December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: "German service cuts Net access" (to Santa Cruz)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 06:08 PM 1/28/96 -0800, sameer wrote: > When I worked for Walnut Creek CDROM they had to remove > "Castle Wolfenstein" from one of their CDs because they wouldn't have > been able to ship to Germany if they didn't. In "Castle Wolfenstein" you run around shooting Nazis, just as in "Doom" you run around shooting demons. And similarly Zundel is not a Nazi, he is an anti fascist. Hmm, these "Anti nazi laws" look suspicious like pro Nazi laws. Seems that the government of Germany is primarily concerned about their own hurt feelings, and to hell with the hurt feeling of the Jews. > >-- >Sameer Parekh Voice: 510-601-9777x3 >Community ConneXion, Inc. FAX: 510-601-9734 >The Internet Privacy Provider Dialin: 510-658-6376 >http://www.c2.org/ (or login as "guest") sameer(a)c2.org > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: "German service cuts Net access" (to Santa Cruz)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:04 AM 1/29/96 -0500, Declan B. McCullagh wrote: >You're actually quoting from an inspired bit of trolling. See my recent >message: "Ernst Zundel impersonator on Usenet" Oops: I guess I should read *all* my cypherpunks mail before I start sending off stuff. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: CP LITE: A Censorship Device?
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think the mail-to-news gateway is better than a "lite" list at this point. On Sun, 28 Jan 1996 03:54:31 -0600, Carol Anne wrote: >I've been watching this CP Lite thing develop. >Sounds like an attempt to moderate the list. >I mean it's easy to post out of it, >but hard to answer to it. >And all of the good back and forth discussion >gets lost in a backwash of private email. >There is just no way I will send someone an >email to a posting they post out of there. >I think that would be a disservice to everyone here. >Love Always, >Carol Anne >-- >Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress >*********************************************************************** >Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 >My Homepage >The Cyberdoc >*********************************************************************** >------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- >M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M >MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ >MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` >------------------------------------------------------------- >for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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Re: Downsizing the NSA
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 28 Jan 1996 02:04:52 -0800, Tim wrote: [..] >However, as Phill notes, the NSA and other intelligence agencies are now in >that most dangerous of positions: a powerful agency or department casting >about for something to do. >Spying on citizens and keeping the keys to their private communications and >diaries is not an appropriate option. >AT&T is downsizing, IBM downsized a while back, so why couldn't the NSA >just do the right thing: admit that the Soviet threat is no more, >congratulate the victors, and downsize by 20,000 employees? Perhaps they are worried about the implications of putting thousands of cryptographers into the private sector? And what if you were one of them? You'd probably have a hard time using or publishing anything classified. Not to mention the usual governmental conflict-of-interest work rules (for low-level employees the standards of who you can work for after leaving the government is a lot stricter than if you were a cabinet member). Just a thought.

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Slip over non-slip ports
by fc＠all.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(please respond directly to fc(a)all.net and not to the list) I am looking for a way to run slip over a telnet connection on a local Ethernet. Does anyone know of any freely available software that allows me to start a SLIP connection over a telnet channel? -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net/ Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236

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No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Of course. My signature was bad. I got a message in response to a request I made to someone for their public key. I wanted to check the signatures that they included with their posts to cypherpunks, but their key was not on the keyservers. The key they included was completely unsigned, and when I use it to validate their previous posts as well as the message they sent which included the key, the signatures come back as bad, the contents of the file changed. Names are appropriately withheld (I hope). As I understand the bcc: definition, only I and the first smtp server this message hits should know who it's to. I don't know if anyone else reading this mailing list needs this info, but just in case... here's my reply to the message. At 10:03 PM 1/28/96 -0800, you wrote: >Sorry, I'm a newbie to Internet, and also the Internet usage of PGP. I just >participated in a local keysigning meeting, so maybe my key will find its >way to a server. Don't worry about being a 'newbie'. Everyone starts somewhere. However, your key will usually not 'find its way' to a server without you specifically sending it. The keyserver I usually use is accessed by sending a mail message which fits the following format. As far as I know, all the keyservers use this format to add or update keys in their databases. You only have to send it to one keyserver, and it will propagate to all the others. I have indented the text so that no handlers decide to interpret it as a new message. - - To: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.iastate.edu - - Subject: ADD - - - - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- - - Version: 2.6.2 - - - - [key deleted to protect the innocent] - - - - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- >I'm sorry to have to admit that I don't even know how to do this! Newbie >alert! If you don't admit you don't know something, nobody will usually tell you how to do it. Also, you should sign your own key. That will make it harder to forge, I think. The reasons were spelled out in a couple of the web pages I read, but I've forgotten them. It has something to do with either a denial of service attack or a man in the middle attack, or both. The command to do this is: pgp -ks 0xHEXKEYID Honestly, I've only just begun to use pgp myself. Also, you should add your e-mail address to the user-id of your key. The command to do so is: pgp -ke 0xHEXKEYID You will be asked if you wish to add a user id to the key. Say yes, and give it your e-mail address. What this does is it allows people who are using pgp-enabled mailers to directly encrypt messages to you without choosing your key manually. The reason that I have not encrypted this message to you using the key you provided is that when I extracted the key and re-checked your message, the signature was no good. I've found that (using eudora) I must turn off the word wrap feature of my mailer to allow for good signed messages out. Of course, having said this, I'll probably not get a good signature on this message. Let me know if it signs ok. Now, I have a question. Which attack(s) is/are a person vulnerable to when distributing an unsigned public key in the open? Could this actually be a complex man-in-the-middle attack? Am I paranoid? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQzROLTS4SjerN/RAQGLNwP8DMXP1BLdeygfEaBF//lYZHkxWGFaFx9L R59KJQ/VaYVU/Q17bFDhXyCztu2IRlzLhBqno+5uHsZTL01M3D1dyXGDBvlxY+FB kNaClKzeXYqA3Or7Ny2mcgyZW/bGXA6v3Z+RQgDuVrXsJz5wGP/UxBU3Ppr05+qL i+5KB2efLxA= =iXlS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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The Politics of Mistrust 2
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to Replay, The Washington Post series on "The Politics of Mistrust" simmers at: http://www.replay.com/young/ Today's second article of six is, "Who's in Control? Many Don't Know or Care." Politics is "a waste of my time. They're cutting each other down, just playing childish games. It's confusing nonsense, like two little kids on a schoolyard," says Temera Porter, a computer chip inspector in Beaverton, Oregon. "When I voted last I wrote in that George Carlin should be president, I really did." A sidekick report tells of Rush's 20m dittoheads' wishes to rid DC of George Carlin's Who's, fuck, shit ...

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Re: more RANTING about NSA-friendly cpunks
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 07:58 PM 1/29/96 +0800, Bruce Murphy wrote: >In message <199601282104.NAA10926(a)netcom3.netcom.com>, > "Vladimir Z. Nuri" wrote: >> >> >In message <199601262011.MAA17408(a)netcom16.netcom.com>, >> > "Vladimir Z. Nuri" wrote: >> >> >> >> has anyone *tried* just ignoring the ITAR wrt crypto and seeing what >> >> would happen? the gubbermint blindly thinks that cyberspace will >> >> inevitably bring the wrath of four horsemen of the infocalypse, but aren't >{snip} >> > >> >Zimmerman. >> >{snip} >> Zimmermann supports my contention, as I wrote in the post. NOTHING >> happened to him. it is conceivable this same result could have >> been arrived at (government drops investigation) if he never even >> hired a lawyer. >> >> Zimmermann is a perfect example of what may be counterproductive >> hysteria on *our* side, toward advancing crypto. if Zimmermann >> cannot be prosecuted, and is not prosecuted, where are the ITAR "teeth"??? >> > >Nod. You may have a point there... > >I'll tell you what, seeing as I *can't* export cryptostuff against >ITAR, what say *you* do it. Lots of it. And if nothing happens to you, >well and good. >OTOH the cause needs a few martyrs. >Packrat (BSc/BE;COSO;Wombat Admin) Packrat, I agree with the (likely) implications of your (tongue-in-cheek?) commentary. The fact that "nothing happened to Zimmermann" is scant hope to us. If ITAR is causing cryptosystems to not be built, merely due to FUD (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) then it is actively harming us. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQz8y/qHVDBboB2dAQGmRwP/YJPpzwQ4pZU3QZcSNNzKSz2kOEml1a9x nV8wWDj019NLrPE0u1sKhsSkDu8QYeaAtSr3NnSMTK+DlLkuV7SKyXg6k/Pk3uWL xqEmWNCM8+rTXyP2FuflD3w+HCe0oCRt2AzmclzUwlalTP2gY2bfKeAAawCdubST FKZFFdlWNG0= =Is7T -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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"Radio Free Cyberspace" and the "Silicon Curtain"
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:25 PM 1/29/96, Dr. Dimitri Vulis wrote: >So, develop the tools to make the (illegal) flow of information easier and >the prosecution more difficult. E.g., the former Soviet Union couldn't stop >its people from listening to Western propaganda on short-wave radio, >although it was illegal, and more repressive governments did confiscate all >short-wave radios in the past. If I were a PR sort of person, and interested in funding a "liberation channel" into the countries behind the "Silicon Curtain," I'd think about a catchy name for the program. Not radio, of course, just a nod to the olden days of "Radio Free Europe" and "Voice of America" (which was, unfortunately, partly staffed by former members of the Mobile Killing Squads which rounded up Russian Jews). --Tim Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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DRE_ams
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-29-96. WSJ: "MCI, Microsoft Form Partnership to Sell Each Other's Products World-Wide." 1-29-96. FinTim: "News and MCI put their money on DBS." Includes proposal that Microsoft distribute by MCI satellite for pennies rather than for dollars by wire. 1-29-96. WSJ: "Sun to Unveil Prototype of Low-Cost PC for Internet That Uses Java Language." Java as OS and browser, sidestepping MS and NSCP. DRE_ams (for the 3)

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Re: "German service cuts Net access" (to Santa Cruz)
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:54 PM 1/27/96 -0800, shamrock(a)netcom.com (Lucky Green) wrote: >Wonder how long before they will include gereral purpose proxies in the >proposed ban. >We should start a "banned websites pool". If a site gets banned, the >controversial content will be mirrored at all other sites. There are enough >ISPs on this list to make that happen. Will they have the courage? If I were running an ISP, I wouldn't go providing free host space for a mirror of Nazi files just because they'd been banned (and an obvious scan is to go claiming you've been banned just to get free space.) On the other hand, an HTTP relay site would be a highly reasonable service, perhaps with NNTP relaying as well. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # http://www.idiom.com/~wcs

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Re: Over-reacting?
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 11:22 PM 1/28/96 -0800, Alan Olsen wrote: >The reason for the killfiling is your habit of adding multiple additional >mailing list into the To: and cc: list. I have seen more than one post >where you have added a Libritarian list and the "Democracy Now Channel 2' >list into the fray, not to mention other individuals. THAT is why you are >getting the golden killfile, not your association with Jack "Acid" Hammer. >(Though that may help...) Hmmm.. It's odd that nobody has ever warned me of this before. (Another spoof?) That's why I'm using the term, "over-reacting." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMQyDUvqHVDBboB2dAQFduAQAlas9DMaiatiYd51WKepEzLGPBWl4I9+2 FNOUzoQoy3OQ+wdk7lT1FFqvrDqSqviIj8MZ6j7/7ENO55W6D8AiN2fFXBbd3iY5 7krA13rTlx6N8ztvqE2+QY0/0RMtHZV6mLOR0SdbedOahUMc6/8qxF1auvJTxtJq 5qU3zS+71IQ= =9edM -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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BAI_bcg
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-29-96. FinTim: "High street dinosaurs wake up. Online prospects are making the banking industry restive." Covers a new Bank Administration Institute/Boston Consulting Group report, "The Information Highway and Retail Banking." BAI_bcg ----- An FT reviewer of the KDM/TSU books writes that "Littman reveals how little divides the sheriffs of cyberspace from its outlaws. Shimomura resembles Mitnick more than he would like to admit. The big difference is that the computer expert on the right side of the law becomes a media celebrity, earns consultancy fees telling companies how to defend themselves, and has others pay his expenses and buy his equipment. The expert who does not inhabits a prison cell with six other men, and is reduced to writing pleas for help with a stub pencil."

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Re: The French do some things right...
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:01 PM 1/26/96 -0800, Timothy C. May wrote: >One thing I have been hoping for as America's scandal-fixated society asks >whether Bill inhaled, whether Rush has a mistress, whether Madonna's >grandmother is really shacked up with a 19-year-old musician...one thing I >have been hoping for is that the American public will say "Enough!" This is one I've never worried about. As I look around at work and see the disorderd personal lives and body piercings of my fellow workers, it is obvious that the amount of that sort of social control that is being applied is way down. And since fewer and fewer of us will have to (be able to) work for large soulless bureacracies as these things are ruthlessly downsized by the market, we will have much greater choice of employers. One would have to be really way out on one of the unfortunate tails of a bell curve distribution to be unable to find someone to work with. DCF

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The Lotus Position
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 4:03 AM 1/20/96, Bill Stewart wrote: >40-unknown-bit RC4 may take a week for an ICE workstation or a herd of >net-coordinated workstations, but it would be much faster to crack on >a specialized machine actually designed for RC4. I think Eric's estimate >was $25-50K for a machine that could do it in 15 minutes, built out of >programmable gate arrays. That's not $10,000/crack, or $584, but $0.25-.50. >Would they crack all the keys they wanted for a quarter each? Sure; >at that rate it's probably cheaper to crack them than read them >(though in reality they'd feed most of them to keyword scanners.) I take it as self-evidently true that NSA would spend the relatively small amount of money to build a dedicated key cracker...probably at least several for each major cipher. "In this room, where we used to have the famed acre of Crays, now we have tenth of an acre of superfast custom key crackers." (Yes, I know the Crays are used for other things besides key cracking. In fact, their main use probably is not for crypanalysis. Also, I'm not talking about cracking ciphers that are essentially uncrackable with any amount of compute power, I'm talking about cracking specific instances of ciphers with NSA-approved key lengths.) To consider just how _cheap_ such a dedicated machine is to them, consider that in the late 50s and early 60s they built the "Harvest" machine, in conjunction with IBM and based to some extent on IBM's "Stretch" machine, as I recall. (Bamford has a bunch of stuff on it, and our own Norm Hardy worked on it for IBM in the early 60s...he gave a good talk at a Cypherpunks meeting on how big it was, how much it cost, its capabilities, etc.) The Harvest machine, and its ancillary units, such as the world's largest and fastest tractor tape drive, cost something like $100 million in today's dollars, according to Norm and others. And Harvest was still running in 1975-6, when it was finally replaced by the Cray 1. NSA also funded the early efforts that later became Control Data Corporation (CDC), and NSA was a major customer of Seymour Cray's CDC 6600, and the later 7600 (and maybe even the ill-fated Star). NSA and AEC were also the early customers for the Cray-1, of course. This gives you some feel for what kind of expenditures "the Fort" is prepared to make when it sees the need. And the black budgets of other intelligence agencies, as described in Richelson's excellent books and other books (such as "Deep Black," an unauthorized history of the National Reconnaissance Organization), can only be described as "stupefyingly large." A surveillance satellite can run upwards of $1.5 billion, so spending a tiny fraction of that to decrypt what you've sniffed out of the airwaves is a gimme. The deep black budget is estimated to be something like $25 billion a year. Recall that the Wiretap Bill _alone_ provided for up to $500 million for compliance measures. Clearly the FBI somehow view their surveillance capabilities as being worth at least this much to them, and probably a lot more. Throw in the budgets for the DEA, IRS, FinCen, FBI, BATF, and all the other agencies fighting the Four Horsemen and the citizen-units who stray outside the drawn lines, and it's clear that NSA could budget several hundred million dollars *each and every year* for breaking its "approved ciphers." Like many, I take it for granted that 40-bit RC4 can be broken for "small change." Moreover, my guess is that foreign traffic is routinely cracked if it is encrypted. After all, it's the encrypted traffic that is likeliest to be interesting. (Sure, some dumbos like Pablo Escobar speak in the clear on cellphones, but the correlation is definitely in the direction of encrypted traffic being likelier than unencrypted traffic to contain interesting stuff. This will become even more the case as more people become educated and as crypto gets built into more things...this is the intelligence and law enforcement communities' worse nightmare.) A $25,000 machine. 4 cracks per hour, 100 per day, and 36,000 per year. Running for an active life of several years (before being replaced, of course, by something several times faster/cheaper), there you have the $0.25 per crack that Bill cites above. Even at 100 times this estimate, it's cheap. (Not for random vacuuming, but for anything targetted, even casually.) And think of what just a few percent of the "Harvest" budget buys you: 100 of these machines. Several million cracks per year. And from these cracks, think of the correlations, the contact lists, and the further targetting that can be done. [Sidebar: One thing that bothers me about any of these LEAF-related schemes--and I don't know if and how the Lotus scheme checks both ends for compliance, etc.--is that they are fundamentally at odds with remailers which hide the origin. If remailers are allowed to continue to exist, schemes involving LEAF fields won't work. Unless I've forgotten how these things work in the couple of years since I last looked at Clipper et. al. in depth. So, I expect a move against remailers as part of the campaign. And with no remailers, if this could ever be enforced, the ability to make contact lists based on random decryption is frightening.] Back to their 100 machines.... My guess is that they haven't even bothered to buy this many machines, that the intelligence they get from a few tens of thousands of cracks is more than enough to point to further leads, to trigger additional HUMINT, etc. But even if the estimates are off by orders of magnitude, we know that a 40-bit RC4 can be cracked in ~hours with ~hundreds of Sun-class machines. (Personally, I think it obvious the NSA has at least speeded up this work factor by at least a factor of ten.) This is also essentially a minor consideration compared to the amount of work done in ordinary wiretaps. And in a few years, 40-bit RC4 will be even more ludicrously weak. The Lotus position is untenable. --Tim May Boycott espionage-enabled software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Revisitting Blum-Macali "digital signatures"
by Paul E. Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There was some discussion on Usenet a while back about doing "digital signatures" with the Blum-Macali public key method. Briefly, Blum-Macali relies on the BBS generator to generate a "one-time pad". And the pad can be reversed by taking repeated square roots on the random number seed (assuming you know the factorization) to get back to the starting seed. So, the author suggested that one calculate a digest of the message, call it D. Then the author suggested that one calculate D^(1/2), as per the Blum-Micali method. Then he goes on to do the signature check by checking whether or not D^2 == X^4 where X is the "signature". I understand that there is some sign ambiguity involved in calculating square roots mod B where B is a Blum integer (that causes 4 possible roots). And that's the source of ambiguity problems in Rabin digital signatures, but if the Blum-Micali public key method works, then this sign ambiguity shouldn't exist (because they define a SPECIFIC root to use), and the method can be simplified to simply calculating D^(1/2) and the check is simply D==X^2. What am I missing here?

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pgp on linux
by cpunk＠remail.ecafe.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

i can't seem to get pgp compiled on my linux machine. where should i ask about this?- since cypherpunks would be a bad choice. thanks.

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Re: Escrowing Viewing and Reading Habits with the Governmen
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Sun, 28 Jan 96 21:05:08 > From: <alanh(a)infi.net> > Subject: Re: Escrowing Viewing and Reading Habits with the Government > To: "roy m. silvernail" <roy(a)sendai.cybrspc.mn.org> > Cc: "timothy c. may" <tcmay(a)got.net>, cypherpunks(a)toad.com > > > The "Library Awareness Program," administered by the Justice Department, is > > > designed to identify potential criminals before they have a chance to > > > commit their deeds. The visits to libraries made by the FBI are used to > > > determine who is reading subversive or dangerous material. > Do you really think the FBI believes that asking librarians to keep > records of customer useage is an efficient way to read the customers minds? > Do you really think that the FBI foreign counter-intelligence squad has > nothing better to do than keep a database of who is reading Che Guevara > memoirs? Yes. Heck, I remember this was a big issue about 15 years ago. Try asking someone who was active in library science in the late 70's, early 80's. The general reaction of the library community was, I am glad to say, entirely pro-privacy. Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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Here's how you put your key on the keyservers...
by Ted Garrett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I got a message in response to a request I made to someone for their public key. I wanted to check the signatures that they included with their posts to cypherpunks, but their key was not on the keyservers. The key they included was completely unsigned, and when I use it to validate their previous posts as well as the message they sent which included the key, the signatures come back as bad, the contents of the file changed. Names are appropriately withheld (I hope). As I understand the bcc: definition, only I and the first smtp server this message hits should know who it's to. I don't know if anyone else reading this mailing list needs this info, but just in case... here's my reply to the message. At 10:03 PM 1/28/96 -0800, you wrote: >Sorry, I'm a newbie to Internet, and also the Internet usage of PGP. I just >participated in a local keysigning meeting, so maybe my key will find its >way to a server. Don't worry about being a 'newbie'. Everyone starts somewhere. However, your key will usually not 'find its way' to a server without you specifically sending it. The keyserver I usually use is accessed by sending a mail message which fits the following format. As far as I know, all the keyservers use this format to add or update keys in their databases. You only have to send it to one keyserver, and it will propagate to all the others. I have indented the text so that no handlers decide to interpret it as a new message. - - To: pgp-public-keys(a)pgp.iastate.edu - - Subject: ADD - - - - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- - - Version: 2.6.2 - - - - [key deleted to protect the innocent] - - - - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- >I'm sorry to have to admit that I don't even know how to do this! Newbie >alert! If you don't admit you don't know something, nobody will usually tell you how to do it. Also, you should sign your own key. That will make it harder to forge, I think. The reasons were spelled out in a couple of the web pages I read, but I've forgotten them. It has something to do with either a denial of service attack or a man in the middle attack, or both. The command to do this is: pgp -ks 0xHEXKEYID Honestly, I've only just begun to use pgp myself. Also, you should add your e-mail address to the user-id of your key. The command to do so is: pgp -ke 0xHEXKEYID You will be asked if you wish to add a user id to the key. Say yes, and give it your e-mail address. What this does is it allows people who are using pgp-enabled mailers to directly encrypt messages to you without choosing your key manually. The reason that I have not encrypted this message to you using the key you provided is that when I extracted the key and re-checked your message, the signature was no good. I've found that (using eudora) I must turn off the word wrap feature of my mailer to allow for good signed messages out. Of course, having said this, I'll probably not get a good signature on this message. Let me know if it signs ok. Now, I have a question. Which attack(s) is/are a person vulnerable to when distributing an unsigned public key in the open? Could this actually be a complex man-in-the-middle attack? Am I paranoid? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBMQy/ds1+l8EKBK5FAQER8Af/SE1lTj3zcpm3ildFGO75zjZiJByZQi+3 LAkYgcHyBmtvhCTvyYCP2aMF4RjayrR3OHB85XthIA4sPmU0NDCVZYv7riSPjslp iBxUk92dO+BkP8nrTFgqCzR4qPqbOSmZxeovZI0PfQvbm99fG6Fc2kjhdKP7Aq+G cw4r0vvJY8JbqAuXftgZgndL9iGR/+xjfrpl+EWL3xtWzpIRfwMS5KMsR1UOf1ZA g9mlMEGLXy5KC/BwaupgTTwlSA/NOTv5mAY8+UWt9ydMWXBqNVt/yiGFsjg5UR1M CaT2D23pLAnWZ8M7yrjMamadkn2iLBqq4nhBNOGYHfZrGcbm/mhmxQ== =jGo3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: The Unintended Consequences of Suppression
by Bruce Baugh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:52 PM 1/28/96 -0600, Alex Strasheim <cp(a)proust.suba.com> wrote: >> You just don't get it, do you? Do-gooders like the Wiesenthalistas >> don't need to be *right*; they need *a steady stream of cash contributions* > >It's usually more effective to point out why what someone is saying is >wrong rather than to speculate as to what their motives for saying it >might be. Particularly in cases where, rightly or wrongly, the folks being subjected to ad hominem have a very favorable public image. Explanations that give credit for good intentions and show how the present action works to undermine them, and which include constructive alternatives, are a _lot_ more likely to be listened to. At least that's the way it works for me. And it works for pretty much everyone I know. If there's anyone here who's more impressed by ad hominem, I'd be curious, but they'd still be in the minority. Bruce Baugh bruceab(a)teleport.com http://www.teleport.com/~bruceab

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Re: An Enigma - Wrapped In a Circle
by liberty＠gate.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- "Perry E. Metzger" foamed: <snip> I wrote: >> 1. Flame me, in *private* e-mail. [I'll happily ignore you.] >> 2. Go hump a tree. > >What the hell is the cypherpunks relevance here, anyway? I mean, other >than trying to elicit a response from me, which you surely knew would >show up, was there any purpose to this? Why are crop circles important >to people worrying about cryptography and cryptography policy? What >possible linkage could there be? Why Perry! I see your point! Any phenomenon that elicits articles with titles like "Ciphers in the Crops" could have nothing at all to do with cryptography... I repeat: Go hump a tree. In complaining about supposed "noise," you cause more noise than any other person on this list. Learn to read before you spew, or just learn to shut up! JMR Regards, Jim Ray -- Boycott espionage-enabled software! "He that would make his own liberty secure, must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty, he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself." - T. Paine http://www.shopmiami.com/prs/jimray _______________________________________________________________________ PGP key Fingerprint 51 5D A2 C3 92 2C 56 BE 53 2D 9C A1 B3 50 C9 C8 Public Key id. # E9BD6D35 <liberty(a)gate.net> IANAL _______________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh. iQCVAwUBMQxOvW1lp8bpvW01AQFvBgP/YQM2CA/f+wq9jCCc/s6BeXm+Lqr6ihCS BhPeB3556EET0mj91XhR1bl5FPb9aUb2f3CeNMBmacr4L/EjAK5S4Fst0WZ10UA8 m7a07IdFdb8wN+TKpAUR4TMmApV1nHnq3fStrSnn1el32rbnMvMmHBDzfXF6wVfk VKvffK+S+WA= =b8Pt -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: more RANTING about NSA-friendly cpunks
by Ted Garrett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:10 PM 1/28/96 +0800, you wrote: >In message <199601262011.MAA17408(a)netcom16.netcom.com>, > "Vladimir Z. Nuri" wrote: >> has anyone *tried* just ignoring the ITAR wrt crypto and seeing what >> would happen? [snip] >> but aren't we equally as comic in assuming that violating the ITAR >> crypto sections will inevitably bring the 4 horsemen of the NSA?? > >One word... >Zimmerman. >I do agree with what you're saying though. But what he's saying is basically this: If instead of targeting a single entity - (eg Zimmerman) for a crypto violation, they had to look at thousands of separate entities per violation (eg cypherpunks, inner circle, users on AOL who have a clue, mit professors, cryptographic experts, corner preachers, etc.), then soon the court system would be forced to come to the realization that, indeed, the genie IS out of the bottle, and the system as a whole would have to recognize that a change needs to be made. As it stands, they bullied on ONE man for something he didn't do, and could drop the case without there needing to be a precedent set. Because there is now no precedent, the NSA and FBI can still use the ITAR regulations to batter any indiviual who attempts to distribute strong cryptography tools to the general public. If they had been confronted with tens, hundreds, thousands, or tens of thousands of people tangibly involved in distributing cryptographic tools, then it would have been much harder for them to say "We are just going to drop this.". They would have had to either go the distance or dismiss it in the beginning. If PGP had been developed under the gnu charter or the Linux concept, what would the government have been able to do about it being distributed? NOT A DAMNED THING. Or at least that's my opinion.

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New Software
by Rev. Ben 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Release time. And I guess I finally get to add my name to the roles of Cpunks that 'write code'. I finished a release of a simple Zero Knowledge Authentication system that uses the GNU Multiprecision Library to implement a modified Fiat-Feige-Shamir ZKIPS. It is written in C on FreeBSD 2.1-R but should run on anything that uses BSD socket code. I tried to write it fairly portably. It is a very early release with little bounds checking or any of the hardening that would be required in a secure environment--hell in a secured environment, you'd want to write the bignum package yourself. But in any case, its just to get some practice writing this sort of code as well as amuse myself My latest project is to write a HTTP anonymizer--sort of like a bit launderer. The plan would be to allow a server to be browsed without actually giving away its real address by using a proxy. The client would have an encrypted URL that would be passed to the proxy. The proxy, using its own private key would decrypt the real URL and make the HTTP request to the server. This would opaque the server's identity from the client. While this sounds all well and good, unless there are multiple proxies deployed a-la Mixmaster with encapsulated encryption, there is the threat that the proxy would be able to match up server-client pairs. In any case, I'm open to suggestions on this project--its very open ended and should be done in a couple of months. If anyone would like a copy of the work done mail me and I'll send you a tarball. Ben. PS: Does anyone know of any French COMPUSEC firms that I could contact? I'd like to try to get a job there for next year. ____ Ben Samman..............................................samman(a)cs.yale.edu "If what Proust says is true, that happiness is the absence of fever, then I will never know happiness. For I am possessed by a fever for knowledge, experience, and creation." -Anais Nin PGP Encrypted Mail Welcomed Finger samman(a)powered.cs.yale.edu for key Want to give a soon-to-be college grad a job? Mail me for a resume

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Re: "German service cuts Net access" (to Santa Cruz)
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The German prosecuters are currently targeting the site of Mr Zundel, "who is well known for his open revisionist positions." Zundel is not in fact a Nazi, but an anti nazi: Here is a sample of his work. Bottom line. German prosecuters are amazingly ignorant idiots. Press Release Date: January 3, 1996 Attention: Assignment Editor / For immediate release Hate all that you can hate in the Nazi Reserves! In The Nazi Reserves, we hate more people before 6am, than most people hate all day! We promise if you join The Nazi Reserves, you will be trained in: 1) Marching 2) Re-learning History 3) Growing a mustache just like Hitler's 4) Burning your own house and blaming it on Jews! 5) Learning how to blame *everything* on Jews! 6) Learning how to blame everything that can't be blamed on Jews on the Blacks! 7) Learning how to blame everything that can't be blamed on the Jews or the Blacks on the Liberals! 8) Learning how to blame everything that can't be blamed on the Jews or the Blacks or the Liberals on the Catholics! 9) How to signal the Alien Nazi UFO Mothership! 10) More marching! 11) How to enjoy being anal probed by Nazi aliens from space! 12) How to make your jackboots *really* shine! 13) How to beat up homosexuals (this one's easy-- just make sure you outnumber them by about 6:1, and make sure you're in Colorado) 14) And yes, MORE marching! If you join now, we promise you there will be *no volleyball* and *no push-ups* and no *5 mile runs!* Yes, even middle aged balding men can join the Nazi Reserves! The Nazi Reserves: It's not just a job, it's a perversion! (Not like my other perversions which involve trying to stuff my plump legs into stockings and prance around in heels.) JOIN NOW AND WIN A FREE TRIP TO THE NAZI UFO BASE AT THE CENTER OF THE EARTH! Surveys show that 9 out of 10 prisons prefer candidates who have learned the skills taught in The Nazi Reserves! Join now and you increase your chances of receiving free meals and housing for the rest of your life! -- Ernst Zundel My right to free speech supersedes your right to exist. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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new(?) anti-usenet censorship technique?
by Jon Lasser 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Playing around online today, it occured to me that much of Compu$pend's subscribers (and many other ISPs, especially smaller ones which might be subject to governmental pressures) rely largely on people who use chat modes frequently, often for sex-related chat... they cannot cut off IRC (for example) without hurting their income substantially. If someone put up an IRC<->news gateway, with a bot that allowed anyone on channel to read newsgroups, it'd be virtually impossible to censor; one could use a variable channel name to increase the difficulty of censoring it. Has anyone done this before? Or talked about it? Jon Lasser ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Jon Lasser <jlasser(a)rwd.goucher.edu> (410)494-3072 Visit my home page at http://www.goucher.edu/~jlasser/ You have a friend at the NSA: Big Brother is watching. Finger for PGP key.

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