December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: SAIC bought InterNic, but who is SAIC? A spook contractor!
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://opentext.uunet.ca:8080/omw/simplesearch The Open Text Index found 199 pages containing: Science Applications International Corporation.

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Export/import of chips
by John D. Ervin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I deal with Importers from Taiwen, Hong kong, Korea, and China on a daily basis. Because the deals I get on components is very good... They are name brand and meet FCC Standards when assembled as systems, but when imported as components they are generally worthless, until assembled How is import or export of Encryption related components monitored ?? Microprocessors can be imported and exported, as can boards.. As Junk.... Nobody Checks these shipments ?? Now if some of those boards did encryption/decryption, and they were paired with a processor, They could do some damage.. But when imported and exported as components (ie Electronic Junk) who is to tell what the end usage is really for ?? This is how a Toyota, Datsun, Subaru, etc are really American built and are American Cars..... ------------------------------------------------- jervin(a)netpath.net -------------------------------------------------

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Murdering Electronic junk mailers *should* be legal. Nuking thei
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On 29 Sep 95 at 16:54, Syed Yusuf wrote: > I just recieved an electronic junkmail! > not only that but it was racist (and/or republican) in content. !! > Nothing? NOTHING?????? > Cypher punks to the rescue? my privacy has been violated anyone got > any ideas besides just putting each individual into my kill file? The return address was forged, I emailed the header chain's first smtp server admin to see if they can help. If I find the guy, he provider will nuke him or they are toast. Period! > -- > Syed Yusuf <yusuf921(a)uidaho.edu> | http://www.uidaho.edu/~yusuf921 > Keep me away from Wisdom that does not Cry, Philosophy that does not > Laugh, and Greatness that does not bow before Children > --Kalil Gibran > >

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Re: X.509, S/MIME, and evolution of PGP
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:29 PM 9/29/95 -0700, Christopher Allen <ChristopherA(a)consensus.com> wrote: >At 3:22 PM 9/27/95, Bill Stewart wrote: >>5) S/MIME - real S/MIME compliance requires support for RC2 as well as >>publicly available algorithms, though this is really just an X.509 handler. >I've been working on getting RC2/RC4 in object-only exportable size key >form from RSA for RSAREF customers, and Jim Bidzos has agreed in principle. >We have to work out details, however. Sounds good, but having publicly implementable standards would be nicer; licensable patented code is enough of a hassle, without having standards that have *trade secrets* built into them. RC2 as an option is fine; RC2 as a mandatory part of a conforming implementation is pretty tacky. >>6) It's a lot of work - well, yeah, it is. And I'm lazy. Is there enough >>related code in SSLeay to steal to help implement it? Actually, it turns out that the latest RIPEM has certificate chains, Web of Trust, and really just about everything I want, except perhaps user-friendly GUIs, which could be added easily enough. I haven't yet sorted out which parts are in the export-approved RIPEM-SIG and which parts are only in RIPEM2.1, but it's a pretty straightforward job. (Now to go scrounge some disk space!) The RIPEM code is all public-domain, and uses RSAREF for its crypto, so exporting the non-RSAREF parts is copyright/patent clean, and maybe it can be possible to put together a CJ-able version of the new stuff so it can gain legitimacy after having been exported for months :-) #--- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0664 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 #---

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RTR-3 Package/Bomb Inspection System
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.saic.com/products/rtis/rtr3.html *** Products and Services *** _________________________________________________________________ RTR-3 [RTR-3 Package/Bomb Inspection System] (Click on the image to see a larger, 268 kb. photo.) Is a rugged one-man portable system for digital X-ray imaging in the field. The RTR-3 is a safe efficient tool for a wide range of Security applications. o It is ideal for: Small package inspection/bomb detection; Unexploded ordnance evaluation; Point-of-entry and Customs contraband detection; Nondestructive search and evaluation. o Quick and easy to set up, simple to operate with either battery or line voltage. o Lightweight (under 10 pounds), compact electronic imager with 8x10 inch X-ray sensor. Images are displayed immediately after acquisition on the flat panel display. o Portable, lightweight (25 pounds with batteries) integrated control unit with 9.5-inch flat panel image display. o Single package portable X-ray source. Portable sources are used with either battery or line voltage. o RTR-3 images are archived digitally and can be transmitted by modem, or floppy disk, to other computers for more detailed evaluation, and /or to assemble a database. [RTR-3 Pipe bomb X-ray] (Click on the image to see a larger, 156 kb. photo.) RTR-3 is a complete, one-man portable X-ray system capable of acquiring, enhancing, archiving, and transmitting radioscopic images in the field. The portable generator produces 20-25 very short bursts of X-rays in approximately one second during image acquisition resulting in very safe field operation. A familiar Microsoft Windows user interface permits efficient operation of the system and provides acess to many image enhancement capabilities of the digital image processor. The RTR-3 features contrast stretch, zoom, pan and scroll, sharpening, smoothing, storage to hard or floppy disk, and transmission of images by modem. The RTR-3 ships in two rugged light-weight containers for maximum field portability. Click here for SPEC sheet. For more information, comments, or questions, send email to John Reed (619) 458-3797 or to Nicholas Vagelatos (619) 458-3769, Fax (619) 458-3718. __________________________________________________________ The right to download and store or output this information is granted to users for their personal use only. Any other reproduction, by any means mechanical or electronic, without the express written permission of Science Applications International Corp. is strictly prohibited. (C) Copyright, 1995, SAIC. All rights reserved. __________________________________________________________ Copyright SAIC Home __________________________________________________________ Last updated on 07-10-95

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Computer Misuse Detection System
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.saic.com/products/cmds/index.html *** Products and Services *** _________________________________________________________________ COMPUTER MISUSE DETECTION SYSTEM [CMDS] Caught in the Act Until now, computer misuse could not be detected until after the damage was done. With CMDS, the system alerts you to suspicious computer activity as it takes place so you can react immediately. Round the Clock Security CMDS never sleeps. Computer misuse characteristically takes place at times when you are not expecting it. If an intruder rattles your door knob at 2:00 AM, CMDS is there to watch the shop. Make the Intruders Think Twice Knowing that security software of this type is installed will give the potential misusers reason to reconsider their actions. CMDS affects the intruder's motivations by threatening them with unseen protection. Like police radar, they won't know it's there until they've been caught! Security Through Pictures If a picture is worth a thousand words and then CMDS speaks volumes about the security status of your network. The security trending reports show you, graphically, all the information you need to identify the intruders. Off-the-Rack or Tailor Made A well made suit off-the-rack can meet the needs of most people at tremendous cost savings. However, a tailor-made suit may be necessary when the person in need has special requirements. SAIC can tailor a system using CMDS core technology to meet any large heterogeneous network or detection requirements. Increase Efficiency While Reducing Cost, Time Spent, and Losses CMDS will increase efficiency of your security operations by performing faster than a manual review process. Your security staff will be freed up for other activities reducing your overall cost. Your losses will decrease through the deterrence and detection capabilities of CMDS. _________________________________________________________________ More About CMDS... o Detecting Computer Crime o Product Description o Designed to Detect o Detection Capabilities o System Requirements o Licensing and More Information _________________________________________________________________ Intrusion Detection Research Papers Audit Reduction and Misuse Detection in Heterogeneous Environments: Framework and Application. Click here to download Macintosh Microsoft Word 5.1 file (464K). _________________________________________________________________ Copyright SAIC Home _________________________________________________________________ Last updated on 07-10-95

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SAIC Acquires Network Solutions
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.saic.com/corporate/news/news03-15-95.html *** About SAIC *** _________________________________________________________________ SAIC ACQUIRES NETWORK SOLUTIONS, INC. (MCLEAN, VA) March 15, 1995 -- Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) has acquired Network Solutions, Inc., a world leader in networking technology and applications. Network Solutions, Inc. is headquartered in Herndon, Virginia and will become a wholly owned subsidiary of SAIC. Terms of the acquisition were not disclosed. Network Solutions, Inc. was established in 1979 and has major clients in the federal government market, state and local market, and commercial market. Network Solutions, Inc. manages the worldwide registration services for the Internet and has significant expertise in local and wide area interoperability technologies. Network Solutions, Inc. currently supports two major Network Information Centers: The InterNIC and the Defense Data Network NIC. "The addition of Network Solutions, Inc. to SAIC brings a world-class networking business into our growing complex of communications and computing capability," said Dr. J. Robert Beyster, founder, chairman and chief executive officer of SAIC. "We see growth in this market segment as unlimited for us in the future." "We are extremely pleased to have Network Solutions, Inc. joining one of the most dynamic and successful growth firms in the world," said Emmit J. McHenry, chief executive officer of Network Solutions, Inc. "We anticipate explosive growth as we combine our networking expertise and experience with SAIC, a recognized leader in information technology and systems integration. The size and scope of SAIC will allow us to deliver our recognized excellence to a worldwide market." "The acquisition of Network Solutions, Inc. is the key next step in our strategy of building a full spectrum, full service global information technology business," said Michael A. Daniels, senior vice president and general manager of the Technology Applications Sector of SAIC. "We now work with clients on major engagements in the federal government market, the commercial market, and the state and local government market in both the United States and overseas. With the acquisition of Network Solutions, Inc. we complete the technology offering of our Systems and Network Integration line of business." SAIC is the largest employee-owned, high technology services and products company based in the United States. SAIC has annual revenues of $1.9billion, 20,000 employees and over 300 office locations around the world. High technology services and products are focused in the core lines of business of information technology, systems integration, energy, environment, medical and health care systems and transportation. Founded in 1969, SAIC has completed its 26th consecutive year of record revenue and earnings. _________________________________________________________________ Copyright SAIC Home _________________________________________________________________ Last updated on 07-05-95

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SAIC Shows Crime-Fighting Technology
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.saic.com/corporate/news/news03-17-95.html *** About SAIC *** _________________________________________________________________ SAIC SHOWS CRIME-FIGHTING TECHNOLOGY (SAN DIEGO, CA) March 17, 1995 -- Illegal contraband hidden in trucks, boats and airplanes can be detected with the assistance of state-of-the-art technology developed by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). The portable system is being demonstrated Friday as part of the opening of the federal Border Research and Technology Center at the Otay Mesa port-of-entry. The center, which has been established through the efforts of San Diego U.S. Attorney Alan D. Bersin, will be the focal point for driving the design, development, manufacture and acquisition of specialized law-enforcement technologies. The center is expected to identify specific programs for development that could be used by a variety of law-enforcement agencies. Various technologies for fighting cross-border crime will be demonstrated during a mock Otay border crossing by a driver attempting to evade the law. San Diego-based SAIC's portable contraband detection system scans inaccessible areas such as wheel wells, bumpers, boat hulls and aircraft fuselages. The system uses a micro-processor, a self-contained low-level radioactive sources and a sensitive detector. As surfaces are scanned, concealed objects including weapons, narcotics, alcohol and explosives reflect the radiation, which is sensed by the detector. The system operator is alerted by both a backlit digital display, visible in all light conditions, and an audio beeper that increases in rate as the contraband is detected. The handheld system's total weight is about two pounds. SAIC also will show how vehicles can be "tagged" by radio transponders which can provide positive identification of cars, trucks or trains passing through a specific area. Already in use by several SAIC-equipped automated toll collection systems across the U.S, the transponders or "tags" are issued to specific vehicles. Attached to bumpers or placed on dashboards, the tags are read as the vehicle passes near an antenna installed over or at the side of the roadway. The signal is displayed on a computer screen, and the data is stored and available for further use. The system could be used to speed commuters or other law-abiding vehicles regularly crossing the border. Violators can be caught because the "smart" system senses when a vehicle crosses without a tag, and can trigger alarms, crossing gates or other barriers, as well as recording the violator on video tape. Operators can electronically enhance license plate photos to be read clearly and process enforcement action. "We at SAIC are encouraged by the opening of the Border Research Technology Center today. This Center will provide the opportunity to apply high-technology solutions in support of increased trade as a result of NAFTA as well as support national law enforcement efforts at the border," said Dr. Donald M. Kerr, executive corporate vice president of SAIC. SAIC also provides other vehicle tracking systems that can trace the movements of railroad cars and detect motorists who evade barriers such as railroad grade crossings. The high-technology company also has developed methods of tracing small motorized boats, submersibles and even swimmers crossing strategic waterways, as well as other imaging applications. SAIC provides services and products to government and the private sector in the areas of law enforcement, transportation, energy, environment, health care and systems integration. With annual revenues of $1.9 billion, the company and its subsidiaries have nearly 20,000 employees and more than 300 locations worldwide. _________________________________________________________________ Copyright SAIC Home _________________________________________________________________ Last updated on 07-05-95

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SAIC's FBI ID System
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.saic.com/corporate/news/news8-23-94.html *** About SAIC *** _________________________________________________________________ SAIC TEAM TO DEVELOP MULTIMILLION-DOLLAR FBI IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (MCLEAN, VA,) August 23, 1994 -- SAIC (Science Applications International Corporation) has won a major contract to design and develop the FBI's Interstate Identification Index computer system. This system is an on-line criminal history database which will support federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies via the National Crime Information Center network. Under the 8-year contract, the SAIC team will design, implement, and provide operations and maintenance support for the Interstate Identification Index. The contract has an estimated value of $27.6 million. "The Interstate Identification Index project contributes to our company's goals to provide quality technical products and services for the security and well-being of our nation," said SAIC Project Manager Shelley Parker. "SAIC has been working for the FBI in this area for the last 10 years. Our expertise and personal commitment to this program made it particularly important to the company." Development and integration work will be performed in SAIC's Software and System Integration Group in the McLean, VA facility by a team of engineers who have worked for many years on this application. The team will be augmented by new staff members with specialized expertise for the new system. SAIC provides innovative services and products to government and the private sector in the areas of systems integration, energy, environment and transportation. The company, which is the largest employee-owned high-technology firm in the nation, has annual revenues of $1.67 billion and 16,000 employees in more than 250 locations worldwide. _________________________________________________________________ Copyright SAIC Home _________________________________________________________________ Last updated on 07-05-95

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SAIC in MD
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.saic.com/business/locations/md.html **** Business Directory **** _________________________________________________________________ SAIC IN MARYLAND * Abingdon + Abingdon/Continental Drive (Loc. 591) * Annapolis + Annapolis/TRG (Loc. 178) + Annapolis/WOR (Loc. 241) * Baltimore + Baltimore/White Marsh (Loc. 221) * Bethesda + Bethesda/CHCS (Loc. 498) * California + California/SCT (Loc. 827) * Columbia + Columbia/Ideas Group (Loc. 905) + Columbia/MSO (Loc. 473) + Columbia/SSIG (Loc. 315) * Fort Ritchie + Ft. Ritchie (Loc. 700) * Frederick + Frederick (Loc. 519) + Frederick/FCRDC (Loc. 970) + Frederick/PAI (Loc. 512) + Frederick/PAI Amin. Office (Loc. 575) + Frederick/Spectrum Drive (Loc. 750) * Gaithersburg + Gaithersburg/Professional Drive (Loc. 134) + Gaithersburg/QUINCE DIAMOND (Loc. 725) + Gaithersburg/UTILITY SVCS (Loc. 555) * Germantown + Germantown/Century Blvd. (Loc. 292) + Germantown/BELLEMEADE III (Loc. 854) * Hagerstown + Hagerstown/DTG (Loc. 652) * Hanover + Hanover/Ashton Road (Loc. 745) * Joppatowne + Joppatowne/SAIC (Loc. 220) + Joppatowne/TDG (Loc. 303) * Lanham + Maryland/SYNTONIC (Loc. 860) * Laurel + Laurel/GSC (Loc. 661) * Rockville + Rockville/ NSI (Loc. 953) * Silver Spring + Silver Spring/ADELPHI (Loc. 908) + Silver Spring/WHITE OAK (Loc. 563) * Towson + Towson/JHK (Loc. 803) * Westminister + Westminister/RE WRIGHT (Loc. 930) _________________________________________________________________ Copyright SAIC Home _________________________________________________________________ Last updated on 09-07-95

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SAIC Global Web
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.saic.com/business/locations/index.html *** Business Directory *** _________________________________________________________________ U.S. Locations Alphabetical List o Alabama o Illinois o Nebraska o Rhode Island o Alaska o Indiana o Nevada o South Carolina o Arizona o Kansas o New Hampshire o South Dakota o Arkansas o Kentucky o New Jersey o Tennessee o California o Louisiana o New Mexico o Texas o Colorado o Maryland o New York o Utah o Connecticut o Massachusetts o North Carolina o Virginia o Delaware o Michigan o North Dakota o Washington o Florida o Minnesota o Ohio o Washington D.C. o Georgia o Mississippi o Oklahoma o West Virginia o Hawaii o Missouri o Oregon o Wisconsin o Idaho o Montana o Pennsylvania o Wyoming _________________________________________________________________ Last updated on 07-05-95 ---------- URL: http://www.saic.com/business/locations/others.html *** Business Directory *** _________________________________________________________________ International Locations Alphabetical List CANADA * Halifax * Montreal * Ottawa * Vancouver COLOMBIA * Colombia, LTDA. FRANCE * Paris La Defense/EUROPE (Loc. 596) GERMANY * Germany * Kaiserslautern/SCT (Loc. 826) * Landstuhl/CHCS HONG KONG * Hong Kong (Loc. 789) ICELAND * Keflavik/CHCS MEXICO * Mexico City RUSSIA * Moscow/MIR (Loc. 764) SPAIN * IBERSAIC (Loc. 693) UNITED KINGDOM * Aberdeen (Loc. 797) * Aberdeen/SAIC Ltd (Loc. 728) * Birmingham * Camberly UK/SAIT (Loc. 666) * Cambridge/TOP EXPRESS (Loc. 340) * IBM SAIC (Loc. 667) * London/Andrew Palmer (Loc. 798) * Meriden (Loc. 865) * Stockley Park (Loc. 884) _________________________________________________________________ Last updated on 07-05-95

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SAIC in CA
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.saic.com/business/locations/ca.html **** Business Directory **** _________________________________________________________________ SAIC IN CALIFORNIA * Anaheim + Anaheim/JHK (Loc. 807) * APO AP + Guam/Naval Hospital/CHCS (Loc. 984) + Japan/ETG (Loc. 427) + Japan/Misawa AB/CHCS (Loc. 987) + Japan/Okinawa/USNH/CHCS (Loc. 986) + Japan/Yokosuka/CHCS (Loc. 601) + Japan/Yokota AB/CHCS (Loc. 988) + Korea/COMSYS (Loc. 740) + Korea/ETG (Loc. 426) + Korea/Kunsan AB/CHCS (Loc. 576) + Korea/Osan AB/CHCS (Loc. 985) * Burlingame + Burlingame/EPRI (Loc.721) * Camarillo + Camarillo/Camino Ruiz (Loc. 161) * Camp Pendleton + Camp Pendleton/CHCS (Loc. 818) * Cardiff + Cardiff/ATLAS (Loc. 790) * Citrus Heights + Citrus Heights/NSI (Loc. 956) * Corona + Corona/AMSEC (Loc. 262) * Cupertino + Cupertino/Baywood Drive (Loc. 636) * Edwards AFB + Edwards AFB/CHCS (Loc. 883) * El Segundo + El Segundo/ASP (Loc. 328) * Emeryville + Emeryville/Berkeley/DTG (Loc. 251) + Emeryville/JHK (Loc. 804) * Fort Irwin + Fort Irwin/CHCS (Loc. 782) * Fountain Valley + + Fountain Valley/MSO (Loc. 57) * Goleta + Goleta/MARIPRO (Loc. 182) * Laguna Hills + Laguna Hills/DTG (Loc.331) * La Jolla + La Jolla/Cave Street (Loc. 450) + La Jolla/1200 Prospect (Loc. 626) + La Jolla/1299 Prospect (Loc. 544) + La Jolla/ITER (Loc. 623) * Lancaster + Lancaster (Loc. 938) * Lawndale + Lawndale/SCT (Loc. 823) * Lemoore + Lemoore/CHCS (Loc. 781) * Los Altos + Los Altos/El Camino Real (Loc. 008) * Los Angeles + Los Angeles AFB/CHCS (Loc. 885) + Los Angeles/Century City (Loc. 124) + Los Angeles/UCLA/Div. 284 (Loc. 605) * McClellan + McClellan AFB/TTG (Loc. 787) * Moffett Field + Moffett Field (Loc. 834) + Moffett Field (Loc. 920) + Moffett Field (Loc. 922) * Monterey + Monterey/Camino El Estero (Loc. 098) * Oxnard + Oxnard/AMSEC (Loc. 159) * Palo Alto + Palo Alto/SCT (Loc. 829) * Pasadena + Pasadena/JHK (Loc. 805) * Pleasanton + Pleasanton/Hopyard Road (Loc. 029) * Poway + Poway (Loc. 962) * Pt. Hueneme + Pt. Hueneme/CHCS (Loc. 841) * Ridgecrest + Ridgecrest/STG (Loc. 336) * Riverside + Riverside/JHK (Loc. 810) + Riverside/NSI (Loc. 955) * San Bernardino + San Bernardino/NSI (Loc. 945) * Sacramento + Sacramento/LEO (Loc. 580) * San Diego + San Diego/AMSEC (Loc. 348) + San Diego/Campus Pt. A (Loc. 245) + San Diego/Campus Pt. C(Loc. 001) + San Diego/Campus Pt. D (Loc. 094) * San Diego/Campus Pt. E (Loc. 461) * San Diego/Campus Pt. F (Lco. 399) * San Diego/Campus Pt. G (Loc. 599) * San Diego/Campus Pt. K (Loc. 548) * San Diego/CHCS (Loc. 703) * San Diego/ESG (Loc. 973) * San Diego/Fourwinds (Loc. 312) * San Diego/MARITIME SERV DIV (Loc. 363) * San Diego/MEG (Loc. 677) * San Diego/MTO (Loc. 408) * San Diego/Old Town (Loc. 552) * San Diego/SAIC (Loc. 218) * San Diego/SAI T/Camus Pt. B (Loc. 291) * San Diego/SAI T/STPG (Loc. 358) * San Diego/SCRIPPS (Loc. 869) * San Diego/SED(668)/FCTCPAC (Loc. 673) * San Diego/SEG (Loc. 332) * San Diego/Wateridge (Loc. 021) * Sorrento Valley/(CSG) MANUFACTURING (Loc. 553) * Sorrento Valley/REC RES RET (Loc. 413) * Sorrento Valley/REMOTE SYS FAC (Loc. 337) * Sorrento Valley/SAI T (Loc. 002) * Sorrento Valley/SEA (Loc. 676) San Francisco * San Francisco/JDA (Loc. 933) * San Francisco/TSC (Loc. 457) San Jose * San Jose/C&I (Loc. 333) Santa Barbara * Santa Barbara/Ekwill Street (Loc. 216) * Santa Barbara/State Street (Loc. 786) * Santa Barbara/CSG (Loc. 431) * Santa Barbara/PSG (Loc. 439) Santa Clara * Santa Clara/Patrick Henry Drive (Loc. 007) Santa Ynez * Santa Ynez/Sagunto Street (Loc. 420) Thousand Oaks * Thousand Oaks/DTG (Loc. 730) Torrance * Torrance/Western Avenue (Loc. 005) Travis AFB * David Grant USAF MED CTR/CHCS (Loc. 671) Vallejo * Vallejo/COMSYS (Loc. 243) * Vandenberg AFB (Loc. 598) * Vandenberg AFB/CHCS (Loc. 882) Walnut Creek * Walnut Creek/HCTG (Loc. 518) Woodland Hills * Woodland Hills/JHK (Loc. 811) _________________________________________________________________ Copyright SAIC Home _________________________________________________________________ Last updated on 09-07-95

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SAIC Directors
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.saic.com/corporate/annual-reports/1995/directors.html Board of Directors _________________________________________________________________ [IMAGE] J.R. Beyster Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, SAIC [IMAGE] L.A. Kull President and Chief Operating Officer, SAIC [IMAGE] A.L. Alm Sector Vice President, SAIC [IMAGE] V.N. Cook Chairman, Visions International, Inc. [IMAGE] S.J. Dalich Executive Vice President, SAIC [IMAGE] C.K. Davis International Health Care Consultant [IMAGE] W.H. Demisch Managing Director, BT Securities Corp. [IMAGE] E.A. Frieman Director, Scripps Institution of Oceanography; Vice Chancellor of Marine Sciences, UCSD [IMAGE] J.E. Glancy Corporate Executive Vice President, SAIC [IMAGE] F. Herwood SAIC Director Emeritus [IMAGE] D.A. Hicks Chairman, Hicks & Associates, a subsidiary of SAIC [IMAGE] B.R. Inman Admiral, USN (Ret.) [IMAGE] D.M. Kerr Corporate Executive Vice President, SAIC [IMAGE] M.R. Laird Senior Counselor, National and International Affairs, The Readers Digest Association Inc. [IMAGE] W.M. Layson Senior Vice President, SAIC [IMAGE] C.B. Malone President, Financial & Management Consulting Inc. [IMAGE] J.W. McRary President and Chief Executive Officer, Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corp. [IMAGE] B.J. Shillito SAIC Director Emeritus [IMAGE] E.A. Straker Executive Vice President, SAIC [IMAGE] M.R. Thurman General, USA (Ret.) [IMAGE] M.E. Trout Chairman Emeritus, American Healthcare Systems [IMAGE] J.H. Warner, Jr. Executive Vice President, SAIC [IMAGE] J.A. Welch General, USAF (Ret.) [IMAGE] J.B. Wiesler Vice Chairman, Bank of America (Ret.) [IMAGE] W.E. Zisch SAIC Director Emeritus _________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents More _________________________________________________________________

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SAIC in DC
by anonymous＠freezone.remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

URL: http://www.saic.com/business/locations/dc.html **** Business Directory **** _________________________________________________________________ SAIC IN WASHINGTON D.C. * P.O.S.T. (Loc. 126) * Walter Reed/CHCS (Loc. 497) * Walter Reed/GOV'T AFFAIRS (Loc. 235) * Washington D.C./SEASG (Loc. 288) * Washington D.C/CHEMONICS XPT (Loc. 821) * Washington D.C/ITG (Loc. 704) * Washington D.C./NSI (Loc. 969) * Washington D.C./OCRW (Loc. 482) * Washington D.C/QATSS HQ (Loc. 729) * Washington D.C./TCI (Loc. 991) _________________________________________________________________ Copyright SAIC Home _________________________________________________________________ Last updated on 07-06-95

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Re: Operation Stop The Aliens
by FELIX R. WILSON SR. 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- [ From: FELIX R. WILSON SR. * EMC.Ver #2.3 ] -- Attachment: natltr.txt Code: 00H7GFL \ Created: 09-29-95, 06:21 PM [34 Kb] The Attached File Is For Viewing It I In Text Format Please Forward To Everyone on the net work. and post to every board " Please.." //BEGIN BINARY MAIL SEGMENT: begin 644 natltr.txt M("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@ M("`@("`@("!&<F]M.B!$96%N($-O;7!T;VX@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@ M("`@("`@.2\R.2\Y-2`@,38Z,#0Z,38@(%!A9V4@,B!O9B`Q,@T*3D%424]. 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M04%!04%!04%!04%!04%!04%!04%!04%!04%!04%!04%!04%!04%!00T*("`@ 6("`@("`@("`@("`@("`@04%P#0H-"E-3 end //END BINARY MAIL SEGMENT:

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Re: Cypherpunks Press release
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:26 PM 9/30/95 +1000, Jiri Baum wrote: >All that is needed then is someone with a fax machine to volunteer >to receive the fax, type it in and summarise the response afterwards >(noting points on which there was disagreement, and who disagreed >in what way). Let the dim bulbs subscribe to the list themselves. If they are not capable of that, they will not make any intelligent reports on it anyway. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Crypto hardware (was: Using sound cards to accelerate RSA?)
by cman＠communities.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Simon-- There is a lot more to cryptography hardware than just making stuff go fast. Any kind of co-processor array could handle the job -- doesn't have to be DSPs. For unsigned integer math, the 486 DX4/100 is a perfectly decent chip, and prices are plumetting. If all you want is to make RSA go fast, you can rack up as many of these as you want, and do your work at Ethernet speeds (which should be more than fast enough for the forseeable future.) Also, you get to use your old familiar (and inexpensive) programming tools to write your code. It also turns out that when you're actually using cryptography to do valuable stuff, a lot of other concerns are just as important as speed -- in particular, physical security over the private keys. Most server-oriented cryptography add-ins are highly tamper-resistant units that can only be re-keyed when some sort of dongle is attached. Said dongle can be kept much more securely than a whole computer. Although other threats still remain, this substantially reduces the threat of key compromise. Incidentally, good hardware of this sort uses ASICs that give substantially more bang for the buck than the DSP solutions you're suggesting. Certainly messing around with DSPs is fun -- I've done it and enjoyed it -- but I don't think they will ever be significant as cryptographic co-processors. >That's another question. A DSP chip can also be used for crypto - yet >sound cards and nexts aren't ITARed, and aren't really considered >dual-use. A Modular exponentiator isn't a crypto device (hey - >it's a bignum accelerator for Mathematica). Now, if I had a pipelined >WSI chip capable of delivering one result per cycle, I could think of >some useful applications, but ... > >Simon

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Re: NetScape's dependence upon RSA down for the count!
by Don.Stephenson＠Eng.Sun.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I haven't read the SSL spec for a while but my understanding was that the server passed it's public key to the client via a certificate signed by a mutually trusted certificate authority (i.e., Verisign). How would the filter be able to forge such a certificate ? - Don > From jbass(a)dmsd.com Sat Sep 30 16:47:11 1995 > Date: Sat, 30 Sep 95 16:39:57 -0600 > From: jbass(a)dmsd.com (John L. Bass) > To: www-security(a)ns2.rutgers.edu, cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Re: NetScape's dependence upon RSA down for the count! > > > jbass(a)dmsd.com writes: > > > client -> filter Client sends packet with K(c) > > filter -> Server filter forwards packet with K(f) filter <- Server Server sends encrypts with K(f) > > > client <- filter filter re-encrypts with K(c) > > > > > > As the protocol progresses the filter also uses the master key, > > > and follows the renegotiation as the master key expires. > > > > Yeah, but in order for this to work, the fake server needs to know > > netscape.com's private (secret) key, no? > > > > -jon > > No ... the public part of any server private key is held by the filter > and not returned to the client. The client only encrypts with public > keys provided by the filter. The Server only encrypts with public keys > provided by the filter. The filter has cleartext of the entire session. > > John > >

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A new tack on breaking SSL streams and NetScape servers
by jbass＠dmsd.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

| From jbass Mon Sep 25 15:00:41 1995 | To: JohnCGreen(a)aol.com | Subject: Re: Netscape bug, RSA patent, hacker challenge | Cc: rmiug-discuss(a)rmiug.org, isig(a)netf.org | | On Thu, 21 Sep 1995 JohnCGreen(a)aol.com wrote: | > Internet commerce is getting off to a slow start. One of the reasons is | > nervousness on the part of the general public regarding the use of insecure | > networks. I believe it is not in the industry's interest to have vendors | > publicly pointing out flaws in competitors' products. | [ ... part deleted ...] | > I believe that as long as industry experts working for huge companies like | > Sun and AT&T as well as executives of small companies like NetManage and | > Community ConneXion continue to criticize publicly the security of | > competitors' systems commerce will be very slow to develop. | > - - - | > Internet Marketing and Business Development Consultant | > 21483 Old Mine Rd Tel: (408)353-1870 | > Los Gatos CA 95030 Internet: JohnCGreen(a)aol.com | | Most of us are employed directly or indirectly by somebody. The quotes | involved were not derived from text under a press release letterhead | by the employers of those involved. The press is certainly free to use | the persons educational and employment credentials in citing the source. | Your objections here are with out merit, since the quotes were not | officially released by the businesses involved and only serve to distract | from the real problems. | | Internet commerce is getting off to a slow start for good reason. Encryption | or not, using the internet in it's current state for commerce is fundementally | insecure, and the commercial internet providers have failed to address the | primary problems. During a security discussion in the Colorado SuperNet | users group mailing list last spring Brad Huntting, one of CSN's lead | techinical specialists, made this remarkably clear in his posting on | 13 Mar 1995 23:55:46 in response to my posting regarding minimal security | expectations to do business on/over the internet. | | A clear line of attack for any site dealing with credit cards or other | valuable data would be to attack the authoritative name servers (and routes | to/thru DNS servers) to reroute the target hosts traffic thru a filter host | to skim off data transparently. Or more directly to watch /dev/nit somewhere | on the network where www clients or servers are active with this data. | | I am hardly an internet security expert, but also far from being a newbie | at this game. I often have a more fundamental perspective on these problems, | and in some cases very different levels of expectations. We are dealing with | areas where there is no single right and wrong way to solve the security | problem. But there are clearly certain technical flaws that MUST be addressed | FIRST, before any solution will be viable. | | [from my Mon, 13 Mar 95 21:43:46 -0700 posting to ug(a)csn.net] | | I start with 4 expectations about providers which are seldom met: | | 1) ISP's manage internal and external back bones in a secure mode. | This means that nobody except critical internal staff can snoop | customer traffic or program routers - by network design. | | 2) ISP's manage the bridge/routers and subnets for network customers | (dedicated/slip/ppp) with advertised routes/domains/MX service | as secure too. | | 3) They firewall the billing systems, key servers, and monitor | the security for them very carefully. | | 4) They have a relatively insecure interactive environment on it's own | subnet behind a bridge/router/etherswitch to issolate it from the | internal backbone. | | The CSN/Brad Huntting response was: | | >I dont believe any ISP's do this. "As secure"? This [...] is fantasy. | | With this model we can make some assertions (not necessaryly true today): | | A) Customer data between two full-time (#2 above) subscribers (of | atleast the same provider, and reasonably expected between major | providers) *SHOULD* be expected to be secure *AND* that they devote | the resources to insure that it remains secure. Without this | everyone using the internet to transact business is highly at risk. | | B) Mail service between two full-time (#2 above) subscribers (of | atleast the same provider, and reasonably expected between major | providers) *SHOULD* be expected to be secure. This is clearly not | true today since some providers use interactive customer systems | for mail servers - so fall back delivery via MX records drop mail | into an insecure environment. | | The CSN/Brad Huntting response was: | | > E-Mail? Secure? You are high... | | It's no wonder an increasing number of companies are all but disconnecting | from the internet. | | The interactive systems at providers sites are completely a different cow/pig | ... they are difficult to class as anything but unsecure/hostile since the | user base has *NO* controls. Anybody that pays their startup fees can get an | account and hack/crack for atleast a month. Running www, other clients or | servers which transact business in this environment is fundementally insecure. | Because of this, the home computer model over slip/ppp should be the only or | prefered way to do internet business. | | Any rational provider needs to firewall their "support" systems (routers, | billing systems, and key servers) from this interactive zoo, slip/ppp/dedicated | customers, and the rest of the internet. The Kevin Mitnick attack was pure | stupidity ... he left a trail to his apartment. The providers involved didn't | do enough to firewall their support systems. Dozens/hundreds of other hackers | and crackers are atleast smart enough to loop their telnet/rlogins thru foreign | sites that *WILL NOT* provide call/route trace data to the Feds and then loop | the service such that packet correlation within a provider can not be done. | Had Mitnick done this he would still be reaping havoc. Other probably are | still at it, untraceable. | | I have several friends that have been running mail order businesses via | WEB servers ... you can order audio CD's, Video's, software, Adult toys, | and other interesting things from them. They are also cracker targets since | they do business via credit cards from their systems. Unless somebody can | start making the core part of the network secure and drive the cracker | havens from the net, I would not be suprised if the credit card companies | start withdrawing authorization from these businesses. Some of the non-credit | card companies, like Pizza Hut will also get tired of the internet when | some SOB floods them with prank orders day in and day out ... | | Current "secure protocols" are hardly secure in an insecure environment, they | require atleast a certain trusted agent/transport domain to work. If we are | going to "cleanup the net", it is going to be with providers and users taking | responsiblity for securing the primary backbones and provider resources, then | removing the hostile users and havens from the net. | | Having safe-havens on the net where hackers from around the world can safely | telnet thru has to stop ... before business on the internet is practical. | Getting the ISP's to accept basic route/data security as part of their service | offering is manditory for any sucessful encryption scheme. NetScape's current | problems are just the tip of the iceberg. | | ----------- | John Bass | UNIX Consultant Development, Porting, Performance by Design | | | From jbass Mon Sep 25 16:48:29 1995 | To: isig(a)netf.org, rmiug-discuss(a)rmiug.org | Subject: encryption in an insecure environment | Status: O | | Since several Public Key and PGP supporters don't understand the basics | of their own offerings ... I'll provide the rebuttal publicly for the | rest of you who may have been confused by my last posting. | | Encryption security is only as good as the security of the "key(s)" involved. | How keys are transmitted is the weak link for network based encryption | security systems. | | First Public Key encryption is far better than "pretty good" as long as | you know the sending party *IS* using *YOUR* key. The problem is that | when one or more messengers are in the loop, they can keep the receipents | key and provide the sender with their own key. When they get the senders | message they can decode the text, then re-encode it with the key obtained | from the receipent before passing it along to the receipent. | | Using Public Key encryption over the internet therefore requires that the | messengers (ISP's and the commerical internet backbones) are trustworthy | in delivering keys and limiting data access. If any point in the network | allows a hacker to substitute keys and reencrypt messages, then communication | between the customer and vendor is insecure. Routers, bridges, and Domain | Name Servers become key targets and must be trusted and secure. This is not | true today. | | John Bass | UNIX Consultant Development, Porting, Performance by Design | | From jbass Tue Sep 26 20:46:01 1995 | To: rmiug-discuss(a)rmiug.org, isig(a)netf.org | Subject: DNS role in an insecure network environment | Status: O | | Since some folks here may not understand why Domain Name Servers | and the routes to/from them must be secure I'll provide a short | description of why attacking them, or their routing, can be used | to attack a vendors server system. | | Domain Name Service (DNS) has several critical roles in regard | to supporting internet security. This opens the door for several | interesting attacks. | | It is critical that the mapping of host.domain a client system results | in the internet address of the server host requested - and not that of | some substituted server intercepting traffic for it. | | If an attacker can convince a client system to resolve requests for | server.vendor.domain to the substituted server, then the attacker can | forward the clients requests to the real server while skimming the | data involved. There are several ways to do this ranging from directly | attacking the DNS system to injecting subsituted DNS replys into the | network. Doing this on an ISP's interactive system simply requires | gaining enough privilege to either edit/replace host name tables or | forcing an entry into the network kernel cache. Since DNS entries are | cached, the substituted server address can have a fairly long life. The | substituted server can be any machine in the world ... either in a safe | haven zone or another compromised site to protect the hackers identity. | | Authentication often requires that given some client/server address | that you can trust DNS services to map it to the correct host.domain | name which is then compared with an access control list. Many network | servers can be attacked by subsituting a trusted sites name given the | attackers address. | | The reliance on DNS creates a house of cards out of internet security, | particulary since the ISP's internal network and internet backbone | is managed without explict attention to data/routing/DNS security. The | ISP's seem think it's the users problem ... without any viable solution. | | John | | From jbass Thu Sep 28 08:14:26 1995 | To: Steve Hultquist <ssh(a)rmii.com> | Subject: Re: DNS role in an insecure network environment | Cc: rmiug-discuss(a)rmiug.org, isig(a)netf.org | Status: O | | Steve, | | Let's recap this in brief. In the first three postings I formed a strong | argument that a collection of technologies in current use and percieved | as secure, have in fact several lines of attack related to the messenger | problem of distributing public keys. Nobody has offered a rebuttal to | this method of attack showing the assertions invalid. | | This assertion directly implies that current practice of using Public | Key encryption with inband keys is flawed, independent of the merits | of the encryption algorithm, key algorithm or key length. | | Independent of the merits of any encryption or authentication algorithm, | accepted solutions to the the messenger attack require the existance of | either an out-of-band key or a secure communications channel. How secure | the channel must be depends on several factors. At minimum it must have | routing integrity, which is not currently the case, to prevent a third | party from inserting a filter (messenger) into the data path. Preferably | the data path would not be clear text at all. | | There are millions of customers and a large number of vendors accepting | the current technology without the knowledge of it's flaws. | | You jump in with two postings which attempt to discredit my assertions | purely with the force of your reputation saying it ain't so, and offer | your signature lines as proof. And then get highly personal and offended | when I question your weak attack. | | There are solutions to the problem, but they are not in widespread use | on the internet to protect WWW commerce. CrypoCards are neat, but they | are not the solution for the WWW. Third party systems still have the | messenger problem unless an out-of-band key exists or the communication | channel is secure to start with. | | My business cards just say "consultant" ... I also have a few left that | say "janitor" (for cleaning up other engineers messes, and empting the | trash after my employees). I also have a few that simply say "owner", | but I have never thought it quite right to run my 1-10 man shop with | the title president, CEO, or whatever titles that are used by those | with the real resposibility for running multi-million/billion dollar | companies with hundreds/thousangds of peoples jobs/lives at stake. | | | You say: | | I think the technology is well-understood and has to do with | key escrow by trusted servers. | | and I say fine, but that doesn't help today's customers. The messenger | problem still exists with dynamic in-band registration, an out-of-band | key is still needed.. | | Yes, it takes a little time to set up third-party | key servers, but it's not *that* difficult. And, fortunately, it has | nothing to do with major changes to things as fundamental as DNS. | | and I say fine, but that doesn't help today's customers. Nor did I advocate | changes to DNS ... just cleaning up the security of the channels it operates | over. | | I don't think [out-of-band] key management is that difficult. | | I don't think it is either, *IF* done by the ISP for the ISP's protection | domain *AND* the ISP's implement and extended protection domain to cover | the backbone and all ISP's. But's that's not here today either | | Are you familiar with the current IETF working groups? Would you | like to provide us with an assessment of the various approaches, including | IPv6 (which, by the way, we are demonstrating here at Networld+Interop this | week: http://www.interop.net)? | | As I stated in my original post I don't claim to be an internet security expert. | You do. | | The real point is that none of this protects todays customers and vendors. | I am not going to beat my chest and hope some group can change the risks | for www customers in the next year either. (But it would be nice) | | >Since current systems depend on messengers, they are flawed from | >a security standpoint no matter how many million may be in use. | >The NetScape encryption that was just broken what widely in use | >and success by your definition ... by mine it was a failure due | >to it's flaws ... exploited or not. | | Hogwash. Netscape was broken because they screwed up their randomization | routine. It has nothing to do with the inherent security of the design, | other than the flawed randomization. These are the rumors I was talking about. | | (grin) then prove it. Disprove the messenger attack. This is not a complex | theory or algorithm we are talking about. The thousand or so readers of | these lists will sleep a lot better if you can. | | >And there in lies the cruz of the problem, trusting people with your title | >for security who claim to be experts, yet just stick their head in the sand ... | | You know, John, you are one of the most caustic people I have ever conversed | with. You don't know me, other than our e-mail conversations, yet you | continue to denigrate me in public. I won't talk about my background, | except to say that none of my security implementations have been | compromised, my clients recommend me to others, and I am well aware of those | times I need to enlist other experts. | | Unlike you, John, I'm not perfect, and can use the assistance of others at | times. | | Gee ... for somebody that doesn't know me either you bring a lot of personel | stabs into this. "stick their head in the sand" is pretty meek compared to | your full on attack. | | >please explain to the rest of how your CryptoCard can be used | >to solve the problem for the rest of us that would like to wander | >the Web and shop without physically registering our card | >with each store. | | You'd only need to register it with a key server. But, you won't be | convinced, will you, John? | | and serveral million readers installed on every PC, and several million more cards | with unique ID's manufactured and distributed to users world wide, and the | coding whould have to have a trap door for the NSA and law enforcement which | would soon become widely known by all cyber crooks and econo terrorists. | (or copies of the servers database should some employee decide that a new | name and foreign home and retirement plan was worth the price of walking out | the front door with some extra in their pocket) Not every problem has | a technical solution ... not even for technical secrets. | | >dream on and sleep well ... | | I sleep well almost every night. And so do my clients. | | It makes me wonder about yours. If you have any. | | cheap shot ... sleep on. (but I wonder about your ...) | | Cheers, | ssh | -- | Steve Hultquist Distributed Systems and Internet Engineering | President, Worldwide Solutions, Inc. Boulder, Colorado | | John Bass | Janitor, DMS Design ;-)) | | From jbass Fri Sep 29 01:28:26 1995 | To: isig(a)netf.org, rmiug-discuss(a)rmiug.org | Subject: How to get rich from this ... | Status: R | | | Security flaws for the most part are just fun toys. With WWW & credit cards | we can really let our fingers to the walking. Thru the internet backbone | travels thousands of credit cards with authorization data every day/hour/minute. | Or you can be a little more selective and pick a state, city, or smaller | geograhical area by choosing which pipe to plug into. | | Where good old phone banks with people and the net differ - is a single | electronicly readable pipe of treasure outside the normal EFT security | channels. This centralization of data is what makes it attractive *IF* | you find a way to turn it into cash without getting caught or the risk of | getting caught can be out wieghed by the gains. | | How much can 5,000 credit cards be worth ... 1,000-3,000 each to the tune | of say 10 million if you are thinking small. On a little bit more grand | scale 10X or 100X is possible with some planning on how to get the money | into a usable place. We are talking more money than can be obtained from | even the biggest of bank or collectable roberies. I think that makes it | a goal of atleast somebody out there ... if not an unknown cyber crook, | organized crime, revolutionaries, some third world government. | | Some planning is in order - how to plug into the pipe, how to get the | money out. This is the fun part ;-) | | We could probably afford to give say $50K to some college kid working for | the regional ISP to find out a router passwd or two and share them with us. | Maybe we are a little more discrete and simply put in a job application with | them for the summer, or we by a few dozen very expensive routers and sell | them cheap after installing a trap door in their firmware. Maybe we just | do it the old fashion way and crack the root passwd on the interactive server | and leave a background process watching /dev/nit for router passwds around | the time we know they are going to do some reconfiguration. | | Getting the money out is the real creative part. Certainly running down | and taking out cash advances is out of the question - or at least boring. | We could do it the simple way - for each card in a targeted city, binary | search it's limit by ordering various non-traceable comodities like Pentium | CPU's, memory, jewlry, gold/silver coins for the card owners shipped to | their homes - then hijack the FedX and UPS regional delivery trucks first | thing in the morning. Since the goods are prepaid, it will probably take | several days before they can figure out the magnitude of the deal. Probably | time to do it a couple more times. Certainly doing say 50 at the same time | could yield a diversified retirement income. | | With out the glamour is more tried and true ways - hire a few hundred | college kids to start a chain of computer software stores. Build volume | by selling exactly at operating costs - undercutting everybody. When the | bank gets used to the credit card rate, hold a few loss leader sales to | create some greate peaks ... then dump the entire stolen credit card list | spread out against all the stores over a week period - slamming the cash | into places difficult to find and run like heck. With luck you may be able | to shield your identity and be faceless after the fallout. | | Take a large portion of the earnings to the track, powerball offices, | and your local bookie ... REALLY HIDE the rest. If you get caught nobody | will have the foggiest idea of how much is in your retirement fund | after writing a best selling crime series in the slammer. Hopefully | they will allow notebook computers and ISDN lines in cells by then. | | Find your body double and do everything in their name and town -- that's | FYI on the SLY of course .... | | Unlike others, I have a strong dislike for centralized key databases, they | make too big a target for traditional sorts of penitration - the data is | worth thousands times more than you are likely to pay for it under the table. | | I am a strong supporter of Public Key for both private and commerical data | protection ... but you must be fully aware to protect the initial key. As | used by most applications, the messenger attack is possible. | | have fun, hope you enjoyed this series. | | The Janitor :)

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NetScape's dependence upon RSA down for the count!
by jbass＠dmsd.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well guys and gals ... I spent some time reading documentation on the www servers for NetScape and Community ConneXion (c2.org) The "messenger attack" as described in my earlier posts regarding public key encryption and key management seems to apply to NetScape's SSL. I have a Fifty dollar bill for the first person to submit to the mail box nethack(a)dmsd.com a working Unix server (with cleartext session logs) which accepts all connections on a unix based host to the www port and redirects them to netscape.com leaving a clear text log of each session's SSL packets in /tmp by session. All entries become the property of DMS Design. The winner and I will submit a claim for one of Community COnneXion's "I HACKED NETSCAPE" tee shirts as a server hack. (Have Fun!!) After a careful examination of NetScapes public documentation it appears that SSL which is based upon RSA's public key technology may be down for the count. The fall of SSL would doom NetScapes current claim of "Strong exhortable cryptography for credit card-based financial transactions" as outlined in Taher Elgamal's (NetScape's Chief Scientist) white paper titled "COMMERCE ON THE INTERNET: CREDIT CARD PAYMENT APPLICATIONS OVER THE INTERNET" Version 1.00 dated July 14, 1995 which can be found on the www as http://home.netscape.com/newsref/std/credit.html. SSL doc can be found as http://home.netscape.com/newsref/std/SSL.html. John L. Bass Owner, DMS Design

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Re: COE Document
by shamrock＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- In article <n1399743612.14225(a)epic.org>, banisar(a)epic.org ("Dave Banisar") wrote: Here are some thoughts. [...] > Recommendation No. R (95) 13 > Recommendations No. R (87) 15 > regulating the use of personal data in the police state and > Recommendations No. R (89) 9 on computer-relating crime, The countries of the EC are police states and admit to it in an official doccument. [...] > 3. During execution of a search, investigating authorities should have the > power, subject to appropriate safeguards, to extend the search of other > computer systems within their jurisdiction which are connected by menas of > a network and seize the data therein, provided immediate action is > required. If the computer to be searched is connected to the Internet, any other computer connected to the Internet and located in the same country may be searched as well without requiring a second warrant. > 12. Specific obligations should be imposed on service providers who offer > telecommunications services to the public, either through public or > private networks, to provide information to identify the user, when so > ordered by the compentant investigating authority. Remailers will be outlawed. [...] > V. Use of Encryption > --------------------- > > 14. Measures should be considered to minimise the negative effects of the > use of cryptography on the investigation of criminal offenses, without > affecting its legitimate use more than is strictly necessary. GAK is comming. The new world order is unmasked: a gobal police state. Folks, it is time to buy some rifles and lots of ammunition. Oh, I forgot, over there in Europe you can no longer buy any. Seems the political leaders have thought ahead. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMG2V5SoZzwIn1bdtAQG5qQF/R3iX89TlU3rRD6NeIIVMG2F7iF6SNpME 6MjNUABjfCmGRwl6llCAC/bDtc2zxndA =pXsk -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: NetScape's dependence upon RSA down for the count!
by jbass＠dmsd.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In case SSL packets are not available from NetScape homepage server, use the netscape server of your choice in the contest ... have fun, John

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Re: NetScape's dependence upon RSA down for the count!
by jbass＠dmsd.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

and yes I'll accept server hacks which run's on linux and bsd too :) John

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The 4th Estate
by Tim Philp 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am a freelance journalist who has been 'lurking' on your list for about six months now. I have a great interest in cryptography and the mathematics behind cyphers. I write a weekly column about computers and the Internet in a small town newspaper in Brantford Ontario. I was particularly interested in the SSL crack that took place recently and I wrote an article about the feat and talked about some of the implications of this use of the Internet. In previous articles I have spoken about the need for widespread, strong, cryptography to both protect personal privacy and to aid secure business communications. I have been following the debate about a Cypherpunk spokesperson with some interest and I thought that I would throw in my two cents worth (2.5 cents Canadian! :-}) It is always difficult to get a group of strong individualists to agree to a common cause or to allow one person to become a spokesman for the group. Such a position grants a certain amount of 'power', for lack of a better word, to such a person. I think that there is no need for such a person. Each of us has a different point of view that, while sharing some common ideas, cannot be reconciled with any 'official' position. I think that the accomplishments of the group speak volumes and have no fear, the public is listening. I do, however, detect some small amount of smugness attached to comments about 'Joe Sixpack'. While it is true that the average citizen is not interested in esoteric subjects such as cryptography, do not underestimate the importance of communicating with them. Their votes and elected representatives will control the future legislation regarding cryptography. It is vital that they understand just what is at stake in this debate, and that they make decisions based upon knowledge and not upon fear. Therefore, it is important that we ALL do our share of communicating with the press and the public. Without our input, the scaremongerers will carry the day. In the meantime, keep up the good work. If anyone wants copies of the articles that appeared in the paper, E-mail me and I will send them. If there is enough demand I will post them to the list. Don't worry, they are only about 700 words each. Regards, Tim Philp Brantford, Ontario Canada -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAy/KL1MAAAEEALIrcJLNr3LTauphCzkU1SNtZkUPCEH14xIxVaiSM/7850/y 6qkA17N0/4E20RiyQIZ7TZf2vpbaTHs88+jU4Lvb/fBWBnL1AZBdW7I1+vNSMGzG ljBzU9X+BXrBFYi4CzpWhqOo+a2IQaJx4sZ7w/GG59gdFIyps3seeMISF+fVAAUR tCBUaW0gUGhpbHAgPGJwbGliQG5pYy5ob29rdXAubmV0Pg== =6Rrp -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Simple Hardware RNG Idea
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:57 PM 9/30/95, zinc wrote: >regarding the use of radioactive material for generating random >numbers, lantern mantles are fairly radioactive. i'd say they would >be able to emit sufficient particles for OTP use, especially if one >builds a device that just constructs the pads all the time (ie, it >just sits there making various pads of X min length and Y max length, >storing them on a hard drive, or RAM if you're that rich). you just >request a pad from the machine when you need it and encrypt whatever >with it... Thorianated lantern mantles are only slightly radioactive. The counts per second is what matters. This will be a function of a lot of things, not the least of which is the detector area and the fluence of alphas intercepted. At the risk of repeating myself, there are easier ways of generating essentially random numbers. --Tim May (P.S., as my last word on this for a while. You may have heard that RAM chips can have bits flipped by the alpha particles emitted by low levels of uranium and thorium present in packaging materials. And that cosmic rays can do the same thing, at a lower error rate. Well, I discovered these effects in 1977 and wrote the original papers on this "soft error" effect. I'm not making an appeal to authority here, just telling you why I'm skeptical of all of these proposals to make a radioactive decay-based random number source. There are much easier ways.) ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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