December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

EPIC Analysis of E-Privacy Act
by David Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

==================================================================== EPIC Preliminary Analysis of E-PRIVACY Act May 12, 1998 Washington, DC Senators John Ashcroft (R-MO) and Patrick Leahy (D-VT) today introduced the "Encryption Protects the Rights of Individuals from Violation and Abuse in Cyberspace (E-PRIVACY) Act." The proposed legislation is the latest in a series of congressional measures designed to resolve the debate surrounding current U.S. encryption policy. Like the SAFE Act (H.R. 695) now pending in the House, the E-PRIVACY Act seeks to relax existing controls on the export of encryption products. Controls would be lifted for encryption products that are deemed to be "generally available" within the international market. Exporters would be given new procedural rights to obtain expedited determinations on the exportability of their products. The bill also contains several provisions that would preserve the right of Americans to use encryption techniques and that would enhance the privacy protections currently accorded to personal communications and stored data. Among its positive features, the bill: * Reiterates the right of Americans to use, develop, manufacture, sell, distribute, or import any encryption product, regardless of the algorithm selected, key length, or the existence of key recovery capabilities; * Prohibits government-compelled key escrow or key recovery; * Prohibits government agencies from creating any linkage between cryptographic methods used for authentication and those used for confidentiality; * Prohibits the federal government from purchasing key recovery encryption systems that are not interoperable with other commercial encryption products; and * Provides enhanced privacy protections for stored electronic data held by third parties, location information generated by wireless communications services, and transactional information obtained from pen registers and trap and trace devices; The bill contains two provisions that raise significant civil liberties and privacy concerns. The Criminalization Provision The bill would make the use of encryption to conceal "incriminating" communications or information during the commission of a crime a new and independent criminal offense. While well-intended, the provision could have several unintended consequences that would easily undermine the other desirable features of the bill. We believe it is a mistake to create criminal penalties for the use of a particular technique or device. Such a provision tends to draw attention away from the underlying criminal act and casts a shadow over a valuable technology that should not be criminalized. It may, for instance, be the case that a typewritten ransom note poses a more difficult challenge for forensic investigators than a handwritten note. But it would be a mistake to criminalize the use of a typewriter simply because it could make it more difficult to investigate crime in some circumstances. Additionally, a provision which criminalizes the use of encryption, even in furtherance of a crime, would give prosecutors wide latitude to investigate activity where the only indicia of criminal conduct may be the mere presence of encrypted data. In the digital age, where techniques to protect privacy and security will be widely deployed, we cannot afford to view encryption as the potential instrumentality of a crime, just as we would not today view the use of a typewriter with suspicion. Finally, the provision could also operate as a substantial disincentive to the widespread adoption of strong encryption techniques in the communications infrastructure. Given that the availability of strong encryption is one of the best ways to reduce the risk of crime and to promote public safety, the retention of this provision in the legislation will send a mixed message to users and businesses -- that we want people to be free to use encryption but will be suspicious when it is used. If the concern is that encryption techniques may be used to obstruct access to evidence relevant to criminal investigations, we submit that the better approach may be to rely on other provisions in the federal and state criminal codes (including sections relating to obstruction of justice or concealment) to address this problem if it arises. The "NET Center" The bill creates within the Department of Justice a National Electronic Technology Center (NET Center) to "serve as a center for . . . law enforcement authorities for information and assistance regarding decryption and other access requirements." The NET Center would have a broad mandate and could spawn a new domestic surveillance bureaucracy within the Department of Justice. Among other powers, the bill authorizes the NET Center to: * Examine encryption techniques and methods to facilitate the ability of law enforcement to gain efficient access to plaintext of communications and electronic information; * Conduct research to develop efficient methods, and improve the efficiency of existing methods, of accessing plaintext of communications and electronic information; * Investigate and research new and emerging techniques and technologies to facilitate access to communications and electronic information; and * Obtain information regarding the most current hardware, software, telecommunications, and other capabilities to understand how to access digitized information transmitted across networks. The mission of the NET Center is made more troubling by the bill's authorization of "assistance" from other federal agencies, including the detailing of personnel to the new entity. In light of the fact that existing federal expertise in the areas of electronic surveillance and decryption resides at the National Security Agency (NSA), the bill in effect authorizes unprecedented NSA involvement in domestic law enforcement activities. Such a result would be contrary to a half-century-old consensus that intelligence agencies must be strictly constrained from engaging in domestic "police functions." That consensus arose from the recognition that intelligence agencies created to operate abroad are ill-suited for domestic activities, where U.S. citizens enjoy constitutional protections against governmental intrusions. In 1975, Sen. Frank Church led a congressional investigation into the activities of NSA. He noted that Congress had a "particular obligation to examine the NSA, in light of its tremendous potential for abuse. ... The danger lies in the ability of NSA to turn its awesome technology against domestic communications." In 1987, Congress enacted the Computer Security Act, which sought to vest civilian computer security authority in the Commerce Department and to limit the domestic role of NSA. The House Report on the Computer Security Act cited congressional concern over a Reagan Administration directive that "gave NSA the authority to use its considerable foreign intelligence expertise within this country." The report noted that such authority was "particularly troubling" since NSA "has, on occasion, improperly targeted American citizens for surveillance." The NET Center proposal, if approved, would constitute a fundamental re-definition of the relationship between intelligence agencies and domestic law enforcement. Such an approach would ignore 50 years of experience and would pose a serious threat to the privacy and constitutional rights of Americans. EPIC looks forward to working with the legislation's sponsors and other interested parties to address these issues and develop a national encryption policy that will ensure the widespread availability of robust encryption products and the preservation of constitutional rights. Such a result will be critical for both our nation's continued leadership of the information industry and the protection of personal privacy in the next century.

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No Subject
by Josh Schoof 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Re:"... would cause us to look at this person as a threat"
by StanSqncrs 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In a message dated 5/12/98 4:37:47 PM Central Daylight Time, ptrei(a)securitydynamics.com writes: << ... Considering it's content, I have no doubt that it is manufactured - it carefully written to offend millenialist Christians, such as the SDAs. I've written the page owner to see if I can find out more. ... >> Not only that, it seems to be "spam" (the repetitive list type). You see 2 days ago we welcomed a guest to my list (FreeGroup), and in his first batch, guess what was there. Another FreeGroupie had a great response to it, I include it - ===== ... writes: > Well howdy 'yall, i'm mighty proud to have someone to chat wdith and share > ideas and some news, both good and bad. > here's some bad news to start off the day > > RE: Janet Reno, Attorney General of these United States of America > > Subject: Janet Reno Quote > > Date: Wednesday, May 06, 1998 10:54 > > > > A friend sent me this...sure would like to see the interview in context, > > but at any rate a very scary statement. > > > > Subject: Cults and Government? > > > > "Just ran across this quote from AG Janet Reno. From a person of such > > high power, these are scary words. --------- " <snip - the "spam"> > > "-Attorney General Janet Reno, Interview on 60 Minutes, June 26, > > 1994" > > Bad *NEWS*??? This purports to be an item that's nearly 4 years old. What's the news? I guess the news is that we're getting this 3rd hand--at a minimum, with no idea if it's true or not. But hey! This is the internet. So, again, I ask, *NEWS*???? Bad beginning, Sir Will. The willingness to pass along material of dubious authenticity is not a good sign in my book. As Mr. Natural would say, "Check your source." So, what *IS* your source? ===== Thanks for your excellent research on the origins of that, Peter! Stan, FreeGroup - "Just Say It!" http://members.aol.com/WhtsAMetaU/freegroup.html

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Bitslice DES S-boxes
by mkwan＠preston.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

After 6 weeks of number crunching, I've finally produced a new set of bitslice DES S-boxes using non-standard logic gates. Numbers are as follows - S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 Avg 56 50 53 39 56 53 51 50 51 Details at http://www.cs.mu.oz.au/~mkwan/bitslice There won't be any more improvements in the foreseeable future, since I've run out of ideas. Feel free to use this code in the RSA DES II challenge, but remember to give credit where it's due. mkwan

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Chaffing and winnowing
by Mark Rosen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have just been notified that chaffing and winnowing does, indeed, violate the export regulations. You can read them for yourself at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Encryption/encreg.htm, but here are a few parts a. Designed or modified to use ``cryptography'' employing digital techniques to ensure ``information security''; b. Designed or modified to perform cryptanalytic functions; c. Designed or modified to use ``cryptography'' employing analog techniques to ensure ``information security''; ... Note: 5A002 does not control the following: b. Equipment containing ``fixed'' data compression or coding techniques; ... g. Data authentication equipment that calculates a Message Authentication Code (MAC) or similar result to ensure no alteration of text has taken place, or to authenticate users, but does not allow for encryption of data, text or other media other than that needed for the authentication; So it seems 5A002.a and 5A002.g cover such encryption technologies as chaffing and winnowing. Interestingly enough, 5A002.b allows such functions as the package transform (keyless coding), even though it uses encryption algorithms. - Mark Rosen http://www.mach5.com/

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Re: Gary Lee Burnore is a Convicted Sex Offender in Raleigh, NC
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

wmcclatc(a)primenet.com (William J. McClatchie) > X-Comment: Aw, are you offended? > X-no-archive: yes > [anonymous makes illegal usage of information, as defined by the state he > got the info from, and then whines] And your legal basis for calling the posting of public information from a public website to usenet "illegal usage" is ??? Presumably if the state had wanted to keep the info secret, they wouldn't have made it public available. The only whining I've seen has been by Gary Burnore who complained that the state of North Carolina failed to keep his conviction as a sex offender a secret, and by various DataBasix sock puppets and groupies. Burnore did the crime, he was convicted, he registered as a sex offender with the state of NC, the information was made publicly available by the state, and people found out as they were intended to. Deal with it! Maybe you ought to learn a little about remailers before you make such ridiculous claims, McClatchie. If I'm the person you say "whined", then I'm *NOT* the same person who posted the information that Gary whined about. Sorry to burst Gary's bubble that all posts which poor little Gary Burnore doesn't like originate from his one mythical "Anon Asshole <tm>". In fact, the information is just as likely to have been posted anonymously by YOU as by me. > >It's people like you and Gary Burnore who threaten and harass people who > >say things you don't like that make anonymous remailers necessary. > > >And it is assholes like you who ABUSE remailers that make them go away. Let me get this straight... Someone threatens a remailer user with physical violence, I comment on it, and now I'm "abusing a remailer" just because you don't like what I have to say? Don't you think that's for the remailer operator to decide? Do you operate a remailer, McClatchie?

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[rivest@theory.lcs.mit.edu: Chaffing question]
by Jim Thompson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

With all of the discussion of C&W, and potential expansion, along with a sideband discussion of same, I decided to ask 'the man' himself. The '10K email file' used in the example came from the sideband discussion. Forwarded for your edification. ------- Start of forwarded message ------- Date: Tue, 12 May 1998 18:24:46 -0400 From: Ron Rivest <rivest(a)theory.lcs.mit.edu> Subject: Chaffing question Suppose you can start with a 10KB email file. Running a package (all-or-nothing) transform on it adds only a small amount to the length---say 128 bits total, or less (basically the length of a key in your favorite algorithm). You can break the result into 128 one-bit blocks and one 10KB block. MAC each block. Add 128 bits of chaff, intermingled with the first 128 blocks from above. The final result has 128+128+1 packets, and total length 10KB (the original email) + 257*64 bits (for the 257 64-bit MAC values) plus 128 bits (the chaff bits), and assuming that the sequence numbers are implicit rather than explicit, you get a total of around 12.3 KB. Cheers, Ron ------- End of forwarded message ------- -- Jim Thompson / Smallworks, Inc. / jim(a)smallworks.com 512 338 0619 phone / 512 338 0625 fax Real, cheap Hardware RNG: http://www.fringeware.com/nscd/

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Abusive crossposting by anonymous remailer user (Was: Gary L. Burnore blah blah blah)
by eridani＠databasix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <199805130137.DAA03874(a)basement.replay.com>, nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) wrote: [who cares what he wrote] Where's the idiot who was ranting about kooks who crosspost threads everywhere and called -me- a Usenet abuser? Take a look at the references in this one: References: <199805101850.LAA00114(a)sirius.infonex.com> <3555FA78.7795(a)pageplanet.com> <199805121307.PAA21528(a)basement.replay.com> <6ja344$i2h(a)nntp02.primenet.com> <199805101850.LAA00114(a)sirius.infonex.com> posted to triangle.general only <3555FA78.7795(a)pageplanet.com> posted to triangle.general only <199805121307.PAA21528(a)basement.replay.com> posted to: alt.fan.gburnore,triangle.general,alt.vigilantes, alt.netcom.emeritus,alt.cypherpunks,news.admin.censorship, alt.privacy,alt.privacy.anon-server,misc.kids And there we have it, folks. The anonymous stalker who's spent the past year following Gary Burnore around Usenet found a post in triangle.general that mentioned him, added a propaganda-filled follow up to it, and posted it to 9 newsgroups--many of whom have repeatedly requested that this crap be kept out of said groups. Oh and lookee what else: it was mailed to cypherpunks(a)toad.com, presumably for archival on the cypherpunks mailing list, where it will be picked up by WWW search engines. Since those folks don't seem to mind having their archives used in personal grudge matches, I'll just start cc'ing my responses there as well. I'm sure, as champions of free speech, they can understand the necessity of making sure both sides of the story get equal time. -- Belinda

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Re: Abusive crossposting by anonymous remailer user (Was: Gary Lee Burnore is a Convicted Sex Offender in Raleigh, NC)
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

eridani(a)databasix.com (Belinda Bryan) wrote: > And there we have it, folks. The anonymous stalker who's spent the past > year following Gary Burnore around Usenet found a post in > triangle.general that mentioned him, added a propaganda-filled follow up > to it, and posted it to 9 newsgroups--many of whom have repeatedly > requested that this crap be kept out of said groups. "Anonymous stalker"? For merely posting a reply to a public post on Usenet? What state or country has a statute against that, and what makes you think the poster falls under its jurisdiction if it does exist? As for whether a certain post is "propaganda", that is for the reader to decide, especially when of the content is independently verifiable. The "propaganda" you refer to was apparently intended to refute the fallacious assertion that since Gary Lee Burnore's entry in the North Carolina official database of registered sex offenders had apparently been removed, then the underlying crime for which he was convicted and required to register somehow automagically never happened. To make such an assertion is to invite rebuttal. The thread you're whining about involved Steve Crisp <crisp(a)pageplanet.com> threatening an anonymous poster with "beating the living fuck out of you" if his/her identity could be determined, a second anonymous poster challenging the propriety of such a threat, and yet another DataBasix groupie, William McClatchie <wmcclatc(a)primenet.com>, calling the second anonymous poster a "remailer abuser" for daring to make such a challenge. So rather than denouncing the threat itself, you choose to call the person challenging it an "anonymous stalker"? If you feel no need to "hide" anything, please feel free to post your street address and home phone number. But I imagine that many people with small children would not want their names, from which their street address can be derived by someone with the resources available to you and Gary Burnore, to fall into the hands of a convicted child molester with a history of abusive retaliation. Being threatened with physical violence for making an unpopular post is one of the best arguments available as to why anonymity is necessary when people like Steve Crisp and convicted child molester Gary Lee Burnore are running around loose making those threats. > Oh and lookee what else: it was mailed to cypherpunks(a)toad.com, > presumably for archival on the cypherpunks mailing list, where it will > be picked up by WWW search engines. Since those folks don't seem to > mind having their archives used in personal grudge matches, I'll just > start cc'ing my responses there as well. I'm sure, as champions of free > speech, they can understand the necessity of making sure both sides of > the story get equal time. This, of course, comes from the same Belinda Bryan who impersonated a lawyer for DataBasix to demand the disclosure of (fortunately non-existant) user logs from the Huge Cajones remailer in a failed Scientology-esque attempt to embarass its users. And that attack, BTW, started because Gary Burnore was pissed that an anonymous whistle blower used a remailer to tip of his victim's mother to the molestation. As is typical of his style, Burnore denounced that legitimate use of anonymity as "harassment" and "abuse". It was also Burnore who chose to make PUBLIC what had previously been a private e-mail, thus inviting his critics to factually evaluate the claims. One of them apparently did so and discovered Gary Burnore's name and mug shot were published on an official PUBLIC website of registered sex offenders maintained by the state of North Carolina where Burnore moved after leaving San Francisco. Perhaps he should have learned a lesson from Gary Hart and not have taunted the wrong people to find evidence of his wrongdoing. Will the continual harangue against privacy and anonymity by Gary Lee Burnore, Belinda Bryan, Billy McClatchie, and other staffers and sock puppets of the DataBasix wrecking crew never end? BTW, Belinda, cross-posting your whining drivel in the fashion you're threatening negates your lame attempts to achieve deniability by using the infamous X-No-Archive header that has become the trademark of DataBasix' denizens. IOW, you won't be able to retroactively claim that an embarassing post from you was "forged" because it's not archived at an unbiased, third party site. Can you say "oops"?

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Hidden US government
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Guys There is a segment in the US government who do whatever they want. Like stinging Iran. The segment thinks that they are unaccountable. We want to change this. And get our money too! Wednesday 5/13/98 7:40 AM Lawyers and netizens Morales and my last Friday filing seen at http://www.jya.com/whp050898.htm is causing comments at http://www.jya.com/mf050998.htm and elsewhere. One of my neighbors, Bill Moe, is a retired AF officer and now an APD cop. Moe commented that no lawyer would ever write a document like the one we FILED. Morales is ready to go to the Supreme Court on this case for the reasons of Campos dismissing DIR NSA Minihan. Morales feels that this decision make no one in a federal agency accountable.. We will also probably have to appeal the dismissal of Morales too. Bad precedent. Now that we have copies of the docket sheets seen at http://www.jya.com/whp-10usca.htm we must study them. We will do this at noon today. Then we will begin the process of filing criminal complaint affidavits on Tenth circuit judges and judge Joseph Weis, of the Third circuit. Dolores K. Sloviter Chief Judge, Third Circuit 18614 U.S. Courthouse Philadelphia, PA 19106 215-597-1588 also EARNED a criminal complaint affidavit along with clerks Bradford Baldus and Toby Slawsky. Slawsky earned another for sending US Marshals Lester and Lopez to investigate me, with no letter of authorization, for inappropriate communications. The matter of Campos in camera ex parte meeting with NSA is also causing CONCERN. http://www.jya.com/whp043098.htm NM judge John Conway had an ex parte in camera meeting with Sandia/NSA high tech terrorist James Gosler in 1992 in my ADEA lawsuit. Conway then sealed all of my lawsuit court records and halted discovery. Then there was the matter in both my and Morales lawsuits of material showing up in the final district decisions which was not in pleadings. A district federal court spy gave us information that Sandia wrote the decision for, in Morales case, judge Galvan and my case, John Conway. These actions by judges and court clerks largely prompted Morales and my genocide and crypto incompetence lawsuit. We know that the federal courts and the legal system are LARGELY controlled by the US federal government. This is becoming more obvious to all by those who read http://www.jya.com/whp043098.htm. The US Hidden government is in reality a fascist government. FASCISM - a political and economic movement, strongly nationalistic, magnifying the rights of the state as opposed to those of the individual, in which industry, though remaining largely under private ownership, and all administrative political units, are controlled by a strong central government. Since Morales and I have both lost money as a result of actions of a fascist government, we struck at the heart of the US Hidden government [aka The Great Satan] with our genocide and crypto incompetence lawsuit. Representative Cynthia McKinney [CYMCK(a)mail.house.gov ] and Senator Grassley [chuck_grassley(a)grassley.senate.gov] are in possession of the Swiss Radio International audio tape telling the saga of Hans Buehlers arrest in Teheran in 1992 for espionage. Hopefully those who are concerned can share their concerns about possible consequences of NOT releasing our requested documents on Internet. And, too, encourage settlement of this NSA-caused American tragedy. http://caq.com/cryptogate http://www.aci.net/kalliste/speccoll.htm Morales and I continue to feel that we should settled this unfortunate matter before it gets WORSE. Later bill

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Question reports on Y2K report
by vpuser＠u041.oh.vp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello, Has anyone read "The McAlvany Intelligence Advisor" of Febuary 1998? Title: The millenium Bug: Global cyber-meltdown in the year 2000 PART 1 Mr McAlvany has a very domesday perspective. Does his report have alot of Truth or alot of Hype? Please don't flame me to hard for my ignorance, I'm just attempting to seperate the CHAF from the WHEAT. Thank you for any guidance Brian --

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El Nino !!!
by goodnews4u＠mailexcite.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Encryption trends and legal issues
by whitelaw＠ndirect.co.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am looking for information on the legal and export issues on encryption around the world and the current use of different encryption algorithms today. If anyone can send me some information or point me to the appropriate sites I would be most grateful. Thanks, Gavin.

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Philodox Symposium: Digital Bearer Transaction Settlement
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Wed, 13 May 1998 12:54:33 -0400 To: Digital Bearer Settlement List <dbs(a)philodox.com> From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: Philodox Symposium: Digital Bearer Transaction Settlement Sender: <dbs(a)philodox.com> Precedence: Bulk List-Subscribe: <mailto:requests@philodox.com?subject=subscribe%20dbs> X-Web-Archive: http://www.philodox.com/dbs-archive/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Announcement Date: May 13, 1998 The Philodox Symposium on Digital Bearer Transaction Settlement The Downtown Harvard Club Boston, Massachusetts July 23-24, 1998 Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism, of Boston, Massachusetts, in association with the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, announces the first in a series of symposia, conferences and workshops on the subject of digital bearer transaction settlement. The first of these gatherings, a symposium examining the technology, economics, markets and law of digital bearer settlement, will be held at the Harvard Club of Boston, Thursday and Friday, July 23 and 24, 1998. What is Digital Bearer Settlement? A digital bearer transaction is one where a cryptographically secure value-object, issued and underwritten by a third party, is exchanged between the two parties in a trade, typically over a public internetwork. The object, when passed in trade for something else of value, executes, clears, and settles the transaction instantaneously, securely, and, usually, anonymously. And, at considerable savings in transaction cost compared to "book-entry" transactions, such as credit and debit cards, checks, and modern securities clearing methods. It is estimated that $100 billion in transactions are being executed on the internet annually. 40% of all retail stock trades are now executed from the net, for instance. If it's possible to properly call a credit card transaction transmitted under Secure Socket Layer to be settled and cleared on the net itself, then an estimated maximum of $10 billion of those transactions, 10%, are actually cleared and settled on the net, with marginal market share to other transaction protocols. By comparison, $3 trillion in foreign exchange transactions are executed, cleared and settled every day, using standard book-entry processes. There are electronic check and debit protocols in experimental development, but, as transaction settlement time tends towards the instantaneous, the more cost, security, and non-repudiation advantages there are for digital bearer settlement. It is not unreasonable to see how transaction costs can be reduced enormously by digital bearer settlement, possibly by several orders of magnitude over any analogous book-entry method. It is completely conceivable that digital bearer transactions, of all kinds and sizes, from macrobonds to micropayments, will be executed, cleared, and settled on ubiquitous global internetworks, and will become the dominant transaction mechanism over time on those networks, and, by extension, in the global economy in general. It may happen sooner than we can imagine. Electronic book-entry settlement itself is only 40 years old at best, and internet financial cryptography and digital bearer settlement are much more a phenomenon of collapsing microprocessor prices than electronic book-entry settlement ever was. The Philodox Digital Bearer Transaction Settlement Events Towards that end, Philodox has taken it upon itself to focus the attention of the information technology, financial and legal communities onto the technology of digital bearer settlement though the following series of events. First, this initial Symposium of professionals interested in digital bearer settlement, to be held in Boston. Then, contingent on interest, a peer-reviewed Financial Research Conference to be held during the winter of 1998-99 in Manhattan or Washington, followed by a small Developer's Conference in the spring of 1999, held in more casual surroundings, and, finally, a teaching Workshop for Financial Professionals held in the summer of 1999 at a resort location, probably Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. It is hoped by Philodox that some, or perhaps, all, of these events will be recurring ones, and of course, that they will increase in attendance over time. The Symposium Each section of the Symposium agenda will consist of a short presentation on the topic by the most expert symposium participant on the subject present, followed by discussions led by a moderator. While it is not expected that everyone will even be conversant on each topic, it is expected that participants will bring their own particular expertise to bear on specific elements of the symposium program, and, of course, not everyone will have to present something. We have a lot to teach each other, but, fortunately, most of the people who are interested enough in this topic to come to this first symposium will know more than enough to have at least some opinions on the topics under discussion, and will certainly want to share those opinions with everyone else. Finally, there are lots of differing opinions this subject, so expect some animated discussion. Because of the expected demand and the size of the Harvard Club space we're using, participation in the symposium will be limited, and advance registration will be required. See below for details. The Symposium Agenda Agenda The Philodox Symposium on Digital Bearer Transaction Settlement The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston July 23-24, 1998 Thursday, July 23, 1998 (Club Dress Code: jacket and tie, no jeans or sneakers) 0730-0830: Check-in, Breakfast 0830-0845: Welcome 0845-1015: History of Bearer Transaction Settlement How old is bearer settlement? Why should we think about physical bearer settlement? What were the market models for underwriting digital bearer instruments? What sanctions prevented non-repudiation? What happened to physical bearer settlement? What is digital bearer settlement? How was it invented? What is the status of digital bearer settlement now? 1015-1030: Break 1030-1200: Digital Bearer Settlement Technology Survey and Forecasts What are the different digital bearer settlement protocols? How do they work? Which ones are on the market today? What are some of the technical limits of these protocols? Can they be overcome and do they need to be? What kinds of technology is in the labs? 1200-1300: Lunch 1300-1500: Bearer Settlement Legal/Regulatory Survey and Forecasts How did we get transaction regulation in the first place? What are the legal restrictions on bearer transactions in general? What are the laws on strong cryptography? How do the above laws and regulations effect the prospects for digital bearer settlement? What effect will cash-settled, and possibly anonymous, digital auction markets have on intellectual property rights? 1500-1515: Break 1515-1715: Possible Legal/Regulatory Solutions What can be done about bearer settlement law and regulation? Are there ways that internet digital bearer settlement can coexist with book-entry settlement laws? Will the potential cost savings overcome the need to regulate? What about intellectual property laws? Should there be a legislative/regulatory strategy? If so, what would it look like? 1730-1930: Reception, Cocktails and Hors d'Oeurves Friday, July 23, 1998 (Dress Code: "business casual", no jeans or sneakers) 0800-0830: Breakfast 0830-0845: Announcements 0845-1015: Internet Transaction Settlement Economic/Financial Survey and Forecasts What is the annual dollar volume of all transactions worldwide? How are they broken up by payment mechanism? What is the actual and forecasted dollar volume of internet transaction execution? How will those transactions clear and settle? What are the current clearing and settlement costs? What are the expected costs of internet digital bearer settlement? What is the micro- and macroeconomic impact of a digital bearer settled economy? 1015-1030: Break 1030-1200: Capital Market Applications for Digital Bearer Settlement What kinds of securities can you create digital bearer instruments for? How do they work? How do you vote stock, collect dividends, etc.? Can you really do limited liability in software, without law? What size transactions can be cleared and settled like this? How much transaction volume can a digital bearer market handle? 1200-1300: Lunch 1300-1430: Other Market Applications for Digital Bearer Settlement Just how ubiquitous can the internet be? Can you create cash settled pay-per-use utilities? Even roads? Digital bearer gambling tokens? "Digital Collectibles"?? Lions, and tigers, and bears: "Perfect kidnappings", "crypto-anarchy", auction markets for force, geodesic warfare, the end of civilization as we know it, and other monsters under the bed. 1430-1445: Break 1445-1630: New Product/Market Ideas for Digital Bearer Settlement Who are the entrepreneurs? What else can we do with digital bearer instruments? When is the transition to digital bearer settlement going to happen? Where's the most bang for the buck, right now? How are we going to make money on this? 1630-1645: Closing Symposium Cost and Registration The cost for the Philodox Symposium on Digital Bearer Transaction Settlement is $447, payable by company check or personal money order to "Philodox", and sent to Robert Hettinga, Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA, 02131, USA. Massachusetts residents should add 6% sales tax. Please contact Robert Hettinga <mailto:rah@philodox.com>, or <mailto:rah@shipwright.com> for wire instructions if it is necessary to make your payment by bank wire. Include the participant(s) name, shirt size, email address, and company affliation, if applicable, with your check or money order. Confirmation of your check and your Symposium seat will be sent by email. If you pay by wire, please notify Mr. Hettinga by email that you intend to do so, and include in your email the other requested information. In order to organize the Symposium properly, payment must be received by Philodox no later than noon, Thursday, July 9th, 1998. Again, attendance to the Symposium is limited, so please register as soon as possible to assure your seat. The Symposium fee goes towards conference room rental, breakfasts, lunches, a cocktail reception on Thursday night, snacks, audio-visual rental, internet access on-site, various mementoes of the occasion, and, of course, Philodox's event management fee. Scholarships A small number of scholarship fee-waivers will be available, contingent upon direct sponsorship and the size of the Symposium, to be selected by Philodox and based upon the applicant's financial need and ability to contribute to the symposium. Please contact Robert Hettinga, <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com>, or <mailto: rah(a)shipwright.com>, if you want to request a fee-waiver. Sponsorship In addition to direct event and website sponsorship opportunities, including the possiblity of exhibition space, there are several in-kind sponsorship opportunites available, particularly in the areas of audio-video services and internet services, including internet access, web-casting and web-page development. Please contact Robert Hettinga, <mailto: rah(a)philodox.com>, or <mailto: rah(a)shipwright.com>, if you're interested in in-kind or direct sponsorship of the Symposium. The Digital Bearer Settlement Email List: dbs(a)philodox.com As part of Philodox's ongoing support of the technology of digital bearer settlement, an email list has been established to discuss the technology and it's ramifications in an unmoderated, informal setting. Please see <http://www.philodox.com/> to see the archives of the Digital Bearer Settlement discussion list, and its subscription information. If there is enough demand, an additional announcement list for the Symposium itself will be created, but it is hoped that the Symposium's participants will use dbs(a)philodox.com as a "watering hole" for their discussions. Who is Philodox? Philodox is a new financial technology evangelism company founded by Robert Hettinga, founder of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, and founding moderator and editor of several internet discussion lists and newsletters on digital commerce and financial cryptography. Mr Hettinga is also the founder of both the International Conference on Financial Cryptography, and the International Financial Cryptography Association. For more information on Philodox, please see <http://www.philodox.com>. For more information on Robert Hettinga, please see <http://www.shipwright.com>. For more information on the Digital Commerce Society see <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu?body=info%20dcsb>. For more information on the International Conference on Financial Cryptography, see <http://www.fc98.ai/>. See You in Boston! Cordially, Robert Hettinga Founder, Philodox Financial Technology Evangelism Boston, Massachusetts -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNVnPvMUCGwxmWcHhAQGEDwf6AzFX53KDFRwNieTsU7M19nLf7F88BNWM bu+ii9aJsrAFlvkllyFuruVMjEWiYpNTfj5xPEJaaIxeHFRR6vNJet7XekAMjg1O ZeYzs86I9DovtSIpSuSt3uHcPuwPgE9ZvO0parHwUl64uZ1cTldExYPCaquqU1K0 YzOVI+01MNKs/T5Zo68nRhkm1DfzYCE3DjKs4YA2mgA8nmgpqjhbnncOYATgv3Up H+RRLLVSHD3nKh2RdK49RtGpRg6YvDRI3FP0vPaPTAMNy6A0KREhcnixZp8CZhBC X510YO4ctlUkcS6esfSL9NyDZNlvLPZ4DdFveFgCurqvrUF5dyHMvQ== =6min -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Re: Encryption trends and legal issues
by jim＠mentat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Gavin skribis: > I am looking for information on the legal and export issues on > encryption around the world and the current use of different encryption > algorithms today. For legal/export issues: http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/lawsurvy.htm He keeps it up-to-date, and it covers the world. For current use of different encryption algorithms, I think TIS has a continuing project monitoring availability of packages worldwide using different systems. Jim Gillogly

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Re: Question reports on Y2K report
by vpuser＠u041.oh.vp.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Declan, Unfortunately it does not have a URL it is a printed report ( Febuary 1998), & I was given a copy of it. One paragraph in the report ( that I have read so far) does reference http://www.garynorth.com ========== NOTE: Have not had the time to look at the Home Page for the report, but could possibly be at http://www.mcalvany.com =========== However, the report it self discusses all areas that the Y2K bug could affect. The Only location, that I have found so far, is at the subscription office ( subscription is to high for me ) MIA P.O. Box 84904 Phoenix, AZ 85071 Brian > > Want to give me a URL? > > -Declan > > > --

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Re: Abusive crossposting by anonymous remailer user (Was: Gary Lee Burnore is a Convicted Sex Offender in Raleigh, NC)
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steve Crisp <crisp(a)pageplanet.com wrote: > > The thread you're whining about involved Steve Crisp <crisp(a)pageplanet.com> > > threatening an anonymous poster with "beating the living fuck out of you" > > if his/her identity could be determined... > > And it still stands. Come out of hiding and see if you survive the > night. > > Steve Crisp Does anyone question the need for the ability to post anonymously with censorious bullies like him running loose? Him and Belinda Bryan <eridani(a)databasix.com> threatening to "make life a living hell" for anyone who dares to criticize her anonymously, that is. Someone posts something he didn't like and he threatened that person with bodily harm. I criticize him anonymously for making that threat, and now he threatens me, too. That sure makes PagePlanet sound like a company I'd like to do business with: PagePlanet (PAGEPLANET-DOM) 3252 Octavia Street Raleigh, NC 27606 US Domain Name: PAGEPLANET.COM Administrative Contact: Crisp, Steve (SC2795) crisp(a)PAGEPLANET.COM 919-852-5262 (FAX) 919-233-0816 Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Sullivan, Mikey (MS5652) mikey(a)PAGEPLANET.COM 919-852-5262 (FAX) 919-852-5261 Billing Contact: Crisp, Valerie (VC370) valerie(a)PAGEPLANET.COM 919-233-6602 (FAX) 919-852-5261 Record last updated on 10-Feb-98. Record created on 25-Nov-96. Database last updated on 13-May-98 03:50:14 EDT. Domain servers in listed order: DNS.PAGEPLANET.COM 205.152.36.2 DNS2.PAGEPLANET.COM 205.152.36.3 DNS3.PAGEPLANET.COM 208.194.157.172

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Pottery, Stalingrad , Fascists, Sandinistas, and settlement, of course
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wednesday 5/13/98 1:17 PM John Young J Orlin Grabbe Tuesday evening Patty and I journeyed to Placitas, NM. Patty was going to have some kindergarten student pottery projects kiln fired. Karl and Mary Hofmann are fine artists. Pottery. Both are graduate school graduates in fine arts. Karl is German-born. Karl told me his brother helped build the Russian pipeline system. And it isnt buried deep enough. Karl told me his brother was captured at Stalingrad. I think that I read that only about 10% who were captured at Stalingrad lived to return. http://www.semionoff.com/cellular/hacking/phreaking/ Patty and I bought you both identical gifts from Hofmanns. I am on the way to mail them. Thank you both for so much for what you both have done. Visibility. http://jya.com/whpfiles.htm http://www.aci.net/kalliste/ The Hidden US Government was trying to bury us in their invisible grave yard. But NOW the WORLD is on to the composition of the US Hidden Government. FASCISM - a political and economic movement, strongly nationalistic, magnifying the rights of the state as opposed to those of the individual, in which industry, though remaining largely under private ownership, and all administrative political units, are controlled by a strong central government. Especially, after all of this, aggrieved Shiite Muslims. http://www.wpiran.org/ And now, perhaps, even Sandinistas too. Carlos brought Swiss Radio International audio tape to Nicaragua this spring from Moscow ... Idaho, that is. http://caq.com/cryptogate Lets all hope for prompt PEACEFUL settlement of this HORRIBLE chapter in US history. Later bill

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Email Bot
by cons0005＠algnet.algonquinc.on.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was wondering if anyone knows of such a creature that I could send email to with an URL, and I would get a reply of that HTML file? example I email bot(a)somewhere.com with the Subject:http://www.hotmail.com and I will get an email of the HTML file at www.hotmail.com This would be handy because I don't have a broswer (2 meg RAM (I know)) and also for anonymity, cookies etc I couldn't be traced. When you send mail, do you use a postcard or an envelope? Get PGP (tm) my pgpID@ 0xD0186E85 http://wabakimi.carleton.ca/~nmarion/pgp.html -yashy-

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International Crime Control Strategy
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary ________________________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release May 12, 1998 INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL STRATEGY BACKGROUND International crime is a serious and potent threat to the American people at home and abroad. Drug and firearms trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal alien smuggling, trafficking in women and children, advanced fee scams, credit card fraud, auto theft, economic espionage, intellectual property theft, computer hacking, and public corruption are all linked to international criminal activity and all have a direct impact on the security and prosperity of the American people. Americans spend billions of dollars annually on cocaine and heroin, all of which originates abroad; in 1997, there were 123 terrorist attacks against U.S. targets worldwide, including 108 bombings and eight kidnappings; each year, approximately one billion dollars worth of stolen cars are smuggled out of this country; annually, U.S. companies lose up to $23 billion from the illegal duplication and piracy of films, compact discs, computer software, pharmaceutical and textile products, while U.S. credit card companies suffer losses of hundreds of millions of dollars from international fraud; and several hundred U.S. companies and other organizations have already suffered computer attacks in 1998, resulting in millions of dollars of losses and significant threats to our safety and security. PURPOSE The International Crime Control Strategy (ICCS) addresses this increasing threat by providing a framework for integrating all facets of the federal government response to international crime. This first-ever strategy reflects the high priority accorded international crime by this Administration and builds on such existing strategies as the National Drug Control Strategy and the Presidential Directives on alien smuggling, counter-terrorism and nuclear materials safety and security. The ICCS is also an important initiative in terms of enhancing the ability of U.S. law enforcement officials to cooperate effectively with their overseas counterparts in investigating and prosecuting international crime cases. At the upcoming Birmingham Summit, G-8 leaders will discuss international crime as one of the most pressing issues related to increasing globalization and rapid technological and economic change. President Clinton will highlight the new ICCS in underscoring the U.S. commitment to close cooperation with all nations who are mobilizing to confront this increasing threat. OVERVIEW The ICCS is a plan of action containing eight broad goals with thirty implementing objectives. The ICCS expresses President Clinton's resolve to combat international crime aggressively and substantially reduce its impact on the daily lives of the American people. The Strategy's eight goals and related objectives are: 1. Extend the First Line of Defense Beyond U.S. Borders by (a) preventing acts of international crime planned abroad before they occur, (b) using all available laws to prosecute select criminal acts committed abroad, and (c) intensifying activities of law enforcement, diplomatic and consular personnel abroad. 2. Protect U.S. Borders by (a) enhancing our land border inspection, detection and monitoring capabilities, (b) improving the effectiveness of maritime and air smuggling interdiction efforts, (c) seeking new, stiffer criminal penalties for smuggling activities, and (d) targeting enforcement and prosecutorial resources more effectively against smuggling crimes and organizations. 3. Deny Safe Haven to International Criminals by (a) negotiating new international agreements to create a seamless web for the prompt location, arrest and extradition of international fugitives, (b) implementing strengthened immigration laws that prevent international criminals from entering the United States and provide for their prompt expulsion when appropriate, and (c) promoting increased cooperation with foreign law enforcement authorities. 4. Counter International Financial Crime by (a) combating money laundering and strengthening enforcement efforts to reduce inbound and outbound movement of criminal proceeds, (b) seizing the assets of international criminals, (c) enhancing bilateral and multilateral cooperation against all financial crime, and (d) targeting offshore centers of international fraud, counterfeiting, electronic access device schemes and other financial crimes. 5. Prevent Criminal Exploitation of International Trade by (a) interdicting illegal technology exports, (b) preventing unfair and predatory trade practices in violation of U.S. criminal law, (c) protecting intellectual property rights, (d) countering industrial theft and economic espionage of U.S. trade secrets, and (e) enforcing import restrictions on certain harmful substances, dangerous organisms and protected species. 6. Respond to Emerging International Crime Threats by (a) disrupting new activities of international organized crime groups, (b) enhancing intelligence efforts against criminal enterprises, (c) reducing trafficking in human beings and crimes against children, (d) increasing enforcement efforts against high tech and computer-related crime, and (e) continuing to identify and counter the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructures and new technologies in high tech areas. 7. Foster International Cooperation and the Rule of Law by (a) establishing international standards, goals and objectives to combat international crime and by actively encouraging compliance, (b) improving bilateral cooperation with foreign governments and law enforcement authorities, and (c) strengthening the rule of law as the foundation for democratic government and free markets in order to reduce societies' vulnerability to criminal exploitation. 8. Optimize the Full Range of U.S. Efforts by (a) enhancing executive branch policy and operational coordination mechanisms to assess the risks of criminal threats and to integrate strategies, goals and objectives to combat those threats, (b) mobilizing and incorporating the private sector into U.S. government efforts, and (c) developing measures of effectiveness to assess progress over time. ICCS INITIATIVES Highlighted below are ten Administration initiatives to further our efforts to fight international crime. 1. International Crime Control Act of 1998: Proposed legislation containing significant new law enforcement tools for the fight against international crime. 2. Comprehensive Threat Assessment: A comprehensive assessment of the threat to the American people posed by international crime, to be completed within six months. 3. International Conference on Upholding Integrity Among Justice and Security Officials: An international conference to address upholding integrity among key justice and security officials worldwide, to be organized by the Vice President within the next six months. 4. High Tech Crime: An action plan, building on the work of the G-8 justice and interior ministers and the creation of the U.S. National Infrastructure Protection Center, to protect interconnected U.S. communications and information systems from attack by international criminals. 5. Border Law Enforcement: A program to enhance border law enforcement through deployment of advanced detection technology and investment of new resources. 6. Financial Crimes: A commitment to employ aggressively new tools to deny criminals access to U.S. financial institutions and to enhance enforcement efforts against financial crimes. 7. International Asset Forfeiture and Sharing: A U.S. call for new criminal asset forfeiture regimes worldwide and new asset forfeiture sharing agreements with our international partners. 8. OAS Treaty Against Illicit Trafficking in Firearms: A program to work with our OAS partners to implement fully a hemispheric convention to combat the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition and explosives. 9. Economic Espionage and Theft of Industrial Property: A commitment to use the Economic Espionage Act to increase U.S. investigations and prosecutions of individuals and companies who attempt to steal U.S. proprietary information. 10. Strategic Communications Plan: A plan to engage the private sector in assessing the impact of international crime on that sector and in determining its appropriate role in countering this threat.

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Senate Intel Committee on Crypto
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From Senate Intelligence Committee Report 105-185, on intelligence funding for FY1999, May 7, 1998: Encryption The Committee remains concerned about efforts to inappropriately ease or remove export restrictions on hardware and software encryption products. Export controls on encryption and other products serve a clearly defined purpose--to protect our nation's security. Therefore, the Committee believes that the effects on U.S. national security must be the paramount concern when considering any proposed change to encryption export policy, and will seek referral of any legislation regarding encryption export policy under its jurisdiction established under Senate Resolution 400. Export restrictions on encryption products assist the Intelligence Community in its signals intelligence mission. By collecting and analyzing signals intelligence, U.S. intelligence agencies seek to understand the policies, intentions, and plans of foreign state and nonstate actors. Signals intelligence plays an important role in the formation of American foreign and defense policy. It is also a significant factor in U.S. efforts to protect its citizens and soldiers against terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics trafficking, international crime and other threats to our nation's security. While the Committee recognizes the commercial interest in easing or removing export restrictions, it believes the safety of our citizens and soldiers should be the predominant concern when considering U.S. policy towards the export of any product. The Committee supports the continued control of encryption products, and believes that a comprehensive strategy on encryption export policy can and must be developed that addresses national security concerns as well as the promotion of American commercial interests abroad. The Committee looks forward to working with senior Administration officials in developing such a strategy. ----- Full report: http://jya.com/sr105-185.txt (94K)

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Re: Chaffing and winnowing
by Mark Rosen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Mark> ... g. Data authentication equipment that calculates a > Mark> Message Authentication Code (MAC) or similar result to > Mark> ensure no alteration of text has taken place, or to > Mark> authenticate users, but does not allow for encryption of > Mark> data, text or other media other than that needed for the > Mark> authentication; > >But wasn't that the gist of Rivest's paper: he's not encrypting the >message, he's just obscuring it really, really well. > >All this needs someone with the cash & the time to push it to court... > Actually, the first parts I quoted applied to chaffing and winnowing too: a. Designed or modified to use ``cryptography'' employing digital techniques to ensure ``information security''; b. Designed or modified to perform cryptanalytic functions; c. Designed or modified to use ``cryptography'' employing analog techniques to ensure ``information security''; Part a. basically prevents any sort of "encryption" technique, whether that technique uses a normal encryption algorithm, a hash function, or quantum cryptography -- anything that can be used for "information security" I think that the NSA knew about chaffing and winnowing, and they talked with the people who wrote the EAR and helped them make the legislation cover chaffing and winnowing. Please know that I, in no way, like the EAR; it just seems that everyone's hopes that chaffing and winnowing gets around the export controls are invalid. The EAR doesn't care *how* you do the encryption, it only cares that some sort of "encryption" was performed. Are there any legal-types out there that can give a more definitive answer? - Mark Rosen http://www.mach5.com/

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Re: Abusive crossposting by anonymous remailer user (Was: Gary Lee Burnore is a Convicted Sex Offender in Raleigh, NC)
by gburnore＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 13 May 1998 15:11:11 +0200 (MET DST), in article <199805131311.PAA05504(a)basement.replay.com>, nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) wrote: :eridani@databasix.com (Belinda Bryan) wrote: : :> And there we have it, folks. The anonymous stalker who's spent the past :> year following Gary Burnore around Usenet found a post in :> triangle.general that mentioned him, added a propaganda-filled follow up :> to it, and posted it to 9 newsgroups--many of whom have repeatedly :> requested that this crap be kept out of said groups. : :"Anonymous stalker"? For merely posting a reply to a public post on :Usenet? What state or country has a statute against that, and what makes :you think the poster falls under its jurisdiction if it does exist? As for :whether a certain post is "propaganda", that is for the reader to decide, :especially when of the content is independently verifiable. The :"propaganda" you refer to was apparently intended to refute the fallacious :assertion that since Gary Lee Burnore's entry in the North Carolina :official database of registered sex offenders had apparently been removed, :then the underlying crime for which he was convicted and required to :register somehow automagically never happened. To make such an assertion :is to invite rebuttal. Only for someone as obsessed in this as you. Everyone else I've seen post except those who have a grudge directly against me has said something similar to "who gives a fuck?" Your obsession continues. : :The thread you're whining about involved Steve Crisp <crisp(a)pageplanet.com> :threatening an anonymous poster with "beating the living fuck out of you" :if his/her identity could be determined, a second anonymous poster :challenging the propriety of such a threat, and yet another DataBasix :groupie, William McClatchie <wmcclatc(a)primenet.com>, calling the second :anonymous poster a "remailer abuser" for daring to make such a challenge. :So rather than denouncing the threat itself, you choose to call the person :challenging it an "anonymous stalker"? If you feel no need to "hide" :anything, please feel free to post your street address and home phone :number. But I imagine that many people with small children would not want :their names, from which their street address can be derived by someone with :the resources available to you and Gary Burnore, to fall into the hands of :a convicted child molester with a history of abusive retaliation. Geesh you ignorant fuck. It's been posted more times than I can count. You don't remember posting it right? Oh wait, that was someone else who's obsessed with me right? Uh huh. The same way you posted Steve's info you posted mine. : :Being threatened with physical violence for making an unpopular post is :one of the best arguments available as to why anonymity is necessary when :people like Steve Crisp and convicted child molester Gary Lee Burnore are :running around loose making those threats. If people like you weren't allowed to abuse remailers, people like chris wouldn't make comments that he knows are not threats to draw you out. You buy it hook line and sinker. You must certianly know that he's not threatning anyone since you're posting anonymously and he couldn't possibly know who you are. But obsessed as you are you can't take it. : :> Oh and lookee what else: it was mailed to cypherpunks(a)toad.com, :> presumably for archival on the cypherpunks mailing list, where it will :> be picked up by WWW search engines. Since those folks don't seem to :> mind having their archives used in personal grudge matches, I'll just :> start cc'ing my responses there as well. I'm sure, as champions of free :> speech, they can understand the necessity of making sure both sides of :> the story get equal time. : :This, of course, comes from the same Belinda Bryan who impersonated a :lawyer for DataBasix to demand the disclosure of (fortunately non-existant) :user logs from the Huge Cajones remailer in a failed Scientology-esque :attempt to embarass its users. More lies from the obsessed one as Belinda NEVER impersonated a lawyer for anyone. Beating dead horses is your specialty isn't it? : And that attack, BTW, started because Gary :Burnore was pissed that an anonymous whistle blower used a remailer to tip :of his victim's mother to the molestation. As is typical of his style, :Burnore denounced that legitimate use of anonymity as "harassment" and :"abuse". More unproven lies. If you, the anonymous asshole were really interested in the truth (rather than your obsession with me) you'd get the court documents and see that the dates do not support your libelous statements. Libelous statements are the best argument for remailers. If you need to make a libelous statement, do it from a remailer. Nothing will happen to you. (Other than folks will begin to ignore the remailer) : :It was also Burnore who chose to make PUBLIC what had previously been a :private e-mail, thus inviting his critics to factually evaluate the claims. :One of them apparently did so and discovered Gary Burnore's name and mug :shot were published on an official PUBLIC website of registered sex :offenders maintained by the state of North Carolina where Burnore moved :after leaving San Francisco. More lies from the anonymous asshole. It's not been that long since this started that people don't remember how and why it was posted to USENet. It had nothing to do with an email. : Perhaps he should have learned a lesson from :Gary Hart and not have taunted the wrong people to find evidence of his :wrongdoing. Perhaps I should continue to improve my tracing skills and find you one day. : :Will the continual harangue against privacy and anonymity by Gary Lee :Burnore, Belinda Bryan, Billy McClatchie, and other staffers and sock :puppets of the DataBasix wrecking crew never end? Translation: If Gary Burnore and Belinda Bryan and Bill McClatchie leave the internet, the anonymous asshole will stop lying. : :BTW, Belinda, cross-posting your whining drivel in the fashion you're :threatening negates your lame attempts to achieve deniability by using the :infamous X-No-Archive header that has become the trademark of DataBasix' :denizens. You've never given a valid reason why someone should or should not use an X-No-Archive header. You hide behind a remailer and libel and then complain when someone X-No-Archives. Typical hypocritical thinking. : IOW, you won't be able to retroactively claim that an :embarassing post from you was "forged" because it's not archived at an :unbiased, third party site. Can you say "oops"? Well we'll see about unbiased sites now won't we? -- for i in databasix netcom primenet ; do ; gburnore@$i ; done --------------------------------------------------------------------------- How you look depends on where you go. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Gary L. Burnore | ÝÛ³ºÝ³Þ³ºÝ³³ÝÛºÝ³Þ³ºÝ³Ý³Þ³ºÝ³ÝÝÛ³ | ÝÛ³ºÝ³Þ³ºÝ³³ÝÛºÝ³Þ³ºÝ³Ý³Þ³ºÝ³ÝÝÛ³ DOH! | ÝÛ³ºÝ³Þ³ºÝ³³ÝÛºÝ³Þ³ºÝ³Ý³Þ³ºÝ³ÝÝÛ³ | ÝÛ³ 3 4 1 4 2 Ý³Þ³ 6 9 0 6 9 ÝÛ³ spamgard(tm): zamboni | Official Proof of Purchase =========================================================================== PGPprint: C63B CF4E 1B71 4D7E C6F8 AF4E 338D 5CB4 KeyID: 0x0F7EDBD9 (RSA) finger gburnore(a)netcom.com for public key ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was looking at my RAM when I noticed several passwords I have frequently used were still there, and as I never turn off my comp, I was wondering if there is a way you can "clean" your RAM? I also got errors when installing LILO on my DOS partition, so now I *CAN'T* boot without a bootdisk, and I think LILO sticks itself on the master boot record, is there an MBR editor? Where can I get a list of Candian Remailers? Is there a DOS and/or Winbloze 3.* Email program that I can "forge" headers? (ex: Like in Linux fastmail adding: -f billc(a)whitehouse.gov) thnx.

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Are you curious about WHERE your family roots originate?
by R2wjEAy94＠msn.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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