December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: For the New Year: A Symbol for Information Freedom
by groundfog＠alpha.c2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In talk.politics.crypto, ptupper(a)direct.ca (Peter Tupper) wrote: > A Symbol for Information Freedom > by Peter Tupper <ptupper(a)direct.ca> > 1996 is off to a discouraging start when it comes to the >future of information freedom. The American Congress seems >determined to impose censorship on the Internet. The legal >status of strong dual-key cryptography is still in debate. >Telephone companies, cable TV services and publishing services >are all eagerly trying to seize control of the Internet and >eliminate the many-to-many nature of the medium. The accidental >wonder that is the Internet seems to be threatened on all sides, >in danger of being destroyed or denatured before reaching its >potential. > My proposal is only a small contribution to the solutions to >this problem. I believe a symbol is needed; a simple yet >recognizable item that will communicate to others that you are: > -for freedom of speech and expression in all realms, >particularly via computer mediated communications. > -against the imposition of arbitrary community standards by >centralized authority on communications. > -for making access to communications available to everyone. > -against the violation of individual privacy by wiretapping, >intercepting computer communications, compiling dossiers by >government or commercial organizations or other forms of >surveillance. > -for making strong, dual-key encryption programs without >back-doors available to the public. > -against building surveillance measures into communications >and financial infrastructures. > -for a future of communications that is by, for and of the >people, not the state or the market. > The symbol I have chosen is the paper clip. Why a paper >clip? > There are many reasons: > Pragmatic: Paper clips are readily available for >practically nothing, all over the world. They can be applied to >collars, lapels, scarves, pocket edges, suspenders and neck ties >without damaging them and without risk of the pin breaking the >skin. > Aesthetic: The paper clip is a simple, elegant design that >is easily recognized the world over. It can be rendered in many >colors or plated with precious metals. > Symbolic: The paper clip is a simple but effective piece of >technology. An individual uses it to bundle together documents >from disparate sources to create a unified document upon a given >subject, which may be dismantled and remade for another topic. >Furthermore, a paper clip may be bent out of its regular shape >and used as an improvised tool for any number of purposes. > Historic: During the German occupation of Norway in World >War II, Norwegians wore paper clips on their collars as a sign of >solidarity against the invaders. > Commercial: While anybody can obtain a plain paper clip >with little trouble, funds for Information Freedom can be raised >by marketing electroplated or designer paper clips. > The cause of awareness of and activism about AIDS had a >simple, readily recognized symbol, the folded red ribbon. Just >as every celebrity who wears a red ribbon, no matter how trite >and self-promoting it is, is a reminder to those watching that >AIDS is happening and that many people are concerned, >celebrities appearing at the Academy Awards or Grammies with a >designer, gold-plated paper clip on their outfit reminds the >world that information freedom is under fire and that people are >concerned. It will make the Internet community a visible reality >in the public sphere. It will bring these issues into the public >eyes, and give those involved a rallying symbol. It will make a >small difference, but it will contribute to the greater good. > Advertising couldn't hurt.

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Ah, the future...
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friend, 12 31 95 Associated Press reports: Ah, the future ... At least part of what will happen in the coming year seems clear. Cyberspace will be regulated -- kicking and screaming -- and the court battles over free speech will begin. "It's going to throw the Internet into a state of uncertainty for several years," said [Bob] Smith [of Interactive Services Association]. You may recall the question I asked in an earlier message: And when the State DECIDES...? But that's all right... Despite that, business growth on the net will begin to catch up with the phenomenal increase in accounts. Cordially, Jim NOTE. The newsstory's headline? YEAR OF THE INTERNET: What a tangled web we weave. Its dateline? (Dec 31, 1995 - 00:23 EST). Accessed at? Nando News (www.nando.net) Online filename? info306_3.html That message? Date: Wed, 22 Nov 1995 04:16:50 -0500 (EST) From: "James M. Cobb" <jcobb(a)ahcbsd1.ovnet.com> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Secrets of the Internet This critical essay, "Ah, the future..." was composed 12 31 95.

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Re: Australian "calculatorcard"
by amp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: amp * EMC.Ver #2.3 ] -- From: David Lesher \ Internet: (wb8foz(a)nrk.com) To: amp \ Internet: (alan.pugh(a)internetmci.com) cc: Cees de Groot \ Internet: (c.degroot(a)inter.nl.net) cc: cypherpunks \ Internet: (cypherpunks(a)toad.com) Subject: Re: Australian "calculatorcard" > sounds like the card i use for remote dialup to certain non-public > systems i use at work. it has a six digit number on the front that > changes every 60 seconds. DS> Do these card systems use a window to handle clock-slip? i'm not sure. i would image so. DS> I'd think you could have the server safely accept # N, N-60 sec, and DS> N+60 seconds; and adjust the server's idea of your card's clock speed DS> from that. DS> What new risk would that create? i would figure the server would give a minute or so for slippage. basically the risk is that it would give someone 3 minutes to do a brute force attack rather than one. if you have decent security on the server side, i.e., disallow the card for 5 minutes or more after 3 or so failed attempts, brute attacks would be minimized. however, if the actual window for a single code is 3 minutes, that increases your chance of hitting it as 3 separate numbers would be valid for a given card at any given time. amp <0003701548(a)mcimail.com> (since 10/31/88) <alan.pugh(a)internetmci.com> PGP Key = 57957C9D PGP FP = FA 02 84 7D 82 57 78 E4 E2 1C 7B 88 62 A6 F9 F7 December 31, 1995 21:59

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Re: Australian "calculatorcard"
by amp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: amp * EMC.Ver #2.3 ] -- From: Vin McLellan \ Internet: (vin(a)shore.net) > it's Pretty Good >(tm) security, but like anything not biometric, it is vulnerable to >black-bag attacks. physical possession being all that is required. VM> Actually, all ACE/Server or ACE software modules _require_ a VM> user-memorized PIN. Physical possession of a stolen token is not VM> enough to gain illicit access. >if >you know the algorithm and the serial number of the card and the >time, even that isn't necessary. VM> Bleep! Earth to amp! Check your voltage, lately? The token's VM> serial number has nothing whatsoever to do with the generation of a VM> SecurID's PRN token-code. hmmmm, let me see... yup. you are right. voltage low. give me a second to plug back in... VM> and distribution. The serial number stuck to the back of a SecurID VM> after it is programmed with its secret key -- a unique PRN VM> "significantly longer" than 56 bits -- but they are not the same VM> thing. The cpu in a SecurID doesn't even "know" the serial number VM> stuck on the back of the token. VM> (It would be Pretty Stupid <TM> to glue or emboss a secret on VM> the back of the damn token, wouldn't it?) I should note that Alan is VM> just regergitating one of the most widely circulated rumors about VM> SecurIDs -- which like any popular crypto device attracts a lot of VM> wiLd & w00ly speculation. actually, i was speaking pretty much off the top of my head. it's been a while since i registered it, but all i basically had to tell the server the first time i used it was the s/n. and yes, i think it would be Pretty Damn Stupid to have the s/n have anything to do with the actual seed or pin. VM> Getting the algorithm for SDI's one-way hash is no big deal, VM> given that it sits in software in thousands of SDI customer VM> installations, protected only by contract and trade secret status. VM> (The integrity of the product -- the unpredictability of the VM> token-code PRN series, and the secrecy of a specific token's seed or VM> key -- rightly depends cryptographic strength of the hash, not the VM> secrecy of the algorithm.) Getting a token-specific secret key would VM> hopefully be a much greater challenge. one would certainly hope so. <g> personally, i like the card. it offers pretty good security and thus gives me remote access to systems my employer would otherwise laugh in my face for access to (and did, more than once before we got these things). its main weakness would be a black bag job where someone gains physical posession. at that point, all bets on its securty are off for obvious reasons. luckily, because of the nature of the device, i can simply report it as stolen and it quickly becomes a rather worthless piece of silicon. amp <0003701548(a)mcimail.com> (since 10/31/88) <alan.pugh(a)internetmci.com> PGP Key = 57957C9D PGP FP = FA 02 84 7D 82 57 78 E4 E2 1C 7B 88 62 A6 F9 F7 December 31, 1995 22:15

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail, which is available at: ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/premail/premail-0.33a.tar.gz For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash"; $remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub"; $remailer{"c2"} = "<remail(a)c2.org> eric pgp hash reord"; $remailer{"penet"} = "<anon(a)anon.penet.fi> penet post"; $remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer(a)ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub reord"; $remailer{"hacktic"} = "<remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"flame"} = "<remailer(a)flame.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut post reord"; $remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer(a)rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash filter"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"ford"} = "<remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de> cpunk pgp hash ksub ek"; $remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller(a)c2.org> cpunk pgp hash latent ek"; $remailer{"vishnu"} = "<mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut ek ksub reord"; $remailer{"robo"} = "<robo(a)c2.org> cpunk hash mix"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"spook"} = "<remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"rmadillo"} = "<remailer(a)armadillo.com> mix cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"ecafe"} = "<cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org> cpunk mix"; $remailer{"wmono"} = "<wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; $remailer{"shinobi"} = "<remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net> cpunk mix hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"amnesia"} = "<amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub"; $remailer{"gondolin"} = "<mix(a)remail.gondolin.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{"tjava"} = "<remailer(a)tjava.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{"pamphlet"} = "<pamphlet(a)idiom.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'gondonym'} = '<alias(a)nym.gondolin.org> alpha pgp'; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (c2 robo hroller alpha) (gondolin gondonym) (flame hacktic replay) (alumni portal) (vishnu spook wmono) Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys for the remailers. Fingering this address works too. Note: all of the "ek" tags have been verified correct. Apologies to those who were inconvenienced by incorrect "ek" tags in the past. Last update: Mon 1 Jan 96 6:49:52 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- c2 remail(a)c2.org +.-+++-.-*** 47:18 99.99% hacktic remailer(a)utopia.hacktic.nl *****+****** 8:12 99.99% bsu-cs nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu #*#+#+##++*# 3:50 99.98% replay remailer(a)replay.com *****+**+*** 6:58 99.98% pamphlet pamphlet(a)idiom.com +--++* 1:32:43 99.97% ford remailer(a)bi-node.zerberus.de -+-++-+--+++ 2:16:40 99.97% hroller hroller(a)c2.org #.-##+-.-#*# 23:11 99.94% flame remailer(a)flame.alias.net +.-----+-++ 2:35:44 99.93% spook remailer(a)valhalla.phoenix.net *.--+-.--.-+ 4:33:40 99.88% amnesia amnesia(a)chardos.connix.com -++--------- 3:31:08 99.85% rmadillo remailer(a)armadillo.com +++++++ #### 15:42 99.81% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com __.------+- 6:43:02 99.77% extropia remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com --.-------- 5:40:08 99.69% wmono wmono(a)valhalla.phoenix.net * **+ *** * 13:04 98.86% penet anon(a)anon.penet.fi --- *+++++++ 3:07:11 98.86% alumni hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu +###*++*-- # 31:22 98.14% vishnu mixmaster(a)vishnu.alias.net ----- - -* 1:22:32 98.12% portal hfinney(a)shell.portal.com #####+##- # 26:19 97.36% shinobi remailer(a)shinobi.alias.net -+++++++++ 1:33:37 90.69% rahul homer(a)rahul.net -+##*+*+#### 5:20 99.99% tjava remailer(a)tjava.com #+#*#*# :40 89.19% ecafe cpunk(a)remail.ecafe.org -#___.## 16:32:15 67.10% gondolin mix(a)remail.gondolin.org -*+..* 15:03:39 46.77% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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96R_azz
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-1-96: NYP: Denise Caruso offers '96 resolutions on Nscp/Aol bugs, Web rubes, daft pols, Gates' dogs, crypto zip, Apple rot, W$ dupes. 96R_azz

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Who sent me this message?
by Steve14571＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Someone from this list sent me a message encrypted with the international version of PGP 2.6.2. Unfortunately, my system crashed and lost the email address... Plaintext of the message follows: Hi Stephen, >Me too 8^) This is a 2047 bit key (I think big) :-) As I can see. How did you generate this key? Are you using a special version of PGP? Maybe something about myself to start with: I'm from Belgium (that small spot between France, Germany and the Netherlands). I work in a bank (no, this does not mean that I'm swimming in money!) as a system engineer. We work mainly with A-Series mainframes from UNISYS. At home I spent some time on the internet, my PC, reading a good book and last but not least having a beer with my friends. That's it for now, looking forward to hear from you again. Happy New Year! Luc Whoever sent me this message please write back, and send a public key so that I can respond.

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Re: Can We Cut the Crap?
by Gordon Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:18 PM 12/31/95 -0800, tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) wrote: > >Really, the S/N ratio is approaching all-time lows, even for the Silly >Season of Xmas. A week or so ago there was a massive flame war involving >insults and counter-insults--I returned from my Xmas vacation to find the >list melting down. Now, a week later, a new flamewar has erupted. As a lurker on the list, I'd like to second this opinion. The cypherpunks list is held up to be this almighty oracle of cryptographic information. Yet, every time I subscribe to it (this is the fourth time in a year) I have to wade through irrelevant personal attacks and various other rubbish. I mean, really. This is worse than Fidonet. However, I suppose that with any gathering of (mostly) intelligent, liberty and privacy minded people, there are likely to be clashes of one sort or another. If the anonymous twits will grow up and stop stirring things up, maybe the rest of us can learn something. Just my $0.02 ----- Gordon R. Campbell, Owner - Mowat Woods Graphics P.O. Box 1902, Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 5J7 Ph: (613) 542-4087 Fax: (613) 542-1139 2048-bit PGP key available on request.

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Canadian Cypherpunks
by Tim Philp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Is there some interest in a meeting of Canadian Cypherpunks? If you are a Canadian (or an American who is fortunate enough to live near our sainted shores ;-)) send me a private E-mail message. Because Canada is such a big country, I propose that we start with a meeting in Toronto or area. If there is enough interest, I will arrange for a meeting place. Regards, Tim Philp =================================== For PGP Public Key, Send E-mail to: pgp-public-keys(a)swissnet.ai.mit.edu In Subject line type: GET PHILP ===================================

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TSCM.COM Counter Surveillance, Privacy, & Security Page
by jmatk＠tscm.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Happy New Year!!!!! TSCM Technical Surveillance Counter Measure - new materials finished... Check it out... http://www.tscm.com/ New section on TSCM test equipment New section on TSCM training and career paths Coming Soon, TSCM Hand tools TSCM and Technical Surveillance books - James M. Atkinson "...shaken, not stirred"

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Re: "Deterrence"
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 19:17 12/29/95, jim bell wrote: >In my essay, "Assassination Politics," I pointed out that it would be >relatively easy to deter such official-type actions if enough of us simply >said, "NO!" and denominated it in terms of dollars and cents. After all, >with four million Compuserve users, if they each were willing to donate a >penny to see this latter-day Fuhrer dead, that would be $40,000. (Pardon me >if I don't translate this into marks and other currencies.) [snip] >WHEN, exactly, would it be appropriate to act? This reminds me of a Science Fiction story by H. Beam Piper called "A Planet for Texans" where as part of the laws of the planet (and the oath of office) was a statement that the politician was representing the interests of ALL of their constituents. Every constituent had the legal right (and duty) to register any protests of the politician's actions _in-person_ with said politician. Such protest could take any form up-to-and-including killing the SOB on the spot. In the story, this right was illustrated by a small farmer being charged will killing a Senator by hacking him to death with a machete (all legal protests are required to be registered in person and use of long range techniques such as car-bombs or snipping with rifles is not regarded as a valid protest) and we are shown his trial. The charge is not killing the Senator (which is by law the farmer's right since he felt that the Senator was violating his oath of office by misrepresenting him) but whether, in exercising this right, he used excessive force out of proportion to the actions that was being protested.

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Re: (NOISE) Re: PLA_gue Germ Terrorism
by Robert A. Rosenberg 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 21:54 12/30/95, jonnyx wrote: > >Think that's fun? How 'bout this: given that the initial "mapping" >phase of the human genome project is nearly complete, and the huge >amount of genetic information available on the net, PLUS ever- >more-powerful-yet-less-costly computers anyone can purchase, just >how long do y'all think it'll be before some nut whips up a bug >that targets, say, people with negroid genetic characteristics? >Or epicanthic folds? Or blonde hair? This reminds me of a 1940's Novel by Science Fiction Author Robert A. Heinlein called "Sixth Column." In it the US has been conquered by an invasion from Asia and the resistance (such as it is) is a small Top Secret hidden US Army research center with some equipment that can act on people based on their genetic makeup. Thus when it is time to go after the invaders, it is done with guns that kill only Asians but have no effect on anyone-else.

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Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 14:17 1/1/96, Mike McNally wrote: >Seems to me at as soon as things like a general-purpose browser (and >associated TCP/IP stack & PPP or SLIP) becomes as easy to load up as >an AOL demo disk, and local ISP's are listed in the yellow pages, the >advantage of being able to pay a provider for nothing more than the >routing of IP packets so that the net as a whole can be explored (and, >perhaps, more services purchased) will FAR outweigh any of the goodies >the current big providers offer. But how many of them will be willing to forward certain newsgroups if doing so carries a mandatory 10 year prison term? Hint: count the number of narcotics dealers that advertize in your local yellow pages. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: SEY_use [NOISE]
by attila 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Mon, 1 Jan 1996, David Lesher wrote: > > > > > > the concept is interesting... diplomatic immunity is not automatic in > > that it implies diplomatic recognition. does a rogue state enjoy the > > privilege of obviously bogus diplomatic passports? the diplomatic > > passport is a "gentleman's agreement" to facilitate trading intelligence > > officers --sarcastic maybe, truthful? been there, done that. > > A Dip Passport does nothing of the kind. > come on, David. stated and "real" use are often quite different. I meant what I said, literally: "...been there, done that." it's nice to believe that governments are above board --they never have been, and never will be --and Bubba is a prime example. I would buy a used car from Tricky Dick long before I would from Bubba! power is not only corruption, it is _deceit_! BTW, I do not disagree with your "protocol" in the slightest. PNG, and the trading of PNGs has been around ever since the French seemed to their language dominate foreign affairs --however, persona non gratis is rather explicit. and, I still wonder how the host country will treat "bogus" DPs from rogue states if they have more DPs than real citizens. uncle has been getting less suble these days.... > You are awarded stutus by your placement by the host country, on their > Diplomatic List. If you are there, fine; otherwise... Now, you'll never > get on that list without a Dip. Passport & recipricol agreement but it's > not enough... > > Your name can be removed by the host at any time (PNG'ed) but some kind > of warning is necessary so you can leave the host country prior to > expiration of the status. (Not much, however! I recall one case where it > was _literally_ "Be on the 4pm plane, or else.") If you are out of the > country already, you won't be back. (One person was, and his cat became > the ""PNG Pussy"" as she was shipped home the next day.) > > The Dip List being out-of-date caused considerable embarrassment to the > US during our invasion of Panama. Marines raided the Nicaraguan > Ambassador's Residence because the out-of-date copy at the US Mission > showed the _old_ address. > > -- > A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com > & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX > Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 > is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433 >

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Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:14 1/1/96, Mike McNally wrote: >Lucky Green writes: > > But how many of them [ IP providers ] will be willing to forward > > certain newsgroups if doing so carries a mandatory 10 year prison > > term? Hint: count the number of narcotics dealers that advertize > > in your local yellow pages. > >But an IP provider doesn't have to know that it's "forwarding" *any* >newsgroups; all it has to know is that IP packets are moving between >my PC and the outside world. It doesn't have any way of knowing what >those packets contain and doesn't want to. Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the ftpd, and the httpd. That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of owner. If you don't have a host, there won't be any packets to forward. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Canadian Cypherpunks [NOISE]
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Is there some interest in a meeting of Canadian Cypherpunks? If > you are a Canadian (or an American who is fortunate enough to live near > our sainted shores ;-)) send me a private E-mail message. > Because Canada is such a big country, I propose that we start > with a meeting in Toronto or area. If there is enough interest, I will > arrange for a meeting place. I don't think it is any more practical to have "Canadian Cypherpunks" meetings than "U.S. Cypherpunks" meetings. Call them what they are, i.e. regional meetings, (e.g. areas around Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Quebec, Calgary-Edmonton, etc.), but I suspect that most people are unlikely to travel in excess of 3000km for meetings which last a few hours. For example, I expect that Vancouverites are much more likely to travel to Seattle for a meeting than to Toronto. My point is, don't advertise what is really a Southern Ontario regional meeting as the meeting of "Canadian Cypherpunks". This would be like calling the S.F. Bay Area meetings the "U.S. Cypherpunks meetings". -- Mark Henderson -- markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca, henderso(a)netcom.com, mch(a)squirrel.com PGP 1024/C58015E3 fingerprint=21 F6 AF 2B 6A 8A 0B E1 A1 2A 2A 06 4A D5 92 46 cryptography archive maintainer -- ftp://ftp.wimsey.com/pub/crypto ftp://ftp.wimsey.com/pub/crypto/sun-stuff/change-sun-hostid-1.6.1.tar.gz

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CSPAN Currency Creation Hearings
by Wink Junior 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dave Feustel <feustel(a)netcom.com> on talk.politics.crypto mentioned that on Saturday morning CSPAN was broadcasting congressional hearings on "currency creation, during which smartcards, Ecash, encryption, privacy and government regulation of all of the above were discussed." There's supposed to be at least one rebroadcast. A brief review of the highlights would be very interesting. Wink -- winkjr(a)teleport.com

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Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 17:14 1/1/96, sameer wrote: >> Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the ftpd, and the httpd. >> That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of >> owner. > > Said site, however, can be located in a different jurisdiction >than the laws. Seems to me that the laws are becomming unified on a global scale. The people in power all over the world have the same interests. To stay in power. The 'unregulated' Internet is in direct confilict with this interest. Since these powers make the laws, they will use the laws to reduce the threat the present day Internet presents. Will C2 carry certain newsgroups/info after doing so has become a felony? Who wants to be an 'illegal data' kingpin and face execution? (Kingpins are 'data trafficers' that carry more than 1.5 Megs of 'controlled information'.) -- Lucky -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: Who sent me this message?
by andr0id＠midwest.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>:-) As I can see. How did you generate this key? Are you using a >special version of PGP? > Well I didn't send the message but I also use an undocumented larger key with PGP. Read it in the book a friend got. (andr0id(a)midwest.net callsign: N9XLM) ( Computer Consulting & Management ) (P.O. Box 421 Cambria, IL 62915-0421) -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.2 mQENAzCsIi4AAAEH/1hb5+tO/n99Nbppf0ImLJ6AaVZ3NlZP0ZHwRQor00uA129i d4zWixNXxc8t2auaqN+asV99LpIip3/nQzBnjydiumeBdGLF2PR9+6X8X/RrqKa1 dVIukxM5Agg2eM6ih+0J38hgKJ3qzKXSz6sjYmpaxvbXZoHHOLUk/ZtHUKvvEyPw hnJEYnut8NUnIeK56lqeqRw86yoeRKymbfCdjdpgeY2aRwK2FJts8sbb7Fs10s4y jgxWIxIipBznbGUTh1hb2XrLGPENwk3E/qqXQJEsrySbtwdl6VgTVQjhDDEJMitL DYeiQ3W5EgxfcdbM1j2FwYu3P/dM6Y0I8xLMYT0ABRG0NmFuZHIwaWRAb2ljdTgx Mi5jb20gKG9pY3U4MTIuY29tIHN5c3RlbSBhZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yKYkBFQMFEDCs LO90C7R/GkJcSQEB01cH/0KC3sd+u4OxMku5378SJktoN6QIQYLJ7uVbuV4S51yK NAotCGf4Wl6wwjynzZvXKU0H87oDuMiq7FybgMNL2n+4bQIZi0iz0lIuzwoMDu63 NrHUW9Kz42pOnhrEhrdkHhHL9O5GgD1yc40fJ3qw5h7LQEjDxgypyw0IFILFc34u LeRLliNibxKp8JwAxXNHWSgxu28TQvmnkHi0AHP6tJ/uZYe+4dqJtrMMsYFjzZaz DPmxD+dzbTwlQKtJaP1ZkDI0Sr072wrZDv+G86GyGBMX2lpSafpRitnxuUttjU9o wsQ9Qo5xiH1nZRCs/bDzJe/gng+GHzevixDIITurtNA= =SgPT -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 23:30 1/1/96, Andreas Bogk wrote: >So I guess we'll need some computers in outer space, on offshore boats >or in well-bribed stable dictatorships. o Outer space: not very realistic o Offshore boats: see the fate of drug trafficers in international waters after the Coast Guard is through with them. o Stable dictatorships: Not stable enough to withstand an humanitarian mission by the US Army. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Prevention Of Trauma 2 [NOISE]
by joee＠li.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Here's something scary to start your new year. . . ] << start of forwarded material >> ** Date: Mon, 1 Jan 1996 23:41:38 -0000 ** Reply-To: "POLI-PSY [ Political Science-Psychology/Psychiatry ]" ** <POLI-PSY(a)SJUVM.STJOHNS.EDU> ** Sender: "POLI-PSY [ Political Science-Psychology/Psychiatry ]" ** <POLI-PSY(a)SJUVM.STJOHNS.EDU> ** From: Michael Benjamin <pmhil(a)SHANI.NET> ** Subject: Prevention Of Trauma 2 ** X-To: Multiple recipients of list FORENSIC-PSYCHOLOGY ** <FORENSIC-PSYCHOLOGY(a)SJUVM.STJOHNS.EDU>, ** Multiple recipients of list LEGALTEN ** <LEGALTEN(a)SJUVM.STJOHNS.EDU>, ** Stress Traumatic <traumatic-stress(a)netcom.com> ** X-cc: Multiple recipients of list TRANSCULTURAL-PSYCHOLOGY ** <TRANSCULTURAL-PSYCHOLOGY(a)VM1.NoDak.EDU>, ** Traumatic Stress Forum <traumatic-stress(a)netcom.com> ** To: Multiple recipients of list POLI-PSY <POLI-PSY(a)SJUVM.STJOHNS.EDU> ** ** PREVENTION TRAUMA II ** ** In a previous letter I pointed out the need to eliminate ** trauma by prevention. I mentioned that there are generally Agencies ** whose function is to prevent trauma, if it is in industry, military, driving, ** etc. These agencies have criteria for excluding people who they feel ** are liable to mal-function and cause trauma (danger). Often these ** Agencies employ programs to reduced the likelihood of trauma. ** I pointed out that I feel it is legitimate to help these Agencies ** not in defining their criteria but in eliciting the given criteria by the use ** of the techniques which are used in a Diagnostic Setting. I emphasize ** that the presence or absence of these criteria are not indicative of any ** pathology. As such I feel that this discussion does not only belong in ** the field of Forensic Psychiatry but is a legitimate form of treating ** trauma, i.e. prevention. ** In the field of Road Safety in Israel the Institute for Road ** Safety is a medical institute which advises on likelihood of a driver to ** be dangerous. ** The examination is carried out on all applicants for a Public ** License (taxi, autobus), heavy vehicle drivers, and drivers involved in ** fatal accidents, and drivers or prospective drivers who have had ** contact with Mental Health Care. Generally the exams are given by ** Psychologists and are based partially on the M.M.P.I. and a clinical ** examination. More difficult cases are referred to Consultant ** Psychiatrists and an Ad-Hoc Committee. ** The criteria under discussion are mainly:- Concentration, ** Attention, Projectivity, Judgment, Consistency, Reality Jesting, Ability ** to identify , Confirm with instructions, Impulsivity and Control over ** Impulsivity. ** Over the years we have found these to be of primary ** importance and we thus concentrate on illnesses or personality ** disturbance where these criteria may well occur. ** If these indications are discovered we check if they are ** causing driving delinquency. If so, we then determine if there is a ** reasonable likelihood of the patient / examinee being made to ** understand and correct himself. Obviously in some instances this is of ** little likelihood. If these indications are present or applying for a new ** license, the application is rejected. If we allow a "trial" period, the ** position is first explained to the examinee, and we try and ascertain if it ** at all possible that he both understands and is able of "changing his ** ways". ** In addition to the "meeting point" between Forensic ** Psychiatry and "Preventive" Traumatology we feel that we are on the ** delicate meeting point of "Personal Rights" and Societies "Right to ** defend itself". ** We are under perpetual scrutiny, which I feel is justified and ** healthy. I would very much enjoy any comments or suggestions. ** ** ** Michael. << end of forwarded material >> j. ercole <joee(a)li.net> ny, usa pgp public key at: http://www.li.net/~joee/index.html $$$$$$$$$$$$$$$$********************&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& Stand By---.sig presently being unearthed in regression therapy.

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Re: Guerilla Internet Service Providers
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 15:32 1/1/96, Felix Lee wrote: >Lucky Green: >> Some site in physical space has to host the nntpd, the ftpd, and the httpd. >> That site will be subject to search, seizure, and arrest and conviction of >> owner. > >but if it turns out that 30% of home PCs have to be seized to prevent >dissemination of dangerous-information-X? Wrong. Only 0.03% of the home PCs have to be seized and the owners incarcerated. The remaining users will cease to carry controlled data on their own. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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Re: CSPAN Currency Creation Hearings
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 19:04 1/1/96, Brad Dolan wrote: >I caught part of it. > >The general theme was,~"we're going to establish a `partnership' with >digicash / crypto firms to ensure that our `legitimate law-enforcement >needs' are designed into the products."~ I sincerely doubt that there will be any 'partnerships' between DigiCash and law enforcement. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred.

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[local] Syracuse new york
by Douglas F. Elznic 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Are their any interested people in having a meeting in the syr area?

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Guerilla ISP's...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone looked at operating systems like Plan 9 which divide the services into 3 sets (terminal, file, process) and then distribute them over various machines (and cpu's in multi-cpu systems) on a 'cost' basis? This would effectively address the issue of where named, httpd, or whatever was running. Mainly because it would never run on the same machine (or cpu) each time or necessarily all the time (ie run a while here then over there).

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