December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Microsoft to digitally certify other manufacturers' code?
by Rich Graves 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is old news, but I don't remember it being brought up. This is interesting in light of recent discussions regarding the CryptoAPI, the uncertainty of Microsoft's support for Java (it won't be in Internet Explorer 3.0, but Visual Basic will), and Microsoft's Internet Developers' conference scheduled for mid-March. One of a set of press releases on http://www.microsoft.com/internet/ I thought I remembered seeing an announcement of Microsoft's plans to license Java there before, but it's not there. I know they've revised press releases without changing the date before (most notably the October 20th SMB security bug acknowledgement). > [Microsoft] > Microsoft Announces Internet Code Safety Initiative > Microsoft Previews Internet Digital Signature Initiative to 150 ISVs > > REDMOND, Wash. - Dec. 7, 1995 -At the Internet Control Developers' > Workshop on December 6, Microsoft Corporation proposed to the top > 150 software companies in the world, an Internet digital signature > initiative which provides a safer environment for executable code on > the Internet. To address concerns about potentially malicious code > or viruses, this technology will enable users to verify that a > program's integrity is free of third-party tampering. Browsers such > as Microsoft Internet Explorer will be equipped with the ability to > automatically download applications from a list of vendors approved > by the user. If the author is not on the user's pre-approved list, > the browser can display the signature of the executable code and > allow users to make an informed decision on whether to proceed with > the download. > > Microsoft plans to propose the Internet digital signature > specifications to the W3 Consortium (W3C) and the Internet > Engineering Task Force (IETF) as an open Internet standard. The > technology will be an open, proposed specification available to the > entire Internet community. In addition, as part of the Open Process > Design Review, Microsoft will host a digital signature design > preview in January to solicit feedback from the Internet community. > > Ken Wasch, president of the Software Publishers' Association (SPA) > said "The Software Publisher's Association applauds this important > initiative. Independent software publishers large and small will > have greater business opportunities publishing powerful software > with this mechanism. Users will buy more signed software over the > Internet because it will be more powerful and users will have > confidence in the accountability of its creator." > > "Digital signatures allow people to interact over the Internet with > the same confidence that they interact with each other in everyday > life," said Bob Atkinson, digital signature architect. "A reliable > accountability mechanism like this allows users to avoid walking > around in a virtual suit of armor, giving users the flexibility to > download and run the most powerful and interesting programs without > undo fear of anonymous computer vandalism." > > Founded in 1975, Microsoft (NASDAQ "MSFT") is the worldwide leader > in software for personal computers. The company offers a wide range > of products and services for business and personal use, each > designed with the mission of making it easier and more enjoyable for > people to take advantage of the full power of personal computing > every day. > > Microsoft is either a registered trademark or trademark of Microsoft > Corporation in the United States and/ or other countries.

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Re: Wipe Swap File
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 20:27 1/21/96, jim bell wrote: >However, I _still_ want to see brainless operating systems like MSDOS >changed to erase (zero) allocated data buffers before and after use (and >especially before re-use!), so that parts of vital files don't accidentally >get written to the ends of other files. Not only DOS suffers from this problem. The MacOS does as well. All 'wipe unused space' utilities for the Mac fail on a typical hard drive to overwrite several hundred kB of data. Few people seem to care that the OS fills the unused parts of the last block of a file with whatever happens to be in the buffer. Not good. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Hassles taking App. Crypt. to Taiwan?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>At 1:49 PM 1/21/96, Daniel A. Monjar wrote: >>I've lurked for quite a while now. It is time to ask my first newbie >>question. I'll be going to Taiwan for three weeks in March. Is there >>likely to be any problems at US or Taiwan customs if I take >>Applied Cryptology 2/e along for personal study? The first edition of Applied Cryptography has explicit permission to be exported, thanks to Phil Karn. It's not clear that he needed to ask, except as a setup for asking permission to export the same material on floppy disks; books normally get lots of slack because they look surprisingly like the kind of thing the First Amendment covers. (It's also not clear that he _didn't_ need to ask, given Dan Bernstein's attempts to get official permission to teach cryptography.) >On the Taiwan side, though, they may wonder why you brought an expensive >U.S.-printed copy when you get the special rice-paper edition of "Applied >Cryptography, 2nd Ed." for the equivalent of $2.25 in Taipei's book stalls. If this were Singapore, they might consider it subversive literature, because it is :-) Don't know about Taiwan; you can tell them it's a computer textbook or math textbook if they ask any questions. Rice-paper editions of books are especially good if you need to eat them in a hurry when the Feds are raiding you.... #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # # "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty" used to mean us watching # the government, not the other way around....

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Re: Wipe delete
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Jan 20, 1996 10:24:34, 'sheol(a)downdeep.com' wrote: >How can data be recovered after it has been wipe by being >overwritten? You say even 8 or 9 times is not secure? That's kind of >scary. > Let me "answer" this and another post first by saying, re the tekkie stuff, "I do not know." However, my non-technical understanding goes something like this: Reading and writing/erasing from a disk platter are pure only in the abstract. A bit interpreted as a 1 or 0 has a certain level of magnetism that the software accepts as defining it as a 1 or 0. The level of defined magnteism is never 100% on the specification; it always varies a little. How much it varies can be read by different grades of hardware. Think of a simple erasure of data that has been written once and erased once. The different patterns of writing will have slightly different values. These can be read with specialized hardware and the raw data analyzed with special software programs. Is there a cheap way that *we* can do such things? I do not think so. The normal read/write head(s) on our normal hard disks have a limited sensitivity, fine for normal read/write operations but not sensitive enough the gather the minute variations described above. Doing a military grade analysis of heavily overwritten data involves, to my knowledge, first opening the disk drive, removing the platters, inserting the platters in a second drive with much more sensitive heads, initializing the new drive to make sure that the extra-sensitive heads can locate the proper tracks/sectors etc. on the old platter, and then gathering the data. That is, the first steps in the process are hardware, not software, steps. Now one way to increse the sensitivity of a read/write head is to run it closer to the physical media on which the magnetic signal resides. In other words, the intensity of magnetic flux decreases as a function of distance; get closer to the source and you can read weaker signals. This also means that, as you postion a new read/write head closer to the platters you significantly increase the likelihood that it will physically crash into the platter itself with the data intensity of an army tank running over a stack of bowling pins. This, in turn means that the new combination of extra-sensitive read/write head and old disk platter is especially sensitive to contaminates. (Forgetting the width of the gap in the head which is another way of increasing sensitivity), the level of contamination like smoke particles, dust, etc. must be less than that called for in the original factory specifications. This, I think, means you need a physical "clean room" to perform the reassembly that is cleaner than that used by the original factory. Those aren't cheap and that is (one) reason why there isn't a cheap way for us to do this. At least some aspects of this service is commercially available today. One easy way to locate services is to look at the small ads in the back of _PC Magaxine_. You might try Vogon USA. voice is 405-321-2485. fax is 405-321-2741. They have no WWW page or even e-mail address because they are not on the net. I don't even think they permit modems on their factory site. I spoke to Bob Emerson, Vogon's Service Manager, about this. He explained it as a security matter: you don't get hacked over the net if you aren't on the net; you don't get penetrated over the phone lines if you don't have modems in your shop. Sorry for the excessively broad non-technical character of this post. I'm sure other people on the list can go into the privacy issue of data recovery in far greater detail while ROFLTAO at my low level of knowledge. tallpaul

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Re: "Noise Filter" : Cypherpunks Lite Reminder...
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Just a friendly reminder to those of you overwhelmed by the noise... While we're plugging things, Don't forget e$pam, which has (mostly) e$-related cypherpunks postings, and e$-filtered stuff from usenet newsgroups, and from as many mail groups as the subscribers find for me to look at. The AustrianECON list has talks about Hayek, Mises, et. al., and I zinged something to e$pam from it recently about currency boards, fiat money and all that stuff. Both e$spam, and it's companion discussion list, e$, are free. They're sponsored by OKI Advanced Products and Hyperion, and anyone else who cares to, for a rediculously cheap charter sponsorship rate ;-). The sponsor tags are in the .sig of each message. You can subscribe to e$pam and e$ by looking at the e$ home page, http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ . Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The NEW(!) e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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NOISE.SYS Stupid Bugs w/Int13h
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There's an unpleasant bug in NOISE.SYS, BTW. It doesn't properly return the flags from the Int 13h handler, so disable that for now unless you'd like to do funky things to your disks. Sorry 'bout that. Rob.

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Re: Hassles taking App. Crypt. to Taiwan? (fwd)
by Chih-Wei Chang 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >On the Taiwan side, though, they may wonder why you brought an expensive > >U.S.-printed copy when you get the special rice-paper edition of "Applied > >Cryptography, 2nd Ed." for the equivalent of $2.25 in Taipei's book stalls. > > If this were Singapore, they might consider it subversive literature, > because it is :-) Don't know about Taiwan; you can tell them it's a computer > textbook or math textbook if they ask any questions. Rice-paper editions > of books are especially good if you need to eat them in a hurry when the > Feds are raiding you.... There will be no problem to bring it to Taiwan. I think you can buy a cheaper one at Taipei, but not as cheap as $2.25. Everything there is very expensive now, except books. Unfortunately, they are not rice-paper editions. You will have a hard time to eat them. -- ============================================================================ Name : Chih-Wei Chang (Ray) Computer Science, Texas A&M University, E-mail : cwchang(a)cs.tamu.edu College Station, TX-77843-3112, USA. ============================================================================

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"Trustworthy" PGP Timestamping Service ??
by matthew＠itconsult.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I have recently setup a free PGP timestamping service which operates by email. The objective of the service is to be able to produce "trustworthy" timestamps which cannot be backdated without detection. It achieves this by:- (a) giving every signature a unique sequential serial number; (b) every day making a ZIP file of that day's detached signatures and feeding the ZIP file back for signing (and hence the assignment of another serial number); (c) making available details of the highest serial number on each day as well as the signed ZIP files via email (and shortly WWW); (d) weekly publishing details of the DETACHED signatures of the ZIP file in alt.security.pgp and to users requesting them on a list server. I would be interested in folks comments on this "trustworthiness", including any weaknesses or possible improvements. Full details of the service can be found at:- http://www.itconsult.co.uk/stamper.htm Thank you in advance. Best wishes, Matthew -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAgUBMQKHtAKwLwcHEv69AQFVLgQAjVyX5w0YM75gskinZ74dkqQ9vDfnOlWt OD28p/0ot+85q+UP8hreS61Fs1bGDqgH5YL3/2Lviy+xhlIj9x8kVw+Rj1KrZvI+ Jt7pInfqwdx9gYxVGDuP0rIcCH+74vFWQJu1UMpZWORq4gv4t/IS1cBJJRaYSyrM hhcdHPRU6RE= =qD+L -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Hassles taking App. Crypt. to Taiwan?
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:49 PM 1/21/96, Daniel A. Monjar wrote: >I've lurked for quite a while now. It is time to ask my first newbie >question. I'll be going to Taiwan for three weeks in March. Is there >likely to be any problems at US or Taiwan customs if I take >Applied Cryptology 2/e along for personal study? No. The U.S. rarely inspects outgoing stuff (I've never even seen an international departure area that has the facilities for Customs inspection). Unless tipped-off that some crime they are investigating is involved. Even if it ultimately gets established that printed books can require export permits--something I don't expect--the enforcement of such a situation would be problematic in the extreme. They might stop a cargo pallet from being shipped to Slobostan, but not individual books carried in luggage. "Don't ask, don't tell." On the Taiwan side, though, they may wonder why you brought an expensive U.S.-printed copy when you get the special rice-paper edition of "Applied Cryptography, 2nd Ed." for the equivalent of $2.25 in Taipei's book stalls. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Ultimate Paranoia
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Fellow Cypherpunks, I have been lurking around for some time and I have learned alot, But I have a few questions that I either haven't seen posted or I've missed all together. I keep PGP stored on a removable hard drive and keep it under lock and key when it's not in use. I write and encrypt messages on a stand-alone computer, that I only have access to. My passphrase is rather long and full of gibberish, But I still fear the other things that I can not control. Does anyone make and sell a device that emits white and pink noise? How do you take the randomness collected from radation sensors to create a truly random sample for creating a PGP key? Is there anything else that I might be missing besides lining the walls & computer in tin foil? :^) Thanks for your help! -Murphy --

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Re: (cpx) Australian GAK?
by Roger.Clarke＠anu.edu.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sdavidm(a)iconz.co.nz (David Murray) asked cypherpunks(a)toad.com: >I've just seen a note to the effect that the (Australian) Senate Economics >References Committee has recommended, in their recently tabled report >quaintly entitled _Connecting You Now...Telecommunications to the Year >2000_ the establishment of a third party body for the management of public >key authentication. > >The Committee has also recommended the establishment of a national >authentication system to be recognised internationally with credibility >>with the legal system - True Names, most probably. > >Any c'punks closer to Canberra with the real goods? So far, very few Australian Senate documents are up on the net (honourable exception: those of those of the Committee on 'Community Standards' and on-line services); but keep your eye on them, and maybe they'll catch up: http://senate.aph.gov.au/ Steve Orlowski from the Australian Attorney-General's Department wrote a paper in November/December 1995 which outlined the idea. He's given me permission to put it up. Me? I'm just playing proxy until A-G's really come to believe in this medium (:-)} http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/II/Orlowski3 While you're at it, check these two out as well, and hit me with anything that'll improve them: - hot-links concerned with regulation of the net: http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/II/Regn - a compendium of things that go bump on the net: http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/II/Netethiquettecases Roger Clarke http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/ Xamax Consultancy Pty Ltd, 78 Sidaway St, Chapman ACT 2611 AUSTRALIA Tel: +61 6 288 6916 Fax: +61 6 288 1472 Visiting Fellow, Faculty of Email: Roger.Clarke(a)anu.edu.au Engineering and Information Technology Information Sciences Building Room 211 Tel: +61 6 249 3666 The Australian National University Canberra ACT 0200 AUSTRALIA Fax: +61 6 249 0010

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Re: (none)
by roy＠sendai.cybrspc.mn.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In list.cypherpunks, someone wrote: > Note that RSA normally is used as probabilistic encryption: encrypt the > same plaintext twice, and you'll likely get two different ciphertexts. I think you're confusing PGP's use of random session keys and random padding with actual RSA encryption. Using RSA alone on a given plaintext will always give you the same ciphertext. - -- Roy M. Silvernail [ ] roy(a)cybrspc.mn.org PGP Public Key fingerprint = 31 86 EC B9 DB 76 A7 54 13 0B 6A 6B CC 09 18 B6 Key available from pubkey(a)cybrspc.mn.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQN/6Rvikii9febJAQGCwwP+LGSeA56pCk9kFIULEuNX9B7VxBV5oYho y2JsyjdrJayUzVDS6iqhzFSrHHM8QSq3C3MlAmriXx52BdbFOZZ6lduV35hZKAjb TELDjeKixe/8BiDajP+98XcOSABqhTgvG/QgXV12dyuvr6uJETw8v1m5VkHH+svn BElJdmt5ZL8= =Dc+e -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ?"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: The remailer list now includes information for the alpha nymserver. Last update: Mon 22 Jan 96 6:49:09 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- c2 remail(a)c2.org *******+**+* 16:05 100.00% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org ######*##### 28:53 99.99% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com ++++++++-+++ 53:51 99.99% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net *******+**** 15:49 99.98% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +++++..++-+* 2:48:04 99.96% alpha alias(a)alpha.c2.org #**** 3:24 99.96% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com ##+#-#*** ## 11:04 99.69% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ----------- 1:41:10 99.58% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com ##+#*### ## :57 99.39% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #*+++*-*## # 4:56 99.29% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu *+****+*#+ # 4:35 99.23% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com ----__....- 18:15:09 98.38% hroller hroller(a)c2.org -# ######## 1:11 97.93% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi ------.. - 15:40:28 92.22% rahul homer(a)rahul.net * ##*#**+*** 1:30 99.87% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net .- + #+# 8:52:40 79.39% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de *++++++-+ 2:30:08 63.32% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu *---*##* 8:49 56.61% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *+ 6:03 41.80% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl ******* 8:05 41.23% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Hassles taking App. Crypt. to Taiwan?
by pclow＠pc.jaring.my 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>If this were Singapore, they might consider it subversive literature, >because it is :-) ...............and the next thing you'll probably say is that Asians live in tree houses and have pet gorillas or whatever :)......

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Re: Netscape and NSA
by jwarren＠well.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:02 AM 01/19/96, Alex Strasheim wrote: >... > >I'm personally a little frustrated by the timidity of industry's >response. I don't understand it. Netscape's interests are clear, their >voice is loud, and their resources are vast. Where's John D. Rockefeller >when you need him? Having served on the Board of a half-billion-buck revenue software for half a decade, I will tell you -- from having once been on "the inside" -- that there is one and only one focus for almost all publicly-traded corporations ... optimization of profits in the next quarter. This *often* involves a broad range of cooperation with government agencies -- especially if/when the corporation is trying to peddle its products to the guv'ment. Corp management *know* how helpful -- or foot-dragging harmful -- bureaucrats can be ... and our current administration has been *hot* to have crypto suppression and wiretap expansion, big time! (The [unproven] word I've gotten from inside of Washington legal circles is that when Clinton hit the White House, the spooks and enforcers were there with endless horror stories about how the sky will fall and vile terrorists will bomb every building if they don't have unfettered electronic snooping freedom. And Clinton, never having dealt with national security issues before and having a total non-record re enforcement or int'l affairs, was totally cowed by the very effective bureau and agency terrorists ... uh, fear peddlers. --jim There is no safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be.

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NSC_lub
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-22-96. W$J: "VeriFone and Netscape Plan Software To Ease Internet Credit-Card Payments." They aim to simplify payments with software for both banks and merchants. The bank software would allow banks to use their existing computer systems to read and process transactions. The merchant software would allow merchants to buy just one software package to put up an electronic storefront and payment system on the Web. Netscape said the software will include a new encryption technology that Visa and MasterCard are expected to announce in two to three weeks. That technology would break sensitive information into 1,024 bits instead of the 128 bits used currently. "AOL, Netscape Are Discussing An Alliance." Netscape and America Online Inc. are in talks to forge an alliance aimed at furthering their lead over the on-line push by software giant Microsoft Corp. "If you can't beat 'em, unguent 'em," Case-squirted an a-oiler. NSC_lub

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Re: Why is blowfish so slow? Other fast algorithms?
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:00 AM 1/22/96 -0500, David Mazieres wrote: >Failing that, can anyone suggest other secure, preferably unpatented, >shared-key encryption algorithms that could encrypt at ethernet speeds >(1 MByte/sec) without using most of the CPU on a fast Pentium or >equivalent processor? RC4 is of course unpatented and faster than anything else. Of course the name RC4 is trademarked, so you could simply call it "the well known algorithm" in your documentation and give the algorithm explicitly. RSA's present legal gimmicks seem to me to be based on the "trade secret" that RC4 really is the well known algorithm, so if you refrain from using the name "RC4", you should be OK. (I am not a lawyer.) T > >Thanks a lot, >David > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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CIA Stashes
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Reuter has a brief story today about "80 secret U.S. weapons arsenals that remain scattered across Austria for 40 years after they were hidden in case of a Soviet invasion" for use by resistance fighters. It says the CIA stockpiled the weapons without telling the Austrian government. The Austrian paper Kurier quotes the U.S. Ambassor as saying the CIA only recently informed Congress about the weapons stash. Does anyone in Austria or elsehere have more on this? ----- In a related matter, on Friday C-SPAN 2 aired several hours of comments and proposals by intel experts before the US Commission on Intelligence Reform. Mephistophelean former NSA head Admiral Bobby Ray Inman proposed among other brain-wavers to reorganize the thirteen or so bloated, bumbling, cat-fighting intelligence agencies: 1. Establish a new International Operations Agency to combine all operations units -- civilian and military -- into one, separate from the CIA -- which he thinks has irretrievably lost operations credibility. 2. CIA to do all intelligence analysis, but no collecting, to avoid contamination caused by "ownership of the data." The military to do intelligence collection and analysis only needed for immediate operations. 3. FBI to do all counter-intelligence, domestic and international, with agents stationed overseas. 4. Defense to do all imagery. 5. NSA/NRO/???, though not named in open session, presumably would continue ELINT and SIGINT. 6. All this will be very expensive, he roostered, intelligence on the cheap is worthless. 7. The total intelligence budget to be made public but no further breakdown of how the the pot of gold is distributed to supplicants is to be confessed. Former Ambassador to China Tilley, a 25-year veteran of CIA operations, emphasized the importance of continuing Non Official Cover operations, which, he said, are invaluable very-long term penetrations. He cited those he set up in China as COS and then revisited fifteen years later as ambassador -- still ferreting deepest of demon red-commie secrets, he black-comicly glowered to the glazed-eyes. NOC, while very expensive, is crucial, he, too, parroted. For the full eye-opening pack of lies to replenish the pot of gold, Tilley co-conspired that a closed session was needed. But all the intel gold-digging experts testified to that, grinning malevolently, thus continuing the grand tradition of looting national treasuries top-secret cloaked by national interest. So, where are all those not-yet-reported CIA Non Official Cover stashes of gold bullion (or $100 bills) to pay the world-wide "resistance fighters" for illusory supremacy?

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NYT New Web Site
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NYT reported today that it has set up a new web site: http://www.nytimes.com It offers most of the daily articles as well as some from archives. More info on subscription and the offerings at the home page. Subscription is free, for now. Though there is a charge for downloading, and a battery of whistling-in-the-dark copyright proclamations and threats and pleadings. For the Times-addicted, today's WSJ has a page one article on NYT-leadership squabbling, fomented by board member Gerstner, infamous IBM-Lotus espionage-enabler.

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Lan Manager security
by lws＠transarc.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Have you seen an analysis of the security of the LanMan authentication scheme? It strikes me as better than K4, but worse than K5. I wonder if you concur. Since Don and Ted have probably not seen this before, here's the technique as I understand it (summarized from the SAMBA docs). The password is uppercased and truncated to 14 bytes (or padded to 14 bytes with nulls). This is split (0..6,7..13) into two DES keys which are each used to encrypt a static 8-byte value. The resulting 16 byte key is stored at the server. To authenticate a connection, the server issues an 8 byte random challenge. I presume this is returned in the clear since the docs don't specify otherwise, but I haven't sniffed one. The randomness of the challenge doesn't matter so much if it crosses the network in the clear (though I can't understand why they did this), as long as the period of the generator is large enough to prevent replay attacks. The client then pads the 16-byte key to 21 bytes (with zeros, natch), splits it in thirds, {0..6}, {7..13}, {14,15,NUL,NUL,NUL,NUL,NUL}, uses each third to DES-encrypt the challenge, concatenates the ciphertexts, and returns the response to the server. I don't want to prejudice you too much by posting my own thoughts on this protocol, but here are a couple of things that should be obvious: 1. It doesn't hand back free samples of enciphered known plaintexts to all comers for offline attack. This is a Good Thing, unlike some other NOTABLE EXAMPLES. 2. This business with padding the keys out with zero bits really simplifies cryptanalysis. Where my limited expertise breaks down, is identifying just how easy it makes things. 3. I'm kind of boggled as to why they do this multiple encryption of things and then *concatenate* the ciphertexts. If you're going to do multiple encryption, it seems to make sense to pipeline the stages. Doesn't it?

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(fwd) e$: PBS NewsHour, Path Dependency, IPSEC, Cyberdog, and the Melting of Mr.Bill.
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - --- begin forwarded text Sender: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com Reply-To: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com Mime-Version: 1.0 From: rah(a)shipwright.com (Robert Hettinga) Date: Mon, 22 Jan 1996 10:37:28 -0500 Precedence: Bulk To: Multiple recipients of <e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com> Subject: e$: PBS NewsHour, Path Dependency, IPSEC, Cyberdog, and the Melting of Mr. Bill. I thought I'd crank this out in light of Friday's NewsHour segment about Apple and the path-dependency of the microcomputer market. Contrary to what PBS would have us believe, ;-), the concept of path dependency in technology, and in economics, for that matter, is a proven fallacy. At the risk of sounding credentialist (*I'm* not an economist, either), the NewsHour's Mr. Solman seems to be proof that journalism isn't economics, no matter the journalist's academic credentials. Journalists have to get a story out, and sometimes there's no story in the actual economics of a situation. Certainly there's no story in the non-existance of path dependency. The most famous example of path dependency, the idea that our previous economic choices doom us to repeat those choices forever, is the QWERTY keyboard, which has been proven *not* to be significantly slower than the Dvorak keyboard, its supposedly more efficient alternative. Dvorak, the designer of the alternative keyboard, was also the same person who conducted the "ergonomic" studies (spending our WWII tax dollars, I might add) "proving" it's efficacy, and elevated his keyboard to the status of an urban legend. Dvorak was at worst a fraud and at best deluded with his own grandeur. Reviews of Dvorak's own data show some significant flaws in both research methdology and data handling. In addition, several independent studies since then have shown that randomly selected beginning typists, starting out on one keyboard or the other, have *never* shown any significant difference in typing speed. The Betamax/VHS videocassete war, another example of path dependence, was more one of Sony not having an open standard than anything else. Sony played dog-in-the-manger with it's own technology, and consequently ended up owning the most lucrative market on a profit-per-machine basis, the one in television broadcasting. It also means they were leaving big money on the table where the largest market was, in consumer electronics. Doesn't this sound familiar to Mac fans? Path dependence had nothing to do with it. Consumer Reports did comparisons at the time showing only a marginal difference between Betamax and JVC, and nowadays there is absolutely no percievable difference between the two. I now challenge anyone (including, unfortunately, Apple's own *psychologist*, quoted in the NewsHour piece) to *prove* path-dependence in the current market "hegemony" of Microsoft on the desktop. It ain't so. The reason that Microsoft has business computer market dominance today is *not* because of it's original *perceived* incompatibility with legacy mainframe equipment ("nobody ever got fired for buying IBM -- or Microsoft"). Technically, mainframe compatibility was a non-issue at the time. It certainly wasn't for the first 5 years of the Mac's life, anyway. Apple could have done something about the mainframe compatibility issue with simple marketing communications if they had paid any attention to it at all. Apple's heart was never in the business market. First of all, for all their lip service to business, they really weren't ever attracted to the idea of building better word-processing and spreadsheet boxes, even if they did have the best one, before Excel and Word moved to Windows, at the time of the big ramp up of the business microcomputer market. It showed in their attitude to most business people. Outside consultants and mavericks were always the heroes in Apple's commercials, and so outside consultants and mavericks were attracted to the Mac as a computing platform, but large businesses and conformists weren't. When compatibility with mainframes actually did become an issue, for the short time when people were offloading their mainframe data onto LANs, Apple didn't want to be there anyway. With the advent of LANs, Apple didn't build the technology to deal with LANs head on on their own turf, large corporations. Apple built peer-to-peer networks of collegial desktop machines. Unfortunately, they never paid attention to the bandwidth or the multitasking premia necessary for those networks to function properly from the high-volume user's point of view, and, so, when someone downloaded a file from your machine, and you printed something in the background at the same time, you suffered a performance hit if you tried to do anything else. Your mouse jerked around the screen, or your words wouldn't show up in a window as fast as you typed them. With PC file and print servers, this was less of a problem, because those two jobs were offloaded to a seperate machine, whose job it was to do nothing but run a printer, or to serve files. Since everyone had to be connected to these servers the local area network, or LAN, was born. On Apple networks, every machine is potentially a server for everyone else, and everyone is their own print server. Only after PC LANs became ubiquitous did Apple ever build servers of their own. Again, their hearts weren't in it, because they were more interested in the possiblities of more distributed, collegial, peer-to-peer networks. Fortunately, the first problem, network bandwidth, has been solved, because almost all Macs now come with ethernet, while the second problem, preemptive multitasking on faster processors, is being solved slowly. This is all very good for Apple, because peer-to-peer architecture is where the world's going to go anyway. The whole internet is a peer-to-peer, "geodesic" network, where each machine is optimized for it's own particular function, be it serving, or switching information. There is no central repository of anything. That has been Apple's view of networks since day one. If it's any consolation, we won't even need LANs to do business with, anyway. A couple months ago, I saw Netscape running in the bond trading room of this country's largest institutional trustee bank, of all places. In their case, Netscape beat Powerbuilder hands-down in a prototype development shootout. The prototype *was* the production version. Netscape can do anything from secure outside-the-firewall SQL calls to actually conducting cash commerce. Game over. By the way, Netscape is not special in this regard at all. So can any other sufficiently secure browser server combination. Either one, client or server, can be developed for a dime a dozen even now. This is especially true when compound document architectures come on-line, like Apple's Cyberdog, an internet implementation of their OpenDoc software object technology. The reason we won't need LANs is because the only real difference between a LAN and the internet is a firewall for security, and the need for clients to speak Novell's TCP/IP-incompatible proprietary network protocol. With internet-level encryption protocols like the IETF IPSEC standard, you won't even need a firewall anymore. The only people who can establish a server session with *any* machine connected to the net will be those issuing the digital signatures authorized to access that machine, no matter where those people are physically. When that happens, networks will need to be as public as possible, which means, of course, TCP/IP, and not Netware. It's like Heinlein's old joke about space, "once you're in Earth orbit, you're halfway to anywhere". So, once you've gotten *rid* of the firewall, you're everywhere. So much for the path dependence of the LAN market. What happens to the information concentrated behind those firewalls -- or proprietary software markets, for that matter -- when, because of strong cryptography, firewalls disappear? Remember what happened to those floating globs of grease in the detergent commercial? Surfacted away into little tiny bits. I can hear Bill Gates now: "I'm melting!, I'm melting!". Ding, dong, Mr. Bill is dead... Game over. Now you see why he's fighting so hard to be net-compatible all of the sudden. In this "decade of the internet", the [user interface, platform, desktop, LAN, whatever] is meat, and real life is on the net, to paraphrase William Gibson. For the time being, I have come to the conclusion that the Mac, at least as long as Apple makes most of them, is the computer for the "best of us", and, unfortunately, not "the rest of us". I've learned to live with that. I no more worry about Apple's prospects than I do about Porsche's. I expect that Apple management, like Herr Doktor Porsche, is just waking up to the fact that even though they designed the Volkswagen, they can't possibly mass produce them efficiently at a decent enough profit to advance the state of the art, which is really where their hearts have been all along. Sooner or later, Apple will go back to cranking out 917s, to demonstrate the power of the technology, 911s, for a more affordable version of that power, and 928s, for those of us who only want to look the part. ;-). Fortunately, there are lots of companies, like Power Computing, to produce those Volkswagens for those of us who can't afford Porches, and "Macintosh" won't mean just "Apple" anymore. So, for developers, and for me, a fully-credentialled Mac Bigot and camp-follower, the future for Apple means Cyberdog, because Cyberdog means breaking down large "glops" of information and software "grease" and surfacting them, fractally, into little bitty bits out into the net, where *all machines*, not just dumb Java-terminals, can use them better. It also means developing cryptographically strong internet-level security, so that anyone can talk to any machine from anywhere if they have permission to do so, and *nobody* with out permission can either get in or see what those authorized people are doing, with a packet sniffer, or worse, with a key-cracker. It means building into all network applications the ability to do digital commerce. That is, the ability to handle digital bearer certificates, like Digicash's ecash, and the ability to handle micropayments, like the MicroMint protocol or it's successor technologies. Imagine if your code could send you money in the mail, or if a router did real-time load balancing by changing it's micropayment price-per-thru-packet when traffic got too high or too low. The future of the net's going to be a strange place, indeed. Until that happens, I suppose Porsche parts is still a lucrative business, as long as developers keep in mind what business they're really in. Cheers, Bob Hettinga - -------------------------------------------------- The e$ lists are brought to you by: Making Commerce Convenient (tm) - Oki Advanced Products - Marlboro, MA Value-Checker(tm) smart card reader= http://www.oki.com/products/vc.html Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion http://www.hyperion.co.uk info(a)hyperion.co.uk See your name here. Be a charter sponsor for e$pam, e$, and Ne$ws! See http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/ or e-mail rah(a)shipwright.com for details... - ------------------------------------------------- - --- end forwarded text -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQO/sPgyLN8bw6ZVAQGuSgP/fkKrI6aTSmPIGOu+LOxRzO5Ptt7QZNxh 48+b7975jIfUMgovphKBWdWtO+jGMCyUWxUVqjVbN8nmwfLT1RZFckOdLK0iM4nD Fgl5+s9yoI0OllHS+oOMcAIyuLIkzazUgtQojm8qBFGSGulW0Keq2dIRNsThGLrk Kk7K3oGMrQs= =71fv -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell The NEW(!) e$ Home Page: http://thumper.vmeng.com/pub/rah/

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Re: "Trustworthy" PGP Timestamping Service ??
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:51 PM 1/21/96, Matthew Richardson wrote: >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >I have recently setup a free PGP timestamping service which operates >by email. > >The objective of the service is to be able to produce "trustworthy" >timestamps which cannot be backdated without detection. It achieves >this by:- > >(a) giving every signature a unique sequential serial number; > >(b) every day making a ZIP file of that day's detached signatures >and feeding the ZIP file back for signing (and hence the assignment >of another serial number); ... It sounds like a variant of the Haber and Stornetta work on digital timestamping, about which much has been written on our list (check the archives, and/or sections of my Cyphernomicon). They have a company, Surety, which is doing this (or was, last time I heard). www.surety.com will get you there. My hunch is that your scheme implements a version of a hash (the idea of hashing the doc and then publishing the hash as a "widely witnessed event," in Haber and Stornetta terms) that could infringe on their patents (assuming they applied, as I recall hearing they did). Before you go much further on this, it would behoove you to check on what they are doing and on what patents, if any, you might need to license. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: NSA vacuuming down Internet traffic
by Rick Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

alanh(a)infi.net (Alan Horowitz) asks: >Is there any open source - or otherwise - knowledge or speculation about >which words/phrases the Terra-cycle cpu's are text-searching *for*? If it >were your responsibility to eavesdrop on Iranian terrorists ... >... would you know for sure which words/phrases to key on? It >doesn't sound like a tractable problem to me. There are two parts to this question. First, how do you choose targets? It's been a few years since I read Bamford's book (when *is* the next edition coming out, anyway?) but I seem to remember that there is some sort of "committee" that agrees on what to aim at. It probably contains the usual collection of bureaucrats from military and civilian agencies. Despite the lofty budgets, even the NSA's vacuum cleaner has a hose of limited size. The committee allocates the available resources to prioritized objectives. You can probably predict targets by estimating political priorities and clout of the various agencies, and, of course, by watching CNN. Second, how do you ensure that you capture relevant traffic? I'm sure you start with the obvious -- look at traffic that's definitely relevant and set up filters to find more of it. While it's attractive to want to treat this as a state detection problem (message is/isn't relevant) you really want more of a signal analysis solution (measure likelihood of relevance). Also, a high priority target would probably have its hit behavior evaluated by real humans to ensure that the expected amount of relevant traffic is continuously sucked up. My first job, twenty years ago, involved a prototype speech recognition system under contract for Rome Air Development Center (a traditional cover for TLA research). The machine was supposed to go beep whenever a specified word or phrase was heard over the input voice stream. We joked about testing for the term "Russian Spy" but settled on looking for "Kissinger" instead. That let us run tests by listening to news broadcasts of the time. We built custom boards with Schottky TTL and a blazing fast 120ns cycle time. Times change, eh? Rick. smith(a)sctc.com secure computing corporation

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Espionage-enabled Lotus notes.
by Trei Family 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've come up with a new term to describe the type of 'improved' security in the new International edition of Lotus Notes: 'espionage-enabled' It's specifically built for export, and has a backdoor to enable USG agents to read the messages more easily. From the viewpoint of a foreign purchaser, 'espionage-enabled' seems an appropriate term. If we spread this term sufficiently, we may be able to discourage the widespread adoption of this half-measure, and increase the pressure for good, unencumbered crypto. speaking only for myself, Peter Trei ptrei(a)acm.org

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Re: NYT New Web Site
by take＠imasy.or.jp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Mr. John Young, This is Tsuyoshi Hayashi. At 11:18 AM 96.1.22 -0500, John Young wrote: >NYT reported today that it has set up a new web site: >http://www.nytimes.com Now I visiting there. It's very worth for me. Very very thanks for your info. (^^) >For the Times-addicted, today's WSJ has a page one article on Does WSJ have there own web site, too? - Tsuyoshi Hayashi <take(a)imasy.or.jp> --- hayashi(a)scs.sony.co.jp is no longer valid. --- Please update to take(a)imasy.or.jp

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