December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: "random" number seeds vs. Netscape
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:01 PM 9/20/95 -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: >PC timers inherently run at Mhz speed -- they interrupt every 100th of >a second but you can get finer resolution by querying the clock >chip. Does Windows let you do this? Yes: 1.196 MHz precision. The VTD maintains a 64-bit value that is accurate to 0.8 microseconds. This value is obtained by calling the VTD with AX set to 0100h. The 64-bit value is returned in EDX:EAX. The returned value indicates the time Windows has been running based on a 1.196 MHz clock. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: Cypherpunks Hold a Cracking Party
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:28 AM 9/19/95 -0400, Duncan Frissell wrote: >Just to let everyone know that I've got an assignment from Wired to do a >story with the above working title. > As it turns out, Steven Levy and I had an assignment collision at Wired and were both assigned the story. For some unknown reason, they wanted him to do it instead of me so I will *not* be doing it. Steve -- feel free to use my title if you like. DCF "Anyone know any publications interested in an article on the Crack?"

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Re: Munitions shirt (again)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 3:49 PM 9/20/95, Ian Goldberg wrote: >So, Dave and I got free munitions shirts (they're different, though; >the font is smaller and they have a bunch of X'd out Constitutional >Amendments on the back; I think they ere designed by Joel Furr) for >our bug find. > >So I'm wearing it today. The thing is, I live in International House, >a residence that has 50% non-Americans. > >So, any consensus as to whether it's actually illegal to do so? I >remember some disagreement a few weeks ago that AFAIK wasn't resolved. The _consensus_ here seems to be: "This t-shirt is illegal to wear in front of non-Americans," judging by the comments here. The _reality_ is quite different, I think, and the "this shirt is illegal" hype is, in my opinion, just that, hyperbole. Even hyperbull, too. Books and written articles containing crypto algorithms are _not_ illegal for "furriners" to look at. The t-shirt contains at most a fuzzy printing of an algorithm that has been widely printed in various books and in articles in mailing lists like ours. (I agree that there are some unresolved issues with ostensibly machine-readable forms. The t-shirt is not machine-readable by any plausible interpretation of machine-readable.) >As far as I can tell, it's _technically_ illegal, but any LEO would be >out of his mind to try to enforce it (it would have to be a Fed, too, >wouldn't it? Or can regular city cops get you for violating export >restrictions?). Ian did great work on the latest Netscape break, but this is just plain crazy. --Tim May ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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What's with the list? (Old mail?!)
by Deranged Mutant 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone else get old c'punks postings remailed to them from August?

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Re: Deja Vu / Re: Info please
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On or About 8 Sep 97 at 16:01, TruthMonger wrote: > Dont go swimming on a full stomach. > Don't play with that, you'll shoot your eye out. =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://www.slip.net/~cdr/kingmedia Voice: (408) 259-2795

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Re: Please send me SSL problems...
by Rich Salz 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From what I can see, GSSAPI has broad acceptance and will soon have broad use. I've heard that Digital, HP, and IBM have all mandated that all security code (except keymgmt and other things that are out of scope) must go through the GSSAPI: no writing your own stuff. I heard, less authoritatively, that Microsoft has the same rules, except they use a FunnyLookingVariant(far) of an earlier GSSAPI draft. /r$

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GAK patents, anyone?
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anyone want to guess how long until they will give 'key escrow' systems special protection? (Actually that would be a good thing, because it would make GAK more expensive :-) ----- http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/notices/terrog.txt ----- Petitioning to Make Special Patent Applications Relating to Inventions For Countering Terrorism New patent applications are normally taken up for examination in the order of their effective United States filing date. However, the Commissioner may provide that a patent application will be advanced out of turn for examination if a petition to make the patent application special under 37 CFR 1.102(c) or (d) is granted. On July 31, 1996, Vice President Gore stated that [i]t is imperative that those seeking to prevent terrorist activities have all of the tools necessary to accomplish their task. In view of the importance of developing technologies for countering terrorism and the desirability of prompt disclosure of advances made in these fields, the Patent and Trademark Office is establishing a new category for petitions to accord "special" status to patent applications relating to counter-terrorism inventions. International terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2331 is activities that (A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnaping. The types of technology for countering terrorism could include, but are not limited to, systems for detecting/identifying explosives, aircraft sensors/security systems, and vehicular barricades/disabling systems. Applications which are made special will be advanced out of turn for examination and will be treated as special throughout their pendency by the Patent and Trademark Office. Applicants who desire that an application relating to inventions for countering terrorism be made special should file a petition, with the fee under 37 CFR 1.17(i) which is presently $130.00, requesting the Patent and Trademark Office to make the application special. The petition for special status should be made in writing, should identify the application by application number and filing date, and should be accompanied by a statement explaining how the invention contributes to countering terrorism. Such statement must be set forth in oath or declaration form unless it is signed by a registered practitioner. The petition will be decided by the Director of the patent examining group to which the application is assigned. This new category for a petition to make an application special will be added in the next revision of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) to the other categories discussed in MPEP section 708.02. Questions concerning this notice should be directed to Magdalen Y. Greenlief, Office of the Deputy Assistant Commissioner for Patent Policy and Projects, (703) 305-8813. Bruce A. Lehman Dated: August 19, 1996 Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks

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Netscape is doing well -- give 'em a break.
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> > around at the time that this code was being written. I must admit that > > the RNG seed code was not an area that I thought to examine when I took > > over our security library. > > I don't know what your background is, so don't take this as a > personal attack please, but someone who is trained in computer > security and cryptography implementation should *know* to check these > things. Hell, even I would check those things, and I'm not a > cryptographer by any means. Hey folks, lighten up! Netscape is to be commended for even *putting* crypto into their product! Of course the first version is going to have a few screwups; they're in a fast market and things must be done in a hurry. But they are showing a real committment to securing Internet privacy and commerce -- with real algorithms and without key escrow. They hired a real cryptographer, and their security programmer is a cypherpunk. They've told the world they will put the real "domestic" version out for public use. This is a step that a very small number of companies even bother with; most don't even have a high-security unexportable version. They're combing the net for better random number algorithms. We could do a lot worse! Cygnus' Kerberos faced the same random-seed problems and punted in similar ways. Our random numbers are derived from the time and the PID and etc. You can read the sources to see. Ted Ts'O claims it is harder to exploit them because they're mixed in (with DES encryption) with a secret key, either the Kerberos database's master key on the server, or the session key from the ticket on the client. But I haven't done a full blown security analysis of this scheme. I was too busy trying to productize it on eight platforms, write real documentation, do customer support, and make it run on the *^*&%&&# Macintosh. I did have it marked in my mind as something to look at "when I had the time". If you-all have the time, hey, go for it! Might as well look at the one in MIT K5, since that's the development tree from which all future Kerberoses will come. All progress is by steps. Let's step on each others' shoulders, not on each others' toes. Netscape is doing us a favor by pushing strong crypto. We are doing them a favor by pointing out problems before they cause major losses to Netscape customers. The result is higher security for everyone, and more respect for each other's efforts. So kindly show them a little... John Gilmore

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Entropy vs Random Bits
by David Van Wie 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I've been watching the debate and discussion unfold on usable sources of random data from environments, user actions, etc. I have a vocabulary question (and something of a bone to pick as a mathematician and physicist). Usually, the term "entropy" is being used to characterize one of two different things: (i) random data, as in "300 bits of entropy," and (ii) the "randomness" of data (i.e. high degree of variance in a statistic drawn from it), as in "you can find a lot of entropy in the low order bits of a timed interval between keystrokes." I suspect that there are other shades of meaning intended in other uses as well. This is odd. The term entropy describes an aspect of thermodynamic equlibrium in physical systems. Although sometimes used as a synonym for "random," that definition is vernacular, not technical. In fact, there is no meaningful relationship between "entropy" and random data of the type described in the postings related to seed values. In the presense of a perfectly suitable and precise mathematical term (i.e. random), why invent new terms? Why use them to mean at least two different things? dvw

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News: California Legislature Backs Encryption Exports
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Incredible ... I've been tracing this for the last few days, and I have seen ZERO mention in print and ONE tiny mention in San Jose Mercury News (which did NOT get reflected in the print version; someone please prove me wrong). The Key Bill Numbers: SB-1133 and SJR-29 (Start from: http://www.ca.gov and look under "senate") SB-1133 is a full encryption policy direction declaration (yes, that means it's still fluff, but at least it says key recovery does not work.) SJR-29 is the resolution mentioned below. Full Article: http://www.zdnet.com/intweek/daily/970908b.html by Will Rodger Key Passage: Clinton administration officials tried to fight passage of the resolution in the technology-heavy state, while at the same time trying to conceal their moves from industry opponents, according to lobbyists close to the floor action. Commerce Undersecretary William Reinsch, for example, sent the state senate committee considering the measure a three-page fax urging them to vote down the resolution an hour before a scheduled committee vote on Aug. 28. Officials of the Office of Management and Budget then tried to keep the contents of the fax secret from opponents by warning that the work was protected by copyright and could not be shown outside the committee without violating the author's copyright. "We eventually got a copy anyway. It's nothing but the same old arguments," said Chuck Marson, a lobbyist for the Internet Industry Alliance, an industry group composed of Netscape Communications Corp., Microsoft Corp., America Online Inc. and Netcom On-Line Communication Services Inc. It is just utterly amazing that NO major news organization has yet to challenge the Clinton Administration on this issue: That the Administration has consistently misrepresented the facts and, in some case, just plain lied, to the public, and have tried every under-handed method to slow the spread of encryption, key-recovery or not, and to increase the surveillence powers of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. And now, here we are, on the eve of a series of important votes to gut Goodlatte's SAFE legislation, and no one knows anything about the slimeball tactics the Administration is using to regulate, for the first time, what kind of software one can write. Maybe it is just as well. Perhaps the best way is to fold and appear weak on the initial vote and let the whole damn thing pass (after all, I'm willing to bet that the purpose of trying to gut the legislation before it reaches the floor is to make it not worth anyone's vote). If our side can get everyone to vote for the GAK-compliant version, perhaps it will pave the way for a most excellant CDA-style challenge. Ern

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Re: your mail
by starrd＠iia2.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 20 Sep 1995 owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com wrote: > ( \ > Finger for public key \ ) > Strong-arm for secret key / <-- minor groove > Thumb-screws for pass-phrase / ) > > I love your phrase, I hope you don't mind...I added it to my .sig. :) ||||||||||||email address: starrd(a)iia2.org or starrd(a)cinenet.net||||||||||| | Creator of the original | Get paid to upload | | Patriot's Archives \ shareware to BBSes and | | ftp: iia.org /pub/users/patriot \_____ the Internet! | | ftp: wuarchive.wustl.edu /pub/msdos_uploads/patriot\ Get file: | | For index of available files: descript.ion \ uploader.zip | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Finger for PGP public key, strong-arm for secret key, thumbscrews for passphrase...

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Re: Government shows its hand...good news!
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

tcmay(a)got.net: > Though it's understandable why so many are expressing anger, gloom, > anxiety, and rage over the Freeh-Feinstein mandatory key escrow draft bill, > a better attitude is that of joy. > Any way it goes, this is good news for us. > If the Safe Internet Act (or whatever it is finally called) is passed, the > Supreme Court will likely strike it down (on First and/or Fourth Amendment Joy may be an overreaction. I just wrote (in part) to ukcrypto(a)maillist.ox.ac.uk: Perhaps the law will be passed, then struck down by courts as unconstitutional (after campaigners have incurred some expense) and something else will replace it days later. I'm too young to be this cynical. On another subject: Micali's patents are described in AC2. (Page 97 is missing from the indexed list of Micali-mentioning pages,) On page 98 Schneier says of the advantages of key escrow: "Well, there really aren't any". -- ############################################################## # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ##############################################################

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No Subject
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:53 AM 9/20/95, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > This was a bad mistake on our part, and we are working hard to fix it. > We have been trying to identify sources of random bits on PCs, Macs, and > all of the many unix platforms we Maintain a 4K entropy buffer. Mingle the exact time an place of each mouse hit into the entropy buffer using some combination that will have the effect of progressively shifting bits all over the place, so that every noise bit that you get eventually effects every bit of the buffer in a complicated way. For example: Buf[p] = MouseNoise + Buf[p] + Buf[p-24] + Buf[p-55]; p = p+1; (See Knuth, SemiNumerical Algorithms, Book 2, page 27 for the magic properties of the numbers 24, 55. This rule means that buffer immediately before p depends in a non linear fashion on all the noise you have received.) Whenever you need a random number, take a one way checksum, for example MD5, of the most recently altered part of that buffer. Use that as your random number. Whenever the user has used this buffer during a session, then when he quits netscape, save the buffer after first hashing it. To hash the buffer without loss of entropy, take the hash of one block of the buffer, and XOR it onto the next block (not the block that you hashed.) Repeat for each block in the buffer cyclicly. Publish your random number and encryption code here and in sci.crypt. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Government shows its hand...good news!
by Tim May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Though it's understandable why so many are expressing anger, gloom, anxiety, and rage over the Freeh-Feinstein mandatory key escrow draft bill, a better attitude is that of joy. Any way it goes, this is good news for us. If the Safe Internet Act (or whatever it is finally called) is passed, the Supreme Court will likely strike it down (on First and/or Fourth Amendment grounds). This will marginalize the crypto folks, and perhaps cause the Court to reaffirm the Patel decision and related issues. If the Safe Internet Act is never actually proposed, or dies in committee, or fails, then at least Big Brother's true intentions will have been shown. Actually, this has already happened. All of those who ever expressed doubt that Big Brother planned to ban crypto must now see we were right all along. The remaining alternate course, that the Act is passed, and then that the Supreme Court eventually affirms its constitutionality, is also good for us. For it will then mean war has been declared, and various extreme sorts of actions will then accelerate. And that could be a lot of fun. But I expect, in all seriousness, that the Freeh-Feinstein view will fade. Clinton is about to enter his lame duck phase, and sentiment seems to be against mandatory key escrow. As one ironic example, the California state legislature has voted unanimously, both houses, to send a message to Washington urging easing of crypto exports. Feinswine, being a Californian, might want to heed this. But, being a Pacific Heights socialist, er, socialite, she's too clueless to have any inkling what the issues are. --Tim May There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Re: Deja Vu / Re: Info please
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> Dont go swimming on a full stomach. >> >Don't play with that, you'll shoot your eye out. > Always wear clean underwear in case you get hit by a car.

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Re: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm > Date: Mon, 8 Sep 1997 21:54:31 -0500 (CDT) > From: ichudov(a)algebra.com (Igor Chudov @ home) > Nobuki Nakatuji wrote: > > > > Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm > > > > 1.key input > > 2.input key generate chaos initial condition > > 3.input key generate chaos signal(random number) > > 4.chaos initial condition plus chaos signal > > XOR plain text > > How do you generate "chaos"? I can think of several ways right off... - radioactive source - controlled water flow through a faucet - waterwheel such that each bucket contains a hole of the correct size - magnetic pendulum - jello scintillation counter - A-B chemical oscillators at their critical point - a light detector placed under a tree in a breeze or wind - Chaos Game - Foucalt Dust The real question is what algorithm is used to generate the random seeds. The above mechanical systems (eg magnetic pendulum) are excellent sources of random numbers whereas the algorithmic (eg Chaos Game) methods are more suspect and open to breaking. You might want to check out: Fractals for the Classroom: Part 1; Introduction to Fractals and Chaos Peitgen, Jurgens, Saupe ISBN 0-387-97041-X ISBN 0-540-97041-X I haven't looked at Part 2 yet so I don't have a clue as to its applicability. But considering the authors reputations I would suspect it would be worth a check out (I am planning on buying a copy anyway). ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Is Feinstein's comment a blessing in disguise?
by Ernest Hua 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Nothing other than some kind of mandatory key recovery really does the job," the California Democrat said at a hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee's technology, terrorism, and government information subcommittee. This comment may, in fact, be a powerful weapon against ANY control. In fact, Feinstein is believing that no half-assed policy (including the current policy and Kerrey's bill) will really help law enforcement much. I can imagine why Freeh would not just jump at that conclusion full-force. He is not that stupid. If he were to hold onto that conclusion too tightly, then there is little justification for any law "encouraging" the proliferation of key-recovery products, as that would be worthless in terms of providing relief to law enforcement. Basically, Feinstein is providing further support for the long-standing argument that unless you plug every leak (a.k.a. no KR/GAK product), criminals will find the loop-hole and work around government surveillence. Ern

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Stewart Baker's analysis of administration crypto-proposal
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 8 Sep 1997 19:13:52 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Stewart Baker's analysis of administration crypto-proposal [Some folks have asked me why I'm sending so much encryption-related information recently. The answer is simple: this week will be a crucial one in deciding how much privacy Americans will enjoy in the digital age. This proposal is //at least// as important and newsworthy as the original Clipper Chip was, and ranks up there with the Communications Decency Act. Thanks to Stewart Baker for forwarding. --Declan] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 08 Sep 97 18:19:24 EST From: Stewart Baker <sbaker(a)mail.steptoe.com> To: declan(a)well.com Declan, here is a quick analysis of the latest leaked Administration legislative draft on encryption. Whether this language ever sees the light of day in this form, however, is open to doubt. With that disclaimer, here's what the bill seems likely to do. Stewart Baker THE LANGUAGE The draft borrows heavily from the structure and content of the Kerrey/McCain legislation--it even retains the title, the "Secure Public Networks Act". In fact, the provisions in Titles IV through X of McCain/Kerrey regarding the registration of certificate authorities and key recovery agents, liability, criminal penalties, defenses, international negotiations, authority of the Secretary of Commerce to investigate compliance with the Act, and authority for the Attorney General to bring actions to enjoin violations of the Act are largely unchanged in this draft. The significant changes are: -- gone is the section (102) that would prohibit mandatory third party escrow of keys. In its place is a new section (105) that would prohibit, after January 1, 1999, the provision of encryption services in the U.S., or the manufacture for sale or distribution in the U.S. of encryption products/systems, that do not have a plaintext recovery feature that may be turned on at the option of the user. -- gone is the exclusive emphasis on key recovery as the technology for assuring plaintext recovery. Instead, this legislation would require products and systems that permit immediate decryption without the knowledge or cooperation of the user. The Attorney General is to issue regulations describing these functional criteria, but there is no provision requiring public notice and comment on such regulations. -- gone is the language requiring key recovery agents to disclose recovery information when presented with a subpoena. In its place is language that indicates a court order or court authorized warrant is required before a key recovery agent may disclose recovery information. -- added is export license exception treatment for products that are access or recovery enabled, regardless of algorithm, key length, or even whether the access feature is activated. This would be broader than McCain/Kerrey which would extend license exception treatment to products with over 56-bit key lengths only if the product includes an access feature and the access feature is turned on at the time of export. -- retained is the provision to decontrol 56-bit encryption after one time review. However, the bill adds an Encryption Export Advisory Board, composed of industry and government representatives, to, among other things, recommend to the President whether the key length of encryption exports to be decontrolled should be raised beyond 56 bits. The President retains the final decision making authority, however. -- gone is the McCain/Kerrey provision that would authorize the Secretary of Commerce to prohibit any exports that could be contrary to U.S. security interests. -- added is a provision to permit license exceptions for voice products with encryption if the Secretary of Commerce determines that requiring an access feature would be a competitive disadvantage and permitting the export would be compatible with U.S. foreign and national security policies. -- retained are the provisions that require the use of accessible encryption products and services on any system used or funded by the Government, but this draft sets a January 1, 1999 date of compliance. -- contrary to earlier indications, there is no requirement for certificate authorities registered under the Act to ensure recovery information is escrowed with a recovery agent registered under the Act. ANALYSIS Even though expected, the big news with this draft is the introduction of domestic control of encryption products and services available in the U.S. For many, the idea of such controls is simply an unacceptable infringement on privacy. But even for those who could be persuaded of the need for such controls, the implementation date provided (January 1, 1999) is unworkable. Industry must have the time to research and develop access technology appropriate to their products, particularly in the telecommunications industry where the demand for security is increasing, but there is little or no market for key recovery and its associated infrastructure. Likewise, manufacturers cannot afford to write off the investments they have made in existing security products or services by being compelled to implement new designs before technology turnover would normally be expected to occur. A related concern would be to ensure new products with access features may interoperate with products or services that are already in use without such features. It is unreasonable to expect that users could afford to replace their existing systems with new products that include access features. The language of this draft would seem to permit such interoperability since the access feature is required only to be an option that may be turned on by the user, or not. But even if the legislation is understood as permitting such interoperability, the cost to manufacturers and consumers of meeting this new requirement could be substantial.

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Government has appealed the Bernstein case to the 9th Circuit
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

No great surprise. We have received their Notice of Appeal. We'll scan it in and put it on the Web as soon as possible. Only Lee Tien has seen it yet, and he didn't mention anything exceptional in it. Soon in http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITAR_export/Bernstein_case/Legal/ John

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Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithim
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

P(i) Plaintext,C(i) Ciphertext,K(j) Key,Ch(i) Chaos signal, L Irrational number P(),C()-->Manage in byte,Length supposing that n byte. K()-->Character line from ASCII CODE,Length supposing that m. Ch(n) begin Xn+1=aXn(1.0-Xn) return Xn+1 end f(K) begin w = Sigmaj strtoul(K(j))j delay=int(w/L) return(double)(w/L-delay) end 1.K input 2.delay generato 3.Ch(i) generato 4.P(i) acquire 5.C(i)=P(i) XOR Ch(i+delay) 6.C(i) output ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithim (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: "Nobuki Nakatuji" <bd1011(a)hotmail.com> > Subject: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithim > Date: Mon, 08 Sep 1997 21:18:24 PDT > P(i) Plaintext,C(i) Ciphertext,K(j) Key,Ch(i) Chaos signal, > L Irrational number > > > P(),C()-->Manage in byte,Length supposing that n byte. > K()-->Character line from ASCII CODE,Length supposing that m. > > > Ch(n) > begin > Xn+1=aXn(1.0-Xn) > return Xn+1 > end > > > f(K) > begin > w = Sigmaj strtoul(K(j))j > > delay=int(w/L) > return(double)(w/L-delay) > end > > > 1.K input > 2.delay generato > 3.Ch(i) generato > 4.P(i) acquire > 5.C(i)=P(i) XOR Ch(i+delay) > 6.C(i) output Nice but as noted by others, without a better explanation of what is going on with Ch(i) the algorithm as detailed is useless. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >The interesting question that Nobuku can answer is how he generates >the key from the input. > > The key generates from chaos function. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >The interesting question that Nobuku can answer is how he generates >the key from the input. > > The key generates from chaos function. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> >I will just repeat Prof. Choate's question, how do you generate Ch. > > Ch generate begin Xn+1=aXn(1.0-Xn) return Xn+1 end Do you understand Japanese ? If you understand Japanese, I will send theis of Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem to you. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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Re: Gao's Chaos Cryptosystem Algorithm
by Nobuki Nakatuji 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Nobuki Nakatuji wrote: >> >> > >> >I will just repeat Prof. Choate's question, how do you generate Ch. >> > >> > >> Ch generate >> >> begin >> Xn+1=aXn(1.0-Xn) >> return Xn+1 >> end > >What does aXn(1.0-Xn) mean? That's what I do not understand. > It mean Chaos function. ______________________________________________________ Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com

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