December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: So much for free speech...
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:57 AM 11/6/95 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >Children are usually not accorded full constitutional protections, >especially not in public schools, but this does not mean the police should >arrest those who utter the wrong words! (Maybe suspending the student, >though I certainly wouldn't do that.) That's the rub. Kids can be kept locked up even with no crime. "Children don't have a right to liberty only a right to custody." An adult would probably not get arrested in the same circumstances (cops have more discretion to push kids around) or if arrested not prosecuted, or if prosecuted, case dismissed. It's a good thing the kid didn't engage in racist/Nazi acts like cutting government spending and taxes or they would have thrown the book at him. >This is the "safe and secure" world we are in, where bad thoughts and bad >words are punished. Or threatened with lawsuits. Anarchy seems infinitely >preferable to me. You got that right. DCF "Remind me to use an anonymous remailer in the future when indulging in racism."

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Re: DejaNews all over again--a URL for Usenet Searching
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:28 PM 11/6/95 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: > >I usually avoid passing on URLs of interesting sites, in the name of >conserving bandwidth (*), but this one really has me jazzed: > >http://dejanews.com/ > >It allows searching of Usenet archives (a few months' worth, from what I >can see). I'm not impressed since I've been using the subscription version of Infoseek for a while now which lets you search the last month of News and includes mailing lists as well (including cypherpunks). The free version is behind the Net Search button on Netscape but only searches the Web. http://www.infoseek.com A search for tcmay(a)got.net produced more than 200 hits. My Tim you *do* get around. Modesty prevents me from mentioning any newsgroup names. DCF

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Re: DejaNews all over again
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Tue, 7 Nov 1995 lmccarth(a)cs.umass.edu wrote: > your True Name (verinym) from your name on the net. > Many will want to use > tentacles (*), er, separate pseudonyms for discussions in different parts of > the net. After all, I might not want the c'punks to hear about my past life > as a control freak (pun intended) in alt.config. Just a reminder.... > > (*) Speaking of tentacles, Dejanews reveals that my name is on the long list > of people whose signatures have been appropriated by Detweiler ;) You too, eh?? I wish that Detweiler could (seriously) go back to wherever he came from. Hopefully this time, he can make the attempt ... backwards. I no longer become incensed at his type of spoofing. I understand that a message may look like it appears to come from a site, but it in fact doesn't. Who really knows?? Even a message that is PGP signed isn't guaranteed to be from the person who apparently signed it. Someone might have a web server that asks Netscape Navigator (very politely) to send out someone's secret PGP keyring, or asks Navigator to monitor a person's keystrokes when they enter their password, or heaven forbid their electronic daytimer. Once you have that, it's easy to send a forged PGP SIGNED email. Even worse, most readers of email will tend to believe that an electronic signature is prima facie evidence that a message is from who it appears to be from. It just doesn't work that way. You have to look at the message and use "fuzzy" logic to determine how probable it is that a given message is from the person who it represents itself as coming form. And sometimes, you'll be wrong. Just like the good old, "Dr. Frederick B. Cohen", who posted to this list. Is he really the Dr. Cohen, noted international computer virus expert, the very man who coined the term "computer virus", or isn't he? Is he the man who the US military approached to verify whether missile guidance systems could be compromised by a foreign power utilizing a trojan horse or virus, or not. Do we believe his web page?? Even if we do, do we place a greater degree of trust in his words, than that of say, yours truly, Alice de 'nonymous, or of someone who claims to be Tim May when they BOTH say that there are very serious flaws and deficincies in the Netscape Navigator product? Or do we infer that a "no comment" coming from AT&T and Netscape, acts as confirmation that the *information* in the post is reliably correct. It's impossible to say with certainty. Maybe if someone on this mailing list attended Dr. Cohen's talk today at the Hilton Hotel, in Washington, D.C., and fills us in with what he said, (if we can trust _that_ poster) and we independently verify for ourselves whether what _he_ (Dr. Cohen or Mr. Confirmation) is saying *seems* to be reasonable, then we _might_ be able to say that we _may_ be reasonably certain, that we DO have an international celebrity amongst us and posting to this list, and notifying the world of a serious problem. I mean what would you expect, a Press Release?? Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: using pgp to make an otp
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:31 PM 11/6/95 EST, Derek Atkins <warlord(a)MIT.EDU> wrote: >> PGP output is not random enough to be used for a one time pad. >> The security of a OTP is *entirely* based on the quality of the random >> numbers; they should come from some strong generator. Building good >> one time pads is tough, and usually not worth the effort. > >No, however the output of "pgp +makerandom=XXX filename.dat" _IS_ >random enough for an OTP. The problem then becomes distributing this >data. amp had written: | my point here is that _if_ pgp output is random enough, i wouldn't need | hardware. even i, with my extremely limited programming skills could create | a .cmd file or program that could be used as input for a stream cypher. The output of PGP should be random enough for your application, as long as you don't think you're getting a cryptographically-correct OTP out of the deal. PGP uses its randpool stuff in its random number generation, so there are likely to be at least 24 bytes of real randomness kept around, maybe more depending on the size of your randpool, but the rest of your security comes from algorithm quality and is theoretically crackable like any pseudo-random sequence (albeit requiring exponentially-large crackwork.) It's using IDEA in a feedback mode, so it's better than just repeated MD5s. The output of PGP +makerandom probably is secure enough for most applications, depending on how many bits you're using, what you're doing with it, and how paranoid you need to be. Check out the code to be sure. You may have special applications such as amp's stream cypher for which it's more convenient to XOR the makerandom instead of using PGP, but watch out for attacks like known-plaintext, which can really bite you in secure-voice systems where there's a lot of near-silence. Careless protocol work can spoil really decent random numbers.... #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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PGP Comment feature weakens remailer security PGP Comment feature weakens remailer security
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Suppose you want to mail or post something sensitive enough to chain through several remailers with PGP encryption at every stage to protect the privacy of communications. PGP can bite you. The PGP comment feature lets you stick one (or more?) lines of comment into your encrypted messages, after the Version: line but before the encrypted message body. If you use the PGP comment feature to say something more or less unique (mine says that you can get PGP outside the country from ftp.ox.ac.uk), anybody eavesdropping the last remailer in your chain can notice this in the remailer's input and recognize that it's from you, even though you've chained through six different places to get there. It's still encrypted, and protected to the extent that the remailer protects you, but if the remailer is corrupt or your message can be identified by size among the other remailer inputs, you're hosed. So, for safety, either turn off PGP comments before using it with remailers, or wipe out the comments by hand before each layer of encryption (easy to do with GUI-based systems like Private Idaho; I don't know if premail lets you do this or not.) Bill Stewart -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.7.1 Comment: PGP available outside U.S.A. at ftp.ox.ac.uk iQBVAwUBMKAgw/thU5e7emAFAQFStwH/QnIiiaeSmUp1YynDBLVo3HAWsVkS0nx8 Fc95Mr0YJ/YIoRDz+xuNgLHbjJZSTUbhOnigMRb7JLNqhmCGvS5RBQ== =ZWhB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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EARLY WARNING: Decemeber SF Bay Area Cyperpunks
by Katy Kislitzin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi-- Eric Messick and I will be holding the Decemeber C'punks meeting at our geodesic dome in the Santa Cruz Mountains. It will be a combination meeting and holiday get-together. It will be happening on the usual c'punks saturday, Dec 9, but will start at 4:00 pm instead of the usual noon. A more spirited announcement will follow closer to the date. --kt

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Lotus Notes RSA Implementation Question
by bglassle＠kaiwan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I am currently considering using Lotus Notes for a group-ware solution where security is of great importance. I have studied Notes documentation regarding thier implementation of the RSA encryption library, but it leaves some unanswered questions. If anyone on the list has knowledge of the following items, I would be very gratefull. 1) What is the key size used by the USA licensed version? 2) Considering RC4 is a proprietary scheme, have there been any concerted efforts to validate it's strength or lack of? If so, could you give a pointer to any documents I could review. ...Bob Glassley -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMKBVtW7xvKhVs/sNAQHCowP+LF2stvSPzatDfAkKx2DfU8sH5S7p6KwN PwDEak9it1Uq0eALHWVTc3VZ3WYY+6XIjYNnNyfdKsgehXb+2dVEgjz1qbHyK+uE 3JhlYOeCfBcXUrTbilAoYXghJHvrpJq8z+Pa6u2W5Wgxks+t9MYzjV3YKLM2Nj6Z y6jbBUcyyNc= =TN1O -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Crypto++, Cpunk Icons, list noise
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 6 Nov 1995 s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: >> And as the messenger, I (hope) I don't have anything to fear, from the >> NSA or any other foreign group that would seek to pursue its own agenda >> within the borders of sovereign Canada. I really don't think that the >> NSA is "evil incarnate", as some list subscribers do. They have their >> intelligence and know how to use it. Usually, they use it prudently. > >They have a nice friend (the author of Spyworld would say outpost) >right here in Ottawa at the Communications Security Establishment. Yes. I'm well aware of where I can find an Operations Officer, if I need to. Locally, in fact. Don't really have to go to Ottawa, for that. (Wrong guess, btw ...) >They (CSE) seem to have done some recent spying on the opposition >parties and Quebec separatists (so I vaguely recall having read in >several places. Yes. At least in this part of the country, we're relatively ho-hum (big yawn) about scouts and scouting. Part of the territory, I guess. We're Canadian. We're civilized about these things. >If you're ever in town, they're just a bit past Carleton U. on Heron. >(it doesn't say CSE on the signs, but the guy at the gate will tell you so) Thanks. Personally, I'm much more interested in the Museum of Civilization. Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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Re: Java insecurity - long - argumentative - you are warned.
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 6 Nov 1995, Dr. Frederick B. Cohen wrote: > WARNING - THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS INFORMATION THAT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS > A FLAME BY SOME READERS - IT IS LONG AND TEDIOUS - YOU ARE WARNED! > > 4.2 Security in the Java Environment > > > > Security commands a high premium in the growing use of the Internet > > for products and services ranging from electronic distribution of > > software and multimedia content, to "digital cash". The area of > > security with which we're concerned here is how the Java compiler and > > run-time system restrict application programmers from creating > > subversive code. [long list of important questions deleted ...] Essentially, I think that all of this will distill to a single issue, vis-a-vis Java or any other paradigm which wishes to represent itself as *secure*. Where is the security review role placed within the project development life cycle?? Is it at Design Concept? Or during Application Development? Or is it done last, after design completion, after all of the programming is complete and the production people are involved in operational turnover. Or is it done at all? This concept is not new, and should not present any problems to anyone in the industry. Even John Q. Public will understand it, if we use a simple construction analogy. If you want to build a secure house, your security doesn't start AFTER the house is built. It has to start at a very early stage. It starts before the blueprints are made, when you specify that you want a concrete windowless box located on a quiet street at the end of a cul-de-sac. That is simple and obvious. You certainly don't have *security* if after building a glass house on Main Street, if after the design is finished, the footings have been poured, and the key is about to be turned over to the occupant; if then, as an afterthought you put a single strong deadbolt on the front door to "secure" it. Anyone who can't or won't quite grasp this idea is either willfully attempting to steer gullible individuals astray, or is congenitally stupid. It's time to call a spade a spade. > What exactly does this mean? > > > While all this checking appears excruciatingly detailed, by the time > > the byte code verifier has done its work, the Java interpreter can > > proceed knowing that the code will run securely. Knowing these > > properties makes the Java interpreter much faster, because it doesn't > > have to check anything. Yikes!! I'll leave this for someone else to address. This sounds to me like a variation on virus scanning. I think that there are far more reputable virus experts than I who can comment and expand on *flaws* with that approach. > No runtime checking whatsoever. Get past the supposed verifier, and you > have free run of the machine. A single verifier bug or inadequacy, and > the world is unsafe for electronic commerce. As someone who *vividly* remembers October, 1987 and the near economic meltdown which was BARELY averted by the Fed, a near meltdown which occurred because of the interactions of systems far less intelligent or complex than those we routinely utilize today, systems which directly interface not only to each other, but have undocumented, non-predictable interactions with "soft and wet" systems, I might have some serious concerns. Then again, it is _only_ the economy, isn't it? > ASBESTOS SUITS MAY NOW BE REMOVED - FLAME OFF. > > P.S. > > When: Tuesday, November 7, 8AM > Where: The Hilton, Washington D.C. (the CSI conference) > The talk: 50 Ways to Attack Your World Wide Web Systems > > If you want a chance to heckle - be there. Drat ... I don't think that I'll be able to attend. I've already got a local presentation that I've pencilled in for tomorrow morning at some god awfully early hour. Then again, D.C. isn't quite my circuit. I was hoping though for some clarification. Are you THE Dr. Frederick B. Cohen?? The one who originally coined the phrase "computer virus" and who maintains the computer virus FAQ? Are you THAT Dr. Frederick B. Cohen, and are you speaking publically in Washington, tommorow as one of the keynote speakers? If you are, I'd be interested as to whether you'll talk about the recent gaping security hole in the existing installed Navigator code base which I detailed to this list's subscribers. The one posted this last Friday the Thirteenth, that questioned Netscape's wisdom in creating an experimental MIME object which does not follow the usual HTTP request/response paradigm, but instead allows a server to open and maintain a bi-directional communications channel from server to client. Effectively a non-password protected telnet into the heart of any system, a open exploitable connection which penetrates proxy servers and firewalls, and acts as an enhanced bi-directional delivery/recovery mechanism? I'd be very interested in the comments around that, especially since both Netscape and AT&T (who distributes the softwre under its own brand name) have made an explicit "no comment". I'd especially be interested in any post-session transcript. I also think that Elaine Garzarelli might be interested. Especially since she'll be addressing the nation and the public via the public television airwaves this Friday evening. Or at least ... uhmmm ... I _think_ that's when her electronic daytimer has her pencilled in ... Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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expiration dates on cryptography
by John Curtis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The discussion between Mr. May and Mr. Shields concerning time-release cryptograhy raised an interesting question in my mind. Given that trust is often of an ephemeral nature, it would be quite useful to set time limits on secrets. Would it be possible to cryptographically protect a secret such that it could not be decrypted after a certain time? I suspect that the laws of thermodynamics might prohibit this in classical cryptography because as a message expired the amount of entropy would decrease. Quantum cryptography might work, but that will be science fiction for some time to come. Has anyone either shown how to do this or proven it impossible?

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Re: Newt on Crypto
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From John Young's posting CYB_lip of a column from the Washington Post > "At some point in the not-very-distant future," said > Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) in an August interview in > Wired with computer guru Esther Dyson, "somebody is going > to have encryption you can't break.... Governments are not > going to be able to stop it." Newt's an optimist (from the government perspective.) At some point in the not-very-distant future, _everybody_ is going to have encryption the government can't break! #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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Re: nym-compoop
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[I have taken the liberty of deleting "speaker(a)leg.state.vt.us" and "villuzzi(a)leg.state.vt.us" from the cc: list, as I think cross-pollinating our list with state asssembly houses is even worse than being "assimilated" by wwwbuyinfo and e$-list.] At 2:35 AM GMT 11/6/95, Stephen Whitaker wrote: >Eating my tasty crow gives rise to another question relating to the timing >and continuity of these threads: How did the first responder on the RE: >134.222.9.1, Simon Spero, reply at 10:48 pm on Nov. 4 to Anonymous' posting >of 7:19AM on Nov 5? Which way is this thing spinnin? Have you heard of time zones? The first message, from Anonymous, was sent from the Replay remailer (in Amsterdam, I recall). Date: Sun, 5 Nov 1995 07:20:12 +0100 Subject: lp (134.222.35.2)? To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) 07:20 in the +0100 timezone is of course 22:20 of the previous day (Saturday) in the -0800 time zone. The reply by Spero was sent Date: Sat, 4 Nov 1995 22:48:39 -0800 (PST) From: Simon Spero <ses(a)tipper.oit.unc.edu> X-Sender: ses@chivalry To: Anonymous <nobody(a)REPLAY.COM> Looks harmless to me. However, there is increasing evidence the intelligence agencies have managed to open up a portal in time, using the tachyonic devices being manufactured by Tachytronx, of Woodland Hills. These time portals are used by Science Applications to launder money back to eras in which it was needed. One of the major remailers is located on a system called "Portal," which ought to be enough to convince anyone in these paranoic times. --Klaus! von Future Prime, whose chronotransport secrets now stand revealed

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nym-compoop
by Stephen Whitaker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm glad "nobody" thinks I'm a nym for being a good eight hours:fifty-nine minutes out of step and having lowered my reputation in his/her eyes. Now I'll ask my question again, which apparantly got lost in the collective groan of my stale post: Are there ways for someone with access to modify router tables to constantly create alternate paths at other routers which would serve to end-around any such snoops? This question is now offered in the context of the _hypothetical_situation_ of there being snoops out here in the first place. Later I'll ask about sniffing for sniffers. One reason for this post is the fact that certain ambitious bureaucrats here in Vermont have decided to build, own and control the internet, connecting governments, schools and a few businesses. There is no encryption in use by the government agencies and they have let the school hackers and teachers on now to share the T-1 backbone with the state agencies and contractors (medicaid/EDS) carrying personal information collected and managed by state government. These [ir]responsible parties refuse to provide any documentation requested under public records law demonstrating that a security plan or practice is in place. The high schools are offered 56K circuits for $5K/annual and a share of a gov'ment network manager who wont answer his e-mail and doesn't know where to begin looking for copies of it, when it too is requested under our public records laws. Our governor stated in his address to the legislature that these 56K lines will let an "unlimited number of students access the internet simultaneously". Anybody got a bridge? I sure would like to hear from some folks who would be willing to aid in paying close attention, discussing the implications and appropriateness of encryption technologies for this situation, aiding in testing for sniffers, etc. This request is offered as an attempt to keep a step ahead of the public/private competition, privacy accident-waiting-to-happen and the surveillance potential/practice of such a beast. If someone who feels strongly that this is off-topic for this list makes that case I'll carry my inquiry elsewhere, after a little cross-fire, of course. I even went back and just now read the "Welcome to" message to see whether these issues fall withih the scope. I can hardly find anyone who even cares about the fact that our legislature relies on the executive branch gov-net managers for their port/connection on the internet router. They also rely on the executive branch for troubleshooting their novell LAN. Does anyone else see a separation of powers issue or privacy issue here? Note that I cc: the speaker, who cares but doesn't yet grasp the implications. Feel free to write him directly. His name is Michael Obuchowski, Obe for short, <speaker(a)leg.state.vt.us>, tell him I sent you. At this point offering encryption software to school age kids is a whole lot easier than convincing bureaucrats that it's a good practice. This wont solve the problem of poor practice by government though. Unfortunately this will also likely frighten the school network techies, administrators and school board members. Anybody have a copy of any good, tight, discovery orders which can be useful in gaining court ordered access to prevent destruction of evidence and for combing the electronic files and e-mail of these accountable public servants to demonstrate that they don't know what there doing? (responses to the legal points by private e-mail please. Do I come across as litigious?) The Boston Globe did a good front page story a week or ten days ago entitled "e-mail as evidence". Mostly the story was relating to lawyers and consultants making big money aiding corporations to assure that the really damaging, unencrypted e-mail is thoroughly scrubbed from all systems. Back to where this started: Eating my tasty crow gives rise to another question relating to the timing and continuity of these threads: How did the first responder on the RE: 134.222.9.1, Simon Spero, reply at 10:48 pm on Nov. 4 to Anonymous' posting of 7:19AM on Nov 5? Which way is this thing spinnin? Stephen Whitaker P. O. Box 1331 Montpelier, Vermont 05601-1331 802.479.6118

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Re: PRINCETON STUDENTS FIND HOLE IN INTERNET SECURITY SOFTWARE
by Herb Sutter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've always read with interest Sameer's notes, and I also enjoyed this one. I just can't figure out why he's writing it (spelling and grammar errors aside): At 07:52 11.06.1995 -0800, sameer wrote: >For Immediate Release >Date: Nov 6th, 1995 >Contact: Sameer Parekh 510-601-9777 sameer(a)c2.org > >PRINCETON STUDENTS FIND HOLE IN INTERNET SECURITY SOFTWARE This title and the opening paragraphs seem unnecessarily (and misleadingly[*]) alarmist, given the recent spate of similar mass-media articles. After the lead and second paragraphs repeatedly talk about "holes", "make viruses and other malicious programs possible", etc., it isn't until the third paragraph that we read a calmer quote: [*] Java isn't really 'Internet security software', and the students didn't find a hole in any current version according to the rest of the text. >"While we did find some interesting holes, we believe these can be >addressed and Java could make a good standard for remote code on the >Web, if an effective security policy is defined." The opening paragraphs sure didn't reflect this. Then: >The holes they found exist only in the alpha release of HotJava. The >beta release, which is the version found in the widely-used Netscape >Navigator 2.0b1J is not vulnerable to these attacks. They do? It's not? Then... why mention it at all?! If this is so, it's a dead issue, old news, passe'. Why another alarmist press release (other than to promote Community ConneXion's decision to add Java to its hit list <grin duck & run>)? The public's paranoid enough about net commerce; why should we, of all people, fan the flames? This isn't to bash Sameer, whose posts I always enjoy reading. I'm just a bit puzzled by this one... Herb ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Herb Sutter 2228 Urwin, Suite 102 voice (416) 618-0184 Connected Object Solutions Oakville ON Canada L6L 2T2 fax (905) 847-6019

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Paranoia Has Its Uses
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:10 AM 11/7/95, Carl Ellison wrote: > ``According to the former head of Romania's secret police, Ion Mihai >Pacepa, there had been ten million microphones in a country of twenty-three >million people. That would mean that nearly everyone had been listened to >and then blackmailed into listening and reporting on others. A maze of >psychic tunnels led from one person to another.'' [Andrei Codrescu, "The >Hole In The Flag", pp. 21-22] This was the Romanian version of key escrow, don't you know? "Conversation Escrow" was scrupulously safeguarded in Ceausescu's Romania, with conversations only unlocked if a "court order" was obtained lawfully. (Of course, governments get to make the laws, get to enforce them, and so it goes.) Theodore Roszak, influential author of "The Making of the Counterculture" (1969), was bemoaning the apparent distrust people now have in governments, and thinking he and his generation are partly to blame for the current paranoia and mistrust. He was bemoaning the fact that nobody trusts that government can fix society's problems, that everyone from leftists to rightists apparently hates the way government works. Relevance? Next time someone mentions "safeguards" in connection with GAK, remind them about Tricky Dick and his "Enemies List." Or about possibly greater abuses by other presidents. Remind them of what might happen if a Religious Right president is trying to crack down on abortions, pornography, and drugs. This may make a doubter out of someone. It may be paranoia, but paranoia has its uses. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Timed-release crypto and information economics
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

First, let me congratulate Michael Shields for working on this problem, and for (possibly?) coming up with a cleaner scheme. I confess that I'm not clear on how his scheme differs from mine. Let me hasten to add that my 1993 proposal was intended to be more conceptual than practical, to illustrate how distibuted escrow agents (escrow in the real sense, not in the GAK sense) could be used to "send messages into the future," a tool that has several intriguing applications, some of which Michael explores in the second part of his post. At 12:09 AM 11/7/95, Michael Shields wrote: >In the May proposal, when you have a message to be encrypted, you >encrypt it with a session key, optionally split that key with an n-of-m >scheme, and then send the key into a network of escrow agents, which are >instructed to hold the message for a given period of time. You then >hold onto the encrypted message, though you need not keep it secret. >Conceptually, you have encrypted a message and then remailed the key to >yourself in such a way that it will take X length of time to arrive. Sending either the pieces of the message or the pieces of the key seem closely related to me (they go together). In principle, it is only the key that counts, so that is what I would focus upon. >I have a simpler, public-key plan. When you want to keep a message >secret until date X, you ask your favorite crypto house to generate a >key pair and hold the secret key until date X. You then encrypt your >message with the public key, and again hold onto the encrypted message. >N-of-m trust management can be implemented by secret-sharing your message >and encrypting each with a key generated by a different crypto house. This seems to be saying the same thing. In both cases, "Alice" is either distributing a message to"Bob," "Charles," "Donna," etc., with instructions not to return the pieces until Date X, or is holding onto a sealed message but asking that the decryption keys not be returned until Date X. I don't see the real difference, modulo some minor factors. In neither case can the original message be reconstructed unless n out of m of the escrow agents provide the pieces. I hope we are not miscommunicating because of terminology or because of the continuing Net problem of not being able to draw pictures showing what is going on. >I'll let everyone tear into this for a few days, and then I'll put up a >server for timed-release key generation, charging maybe c$1. I'd like >to then enhance it to be capable of issuing bonds and loans denominated >in c$. (I like the cyberbucks trial because it's officially play money, >so there aren't any regulatory burdens.) This should be interesting. In any case, I look forward to seeing reaction to this. This could be an important service. (In many ways much more interesting than fairly mundane "Internet commerce" applications.) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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CSSPAB June 1995
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/csspab/minutes.695 [Reformatted for easier reading] MINUTES OF THE JUNE 7-8, 1995 MEETING OF THE COMPUTER SYSTEM SECURITY AND PRIVACY ADVISORY BOARD Wednesday, June 7, 1995 Introduction A quorum being present, the Chairman, Dr. Willis Ware, called the meeting to order at 9:00 a.m. at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, Maryland. Besides Dr. Ware, the following Board members were present: Charlie Baggett Jr., Genevieve Burns, Cris Castro, Don Gangemi, Sandra Lambert, Joseph Leo, Henry Philcox, Randy Sanovic, Linda Vetter, Steve Walker, and Bill Whitehurst. Mr. Ed Roback, Board Executive Secretary and newly appointed Designated Federal Official, discussed some of the handouts provided to the Board. Most important, was a copy of a draft House bill referred to as the "Department of Commerce Dismantling Act." If enacted, part of NIST would be transferred to the National Science Foundation. The Commerce Program Resolution Agency (CPRA) would be established and attempt to sell NIST laboratories (and other specified elements of the Department of Commerce) to the private sector. If not sold within 18 months of enactment, CPRA would submit their recommendations to Congress on the appropriate disposition of the property and functions of the laboratories. OMB Circular A-130, Appendix III Update and Review of Comments and "NII Security: The Federal Role" Mr. Ed Springer of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), updated the Board on the recently signed Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. (Copies are available for distribution to the Board.) (ACTION - SECRETARY). Mr. Springer said that security remains a concern and is supported by strong language in the law requiring agencies to secure their systems. Mr. Springer updated the Board on Appendix III to OMB Circular A-130. Since his briefing to the Board in March, the comment period for the proposed changes to Appendix III has closed. OMB received twenty-nine written comments to date. He solicited Board members for their reactions to the draft proposal. Mr. Springer was asked how OMB will enforce the requirements of Appendix III. He said enforcement comes through oversight and the budget process. There is a sharper focus on where agencies can go for help. One Board member asked if OMB plans to develop a standard set of behaviors. Mr. Springer replied that OMB will not go that far; however, Appendix III addresses the risks for agencies to use as a guideline for security considerations. Board members noted that agency visits to senior management regarding security plans, as was conducted in the 1989-1990 timeframe, seemed successful. Mr. Springer said that the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act provides oversight of the requirement for agencies to prepare new plans. Mr. Springer agreed to brief the Board at its September meeting to further discuss the comments received and current status. He mentioned that the final document "NII Security: The Role of Federal Government," would be out soon and Board members would receive copies. (ACTION - SECRETARY). Defensive Information Warfare & Unclassified Government and Private Sector Mr. Martin Hill, Deputy Director for Information Warfare Programs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, briefed the Board on Information Warfare (IW) from a DoD perspective. He said that commanders should not depend on information and information systems that they cannot rely on. He used the example of Desert Storm, which was a won through the use of intelligence; Iraq, in effect, lost the war before it even began. Mr. Hill said that IW is driven by daily attacks on U.S. computer networks. The national security construct is changing because DoD utilizes commercial sector security and shares their vulnerabilities. The DoD unclassified definition of IW is "Actions taken to achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy by affecting adversary information and information systems while leveraging and protecting our information and information systems." Some of the areas that need defending are: leadership; command facilities; integrated air defense and controls; computers, software, data bases, and displays; power production sources; and links to media. The U.S. IW strategy is to: - Use U.S. technological superiority to provide the right information to the right place at the right time, - Aggressively defend against attacks on our information, and - Use offensive techniques to attain and maintain information superiority. Mr. Hill also emphasized the need for and importance of training. He said they have assembled "Red Teams" made up of DoD personnel that converge on other DoD systems to determine their vulnerabilities. When asked how DoD could best communicate their requirements to the commercial sector, Mr. Hill said that they conduct seminars and "war games" which are both attended by industry. (See Reference #1.) X/Open Security Branding Proposal Mr. Peter Callaway, Senior Security Technologist for IBM, provided the Board with an update on the X/Open security branding proposal. Mr. Callaway was speaking from three perspectives: IBM (a member of X/Open), X/Open, and as a user. He said that X/Open feels they have the appropriate and proven experience by setting industry standards and performing conformance branding. X/Open has the commitment of vendors to build products to their specifications with regard to technical plans established with vendor cooperation and commitment to product follow-through. X/Open Branding is a certification scheme for conformance verification, not evaluation. Currently, X/Open branding requires evidence of successful execution of a test suite where appropriate test suites are available. It requires a conformance statement questionnaire and a trademark license agreement to be completed by the applicant. (See Reference # 2.) Security Policy Board (SPB) Update Ms. Vicki LaBarre, Security Policy Board (SPB) Staff, briefed the Board on the progress of the SPB. Ms. LaBarre reminded the Board of the role of the SPB as chartered by Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-29. The SPB and Security Policy Forum are jointly chaired by DoD and intelligence community members, but their members include non-DoD and non-intelligence community representatives. Ms. LaBarre relayed that the SPB considers itself an "honest broker" to identify issues and positions from all parties on key questions. She said that the fundamental question is whether the executive branch needs a single, consolidated INFOSEC policy making mechanism. If a consolidated INFOSEC policy making mechanism is needed: Can the existing SPB structure created by PDD-29 meet that need? - If yes: how should an information systems security committee be chartered and constituted? - If not: how could/should the SPB/SPF be modified to become an effective INFOSEC policy mechanism? What other existing entity in the executive branch could act, or be modified to act as the executive branch's INFOSEC policy making apparatus? What kind of new entity could be created to meet this policy making need? If a consolidated INFOSEC policy making mechanism is not needed: - How can the existing INFOSEC policy and advisory boards, committees, forums, etc., be made to more effectively identify, prioritize, resource and act on major INFOSEC issues and vulnerabilities affecting the national interest? - Are executive branch INFOSEC resources adequate to provide for acceptable security for government information systems? - Are existing INFOSEC resources appropriately located and distributed within the executive branch? Recently the SPB staff convened a special working group to draft a resolution to call for compiling a list of major INFOSEC issues. The matter will be discussed at the Security Policy Board Forum meeting on June 23. In summary, Ms. LaBarre emphasized that we must to do a better job of INFOSEC governmentwide which is doable if everyone works together for the common good. Throughout Ms. LaBarre's presentation, some Board members expressed serious concerns about many aspects of the SPB's charter, the first SPB staff report and their present stance on the effort of a single policy making mechanism. Some Board members expressed the view that the initial report was not clear with regard to what kind of information would encompass "national interest." She said that the first report was purely a "think piece" to stimulate discussion, which it has done. (See Reference #3.) Commercial Key Escrow Update Mr. Steve Walker, President, Trusted Information Systems (TIS), presented the Board with an update of TIS' Commercial Key Escrow (CKE) activities. Mr. Walker recently met with senior management of National Semiconductor Corporation. They discussed a proposal to use CKE in an escrowing approach called Commercial Automated Key Escrow (CAKE) in which the CKE system has been modified to work with National's PersonaCard cryptographic hardware tokens. Mr. Walker believes that this approach meets the needs expressed by the Vice President. CAKE does the following: 1. It removes all very strong cryptography from software. 2. It uses these special CAKE tokens to automatically escrow an encrypted copy of every message key within the message envelope itself, in a special Data Recovery Field (DRF) consisting of the message key and Data Recovery Center (DRC) and token identifiers, encrypted with the public key of a Designated DRC. 3. It provides access to DRFs via the private key of the DRCs, and allow any user to establish their own DRC to safeguard corporate information. 4. It uses well known cryptographic algorithms such as DES, triple DES and RSA, instead of algorithms such as Skipjack. 5. Finally, it gives American computer and communications industries the ability to easily export strong and very strong encryption as part of their information highway products. Mr. Walker briefly discussed the software binding issue which have been put off by implementation into the PCMCIA card but, it still needs to be tried and a software vendor is being sought to do so. The card implementation is aimed at files and e-mail, not telephony. There is initial concern with regard to cost, however, it is tamper proof and cannot be distributed over the Internet. Mr. Walker said they are seeking export approval with DES and CKE and hopes for a position resolution in the near future. (See Reference #4.) The meeting recessed at 5:20 pm. Thursday, June 8, 1995 SI-PMO Action Plan Briefing Mr. Al Williams, Acting Director of the Security Infrastructure Program Management Office (SI-PMO) at GSA, updated the Board on the activities and progress of the SI-PMO. He discussed some of the near term goals: identifying and resolving critical policy issues related to support multiple technologies, developing a security architecture, defining user-to-user and user-to SI specifications, and establishing a formal liaison between the SI-PMO and the Canadian Government. Board members asked about milestones. Mr. Williams directed members to the summary of the near-term actions and milestones in the Action Plan appendix. When asked who has received the Action Plan, Mr. Williams replied that it was distributed to the Government Information Technology Services Group, the National Information Infrastructure Security Issues Forum, the Electronic Commerce Acquisition Program Management Office, the E-Mail Program Management Office, NSA, NIST, and the PKI Steering Committee. The Board commended Mr. Williams for working an issue with a real time frame. Mr. Williams was invited to come back and update the Board as he feels appropriate. (See Reference #5.) Common Criteria Update Dr. Stu Katzke, Chief, NIST Computer Security Division, updated the Board on the Common Criteria (CC) effort. He discussed the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation workshop on May 11-12 in Ottawa, Canada. Approximately 40 people from Europe, Canada, the U.S., and Japan participated in the workshop. The workshop served to allow the CC Editorial Board to: - provide general information on the comments received and the planned changes to the document based on these comments; and - receive added clarifications on the reviewers' comments on the document so they can update the document to reflect the expert opinions. The number of assurance levels and where they are were discussed; however, that issue is not as high on the list as the six key global issues below: 1. Document Organization - understandability and usefulness; 2. Extensibility of Requirements - support of ITSEC is unclear; 3. Extensibility of CC - how to maintain the CC; 4. Protection Profile - relationship unclear; 5. Protection Profile - selection of requirements; and 6. Dependencies and Binding - completeness/correctness. Dr. Katzke said that the NCSC plans to perform evaluation trials by January of 1996. (See Reference #6.) Mr. Charlie Baggett volunteered to brief the Board in September on trial evaluations. (ACTION - SECRETARY AND MR. BAGGETT.) The discussion then turned to the Board's March resolution (95-2) which recommended to NIST and NSA that a statement be made regarding the equivalence of C2-level evaluated products. Mr. Lou Giles of NSA briefed the Board on NIST and NSA's response to that recommendation. In July, NIST and NSA will publicly clarify the relationship between TCSEC C2, ITS EC E2, and CTCPEC T1 levels to encourage federal programs with requirements for evaluated low assurance level products to use trusted products evaluated at these levels. NIST and NSA will publish a Bulletin in July 1995, which will describe a structure for the selection and acceptability of these products. The Bulletin will include an appendix listing the products evaluated and in evaluation under each criteria. (See Reference #7.) Mr. Giles used the phrase "selection preferences for C2 requirements." Some Board members said that the word preference takes away from equivalency and they are concerned that the list of requirements is a preference list rather than a menu. Selection preferences for C2 requirement are as follows: - C2 products on U.S. EPL; - Products under U.S. TCSEC Evaluation (C2); - FPC2/T1 products on Canadian EPL or FC2/E2 products on European EPL; and - Products under CTCPEC (FPC2/T1) or ITSEC (FC2/E2) Evaluation. Some Board members are concerned that the list suggests that U.S. products be used first, thereby implying that they are better than other products. In discussion, most Board members recommended they order the products in rank of completed vs non-completed. Mr. Giles updated TTAP accomplishments. To date the work group has performed the following: - Drafted an SOW for TTAP Developmental Commercial Evaluation (Feb. 95); - Annotated outline for document on what it takes to be accredited under NVLAP (Mar. 95); - Drafted first suggested evaluator actions for TCSEC Class C2 provided to NVLAP for review (Apr. 95); - Drafted second suggested evaluator actions for TCSEC Class C2 (May 95); and - Drafted first Technical Review Board expectations of a team (May 95). Future activities for TTAP include: - Contract for TTAP Developmental Commercial Evaluation (Jun/Jul 95); - Start TTAP Developmental Commercial Evaluation (Aug. 95); - Conduct lessons learned from contracted effort (May 96); and - Expect NVLAP to accredit several Labs (NLT Aug. 96). (See Reference #8.) Privacy Update [Statement by Mr. Robert Gellman omitted] Discussion During discussion time, Board members voted on and unanimously approved the minutes of the March, 1995 meeting. The Board engaged in a lengthy discussion concerning PDD-29 and the intent of the charter of the SPB. Board members debated the idea of a single policy focal point. They also debated the phrase in PDD-29 "National Security." One Board member reminded the Board of a Government Computer News article that PDD-29 appears to be clouded as to whether the PDD intended to include sensitive unclassified information in addition to national security (i.e., classified/Warner Amendment) information. A motion was moved and seconded directing the chairman to draft a letter to the Co-Chairs of the SPB and the SPF, articulating the need for clarification of PDD-29 and the SPB charter. (ACTION-CHAIRMAN AND SECRETARY.) PKI Steering Committee Activities Mr. Robert Rosenthal, Manager, NIST Protocol Security Group, briefed the Board on the activities of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Steering Committee. Three working groups reside under the Committee: technical (chaired by IRS), business and legal (chaired by Treasury), and users (chaired by the SI-PMO). The Steering Committee continues to liaise with the Canadian and Swedish governments, the Internet community, the American Bankers and American Bar Associations and the U. S. Council for International Business. The Steering Committee is exploring the establishment of a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRDA) with industry organizations to: - Research and Develop a PKI Interoperability Test Plan and a NIST PKI Test Facility; - Publish test procedures and lessons learned; and - Develop and Demonstrate Interoperable Certificate Services on a wide variety of Internetworked Communications Facilities. Mr. Rosenthal said there are workshops and special projects slated for the future to include a tri-sponsored PKI Invitational Workshop Series by NIST, the Security Infrastructure Program Management Office and MITRE. Also planned, are some interdivision projects such as: PKI, time and attendance, travel, procurement, and others that will be available on the "NISTNET." NISTNET is a campus-wide local area network for NIST. (See Reference #9.) DISA/ARPA/NSA Memorandum Of Understanding Briefing Mr. John Davis, Director, NSA's National Computer Security Center, briefed the Board on the Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) between the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), and the National Security Agency (NSA). He said that ARPA and NSA are the major INFOSEC research programs in government and the major user of INFOSEC is DISA. The Information Systems Security Research Joint Technology Office was established by a Memorandum Of Agreement (MOA) in March of 1995 and signed by the Directors of ARPA/DISA/NSA to coordinate security research efforts with a heavy reliance upon commercial technology. The following nine items were called out in the agreement: 1) Strategic Planning, 2) Review and Coordinate, 3) Evaluate Proposals, 4) Metrics, 5) Prototypes, 6) COTS, 7) Standards, 8) Crypto and 9) Public. Mr. Davis said this is work in progress and they are looking for useful results. Vendors will show their products at the NIST/NCSC National Information Systems Security Conference (NISSC) in Baltimore in October. Mr. Davis stated that the intent is not to focus only on DoD. A Defense solution would be costly, therefore, commercial products with built in security are needed. (See Reference #10.) Public Comment [Omitted]

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Re: toolkits?
by droelke＠spirit.aud.alcatel.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > > >Third - provide services to the citizenry. For example - provide > >a public key server. Or how about a digital time-stamping service. > >If the crap was kept out of these services, and they were free for > >anyone to use, then it would advance the idea of encouraging people to > >use crypto in their daily lives. > > > > Now were getting specific. These are things that us ordinary folk can do > which show the 'leaders' how to follow. What software, hardware, > applications, support and sysadmin experience is required and where is it > available on what terms. What are the cash flow opportunities to support > such services? PGP Public key servers - see MIT's key server as a good example. Digital time-stamping service - see Betsie (sp?) from Bellcore as a basis. These are things that are already out there, BUT I think that we can use more services like this. Comercially there probably isn't the demand to support these yet, but I think we have a chicken and the egg problem here. People can't use encryption easily if they don't have good access to the tools, but people won't demand services like key-servers until they start useing the tools. A good service would be to provide and support distribution of of privacy enhancing tools to universities and companies that want them. i.e. have people who will help set up firewalls, PGP, encrypted telnet (pick your flavor), etc. A state wide group that has grants to provide internet connectivity for universities and companies could have a person that does nothing but work with these companies to help incorporate encryption into their networks. For instance, my employeer has hardware engineers putting VLSI designs on tape, and then fed-ex'ing them to the chip manufacturer, because they can't get good encryption set up that allows secured ftp transfers. (and get the manufacturer to agree to the same encryption technology, etc. etc. etc.) Yes - I know that most of this stuff is out there already, but having people *willing* to integrate it for you without charging an arm and a leg would go a long way towards convincing the suits that this is a *good* thing. Dan ------------------------------------------------------------------ Dan Oelke Alcatel Network Systems droelke(a)aud.alcatel.com Richardson, TX

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Photuris 512bit Prime Challenge? (Re: Photuris Primality verification needed)
by Richard.Johnson＠Colorado.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hilarie Orman <ho(a)cs.arizona.edu> wrote: >> Well, since we already require 56-bit DES in ESP in the interests of >> promoting basic interoperability, wouldn't a 512-bit prime be >> similarly sufficient? > >If you are willing to accept that in all likelihood, one year from >now, some group will announce that can "crack" all key exchanges that >using the published modulus, then sure, call it sufficient. Sounds like someone just threw down a gauntlet. Is it even possible to do the precomputations in a distributed manner in less than a year or two? Or maybe starting a few years down the road? It would be nice to give Photuris a chance to get established before the least common denoninator shared modulus gets taken out, if we even can take it out. Richard -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMKDVvfobez3wRbTBAQHpkgP9Fg+MGMz8U6Bisv45PZohoZxWbiEYuxJK tg8oHD8TZRQsuqCwveWFRTnmPGiGKs2cBs5ZKXkFNU6ot7lZLO8d/1BSSjo0yX2Q 0FSXDSaBjUKIFcjHHGYBWrZZ+gjc/bdab94EqQvmFSUmAp73/mnKZgcyUPGL3Cmt MW3jZhlVMdw= =bfsQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: expiration dates on cryptography
by David E. Smith 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 07:21 AM 11/8/95 -0500, John Curtis wrote: >Given that trust is often of an ephemeral nature, it would be >quite useful to set time limits on secrets. Would it be possible >to cryptographically protect a secret such that it could not be >decrypted after a certain time? It's a nice idea, really. The problem is - how do you verify the absolute time? For instance, by resetting a PC's internal clock you can instantly circumvent that measure. Possibly by forcing the application to consult a "reliable" clock like one of the cesium clocks, but that could be hacked. Unless you can absolutely, reliably, and without fear/danger of being hacked around, verify the correct time, self-destruct crypto probably won't happen. ----- David E. Smith, dsmith(a)midwest.net, PGP ID 0x92732139 http://www.midwest.net/scribers/dsmith

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Re: DejaNews all over again--a URL for Usenet Searching
by Kevin S. Van Horn 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) wrote: > >Paul Robichaux pointed me to another searcher, http://www.excite.com/, >which _does_ index the alt groups. I'm sure more are coming, reaching >further and further back in time. A small point of information. I work for Architext, the company that provides the excite service. We only keep the last two weeks of USENET news around, and don't keep any archives going further back than that. USENET is just too damn huge for us to go to the trouble of keeping comprehensive archives around without good evidence of demand for it among our target audience. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Kevin S. Van Horn | Uncle Sam needs YOU! vanhorn(a)atext.com | But not vice versa. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMKEY8ioZzwIn1bdtAQFFEgGA1e12AazfexoLEvlrQDWFGPqFOXafAgBZ NxKKd+nWATgsUQhwI7jQ0P8pTQ9XvI1k =7sgB -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Return of the Cyber-Censors
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Washington Post, November 8, 1995. Return of the Cyber-Censors [Editorial] When the Senate passed its ill-advised "Exon amendment" to the telecommunications bill last spring, which would criminalize the transmission of obscene, pornographic or "indecent" material on the Internet, the measure got an overwhelming 84 votes, many of them from senators who didn't understand the implications of the move. Only a few weeks later, the House went even more overwhelmingly the other way, voting 420 to 4 for an amendment (co-sponsored by Reps. Ron Wyden and Christopher Cox) that would bar the Federal Communications Commission from regulating cyberspace and would instead make it legally easier for commercial Internet providers to use their own technical tools to regulate questionable material. The contrast was the result of a burst of public discussion in which more technologically astute members, including House Speaker Newt Gingrich, caught on to the disturbing fact that the kinds of far-reaching liability imposed by Sen. James Exon's formulation -- hastily adapted from an existing measure on telephone transmission -- would cripple practically any commercial Internet provider and effectively lame the new medium as a venue for moneymaking activity. Now these vastly different measures are in conference committee along with the rest of the telecommunications bill (in other areas of which, we remind readers once again, The Washington Post Co. has some interests). But the seeming clarity afforded by the House response to the Exon amendment and by Mr. Gingrich's appreciation of the need for untrammeled development of the new medium is nowhere to be seen. A letter from Christian Coalition head Ralph Reed, Phyllis Schlafly and other prominent spokesmen for the religious right is urging the conferees toward an Exon-style approach that's as destructive now as it ever was. The House bill also could end up including an amendment sponsored by Rep. Henry Hyde that adds some criminal liability to the transmission of obscene (but not "indecent") images via the new technologies. The argument against "criminalizing" the transmission of "indecent" images via the Internet remains stark and simple, and it goes not to the awfulness of child pornography or even to the ability of parents to control what their children do on the computer (a wide variety of off-the-shelf technological filters now exist that let parents do this themselves) but to the impossibility of regulation by the electronic middleman industries that are developing. Commercial providers such as America Online continue to pass along millions of messages a day, the interactive "newsgroups" unfold quickly and internationally, and the kind of central filtering envisioned by would-be regulators erases the very quality that makes the Internet a live and promising medium -- its inexpensive accessibility. If the Internet were like a telephone system, there would at least be the possibility of identifying a specific "sender" and "recipient." On the Internet it's "receivers" who do the selecting of what to look at and where. Giving those recipients the tools they need remains the way to go. The conferees should resist the urge to censor cyberspace.

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Cybercensor in Singapore
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

NY Times, November 8, 1995, Editorial Cyberspace in Singapore. The Internet Threat to Official Censorship "The Internet is like fire," Mr. Yeo said. "If you don't learn how to control it, it will burn you." In Singapore, a little democracy can be a dangerous thing. Singapore. From his 37th-floor office overlooking Singapore Strait, George Yeo can survey the oil refineries and bustling dockyards that helped make Singapore the trade and financial center of Southeast Asia. But the view that interests the Minister of Information and the Arts these days is not the vista beyond his window. It is the image on the computer terminal at his desk. Mr. Yeo, like the rest of Singapore's top politicians, wants his country to be a leader in the manufacture and use of computer technology without relinquishing the Government's chokehold on the dissemination of information in Singapore. Singapore's effort to find a balance point will be closely watched by other Asian countries that mix capitalist economics with authoritarian politics. The difficulty was underlined last week. Even as Mr. Yeo worried about the perils of the Internet, the Government announced it was relocating 500 industrial enterprises to make room for the development of advanced electronics manufacturing plants. Contradictions like that abound in Singapore, a country that eludes simple classification. With its gleaming skyscrapers and shopping arcades, it can seem like Dallas transplanted to the South China Sea. Conversely, the dominance of one political party and the presence of a paternalistic Government can make it feel like a remnant of the Soviet bloc. Salman Rushdie's "Satanic Verses" and Cosmopolitan magazine are banned, yet the city's largest bookstore stocks a selection of contemporary literature and the works of Chee Soon Juan, Singapore's opposition leader. Singapore's gaudy prosperity challenges the American faith that individual liberty is essential for a vital marketplace. George Yeo is the personification of that challenge. Born in Singapore in 1954, educated at Cambridge University and Harvard Business School, he is disdainful of the cacophony and untidiness of American democracy. Like Lee Kuan Yew, the architect and ruler of modern Singapore, he believes the vulnerabilities of his ethnically divcrse city-state can be best handled by a strong government that encourages a sense of community and limits individual rights. But controlling semiconductors is not the same as controlling newspapers, television networks or political opponents. With the aggressive use of libel and slander statutes Singapore's leaders have intimidated the newspapers that publish here, including The International Herald Tribune. To control television broadcasting, the Government has banned household use of satellite dishes. Some political pluralism is permitted, but no one doubts the primacy of Mr. Lee's People's Action Party. Recognizing the risk of bottling up public demand for foreign television broadcasts, Singapore's leaders are wiring the country for cable television. That way viewers will receive many more channels, including MTV, while the Government will still be able to screen out programming it finds objectionable. It is the quintessential Singapore solution. Singapore's approach to controlling cyberspace is equally ingenious, but harder to enforce. Mr. Yeo, essentially, hopes to control the Internet by embracing it. He is encouraging use of the Internet by equipping schools with computers, and establishing systems that allow Singaporeans to link up with the computer network by dialing a local phone number. The catch is that the Government will be able to monitor use of the Internet that goes through local servers, and is already intervening to block material it considers pornographic. The Government has blunted an uncensored Internet forum on Singapore political life by assembling a group of users who make sure the Government's views are represented. Mr. Yeo concedes that more sophisticated and affluent users can outflank many of his defenses by dialing into the Internet through foreign phone systems. His purpose, he says, is to lay down markers for citizens, expecting that most will abide by them. "The Internet is like fire," he said. "If you don't learn how to control it, it will burn you." In Singapore, a little democracy can be a dangerous thing. Philip Taubman -----

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Re: expiration dates on cryptography
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:21 PM 11/8/95, John Curtis wrote: >The discussion between Mr. May and Mr. Shields concerning >time-release cryptograhy raised an interesting question in my >mind. > >Given that trust is often of an ephemeral nature, it would be >quite useful to set time limits on secrets. Would it be possible >to cryptographically protect a secret such that it could not be >decrypted after a certain time? An interesting twist. There are two broad things to consider: 1. Cryptography, what can mathematically be done. 2. Economics and social systems, what "business ecologies" can do. Pure cryptography is about #1, with minimal consideration of #2. Much of what interests me involves #2. How this relates to your interesting question goes as follows. Even the "timed-release cryptography" is NOT a pure cryptographic system, as the idea of "temporal state" in crypto is iffy. That is, clocks can be jiggered. Even "sealed clocks" can be jiggered. But just as Haber and Stornetta's "digital timestamps" use time, such a thing is possible once _economic agents_ enter the picture. And once economic considerations are used. The "timed-release crypto" system depends for its security on the likelihood that N agents holding pieces of something--something they don't know the value of--will likely hold those pieces for as long as they are being paid. (If you want to discuss why this is likely, even in a world of mistrust and malice, we can discuss it.) "Self-destruct crypto" would work roughly the same way: -- N agents holding pieces of puzzle, contracted to destroy those pieces on such-and-such date. It is likely that some or even all of them would comply, if properly paid. Caveats: 1. Sure, they could make backups. Probably do. But just as archival files are shredded, a system for eliminating "expired" files would be possible. 2. Sure, they could cheat. Ditto for "timed-release crypto." (Time is symmetric for this problem.) 3. Again, the security of the system to a large extent depends on the N agents not knowing what the pieces are part of, nor knowing who the other holders are. They never know whether a given piece is part of an audit, a test, etc. 4. There is a slight asymmetry, despite what I said, in that one can "test" agents to see if they'll release their pieces as contractually obligated to, but one can never be sure that agents have actually destroyed their pieces. 5. Still, distributing a secret amongst, say, 30 agents and having them "agree" to destroy their pieces on January 20, 2002, seems pretty likely to result in the collective secret (n-out-of-m pieces) being recoverable after that date. Such a system would need more consideration of backup strategies, etc. (If everyone is carefully backing up and the backup tapes are somewhere, then quite clearly the secret would not be gone; hence the issue of backup strategies.) >I suspect that the laws of thermodynamics might prohibit this >in classical cryptography because as a message expired the >amount of entropy would decrease. Quantum cryptography >might work, but that will be science fiction for some time to >come. I'm always interested in the links between information theory, algorithmic complexity, and notions of entropy, but I am skeptical in the extreme that the "laws of thermodynamics" have anything to do with whether one can throw away bits. If I make a list on my computer, and then erase it, have I violated a "law of thermodynamics"? Of course not. --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: expiration dates on cryptography
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[ Hmmm, maybe I'd better get this message out quickly, before it expires... :-] At 07:21 AM 11/8/95 -0500, John Curtis <jbell(a)capecod.net> wrote: >The discussion between Mr. May and Mr. Shields concerning >time-release cryptography raised an interesting question in my >mind. > >Given that trust is often of an ephemeral nature, it would be >quite useful to set time limits on secrets. Would it be possible >to cryptographically protect a secret such that it could not be >decrypted after a certain time? Decryption is equivalent to knowing a secret plus doing some work. There are two ways to make information available/unavailable - by depending on calculations from known data, or by having people agree to publish/delete it. The former method is trustable, but doesn't have time built in to it - either you know stuff or you don't. The latter method is harder to trust - you can build contractual mechanisms to encourage people to keep their commitments, and use crypto methods like splitting shared secrets to limit the impact of some of them not keeping them - but it's basically not cryptographic. Getting people to keep information secret for a while and then publish is possible; that's within their control. Getting people to keep information public, and then delete all the copies they own is possible, but if the information is _public_, anybody in the world could have a copy - deleting it requires finding them all, and getting them all to agree to delete it. That's _much_ harder. You could build a system where an escrow agent keeps a piece of information private, but available upon request, and deletes it on a certain date. That lets you know that _if_ nobody's asked for the information by then, and the agent has done its job, that nobody else will be able to decrypt it. Again, you can secret-share among multiple agents to decrease the impact of defaults (either failure-to-delete or failure-to-deliver.) A related approach is for the agent to provide a service of decrypting data encrypted with the agent's public key, and agreeing only to decrypt data before or after some date specified in the message. Another technique you can use is to for the agent to keep the data until paid for delivery; the retrieval token includes a digital check with an expiration date. In this case, you're trusting the bank to not honor the check after its expiration date, and the escrow agent not to deliver the data without getting paid. For this service, you want checks rather than cash - if the check goes stale, the money is still in your account. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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