509peCoND4JUUXj2eBhJ0U/tHz 3Xw2D2oCep0fgm8NC6TzBBobrzcTExM41N5BG8H76SAJk9bz9zoHRx5OH2HVNCvu WyRXA0g2C9N6v0FpmQaQ2C0ose5c/WVQ9Yk/JmMgc0kw0HaT6VVVDfAkz+jTjCbj +0fh3gLREUdkx3pHXQ6ulfrZ4VoSz1qHSXCVKLy5kODieIYAMkZ0k/aYnbxPZRyX oHmk5kIKP9dO5Ao064ViJACi8gAYlwFp7YOSCexpJRDz0b7UMtO9/g== =a251 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- PGP key at: http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> ID:C58ADD0D 96/03/01 fingerprint: 52 96 45 E8 20 5A 8A 5E F8 7C C8 6F AE FE F8 91 Unsollicited commercial e-mail will be proofread at a rate of 165 $ U.S. per hours. Any sender of unsollicited commercial e-mail will be considered as to have accepted the above ment- ionned terms.

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Re: What backs up digital money?
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:25 3/28/96, Black Unicorn wrote: >> > At 1:46 PM 3/27/96, Scott Schryvers wrote: >> Between those times the net amount >> of money in bank accounts was reduced, by exactly the amount of >> circulating dcash. > >Ditto uncashed checks. Only Teller's/Cashier's and Traveler's Checks. These represent the conversion of Cash into a promise to pay when the Check is presented. This is the same as dcash. An Uncashed Personal Check (unless it has been certified [which withdraws the money from the account at Certification time]) only represents an unsecured claim on the monies in the account (ie: the Bank has no knowledge of its existence or amount until it is presented for payment/clearance).

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Re: Question about integrity of Blind Signature
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:51 PM 3/31/96 +0800, Chein-hsinLiu wrote: > Hi! >I have some question about ecash protocol. In ecash protocol, we represent >money by a sequence number which is signed by bank. And for privacy, we >use blind signature. But when we send bank a pesudo sequence number-- >X*PK(r) (X:sequence number we want, r :random number to cheat bank) >then we can get SK(X*PK(r)) from bank, and get money by SK(X*PK(r))/r=SK(X). >But if we divide SK(X*PK(r)) with r', we can get another money? It confuses >me. How does it preserve the integrity of the money, and let people divide >r on the SK(X*PK(r)) ? The sequence number is not a sequence number, nor is it just any random number. It is a random number of some special form, so that the chance that the "other money" will be of this special form is remote. For example one might demand that every second hex digit was the number 7, and the other digits were random. When we divide a valid money number by r, we will not get another valid money number. > It confuses me very long time. Thanks for any help! > Chein-hsin Liu 4/1/96 > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Witch Hunts
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:15 PM 3/31/96 -0500, Bruce Zambini wrote: >On Sun, 31 Mar 1996 JonWienke(a)aol.com wrote: > >> >My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li >> >"In fact, had Unicorn not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est >> >Detweiler might not have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti >> >00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information >> >> Unicorn = Detweiler = Agent Provocateur > >Well, I won't say it's impossible. > >However, for those of you who are relatively new to the list, Mr. Unicorn >has been a regular (and useful) contributor to the list. My belief in >this has been unwavering. Excepting, of course, the recent Unicorn/Bell >flamefest, which we all get sucked into occasionally. The fact that you are willing to include the name "Unicorn" in that "flamefest" should hold a clue as to the source of the problem. >My opinion of Mr. Bell on the same issue has varied widely; however, he >has participated (in recent times) in more flamewars on the list than >anyone, including the usual flamers (ie Perry, me, etc.). I do, however, promote one of the most controversial ideas you've probably ever seen discussed on the computer networks. You might well imagine that doing so would tend to attract people who are like moths attracted to a flame. Thus, a "flamewar." Notice that Unicorn tries to flame me on practically every subject he can, which should be another clue as to his motivations. If you've ever had a controversial work published in a mass-media outlet (and the Internet is turning into just such a thing) you'll notice that you'll get unsolicited letters from people, some of whom aren't quite "all there", and people who obviously have their own ax to grind. Often both. (I had a guest editorial published in the Portland Oregonian newspaper about six years ago, so I speak from experience.) Usually that ends quickly; people have short memories and are distracted by newer events. In the computer network area, however, the opportunity for follow-ups is ever-present. That's why I'm not surprised about people like Unicorn. It would probably be excessive to say "he's crazed," but he clearly spends an unusual amount of effort. Check out the CP archives a few days ago; I did an experiment, choosing to not to respond to nearly all of his notes. He kept writing! >It is also interesting to note that Mr. Unicorn talks knowledgably about >several fields; Mr. Bell talks about one field, and there are those who >would dispute his knowledge about it. Quite the contrary: While my degree is in Chemistry, most particularly Organic Chemistry (but also Physical chemistry, solid-state chemistry, and inorganic chemistry), I am rather knowledgeable about physics (including nuclear, high-energy, semiconductor, astrophysics, etc), electronics (analog and digital; I was frequently mistaken for a EE student during my college years), optics, computer hardware, a smattering of computer software, radio (I'm a ham) and a few other fields. This, however, is the "Cypherpunks" area, and with the exception of some bomb-trigger discussions a few weeks ago, much of that knowledge isn't commonly shown in the majority of the discussions here. It's odd, therefore, that you would suggest that I "talk about one field," as if that was somehow my limit. If anything, it shows that I (at least in your eyes) pay more attention to the subject of the list than Unicorn. If you really want to start talking about some of these other fields, I'd be happy to, but I don't think that would improve the specificity of the list. Other people might object, as well. We go on enough tangents as it is. >I have had an e-mail correspondence with Mr. Bell that lasted several >messages. In it, we were both civil and friendly; I post this now not to >take sides in the flamewar, but merely to note that, in my opinion, it is >improbable that Black Unicorn is Detweiller, and that, although I missed >the origin of this thread, it is likely a suggestion from Mr. Bell or one >of his associates, intended to discredit him. This sounds like a conspiracy theory. I don't have any "associates." And I have never posted on any list, echo, USENET group, or bbs under an alias, and I am posting with my real name. I'm listed in the phone directory for Vancouver, Washington, and I've never had an unlisted telephone number. Until Unicorn is willing to identify himself with the same amount of verifiable detail, it is in his direction you should look for conspiracies. >If Mr. Unicorn is indeed Detweiller, it is in the mold of Vlad Z. Nuri, >who (while almost certainly Detweiller) has produced useful contributions >on the list, while refraining from acting out. What, exactly, is your definition of a "useful contribution"? >It is also worth noting that the original Detweiller, in a sense, played >De Sade to Tim May's Rousseau, in that he used an unorthodox, but >effective, critical technique. (This is, in fact, one reading of De >Sade's "pornography" -- an interesting counterexample to what was >trumpeted on _Both_ sides of the recent Firing Line debate: that >pornography or obscenity is, whether or not protected, devoid of any >intellectual content.) Somebody ( I don't recall who) once opined to me that Unicorn behaves toward me somewhat like Detweiler behaved towards Tim May. I probably missed most of that, but I can see the similaries. This doesn't make him Detweiler, but it suggests that his motivations are similar. One last thing: On re-reading your note, I noticed that your writing style is rather... how shall I say... familiar. Care to discuss how you did it? Did you use a program? Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: [NOISE] Nasty-Quibble-Punks
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:06 PM 3/31/96 -0800, Mike Duvos wrote: >"Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> writes: >Uh huh. > > > Incidently, EEPROMs don't work by simply charging a > > capacitor or something silly like that. No insulator is > > perfect, no dielectric is perfect, and charge would > > eventually leak away were that the case. However, if it > > were, it would be fairly easy to determine the state of a > > cell without having to get particularly close to it. Beyond > > that, there is this insane notion you seem to have that a > > charged object will lose its charge if the "insulator" is > > "stripped off" -- I wasn't under the impression a vacuum, > > for instance, was a particularly good charge carrier. > >Uh huh. Turns out Perry is wrong about this. I believe that UV EPROMs and probably EEPROMs do indeed work by storing charge on a buried, totally-isolated capacitor. The capacitor is charged with a system called "Fowler-Nordheim tunneling," which involves placing a relatively high voltage on a nearby electrode and causing the thin interface to temporarily conduct. (It's odd. That's why it's called "tunnelling.") The charge, surprisingly enough, is stable for years, in fact decades, and probably (statistically) centuries at room temperature. The reason the charge stays around so long is that the insulator, silicon dioxide, is extremely good. It has to be. If the capacitor were, say, 1 picofarad, and the resistance was 10E18 ohms (a billion gigohms) the resulting time constant would be 1E6 seconds, or about 12 days. Since EPROMs obviously hold data far longer than this (well over 100 times longer, or else our computers wouldn't work!), and since the capacitance is probably not nearly 1 pf, that tells you that the effective resistance is far above 1E20 ohms. UVEPROMS are erased, naturally enough, by exposing them to UV light, which is usually produced by a mercury vapor lamp. This UV causes enough electrons to be excited into upper electron shells in the insulator to temporarily turn it into a slight conductor, and the charge dissipates. I think EEPROMs are erased by, more or less, reversing the voltage on the charging electrode. As for keeping the charge when that insulator is stripped off, that would be a problem. It isn't that a vacuum isn't a good enough insulator; it is, but it would be hard to imagine a technique to strip off an SiO2 insulator that doesn't also allow a substantial amount of charge to flow. You could strip it off with HF (hydrofluoric acid) but that's electrically conductive. Even a gas-phase process would probably result in enough conductive products to discharge the capacitor. Ion-beam milling would also remove SiO2, but as the name implies that's applying a current to the system. Fortunately, all this is moot: Since the floating gate is inherently part of a transistor, it isn't necessary to expose it to detect its charge state: Just activate the transistor in-circuit BTW, some PLD's have a so-called "security bit" which (when set) is designed to prevent reading of the state of the rest of the programmed bits. Years ago it occurred to me that if you knew where this particular bit was stored, you could expose this bit location alone to a UV source through a tiny mask to discharge it. Finding that location wouldn't be all that hard: Just expose the chip with a series of exposures, moving a linear mask slightly, and eventually the security bit will erase. Note the location of the mask, and rotate the mask 90 degrees and repeat the process. At that point, you've located the bit (this may require a few iterations), so you expose the target part through a tiny pinhole (Edmund Scientific sells them in many different sizes, exposing only that security bit location. Jim "Mr. Bell talks about one field" Bell (Let's see, I covered solid, liquid, and vapor phase chemistry, a bit of particle physics (ion-beam milling), semiconductor physics, minor optics, electronics, some trivial math, and maybe even some detective work!) jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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NYT on CFP
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The New York Times, April 1, 1996, p. A14. Pioneers of Cyberspace Move Into Wider Arena By Peter H. Lewis Cambridge, Mass., March 30 -- Cyberspace is dead, many of its electronic pioneers said at a conference here this week. As the Internet population has grown into the millions, what was once a small, self-regulating society of academics and computer wizards has been engulfed by mainstream culture. But in their efforts to preserve the libertarian spirit of the electronic frontier, the original members of the cyberspace community have emerged as a political and social force. "Last year, it was still possible for people to say cyberspace is a different place, subject to different laws and different rules and that there is a Net culture," said Hal Abelson, a professor of computer science and engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology here. "Now you have such a large percentage of the population on the Net, it just is not sensible to talk about this as some other place anymore. What you are really talking about now is the communications fabric of the country." In what was seen as a clear sign of Internet users new power, several members of Congress announced, by telephone and through the Internet, new legislation and initiatives at the gathering here, the annual Computers, Freedom and Privacy Conference. The proposals include the formation of an Internet Caucus in Congress and a Senate blll to relax the Government's laws restricting the transmission of secrets over the global information network. "Washington is coming to thls conference in droves," said Daniel J. Weltzner, deputy dlrector of the Center for Democracy and Technology, one of several public-interest groups that seek to influence Government policy related to cyberspace, "and I think it's very exciting and promising. It's the coming of age of this community." The members of Congress were wooing more than 500 of the Internet's most prominent champions, who had gathered to discuss issues that were once esoteric but are now affecting millions of people worldwide: questions of privacy, electronic copyrights, computer crime, the nature of free speech, digital pornography, electronic cash and grassroots electronic democracy. The Computers, Freedom and Privacy crowd included its usual assortment of computer hackers, academics and self- described crypto-anarchists, and even one man wearing video goggles with an antenna apparently sprouting from his head. But it also included others who wanted to assess the fusion of cyberspace and real space: Federal judges, lawmakers, White House policy experts, corporate executives and law-enforcement agents. Senator Conrad Burns, a Republican from the real frontier state of Montana, chose the conference to announce, by telephone, new legislation that would remove nearly all current Government restrictions on the export of mass-market encryption software, which is used to send secret messages over computer and telephone networks. Senator Burns's legislation would also block the Administration from imposing as a Government standard any form of data encryption that would give law-enforcement agencies the ability to decode messages. The Senator's bill places him squarely at odds with the Clinton Administration and the Justice Department. But Mr. Burns said the use of robust data encryption would foster the rise of electronic commerce, distance education and digital communicatlons, which his large, rural state desperately needs in the 21st century. While the bill might have little chance of passage this year, conference participants were heartened by what appears to be growing support in Congress for a relaxation of the Government's cryptography policy. The proposal drew some opposition. "I think we'll regret it down the road," said Dorothy E. Denning, a professor of computer sciences at Georgetown University and a computer security consultant to the military. Dr. Denning and others have argued that the use of unrestricted encryption would thwart the ability of law-enforcement and intelligence agencies to conduct wiretaps on messages sent by foreign spies, terrorists, child pornographers and other criminals. On Friday, a bipartisan group of wired lawmakers addressed the conference by telephone and Internet to announce the formation of a Congressional Internet Caucus. Fewer than half of all members of Congress are now on line. Representative Rick White, Republican of Washington, said, "The idea behind the Internet Caucus is to do two things: increase members understanding of the Internet and get more members on-line so that people can contact their elected representatives on the Internet." [End]

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Re: Chaumian ecash without RSA
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:10 AM 3/31/96 -0800, David Wagner wrote: > The bank picks a secret value k, and publishes g^k. > > To withdraw a coin, Alice picks an x, sets > y = x | hash(x), [ | is concatenation ] > chosen so that y is in G. Alice chooses a random secret blinding factor b, > sends to the bank > A->B: y g^b, > and the bank returns > B->A: (y g^b)^k, > debiting Alice's account. > > Note that this is a (blinded) Diffie-Hellman key exchange with public > exponentials g^k and y g^b; the bank returns the exchanged "secret". > > Alice unblinds this value, computing > z = (y g^b)^k (g^k)^{-b} > and now c = (x,z) is a coin in the digital cash system. Note z = y^k. > > We use the traditional online clearing protocol; to deposit the coin, a > shop S sends > S->B: x, z. > The bank checks to make sure the coin hasn't already been spent, and then > computes > y = x | MD5(x), > checking whether y^k = z. Two irritations with this protocol: 1: A coin is almost twice the size of a coin in the RSA protocol 2: Nobody except the bank can verify that a coin has face validity. The second point is more serious than you might think, as most of us want to see a world where everyone is his own bank and his own credit rating agency, as well as his own publisher. It will obstruct contracts of the form "Anne promises to provide numbers with certain cryptographic properties, provided Bob provides numbers with certain cryptographic properties." With RSA crypto cash, Anne can construct a blinded unsigned coin, and ask Bob to have it signed. For this to be reasonably convenient and practical, we need to have locally verifiable signatures. For computer mediated management of contracts, transactions, and credit ratings, we need contracts such that all intermediate transactions can be reduced to locally verifiable cryptographic protocols. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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gnutar + pgp filter mode
by danisch＠ira.uka.de 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The gnu tar archiver allows to use an arbitrary compression program (option --use-compress-program=PROG). This works well with pgp if a small wrapper is used: #!/bin/csh -fb if ("$1" == "-d") then exec pgp -d -f else exec pgp -e -f endif The only problem is that this doesn't work well for larger amounts of data, because pgp reads in all data before starting with its work. Perhaps a future release of pgp will have a real filter mode. Hadmut BTW: Does this "crypto-hook" cause export restrictions to apply on gtar ? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMV/0tmc1jG5vDiNxAQFtAAP/TMuYeYf5q7k1Y8DrBjb6XFKYYFANH3RH FvThWq1BUgI+unH97EZkNkCzZJYT5qmLGk3+JLufCAw/o9YR7jKcldm2LNYJ96t2 BDcSGDF3qx/IUzQBa5NV+gUerNRVSwA3LzkTbXufOxYH0cB3KNcsx3B0bE1rEDa/ GCcJ1L6T+2s= =FMiZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Cylink gives away encryption kit
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cylink to offer free SDK for embedding encryption security By Jessica Davis InfoWorld Electric Posted at 1:21 PM PT, Mar 29, 1996 Lobbing the latest bomb in a patent war over public key/private key encryption technology, Cylink Corp. will offer a Software Developers Kit (SDK) free-of-charge so that software companies can embed security and encryption technologies in their products. Cylink's move to offer Passport Gold for free follows a failed attempt in federal court to stop another company, RSA Data Security Inc., from selling a similar kit allegedly based on Cylink patents. The two companies have been engaged in a public relations feud, as well as a federal court patent dispute and IS mind share war over public key/private key/certificate authority encryption technology. Cylink lost the latest round in federal court in early March. Cylink and RSA both participated in the creation of public key/private key technologies through their partnership, Public Key Partners. PKP was formed in 1990 to establish security standards to license to software vendors. The partnership fell apart over the patent dispute. Cylink's PassportGold modules and APIs allow software developers to enable their applications to access national certificate authority electronic commerce and correspondence services that are planned by the U.S. Postal Service's ECS system and other commercial certificate authority facilities. Cylink expects its revenue stream to come from a series of products, existing and planned, that enhance the speed and effectiveness of such encryption technologies. Cylink has also announced SecureFrame, one of those products that provides a high-speed data encryption and security system for frame relay-based Wide Area Network environments. Working in conjunction with any public or private frame relay network, Secure Frame dynamically encrypts data while authenticating its source and destination, delivering throughput of up to 2.048 Mbps. SecureFrame is priced at $5,995 and will ship in April. Cylink also introduced SecureNode, an SNMP and TCP/IP-based data security hardware and software card for secure end-to-end data transfer and communication. The PC card is available now and provides network independent security management at the desktop level without hitting users with crippled CPU performance by acting as an "encryption and authentication accelerator." SecureNode cards for ISA or for PCI are priced at $595 and $695 respectively. The standalone software product is priced at $199. Sunnyvale, Calif.-based Cylink can be reached at (800) 533-3958 or http://www.cylink.com/. Please direct your comments to InfoWorld Electric News Editor Dana Gardner. Copyright © 1996 InfoWorld Publishing Company

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PICS makes headline in ET
by Richard Martin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The electronic Telegraph is an electronic version of the British daily, the Telegraph. I actually went through the bother of filling out their online registration a few months ago. The `headline' of today's edition is an article on PICS, the Platform for Internet Content Selection, boosting it as a method for screening [actually, they use the term `policing'] content on the internet. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/et/access?ac=130174817686&pg=home.html Feel free to use the above url for reading the one article. I'm somewhat undecided on whether i think it would be good idea for several folks to be using my identity to read et--it obfuscates any tracking of my reading habits they may be doing--so i'll just ask folks to not tell me if they do. richard -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMWAQpR1gtCYLvIJ1AQGEHwP/dzTNcc1FcWz4ydKMX5MctyWfjBf82ka+ qSZenBZ4tjgCYCbyTDFYG/Hx3c0y5NTpwskTVwzCkZ7RFvVwAFFSsPOGrHSAAA09 b6FiC1Vvct3XJg3mjDlZhImiF04LKI2oPcsHAHmNhOomjK+tdJtN3Wuwhs6fvv90 pW17rnxvZ5o= =IqxK -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Richard Martin [not speaking for a|w] rmartin(a)aw.sgi.com http://reality.sgi.com/rmartin_aw/ Alias|Wavefront - Toronto Office [Co-op Software Developer, Games Team]

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(fwd) Russians Break RSA?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friends, I just grabbed this of the ClariNet news feed on Netcom...I'm not supposed to forward anything from this service (so don't tell Brad Templeton!), but this appeared to be too important not to pass on as quickly as possible. Apparently those rumors that the Russians, always topnotch mathematicians, had developed public key crypto in the 1950s or early 60s are true--my hero Kolmogorov developed this when he was technical director at Kryptogorodok, the secret city of Soviet cryptographers hidden in the Urals (and first visited by an outsider, Stephen Wolfram, only a couple of years ago). Here's the report on a news conference announcing the cracking of their Kolmogorov system, which is equivalent to our own RSA. I haven't had a chance to talk to John Markoff, who was at the press conference, to get his comments. --Tim > Xref: netcom.com clari.world.europe.eastern:2783 > clari.news.hot.ussr:3792 > clari. > news.trouble:3258 clari.science.crypto > Path: netcom.com!bass!clarinews > Approved: doug(a)clarinet.com > From: clarinews(a)clarinet.com (AP) > Newsgroups: > clari.world.europe.eastern,clari.news.hot.ussr,clari.news.trouble,clari.sc > ience.crypto > Distribution: clari.apo > Subject: Russian Mathematicians Announce Breakthrough > Keywords: Europe Cryptography RSA > Copyright: 1996 by The Associated Press, R > Message-ID: <russia-cryptoUR7f0_4ME(a)clarinet.com> > Date: Mon, 1 Apr 96 10:40:19 PST > Expires: Mon, 7 Apr 96 12:40:19 PDT > ACategory: international > Slugword: Russia-Crypto > Priority: regular > ANPA: Wc: 116/0; Id: V0255; Src: ap; Sel: -----; Adate: 03-14-N/A > Codes: APO-1103 > > > MOSCOW (AP) -- At a press conference held minutes ago in a > crowded hall, Russian mathematicians announced that a breakthrough had > been made nearly a decade ago in the arcane branch of mathematics > known as "cryptography," the science of making messages that are > unreadable to others. > Leonid Vladwylski, Director of the prestigious Moscow Academy > of Sciences, called the press conference yesterday, after rumors began > circulating that noted Russian-American reporter John Markoff was in > Russia to interview academicians at the previously secret city of > Soviet cryptographers, Kryptogorodok. The existence of Kryptogorodok, > sister city to Akademogorodok, Magnetogorsk, and to the rocket cities > of Kazhakstan, had been shrouded in secrecy since its establishment in > 1954 by Chief of Secret Police L. Beria. Its first scientific > director, A. Kolmogorov, developed in 1960 what is called in the West > "public key cryptography." The existence of Kryptogorodok was unknown > to the West until 1991, when Stephen Wolfram disclosed its existence. > American cryptographers initially scoffed at the rumors that > the Russians had developed public-key cryptography as early as 1960, > some 15 years prior to the first American discovery. After interviews > last year at Kryptogorodok, noted American cryptographers Professor > D. Denning and D. Bowdark admitted that it did seem to be > confirmed. Professor Denning was quoted at the time saying that she > did not think this meant the Russians could actually break the > Kolmogorov system, known in the West as RSA, because she had spent > more than a full weekend trying to do this and had not > succeeded. "Believe me, RSA is still unbreakable," she said in her > evaluation report. > Russia's top mathematicians set out to break Kolmogorov's new > coding system. This required them to determine that "P = NP" (see > accompanying article). Details are to be published next month in the > journal "Doklady.Krypto," but a few details are emerging. > The Kolmogorov system is broken by computing the prime numbers > which form what is called the modulus. This is done by randomly > guessing the constituent primes and then detonating all of the > stockpiled nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union for each "wrong > guess." In the Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics, > invented in 1949 by Lev Landau (and later, independently by Everett > and Wheeler in the U.S.), all possible outcomes of a quantum > experiment are realized. > As Academician Leonid Vladwylski explained, "In all the > universes in which we guessed the wrong factors, we were destroyed > completely. But since we are obviously here, talking to you at this > press conference, in this universe we have an unbroken record of > successfully factoring even the largest of imaginable numbers. Since > we are so optimistic about this method, we say the computation runs in > "Nondeterministic Pollyanna Time." Allow me to demonstrate..." > > [Press Conference will be continued if the experiment is a success.] > > MOSCOW (AP), ITAR-Tass, 1 April 1996 > > > Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Navajo code-talkers
by Brian D Williams 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Tim May comments: >According to an episode of "The X Files," which dealt with Navajo >code-talkers, the answer is that young Navajo men are losing their >fluency in Navajo, especially of the nuances and double entendres >that code-talkers relied upon. (For those who scoff at using a >television show as a source, writers for shows like this often do >more interesting research than, say, the average encyclopedia >article will report.) Navajo also has something now it didn't have before WWII, a written language, and I believe a rudimentary dictionary. Brian

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ACM/IEEE Letter on Crypto
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reply to: ACM/IEEE Letter on Crypto Association For Computing Machinery Office of US Public Policy 666 Pennsylvania Avenue SE Suite 301 Washington, DC 20003 USA (tel) 202/298-0842 (fax) 202/547-5482 Institute of Electronics and Electrical Engineers United States Activities 1828 L Street NW Suite 1202 Washington, DC 20036-5104 USA (tel) 202/785-0017 (fax) 202/785-0835 April 2, 1996 Honorable Conrad Burns Chairman, Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee US Senate SD-508 Washington, DC 20510 Dear Chairman Burns: On behalf of the nation's two leading computing and engineering associations, we are writing to support your efforts, and the efforts of the other cosponsors of the Encrypted Communications Privacy Act, to remove unnecessarily restrictive controls on the export of encryption technology. The Encrypted Communications Privacy Act sets out the minimum changes that are necessary to the current export controls on encryption technology. However, we believe that the inclusion of issues that are tangential to export, such as key escrow and encryption in domestic criminal activities, is not necessary. The relaxation of export controls is of great economic importance to industry and users, and should not become entangled in more controversial matters. Current restrictions on the export of encryption technology harm the interests of the United States in three ways: they handicap American producers of software & hardware, prevent the development of a secure information infrastructure, and limit the ability of Americans using new online services to protect their privacy. The proposed legislation will help mitigate all of these problems, though more will need to be done to assure continued US leadership in this important hi-tech sector. Technological progress has moved encryption from the realm of national security into the commercial sphere. Current policies, as well as the policy-making processes, should reflect this new reality. The legislation takes a necessary first step in shifting authority to the Commerce Department and removing restrictions on certain encryption products. Future liberalization of export controls will allow Americans to excel in this market. The removal of out-dated restrictions on exports will also enable the creation of a Global Information Infrastructure sufficiently secure to provide seamless connectivity to customers previously unreachable by American companies. The United States is a leader in Internet commerce. However, Internet commerce requires cryptography. Thus American systems have been hindered by cold-war restraints on the necessary cryptography as these systems have moved from the laboratory to the marketplace. This legislation would open the market to secure, private, ubiquitous electronic commerce. The cost of not opening the market may include the loss of leadership in computer security technologies, just at the time when Internet users around the world will need good security to launch commercial applications. For this legislation to fulfill its promise the final approval of export regulations must be based on analysis of financial and commercial requirements and opportunities, not simply on the views of experts in national security cryptography. Therefore, we urge you to look at ways to further relax restrictive barriers. Finally, the legislation will serve all users of electronic information systems by supporting the development of a truly global market for secure desktop communications. This will help establish private and secure spaces for the work of users, which is of particular interest to the members of the IEEE/USA and the USACM. On behalf of the both the USACM and the IEEE/USA we look forward to working with you on this important legislation to relax export controls and promote the development of a robust, secure, and reliable communications infrastructure for the twenty-first century. Please contact Deborah Rudolph in the IEEE Washington Office at (202) 785-0017 or Lauren Gelman in the ACM Public Policy Office at (202) 298-0842 for any additional information. Sincerely, Barbara Simons, Ph.D.3 Chair, U.S. Public Policy Committee of ACM Joel B. Snyder, P.E. Vice President, Professional Activities and Chair, United States Activities Board cc: Members of the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space

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Elementrix Technology Announces Power Quantum Cryptography
by sales＠elementrix.co.il 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Elementrix Technology Announces Power Quantum Cryptography Elementrix Technology, a leading developer of security software, including the well-known Power One Time Pad (POTP(TM)) today announced the first commercial release of a next-generation unbreakable security product. Power Quantum Cryptography pushes data security into the modern world of quantum physics. Elementrix PQC(TM) is your best choice for securing your sensitive data against Hackers, Crackers, Snoops, NSA, and other Evil People. Elementrix, long recognized as an innovator in unconventional data security technology, combines absolute security with utility, performance and ease of use. Our remarkably simple algorithm gives you unprecedented speed in a software-only implementation. PQC requires no additional hardware, and no knowledge of quantum physics. By using a novel method (covered by trade secret law and now patent-pending in 26 countries) our server software transmits packets onto your local network without reading them, thus preserving their unique quantum properties. Any attempt to read the packet, except by the intended recipient will destroy the quantum waveform of the packet. Our sophisticated error-recovery system will detect this and re-initialize with a predefined Emergency Quantum State, which has all the same characteristics as the Normal Quantum State, but has not been compromised by the attempted eavesdropper. PQC provides you with fast, reliable, and secure data transmissions, XOR encrypted with unbreakable quantum randomness. Our Plug-and-Play installation assures that you can have secure transmissions within minutes. PQC ensures that your data transmissions are absolutely unbreakable, guaranteed by the Laws of Physics. The innovative PQC technology requires no public or private Keys, no master or session key, no key management, no key escrow or trusted third parties, no key distribution servers, no access codes, no substantial overhead, no special training for users, and no waiting. PQC gives you total security from anyone without the aid of an object code disassembler. Elemntrix PQC(tm) version 1.0 requires 80386 or higher IBM PC (or 100% compatible), 4MB RAM, MS-Windows 3.1, Windows For Workgroups, or Windows 95, a MODEM or LAN connection, and any TCP/IP stack for Windows. For more information: Tel: +972-4-550963 Fax: +972-4-550356 Within the US and Canada, phone: 1-212-888-8879 fax: 1-212-935-3882 e-mail: sales(a)elementrix.co.il info(a)elementrix.co.il for customer and technical support: support(a)elementrix.co.il

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Re: NYT on CFP
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:24 AM 4/1/96 -0500, John Young wrote: > The New York Times, April 1, 1996, p. A14. > Pioneers of Cyberspace Move Into Wider Arena, By Peter H. Lewis Cambridge, Mass., March 30 -- Cyberspace is dead, many of > its electronic pioneers said at a conference here this > week. [stuff deleted] > The proposals include the formation of > an Internet Caucus in Congress and a Senate blll to relax > the Government's laws restricting the transmission of > secrets over the global information network. This goes to show that export controls on encryption are going to have to go, Leahy bill or not. > "Washington is coming to thls conference in droves," said > Daniel J. Weltzner, deputy dlrector of the Center for > Democracy and Technology, one of several public-interest > groups that seek to influence Government policy related to > cyberspace, "and I think it's very exciting and promising. > It's the coming of age of this community." I don't think they have any choice! Washington is already bombarded with email within hours every time they do something stupid. > The Computers, Freedom and Privacy crowd included its usual > assortment of computer hackers, academics and self- > described crypto-anarchists, and even one man wearing video > goggles with an antenna apparently sprouting from his head. > But it also included others who wanted to assess the fusion > of cyberspace and real space: Federal judges, lawmakers, > White House policy experts, corporate executives and > law-enforcement agents. Some of whom might even be aware that they could easily lose their jobs as a consequence of what's happening now on the 'net. > Senator Conrad Burns, a Republican from the real frontier > state of Montana, chose the conference to announce, by > telephone, new legislation that would remove nearly all > current Government restrictions on the export of > mass-market encryption software, which is used to send > secret messages over computer and telephone networks. I sure wish they'd hurry up on this legislation. Hope it's not just vaporware...er... vaporbill, or whatever. > Senator Burns's legislation would also block the > Administration from imposing as a Government standard any > form of data encryption that would give law-enforcement > agencies the ability to decode messages. Gee, I thought the 1st amendment did that? Are our freedoms dependant on a bill that hasn't yet been passed, and may not even yet exist? > The Senator's bill places him squarely at odds with the > Clinton Administration and the Justice Department. But Mr. > Burns said the use of robust data encryption would foster > the rise of electronic commerce, distance education and > digital communicatlons, which his large, rural state > desperately needs in the 21st century. While the bill might > have little chance of passage this year, conference > participants were heartened by what appears to be growing > support in Congress for a relaxation of the Government's > cryptography policy. I'm anxious to see how many self-proclaimed supporters of the Leahy bill are going to do the right thing and drop their support of it once the text of this Burns bill has been released. (assuming the Burns bill turns out to be satisfactory, of course, and that it covers all the "good" parts that we wanted from Leahy as well as leaving out all the bad ones.) Though I was never happy about that "list of shame" idea, one of the tests that would partially confirm or deny the proper placement of any given name on that list would be that the person named would shift his support to a repaired bill. I can't see any logical reason to continue to support a flawed bill if and when a corrected bill appears. > The proposal drew some opposition. "I think we'll regret it > down the road," said Dorothy E. Denning, a professor of > computer sciences at Georgetown University and a computer > security consultant to the military. Dr. Denning and others > have argued that the use of unrestricted encryption would > thwart the ability of law-enforcement and intelligence > agencies to conduct wiretaps on messages sent by foreign > spies, terrorists, child pornographers and other criminals. Damn! They keep leaving me out of their short list! Maybe they meant to lump me in with the groups they mentioned. I'm an American, so I can't be a "foreign spy," and my supply of child pornography is at a constant zero level. I'd sure hate to be lumped into an ignominious position with the "other criminals," however: What an unimpressive title! Maybe I'll just have to settle for being called a terrorist. Harrumph! Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Why Americans feel no compulsion ...
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:21 AM 3/28/96, Syed Yusuf wrote: >If a person who speaks three languages is tri-lingual >If a person who speaks two languages is bi-lingual > >What do you call a person who only speaks one language? > >---------------------answer follows: > >An American. Or our version: What do you call a person who has to learn English as a second language in order to compete in the world? A foreigner. (Sorry for the insult, but it seems that this thread is bringing out insults from foreigners of all sorts.) --Tim Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Java flaw is in bytecode verifier
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From http://java.sun.com/sfaq/960327.html: > Researchers at Princeton recently found an implementation bug in the Java > bytecode Verifier. The Verifier is a part of Java's runtime system which > certifies that applets downloaded over the Internet adhere to Java's > language safety rules. Through a sophisticated attack, a malicious applet > can exploit this bug to delete a file or do other damage. This is one of the more worrisome places for a bug to exist. Much of Java's security rests in the claim that it can screen for and detect bad bytecode sequences. This screening code is extremely critical for Java security and I am surprised to see that it was implemented in a flawed manner. I've been writing Java quite a bit in the last couple of weeks, and I find that I have crashed my browser, whether Netscape or appletviewer, many times. Granted some of my code has been pretty buggy, but it's still not supposed to crash the browser. Obviously some of the runtime checks are not being done properly. I had expected that the bug would be in these areas, something like the stack overflows that we have seen cause problems in the past. A simple error in the bytecode verifier (if that is what this really is) seems like a more fundamental security flaw. The researchers have still not released full details on the bug, although they had planned to do so by the end of March. Maybe they are waiting for the fix to be distributed. Hal

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PsychicCash IPO
by M. Thomlinson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PsychicCash(TM) Announces Initial Public Offering PsychicCash, a leading developer of electronic commerce systems, today announced that it will sell 4.5 Million shares of common stock at a price of $25 a share. "This IPO will make me very rich" said co-founder Dan Thompson, "but of course you already knew that." PsychicCash pushes secure, thought-driven commerce into the modern world. PsychicCash is the holder of a number of crucial psychic commerce patents, including those on psychic blinding, psychic key-exchange, and psychic anonymity. The PsychicCash technology is based on the idea that there is no need for paper bills or plastic cards. Instead, a user simply thinks to exchange money. PsychicCash requires no hardware, and little knowledge of cryptography, however, it does require doing 1024-bit modular exponentiation in your head. "This is the logical progression of things," said PsychicCash supporter Dionne Warwick. "The use of PsychicCash(TM) to secure transactions should completely remove consumers' concerns about the safety of psychic commerce." Through the use of their patented technology, PsychicCash allows users to transmit value to any vendor, in any denomination, in any currency. With a future release of the protocol, a few additional multiplications will allow PsychicCash users to anonymize either party. The release is currently on hold due to problems in accidentally revealing (thinking) blinding factors. "Psychic debit" technology allows secure transmission of value across time as well as space. That is, one can deduct amounts from payee's bank accounts before the idea to purchase has even been conceived. (A similar use of this technique overcomes prior art claims on PsychicCash patents by shifting the date of filing back as far as needed.) As with all cryptographic solutions, PsychicCash must first get export approval from the US government for each of its' products. However, an ingenious system, called telepathic key escrow (TKE), should allow the company expedited commodities jurisdiction approval. Using TKE, a user simply thinks his key to the National TKE Center, which will then allow access to the key only with a court order. Whether or not other countries will allow the NTKEC to escrow their citizens' keys is still unclear. For more information: Tel: 206-936-0123 Within the US and Canada, phone: 1-212-888-8879 fax: 1-212-935-3882 e-mail: sales(a)psychiccash.mil for customer and technical support: think Matt Thomlinson University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Check my home page -- http://weber.u.washington.edu/~phantom

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Re: So, what crypto legislation (if any) is necessary?
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>My preferred and soon to be permanent e-mail address:unicorn@schloss.li >"In fact, had Unicorn not existed, potestas scientiae in usu est >Detweiler might not have had to invent him." in nihilum nil posse reverti >00B9289C28DC0E55 E16D5378B81E1C96 - Finger for Current Key Information Unicorn = Detweiler = Agent Provocateur

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