December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Your Mama's so......
by uunet!in2.uu.net!gatech!newsfeed.internetmci.com!lamarck.sura.net!mother.usf.edu!luna!panagopo＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaak

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Re: Bootable disks
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I recently installed an IDE version of the Syquest EZ 135 hard drive for a client. Since it is a fully functional hard drive, it is bootable, unlike the parallel port model. The biggest advantage to this type of drive is that the cartridge (and any potentially incriminating data) can be quickly removed and destroyed (burn it, smash it with a large heavy object, insert it into a bulk eraser) or taken to a secure location for storage. Also, this type of drive provides an excellent place to put swap files, which have an annoying tendency to pick up sensitive data. That is less of a problem if you can remove the cartridge and store it in a secure location when not processing sensitive data. Jonathan Wienke

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test ignore
by uunet!in2.uu.net!gatech!newsfeed.internetmci.com!solaris.cc.vt.edu!news.genie.net!usenet＠warwick.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

able the workers to protect their immediate interests against the employers. In addition to organizing industrially, the workers will need a political party to spread the idea of social ownership, and to gain the supprt of the majority at the polls. When this is achieved, the workers will assume control of their workplaces, and manage them democratically through their New Unions. An elected Congress of delegates from each industry will plan and manage the national economy, and will replace the present political Congress as the nation's government. New Unionist 621 W. Lake St., Suite 210 Minneapolis, MN 55408 nup(a)delphi.com

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Re: Jump Start ecash With IPhone
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:37 AM 3/6/96 -0800, Jim McCoy wrote: >On another related note the IRS is getting somewhat concerned >about the opportunities the Internet offers people to avoid taxes >according to the Treasury department's international-tax counsel. The >government will "maintain [tax] toll booths on the information superhighway." >(WSJ, 3/6/96) The note in the WSJ's regular Wednesday "Tax Report" column specified that the IRS was most concerned about the possibility that electronic payment systems could lead to "extensive transactions outside of normal banking channels." As well they might worry. "When money is data, data switches are money switches." Talking about toll booths is easier than erecting them on a system built by consensus. I can see the ETF meeting when the Service presents its proposal. And as for those who say that the ETF will be replaced by the 'Big Boys' now that the Net is a hot item, I say so what. We can have our own net running on any infrastructure. What counts is how many hosts run the protocols not who wrote the protocols. And how successful will the Service be in convincing lots of hosts to run its new and improved Simple Tax Collection Protocol (STCP)? DCF

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Re: NYT login
by Phillip M. Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Just Rich wrote: > > On Sun, 3 Mar 1996 hallam(a)w3.org wrote: > > > >The tobacco companies need a forum. And they are used to spending big > > >bucks on sponsoring things. > > > > That misses the point. There is no shortage of potential sponsors. > > What these people are asking me is "how much business will Web > > advertising create for me". > > This misses another point. The question was, how do *we* pay for this > stuff (emphasis mine). > > If someone develops a reasonably easy-to-use and reasonably secure digital > cash micropayment system, then I would be happy to pay to read the New > York Times on the Web. I would rather they were dependent on my money than > R.J. Reynold's. I am attempting to support the largest number of models possible. Micropayments is only one model, I have an internet draft out describing a scheme based on a suggestion by Ron. I don't think I should choose how people will raise revenue. I don't think that the NYT will want to be associated with cancer sticks in any case. There are plenty of sponsors such as IBM, Intel etc who will be happy to pay cash for a Web site ad, provided it makes them money. Phill - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMTuaOCoZzwIn1bdtAQF5DQGAsdUiYsmP0EwHZUWA2ijeAZf/pBoqFtzR VDYY2760gf0QLqNBDbLHo6LnJp7T4b5h =vjES -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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What's anyone know about Teledyne Electronic Technologies?
by Mark Aldrich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Teledyne (TET) is out marketing a "new" crypto system as a competitor against DES and what TET calls "linear" cryptosystems. They are claiming a non-linear approach in which (as best I can tell) they are permuting the s-boxes and using 4 bit/16 entry substitution tables. They are also asserting that these "key generated substitution tables and inter-round permutations" are supported by "nonlinear orthomorphic mappings generated from arbitrary key" (and that this is patented) and "row-complete Latin Squares generated from an arbitrary key" (and that this is also patented). The claimed benefits include being invulnerable to differential and "linear" cryptanalysis, no linear key/data interaction to hide, that this results in the tables and permutations being "transient/secret," and that fewer rounds are needed (fewer than what, I don't know) to attain "resistance to cryptanalysis." If there's any c'punks who'd care to comment on these notions, I'd very much appreciate the feedback. Also, if anyone's actually seen the algorithm, reviewed it, or knows of published material about these techniques, I'd also appreciate seeing those posted. Of course, any feedback from existing customers of TET would also be great. Thanks! ------------------------------------------------------------------------- |So, I went walking through the street. |Mark Aldrich | |I saw you strung up in a tree. |GRCI INFOSEC Engineering | |A woman knelt there, said to me, |maldrich(a)grci.com | |Hold your tongue, man, hold your tongue. |MAldrich(a)dockmaster.ncsc.mil | |_______________________________________________________________________| |The author is PGP Empowered. Public key at: finger maldrich(a)grci.com | | The opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the author | | and my employer gets no credit for them whatsoever. | -------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Bombings, Surveillance, and Free Societies
by Phillip M. Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Timothy C. May wrote: >The Red Brigade in Italy sought a fascist crackdown, and > the "strategy of tension" is common. (And even revolutionists of crypto > anarchist persuasion often think laws like the CDA are good in the long > run, by undermining respect for authority and triggering more extreme > reactions....) It is important to note in this regard that the worst bombing in Italy was the Bologna station bombing, now decisively linked to right wing facist groups the involvment in which of ex-prime minister Adreotti is shortly to be examined in a criminal trial. The point being that the extreemists play into each others hands. > -- expect increased support for a "New World Order" to restrict > non-governmental access to strong crypto (via key escrow measures) This is pretty much a diversion. Terrorist groups have been using encryption since long before PGP arrived. > -- expect the various laws about "talking about explosives on the Net" to > be used to clamp down on various fringe groups Hang on here, some of those groups are actively conspiring to commit terrorist acts. If someone sends a message saying "lets plant a bomb under a federal building, that will show them" I'm not worried if the govt. decides to arrest a few people. There is a border between free speech and conspiracy to murder which some people have crossed. > -- expect "national security" to become a bigger part of the political debate Possibly. > -- expect more and bigger bombings, as the groups thinking about bombings > see how productive they are in accomplishing policy goals (such as ending > peace talks, triggering police state actions, etc.) The IRA has not got very far after 25 years or terrorism. The civil rights movement which the IRA usurped achieved much more in the five years before the IRA started killing people. Had it not been for the IRA there would probably have been a settlement by now. The same goes for Israel where the PLO only gained a partial settlement after giving up the terrorism. > I predict that it will take about 5 more major bombings in European and > American cities to trigger substantive changes in laws. Generally it takes two. The legislation is written after the first and then staled until being passed on the second. There is a usefull procedure in the UK parliament which causes bills to expire at the end of each session. Note that on the CDA there was the behaviour of certain people deliberately seeking to create an issue. The CDA was to a large extent the work of one Marty Rimm and his fellow conspirators. > Personally, while I feel sorry for the dead in Israel, I think anyone who > moves to a small desert state surrounded on all sides by Arabs who want > their land back is asking for trouble. A point to consider is that there are many Isralis born in Israel who have no other home. These people did not ask to be born in the middle of a desert state. As with the Irish problem it is easy to solve if one could change the past. The fundamental problem being that the wrong side won at Hastings. Phill - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMTuYpioZzwIn1bdtAQEkMQF+I1lUyGbzdScAyYqtSDLPGuX4qsCTKcmM Plfdv25rn9u8M6squAw5xfgaQu8au1Ce =9xbY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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No Subject
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(Lots of stuff deleted) >I attended last weeks "Information, National Policies, and International >Infrastructure" Symposium at Harvard Law School, organized by the Global >Information Infrastructure Commission, the Kennedy School and the >Institute for Information Technology Law & Policy of Harvard Law School. >During the presentation by Paul Strassmann, National Defense University >and William Marlow, Science Applications International Corporation, >entitled "Anonymous Remailers as Risk-Free International Infoterrorists" >the questions was raised from audience (Professor Chaarles Nesson, >Harvard LAw School) - in a rather extended debate - whether the CIA and >similar government agencies are involved in running anonymous remailers >as this would be a perfect target to scan possibly illegal messages. >Both presenters explicitly acknowledged that a number of anonymous >remnailers in the US are run by government agencies scanning traffic. >Marlow said that the government runs at least a dozen remailers and that >the most popular remailers in France and Germany are run by the >respective government agencies in these countries. In addition they >mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break >encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested >to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024 >bit keys. >I ask Marlos afterwards if these comments were off or on record, he >paused then said that he can be quoted. >So I thought I pass that on. It seems interesting enough, don't you >think? (more stuff deleted) I don't know about everyone else, but I consider this, if true, to be a MAJOR worry. It never ceases to amaze me how lightly the government takes lying to the people. Unfortunately I don't have the contacts or resources to do any further investigation, I hope this thread is resolved one way or another soon. nobody@unimportant

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Newest CACM and Key Escrow
by Joseph M. Reagle Jr. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The newest Communications of the ACM (March 90) is entitled "How to Use Key Escrow." I haven't read it yet, but on a quick glance, I don't see some of the newer schemes I've heard of, but there is an article "taxonomy of key escrow encryption systems" by Denning and Branstad -- Which does briefly mention of the Lotus scheme and some of the other published schemes that I was thinking of. _______________________ Regards, 8146th member of the CIEC coalition Joseph Reagle http://farnsworth.mit.edu/~reagle/home.html reagle(a)mit.edu 0C 69 D4 E8 F2 70 24 33 B4 5E 5E EC 35 E6 FB 88

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Re: TET cryptosystem
by B. Schneier 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

************************************************************************* This is a temporary e-mail address; I am in Cambridge until 12 March. Continue to send mail to schneier(a)counterpane.com; it forwards by itself. ************************************************************************* > Teledyne (TET) is out marketing a "new" crypto system as a > competitor against DES and what TET calls "linear" cryptosystems. > They are claiming a non-linear approach in which (as best I can > tell) they are permuting the s-boxes and using 4 bit/16 entry > substitution tables. > > They are also asserting that these "key generated substitution > tables and inter-round permutations" are supported by "nonlinear > orthomorphic mappings generated from arbitrary key" (and that this > is patented) and "row-complete Latin Squares generated from an > arbitrary key" (and that this is also patented). > > The claimed benefits include being invulnerable to differential and > "linear" cryptanalysis, no linear key/data interaction to hide, > that this results in the tables and permutations being > "transient/secret," and that fewer rounds are needed (fewer than > what, I don't know) to attain "resistance to cryptanalysis." This explanation is so laced with nonsensical buzzwords that the algorithm is probably absolute nonsense. I can't tell you (because of NDAs) how many times I've seen proprietary algorithms that make all sorts of grandeose claims of security and are actually terrible. Bruce ************************************************************************** * Bruce Schneier * Counterpane Systems For a good prime, call 391581 * 2^216193 - 1 * schneier(a)counterpane.com **************************************************************************

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Re: What's anyone know about Teledyne Electronic Technologies?
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:42 AM 3/7/96 -0500, you wrote: >>Teledyne (TET) is out marketing a "new" crypto system as a competitor >>against DES and what TET calls "linear" cryptosystems. They are claiming >>a non-linear approach in which (as best I can tell) they are permuting >>the s-boxes and using 4 bit/16 entry substitution tables. > > A couple of points: 1. DES is nonlinear and (I believe) provably not a group; that TET is alluding to DES being linear casts grave doubt. If their S-Box "permutes" I'd also be concerned! >Dont trust it unless you are a good cryptanalyst and have a copy of the >source code. Most commercial crypto products are crap. > >Jonathan Wienke > 2. Most NEW UNPROVEN CRYPTOSYSTEMS are crap, not crypto products. That's too strong an assertion. Plenty of commercial crypto products(and perhaps "most" which in significant commercial disctribution) are based on strong DES/RSA, etc. proven technologies.

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Re: Anonymous remailers and Leahy bill
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 10:26 AM 3/7/96 -0500, A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security wrote: > >>I am assuming they fix the obvious error in the phrasing above. > >Until they do, we can only guess at the intent. > >>"Thanks for the use of your nifty anonymous remailer. Under a different >>name, I intend to use this remailer (along with others) to transmit child >>pornography, plot terrorism, and do all of my drug deals. You've made my >>life so much more secure!" > >At this point, Bob has no choice other than to reply with: "I assume you are >joking however since what you have stated is in violation of numerous laws, >we have no choice other than to disable your account. If we find that >illegal acts have been committed using this remailer, we will have no choice >other than to report such actions." Wouldn't help "Bob" in the least. And you didn't read what I wrote very carefully, either: Notice that I said, "under a different name." In other words, the source of the note does not identify the user name under which the illegal activity is promised to occur. Cancelling this particular fellow's account does NOTHING to prevent the illegal activity from occurring by other, unidentified users, and "Bob" knows it. Moreover, such a statement (by Bob) would be considered deliberately ineffective: Any anonymous encrypted remailer operator is perfectly aware that his remailer can be used for illegal purposes without him ever finding out. If the law was written carefully enough, that mere knowledge would make it a crime to continue to operate that remailer unless its use could be monitored and verified to be legal. Technically, encryption would not be illegal, but using encryption would open one up to harrassment by government. This would become a de-facto ban, at least for whoever was on the government's "shit list" that week. >Anyone stupid enough to make a statement like this deserves to be disabled. Anyone stupid enough to misinterpret what I clearly wrote above deserves to be lambasted. >>At that point, Bob is GUILTY of violation of the Leahy bill, because his >>encrypted anonymous remailer: > >No, if Bob were to follow the above scenario, he would already be guilty of >terminal stupidity. Poor response, and inaccurate too. >>So maybe the word gets out, occasionally. At that point, usage of anonymous >>remailers declines, and people willing to risk operating one declines. A >>few come up which are run by the Feds, which log anyone who attempts to use >>it... > >Declines ? They are only protection from amateurs. Do you really not >believe that everything in and out of anon.penet.fi & others is not >monitored *at the ISP/carrier level* ? I am well aware of the possibilities. But you just destroyed your own argument: If the government is already capable of tracing such messages, and is doing so, it is presumably doing so illegally, or this tracing SHOULD be illegal. If the government is already doing that, then we'd damn well look VERY carefully at any new bills that are proposed to regulate encryption, because we have far more to fear from them than they currently let on. > Warmly, > Padgett I'm disgusted by your "Warmly, Padgett." While I don't sympathize with their motivations, the "red-hunters" of the early 1950's had a term, "pink" to describe a person who was unduly sympathetic to the Communist cause: A person who was just a bit too cozy with their philosophy. Not quite "red," but... In the 1990's encryption debates, you're a bit too "pink" on the pro-government side for me. With generous amounts of disgust, Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com .....Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMT8axfqHVDBboB2dAQHp5AP5AeJ8dPNy9Hkbvyrk6QD/pIIEz7ZeLK3l V2O7zD9Fsvtb6KfIlczX6wpWXOM3RTvgItASg8yNnibLwT37vCKkrpkWKujjIUKb CXGZPZaHGMAAOc9+nU5OzjsAS4IyFuycOlP5z7PlpEap9xo4DlQFJwpgFxHeu53E B3277PHwak4= =5Ff6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Square pegs in round holes, matchmaking, corporate mailservers
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Dimitris Tsapakidis <dimitrt(a)dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk> wrote: >Bob must find out whether Alice has declared (commited) her interest >in him, if and only if he has declared (commited) his interest in her. >Before he does so, he can at most know that a girl is interested in him. >Another description: Bob and Alice can have a date if they both commit >to each other. If only one commits, nobody will ever find out about it. To avoid a trusted intermediary, the problem can be thought of as a secure multi-party communication problem with private inputs, which is much studied in the literature. The easiest formulation is pairwise: Alice and Bob mutually engage in the calculation of "Alice loves Bob" AND "Bob loves Alice". Each inputs his feelings as an input bit, and the output will be true only if they have mutual feelings. Each pair of potential lovers would then go through the protocol with each other. This problem is solved in "Multiparty Computations Ensuring Privacy of Each Party's Input and Correctness of the Result", by Chaum, Damgard, and van de Graaf, in the proceedings of the Crypto 87 conference. They even discuss this application directly: "Note that this AND-gate computation, where both parties want to hide their input from each other, has a meaningful application: consider the situation where Alice and Bob have just met, and each considers dating the other. Neither wishes to lose face in the following sense: if Alice wants a date but Bob doesn't, Alice does not want to let Bob know that she wanted the date. And the same holds for Bob. In other words: if a party does not want the date it does not find out the other party's decision." The solution is reasonably practical, involving scrambled truth tables and bit commitments, and is related to some of Chaum's work on zero-knowledge. The paper is a bit theoretical and hard to read, though. I can write up the protocol if anyone is interested. Hal -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQBVAwUBMT8p4RnMLJtOy9MBAQHUAQIAv6tTbhLvTnbxX+7BlSIQcxCBfF+FhL1E mR57Ks8Rklg2PxEotSl9BDEtKWVFoqXg8UdNhsj6d3ASFzdQe0B6Hg== =tCch -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Square pegs in round holes, matchmaking, corporate mailservers
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: Bill Stewart <stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com> > [>>Dimitris Tsapakidis <dimitrt(a)dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk> wrote:] > > >Bob must find out whether Alice has declared (commited) her interest > > >in him, if and only if he has declared (commited) his interest in her. > > >Before he does so, he can at most know that a girl is interested in him. > > >Another description: Bob and Alice can have a date if they both commit > > >to each other. If only one commits, nobody will ever find out about it. > > >- T is the trusted third party. > [Padgett contribution elided] > Oh, that would work fine. Let a, b, and t be Alice, Bob, and Trent's secret DH > keys, and g and p be the generator and prime (all math below is mod p.) > If Bob wants to talk to Alice, he sends Trent B = g**b, marked "For Alice", > optionally anonymously. Trent calculates X = B**t == g**bt, and sends it to > Alice. > Alice calculates K = X**a == g**bat, calculates H = Hash(K) and > posts it anonymously, or sends it to Trent to post or mail to Bob. > If Alice wants to talk to Bob, she calculates A = g**a mod p, > sends it to Trent, optionally anonymously, marked "For Bob". > Trent calculates Y = A**t == g**at , and sends it to Bob. > Bob calculates K' = Y**b == g**abt, calculates H' = Hash(K') and > notices that it's the same as the H he pulled off the net earlier. > Bob says "Oh, wow! Alice wants to talk to me!", encrypts some lame drivel > of a message M with key K'==K, and mails it to Alice if he knows her address > or posts it with Subject: H', which Alice receives. I don't think this satisfies the requirements. Once Bob calculates H' and sees that it matches H, he knows that Alice likes him, but Alice doesn't know that he likes her. The whole point of the protocol was to be fair. Bob must only learn that Alice likes him if Alice is guaranteed to learn that he likes her. I have posted an alternate solution in another message. Hal

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CDT on crypto bills
by Declan B. McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- Date: Tue, 5 Mar 1996 23:12:49 +0100 To: "Declan B. McCullagh" <declan+(a)CMU.EDU> From: jseiger(a)cdt.org (Jonah Seiger) Subject: Re: NYT: Encryption compromise bill introduced Cc: Fight Censorship Mailing List <fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu>, jim(a)RSA.COM If you read our statement, you will see that we agree completely with EFF & Jim that the new crime is unnecessary and needs to be addressed. As for the second issue, I understand EFF's concerns, and this is definitely an issue that needs further clarification and discussion. But you should note that the bills do not in any way impose key escrow (and only the Senate bill contains these provisions anyway). In fact,the legislation does precisely the opposite in two ways: 1. The bill explicitly affirms the rights of Americans to use any form of cryptography they choose domestically. 2. By directly attacking export controls, the legislation undermines the only lever the Administration has in imposing Clipper and Clipper II. The Clipper and Clipper II policies are based on the assumption that the market in most cases will support only one version of a particular crypto application. By encouraging only the export of cyrpto w/key escrow mechanisms, the Administration believes that they can force the domestic market to adopt escrow as well. This has not worked yet, but it *has* forced a stalemate that has led to a very little privacy and security for the Net. By undermining the only leverage the Administration has for left to impose key escrow domestically (beyond an explicit effort to ban it outright), these bills effectively remove the current threat of a government imposed domestic escrow crypto policy, and allow the market for strong cryptography to flourish. So again, CDT believes that this legislation represents the best opportunity we have had yet to provide the Internet with the privacy protections and security it desperately needs. There are most certainly areas that we would like to see changed and/or clarified, but that should not overshadow the important opportunity these bills represent. Jonah >Thanks for the clarification, Jonah. I agree the bill will undercut >Clipper II, but I share the concerns outlined in the EFF statement, >which says the bill: > > * Makes it a new crime to "use encryption to obstruct justice", with > 5-10 year sentences, plus fines. In plain language, this is a > extra criminal charge that can be applied when police are frustrated > in an investigation but happen to catch someone breaking the law in > some other way. > > * Provides a legal infrastructure for key escrow, a system in which > all users' keys are copied to permit government access. > >Jim Bidzos is the CEO of RSA Data Security, and he supports Leahy's >bill. His mail is attached below. > >-Declan > >---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- > >Date: Tue, 5 Mar 96 13:26:39 PST >From: jim(a)RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos) >Message-Id: <9603052126.AA19534(a)RSA.COM> >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > > >I'm in favor of the Bill because it specifically prevents, by law, the >US Govt from mandating key escrow. Also because it would, by law, >force export control of crypto out of the Dept. of State and into the >Dept. of Commerce, effectively allowing any crypto used in the US and >"widely available" to be exported. (The bill does a few other things. >One, it provides for criminal penalties for key holders who abuse >their role as an escrow agent, assuming anyone *chose* to use key >escrow. Second, it makes the use of encryption -any encryption- a >crime if used in the commission of or support of any criminal >activity. I think the bill would be better off without these >provisions, but I suspect this is an attempt to give the >administration something.) > >I anticipate that the Administration, led by the intelligence and law >enforcement interests, will vigorously lobby against this bill... -- Jonah Seiger, Policy Analyst Center For Democracy and Technology <jseiger(a)cdt.org> 1634 Eye Street NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 PGP key via finger (v) +1.202.637.9800 http://www.cdt.org/ (f) +1.202.637.0968 http://www.cdt.org/homes/jseiger.html

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- From: shabbir(a)vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar) To: Stanton McCandlish <mech(a)eff.org> cc: declan+(a)cmu.edu (Declan B. McCullagh), fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu, jim(a)rsa.com Subject: Re: NYT: Encryption compromise bill introduced Date: Wed, 06 Mar 1996 15:14:01 -0500 Sender: shabbir(a)panix.com The Leahy bill is actually much better than Stanton lets on. Take a look at it, it affirms Americans' right to choose whatever algorithm or technique they'd like, as well as takes great pains to go on record to say that Congress treaded very carefully to preserve Americans' right to not use key escrow algorithms, and if they did, not to use escrow agents. You don't get much more of a guarantee than that. Regardless of the ulterior motives of the White House, key escrow programs are still voluntary as read on the books. The best we can write into a law is to have our rights reaffirmed. Leahy has given this to us in spades. Let's not soft-pedal this legislation. Leahy and Goodlatte are going head to head with the White House to undermine the strongarm export tactics of Clipper and Son of Clipper. They've stuck their necks out for us, we need to back them up. Just wait until the White House starts to act in reaction to this. It's not going to be pretty.... -Shabbir J. Safdar * Online Representative * Voters Telecomm. Watch (VTW) http://www.vtw.org/ * Defending Your Rights In Cyberspace Stanton McCandlish writes: >> Date: Tue, 5 Mar 96 13:26:39 PST >> From: jim(a)RSA.COM (Jim Bidzos) >> Message-Id: <9603052126.AA19534(a)RSA.COM> >> Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >> >> >> I'm in favor of the Bill because it specifically prevents, by law, the >> US Govt from mandating key escrow. > >This is only true of the Goodlatte bill. The Leahy bill just explicitly >does not mandate GAK. Goodlattes does this, and goes further, preventing >the Administration from doing so. > >Needless to say, we'd like to see the two bills merged, and the better >features of each kept. > >> I anticipate that the Administration, led by the intelligence and law >> enforcement interests, will vigorously lobby against this bill... > >Right. We don't expect it to pass, but it could be an important step in >raising the issues. > > >-- ><HTML><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/~mech/"> Stanton McCandlish ></A><HR><A HREF="mailto:mech@eff.org"> mech(a)eff.org ></A><P><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/"> Electronic Frontier Foundation ></A><P> Online Activist </HTML>

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Re: (Fwd) Gov't run anon servers
by mccoy＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hal Finney writes: [...regarding mixmaster remailer passwords...] > >The other suggestion that was made here, that the operator would have to >manually type in the pass phrase every time the computer rebooted [...] >However it would probably not be a practical method of operation given >the reliability of at least the Unix operating systems that I am familiar >with. Then you need to start running PC unix systems which were last written or updated during this decade. Keeping a unix system running, _as long as it is running a limited subset of application programs_, is a trivial task in Linux, BSD/OS, FreeBSD, and others. I routinely have server systems which perform specific tasks (e.g. smtp mail services, DNS, etc.) with uptimes of 5-6 months; there is no reason why a host serving as a remailer should not be able to be as reliable. > And even then the information is in memory. An attacker who could >gain root privileges (and let's not pretend that the NSA can't do that) >can dump memory and later comb it for the key information. > "Security is economics" -E. Hughes The point is not to make a system which is absolutely, positively, no doubt about it, secure against any attacker. If cypherpunks could do this they would be working for defense contractors and others who make certified systems. The objective is to make a system which is difficult to attack, one which costs the attacker time/money. After securing a host against the obvious attacks one can turn to the esoteric ones such as you present: move the key to kernel memory and remove tools for accessing or manipulating that area, run the memory-space encrypted and do not let it dump the contents to disk, etc. Systems which have been certified to high Orange book levels already exist, so there are obviously solutions to the problems you present. The tools and tricks of these systems just need to be migrated into systems which people actually use. Then remember that remailers gain strength in numbers. The more remailers you chain your message through the better your chances of passing through a single node which is not compromised, at which point your message has been "mixed." As long as it is easier for someone to create new remailers than to break existing remailers we are winning. >My point remains that strong keys are pointless for remailers which run >on Unix systems connected to the net. "Insisting on perfect security is for people who do not have the balls to live in the real world" -paraphrased from M. Shaefer You give far too much credit to the potential attackers. One advantage that unix systems connected to the net have over your hypothetical PC at home is the advantage of persistence, what is the point of running a remailer if it is never up, or only up when you need to use it? Traffic analysis of that particular node becomes a pretty easy task :) The unix hosts running remailers also have the advantage in that they have been subjected to attack for quite a while now and most of the obvious problems (and some of the non-obvious problems) have been fixed. A strong key on such a host is better than a weak key, so why not make systems as strong as you can? The only way to have a completely secure computer is to encase it in concrete, cut any network connections, and drop it into the ocean; OTOH the only thing you have created in this case is a fairly unique boat anchor. You are beginning to sound like the people who claim that the NSA can crack any encryption system, not because they have any proof but just because they extrapolate their limited knowledge into the unknown and mix in a bit of paranoia. [...] >Recall that my original comments were in connection with the claim that >the government was running most of the remailers. As I said, I still >think that is absurd when it would be so much easier to simply steal >their keys. But the point is that it is _not_ easier to steal the keys. It is much easier to put up a remailer than to attack an existing remailer, this is why the remailer system is winning the battle of security economics. By putting up its own remailers a potential attacker probabalistically diminishes the number of systems which they must break. jim

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[In reply to Shabbir's message. -Declan] ---------- Forwarded message begins here ---------- From: Stanton McCandlish <mech(a)eff.org> Message-Id: <199603062155.NAA22301(a)eff.org> Subject: Re: NYT: Encryption compromise bill introduced To: shabbir(a)vtw.org (Shabbir J. Safdar) Date: Wed, 6 Mar 1996 13:55:07 -0800 (PST) Cc: declan+(a)cmu.edu, fight-censorship+(a)andrew.cmu.edu, jim(a)rsa.com In-Reply-To: <199603062014.PAA02169(a)panix4.panix.com> from "Shabbir J. Safdar" at Mar 6, 96 03:14:01 pm > The Leahy bill is actually much better than Stanton lets on. Take a > look at it, it affirms Americans' right to choose whatever algorithm or > technique they'd like, as well as takes great pains to go on record to > say that Congress treaded very carefully to preserve Americans' right > to not use key escrow algorithms, and if they did, not to use escrow > agents. You don't get much more of a guarantee than that. Sure you do: Goodlatte's more direct prohibition on the Exec. branch mandating Key Escrow. What's the problem here? We know Goodlatte's version, on this provision at very least, is better. Why can't we just agree that it is, and support that? Goodlatte's bill isn't competing with Leahy's, they were introduced simultaneously in different chambers, and are intended to get the same message across. I can't see a problem with saying "we like this particular phrasing better, let's have it in both versions." The entire point of all this is to have the same bill on both sides of Congress anyway. It can either happen early, or (on the off chance it ever gets that far) in conference committee. Here we have a large say. In conf. cmte. we have almost no say. Again, what's the problem? What are we arguing about? > Regardless of the ulterior motives of the White House, key escrow > programs are still voluntary as read on the books. The best we can > write into a law is to have our rights reaffirmed. Leahy has given > this to us in spades. I disagree. A better thing we can write into law is to simultanously have rights reaffirmed, and send a more direct message to the Admin that it cannot tread here. > Let's not soft-pedal this legislation. Let's not hard sell flawed parts of it, when fixes are not just available but already introduced as "live" legislation. > Leahy and Goodlatte are going > head to head with the White House to undermine the strongarm export > tactics of Clipper and Son of Clipper. They've stuck their necks out for > us, we need to back them up. Certainly. > Just wait until the White House starts to act in reaction to this. It's > not going to be pretty.... No kidding. I expect either an attempt to mandate escrow, a worsening of the export controls, and/or an all-out assault on American's rights to encrypt at all, or without some kind of worse-than-GAK registry or licensing. If not all of the above. -- <HTML><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/~mech/"> Stanton McCandlish </A><HR><A HREF="mailto:mech@eff.org"> mech(a)eff.org </A><P><A HREF="http://www.eff.org/"> Electronic Frontier Foundation </A><P> Online Activist </HTML>

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Re: Truelly Random Numbers
by Mutant Rob 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mark Allyn 206-860-9454 wrote: [..] > Take a piece of non conducting board, say about six by six > feet. Put electrodes on it; say a pair of electrodes every > quarter inch or so across and down. > > Each pair of electrodes would be connected to logic so that > it generates a unique number. When the electrodes are shorted, > the number would be generated. Quite elaborate. And unless you live in a rainy part of the world, not very useful. Better off using those contraptions where little steel balls fall around the electrodes. There's some entropy there... but still, it's too elaborate for RNG generation. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMTooTyoZzwIn1bdtAQFXIwF/cjzvAfNJMOn9Pw6VSztPKCHUc/dmuwZ1 bOAEKnlQmwhRKOxpNmBr+EpM3zoRIWWP =8nb+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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DoubleSpeak
by A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> In addition they >mentioned that the NSA has successfully developed systems to break >encrypted messages below 1000 bit of key length and strongly suggested >to use at least 1024 bit keys. They said that they semselves use 1024 >bit keys. Is there anyone her who has *not* "developed systems to break encrypted messages" ? One is called brute force and can run on any PC. The two pieces missing from the statement is the *cost* and *time* involved in breaking keys of X length & would suspect the algorithm might have something to do with the answer. (Can generate a LOASDR key of 1024 bits real easily, breaks just as fast). I use a PGP key of 1024 bits simply because I am too lazy to go to 2048 so why was this turkey posted twice ? Lacking meaningful parameters, it does not really say anything. Warmly, Padgett

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thu, 7 Mar 1996, cjs wrote: > > > > BTW, did you hear that IO got on the SurfWatch "bad list" because there > > were more than 25 complaints about objectionable material in the io.com > > domain. (Apparently, when SurfWatch hears more than 25 complaints > > against a particular domain, the just deny access to the whole domain > > rather than particular URLs.) > > So.. whats the number to call? Microsoft has material on their site I > object too. =) And let's not forget the really objectionable stuff at http://www.buchanan.org/pjbindex.html (the Buchanan Campaign web site). ------------------------------------------------------------------------- | Liberty is truly dead |Mark Aldrich | | when the slaves are willing |GRCI INFOSEC Engineering | | to forge their own chains. |maldrich(a)grci.com | | STOP THE CDA NOW! |MAldrich(a)dockmaster.ncsc.mil | |_______________________________________________________________________| |The author is PGP Empowered. Public key at: finger maldrich(a)grci.com | | The opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the author | | and my employer gets no credit for them whatsoever. | -------------------------------------------------------------------------

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No Subject
by Gallicchio, Florindo 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Most humble apologies from a lurker for posting this question to the whole list. I couldn't find the reference in the archives... About a month or two ago, someone posted some information on that little piece of code attached to MS Mail messages alongside the file attachment. I need to find out the vulnerabilities of that code, such as susceptibility to virus, spoof, attack, etc. Not crypto related, but important to me nonetheless. Please send responses to me via e-mail. Thanks in advance. Florindo Gallicchio fgallicc(a)ncsus.jnj.com "I don't speak for my company yadda yadda yadda..."

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Re: PGP backdoor? (No, I'm not paranoid.)
by David Weiss 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jf_avon(a)citenet.net wrote: >perry(a)piermont.com wrote: >> [...] >>Your informant is taking extremely good drugs. You should find out who >>his connection is should you want to get any. >> >>Perry > >Dear Perry, > [interesting statement of why nothing one hears should ever be discounted] > >So, why waste bandwith with a post that apparently mainly seems to be aimed >at dismissing somebody but brings *absolutely no* new knowledge to >the discussion? Please, next time, post privately. Sure it does; Perry's opinion. And what that is worth, depends on the reader's opinion of Perry. >Funny jokes are, IMHO, welcome because they have some life-enhancing value. > >So please, at least be funny... I thought it was pretty funny (more so than your post, anyway). David (I feel another really silly and pointless thread starting...)

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No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This came from Associated Press (27th Feb) : ============================================================================ Europe pushes Asian weapons sales KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia - Russia is doing it. So are Britain, France, Germany and Spain. Even neutral Sweden has joined the race to sell warplanes, missiles, tanks and warships for Asia's rapidly expanding arsenals. The Europeans, fighting an uphill battle against dominant U.S. competitors, are offering what the Americans sometimes won't - the newest, deadliest technology with no political strings attached. While post-Cold War budget cutting devastated the arms trade in the rest of the world, military spending in Asia is still rising. >From 1991 to 1994, Asian sales by Britain, France, Germany and Italy totaled $3.4 billion - a 30% increase over their sales in the 1987-1990 period, according to figures compiled by economist Digby Waller of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London. By contrast, American weapons sales in the region were $5.4 billion in 1991-1994, a 7% decline from the previous three-year period. Despite widespread agreement that U.S. weapons makers are technologically superior, European producers have signed a flurry of deals with nearly every Asian country. According to military analysts, buyers were attracted by Europe's lower prices, equipment - like submarines - that the United States doesn't sell and - perhaps most important - the chance to avoid becoming dependent on American suppliers in case the United States cuts back future arms exports. In one of the most powerful signs of the Asian market's allure, Russia tossed out ideological considerations in favor of cash, selling its former Chinese rivals high-performance Sukhoi 27 jet fighters and the technology to make more. Thailand bought an aircraft carrier from Spain. Taiwan bought six frigates and 50 fighter jets from France. South Korea bought three German cruisers and Malaysia bought two British frigates. Sweden sold diesel-electric submarines to Thailand and Singapore. The United States no longer manufactures such vessels, partly in an attempt to halt their proliferation. Such submarines are very quiet and almost impossible to detect, even with sophisticated equipment. Some military analysts argue the unprecedented weapons buildup will ignite an arms race in a region crisscrossed by territorial disputes. They point to the growing military might of Japan, China and India and a series of smoldering regional disputes, including those between Taiwan and China and between North and South Korea. Asian governments counter that they're entitled to defend their territory. "It is wrong to see the purchase of defense equipment by countries in the region as an arms race,'' Singapore's defense minister, Tony Tan, said in a TV interview in January. "We and our ... neighbors are proceeding with plans to modernize our armed forces, now that our economies have grown and we have the resources to pay for better weapons and equipment.'' The biggest potential source of conflict in the region is China's feud with its Southeast Asian neighbors over oil and gas riches in the South China Sea. China has declared the entire region its territory, and sent warships to enforce the claim. While European governments try not to fuel arms races, they may sell to buyers who are refused American weapons for political reasons, said Paul Beaver, a military analyst for Jane's Information Group. Beaver pointed to the example of Britain's $35 billion deal to supply Tornado fighters and other weapons to Saudi Arabia after the United States balked at selling warplanes that could be used to attack Israel. "That has been seen by the Muslim countries in Southeast Asia as a strong sign that Britain doesn't attach the same political conditions to its sales as the United States does,'' he said in a telephone interview from London. Thailand wants to buy advanced American AMRAAM missiles to arm its new F-18 fighters. But because no other country in the region has a missile that sophisticated, the Clinton administration is hesitating for fear of sparking competition among Thailand's neighbors to match it. "If the United States did not want to sell AMRAAM missiles to Thailand, I wouldn't be surprised if France would be willing to sell a similar missile,'' said Pieter Wezeman, a researcher for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Asian governments also appear to be buying European weapons to diversify their arsenals in case Washington shuts off their supply. "The United States has shown several times that they don't want to sell weapons to everyone, and so at any moment they might start an embargo,'' Wezeman said. In one of the region's biggest recent sales, Taiwan bought 210 fighter jets, splitting the order between French Mirage-2000s and U.S.-made F-16s after Washington first refused to sell and then approved fewer planes than Taiwan wanted. Pakistan, blocked by U.S. law from buying F-16s because of evidence it has built nuclear weapons, is reported to be shopping for French or Russian warplanes to fill the gap. By The Associated Press ============================================================================= no_one@unimportant.

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No Subject
by owner-cypherpunks＠toad.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Shostack <adam(a)homeport.org> mentioned: > The big problem with this is that net phones can be subject to > delay & drop out, and I don't want to deal with that when I'm talking > on the phone. Adam, Yes, and that's good news. We can claim, while we are building up our infrastructure, that we have a low-quality service that cannot compete with the current LD carriers. Meanwhile, several companies and committed enthusiasts are solving IPhone's technological problems. Also, ATM and other high-bandwidth technologies that the LD carriers are deploying can bring them profits when IPhone users request the _fast_ Internet. But the real money is in the billing system. And an efficient, decentralized ecash infrastructure will change the world. A cheap telephone-to-telephone long distance and international voice service, which people do want to buy, could provide the cash flow to jump start it. CW

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