December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Jim Quinn interview of James Norman (edited)
by jon.roland＠the-spa.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have further attempted to edit the interview transcript, cleaning up spelling, punctuation, and occasionally guessing what was probably taken down wrong, from context, (and without the benefit of hearing the actual interview tape). ============================================================================ The following is a Radio Interview between James Norman, formerly Senior Editor of Forbes Magazine and now with Media Bypass Magazine and Jim Quinn, DJ of WRRK 96.9 FM in Pittsburgh. In this interview from December 7th, they discuss issues of national importance and STUNNING IMPACT. Essentially they give out the reason for Vincent Foster's Death, and the fact that the "resignations" of the Congresspersons are NOT for policy reasons but because they have been caught with millions in corrupt funds in Swiss Banks. Read this to learn what the "mainstream media" doesn't ever tell you... Quinn's Interview with Jim Norman QUINN: Jim Norman, former Senior Editor at Forbes Magazine, and currently writing for Media Bypass Magazine after having uncovered Caspar Weinberger's Swiss bank account (we do get punished for some of the truths we uncover, do we not?). Jim is on the phone with us this morning. Good Morning, Jim. NORMAN: Hi, how are you? QUINN: Pretty good. I want to give people a chance to get an idea of what it is we are going to launch into after 8 o'clock, and I want to give some background into this. Is it fair to say that since Iran-Contra that the government has sort of been involved in the drug business? NORMAN: Yes, it goes way back before then, actually. It goes back even to the Vietnam War days -- remember the Golden Triangle, Laos, Cambodia and all that, Pakistan and Afghanistan, but it was always on a much smaller scale. What apparently happened was that in the 80s we got into it in a big way, basically nationalizing the wholesale importation of drugs from Central and South America. The idea was that we control it somehow that way; instead, it has just become the tail wagging the dog, I think. QUINN: It's become the funding source for just about anything that the government covertly wants to do, and for the moneys that various elements of the government don't want to ask the Congress for, nor do they want Congress to know about. NORMAN: Right. And it's an arms business, too. They are kind of all tied up together. QUINN: So it's arms and drugs? NORMAN: Right. QUINN: Kenneth Starr is currently our Whitewater prosecutor, and I have long said on this show that I find Ken Starr interesting but also troubling in that there are many elements to the Whitewater scandal. Part of the laments have to do with banking and have to do with Madison Savings and Loan, check kiting, stuff that went on with the Arkansas Development Financial Authority, but basically there are really two elements -- there is Whitewater and then there is all the stuff with Mena Airport, Iran-Contra, drugs into the country, various unexplained deaths, one of them Vince Foster, the possibility of espionage on the part of the first lady, and all of this lies behind a brick wall that Mr. Starr has been positioned upon to make sure that they get Clinton but that the fire doesn't burn past that wall; because on the other side of that wall are Republicans and Democrats. Am I right? NORMAN: That's right. He is not looking at Mena; he doesn't have the authority to from Janet Reno. He does have authority to look at the Vince Foster death, but I think only inasmuch as it relates to the Whitewater situation. The whole thing is hemmed in and beyond that is this whole national security blanket that has been thrown over big parts of this thing that you couldn't touch if you wanted to. QUINN: It's interesting, I find, that Dr. Henry Lee, who was part of the defense team for the Simpson trial, has ended up working on the Vince Foster affair. The word that I get is that he is going to say it was indeed a suicide. You have to remember something about Dr. Henry Lee -- he was, oddly enough, the guy that was called in to do some work on the Danny Casolaro death down in Martinsburg, way back in the early nineties. Was it 1991? NORMAN: I think it was 1991. QUINN: This was that reporter that you may have heard about that was found dead in a motel room, supposedly from a self-inflicted wound, even though the papers (a year's worth of investigative reporting) were all missing. He was working on the story that he called the "octopus" and basically it's the same story that you are working on, isn't it? NORMAN: Yes, I know I'm talking to a lot of the same sources. Danny supposedly slashed his wrists twelve times, sometimes deep enough to cut the tendon. QUINN: Yeah, right. And his files were all missing. Sure, there's a suicide. Right. And they embalmed his body before they even had a chance to inform his parents that he was dead. So it's another "Arkanside." NORMAN: George Williamson, who is an investigative reporter out of San Francisco, has been working on that. He has come up with all kinds of stuff -- other witnesses that have disappeared, people in the hotel who just aren't there anymore -- disappeared mysteriously. QUINN: It's interesting. There are a lot of people who are witnesses to various deaths involved with this Arkansas crowd, Danny Casolaro for one. Also, the two young boys on the railroad tracks down in Arkansas who stumbled on the drug operation. A lot of the witnesses around that have met violent and untimely deaths as well. So here are a great deal of ugly people involved in this. We are going to get down to what it all means in terms of government corruption and scandal of immense proportions that touch both parties. This is really nonpartisan. The fact that I don't happen to like "President Pantload" doesn't have a whole lot to do with this; he was just sort of a guy who happened to be there with his hand out at the time. It all goes back to the late 70's, right Jim? NORMAN: Yeah, and even before that. Let's start with the early 80s when Bill Casey came into office in the CIA under Ronald Reagan. That's when our government decided to embark on this amazing and extremely unbelievably successful effort to spy on the world's banks. We did it! We have been spying on world banking transactions for more than a dozen years. The way we do it is by basically forcing foreign banks, wittingly or unwittingly, to buy bugged software and bugged computers that let our NSA (National Security Agency) which is the intelligence arm of the government, to basically surveil wire transfers all over the globe. QUINN: Let me ask you this. How do you sucker the rest of the banking community around the globe into buying the software that you are selling? NORMAN: First of all you sell to front companies like this company Systematics in Arkansas, now called Alltel Information Services. They had another company called Boston Systematics, an affiliate based in Israel mainly. There is Robert Maxwell, the UK publisher, who is fronting this stuff. There are a whole bunch of people fronting this. QUINN: Wait a minute, Robert Maxwell -- isn't he dead? NORMAN: Yeah, he is now. QUINN: Didn't he have an unfortunate accident? NORMAN: Fell off his yacht in the Atlantic Ocean somewhere. QUINN: Why, isn't that amazing! NORMAN: The tinkering of it was mainly putting back doors, just a few lines of code, that would allow somebody to dial into a computer without leaving any footprints, any audit trail that you were in there. Then you could go around and look around in files or you could collect information from a system without the user even knowing it QUINN: Now this software, which was originally called Promis, was stolen from a company called Inslaw by the Justice Department. It ended up somewhere, probably at E-Systems or somewhere, and it was converted into banking software. It Started out as software designed to track prosecutorial cases around the country. My question is -- why didn't Ed Meese just pay the damn bill, and none of this would ever have come to light! Danny Casolaro was chasing the stolen software when he stumbled on what it was being used for. NORMAN: Well, the trouble with it was that they bought it for use in the Justice Department, but they were going to use it all over the place. If they were paying royalties on it, Inslaw would know just how extensive the use was of the software, and they didn't want people to know how extensively it was going to be used. QUINN: I see... NORMAN: Plus, a lot of the profits from the resale of this went back into private profits. It was customized and resold to the intelligence community. It became sort of a basic platform database tracking system for most of our intelligence agencies and many of those abroad. The idea was "Well, we can all talk to each other now." In fact what it has allowed us to do is basically rifle through other people's data files abroad too, because the stuff was apparently being sold to foreign intelligence agencies and it was also bugged. We have other ways of basically surveilling and downloading foreign electronic databases. The whole computer world is much more porous and transparent than anybody wants you to believe. QUINN: There is a bank here that I know that uses this software right here in this town, and I'm sure that there is probably more than one. Everybody's got it. NORMAN: In some form or another. It goes under different names now. It's been modified many times. I think when Inslaw had it, it was a half million lines of code. I'm told now it's a couple of million lines anyway. It's gone through many, many modifications over the years. QUINN: This company, Systematics, which is I believe still 8% owned by Jackson Stevens at Stevens Inc., who, by the way, is one of the backers of Bob Dole -- how troubling is that? NORMAN: He is the co-chairman of Dole's finance committee. QUINN: That's right! Bob's in town -- Hi Bob -- You'd better explain this. You'd better explain Mena, too, Bob, or it's going to follow you to the White House. Systematics, I understand, had an attorney who was kind of off the record doing work for them, named Vince Foster. Is that true? NORMAN: Yep, that's true. We've heard that from many, many sources now. In fact, Jim Leach's committee has established that pretty well with some of the investigation that they have done. Foster was a trusted deal guy for Stevens at the law firm. Although Foster never shows up officially as an attorney of record for Systematics, he was definitely in the loop, basically smoothing out things between Systematics and the NSA, which was the main government agency that was contracting for a lot of this stuff. QUINN: So this is how Foster got involved in intelligence, right. NORMAN: Yes, because there is heavy duty code and computer technology stuff involved here. Apparently, some time in the early 80s he developed this relationship with the State of Israel. In fact, some of the same handlers I am told were involved in the Jonathan Pollard case. They basically nurtured him and groomed him for many years and then bingo, they hit the jackpot -- he ended up in the White House. Apparently he convinced Hillary to help him out on some stuff. QUINN: So... what is Foster involved in? It's the mid 80s... NORMAN: Mid 80s. Foster is at the Rose Law Firm. Think of him as a high-level marketing guy between Systematics and the NSA. NSA -- they have all these spooky contracts that they are trying to find contractors for. Foster would have been sort of a go-between there. Plus Hillary was actually an attorney of record for Systematics back in 1978 when Stevens tried to take over the Financial General Bank shares in Washington. Those bank holding companies later became First American - Clark Clifford, Robert Altman, all that crowd. QUINN: Yeah, the BCCI thing. NORMAN: Stevens was fronting for the BCCI crowd and trying to take over this Washington Bank Holding Co. The SEC blocked him at the time, partly because one of the things he was insisting on was that this company Systematics, which at that time was a tiny little thing in Arkansas, he was insisting that they be brought in to do all of the data processing for this multistate bank holding company in Washington. Hillary represented Systematics in that. Now the thing about Systematics at the time -- it was before they even got involved with the bank spying stuff. Abroad for many years, they had been what amounted to a laundromat for covert funds for the CIA and the intelligence community, quite legally, probably. It was done for the national interest. Somebody had to move this money around and Systematics was in a perfect place to do it because they owned the computers and a whole bunch of small banks. They could move this money around electronically without the bankers even knowing about it necessarily, and it wouldn't go through the normal clearing houses. The regulators wouldn't see it. It would just crop up wherever the CIA needed it in whatever bogus front company account, and it was all just bits and bytes; it was a cyberbank -- it still is. QUINN: I'm here with Jim Norman, former Senior Editor at Forbes Magazine. You know, it's interesting, here is a guy who was with Forbes Magazine, a respected senior editor who figured probably this would be his life's work. All of a sudden, he finds himself a defrocked commando journalist working for Media Bypass Magazine out of what? Evanston, Illinois, or somewhere in Indiana? NORMAN: Indiana. QUINN: Yeah, that's right. Now, I've got a question. Before we get into Vince Foster in the mid 80s and Hillary Clinton's role in this, how did you get onto this whole scandal? Where did you walk through the door on this? NORMAN: I came in the back door completely. Look, I had no ax to grind here against Bill Clinton or the Administration. I hated covering politics. I thought it was all baloney. I'm just a business writer, and I never wanted to get enmeshed in this whole Whitewater/Vince Foster thing, but it started -- for a couple of years I had been following this oil company bankruptcy up in Stamford, Connecticut, because I had covered oil. This thing never made sense to me. There is no reason why this company went bust and, in fact, when I actually got into it and started redoing the oil trading transactions, the reason they lost money: they weren't losing it. They were hiding it. They were parking it off shore with another company that was financing arms sales to Iraq, cluster bombs and stuff like that all through the 80s. And, this Chilean arms dealer, Cardone, who was providing weapons, was also, it turns out, brokering some of the sales of this stolen software. Okay, that gets me into the software story. QUINN: So that gets you onto the Promis software, and you and Danny Casolaro are now on the same road. NORMAN: Right, and then in the process of that, I started talking to a whole bunch of rather spooky, strange intelligence community characters, and I was sitting at a guy's living room down in Kentucky one day. He was sitting there in the middle of the night blowing smoke rings, and he said, "Yo, by the way, Vince Foster, he was under investigation." I said, "Under investigation, for what?" And, he said, "Well, it's spelled 'Espionage.'" BOINK!!... and that's how I got on this whole Vince Foster thing. QUINN: So that's how it happened? NORMAN: Yeah. QUINN: Okay, now here it is, the mid 80s. Vince Foster is working for Systematics, and he is coming into contact with the intelligence community. What is, how did Hillary Clinton and the Israeli Mossad and all of this come together and what happened? NORMAN: Well, I think that they had been... look the Israelis were key partners with us in this bank spying effort. This is a joint allied government effort, and the Israelis were one of the key front people in this, in selling and supporting this software all over the world, so that people weren't thinking they were getting the software directly from the U.S. You know, there was an Israeli front company used to sell this stuff to foreign banks. QUINN: Well, they sold it to the Moscow bank. I know that. NORMAN: Well, Systematics did, yeah, and Systematics got involved in supporting this stuff all over the world, a little company in Arkansas... Go figure. Come on. QUINN: Yeah, really. NORMAN: I mean, main software people, they operate in New York and places like that and not out of Podunk, Arkansas. So, at any rate, the Israelis had ties into this whole thing all along, and, you know, they are our friends. We do give them a lot of stuff and share a lot of stuff. QUINN: Well, the whole idea was to track terrorist money, and the Israelis have a great interest in that, and rightly so. There is no problem here. NORMAN: The name of this problem was "follow the money for terrorist reasons," but once you set that up, you can do all kinds of stuff with it. I mean, we were spying on everybody's money. I think that's probably how we helped bust the Soviet Union. We found out just how deep their pockets were, where their money was, who we could bribe. You know, acting as a financial destruction of their society more than anything. QUINN: So, how does Foster get involved in espionage? NORMAN: Well, I think it was money. Money, money, money. And, especially you know with this whole political thing, it takes so much money to run for office. I mean, my theory is that the actual spending is probably twice of what anybody declares when you add up all of the soft dollars and everything. I think there is a tremendous need for money there, and they just weren't real cautious about where it was coming from. I think this thing about selling state secrets to the Israeli's and other countries was just a business. It was just for money. I don't think there was any ideology involved here at all, and it was one of many businesses. There is also insider trading going on here. There was the kickback on drugs and arms stuff and so the money has to go... you have to hide it some way, so it goes into Swiss bank accounts. And Foster would have known that, yeah, we're tracking this money off shore, but there is such a blizzard of information that unless somebody knows exactly what they are looking for they would never find anything. They thought they could cover this up pretty well so Foster had... actually he had several accounts, and there was one in particular in this bank, bank at Villa Switsaria Italiano in Chaso on the Italian border. It is a little kind of a Mafia kind of community there reputed, and so he was taking the money in there for the payments from the Swiss. He was going to Geneva every six or eight months, and his curious one-day trips -- I don't think it was for sightseeing. QUINN: No. I'm sure he wasn't doing any real estate work for Arkansas. NORMAN: No. The whole thing about money laundering is... you know the money would go into a Swiss bank. Somebody would have to go physically and take it out and take it to a friendly bonded dealer or something like that, buy bearer bonds or other kinds of bonds or something that you could pledge as collateral for loans back in the states and turn it back into cash again legitimately, and so that is how money laundering works. Vince, in effect, was a bag man here because when they go to the White House all of a sudden they hit the jackpot. There was so much more goodies there, and, in fact, Deborah Goram, Foster's executive assistant, testified under oath that Foster had given her two, inch-thick ring binders from the National Security Agency to put in Bernie Nussbaum's safe in the White House. What were these binders? Well, I have talked to brokering experts on this stuff, and they say, "Look, when you are talking NSA binders in the White House, you are talking mainly one thing, and these are the codes and protocols by which the President authenticates himself when he has to call up the Pentagon to say 'let's go nuke somebody'." Now, what was Foster doing with these things? He had no business with them. He would have had no access to them. It would have to come from somebody with access to the Oval Office or the Presidential living quarters. QUINN: And, who would that be? NORMAN: Well, I think we know who we are talking about here. QUINN: We're talking about Hillary Clinton, aren't we? NORMAN: That's right. She has been under investigation in this whole thing, too, but I think that they had a strong case against Vince and not such a strong case against Hillary. But, you see what happened was, and this is another whole part of the story as to how they got onto Foster. Basically, there was a team of computer hackers and computer intelligence guys in the CIA who were going through most databases. They found names there that they identified as being Foster and Hillary. They put them under surveillance actually before they went to the White House. I think it was between the election and the time that they went to the White House, and that's when the alarm bells went off. They had been surveilling these accounts for a while, and when Foster on July 1, 1993, bought a ticket to Geneva, a round-trip one-day ticket to Geneva, these guys said, "Oops, he's going to take the money. We're going to beat him to it." And, they went in. They hacked their way into the bank and obtained the necessary authorization codes on this coded account for which no signature is required to withdraw money, by the way. QUINN: Right. NORMAN: They were able to effect their own technically legitimate wire transfer of this money back to the U.S. Treasury, where it sits in a holding account escrowed for use by the CIA. QUINN: So, the CIA empties Vince Foster's Swiss bank account of its ill-gotten money. NORMAN: Yeah, actually it wasn't the CIA. It was this sort of renegade vigilante group of guys they called the Fifth Column that has been out doing this stuff. They don't take any of the money for themselves. The money goes to the... QUINN: They just do it for fun? NORMAN: The CIA only gets the money. It is escrowed for use by the CIA but only when the CIA gets rid of a bunch of its bad apples there who've got dirty hands from drug kickbacks, arms. QUINN: Let's pick this story up. There was a meeting just before Vince Foster died on the eastern shore of Maryland in which Webster Hubbell, Vince Foster, and some others were present. Okay, this was just before Foster died. Pick up the story here. NORMAN: All right. Well, we mentioned July 1, 1993. Foster buys this round-trip ticket to Switzerland. They raid his account. They take out $2.73 million. Foster apparently calls up the bank to let them know he was coming. They say, "Oh, Vince don't you know you took the money out already?" Boing... that's when he found out he was under investigation. That's when he got so mysteriously depressed. It had nothing to do with editorials in the Wall Street Journal. He had his bank account raided big time, and he knew he was under surveillance, or he knew he was under investigation. And, that started this curious chain of events. Webster Hubbell testified that not so much Vince was depressed, but he was worried. He was afraid to use the White House telephones. The guy had heart palpitations. He couldn't sleep at night. His doctor gave him a prescription for sleeping pills. His sister tried to get him to talk to some psychiatrist. He never got in touch with them. Instead, he hired a high-powered lawyer in Washington, Jim Hamilton, this big deal white-collar crime fix-it guy who handles people who get hauled up for Congressional hearings. And, then there is this curious meeting the weekend before Foster died. He and his wife, Lisa, go down to the eastern shore of Maryland for a getaway weekend, and then, by coincidence, they meet Hubbell and his wife down there. Hubbell, also from the Rose Law Firm, at the time the country's de-facto top law enforcement law officer because Janet Reno in effect was taking her orders from Hubbell. They go over to the estate of Michael Cardoza, who is the son-in-law of Nathan Landau, a big deal Democratic fund-raiser, and Cardoza is also the head of Clinton's legal defense fund. Supposedly, this was all poolside chit chat. Baloney, it was damage control. They were trying to figure out how to contain this scandal from spreading to other people in the White House, and they were trying to lean on Vince to get him to, you know, cop a plea, go quietly, or shut up and don't talk about it. And, in fact, what my sources have told me is that there was actually a huge payment made to an account held by Lisa Foster, with more than $286,000, on the Friday before that meeting. QUINN: Wait a minute, on the Friday before that meeting, Lisa Foster's bank account gets a deposit of $286 million? NORMAN: $286,000, yeah. QUINN: I'm sorry, yeah, $286,000. Okay, so does she take it out? NORMAN: Well, I don't know what ever happened to that money. It is hard to tell where it came from even. It is all very mysterious to me, but it sure smells like hush money to me. It's like, "Look Vince, don't worry, we'll take care of your money." QUINN: You don't know if she wrote a check on it? NORMAN: Well, I'm told that it came through the hands somehow of Sheila Anthony, who was Foster's sister, and at the time she was a "congressional liaison" person at the Justice Department, whatever a congressional liaison is. QUINN: So she takes the money to Foster, and Foster turns it down? NORMAN: Well, no... I think he probably accepted it, or it went there. But, apparently, he was having second thoughts, I think. You know, on the Monday after they came back from this meeting, the records showed, the public records showed, that he has a parade of people coming by his office in the White House saying, "Hey, how'd your weekend go, Vince? You cool with this? I mean, you on board with all of this? Everything okay?" you know. Then,... QUINN: A lot of very nervous people in the White House. NORMAN: That's right. Then, the day he died he had like a two-hour meeting with another person from the Arkansas contingent there. I think the problem was that they were afraid that Vince was going to talk or that he was going to crack under questioning, and here's a guy who was now, at this point, under intense surveillance. I mean, he had not only CIA counter intelligence people, but you had NSA. You had FBI surveilling him. There was a four-person IRS team we know was assigned to tail this guy, probably in connection with the money laundering aspect of the Swiss bank account. QUINN: God, this thing's got everything but floats in the... I mean all they need is Goofy, a big balloon with ropes on it following this guy around. NORMAN: You almost did. I mean, you had the Secret Service with a bomb-sniffing dog squad out there checking his car in the parking lot. The video tapes of that, gone. The video tapes of the room where they are stored, gone. I mean, this whole thing is massively covered up, and I guess it is for national security reasons. QUINN: Well now, I understand that Foster had a meeting scheduled with Bill Clinton. I believe it was on a Wednesday. NORMAN: Right. QUINN: And, it was the Tuesday he was killed. NORMAN: Right. Exactly. The question is well, gee, was he going to drop something in the President's lap and blow the plausible deniability that he might have on this stuff. QUINN: Well, this Foster suicide thing is so sloppy. It leads me to believe that on Tuesday they thought he would take the money and shut up, and he didn't take it so they had to do something real quick. NORMAN: Well, that could be it or that even if he wanted to shut up maybe they were afraid he would crack under interrogation or something. You know, it is just somebody wanted him real dead, and there is a bunch of people who had ample reason for it. This was not suicide. It was not over depression. This was a political assassination carried out on U.S. soil by a foreign government. The Israelis were involved in this. There was apparently a three- person Mossad-contracted team that went into the apartment that Foster had gone to that afternoon where he was apparently lured by a female person from the White House staff who I think still works in the White House. QUINN: Now, who would that be? NORMAN: Well, I... QUINN: Because, he had sex with her? NORMAN: That's the impression, yeah. QUINN: I mean, there was semen on his shorts. There was brownish- blonde hair on his clothing and rug fibers all over him which may or may not have had to do with having sex on the floor. It might have been... NORMAN: No, I think that was because he was rolled up in a rug afterwards and taken over to Fort Marcy Park. Now, the question is, were elements of our intelligence community involved in helping to dispose of the body and cover it up some way? QUINN: Who is the woman in the White House? NORMAN: I can't say. QUINN: Patsy Thomason? NORMAN: No. I don't want to say. I suspect... QUINN: Dee Dee. Well, she's not there anymore. NORMAN: That name is known. I mean, she has been identified on these tapes apparently, but.... QUINN: I think Dee Dee and Bill are doing it, but that's just me. Anyway, let's get back to the story here. Okay, so I understand at least you are claiming that there is a videotape of Foster's murder? NORMAN: Well, of the people entering and leaving this apartment a few blocks from the White House where it apparently occurred. QUINN: Has anybody located this apartment? Do you know where it is? NORMAN: I don't know exactly where it is myself. I am told it is actually within a few blocks of the White House. QUINN: Okay, so they lure him here, and they pop him, and there is a videotape of it or there is a videotape of the people going in and out. Then, they go to Fort Marcy Park, and they dump him. NORMAN: Right. QUINN: Okay, and we've got a witness now that says they saw the two guys that fit the same description that Patrick Knowlton, the other witness, to Foster's car. He describes the one guy that threatens him. One of those people is one of the two that supposedly was walking Foster, who looked drunk to this guy, into the park, but he says that they laid him out. NORMAN: Yeah. I don't know too much about all that stuff, but what I know is this, that Paul Rodriguez is the Editor of Insight Magazine, that came up with this Mr. X source. When Forbes decided not to run the story for reasons that were kind of mysterious to me at the time, and while I was still there, they gave me permission to publish it elsewhere. And, as I approached Insight, because they are kind of a gutsy magazine, David Rodriguez made a whole bunch of calls around Washington trying to corroborate this stuff, and I think he was making some headway. Then, he gets this visit in person from some military intelligence guy from the Pentagon who comes to him and says, "Paul, lay off this story. You don't know what you're dealing with here." QUINN: No. I think we do know what we are dealing with here. We're dealing with the biggest scandal since maybe... NORMAN: And, you've got Israeli relations at stake here. You know, the intelligence community has a lot of joint ventures with the Israelis. They don't want to "queer" those things. I mean, we do business with those people a lot, and you know a lot of it is probably quite necessary, but you know there is a scandal here that dwarfs the Jonathan Pollard case by orders of magnitude really. QUINN: I want to discuss a couple of things with you. First of all, now it would appear that a bunch of Republicans picking Kenneth Starr to put him in charge of this investigation of Vince Foster and the Whitewater problem in Washington, D.C. On the surface, it looked like they were going for the jugular, but see, Mr. Starr has some background that leads back to the Inslaw case we discussed earlier in the show about the Promis software and stuff. He excused himself from that litigation. NORMAN: And, the reason was because he was the inside counsel for William French Smith at the Justice Department in 1982 at the time that the Inslaw software was expropriated by the government... QUINN: Okay. So he really is not in the position to be the pit bull to expose this. He is in a better position to get Clinton on whatever Republicans need to get him on and make sure that Republicans don't get burned here. NORMAN: I think that's it. Yeah. QUINN: Okay, now. Given that that's the case and given that the Washington inside-the-beltway crowd on both sides of the aisle are trying to make sure that the fix is in on this, how do you think or what leads you to believe that this is going to come out, and through what channels? NORMAN: Well, again, it goes back to resources of mine. Basically, there are a few good guys in the intelligence community, particularly this handful of people in the so-called Fifth Column, who are so incensed about this bipartisan coverup, the government's inability and unwillingness to deal with the high level corruption here, they've just decided to take things into their own hands. They never had government authorization to go raid the foreign bank accounts, but.... QUINN: How many accounts are there? How many people in the government right now have Swiss bank accounts filled with money from BCCI, drug laundering, defense kickbacks, arms trades, I mean all of this nonsense? NORMAN: Not as many as two years ago. These guys have been out raiding these accounts. They've pulled back $2.5 billion, more than $2.5 billion with a "B" dollars from 300, 400, 500 of these accounts. There is probably 3,000 coded Swiss and other foreign bank accounts that they have been rifling through the computers on. QUINN: How can there be this many of them and it doesn't come out? NORMAN: It is because it is endemic corruption. The government is corrupt. Why should we give the President of South Korea $600 million? ... country more powerful, more worth corrupting, more venal and with weaker controls for policing this stuff. QUINN: Well, because we don't believe it can happen here. NORMAN: That's right. We're Americans. Well, this is greed and money. But, there is.... QUINN: Well, it's murder too. NORMAN: That's right, and there have been hundreds of these accounts already raided, and nobody, NOBODY has been able to stand up and say, "I was robbed." Why? Because, the money came from exactly what you said -- kickbacks on drugs, kickbacks on arms, insider trading, and they never paid any taxes on this stuff. They've never disclosed it, and the minimum sentence for willful tax evasion is ten years, that's the minimum. So, what you have going on right now in Congress is basically, there is an Angel of Death. Actually, there are two I'm told. There is one on the Democratic side and one on the Republican side. QUINN: Now, do they make their rounds together? NORMAN: No. It's separately. What I'm told is that the people in Congress with these Swiss bank accounts, who have had these accounts, if they haven't already left, if they haven't had the good sense to already get their butts out of there, they have been delivered, hand delivered a brown paper envelope with transaction records of their Swiss bank accounts, and within a day or so they get a visit from this Angel of Death who says it's time for you to go, time to do some career planning, you're out of here, we don't want you in the government when the stuff hits the fan here, as it's gonna do in the spring apparently. The records are going to start coming out. It's going to be obvious. These vigilantes are just going to take this situation into their own hands and release this stuff, I'm convinced. QUINN: These people are real patriots. They could end up dead doing this. NORMAN: Some of them may already have. I think... but they've planned this quite well. I think they've got it down now. They know that if anything happens to them, that the stuff would just come out in a gush, so it would be counterproductive for.... QUINN: Yeah, but I mean is it going to come out in the mainstream media. You've got the Mena story being spiked a year ago by Katherine Graham at the Washington Post, and I've uncov... you, what I stumbled on a memo from Paul Keiser yesterday from the editor at the Washington Post who writes me in this memo a flat out blatant lie. He says that the authors of the Mena story, that was supposed to run January 26, 1995, in the Washington Post Outlook Section, had withdrawn the article before the Washington Post had decided to run it, and that's just a flat out lie. NORMAN: Well, it's technically probably true. But, what they've done, they've left those people dangling by a thread for like 6-8 months. I don't blame them for taking the story elsewhere as the.... QUINN: Yeah, but no, but Jim they didn't. The type galleys had been laid, and the artwork had been done. It was supposed... they didn't pull it until the Thursday before the Sunday it was supposed to run. NORMAN: Right. Well, technically the Post can say, "Oh, we never quieted you..." That's what they told me at Forbes, too, about my story. Finally, I never got a good reason why my story didn't run at Forbes. Ultimately, they said, "Oh, we didn't trust your sources." But, actually what my immediate supervisor said, "We can't say this about Systematics," which was a big advertiser at Forbes, and we can't say this about the Israelis. QUINN: Yeah, right. NORMAN: That's why didn't run in Forbes. QUINN: Well, there's actually no proof that Systematics has deliberately delivered stolen software. I mean, they may not even know that the software was stolen, and it may be another version of it. NORMAN: Systematics is under heavy duty investigation, though, right now for money laundering, because once you set up a system for laundering covert funds for the government, who knows what else you can piggyback on top of that. The suspicion is that this was the quid pro quo here in return for laundering, supposedly, call it legitimate funds that the intelligence community can piggyback other stuff to. QUINN: Let's get back to the Angel of Death here and the resignations in Congress, which have been pretty much attributed by guys like Rush Limbaugh to the fact that Democrats just don't like being in the minority anymore, and they don't have the guts or stamina to stick it out the way the Republicans did for 40 years. And, some of that may be true, but how many of these people who have said that they are pulling their hats out of the ring... And, now we have two Republicans... How many of these people have been visited by this so-called Angel of Death? All of them? NORMAN: Well, the figures I've heard is that I think there's like 25 or 26 so far since the last election who have decided they are not going to run again or had actually resigned and out of there, like Norman Minetta from Los Angeles[sic]. Of those, I'm told about 21 or 22 so far can be directly attributed to Swiss bank account problems. There is probably another dozen or so that are going to go that way. Again, there is an argument that, "Oh, we just can't stand the nasty politics in Washington anymore." Come on, give me a break. QUINN: Well, I like Patsy Schroeder. She wanted us to believe that now that the Democratic party is in such good shape she can leave it and it doesn't... did you see that? NORMAN: No.... QUINN: That was great. Oh yeah, now that.... NORMAN: Patsy Schroeder, somebody noted on the Internet that at the news conference where she was announcing she wasn't going to run, there had already been re-elect Schroeder bumper stickers printed up. I mean, she... take this guy Ron Coleman from Texas, a Congressman down there. He made his announcement at his supposed re-election campaign kickoff party. QUINN: You're kidding? This is right out of a... this is a movie. NORMAN: That's right. Listen, these people have been confronted. They've been given 24 hours basically to clean out their desks. That's what it amounts to. QUINN: So, they're gonna try and get all these people out who have Swiss bank accounts before it hits the fan. Now, when do you suppose that this is going to happen? Can you give us a timetable? NORMAN: Well, that's happening in tiers. I mean, we've already seen a bunch of departures. I think that the early spring is the timetable. You know, Wall Street is going to get hit with this stuff too. Now, every year in the spring, soon after the first of the year, after these guys collect their year-end bonuses, you have a big exodus. But, I'm told Wall Street is going to get hit with this big time this year because those guys were in it too. You gotta remember, there was so much money sloshing around here... QUINN: Yeah, really. NORMAN: ... from arms deals. You could not launder all of that money without the knowing, willing cooperation and participation of major banks, major brokerage houses, and... QUINN: Goldman Sachs possibly? NORMAN: Oh yeah. Look, Goldman... QUINN: I always found it strange that Robert Rubin showed up when he did. NORMAN: This Goldman, they were the chief investment bankers to Robert Maxwell in the U.K., helped Maxwell loot a half a billion dollars out of his pension funds, and it now costs a huge amount of money for a settlement there. QUINN: It sounds like somebody's calling you. NORMAN: They still have the bond for ADFA, the Arkansas Development... QUINN: Whoa, hold on a second. What's that? NORMAN: That's another one of these... QUINN: Well no, I know what it is. You're telling me that Goldman Sachs was holding the bonds for the Arkansas Development? NORMAN: No, they were the underwriter on a bunch of these $8 billion or so of bonds that ADFA marketed to who knows whom. QUINN: Oh man. You know, I have transactions on my desk at home, $80 million of money transfers to the Fuji Bank in the Cayman Islands from ADFA, the Arkansas Development Financial Authority, who I believe never had more than $8 million to begin with. I mean, where did they get $80 million, and what's it going to the Fuji Bank for? The interest rate? Come on, the Switzerland of the Caribbean. Jim, I gotta let you go. I gotta wrap this up here, but I want to thank you for joining us this morning. NORMAN: It's a pleasure. I'll keep you posted as more develops. There's going to be more coming down the pike here soon. QUINN: Well, I'll tell you what. I'm gonna call you later on today. I'll give you my home number. Let's stay in touch because if what you say is true and if there are truly some patriots in the intelligence community who are finally going to blow the whistle on this. By the way, all of these resignations and the Angel of Death and all of this, I think is evidence that these people know that this is inevitable that this is going to come out. NORMAN: It's like AIDS. I think there are a bunch of people back before the last election who realized they, in fact, have slept with the wrong woman or person, and they did not run again, but there has been denial, denial, denial by a bunch of these people. Finally, I think it's like the Angel of Death is finally coming around saying, "You gotta go. Bye. You're outta here." *************************** CREDITS****************************** If you are a talk show host and want to contact either one of these guys for an interview you can reach James Norman at MEDIA BYPASS MAGAZINE, 1-800-4-BYPASS Jim Quinn can be contacted at WRRK, 7 Parkway Center, Suite 780, Pittsburgh, PA 15220, Fax Number 412-928-9290, Internet address is quinn(a)sgi.net homepage at http://www.warroom.com or Compuserve 72662,3507. ======================================================================= Visit our Web site at http://www.the-spa.com/constitution/ If you need help setting up your own Web site, call us at 413/786-6802. =======================================================================

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Re: chaotic signal cryptography
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:00 PM 12/12/95 +0100, Anonymous wrote: >>A few years back i ran thru a paper emanating >>from a navy labs researcher (i think the name was Peccora) >>about using synchronised chaotic signal generators as a >>signal scrambling/encrytpion scheme. > >I too am interested in this technique. I may be wrong, but it seems like >a variation on the one-time pad. Any comments on this technique (usefulness, >robustness, etc.)? 1) It's not, repeat NOT, a one-time pad, or anything like one. Synchronised generators on both ends of a communication are yet another keyed algorithmic system, and are theoretically breakable; one-time pads are theoretically unbreakable (as long as you only use them once, prevent theft, etc.). Whether algorithmic systems are breakable in practice depends on how good the algorithms are, how good the keys are, how much attention is paid to cracking them, etc. 2) Almost everything I've heard about chaotic cryptosystems has said they're not very effective; it's too easy to predict the output. They're fine random number generators for simulations, but they're not cryptographically strong. 3) Maybe somebody's done something new and interesting in the field and hasn't told the general public about it, but if you heard about it a few years back it's been broken. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, Freelance Information Architect, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # Phone +1-510-247-0663 Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281

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Re: Pornographic stories
by Daniel Miskell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A&SUser writes: >Hey, I'm Molly, and I know I sent you a bit of mail a couple of days ago. > I'm not sure how you do your Pornographic server, so I'll just ask >again. I know I would be VERY gratful if you could send me any XXX >stories, I love to read them. I could reward you over the net somehow >I'm sure. >my adress is mphillips(a)cctr.umkc.edu > >Thanks....I'll be waiting. > What the hell are you talking about?? This is the cypherpunks mailing list!! Jeses, try alt.sex.stories. :P Munster --- _________________________________ *!Cheese Doctrine:!* Though cultured over time, and aged to perfection, one must not yield to produce mold. One must also not belittle themselves by conforming to the "whiz", but melt over the unprocessed ideas of Ghuda. _________________________________

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EXON
by SBinkley＠atitech.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone please explain to me what this "EXON" thing is??

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Re: Pornographic stories
by SBinkley＠atitech.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Stop posting this type of crap on the Internet. People like you are the ones to get everyone censored. Hopefully everyone else will flame you a thousand times over

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Wanted: email for Calif senators & representatives
by baldwin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Can someone send me, or the list, the email addresses for the California senators and representatives? --Bob Baldwin

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RE: F. Y. I.
by William J. Halverson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

If the >>>>>>>computer contains a hard drive, that will most likely be >>>>>>>destroyed. If the program is not stopped, the computer's >>>>>>>processor will be placed in an nth-complexity infinite binary >>>>>>>loop -which can severely damage the processor if left running >>>>>>>that way too long. Hmmmm ... so now we see that using CPUs 'too much' will damage the processor ... Hmmm ... I guess it runs out of oil??? Heh heh heh ... ---------------------------------------------------------------- Bill Halverson Pacific Bell Sent 12:45:46 PDT on 12/12/95 PH 415 542 6564 wjhalv1(a)pacbell.com FAX 415 542 4744 "The views of the author are not those of his employer ... yet."

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IDEA encryption
by Ben Holiday 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The copy of the source for idea (unix) that I have specify's a user key length of 8 bytes, but allows this to be increased to something larger. Will increasing the user keylength improve the overall security? Also, is it worth hashing the user key first, then using the hashed key as the key for encryption and decryption? Or am I wasting my time? Last thing -- how secure is unix "rm"? If something is rm'd, is it really really gone? Thnks..

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BIO-MUNITION: gifs of perl-RSA tattoo
by aba＠atlas.ex.ac.uk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

People have been reading the list for a while will be familiar with this piece of perl code used as a non-exportable, supposedly ITAR controlled .sig: #!/bin/perl -s-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RSA-3-lines-PERL $m=unpack(H.$w,$m."\0"x$w),$_=`echo "16do$w 2+4Oi0$d*-^1[d2%Sa 2/d0<X+d*La1=z\U$n%0]SX$k"[$m*]\EszlXx++p|dc`,s/^.|\W//g,print pack('H*',$_)while read(STDIN,$m,($w=2*$d-1+length($n)&~1)/2) which is an implementation of RSA encryption in perl optimised for size. A lot of list bandwidth a while back was consumed with discussion of the T-shirt versions of this .sig. More info on the .sig, and T-shirt at: .sig: http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ t-shirts: http://www.obscura.com/~shirt/ Update wrt the idea of using the .sig for a tattoo: Richard White <maldoror(a)pacificnet.net> had his wife (who is a tattoo artist) put a tatto of this code on his forearm. Gif of the Richard's tattoo now available here: http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/tattoo.html This means that he may, technically, qualify as a munitions on the USML, and as a result not be allowed to show the tattoo to a foreign national in the US, nor leave the US. Note it says _technically_ above, as there was much discussion on the list re the shirts as to whether the shirt actually would ever be classified as a munition due to the impracticality of using a shirt as a distribution media, and silliness factor. We shall see wrt the shirt when and if Raph recieves a determination from his CJR for the shirt. (I would note that someone posted a while ago that they did manage to get the barcode to scan, on I think one of Joel Furr's shirts). Also the secondary claim about whether or not ITAR stipulates that a software item can be shown to a foreign national in the US seems open to debate (some say ITAR strictly interpreted does say this, others say not). Also something about the anti-ITAR fight recently which was an eye opener for me was that I took a look at Phil Karn's export page to do with his ongoing battle against ITAR as applied to crypto, with the Applied Crypto disk/book case: http://www.qualcomm.com/people/pkarn/export/ In his court transcripts there is a declaration by Phil Zimmermann in connection with the Applied Crypto case, however he (PRZ) also mentions the unofficial progress on his PGP source code book published by MIT press. PRZs declaration from bottom of: http://www.qualcomm.com/people/pkarn/export/zimm.html > 10. I believe that the commodity jurisdiction request referred on page > 28 of the Justice filing is the one which was filed by MIT Press for > my book, PGP: Source Code and Internals. I am further informally > advised that the National Security Agency has considered the Request > and recommended that the book be controlled for export under the ITAR > and that the Department of Commerce has recommended that it not be > subject to ITAR controls. Wow! If this informal info is confirmed as the NSAs determination, it will have interesting ramifications for the distinction between paper based publications and electronic. It will also reinforce Phil Karn's use of the charge of "arbitrary, [and] capricious" enforcement on the part of the NSA/ODTC, as the CJR for Applied Crypto in print form was successful. Adam

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Spotty c'punks service due to network outages
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Our network service is going up and down, probably due to the storms in San Francisco. If you see delays, that's the reason why. As far as I know, NSA has not figured out how to control the weather, so it's not their fault :-). John Gilmore

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Timing RSA and Certificates worth ??
by lyalc＠mail.mpx.com.au 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

oops Earlier, I said : > >My limited mind induces me to think that a certificate become subject to timing attacks on the RSA private signing key. >In this case, certificate verification processes seem flawed and highly unreliable. I meant that on-line certificate issuing, notary and similar services where data is submitted to a system for processing/RSA encryption are subject to this for of attack. Parts of the SEPP/STT protocols appear to require this of merchants and customers. I retract my comments about ecash/echeques - I'm not sure of the implications there yet. As for SEPP/STT - another nail in the coffin, me thinks. lyal

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Re: Time-based cryptanalysis: How to defeat it?
by Hal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: futplex(a)pseudonym.com (Futplex) > I don't understand why Kocher's point is correct. For example, why do the > times diverge with the following modification of the modexp algorithm on > pg.2 of the abstract ? > > Algorithm to compute R = y^x mod n: > Let R_0 = 1. > Let y_0 = y. > For i = 0 upto (bits_in_x - 1): > Let M = (R_i * y_i) mod n. > Let R_(i+1) = (bit i of x) * M + > (1 - (bit i of x)) * R_i. > Let y_(i+1) = (y_i)^2 mod n. > End. I posted a similar idea on sci.crypt, but later I realized that Paul Kocher is right. Your algorithm works OK for the first iteration. The amount of work is pretty much constant regardless of whether bit 0 of x is 0 or 1. However, at the end of that iteration R_1 will have one of two different values depending on that bit 0 value. And, the attacker can know these two values, and if he controls y he can even choose them (they will be either y or 1). Now, on the next iteration, the time it takes will be different depending on bit 0 of x. It won't depend on the bit 1 value, but different bit 0 values will cause R_1 to be different. So the time of this iteration will depend on the value of the bit used in the previous iteration, and likewise for the following iterations. If the attacker can choose y, he can arrange that the two different R_1 values will take different times on average for the rest of the calculation. So he finds out bit 0 as before, and from there he can go on and find the other bits. Hal

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<None>
by SBinkley＠atitech.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A long time ago, I read about a program that would take a picture, and replace the LSB of every pixel in the picture with your message. I'm wondering, Is the source code for this program availible anywhere on the net???

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Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack
by Peter Monta 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Kocher says this about padding to constant time: > ... If a timer is used to delay returning results until a pre-specified > time, attackers may be able to monitor other aspects of the system > performance to determine when the cryptographic computation completes. Perhaps, but an attack would be much more difficult if the monitoring must be done outside the host doing the computation (viewing a router from the outside, say, as Eric Young alludes to), since the scope for covert channels is much reduced. Peter Monta

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Re: Timing Cryptanalysis Attack
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> writes: > Timings like the ones listed are trivial to take in > establishing things like SSL sessions, or Photuris sessions. > The danger is to online protocols, not to PGP. This must be a new and interesting definition of the word "trivial" with which I was previously unfamiliar. Quite frankly, I would be extremely surprised if anyone mounted a successful hostile attack against a server's RSA certificate using timings of remotely initiated SSL sessions outside of a controlled laboratory environment. "Timing Cryptanalysis" is one of those really cute "obvious with 20-20 hindsight" discoveries, but not one which is likely to be reliably employed by an opponent except under very carefully controlled circumstances. Peter Trei and others have already outlined excellent reasons for such skepticism, so I won't bother rehashing them here. > Any reason you felt you had to say this anonymously? Yes. I wanted to try the nifty WWW-based remailer at http://www.replay.com/remailer/anon.html. Also, it's nice to have a pseudo-anonymous identity now that government regulation of the Net is looming on the horizon. Feel free to compare my writing style, margins, and quote string with other posts on the list in order to determine my likely "real life" identity. -Bourbaki 137

4 4

EPIC Files Suit to Obtain C
by Dave Banisar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Per various people's requests, I'm only putting this piece on the list. You can get the rest of the newsletter at www.epic.org/alert/ -dave >From the EPIC Alert 2.16 ======================================================================= [2] EPIC Files Suit to Obtain Gov't Crypto Report ======================================================================= EPIC filed suit on December 4 against the U.S. Department of Commerce under the Freedom of Information Act to force the release of a survey conducted by the Department on the foreign availability of encryption software. According to Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown the study has been completed and is being held up by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Agency, the two agencies most strongly pushing the Mandatory Key Escrow (MKE) initiative. Observers believe that the report will confirm the existence of a substantial amount of commercial and free software available from non-U.S. companies worldwide. An ongoing survey conducted by the Software Publishers Association has found over 450 products from 27 countries. Of those products, 179 use the U.S. Data Encryption Standard (DES). The existence of a substantial amount of commercial software overseas cuts against arguments that export controls on encryption software should be maintained. The report was created after Congress decided not to pass legislation last year that would have relaxed export controls on encryption. The legislation would have required the Department of Commerce to complete the foreign availability report by April 1995. Although the legislation was not enacted, the Commerce Department nonetheless agreed to conduct the study. More information on U.S. Cryptography Policy is available at: http://www.epic.org/crypto/ In a related development EPIC Legal Counsel David Sobel appeared before the National Institute of Standards and Technology on December 5th to offer comments on NIST's "Draft Export for Key Escrow Encryption". Sobel blasted the latest proposal for Mandatory Key Escrow (MKE) and said that the administration continues to ignore the interests of the public. EPIC also put forward seven recommendations to reform national cryptography policy. The recommendations follow from a presentation to the National Research Council earlier this year. The EPIC Statement on the NIST standard and the EPIC proposal for cryptography policy is available at: http://www.epic.org/crypto/EPIC_Statement.html _________________________________________________________________________ Subject: EPIC Files Suit to Obtain Crypto... _________________________________________________________________________ David Banisar (Banisar(a)epic.org) * 202-544-9240 (tel) Electronic Privacy Information Center * 202-547-5482 (fax) 666 Pennsylvania Ave, SE, Suite 301 * HTTP://www.epic.org Washington, DC 20003 * ftp/gopher/wais cpsr.org

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RE: ViaCrypt supports CKE in PGP
by Pat Farrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In message Mon, 11 Dec 1995 14:45:55 -0600, "Robichaux, Paul E" <perobich(a)ingr.com> writes: > In today's mailbox I got a pack of marketing slicks from ViaCrypt. [liberally elided] > The biggie, though, are these: > "Encryption automatically includes Corporate Access Key as > additional recipient (option)" and > "Key selection/display dialogs show only keys certified by > Corporate Access Key (option)" > So, real CKE will soon be available from an unexpected source. I'm not > sure whether to be excited or dismayed. I believe this is a good thing (tm). This is a vendor with strong crypto implementing Key Escrow for the only known commercially viable market: data recovery of long term storage. In all of the NIST meetings that I've attended, industry says there is a market for key escrow for data recovery when your key programmer "falls in love and moves to a warm water island" They also say there is no market for key escrow for communication, we can simply resend lost messages. Commercial Key Escrow is, by definition, voluntary. You have to pay to get it escrowed, stored, and returned. CKE is not GAK. I bet its not exportable. Pat Pat Farrell Grad Student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Info. Systems & Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available on homepage #include <standard.disclaimer>

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Re: Plea for information
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friend, On 12 07 95 you sent a Plea for information to cypherpunks- @toad.com. You said: I would be interested in learning more about the politics and mathematics of cryptography.... [snip] ...I would like to know how best to understand cryptography - I have a textbook on the basic mathematical concepts under- lying the techniques but it is too advanced for my current knowledge in this field (A-level - ie. end of high school), please can you suggest a good starting place for me. I suggest you lay aside the maths for a time and buy a copy of: Bruce Schneier E-Mail Security. How to Keep Your Electronic Messages Private John Wiley & Sons, Inc 1995 I enquired this morning at Wiley's NY office and was told: (a) the book is available in the UK (b) the phone number of Wiley's Chichester office is 44 1243 779 777 Here's the book's Contents in Brief: Part I: Privacy and Electronic Mail Chapter 1: The Problem Chapter 2: Encryption Chapter 3: Key Management Chapter 4: Authentication Chapter 5: Certificates Chapter 6: Keeping Your Private Key Private Chapter 7: Odds and Ends Chapter 8: Patents, Governments, and Export Laws Part II: Achieving Electronic-Mail Privacy Chapter 9: Requirements and Features Chapter 10: Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) Chapter 11: Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) Chapter 12: Comparing PGP and PEM Chapter 13: Attacks Against PGP and PEM Appendix A: Pretty Good Privacy Appendix B: Privacy Enhanced Mail Index Appendix A = PGP User's Guide. Volume I: Essential Topics. Appendix B = Request for Comments: 1421. To study the book --not the same thing as just reading it-- you will need PGP to experiment with. An ingenious lad should have little trouble... After you have some concrete experience, it'll be easier to see the relevance of the maths. As regards "the politics...of cryptography," this excerpt from the book's Foreward by William Murray should pique your interest: To the extent that E-mail proves to be important, we can expect to see many attempts on the part of government to coopt it in much the same way that they have coopted the paper mail system. The excuses that it will use to do so will be related to security. It will repeat the claim of Cromwell's government ["many dangerous and wick- ed designs...are daily contrived against the welfare of this Commonwealth"] and will create whatever evidence is required to convince the people of the validity of the claim. Arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, the real motive will be to maintain political control and influence. Oklahoma? Whatever... Cordially, Jim

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KOC_her
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-11-95. NYPaper Page One: John Markoff reports on Paul Kocher's paper on the timing attack vulnerability of public-key encryption. Quotes Matt Blaze, Bruce Scheiner, Ron Rivest, Martin Hellman, James Bidzos. KOC_her (11 kb)

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Re: sooner or later
by jf_avon＠citenet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> --------------------------------------------------------------------- > This mail is brought to you by the e$pam mailing list > --------------------------------------------------------------------- Tim May wrote: > By contrast, drug use has typically been confined to the lower classes or > the rebellious young. Not a lot of pols are dope smokers [snip] Well, at least not inhalers... Ciao jfa

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Thursday noon, SF: Meatspace rally against cyberspace censorship
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Monday's rally was canceled on account of rain. There is now a backup location in case of rain on Thursday. Check the web page before you leave, or come to South Park, and the backup location will be close by. See you there! -- John Date: Tue, 12 Dec 1995 18:15:44 -0800 (PST) From: protest(a)wired.com (--Todd Lappin-->) Subject: SF RALLY -- THURSDAY This is an updated announcement for Thursday's Rally Against Censorship, with the current list of speakers. The rally will take place rain or shine, so hope for the best, bring an umbrella, and spread the word. Thanks! *** NETIZENS!! RALLY AGAINST CENSORSHIP *** Thursday, December 14, 1995 at South Park, 12:00 - 1:00 PM San Francisco, California -- Rain or Shine! -- **PROTEST ** PROTEST ** PROTEST ** PROTEST ** PROTEST ** PROTEST ** Amendment I: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." **PROTEST ** PROTEST ** PROTEST ** PROTEST ** PROTEST ** PROTEST ** It's like illiterates telling you what to read. On December 6 members of the House Conference Committee on Telecommunications Reform approved a proposal to censor free speech in cyberspace. If the measures are adopted, the Net and online media will become the most heavily regulated media in the United States. They *will not* enjoy the First Amendment freedoms now afforded to print media. Instead, online publishers and users will be held to a vague and patently un-Constitutional "indecency" standard. "Violators" will be subject to fines of up to $100,000 and prison terms of up to five years. In response, ALL members of the Bay Area media, online, Internet, new media, and telecommunications communities are invited to participate in a protest rally to express our outrage that the politicians in Congress (which is not even connected to the Internet!) are attempting to destroy our First Amendment rights in cyberspace, and directly attack our livelihoods. Help stop the demagogues in Washington! There is nothing "decent" about denying free speech to us, our children, and our children's children. Preserve our Constitutional rights! Join us! WHEN: Thursday, December 14, 1995 12:00 - 1:00 PM WHERE: South Park (between 2nd and 3rd, Bryant and Brannan) San Francisco. (In the event of rain, an indoor location will be announced) SPEAKERS:Mike Godwin, EFF; John Gilmore, co-founder, EFF; Denise Caruso, New York Times columnist; Jim Warren, online activist; Howard Rheingold, author; Dave Winer, essayist and software developer; Audrie Krause, Executive Director, CPSR; Jonathan Steuer, CEO, Cyborganic Corp; Michael Goldberg, Publisher, Addicted To Noise. BRING: Attention-grabbing posters, signs, and banners that demonstrate your committment to free speech and expression, and your feelings about Congress. FOR UPDATED INFORMATION: http://www.hotwired.com/staff/digaman (Although this event is being organized in the offices of Wired magazine and HotWired, we are *actively* seeking participation and support from all members of the local community. Please forward this message to anyone you think should attend, and to all relevant news groups.) CONTACT: Todd Lappin -- 415-222-6241 -- protest(a)wired.com

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Using quantum cryptography to effect covert channels
by Jas 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

B2,3 and A1 system (Orange book), use covert channel analysis to prevent leakages of information (intentional or otherwise). This forms a part of enforcing MAC on such systems. well recently i thought of a method to overcome these barriers so covert channels can again be used to transmit and receive from such machines. this method involves using quantum cryptography. "randomization" is one method used to prevent covert channels, however it is this "randomization" that can be used with quantum crypto to not only make covert channels, but also makes the covert channels secure as well as authenticated! basically quantum crypto uses the fact that observing a system modifies the system. this works on machines that use "randomization" as a method of detering covert channels. ObExample, if an admin gets suspicious of certain behaviour on a machine, the machine behaves differently if he tries to investigate it (as a result of "poking around" the machine to see what is going on). this can be used with quatum crypto methods to covertly communicate data (with security and authentification), and if someone attempts to "observe" the behaviour on the said machines, it will break the communication (because the machine behaviour changes, hence breaks the message) rendering the message unreadable. this may slow down communication some, and will need self-synchronization of some sort, but at least you can communicate. this idea is very rough however, and there may be gaping holes in my arguments, but i think it might be an area someone may wish to look into (especially the high assurance types). i really should write a draft paper on this, but i dont really have a good enough understanding of the formal methods to pull it off. however i have got a coining name for this method, "covert quantum channels". just a random thought to throw around... Matt -- #!/bin/sh echo '16i[q]sa[ln0=aln100%Pln100/snlbx]sbA0D3F204445524F42snlbxq'|dc;exit Matthew Keenan Systems Programmer Information Technology Division University of Technology Sydney Australia It's nice to be in a position where people apologize because they assume there's humor in your work, based on past experience, but they're not sure where it is. -- Rob Pike

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InfoWar 15 (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet')
by Bianca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Computers, Freedom, and Privacy Conference -- Registration Open
by Hal Abelson 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Please redistribute widely **************************************** The Sixth Conference on Computers, Freedom, and Privacy will take place at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on March 27-30, 1996. CFP96 is hosted by MIT and by the World Wide Web Consortium. You can register for CFP96 by US Mail, by fax, or via the World Wide Web. Conference attendance will be limited. Due to the enormous public interest in CFP issues over the past year, we encourage you to register early. SPECIAL NOTE TO STUDENTS: There are a limited number of places available at a special student rate. These will be allotted on a first-come first-served basis, so register as soon as possible. For more information, see the CFP96 Web page at http://web.mit.edu/cfp96 or send a blank email message to cfp96-info(a)mit.edu Since its inception in 1991, the series of CFP conferences has brought together experts and advocates from the fields of computer science, law, business, public policy, law enforcement, government, and many other areas to explore how computer and telecommunications technologies are affecting freedom and privacy. Events planned for this year's conference include: - Federal prosecutors square off against civil-liberties lawyers in a mock Supreme Court test of the "Cryptography Control Act of 1996", which criminalizes non-escrowed encryption. - Authors Pat Cadigan, Tom Maddox, Bruce Sterling, and Vernor Vinge divine the future of privacy. - College administrators, students, lawyers, and journalists role-play scenarios that plumb the limits of on-line expression on campus networks. - Panels on international issues in privacy and encryption; on the struggle to control controversial content on the Internet; on tensions between copyright of digital information and freedom of expression; on threats posed by electronic money to law enforcement, privacy, and freedom; on mass communication versus mass media.

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NT Password Security Update. Registry values changed!
by Ted Cabeen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Well, I did some more research into the NT password security issue and I discovered that I can get access to the Security section of the registry and there are some VERY interesting values there, stored as raw hex. I created a test user and checked the values of these registry keys with two different passwords and iterestingly enough the data in the keys changed when I changed the password. I plan on doing some more work, including changing the values and seeing if the password change, but I've been somewhat busy lately. I've st up a web page at http://shadowland.rh.uchicago.edu/ntcrypto.html that has the password I used and the data in the two registry values that changed when I changed the password. I invite people to look at it and speculate what the change means. Also, I can provide a few more plaintext/cyphertext pairs if necessary. The change in the values could be something like update time, but I don't think that they'd store that as raw hex, espically hex as long as the stuff I got. Good luck figuring it out. _____________________________________________________________________________ Ted Cabeen cabeen(a)netcom.com Finger for PGP Public Key secabeen(a)midway.uchicago.edu "I have taken all knowledge to be my province." cococabeen(a)aol.com

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