December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Assassination Politics(tm) was V-chips, CC, and Motorcycle Helmets
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:42 PM 3/8/96 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: >Since my name keeps getting dragged into this discussion, I will share with >youall the conclusions I reached after my last set of exchanges with Jim >Bell. > >(1) Assassination Politics (AP) will be most useful to a fired-up group of >people who want to silence a single person. Madeline Murray O'Hare comes >to mind. (She was a Texas atheist who challenged school prayer and won.) I think that's a misleading conclusion. While it may, arguably, be "most useful" useful to one kind of person or another, that doesn't mean that it won't be, cumulatively, vastly more useful to the rest of the population. To carry the gun analogy a bit further, somebody might argue that "a handfun will be most useful to a criminal in the commission of a robbery." Aside from gloriously ignoring the self-defense issue, this interpretation falsely implies that the fact that SOME bad person might benefit from it justifies banning them. >(2) Jim Bell and I disagree strongly on the market price for assassinations. Is this relevant? And I don't recall where the "disagreement" you describe exists: I think there will be some people killed for $1000, some won't be killed for less than $100,000. >(3) Jim Bell and I disagree on the number of deaths needed to deter someone >who believes in what they do. In our discussion, this question comes down >to: are IRS employees more like corporate consultants or like soldiers. It's far easier to "believe in what they do" when nobody is out there planning to kill them for doing it. >(4) I think that if someone can be traced as profiting from a AP death, >e.g. through winning a gamble on the date/time of death, that person's >whereabouts at the time of death will be carefully investigated. By whom will it be investigated? And it's merely a matter of ensuring that the payments can be made anonymously; I would consider anyone who tried to do such traces to be an enemy, and I'm sure anyone who believed in the underlying idea would as well. >(5) While killing someone whose name and residence are known is easy, and >the killer is likely to get away with it, does that mean that killing >someone who has been marked as having a price on her head is as easy? I >assume her friends and neighbors will protect her. Question: Let's suppose your neighbor had a $20,000 price on his head. Even if, arguably, you didn't want to see him die, you also wouldn't want somebody to drive a car through his front wall, filled with 1000 pounds of ANFO, and blow his house up, along with doing tens of thousands of dollars of damage to your house as well. I would say you would have somewhat of a motivation to ensure that when the killing eventually occurred, it occurred in a way that wouldn't negatively affect you. > The TV cameras will be >running 24 hours a day. This will, at a minimum raise the price of >assassinations. That won't mean much if the "minimum price" went to $20,000. This could easily be raised for many government employees. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: Artist self censorship (Was Chinese net-censorship) Noise
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:22 PM 3/9/96, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: > guilt. The judge then sentenced her to 30 days at MCI Framingham. We ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > are currently trying to raise money to pay for her appeal. Man, making someone work for one of the Phone Companies...that's a pretty harsh sentence! Maybe that's how that cute "MCI girl" we see on television got assigned to MCI? (Or is this MCI an example of AOL, Acronym OverLoading?) --Klaus!

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Re: Bootable disks
by tallpaul＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My understanding was that the parallel-port version of the Syquest drive would also be bootable. That is, you would boot the driver off a floppy and then the rest of the boot sequence would be handled by whatever was on the Syquest drive. THis, I thought, would let you install something like linux and the various other software to give you a very portable anon server, neatly containing a separate OS and all the "incriminating evidence" while the regular hard disk held nothing other than Windows and Doom. Is this not the case? --tallpaul On Mar 06, 1996 14:55:44, 'JonWienke(a)aol.com' wrote: >I recently installed an IDE version of the Syquest EZ 135 hard drive for a >client. Since it is a fully functional hard drive, it is bootable, unlike >the parallel port model. The biggest advantage to this type of drive is that >the cartridge (and any potentially incriminating data) can be quickly removed >and destroyed (burn it, smash it with a large heavy object, insert it into a >bulk eraser) or taken to a secure location for storage. Also, this type of >drive provides an excellent place to put swap files, which have an annoying >tendency to pick up sensitive data. That is less of a problem if you can >remove the cartridge and store it in a secure location when not processing >sensitive data. > >Jonathan Wienke >

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Re: FCC & Internet phones
by Mutant Rob 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security wrote: > You seem to forget that the Internet is just about the *only* electronic > communications media not controlled/licensed by the FCC in the US. The > FCC also prohibits use of cryptography by those with amateur licenses. Yes... but the Internet is not like HAM radio. The FCC has no jurisdiction outside the US, and it would cause various problems for them to try to regulate the use of IPhone or how ISPs operate. On another note, I wonder how the Leahy bill would affect use of crypto by HAMs.... - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMUHENyoZzwIn1bdtAQE1XwF9EP/jLWWk2gd41oNnkNF88lhTpa7PvGEU iEBdP8oalQfanQz/WcBjYQ9ilXEXxOqo =+FDh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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EXR_ciz
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-5-96. TWP: "Untangling the Spy Network's Webs." Chairman Combest of the House intelligence committee yesterday proposed making the CIA's DO into a separate service and splitting the NRO into two giant technical agencies to handle satellites. The CIA would control most long-range intelligence work, some of which is now handled by the CIO and some by the NSA. The biggest change in terms of size would put the NSA, which has more than 25,000 analysts, in a new Technical Collection Agency that would also take in the managerial functions of NRO and parts of imagery analysis from CIO. 3-5-96. NYT: "Proposal Would Reorganize U.S. Intelligence Agencies." The intelligence services are held in low regard by the public and some leaders -- State complains about the quality of analytical papers; Defense bad-mouths the quantity of intelligence; and Congress gripes about too many secrets and not enough accountability. Rep. Goss, a former member of the CIA's DO, said the proposal aimed to rebuild the credibility of the agency's spies: "The whole exercise we're going through is meant to restore that." EXR_ciz

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Re: (INFO) Leahy/Goodlatte introduce crypto bill
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12:17 PM 3/5/96 -0500, Voters Telecommunications Watch wrote: Dear Mr. Sadfar, By now I'm sure you've read a few items that I posted not only to you, but also to the cypherpunks mailing list, as well as the NWLIBERTARIANS(a)teleport.com list. I believe you have made a grievous error in your position apparently supporting the Leahy bill. As you presumably understand by now, based on your description of the bill it contains an extraordinarily serious flaw, in that it makes a new crime concerning the USE of encryption. Ostensibly, this is "reasonable," but I've already presented a scenario on Cypherpunks (also posted to you; as I write this it may not yet have appeared there, but I copied you) in which the government uses this provision maliciously to go after anonymous remailers. While that was merely a specific example, almost any service that protects the identity of its customers and allows them network access is potentially at a serious risk, because the US government has been known to fabricate a crime (for example, the "Amateur Action" BBS case from a few years ago) in order to make criminals out of non-criminals. As you have quoted it, Leahy's bill allows the government to, in effect, "stalk" a service provider (anonymous encrypted remailer, anonymous digital cash bank, Internet access provider, etc) and create a crime that involves the provider well beyond the standards described in this bill. The government can CREATE a crime, "to order" as it were, and snare the service provider in the net, despite the fact he has done nothing wrong. (In fact, he could be "guilty" even if there was no way, short of going out of business, to avoid the "crime.") This, I hope you agree, is totally unacceptable, but despite this, you said: >This provision only applies to you if you are using encryption to >specifically foil a law enforcement investigation AND the communication >relates to a felony AND you are using the communication to commit the >felony. VTW feels this is a fairly narrowly drawn statute that is not >likely to be easily abused. Frankly, you made an error, and "it was a doozy!" But what I fear is that you will "dig your heels in" and hesitate to admit it, and continue on calling this "a good bill." You _would_ be right about that, except for the specific portion that is referred to above. (In addition, as Padgett Petersen noticed on Cypherpunks, that portion of the bill seemingly contains an error of phrasing, although we can't tell and we are depending on your quoting of that bill. Please verify that the quotation you made was accurate, and please carefully read that portion to see if you can identify the problem both Mr. Petersen and I observed. Since it just about reverses the entire meaning of the paragraph, it is vital to know what the actual bill said and meant.) I strongly recommend that you _DRAMATICALLY_ change the tone of your support: Please make it clear that your support for this bill is ENTIRELY conditional on removing the offending section. (I see little or no problem with your description of the rest of the bill, except for a few items I mention below.) I certainly invite any challenge you'd care to make to my reasoning and logic: If you feel I'm wrong in my estimation of what the government could do with that portion of the bill, say so and back up your analysis. If, on the other hand, you recognize that I'm right, or at least on the right track, I think you have a certain moral responsibility to ensure that this "wolf in sheep's clothing" doesn't get by the shepherd. Remember, in your press release you said: >VTW believes this legislation is an excellent initiative. It would be far more accurate to say, "This legislation COULD BE an excellent initiative, if a short section were removed." >We predict that the White House will do everything in their power to >prevent Senator Leahy from liberating PGP. He will need your help to >push forward. If this is REALLY true, then he will have to listen to our suggestions, right? People listen WHEN THEY HAVE TO CONVINCE YOU OF SOMETHING. Failing to make Leahy aware of what we consider terribly wrong with that bill would be irresponsible. If Leahy REALLY wants the bill passed, and "all" the potential supporters insist on the removal of the offending section, he will have no choice but to do so, since it has already been widely predicted that the administration will oppose it. If, indeed, they will oppose it, they will oppose it REGARDLESS of whether it contains that bad spot or not. >Over the next few months, VTW will be coordinating a coalition of >names, many of which are already familiar to you. This coalition will >ask you to call and write to Congress, expressing your opinion, and >threatening to back it up with the ultimate legitimate weapon of >democracy, your vote in this election year. While I do indeed intend to vote in this election year, as you may be aware I believe there are other weapons the public will eventually be able to use against recalcitrant politicians and government employees of all types. The government is presumably well aware of my position, and it would certainly not be unexpected if they were desperately trying to avoid what I consider to be an inevitable conclusion. This particular bad section, in what is probably an otherwise-good bill, seems tailor-made to fight against developments that I think this society and "our" government can't avoid, and shouldn't avoid. I'm not asking you to endorse, or for that matter even acknowledge, my theories. However, you should at least take notice of the fact that Congress' motivations are clearly to maintain its power over the citizenry, and they will presumably act in predictable fashion to achieve this goal. We've already got them on the run; they can't pass Clipper and they knew they couldn't prosecute Zimmermann, and their position on ITAR is resoundingly criticized by individuals and industry alike. Most people agree that these rules have to change; it would be a tragedy if we "gave away the store" just to get a few trinkets. The fact is, this bill didn't have to contain the offending section, and it doesn't have to keep it. If we make our absolute opposition to that portion clear, who will stand up and support it? Only those people within government who secretly want this bill to pass, that's who! ____________________________________________________________ >A FEW QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS > >Q: Wasn't Goodlatte one of the bad guys on the Communications Decency Act? > Why is he sponsoring this bill, and can we trust him? >A: Goodlatte did indeed introduce the fatal amendment that made the House > version of the Telecomm Bill unsupportable. Nevertheless, VTW has found > that a Congressperson's vote on one sort of bill is little indication of > his or her stand on others. VTW wil closely examine any change in the > language of the bill throughout its Congressional life. Well, frankly, it looks like SOMEBODY managed to sneak in a pit into the cherry pie. (or a worm into the apple!) I wonder who could have done this? What do you want to bet that there aren't any fingerprints on it?!? >Q: Does this create a new obligations for key holders to disclose keys that > they wouldn't have to comply with before? >A: No. In fact, this bill makes it harder for a law enforcement official to > retrieve a key from a key holder, by requiring a wiretap request instead > of a simple search warrant. In my opinion, key escrow agents should be required to inform THEIR CLIENT, the actual user of the key, BEFORE giving the key to the cops. They should also be obligated to fight any such request if the key holder requests it. (Remember, if key-escrow is really voluntary, then it is a contract between the encryption-user and the key escrow agent, and the encryption user should be able to put whatever conditions he wishes on that relationship. Presumably, he would not have entered into that relationship unless he was able to control the disposition of the key.) Furthermore, the cops should not be allowed to do any decryption of any material wiretapped before they possess the key itself. In summary, I think you really need to revisit your support for this bill. It is only a short distance away from being a good bill, but that is a trip we must make if we are to protect and even expand our freedom. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMT5aHPqHVDBboB2dAQEACwP/eDky+Gi0kebbAWPYO9dX9HCQTzac3m3v YVyW4iEtGrQE78/Hmi4M2m9l4sDA3qOaFZtFhImRc4JVVWNy1Yp8JzTPbjESiB4M Q3ppLV7S9sQmYQnHIHbpJu9YVQ/j+cMIwp9tOI0FNLbXIKWhZz4t+6bfiqJWUgZK awsbDpXjYaU= =3HJl -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Leahy bill nightmare scenario?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 12:19 PM 3/8/96 -0800, Dan Weinstein wrote: >> Second, if what they're charging is the hindrance of an >> felony investigation, it isn't clear to me why they would be >> limiting the charging of that "crime" to only those actually who >> have committed a felony. (logic isn't the normal mode of thought for >> a government employee, you realize.) > >I agree with your concerns here, but I find it hard to believe that >the courts would allow a broader interpretation. Unfortunately, what you find "hard to believe" I find easy to believe. Remember, if this bill is passes, it doesn't merely affect YOU, it affects ME. So I suggest the burden of proof is on YOU to show that these provisions aren't going to be maliciously interpreted by the courts. >> Third, all they have to do is to "suspect" the person of a felony, >> and a >> "felony investigation" starts. That would presumably make him >> guilty of the Leahy bill's provision, regardless of whether he is >> actually participating in the crime supposedly being investigated. > >Here you are dead wrong, the bill specifically states: "in furtherance >of a felony." Its like those laws that let them charge someone with >murder in the first if someone dies while you are commiting another >felony. They must prove the original felony before they can get you >on the murder one. The real purpose of this provision, as I read it, >is to give longer sentences to criminals that use crypto. I'm not a lawyer, but I assume neither are you. Please explain the LEGAL DEFINTION of "in furtherance of a felony." If you can't, then you simply don't know how far they will go. And you're depending on the reasonableness of the government for the interpretion. >> Fourth, I gave what I considered to be a clear example of the >> hypothetical misuse of an encrypted remailer by the cops, one that >> would arguably make the remailer operator guilty of some >> "reasonable" anti-kiddie-porn statute. At that point, _he_is_ the >> target of the investigation. Unless you can show that this kind of >> action by the government is impossible, I consider it to be not >> merely possible but almost certain to occur. > >Again, the problem I see with your scenario is that I don't believe >that the courts will interpret it that way. What you think is irrelevant. Most people probably didn't realize what the government did in the Amateur Action BBS case was "legal," either. But they did it anyway. > My interpretation is that >if they serve a warrent and I don't decrypt for them and they can >prove a felony, then I will be subject to the listed punishment. Are you assuming that you have the key? Remember, if you run an encrypted anonymous remailer, and assuming you do it honestly, you won't be keeping records as to the source of the note. Thus, if they "serve a warrant" and you CAN'T decrypt the message (or tell them where it came from) then why aren't you already guilty? Remember, the wording of the proposed law doesn't require that you have full knowledge of the crime involved, merely that you act "in furtherance" of it... If you don't possess the key, but you explicitly ran your remailer so that you never it, just so you couldn't relinquish it, you have structured your operation too thwart any investigations. You are ALREADY guilty. This may not sound reasonable, but the government no longer (if it ever did) considers "reasonableness" to be an impediment to their actions. >> Fifth, it isn't clear what amount of knowledge is necessary to >> "trigger" this clause, especially in its current flawed state. >> Since ISP's and encrypted remailers might know, in general, that >> their systems can and probably are being used for SOME criminal >> activity, even if they can't identify it or the user, or decrypt it, >> etc, a broad interpretation of the resulting law could easily >> de-facto prohibit any business practices (i.e., allowing users to >> use encryption) that prevents full-scale monitoring and/or tracing. > >I disagree, it states you must "willfully endeavor" to use the >encryption as a means of obstructing the investigation. To me, this >means that it is the motivation for using the encryption. Question: What, exactly, is the motivation of a person running an anonymous remailer? His motivation is clear: To allow people to send anonymously untraceable messages. Assuming he's of ordinary levels of intelligence or beyond, he is aware that somebody may some day use his system for illegal purposes. You're going to have to explain why a court _CAN'T_ interpret this as being in violation of the law. > If I set >up an encrypting remailer for the purpose of allowing free exchange >of ideas, I don't believe I would be liable under this law. Your optimism is touching. It is also vastly misguided. >The >only way I could see a remailer charged under this is if he had solid >evidence that a specific user was violating the law, and took no >action. Gee, I wish you were right, but my experience with government thugs says that they will do anything they think they can get away with. >> This is only the beginning of the problems with this section. If >> you can explain why nothing I've described could possibly occur, I >> welcome a contrary explanation. > >I see some real problems too, but I do not see the problems with this >provision to be enough to condemn the entire bill. I don't "condemn the entire bill." I would, however, reject the entire bill if that provision remains. And morever, if we make a serious attempt to have it removed, the more they resist removing it the more we should insist it go. >I would like to >see this portion of the bill ammended to make it clear that only >those actually involved in commiting the felony would be held >responsible. There would still be a problem. What's the definition of "actually involved in committing the felony"? Are you aware, for example, that manufacturers of small plastic screw-top vials have been prosecuted and convicted simply because their vials could be used to hold small quantities of drugs such as cocaine and crack? This was a case from a few years back, BTW. I wish I could remember the cite. If you're not aware of these things, WAKE UP! Your optimism disgusts me, because it is entirely unrealistic and based on a rose-colored-glasses view of the government. >> But I would also ask this: Why, exactly, do we need this section? >> We've already been told that the opponents of this bill will fight >> it tooth-and-nail under its current wording; if that's the case then >> the presence of this section is inadequate to appease their >> unhappiness. Therefore, we shouldn't include it in the bill at all; >> it does no good. >> >> Any explanations, Dan? > >You are talking about the fringe, this, I think, was added as an >attempt to bring in those that are in the middle. Why would "those that are in the middle" object to a bill which is little more than a re-statement of rights we already believe we have?!? > That is, Those >that see the need to prevent the use of encryption as a means of >obstructing justice, but feel that we should also have a right to >privacy. There is no viable middle ground here. Any tool can be abused. > To say that there is no delema here is ridiculous, crime is >a serious problem that we are already having a terrible time dealing >with. On the contrary, my opinion is "The _government_ is a serious problem that we are already having a terrible time dealing with." Fortunately, I've found a solution, and the government is trying as hard as it can to prevent it (and "crypto-anarchy" in general) from taking root. > I think Leahy realizes that this provision will be about as >useful as the "use a gun, go to jail" laws, but wants to give those >in the middle to say that they bill will help prevent crime. Ha ha! That's rich! There is no reason that a "pro-encryption" bill has to contain any general "anti-crime" clauses. The average person is afraid of burglars, muggers, murderers, rapists, car thieves. When is the last time the average person was the victim of a crime whose investigation could be "thwarted" by the use of encryption? If you can't think of an example, you've just proved my point: This provision is entirely irrelevant to the average citizen (at least in a "positive" way) and can't be considered a "win" for him. >> Jim Bell >> jimbell(a)pacifier.com >> >> Klaatu Burada Nikto > >Good movie. I'm working on the real-life sequel. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMUG+9fqHVDBboB2dAQFd+QP/SwSs1R7dV7tStxg9Hs7Sf9X+q6rWNfa/ d9xWPRpCS81TRhRnpKUxqJu0HZsGQphaEyPRLm1G4f6Z/ZCWsnzR+0XNv6H+FPMG QKSbCLmgGxnfNEWQmB3BDDJS0KEkNGs6slUvcUS9aRBuKbW6Optu3rYgM/7DCPAq M1QkmlpC2EU= =YeFw -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: U.S. State Dept criticizes Chinese net-censorship
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "Paul S. Penrod" <furballs(a)netcom.com> wrote to Declan: >IF you hold to the premise that self-censorship is based in a >large part on witholding your natural inclination and/or reaction >, then yes the argument can be made that self-censorship occurs >all the time. However, I would submit that J.F.A. is correct and >that your position is but a subset of the original statement. One problem that arise in all of the discussion around this theme is that peoples have very different ideas of the terms "self- interest" and "selfishness". The collectivists and mystics have made us accept the basic premise that selfishness means "acting in a way harmfull to others". They just trained us to blank out the fact that, as rational animals who love life, our best inte- rest might very well coincide with the one of our neighboor. Man, after being a rational animal is also a social animal. There is plenty of crypto relevency in this discussion and it lies in the basic view of Man of the individuals in such discussion. Is Man an intrinsical blood thirsty beast that either kills or cry or is Man a rational animal that can enjoy life in a peaceful and constructive and exciting way? The one who have the first opinion wants more govt, more laws and GKE. The others wants freedom. JFA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMUGA6MiycyXFit0NAQGlLQf8DxmsCoNvqlmbsvb87/IS5UsZOVFXgdG+ cdLSY9A0UDl7bCPtyKJ5V/kvA8VDiL5H4K/Le9yRD6pYcLWf5S9sHdMhM24odhqy 7/7lIK0ud1+4oD0SIfZyPNcSpJc0AWIMn6E6Xa2K/khtjl9qtKvS+byRyZumExrS p3ScxHPe2WJvR2wCN7lnrwzLoj8MA8+XaHomOa7pQme7z+YjmM76gi/8lzt9i+J7 tmGz39UfDQx8QAaq0NfVmUelmT80xsDxCmWU19lgdCoY2P8QGjR8pie/gZPdJiXl LtutVcefHb7cP9gKYXPHwxV4krM2urMhBM2cS469lwQqZY8VYN5NaQ== =SVWp -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Public Key at http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> 2048 bits key ID:C58ADD0D 1996/03/01 fingerprint=52 96 45 E8 20 5A 8A 5E F8 7C C8 6F AE FE F8 91

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Re: Artist self censorship (Was Chinese net-censorship) Noise
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) said: >before taking >a picture he usually asks himself about how this picture is percived, something >the he never thought twice before the FBI raid. > >Mr. Avon should think twice before commenting on self censorship does not >exist, for that could be the difference from having the door kicked in by the >black ninja turtles with the FBI or toning down your work. OK. *THAT* might be interpreted, wrongly, as self-censorship. But words have a *precise* meaning, which unfortunately, I sometimes miss in the english language. The opinion I wrote was in the *context* of the interaction of an artist with a purchaser. In that context, what govern the events is consensuality: everybody acts *uncoerced* to his best advantage. In the case you cite, the *context* is very different. But still, I would not call it "self-censorship". I do not have, on the top of my head, any precise term for it, but maybe FUD, fear of physical violence, survival tactics while harrassed by a thuggish assaulter, etc., would apply... I did not think twice, I thought about it several hundred times... Your comment is *very* interesting. It point out how peoples can so easily blank out contextual information. Forgive my bias but I personnally makes a big distinction between the volitional initiation of physical violence (or menace of) and other situations where it is absent. Regards! JFA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMUF6K8iycyXFit0NAQFoBgf/Tt0zFCaRNJFBwZcxsV/v5ABnjjnAtqoT EDF0OA7+UogWT1MXL8RP58tQ2vTwUWJ1PdK/gdnwlkjpwxC0i4gRx1HpnCLOjRlL UgkUKu5qiyIWKd6upCYCMd1NCbqaffHjWr3pWxVFE/zPaCQ7mlrZZV4QBeV/bKbU djt70BQTa7WFvQwZWkVO7QcxOawjzItyZErusdEIvPz03MqbcqSaQu0NgtEy/Zwu 82CSF10uTL96TzjXm1icASiquDk8Tj+go8WqC1FZ8uK3kFHDDkEuLqzXdtG6sJKK hV4PPfehyjXXXB2CADmXMnXZVLkWU0x5Ig7l/bdOETrPhfl07Di9tQ== =1OeX -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Public Key at http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> 2048 bits key ID:C58ADD0D 1996/03/01 fingerprint=52 96 45 E8 20 5A 8A 5E F8 7C C8 6F AE FE F8 91

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Re: art-stego
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a very good idea. I wish I'd thought of it. Just bear in mind that this form of steganography is getting further away from conventional hiding, and into "pure plausible deniability." In fact, one need not even make a serious attempt to hide the encrypted bits: just call the encrypted file "art" and be done with it! (I'm not saying stego is worthless, just that there's a slippery slope one can get on, with one extreme being this fiction that "this is not an encrypted file, this is _art_!") At 7:18 PM 3/4/96, Jim Miller wrote: >The recent discussion "Chaff in the Channel" got me thinking about an >alternative to hiding random bit streams in picture files. The goal of >steganography, as I see it, is to provide plausible deniability. The Yes, all those critics who point out that steganography (not to mention stenography) is an example of the rightly-maligned "security through obscurity" are missing this point, that steganography arises in situations where the mere act of communicating is itself actionable. (Get caught in Berlin during the war with invisible ink or microdots and get hanged the next morning, whether or not the SS can read the traffic.) >problem with hiding bit streams is that you can never be sure if the >opponent has developed an analysis technique to prove a particular file >contains a suspicious bit pattern. Yes, this is why I suggested (some years back, originally) that noise be deliberately added to even images not intended for communication, as "chaff" to confuse traffic analysts. Your approach is a better one, as the "art stego" market, while small, could be self-sustaining. >The alternative to hiding bit streams is to not hide them. Use them to >generate pretty pictures. For example, modify a fractal image generator >to accept a bit stream as input. Use the bit settings to influence the >values used to iterate the fractal function. You don't have to use >fractals, any function that produces pretty pictures would probably work >as long as there was a way to extract the bit stream from the final >picture. Brute force would probably work fast enough for humans. > >One possibility is a screen saver that produces an "infinite" variety of >pretty pictures by generating a pseudo-random bit stream and using it to >help generate the next background picture. Occasionally, the picture >might be so cool you will want to send it your friends or post it on the >Net or just keep it around to look at. > >The goal is to create an innocent reason for passing around unique images >that contain random bit streams so we don't have to worry if somebody >finds the bit stream. If you live in a country that doesn't outlaw >abstract art you have plausible deniability. Now it's just up to someone to implement this. I don't expect this to be a huge market--remember what's happened to all those Mandelbrot images that were once the rage--but there's a chance it will get established as one of those "cool" apps that are tres trendy for a while. I still would expect that when the Hamas leaders in Gaza are picked up for questioning and "ArtStego" is found on their systems, along with various "abstract artworks" on their disk drives, that Mossad will not be fooled. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Another Motivation for the CDA (Federal Sentencing Guid
by drose＠AZStarNet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sat, 9 Mar 1996, "Dave Emery" wrote: >The article also points out that in a state with a 7% black population 43% of the >three time losers are black. Right on, bro! This is the kind of institutionalized racism that we all deplore! In fact...hey, wait a sec. Hmmm, 7% of the population; what was the percentage of black rioters in the "motorist" Rodney "Why can't we all live together?" King "peace demonstration"? Yo, homes: of the 50K gang members in L.A., what percentage is non-black? Give it a f... (oops) I mean, gosh darn rest. ObCrypto: Perry, please consult Dave Emery. Thanks! --David M. Rose

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Re: Assasination Politics
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 04:51 PM 3/8/96 EDT, E. ALLEN SMITH wrote: >From: IN%"jimbell(a)pacifier.com" "jim bell" 13-FEB-1996 14:53:40.39 >>From: Me >>> A. My previously mentioned problem with a limited but non-libertarian >>>organization. > >>I don't deny that such an organization might spring up. (Anti-abortion >>activists are the group which come most immediately to my mind, BTW. I'm >>not in sympathy with them; quite the opposite.) I've never claimed that >>this system is totally immune to such abuse, in the same way that the seller >>of a gun can certify that it will never be used to commit a crime. +__________^^^ Ooops! my error, I meant "can't." > I understand and agree with the gun argument. However, it's still a >matter of whether Assasination Politics will overall be better or worse than >the current system. The one thing that disappoints me about the result of my presentation of this idea is that I haven't heard any intelligent arguments quantitatively arguing that things will be worse. Other proponents simply agree that the system would be better; most of the opponents don't take the trouble to quantify their objections. >If better, then I'll support it if it becomes necessary (I >still hope for peaceful (or at least relatively peaceful) change - hopefully, >it has not become necessary for the Declaration of Independence's justification >of revolution to be reused). If worse, I won't. I won't try to stop you from >doing so, however (currently, there's no way that I could, for instance). What's interesting is that you see this; yet there are a number of opponents who can't seem to realize that what THEY want (or, for that matter, what _I_ want) may be absolutely irrelevant to what is actually going to happen. > Incidentally, by "support" I am meaning making suggestions for >technical improvements. Admittedly, the degree to which I can do so is limited >by my lack of technical knowledge, but I believe I have thought of some >workable refinements. These are the kind of discussions I'd most want to have. I understand, however, that anybody might hesitate a bit to appear to be actively encouraging such a system. That's why I've decided my best function is to be the initiator of the idea, and the primary educator. Somebody else will actually develop the system, probably without telling me anything. > As well as the obvious problem of unethical assasinations, there is >also that of a negative reputation being given to various cypherpunk-liked >ideas (anonymous remailers, fully anonymous digital cash, etcetera) if someone >notices this. Perhaps, but most (non-net-using) people are so unaware of encryption as to make this irrelevant, I think. >>> Moreover, Jim Bell is ignoring the other sources of propaganda than >>>government in convincing the average person that someone is doing something >>>wrong (when, by my ethics at least, they aren't) - such as religion and >>>various organizations like the PFDA. > >>Again, only a tiny fraction of the population needs to participate... > > However, if more of the population participates, they may do stupid >things like using an organization that might strike at them - just as they >currently support a government that can crack down on them. The minority of >intelligent people - the tiny fraction needed for this to potentially work - >isn't a factor for this part. In other words, I'm more worried about too _many_ >people - the wrong people - participating rather than too few. Well, there's not a great deal that we can do to prevent it. Five years ago, I'm sure the then-users of the Internet were fearful of all the newbies to come; even today, we may subtly fear those to come. In other words, once WE'RE on the lifeboat, we don't want anyone else to show up! >>Since "Assassination Politics" is based on a combined-donation system, even >>people on a subsistence wage could contribute; a quarter here, a dollar >>there, pretty soon it turns into real money. > > That is an argument against it. Do you want the people who give to >televangelists being able to more directly have people killed than in the >current system (when at least you've got votes by others to take care of the >problem)? Unfortunately, the same system of ethics that would make one's >targets the right ones also excludes the targets (non-governmental figures) >that can create the problems under this system - like the PFDA leaders. Have you forgotten what might happen to those same televangelists? While I'd sure like to be able to design a system where only the "right" people die (by my own opinion), I'm under no illusion that this would be anything other than a dictatorship under "Jim Bell" or whoever happened to be in control. I think I've done a fairly good job of designing (anticipating?) a system that will do a lot of good, hopefully without doing a lot of bad. There may be nothing I can do about the negatives, unfortunately. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMUHG/vqHVDBboB2dAQHitAP/VT/c++g81sgzDPHh2d6wcSmmHgQQg0Rz Vr3sQt2RYoEZBdLG267IxQw0aYAQvQv2KARD7A+nlbXlM7XR6xQYdjhXQ47hEel0 OBG//UI3XcA8TcdIqOuREi1T+AAWpYYyTz1YpGGR1oMZp6Mv/jjHoZ6f6i2XGY6u sjHfSLcd5Dg= =ICpg -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Assassination Politics(tm) was V-chips, CC, and Motorcycle Helmets
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >At 10:42 PM 3/8/96 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: >>(1) Assassination Politics (AP) will be most useful to a fired-up group of >>people who want to silence a single person. Madeline Murray O'Hare comes >>to mind. (She was a Texas atheist who challenged school prayer and won.) I quote this text as an example of an ongoing thought process in the analysis of the AP scheme. A little statistical mechanics would not hurt here. The above example shows *one* possible interaction between two entities, each having their own charac- teristics leading to a given inter- action. But in all theses examples, the specific variables that is forgotten is the time variable. What will be the *dynamic* characteristics of such a system. - the above paragraph describe an interaction in a given direction. - what are the others interactions that could *speed up* the above process - what are the others interactions that could *slow down* the above process Any analysis of the problem that blanks out the probability of occurence (which happens in the time domain) of each partial reaction cannot describe the outcome of the scheme. Proponents of such a scheme should stick a bit more to crypto... Ehhhh... What can I say? Physics is everywhere :) JFA B. Sc. physics A physicist is a guys/gal that cannot help but see a dance floor in a crowded bar as an interesting thermodynamical system... -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQEVAwUBMUGK/MiycyXFit0NAQFZeAf+JzOfyxmQHBw5E6ATx4dYUMXabUTTbt1r 5ifyuwYPQ9Urwz3ONHbOOI7O2CRkBcHfvYalIFvKFwKH4oQGsf/s2mGqKDi1bVX7 hUwk5oKTFPYeBHnrI2i4LglQPiBQMJJsi+ISkKujtCnE6UHR8XHjuPfnQ1FV8amA o5KF8HJlkVgKMCEiJSsHGBmVQl/WbhM8JIJnPy+iteC+d0wEljr9tCMIxJJ6JWza r4dzLAP9VPDoSkhK7qSh5AWUVp2Wh0v3p9M4wuE7WzI+Gbha0KgKht9ZEZOx3oVH SuA0yZ+zfVVib1x4UedG/9rKQ5m0fiYDqJ8xPOWMPXTmo2Ecqad9zA== =DSc6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Public Key at http://w3.citenet.net/users/jf_avon Jean-Francois Avon <jf_avon(a)citenet.net> 2048 bits key ID:C58ADD0D 1996/03/01 fingerprint=52 96 45 E8 20 5A 8A 5E F8 7C C8 6F AE FE F8 91

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Minor challenge: Running IIS on NT Workstation (fwd)
by Just Rich 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Meanwhile, back in my other life... any ideas? This could save small business a lot of money. -rich ---------- Forwarded message ---------- To: hackmsoft(a)c2.org I was at Microsoft the other day and one of the sales guys told me that there is a fix for the IIS (Internet Information Server) that makes it run on Windows NT Workstation. There is something in the registry that the application checks. He backed out from giving me the fix. I guess they want to sell more NT Server than Workstation. It maybe something you may want to watchout for.

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SLE_aze
by jya＠pipeline.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

3-8-96. FT: "Asean forum to fight Internet sleaze." The Association of South-East Asian Nations agreed yesterday to censor "negative elements" of the Internet. Information ministers are concerned about "information contamination" and agreed on the need for regulation and to learn from each other's experience, particularly from Singapore. 3-6-96. WSJ: "Singapore Unveils Sweeping Measures To Control Words, Images on Internet." Singapore said it will concentrate on individuals or organizations putting content on the Internet and the country's three access providers. Only public forums, or electronic spaces where people can converse or create displays visible to others who journey there, will fall under the regulations. 3-8-96. TWP: "FBI Advertises for Tips On Spies From Vietnam." FBI officials said the advertisements were prompted by an increase in activity by Vietnam's intelligence agents impersonating relatives of Vietnamese Americans to sneak into the country and steal high-technology secrets. SLE_aze (for 3)

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Re: FCC & Internet phones
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:47 PM 3/9/96, Mutant Rob wrote: >Yes... but the Internet is not like HAM radio. The FCC has no >jurisdiction outside the US, and it would cause various problems >for them to try to regulate the use of IPhone or how ISPs operate. Question of how practical enforcement would be haven't been big in a lot of the legislation we've seen coming out of various capitals, so I doubt the situation for bureaucratic rule-mongering would be much different. The WP article said that has ACTA has "asked the [FCC] to stop this kind of communications and study how to regulate it," probably--and not surprisingly --in that order. It looks like another case of trying to saddle ISPs with impossible enforcement burdens, though in this case one that a lot of ISPs might not mind so much, given the bandwidth that netphone usage eats up (cf. xs4all, I hear, has forbidden users to run CU-SeeMe). Q: Is it practically possible to find netphone traffic on a generic network at any level above the source and target addresses? Ted

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Index of Coincidence
by Marc North 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm new to the mailing list, but I have grep'd tcmay's CP-FAQ and all related FAQs for this, but have yet to find anything. I'm looking for detailed information on a statistical tool to aid in cryptanalysis called an "index of coincidence". I would appreciate it if someone could please explain what this is, how one builds such an index against a given ciphertext, and how it is valuable in the cryptanalysis of said ciphertext. Many thanks, Marc -- .--------------------------------------------------------. | Marc North <*> mnorth(a)netcom.com <*> San Jose, CA. | `--------------------------------------------------------'

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frequency of remailer use?
by Michael Froomkin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I would be very grateful for pointers to data concerning the number of messages that pass through remailers. (Not anon.penet.fi -- real remailers.) I am currently in a conversation with a journalist who should know better, but claims that secure anonymous remailers are never used by anyone -- just a curiosity. A. Michael Froomkin | +1 (305) 284-4285; +1 (305) 284-6506 (fax) Associate Professor of Law | U. Miami School of Law | froomkin(a)law.miami.edu P.O. Box 248087 | http://www.law.miami.edu/~froomkin Coral Gables, FL 33124 USA | It's warm here.

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Re: TCP/IP Stego (was CU-SeeMe)
by JonWienke＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 96-03-08 15:17:39 EST, you write: >The difference between the two methods is, as I said before, exactly >the same as the difference between TCP/IP and UUCP. Hiding info in >images or sound files works fine for "email" or file storage but has >no chance of being an interactive protocol, sometimes you need to >get things done in real-time. Haven't you ever heard of IPhone, Nautilus, or PGPfone? Jonathan Wienke

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Re: Square pegs in round holes, matchmaking, corporate mailservers
by Dimitris Tsapakidis 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Let's stick one thread this time. I lost track when the Subject header was changed. Twice! :-) The original definition of the problem: >>Bob must find out whether Alice has declared (commited) her interest >>in him, if and only if he has declared (commited) his interest in her. >>Before he does so, he can at most know that a girl is interested in >>him. Another description: Bob and Alice can have a date if they both >>commit to each other. If only one commits, nobody will ever find out >>about it. (PADGETT(a)hobbes.orl.mmc.com) wrote: >Instead of using a binary assymetric key, why not a triple ? (Just >because I do not know of any does not mean that one does not exist). >Given a triple (tertiary ?) function each individual would only need >their receive key and a "post office" transmit key. On sending a >message, it would be encrypted with a session key and the session key >encrypted with the post office key. You got me confused. Does this thing exist, or you would like it to exist? :-) Bill wrote: >If Bob wants to talk to Alice, he sends Trent B = g**b, marked >"For Alice", optionally anonymously. Trent calculates >X = B**t == g**bt, and sends it to Alice. Alice calculates >K = X**a == g**bat, calculates H = Hash(K) and posts it anonymously, >or sends it to Trent to post or mail to Bob. If Alice wants to talk >to Bob, she calculates A = g**a mod p, sends it to Trent, optionally >anonymously, marked "For Bob". Trent calculates Y = A**t == g**at , >and sends it to Bob. Bob calculates K' = Y**b == g**abt, calculates >H' = Hash(K') and notices that it's the same as the H he pulled off >the net earlier. Bob says "Oh, wow! Alice wants to talk to me!", >encrypts some lame drivel of a message M with key K'==K, and mails >it to Alice if he knows her address or posts it with Subject: H', >which Alice receives. on which Hal commented: >I don't think this satisfies the requirements. Once Bob calculates H' >and sees that it matches H, he knows that Alice likes him, but Alice >doesn't know that he likes her. The whole point of the protocol was to >be fair. Bob must only learn that Alice likes him if Alice is >guaranteed to learn that he likes her. Correct. I believe my hash_k is equivalent to your **t (which I thought as well, but preferred to use hash_k in my original description). Hence, my "mediated off-line" protocol can also be written as: - Bob, who likes Alice, sends [g**ab, pseudo(B)] to Trend who posts [g**abt, pseudo(B)]. Alice learns nothing at this point. - If she ever decides she likes Bob, she sends [g**ab, pseudo(A)] to Trend, who posts [g**abt, pseudo(A)]. So Bob and Alice notice g**abt, pseudo(B) and g**abt, pseudo(A) being posted so they know they have a match. Somebody who knows t can only find out who is interested in them. Nothing more. T could possibly be replaced by n T(i)'s each of whom has a secret key t(i). But this is another thread. Hal added: >The easiest formulation is pairwise: >Alice and Bob mutually engage in the calculation of "Alice loves Bob" >AND "Bob loves Alice". Each inputs his feelings as an input bit, and >the output will be true only if they have mutual feelings. >Each pair of potential lovers would then go through the protocol with ^^^^^^^^^^ >each other. Assuming we have a fair AND protocol, Alice cannot initiate it with Bob, because this would demontrate her interest. Solutions: 1) You can force all possible pairs to execute the protocol, as you said, but is not very practical. 2) Alice could initiate the protocol even if she is not interested, in order to "hide" the cases when she is genuinely interested. Not very practical, either. 3) My proposal (protocol 3 in my previous posting) is that Alice approaches Bob anonymously. But they can't execute the AND gate, because Bob doesn't know who she talks to. What they compare is: Alice's number: g**ab and Bob's number: g**bx where x is the girl he likes. >This problem is solved in "Multiparty Computations Ensuring Privacy of >Each Party's Input and Correctness of the Result", by Chaum, Damgard, >and van de Graaf, in the proceedings of the Crypto 87 conference. They >even discuss this application directly: "Note that this AND-gate >computation, where both parties want to hide their input from each >other, has a meaningful application: consider the situation where Alice >and Bob have just met, and each considers dating the other. Neither >wishes to lose face in the following sense: if Alice wants a date but >Bob doesn't, Alice does not want to let Bob know that she wanted the >date. And the same holds for Bob. In other words: if a party does not >want the date it does not find out the other party's decision." Thanks, I will have a look. This will only work if there is a law forcing newly met pairs of people to enter the protocol, as in (1) above, right? Dimitris -- Dimitris Tsapakidis PGP keyID: 735590D5 dimitrt(a)dcs.rhbnc.ac.uk MSc in Information Security, This space reserved Royal Holloway, University of London for future use. Origin: Thessaloniki, Macedonia, Hellas

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Re: Assassination Politics(tm) was V-chips, CC, and Motorcycle Helmets
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 01:45 PM 3/9/96 -0500, Jean-Francois Avon (JFA Technologies, QC, Canada) wrote: >>At 10:42 PM 3/8/96 -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: >>>(1) Assassination Politics (AP) will be most useful to a fired-up group of >>>people who want to silence a single person. Madeline Murray O'Hare comes >>>to mind. (She was a Texas atheist who challenged school prayer and won.) > >I quote this text as an example of an ongoing thought process in >the analysis of the AP scheme. A little statistical mechanics >would not hurt here. The above example shows *one* possible >interaction between two entities, each having their own charac- >teristics leading to a given inter- action. But in all theses >examples, the specific variables that is forgotten is the time >variable. > >What will be the *dynamic* characteristics of such a system. > - the above paragraph describe an interaction in a given > direction. > - what are the others interactions that could *speed up* the > above process > - what are the others interactions that could *slow down* the > above process >Any analysis of the problem that blanks out the >probability of occurence (which happens in the time domain) of >each partial reaction cannot describe the outcome of the scheme. Ever since I started publicizing my "Assassination Politics" idea, I've noticed that self-selected opponents of this idea frequently invent these hypothetical scenarios to try to criticize it. Now, I can't deny that any given scenario can happen, but I respond that I don't believe that it would occur very frequently, and I usually give reasons why. I don't normally get any kind of challenge to this: They've shot their wad, so to speak. >Proponents of such a scheme should stick a bit more to crypto... Well, I agree, but keep in mind that the text you quoted above was apparently written by a critic, not a proponent. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com Klaatu Burada Nikto -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMUH8TPqHVDBboB2dAQG68QP/Uzlblek07Fihu73pDWw/Tf50QK92x4hY j6qeP0lgnFjn4Y2k3ELYv4DbxpJi5vJM4Z/7CIZZaWJnHSeoT9QBF9D3GG88N/5q OjGN1Wwe3b4wHmuaEPen5CWEUfAFFE51zdlBknjYWUBqBKOsZ9lfqoMCKGysqshR gW9UH9zicsA= =qubI -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Why the phone companies are going after Internet phones?
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I suspect that the below bit of information may explain why the phone companies are going after regulation of the Internet phone market. -Allen ----------------- Reuters New Media [...] _ Friday March 8 6:04 PM EST _ Firms to Offer Computer to Telephone System [...] NEW YORK (Reuter) - Two New Jersey companies said Friday they have developed technology that will allow voice conversations via the Internet between users of computers and ordinary telephones. The two companies, VocalTec Inc. of Northvale, and Dialogic Corp. of Parsippany, said they expect the system to be available in the next few months. The company said the computer-to-telephone connection, known as the Internet Phone Telephony Gateway, will allow computer users to place calls to normal local, long-distance or international telephone users. Internet-based phone communication presents a low-cost alternative to traditional telephone communications handled by local and long-distance carriers. It enables callers to combine the low cost of Internet connections, the convenience of initiating calls from either PCs or telephones, and the ability to communicate with anybody with a telephone via the public switched telephone network. However, the Internet poses technical problems such as variable voice quality and momentary speaking delays that preclude, at least for now, any widespread replacement of existing phone networks by Internet telephone communications. VocalTec chairman Elon Ganor said the software provides the conversational quality of a good cellular phone connection, but the quality may vary depending on the sophistication of the Internet access company providing the local connections. He said the Internet telephone gateway is expected to be available as a complete system in the second quarter of this year. [...] The product will be available to third party product developers to incorporate into their own products. Ganor said the products will be sold through Dialogic and Vocaltec's existing networks of resellers, system integrators and direct channels. VocalTec said the Internet Phone Telephony Gateway will enable new applications that use the Internet as a low-cost network for computer-to-telephone and phone-to-phone calls. Calls to wireline and cellular phones are possible. The system is comprised of a PC running Windows 95 and the VocalTec gateway software and a Dialogic computer telephone adapter card and linked to the telephone network and the Internet through a 28.8 kilobit or faster modem connection. The new software complements the company's existing Internet telephone software, which currently can only connect one personal computer user to another. ``The availability of the Internet as an open, global information network has generated considerable interest from our customers,'' said Bob Heymann, vice president of business development at Dialogic. ``The Internet Telephony Gateway will enable (resellers) and systems integrators to offer innovative applications such as international 'hop off' and Internet-based customer service,'' he said. Dialogic is a leading maker of add-on computer hardware circuit boards that enable computers to function as telephones. [...] VocalTec is headquartered in Herzliya, Israel and has U.S. offices in Northvale, N.J. It went public Feb. 7, 1996.

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Someone in a goverment with something close to the right idea...
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, he at least has part of the right idea. -Allen +++++++++++++++++++ Reuters New Media [...] _ Friday March 8 2:41 PM EST _ Malaysia Is Against Curbs On Internet Debate KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia - Censoring Internet access will not solve concerns over privacy and individual freedom in cyberspace, Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said. "Censoring the Internet is not the solution. Simply closing our doors will not only hurt us but push us back in the race for growth and prosperity," he said in a speech at the launching of the Internet World '96 conference (http:/www.asiaconnect.com.my/asia-internet/) Countries concerned with such issues should instead utilize the Internet to reinforce social responsibility, he added. "Let us not forget that an informed citizenry is also a responsible citizenry," Anwar said. Copyright, Reuters Ltd. All rights reserved

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Re: Remailer Security
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: jrochkin(a)cs.oberlin.edu (Jonathan Rochkind) >Um, there's no reason why your remailer's account needs to be logged into >interactively, is there? Seems like remailer ops should disable login to >remailer accounts, putting '*' into the password field in /etc/passwd, or >however unix lets you disable login (I know it does). This depends on the setup at the remailer machine. If I'm operating a remailer off of a rented account on a commercial machine, how am I going to maintain the remailer when it crashes if I can't get into that account? This would work to some degree if the machine in question had the remailer program in a publically-accessible account, and all the remailer account was doing was A. acting as a forwarding account and B. containing info like the private key of the remailer. But it could still go wrong in a way such that you'd need to get into the account (or have root access, which is equivalent from what I know of the subject). -Allen

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Virtual Magistrate Project
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Unfortunately, the below system seems a bit civil liberties-unfriendly in some ways (deeming laws against "obscenity" ever to be justified, for instance). On the other hand, it's an arbitration mechanism - which should have competitors and different contracts using different arbitratiors. Of course, Phil Agre tends to want the "whole community" involved with stuff instead of, as is proper in most cases, the people involved. Progressive liberals... sigh. -Allen From: IN%"rre(a)weber.ucsd.edu" 5-MAR-1996 03:35:20.71 [Is this scheme too naive to work? Well, if we want cyberspace to be self-governing then surely we need something like this. What's important, I think, is legitimacy. That is, people should regard it as having the moral stature to actually make judgements and have them stick. Certainly *I* think that Bob Gellman is a good person to have in charge of a project like this. But it's the whole community's opinions that matter, not just mine. Should we have elections on the net for jobs like this? Or what?] =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= This message was forwarded through the Red Rock Eater News Service (RRE). Send any replies to the original author, listed in the From: field below. You are welcome to send the message along to others but please do not use the "redirect" command. For information on RRE, including instructions for (un)subscribing, send an empty message to rre-help(a)weber.ucsd.edu =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= Date: Mon, 4 Mar 1996 10:18:04 -0500 (EST) From: Paul Evan Peters <paul(a)cni.org> To: Multiple recipients of list <cni-announce(a)cni.org> Subject: Announcement of the Virtual Magistrate Project Dear cni-announce subscribers: Attached please find a press release announcing the establishment of the Virtual Magistrate Project. CNI is facilitating discussion of this project, and I encourage your attention to it. Let me know if you have any observations or suggestions that you would like me to pass on the project's organizers. Best, Paul Paul Evan Peters Executive Director Coalition for Networked Information 21 Dupont Circle Washington, DC 20036 Voice: 202-296-5098 Fax: 202-872-0884 Internet: paul(a)cni.org URL: ftp://ftp.cni.org/ URL: gopher://gopher.cni.org:70/ URL: http://www.cni.org/CNI.homepage.html PRESS RELEASE PRESS RELEASE PRESS RELEASE PRESS RELEASE For Immediate Release, March 4, 1996 Virtual Magistrate Established for the Internet Voluntary Dispute Resolution for Network Conflicts A newly established Virtual Magistrate Project will assist in the rapid, initial resolution of computer network disputes. The specialized system of online arbitration and fact-finding was announced by Timothy C. Leixner, Chairman of the Board of the National Center for Automated Information Research (NCAIR) which is funding the pilot project. The Fellows of the Cyberspace Law Institute helped in the development of the project. "Millions of people around the world communicate and conduct business on computer networks," said Mr. Leixner in announcing the project. "Disputes are inevitable, and existing courts can be too slow, too cumbersome, and too local to have global effect. We need to explore new forms of dispute resolution, provide timely relief, and develop appropriate sanctions that are suitable for worldwide computer networks. That is the purpose of the Virtual Magistrate Project." A pool of neutral arbitrators with experience in the law and in the use of computer networks will serve as the Virtual Magistrates. The magistrates (who do not have to be lawyers) will be selected jointly by the American Arbitration Association and the Cyberspace Law Institute, and will undergo training in arbitration techniques. Complaints will be accepted through either through electronic mail or through a form on the Virtual Magistrate's World Wide Web site. Internet users, system operators, and others affected by network messages, postings, and files may be the source of complaints. Initially, the Virtual Magistrate will decide whether it would be reasonable for a system operator to delete or otherwise restrict access to a challenged message, posting, or file. Objections may be based on copyright or trademark infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, defamation, fraud, deceptive trade practices, inappropriate (obscene, lewd, or otherwise violative of local system rules) materials, invasion of privacy, and other wrongful content. At a later date, the Virtual Magistrate may accept complaints about other network- related activities. The need for a fast and accessible resolution of disputes is highlighted by ongoing litigation involving Netcom On-Line Communications Services and the Church of Scientology. The Church alleged that postings made by a Netcom user infringed on the Church's copyrights. The case is before federal district court, and a lengthy proceeding is expected. Arbitration though the Virtual Magistrate Project might have been able to offer an independent assessment of whether there was infringement. Prompt identification of reasonable responses for system operators would clearly be beneficial to all. Use of the Virtual Magistrate for immediate resolution of disputes would not preclude traditional litigation. An impartial magistrate will be assigned to each complaint. Proceedings will normally take place through electronic mail. The goal is to reach a decision within 72 hours (three business days) whenever possible. Information on cases decided by the Virtual Magistrate will be publicly available at a World Wide Web site maintained by the Villanova Center for Information Law and Policy at <http://vmag.law.vill.edu:8080/>. Other documentation for the Project is available at the same Web site. David Johnson, Co-Director of the Cyberspace Law Institute said: "The Virtual Magistrate Project is not a solution to all network problems. Some matters will inevitably end up in traditional courts. If the Virtual Magistrate Project can contribute to the swift, inexpensive, and fair resolution of some disputes, then it will be a success." Paul Evan Peters, Executive Director of the Coalition for Networked Information, a diverse partnership of over two hundred institutions and organizations promoting the scholarly and intellectually productive uses of the Internet commented: "This project promises an extremely important and much needed alternative to legislation, contract negotiation, and litigation for addressing the uncertainties that we should all face together in the rapidly evolving networked resource and service environment." The Virtual Magistrate Project is a pilot project. Adjustments to the rules and procedures will be made based on experience. The Project will be evaluated by the participants at a conference to be convened by NCAIR and CLI in May 1996, and decisions will be made about finding a more permanent structure and funding. NCAIR has made $75,000 available for the operation of the pilot. NCAIR is a non-profit, educational corporation actively engaged in the study and application of technology to the to the legal and accounting professions since 1966. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) is a public-service, not-for-profit organization offering a broad range of dispute resolution services to corporations, attorneys, insurers, individuals, trade associations, unions, consumers, and all levels of government. AAA has been an international focal point for private dispute resolution since arbitration became an acceptable alternative to courts in the 1920s. George Friedman, Senior Vice President of AAA said: "Given the increasing inaccessibility of the court system and the explosive growth of online technology, it is quite appropriate that an effort would be made to develop a means of resolving disputes simply and quickly online. The American Arbitration Association is delighted to be a founding partner of the Virtual Magistrate Project, which will undoubtedly pave new ground in advancing alternative dispute resolution." The Villanova Center for Information Law and Policy will maintain a public online repository of Virtual Magistrate complaints, decisions, and documents. The Villanova Center will also maintain electronic discussion groups for magistrates, participants, and other interested parties, and it will work jointly with AAA to prepare training materials. The Villanova Center is at Villanova University School of Law, near Philadelphia. Contacts: Virtual Magistrate Project, Robert Gellman, Executive Director, 202-543-7923, rgellman(a)cais.com Cyberspace Law Institute, David R. Johnson, 202-496- 9523, djohns06(a)counsel.com; David Post, 202-364-5010, dpostn00(a)counsel.com Villanova Center for Information Law and Policy, Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Professor of Law, 610-519-7078, perritt(a)law.vill.edu National Center for Automated Information Research: Timothy C. Leixner, Chairman of the Board, 954-462-3300 emoleixner(a)aol.com American Arbitration Association: George Friedman, Senior Vice President, 212-484-4120, usadrghf(a)arb.com Electronic Addresses for the Virtual Magistrate Project VM Web Page: http://vmag.law.vill.edu:8080/ AAA Web Page http://www.adr.com Complaints: vmag(a)mail.law.vill.edu Help: vmag-question(a)mail.law.vill.edu vmag-help(a)mail.law.vill.edu VM Operations: vmag-admin(a)mail.law.vill.edu vmag-owner(a)mail.law.vill.edu AAA Administrator: vmag-aaa(a)mail.law.vill.edu VM Executive Director: rgellman(a)cais.com

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