December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Reply to ERROR: MAX RETRIES E
by BITNET POSTMASTER 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

*** Sent by Alternate User "LM#LK" for "POSTMAST" *** *** Original Author: DRESCHS @ TANDEM - ** Remote User **; 11/02/95 12:27 >Message ID: X5306122746 WAS FORWARDED BY POSTMASTER@MGMT >Original sender: DRESCHS @TANDEM > >Received: from relay3.UU.NET by MVS.MEDCTR.UCLA.EDU (IBM MVS SMTP V2R2.1) > with TCP; Thu, 02 Nov 95 12:27:32 PDT >Received: from toad.com by relay3.UU.NET with SMTP > id QQzodt13430; Thu, 2 Nov 1995 15:16:35 -0500 (EST) >Received: by toad.com id AA12091; Thu, 2 Nov 95 11:58:50 PST >Received: from devnull (devnull.mpd.tandem.com) by toad.com id AA12085; Thu, 2 > Nov 95 11:58:42 PST >Received: from galil.austnsc.tandem.com. by devnull (8.6.8/8.6.6) > id NAA03606; Thu, 2 Nov 1995 13:58:28 -0600 >Received: (from dreschs@localhost) by galil.austnsc.tandem.com. (8.7.1/8.7.1) i > OAA09507; Thu, 2 Nov 1995 14:00:32 -0600 (CST) >Date: Thu, 2 Nov 1995 14:00:32 -0600 (CST) >From: Sten Drescher <dreschs(a)mpd.tandem.com> >Message-Id: <199511022000.OAA09507(a)galil.austnsc.tandem.com.> >To: sameer <sameer(a)c2.org> >Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >In-Reply-To: sameer's message of Thu, 2 Nov 1995 10:10:43 -0800 (PST) >Subject: Re: censored? corrected Steve Pizzo cited in The Spotlight >References: <199511021624.KAA05751(a)galil.austnsc.tandem.com.> > <199511021810.KAA14547(a)infinity.c2.org> >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com >Precedence: bulk > sameer <sameer(a)c2.org> said: >> Is it? This is the _one_ thing in the article (is that term giving >> it too much legitimacy?) that I whought was barely true. Whoever >> controls the root level DNS servers effectively controls the >> Internet. I postulated a couple of months ago about how the US Govt >> might attempt to censor the rest of the world: "Remove >> lurid.porno.site.other-country from your DNS system within 72 hours >> or we will remove references to your DNS servers from the root level >> servers.". (I also speculated that if the US Govt tried doing this, >> that an 'underground' DNS system would form almost immediately.) >> s> The US govt. doesn't run the root nameservers, nor are all the s> root nameservers within US jurisdiction. Granted, the US Govt doesn't run the US-based root servers. But, if an Internet 'Decency' law was passed, they certainly could try to threaten the US-based root server maintainers to make the cascading threats. And, as I understand the way DNS resolution works, address requests go down to your root domain then up from the other root domain, i.e., for me to find out what c2.org's address is, my system requests from: NS mpd.tandem.com NS tandem.com NS com NS org If this is correct, if the com NS has the entry for the org NS, I won't be able to resolve those names. Of course, explicit IP addresses and *** Comments From: POSTMAST - POSTMASTER, BITNET; 11/02/95 12:54 Can someone please tell me how to remove/unsubscribe an email address from this mail list. I need the exact commands. Apparently someone subscribed to this list using an invalid email address and all the mail messages are neding up in a bounced mail file. We need to get this email address unsubscribed. Thank you for your help. Postmaster mvs.medctr.ucla.edu

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ECC_boo
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

11-2-95. W$Japer: "Happy, Healthy and Odd: Nonconformists Live Longer." For modern-day eccentrics, computer hackers qualified, as did academics, scientists, rock stars and artists. Traits: nonconforming; creative; strongly motivated by curiosity; idealistic (wanting to make the world a better place and the people in it happier); cheerfully obsessed with one or more hobbyhorses; aware from early childhood of being different; intelligent, opinionated, outspoken; convinced of being right and that the rest of the world is out of step; noncompetitive (not in need of reassurance from the rest of society); unusual in eating habits and living arrangements; not particularly interested in the opinions or the company of other people, except to persuade them to his point of view; possessed of a mischievous sense of humor; single; usually the eldest or an only child; a bad speller. ECC_boo (9 kb)

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Re: e$: 24 Hours
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Showed up at the speaker's desk at Infoworld Boston, got ^^^^^^^^^Internet World Boston Ack. Spam the planet and then typo the first paragraph. Sorry. Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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EMU_boo
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

11-2-95. FT: "Electronic money in a race with Emu." Economic and monetary union or electronic money? Recent suggestions that the start of Emu might be delayed beyond 1999 raise the intriguing possibility that a viable international electronic money will be available before the European single currency. Depending on your perspective, this would be either disaster or nirvana. Disaster, because governments and central banks in countries with weak currencies would lose the seignorage that currency issue brings, and the sovereignty it is supposed to provide (but may not). Disaster, because it would destroy two central aims of Emu: the sharing of power between monetary authorities, and the attempted imposition of currency soundness by institutional fiat. Nirvana, because it would provide people with a powerful protection against the random and hidden taxation imposed on them when governments inflate, and because it would create monetary soundness via market forces. EMU_boo (5 kb) FT on the Web: <www.ft.com> or <www.usa.ft.com>. Selections avaliable, not this one, but read today's "Smart building" for the security and ID gadgets to track-attack-siphon.

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Cypherpunk recruiting opportunity
by cjl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

C-punx, Considering the amount of "preaching to the choir" that goes on here I thought that the following news item might supply a more suitable outlet for some of the more evangelical-minded Cypherpunks. After all, it is perfectly clear that the science of cryptography exemplifies some of the more exciting applications of otherwise-dry mathematics, and there is always a need for "voices of reason" in the councils of those who would make the 'Net safe for children. ___________________ Tech Help for Schools While high-tech education visionaries are issuing apocalyptic warnings about the fate of the alledgedly backward US school system, a privately sponsored group has launched a Peace Corps-style initiative to ease schools into the 21st century. The Massachusetts-based Tech Corps, which recruits volunteers to help schools harness computers and telecommunications technology, announced last month that it is going national. The corps, whose chief sponsor is the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association, will hold a conference in Washington DC on 30 October where people can learn how to start state chapters. Founded by Gary J. Beach, chief executive officer of Computerworld Inc., the corps last year recruited 300 volunteers theough the magazine Computerworld who have been working in 12 school districts throughout Masachusetts. Karen Smith, Tech Corps' national director, says the response to the call for volunteers from people in industry, government agencies, and private consulting firms, has been "incredible." They help school districts in any way they are asked - such as by installing wiring, training teachers, persuading local industry to donate hardware, and helping schools construct World Wide Web homepages. Interested parties can reach Tech Corp' own web page at: http://www.ustc.org C. J. Leonard ( / "DNA is groovy" \ / - Watson & Crick <cjl(a)welchlink.welch.jhu.edu> / \ <-- major groove ( \ Finger for public key \ ) Strong-arm for secret key / <-- minor groove Thumb-screws for pass-phrase / )

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Organizations Needed to Sign Letter Against Online Censorship
by ACLUNATL＠aol.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CYBER-LIBERTIES ALERT!!! November 2, 1995 from: American Civil Liberties Union People for the American Way ORGANIZATIONS NEEDED TO SUPPORT FREE SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE SIGN THE LETTER BELOW TO OPPOSE FEDERAL ONLINE INDECENCY LEGISLATION! A conference committee of House and Senate members is now meeting to determine the future of free speech in cyberspace. As most of you know, the House and Senate have now passed two different versions of the telecommunications bill that would each outlaw "indecent" speech over the Internet and other online services. The conference committee now has the power to remove the online indecency provisions and to respect the philosophy overwhelmingly approved by the House in their 420-4 vote in favor of the Cox/Wyden Amendment -- online users, not government, should determine what online content is appropriate for themselves and their families. Groups like the Christian Coalition are contacting the Conference Committee to urge even stricter criminal provisions for cyberspace than those contained in the current telecommunications provisions. Organizations dedicated to free speech must counter that movement with a groundswell of opposition to government control over online content. THIS MAY BE YOUR LAST CHANCE TO STOP UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON YOUR RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE. Please sign your organization on to the letter below. To sign on, send an e-mail with your organization's name, address, phone number, and e-mail address to: Jill Lesser People for the American Way jlesser(a)pfaw.org The deadline for signatures is MONDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1995, at 5 p.m. (Due to time constraints, we regret that we are unable to accept further revisions to the letter.) ------------------------ INDIVIDUAL USERS!!! It is also essential that the Conference Committee hear from individual online users who are fundamentally opposed to these draconian speech crimes for cyberspace. Be sure to watch the Net for an action alert within the next 24 hours on how to voice your opposition to the Conferees. ------------------------ LETTER FROM ORGANIZATIONS OPPOSED TO FEDERAL ONLINE INDECENCY LEGISLATION November ___, 1995 The Honorable Thomas J. Bliley Jr. Chairman, Committee on Commerce United States House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515 The Honorable Larry Pressler Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation United States Senate Washington, DC 20510 Re: Parental Empowerment and Free Expression in Cyberspace Dear Chairmen Bliley and Pressler: We write on behalf of a diverse coalition of non-profit civil liberties, education, library, cultural, arts, labor and other civic organizations, and commercial producers and distributors of entertainment, information, journalism, and art, to express our strong belief that the Communications Decency Act (CDA) (also known as the +Exon Amendment+), sections 401 to 408 of S. 652, is unconstitutional, unworkable and unwise. We also strongly beleive that language added to HR 1555, (section 403) amending the federal criminal code (the Hyde Amendment) is similarly unacceptable, because it creates new Exon-like speech crimes, including restricting constitutionally protected speech, mandating vicarious liability for on-line service providers and endorsing the violatation of privacy rights of individuals. We urge you to delete from any final telecommunications legislation any provisions that impose a federal regulatory scheme on online content, hold online service providers liable for the messages of their customers, censor online communications in violation of the First Amendment, or encourage the violation of the privacy of online users. The CDA and Hyde Amendment contain an approach and philosophy that almost every member of the House of Representatives has already expressly rejected in their 420-4 vote in favor of the Online Family Empowerment provisions offered as an amendment to HR 1555 (section 104) by Representatives Cox (R-CA) and Wyden (D-OR). The CDA would impose unenforceable and intrusive government regulation on a newly developing forum for speech and commerce. While failing to accomplish its intended goal of protecting children, it would unwisely impose governmental mandates on content and effectively establish federal standards for parenting in an online world. Similarly, the Hyde Amendment would force online service providers to act as censors of constitutionally protected speech and to invade the privacy of their users. By creating unconstitutional standards, passage of the CDA or the Hyde Amendment merely would assure a decade of expensive litigation and the uncertainty that inevitably accompanies such lawsuits. As the Conference Committee begins to consider the question of content control in the online environment, it must not permit unconstitutional provisions to remain in the bill. The Conferees challenge is to avoid interfering with private sector development of effective blocking and screening technologies that empower online users to make personal decisions about content, to preserve the fundamental freedoms of the First Amendment, and to protect each individual's right to keep private communications private. The undersigned organizations believe that the following principles must be adhered to in any provision that affects the emerging online environment: THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF ALL AMERICANS MUST BE PRESERVED. Any effort to establish federal control over constitutionally protected speech must be opposed outright. There are alternative ways to protect access by children to certain material without infringing on the free speech rights of adults. The Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that Congress may not impose a blanket ban on constitutionally protected speech. Any general restriction on constitutionally protected content must not only serve a compelling government interest but also must be implemented by the least restrictive means available. POLICIES MUST EMPOWER USERS -- INCLUDING PARENTS -- TO MAKE PERSONAL DECISIONS ABOUT CONTENT. While most Americans agree that certain material is unsuitable for children, there certainly is no consensus about precisely what that material might be. The right to decide what children should see and hear is uniquely personal to the family -- government should have no role in dictating such personal and private matters. Instead, policies should encourage and empower individual parents to make decisions about the kinds of content to which their children should have access. THERE SHOULD BE NO INCENTIVE FOR GOVERNMENT OR PRIVATE INDUSTRY TO INFRINGE ON PRIVACY RIGHTS BY READING PRIVATE E-MAIL. Neither online service providers nor federal regulators should be in the business of perusing private e-mail for potentially objectionable content. The privacy rights in e-mail that Congress recognized in its passage of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act should not be undercut through censorship legislation. THE ONLINE WORLD MUST OPERATE FREE FROM INTRUSIVE AND UNENFORCEABLE GOVERNMENT CONTENT REGULATION. Online service providers and other sectors of the communications industry already are taking the initiative to develop technologies to permit users to make choices about the content to which they have access. Governmentally imposed standards and mandates are no substitute for the creativity of the marketplace. Users are demanding technology that will preserve the free flow of information, while simultaneously allowing them to make personal decisions about the content to which they or their children have access. CONCLUSION The undersigned organizations believe that Congress can formulate policies consistent with its deregulatory approach and consistent with the Constitution. We stand ready to work with all members of the Conference Committee to ensure that the above principles are satisfied. [The following organizations signed on to a similar letter last summer, before the House vote on the telecommunications bill.] Alliance For Community Media Alliance for Communications Democracy American Arts Alliance American Association of Advertising Agencies, Inc. American Association of Law Libraries American Association of University Professors American Civil Liberties Union American Communication Association American Library Association American Society of Journalists and Authors Association of American Publishers Association of Research Libraries Center For Democracy & Technology Chicago Computer Society Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility Council of Literary Magazines and Presses Electronic Privacy Information Center Feminists for Free Expression Freedom to Read Foundation Libraries for the Future The Literary Network Magazine Publishers Association Media Access Project Media Consortium National Assembly of State Arts Agencies National Association of Artists Organizations National Association of Media Arts & Culture National Campaign for Freedom of Expression National Coalition Against Censorship National Federation of Community Broadcasters National Gay & Lesbian Task Force National Public Telecomputing Network New York City Arts Coalition Newspaper Association of America Society for Electronic Access People For the American Way Action Fund Rock Out Censorship Theater Communications Group Writers Guild of America, East

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The ITAR, you don't leave home without it.
by s1113645＠tesla.cc.uottawa.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A funny thought just occurred to me. Micheal Froomkin was recently saying that the wonderful ITAR applies to American citizens regardless of country of location. Wouldn't this inane technicality apply to David Chaum in Holland? He is American, right? Ever get any problems at US customs David? The Digicash trial software certainly had crypto in it. I don't remember any export controls.

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Re: Win95 password caching
by Joel McNamara 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was under the impression that MS used some variation of DES for encrypting the password lists (obviously much more secure than the nonsense XOR encryption used for the screen savers). Joel >This was not the question. He wants to prevent local Windows passwords >from being created for network-only users. This is a serious security >issue, because if a user enters her real network password for the Windows >password, and someone else later picks up the .PWL files, which are not >encrypted in a particularly secure way, then someone can get unauthorized >access to the network as the previous user(s).

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Radiation Detectors from Aware Electronics
by Perry E. Metzger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

There have been several requests for information on the company that makes the radiation detectors with RS232 interfaces that I mentioned. Here is how to reach them: Aware Electronics P.O. Box 4299 Wilmington, DE 19807 Phone (800) 729-5397 (302) 655-3800 Perry

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Clinton Administration Plans 1.5 MILLION WIRETAPS
by clarkm＠cnct.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Used with Permission From THE SPOTLIGHT 300 Independence Avenue, S.E. Washington, DC 20003 Subscriptions: (202) 546-5621 Technology & Liberty November 13, 1995 ADMINISTRATION PLANS 1.5 MILLION TELEPHONE INTERCEPTS By Clark Matthews clark.matthews(a)paranet.org Janet Reno's Justice Department and the FBI have directed U.S. telephone companies to prepare for up to 1.5 million simultaneous, electronic intercepts on Americans' telephones. The same directive requires the nation's phone companies to complete the necessary modifications to their equipment to create this massive surveillance apparatus from America's public telephone networks. Telephone companies are directed to have these capabilities in place by October 28, 1998, one week before the 1998 elections. The Clinton administration's claimed authorization for this massive high-tech domestic surveillance machine is the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). The CALEA law is better known as infamous "Wiretap Access Bill", which has been discussed many times in these columns over the past 14 months. The CALEA law continues to be a hot topic because the proposed "Omnibus Counter-Terrorism Bill" of 1995 (H.R. 1710) contains provisions for setting up a national FBI surveillance center and paying for the national eavesdropping system with a 40% surcharge on all federal civil fines and property seizures. "CAPACITY REQUIREMENTS" The administration's eavesdropping diktats are buried in a set of technical "capacity requirements" that telephone companies are expected to meet in order to comply with the CALEA law. The capacity requirements appear on pages 53643-53646 of the Federal Register for October 16, 1995. Computer users can access this document electronically on the internet from the Electronic Privacy Information Center (http://www.epic.org) or by using wais (wais.access.gpo.gov) The "Capacity Requirements" published in the Federal Register correspond to a minimum of 540,000 and a maximum of 1.5 million simultaneous telephone "intercepts" in the United States. These electronic "intercepts" involve several different telephone surveillance techniques. They can record the telephone numbers you call and the numbers of people who call you, and then match the phone numbers in a special database "associating" you with your friends, relatives, acquaintances, journalists, activists, or businesses. They can also be programmed to monitor telephone conversations, intercept faxes, and record communications sessions between computer modems, including computer passwords and digital transactions. Here is a breakdown of the scope of the federal surveillance described by the capacity requirements: * Category 3 -- In 75% of the nation, phone companies must be prepared to activate federal intercepts on a maximum of 0.25% of all telephone subscribers, i.e. 250 telephones out of every 100,000. * Category 2 -- Is ill-defined. Phone companies in Category 2 areas must make their equipment capable of supporting federal interceptions on a maximum of 0.5% of all subscribers, i.e. 500 telephones per 100,000 * Category 1 -- Includes ill-defined "high interest" areas like major cities, where phone companies must be prepared to surveil 1% of all telephones, i.e. 1,000 phones per 100,000 WHAT THE NUMBERS MEAN According to FCC statistics for 1993, there were at least 150 million telephone numbers in our country -- and these figures omitted cellular phones, beepers, pagers, WATS lines, and other non-switched telephone services. Therefore Category 3 translates into 0.25% of at least 112.5 million telephones -- 281,250 intercepts nationwide. Assuming Category 2 equals 15% of the nation's phones, it translates into 0.5% of 22.5 million phones, another 122,500 potential wiretaps. Category 1 is 1% of the remaining 15 million phones: that's 150,000 more people. Add it up: 553,750 intercepts, minimum. And since "major cities" are "high interest" areas, the actual number is more likely to approach one million or more. Even these figures don't tell the whole story. The Justice Department directives have a built-in vagueness that allows areas to be re- defined. They can become "high-interest" hotspots at any time, under any circumstances. A currency crisis, for instance. Or a hotly contested election. Or perhaps a mysterious bombing provocation in the midwest. Furthermore, telephone companies do not have the luxury of meeting the minimum surveillance requirements. It's a technological reality that they must modify their equipment to meet the maximum requirements. That's because the FBI can re- define their surveillance responsibilities at any time, by branding their customers as "interesting". As the FBI's "interest" shifts from area to area, the whole country could rapidly come under the 1% surveillance directive. 1.5 million telephone intercepts. Or more. 'ONLY 1,157 WIRETAPS' The conduct of Clinton's law-enforcement leaders is especially outrageous, now that the true intentions of their KGB-like program have been revealed. When FBI Director Louis Freeh lobbied Congress for the Wiretap Bill last year, he cited FBI statistics claiming only 1,157 federal, state, and local electronic surveillance orders for all of 1993. In sworn Congressional testimony, the FBI director went on to say that his bureau had been thwarted in "several" attempts to intercept communications on specialized telephone equipment. Freeh cited obstacles like digital switches, digital loops, and similar privately owned, computerized business telephone switching systems, which he claimed prevented his agents from listening to telephone conversations, intercepting faxes, and capturing the data exchanged in computer modem sessions. The built-in interception capacity of at least 1.5 million phone subscribers is well over 1,000 times the 1993 wiretapping number given to Congress by Director Freeh. WRITE YOUR REPRESENTATIVES The Justice Department instructed America's telephone companies to respond by November 15th in writing (in triplicate) with comments on their new national telephone surveillance requirements. Why not ask your elected representatives to drop them a line, too? Your Senators and Representative may well wonder how Louis Freeh's 1,157 1993 surveillance orders and "several" failed eavesdropping attempts turned into a license to monitor over a million phones in the nation's telephone system in less than two years. I sure do wonder. The "capacity requirements" for the 1994 Wiretap Law (CALEA) were published in the Federal Register of October 16. They are listed on pages 53643-53646. The address for comments is: Telecommunications Industry Liaison Unit (TILU), Federal Bureau of Investigation, P.O. Box 220450, Chantilly, VA 22022-0450. The FBI expects your representatives to write in triplicate. .---. .----------- * :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: / \ __ / ------ * clark.matthews(a)paranet.org / / \(..)/ ----- * :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ////// ' \/ ` ---- * //// / // : : --- * PERMISSION TO \\/ / * / /` '--* COPY / REPOST \*/ * //..\\ x-x-UU----UUx-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x '//||\\` N E M O..M E..I M P U N E..L A C E S S I T x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x

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Re: Radiation Detectors from Aware Electronics
by sharborth＠hai-net.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

So what does this have to do with this mailing list?? Skip ______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________ Subject: Radiation Detectors from Aware Electronics Author: perry(a)piermont.com at internet Date: 02-11-95 23:45 There have been several requests for information on the company that makes the radiation detectors with RS232 interfaces that I mentioned. Here is how to reach them: Aware Electronics P.O. Box 4299 Wilmington, DE 19807 Phone (800) 729-5397 (302) 655-3800 Perry

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Re: FBI Wants to Wiretap One of Every 100 Phones in Urban Areas
by clarkm＠cnct.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> On Fri, 3 Nov 1995 clarkm(a)cnct.kom wrote: > > > Thanks for this item! Two little excerpts jump out at me. > > Gee, I hope they didn't spook you too badly when they jumped out at you > like that. I can tell you're a little jumpy. Hi Rich! Thx for changing my domain, I'm sure it fooled SAIC. > > So what is it? 1,154 wiretaps? Or 20,000? > > Easy: both. 1,154 wiretaps, and 20K to 25K intercepts, which includes both > wiretaps and other interceptions, i.e., recording which phone numbers you > call but not actually listening to the conversations. > > Get out of Dodge. You get out of Dodge. 1,154 electronic surveillance orders, about 7,000 pen registers & trap/trace plus 500 FISA warrants, all 1993 if memory serves. Figures as supplied to EPIC, and from memory. > By whom is the FBI being sued? What is the case number? Who are the > lawyers? What are their Bar numbers? How many times have they been > disciplined for bringing frivolous suits? EPIC. Quick!! Fire up your index! > > What's so special about the year 2002? > > Obviously, it is two elections from now, when the UN will invade the US > to impose the rule of the Anti-Christ. > > Oops, I wasn't supposed to say that. But now that you have... Check out the wiretap stats and FOIA responses at http://www.epic.org and come back & quibble some more. .---. .----------- * :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: / \ __ / ------ * clark.matthews(a)paranet.org / / \(..)/ ----- * :::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ////// ' \/ ` ---- * //// / // : : --- * PERMISSION TO \\/ / * / /` '--* COPY / REPOST \*/ * //..\\ x-x-UU----UUx-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x '//||\\` N E M O..M E..I M P U N E..L A C E S S I T x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x-x

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Re: Re: Chaum's cash: backup?
by Jiri Baum 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hello Marcel van der Peijl, > From: "Marcel van der Peijl" <bigmac(a)digicash.com> > Date: Tue, 24 Oct 1995 14:10:58 +0100 Sorry about taking so long to reply... I'll quote more than usual to make up for it. > > > I could give a hint: your random state initializer is not the too-often > > > used srand( time( NULL ) ) but user-chosen during installation. > > This sounds great... Will the bank be running crack against the proto-coins > > it gets? (Say, at the behest of a LEA?) > It is not the bank's intention to screw the clients, but mostly the > other way around. I was referring to the claim that the system is payer-anonymous. Thinking of it again now, what's to stop Eve the eavesdropper from spying on the proto-coins, running crack against it, and then (later) eavesdropping on the bank-signed coins and unblinding/depositing them before Alice/Bob does? (No, being encrypted by the bank's public key is not enough.) > If the bank wants to screw the clients the easiest > way is to change their account balance. Remember, you trust them with > your money. That's why they're a bank. Yes, but is the bank really interested in protecting privacy? > > Is there any way for the user to re-initialize the random state? > > > Write that initializer down and you can re-generate all coins. > > ... > > That's going to be one hell of a valuable piece of paper. > > (Certainly to your enemies/prosecutors - it reveals the blinding factors > > for every coin you ever spent.) > You may choose to burn it or change random state and have no > recoverability. What do you value more? Your privacy or your money? > Each user will have too choose. a) It would be nice if the protocol didn't require this choice. b) This choice should be made explicit to the user. c) As I noted above, wouldn't it also strongly reduce security? See you! Jiri - -- <jirib(a)cs.monash.edu.au> <jiri(a)melb.dialix.oz.au> PGP 463A14D5 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i iQCVAwUBMJnEeCxV6mvvBgf5AQF2BwP/XdMn6ktMGjToDltqo014kT1i3Z/GGXPr HPW1gBN3RT3Ba9F2Ac+24IVVFqauo1sT+Ecc872UrlQzoF8S524oZfhjh3IW5xRF mpZX48tnQn5nJE/U4XgvcuQ6yw5JOhc2eEVPs2PnKT+RdUogNb9UDAXOKn6+EILc nqosNXK+aMU= =geHb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: FBI Wants to Wiretap One of Every 100 Phones in Urban Areas
by carolann＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This story broke on ABC radio news 26 hours ago. It is still running as lead story. Love Always, Carol Anne...still amazed it's lead story -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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Transcript of Bernstein hearing is now available
by John Gilmore 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We received the transcript of October 20's oral hearing from the court stenographer. It's up on the EFF Web site at: http://www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/Bernstein_v_DoS/Legal/951020_hearing.tra… This is from Dan Bernstein's case, which is trying to get the crypto export laws invalidated as unconstitutional. This particular hearing is about the government's motion to throw the case out of court because the courts don't have jurisdiction to decide the issue. Some of it is deep legalese, and some of it is quite readable. There's still no news from the judge on what her decision is, or when she will decide. John Gilmore

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Hit-and-Run Anonymous Posts (Re: "Dr." Fred)
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:22 AM 11/1/95, Dr. Frederick B. Cohen wrote: (quoting an anonymous poster) >> The difference, of course, is that its almost impossible >> to have sympathy for Dr. Fred. His hustle is for a hell >> of a lot more than subsistence. He was also never actually >> a master of his field, a fact that becomes increasingly >> obvious as our exposure to him goes on. Now he's reduced >> himself to trying to collect someone else's winnings. > >Sour grapes, and from an anonymous poster too. Oooo - I'm insulted. > >I have been thinking about the issues of anonymity for some time, and I >have been convinced for some time that you can't have both integrity and >anonymity. I thought there might be ways to accomplish this, but the >cypherpunks have convinced me it isn't true. Show some integrity and >tell us who you are. I've also found that anonymous persons are usually the most prone to hit-and-run attacks and flames. I usually only briefly scan anonymous posts and then delete them. Some people hide behind anonymity to launch scurrilous attacks. Best to just ignore them, in my opinion. Exceptions are the cases when an anonymous source has something "sensitive" to contribute, such as the release of the putative MD4 code, and the like. And there have of course been thoughtful anonymous essays. Anonymity is under some assault today. I think it important not to throw out the very basic advantages of allowing anonymity just because some abuse occurs. (The issue is not that "allowing" it is good, but that "banning" it would require drastic and draconian enforcement measures.) Pseudonyms are another matter entirely. Some are classy (Pr0duct Cypher, Black Unicorn, Lucky Green), some are oafish (S Boxx), some are ephemeral. Persistence of the identity, as when backed by digital signatures, is important. (Though not essential, yet.) --Tim May Views here are not the views of my Internet Service Provider or Government. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders are just speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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censored with Perry
by gjeffers＠socketis.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Enzo Michelangeli writes: >In any case, before Perry (rightly) send us stern reminders of the scarce >crypto relevance of this thread, let's take it out of Cypherpunks and, >if someone is interested, let's continue by e-mail. Perry is again narrowly defining allowable speech on Cypherpunks. Encryption becomes a trivial topic if its best medium is taken by the States. Perry is still in his "only encryption algorithms in C is a proper topic for Cypherpunks" mode. This is a direction that if followed would take the vitality and relevance out of the Cypherpunks list. Perry does a disservice for Cypherpunks. Since when did Cypherpunks become the mailing list fit for Perry? Perry makes a big deal out of "nobody speaks for Perry" yet on Cypherpunks he has decided that he sets the parameters for allowed speech. When did Perry come to own the list? Where did he get this "authority" to tell other Cypherpunks to shut up? As Perry often presumptiously and rudely reminds C'punks that their speech is not tolerable, we must also take the time and trouble to occasionally tell Perry to shove his opinions up his ass. Gary Jeffers

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Re: censored? corrected [Steve Pizzo cited in The Spotlight]
by Jay Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Is it? This is the _one_ thing in the article (is that term >giving it too much legitimacy?) that I whought was barely true. Whoever >controls the root level DNS servers effectively controls the Internet. >I postulated a couple of months ago about how the US Govt might attempt >to censor the rest of the world: "Remove lurid.porno.site.other-country >from your DNS system within 72 hours or we will remove references to >your DNS servers from the root level servers.". (I also speculated that >if the US Govt tried doing this, that an 'underground' DNS system would >form almost immediately.) [off topic] It almost did when InterNIC announced it's recent (and abrupt) new pricing structure for domain names. All it would take is an additional entry in {dns}/root.cache - even a small company with decent VC (and multiple geographic locations, preferably) could have pulled this off and made a decent chunk of change underselling InterNIC; with a slight shift in the way things are done, the model could have been opened up into a competitive market with price and (GASP!) customer service/response time wars. [FADE IN: Look, Jim! I submitted my domain through Campbell.NET 30 seconds ago and it's already live .. That's nothing, Terry, ...] Yet another 'axiom' that turns out to be nothing more than convention. -- Jay Campbell edge(a)got.net - Operations Manager -=-=-=-=-=-=- Sense Networking, Santa Cruz Node Jay(a)Campbell.net got.net? PGP MIT KeyID 0xACAE1A89 "On the Information Superhighway, I'm the guy behind you in this morning's traffic jam leaning on his horn."

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Re: alt.anonymous.messages considered harmful
by Jay Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Those who do get the message, can not notice a cancel attack; those >who don't, would have to carefully search for suspicious Supersedes: >lines and monitor the control newsgroup. A denial of service attack by >manipulated Path: header cannot be detected by the victim. cancels aren't the only monster .. we have a vigilante up the pipe somewhere deleting a chunk of every post set in certain alt.binaries.* groups without a cancel - they're simply not passing along a piece of every set. this is irritating (as an ISP) since it should be an individual site's responsibility (if not the user emselve's), hence the term 'vigilante' as opposed to 'concerned administrator'. the fix is to get multiple feeds, of course, but everyone in the area happens to be fed through this branch .. but i digress. -- Jay Campbell edge(a)got.net - Operations Manager -=-=-=-=-=-=- Sense Networking, Santa Cruz Node Jay(a)Campbell.net got.net? PGP MIT KeyID 0xACAE1A89 "On the Information Superhighway, I'm the guy behind you in this morning's traffic jam leaning on his horn."

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Re: FBI seeks huge wiretapping system
by Jay Campbell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I was being facetious. The point is that the government has no >inherent right to tap our phones -- indeed, it didn't do so for nearly >the first 200 years of our existance, and we did just fine -- better, >in fact. It is a well-known fact that it was common practice for NSA operatives to masquerade as Injuns in the 1800's and waylay Pony Express riders in order to intercept communications between targeted parties. This practice lost popularity towards the end of the century with the advent of boxed cereal, and with it the Lone Ranger Decoder Ring, since the operatives were too underfunded to afford anything more than oatmeal. [ducks] -- Jay Campbell edge(a)got.net - Operations Manager -=-=-=-=-=-=- Sense Networking, Santa Cruz Node Jay(a)Campbell.net got.net? PGP MIT KeyID 0xACAE1A89 "On the Information Superhighway, I'm the guy behind you in this morning's traffic jam leaning on his horn."

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Re: Radiation Detectors from Aware Electronics
by usura＠berserk.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

sharborth(a)hai-net.com writes in an followup to perry(a)piermont.com: .... :: There have been several requests for information on the company that :: makes the radiation detectors with RS232 interfaces that I mentioned. [..] :: Perry : : So what does this have to do with this mailing list?? : Skip The cypherpunks mailing list has a lot to do with cryptography, an important element of cryptography is randomness one way that seems to be a superior source for obtaining random data is radioactive decay, radiation detectors wich have an RS232 interface can be hooked up to an computer and thus act as a source of randomness. -AJ- -- kill -9 hkk(a)netcom.com .. process killed .. lawyer terminated successfully

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Risks of ``foreign persons'' under the ITAR
by Peter D. Junger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It is usually assumed that a foreign person outside the United States runs no risks if he posts cryptographic software to the net or otherwise discloses it to other foreign persons, although technically that is a violation of the United States International Traffic in Arms Regulations. I note, however, that in an article entitled ``Export Controls on Encryption Software'' by Ira S. Rubenstein, dated October 17, 1994 (which apparently was distributed at some legal conference) the following passage appears in Section 4(3): ---------------- Finally, foreign employees of those companies or any foreign person who runs afoul of export controls on technology transfers may face severe immigration consequencs.[83] Under the Immigration and Nationality Act,[84] as revised by the immigration act of 1990,[85] an alien who seeks entry to the U.S. to engage in activities that violate or evade export control laws is excludable.[86] Similarly, an alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after entry engages in such activities is deportable.[87] [Notes] [83] For a detailed discussion see generally Rubinstein, ``Export Controls and Immigration Law,'' 93-3 Immigration Briefings (Mar. 1993). [84] Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 USC \S\S 1101-1524) (hereinafter INA). [85] Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (hereinafter IMMACT 90). [86] INA \S 212(a)(3)(A)(i)(II), 8 USC \S 1182(a)(3)(A)(i)(II). [87] OMA \S 21(a)(4)(A)(i), \S 1251(a)(4)(A)(i). -- Peter D. Junger--Case Western Reserve University Law School--Cleveland, OH Internet: junger(a)pdj2-ra.f-remote.cwru.edu junger(a)samsara.law.cwru.edu

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RE: Info needed on observers
by ljo＠ausys.se 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>I am currently preparing a paper on payment systems for the Internet >and related issues. I recently found out that so-called observers could >be placed on smart cards (in order to prevent double spending, or even to >prevent people from cheating on taxes...). > >To be honest that's about all I know about observers and I am very eager >to find out more. I am, however, having a hard time finding interesting >references on this subject. > >Hence, all suggestions to get me started would be extremely welcome. >Questions of particular interest are: possible functions (and limits), >how 'real' are they already?, what about privacy?, ... > >Many thanks in advance. Leo, The concept 'Wallet (Databases) with Observers' was introduced by David Chaum and Torben Pryds Pedersen at Crypto '92. See the proceedings of that conference. Put shortly, it is a method of preventing double spending of digital cash, stored on a smart card, and still provide full payer anonymity. Since then, others have worked on improving the original protocol, e.g. Ronald Cramer, Niels Ferguson and Stefan Brands. In particular the system by Stefan Brands have drawn much attention since it was said to offer "provable security". It is his protocol that is used in the european project CAFE. In CAFE, each user is thought to have a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) which stores the digital cash. The observer is a smart card that has to be inserted into the PDA in order to spend that cash. I don't know how far this project has come, implementation wise but I think another project, called SWAP was about to test these electronic wallets in practise. Regards, /Lars Johansson ljo(a)ausys.se

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Kallstrom Calls All Calls Tappable
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

11-3-95. Wash Post: "Privacy Groups Assail FBI's Wiretapping Plan" [Excerpt] James Kallstrom, assistant FBI director in charge of the New York field division, argues that the proposal would in fact reduce the FBI's surveillance authority. "Today ... we could tap all the phones in the United States," he said, referring to older, pre-digital technology. Under the plan, the FBI's surveillance ability would shrink to a maximum of 1 percent of simultaneous telephone calls from any one telephone switch, he said. Kallstrom said a typical central switching office in New York that serves 50,000 telephone lines has a capacity to carry only 5,000 calls simultaneously. It is the latter number, not the former, he said, on which the FBI bases its calculations. So the highest level of simultaneous surveillance in that area, he said, would be 50 lines. "We've never done that many" taps at one time, he said. But in a "worst-case scenario," such as a major act of terrorism, the agency might need such ability, he said. "I think it's a reasonable, minimal, conservative number."

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Re[2]: Radiation Detectors from Aware Electronics
by sharborth＠hai-net.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Perry - Sorry for the rude question. I have been following this thread closely but must have missed the original message regarding using radiation detectors to produce random numbers. Skip ______________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________ Subject: Re: Radiation Detectors from Aware Electronics Author: perry(a)piermont.com at internet Date: 03-11-95 09:23 sharborth(a)hai-net.com writes: > So what does this have to do with this mailing list?? Generating good random numbers is key to operating a solid cryptographic system. I've argued that computer interfaced radiation detectors are the optimal way of generating such numbers because they are hard to screw up -- biased diode noise and other sources are too easy to misdesign or misuse. Aware is a source of such detectors. Perry > There have been several requests for information on the company that > makes the radiation detectors with RS232 interfaces that I mentioned. > > Here is how to reach them: > > Aware Electronics > P.O. Box 4299 > Wilmington, DE 19807 > Phone (800) 729-5397 > (302) 655-3800 > > > Perry > >

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