December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: ALERT: On Monday, call Congress to stop Big Brother amendment!
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From the joint alert that Sameer reposted: >> Other amendments may be proposed. Please urge the Congressman to pass SAFE >> "as is" and oppose any amendments. But wait... The version of SAFE "as is" contains the ***FIRST EVER*** domestic restrictions on encryption! Why should it be passed intact? For the sake of Beltway politicking and deal-cutting? It includes very, very troubling severe criminal penalties for the use of encryption in a crime. When encryption is in everything from light switches to door knobs, any crime will include crypto, no? It would be like criminalizing "breathing air in the commission of a crime..." Why not just say "stop SAFE altogether?" No new laws are better than bad new laws. And even if the crypto-in-a-crime provisions are yanked, SAFE may be a bad bill. I wrote about this in June: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1022,00.html "Please, do no harm here. Let's keep what we won," says Cindy Cohn, one of the lawyers mounting an EFF-sponsored court challenge to the White House's export rules. So far that effort has been successful: A federal judge ruled last December that the line-by-line instructions in a computer program are "speech" and restrictions on overseas shipments violate the First Amendment. Cohn argues that both Rep. Bob Goodlatte's (R-Va.) SAFE bill and Sen. Conrad Burns' (R-Mont.) ProCODE bill could do more harm than good. She says they might not even help her client, a university professor who wants to discuss encryption without going to jail. "What effect would SAFE or ProCODE have? Either none or a detrimental one," Cohn said on Monday at a conference organized by the Electronic Privacy Information Center. Why are these organizations -- CDT, VTW, Wired, EFF, ATR -- urging it be passed intact, as is? Why should Americans give up their rights so business can make more money on encryption exports? -Declan (Not speaking for anyone but myself, of course.)

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A random-noise sampling device for DOS
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm working on a random noise sampling device for DOS, and so far have a prototype version that samples the keyboard timings. I'm unsure of a good way to implement it... Device timings (and in the future periodic samplings of the mouse position or sound-card noise input) are put into a ring-buffer of raw data and the output is a straight secure hash of it... (when the output buffer is used it, it just rehashes the data in the buffer at the moment...) I'm looking for some advice on how to determine when the raw data has been "used up" and worth processing/encrypting before re-hashing it... This in mind, offers for eventual beta-testers (annnouncement will follow when it's ready), or suggestions for features (what to sample, device interfaces) would be helpful. Thanks in advance, Rob <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com>

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Illustrations
by rmarquis＠umich.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hello. I was wondering if anyone had any .gifs or .jpgs (on the web I suppose) which illustrate how encryption works. Just simple pictures and illustrations are fine. Thanks. -Bob ____________________________________________ Robert Marquis, Jr. University of Michigan - Dearborn e-mail: rmarquis(a)umich.edu www: http://www.umd.umich.edu/~rmarquis

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Cypherpunk Certification Authority
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Tue, 28 Nov 1995, an impostor posing as Alice de 'nonymous wrote: > On Sun, 26 Nov 1995, Perry E. Metzger wrote: > > > Someone spoofing Alice, who is either Detweiler or "Dr." Cohen, says: > > > I have never signed any of my posts to this mailing list and frankly have > > > no intention of beginning at this point. > > > > Well, signed Alice posts have shown up, so we will just have to assume > > that the above was a spoof and that the signed Alice posts are the > > real ones, now won't we? > > Perry. Normally I try my best to ignore you. > > But I will simply repeat, I have never signed a post, and have no > intention of beginning to sign any posts, until I establish a secure > machine in a secure complex that is dedicated to that purpose. This insistence on not making use of authentication tools at the same time as whining about people spoofing you is what caused me to assume your identity. You were given ample warning. Consider it a demonstration of why you should do just what you are stubbornly refusing to do: generate yourself a damn key! It is the best way to ensure a persistent persona whilst retaining anonymity. > I like to think that I take my security somewhat seriously. For a purportedly security conscious impostor, you sure are reluctant to make use of simple authentication tools. Your risk assesment is seriously out of whack too. You do *not* need a secure machine to improve the level of authentication of your posts: signing your posts would provide better authentication than no authentication, even if the machine is not tempest shielded, nor in a secure installation. Finding your machine (we don't know remember), and installing a kernel patch to catch your passphrase as it is typed in, or snag it from PGPs core image is much harder to achieve, even if you are using a multi user system. PGP signing your post will give a much better authentication than people who post from known email addresses; forgeries, and machine breakins are not that hard to effect. > And I would ask whoever DID post the PGP key under my name, to please > issue a revocation certificate. Oh so you do care about authentication :-) An offer: you post your own key, and I'll post a revocation. You might find that people take you more seriously once they know they are talking to a persistent persona. Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMLsT3obu8OQjKS7RAQE62gQAoTxWo6Dipa1bZeNi5NygZ/9CLJ2pn44s KN2TFWY0n1KPC4tibEM88GOI7vHCCLE8t/XQ2zx5YArjd/7toCidAlUY07vQ6ums sL4J8oV4JDKdpq9WTWaTS/unBww8qBJRVDBHigtiOneIkmu6kfuBEh0JR+a5plfQ 00GQ4SfcyBk= =SAXZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: politics aren't all or nothing
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Mark Hedges wrote: >Mostly, I just don't want to get nuked. I don't want the people in >Washington to get nuked. I don't want to be ostracized because a >disjointed group I'm associated with has members who support nuking >political opponents. "Nuke DC" is crap. "Ecash Assassination Politics" is >crap. The loss of faith in one's ability to convince other people with >rational discussion is crap. That whole attitude reminds me of the guys in >early grade school who beat up on me because I was a nerd. I refuse to >sink to their level. The guys who beat you up in grade school are now the ones who are running Congress. They haven't matured, they are just upscale and have learned better techniques. The only problem I have with Tim May's "Nuke DC" is that he lacks the necessary qualifier: "Nuke D.C. now, while Congress is still in session" ThermoNuclearMonger

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Re: Certificate Authorities?
by rajaram＠morgan.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Nov 27, 4:46pm, Jeff Weinstein wrote: > Subject: Re: Certificate Authorities? > If you want a static list of CAs that netscape products > will accept, you will be disappointed. In the future > there will be more commecial CAs, many companies will run > their own internal CAs, and information providers will > provide certs to their subscribers to handle access > control to their sites. It is a losing battle to try > to maintain a static list of CAs. IMHO, Going with a more > dynamic, user configurable approach is the only way to > keep up. Yes. But... I deal with the security infrastructure for a large corporation. I want only security administrators to configure the list of acceptable CAs. I specifically do not want our users to be able to add new CAs to the list of trusted "approved" CAs. The concern is that some users who are not crypto enthusiasts may be "social engineered" into adding a very liberal CA to their list. Once this happens, the browser's signature verification capability is totally compromised. This is one of the reasons why PGP has not been adopted by many large companies. In response, Viacrypt now seems to have a product that can restrict user modifications to the public keyring. -raj

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Re: Intelligence Community Massive Digital Data Systems Initiative
by Carl Ellison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I think the real capacity measure is the number of satellite surveillance images per day -- at their high resolution. Anyone know that resolution? - Carl

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ANNOUNCE: NOISE.SYS random sampling device for DOS v0.2Beta
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Re: NOISE.SYS Random Sampling Device Driver for DOS (v0.2-Beta): I've finally gotten a usable version of NOISE.SYS written. The beta is ready for semi-public release and review. If you're interested in testing it or examing the code, email me at <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> It's only a prototype version. I do not know any strong methods of testing random data. If anyone is willing to help on that part or point me in the right direction, it would be appreciated... What this driver does: When loaded, it hooks onto the keyboard interrupt (0x09) and collected fast timings between keystrokes. It can also be easily configured at compilation to sample other interrupts, as well as collect "seedling" keystrokes upon initialization. It sets up a character device called RANDOM, that when polled takes the earliest collected bytes from the random pool (size can be adjusted), combines them with a count-word based on the number of samples collected plus the number of times the driver has fetched data from the pool, transforms it using the Secure Hash algorithm, and outputs the bits from the hash. It's only a prototype: this version doesn't check to see if the pool is "empty" at the moment. Features: written in 386 assembler, takes under 2k of memory and can be loaded from the command line using a utility like DEVLOD. Also under GPL, so you've got the source-code to play with. Comments and criticism from crypto-gurus would be greatly appreciated. Reply if you'd like me to send a copy. (Important Q: is this software covered under ITAR?!?) - --Rob <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOL8gNscUKerH0gxAQHNlAP/eZChSaAEg3go/vxfm9Z0Af5Dfa4WBDhh SfbbpsYfymSkxFbU7bHUfRMFHk+Uy57AeGMUxXkgml7KO8cxyOPS6yVDcNWf6Z9W OeXtXRAFBWRn3CblT1sQzl5YCEG93YBZS9ZkbTsN4rgTcpo15QY8vG5BJCEgfP9f 9XHn5VGSkVo= =jaNN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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ANNOUNCE: NOISE.SYS random sampling device for DOS v0.2Beta
by wlkngowl＠unix.asb.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Re: NOISE.SYS Random Sampling Device Driver for DOS (v0.2-Beta): I've finally gotten a usable version of NOISE.SYS written. The beta is ready for semi-public release and review. If you're interested in testing it or examing the code, email me at <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> It's only a prototype version. I do not know any strong methods of testing random data. If anyone is willing to help on that part or point me in the right direction, it would be appreciated... What this driver does: When loaded, it hooks onto the keyboard interrupt (0x09) and collected fast timings between keystrokes. It can also be easily configured at compilation to sample other interrupts, as well as collect "seedling" keystrokes upon initialization. It sets up a character device called RANDOM, that when polled takes the earliest collected bytes from the random pool (size can be adjusted), combines them with a count-word based on the number of samples collected plus the number of times the driver has fetched data from the pool, transforms it using the Secure Hash algorithm, and outputs the bits from the hash. It's only a prototype: this version doesn't check to see if the pool is "empty" at the moment. Features: written in 386 assembler, takes under 2k of memory and can be loaded from the command line using a utility like DEVLOD. Also under GPL, so you've got the source-code to play with. Comments and criticism from crypto-gurus would be greatly appreciated. Reply if you'd like me to send a copy. (Important Q: is this software covered under ITAR?!?) - --Rob <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMOL8gNscUKerH0gxAQHNlAP/eZChSaAEg3go/vxfm9Z0Af5Dfa4WBDhh SfbbpsYfymSkxFbU7bHUfRMFHk+Uy57AeGMUxXkgml7KO8cxyOPS6yVDcNWf6Z9W OeXtXRAFBWRn3CblT1sQzl5YCEG93YBZS9ZkbTsN4rgTcpo15QY8vG5BJCEgfP9f 9XHn5VGSkVo= =jaNN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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IwinPak
by gorkab＠sanchez.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Has anyone ever seen or heard of this company? They use PGP as an encryption transport for secure mail and transactions (at a price of course) http://www.iwinpak.com

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another anonymous poster helping to destroy our rights
by fc＠all.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We just heard from another anonymous poster trying to destroy our rights to free speech. How long will the cypherpunks put up with this? -> See: Info-Sec Heaven at URL http://all.net/ Management Analytics - 216-686-0090 - PO Box 1480, Hudson, OH 44236

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Re: Misconfigured Web Servers
by David Klur 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Re: the "trick" below... an even more effective search is the following... http://www.altavista.digital.com/cgi-bin/query?pg=aq&what=web&q=url%3A etc%2Fpasswd&r=&d0=&d1=&Submit.x=51&Submit.y=14 which searches all URLs that contain etc/passwd See for yourself! David Klur _____________________________ Reply Separator _________________________________ Subject: BoS: Misconfigured Web Servers Author: nobody(a)mail.uu.net at Internet-USA Date: 12/26/95 3:57 PM Everyone, A friend of mine showed me a nasty little "trick" over the weekend. He went to a Web Search server (http://www.altavista.digital.com/) and did a search on the following keywords - root: 0:0 sync: bin: daemon: You get the idea. He copied out several encrypted root passwords from passwd files, launched CrackerJack and a 1/2 MB word file and had a root password in under 30 minutes. All without accessing the site's server, just the index on a web search server! Well, the first thing I did was check my site and it's ok. The second thing I did was check my ISP for my home account, and it's okay. But by trying various combinations of common accounts on web searches, dozens of passwd files were found. It seems that a large number of locations who use httpd and ftpd on the same server often copy the regular passwd file to ftp/etc or ftp-users/etc for ftp user access. A few sites have left the root password in the file, and many contain user accounts' passwords. The problems I see here are as follows: 1. You can get the passwd file in some cases by simply pointing your URL to http://target.com/ftp/etc/passwd or http://target.com/ftp-users/etc/passwd. Not good. Anon ftp can't get it but a web browser can. Many passwd files are shadowed but you can see some legit account names. Yes, I realize that this may be a dummy file but hey, not always the case. 2. Some sites do not have the passwd file world readable, but the entire passwd file stills exists indexed on the web search server. I don't know about you, but I don't think I'd want my passwd file indexed and searchable on a world accessible web server. 3. A ton of etc/group files turned up as well. The guy that showed me this found it funny, but I find it disturbing. Are there that many sites that are that poorly configured? Mark_W_Loveless(a)smtp.bnr.com

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proposal for new cyber abbreviation
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

yes, cyberspace just doesn't have enough acronyms like AFAIK and IANAL etc. ad nauseam. (I have reason to believe that PTB, or "powers that be" was actually invented here on this list!!) anyway after reading recent messages I propose: SHTBD!!!! as in, Something Has To Be Done. used either seriously or satirically (probably mostly satirically by everyone here). example: "there was a editorialist on TV ranting about the 4 horsemen of the infocalypse and screeching that SHTBD!!!" or, "I was not implying that SHTBD, merely that we are moving into a brave new world in cyberspace". or, "those @#$%^&* online pedophiles are crawling all over the net. SHTBD!!!" or, "the @#%^^&* mainstream press is always pointing out new bogeymen with the concluding moral, SHTBD!!!" notice that SHTBD is the antithesis of cypherpunk philosophy in that it tends to imply 1. government intervention 2. coercive force 3. censorship etc. hence by using this term and popularizing it, we promote our own agenda of "cryptoanarchy". just my small contribution to humanity for today.

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cool cpunk project proposal: "cpunk approved" logo
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

recently my local newspaper ran a section on privacy preservation in cyberspace. it quoted Dave Banisar of CPSR as talking about how future companies might have a "privacy safe" sticker affixed to them. *wow*, what a great idea. this would be a great project for the cpunks. most people here are familiar with Point Communications and how they do the "top 5% of web sites" and authorize sites to use their logo. this is such a neat idea: it's one of the first reputation rating companies in existence, in a sense. furthermore, it's *private*. TCM and others have advocated that these companies are going to become ubiquitous (rating *everything* including hot-button things like doctors, lawyers, hit men, etc. <g>) and I can see it happening quickly. here's my idea that some enterprising cpunks might like to pursue. create a CYPHERPUNK PRIVACY SAFE logo and distribute it to various companies who adhere to the criteria that it names!!! the steps would be: 1. create a logo 2. create a set of criteria for companies who are "privacy safe" or who adhere to cpunk privacy guidelines. 3. write out this list in careful detail. one might also have different levels or grades, such as "level 5 privacy protection" etc. one could conceivably use it as a negative reinforcement too, handing out "F's" to the worst companies. 4. POPULARIZE this. get companies to put the logo on their sites like they do with the Web logo. now, I don't know if people here realize how much great potential this idea has. the media just LOVES to quote these kinds of judgements when it's a slow news day (witness Blackwell's "worst dressed" list or "best haircuts" or whatever else). the immediate objection I can see is that all kinds of people such as PM will rant that there is no "official" cpunk privacy standard. great!! I propose somebody create their OWN and call it that without any reservations. if the cpunk name is not copyrighted, if no one owns it, then anyone can do whatever they want with it!!! ah, that's glorious anarchy for sure. if multiple standards emerge, I'm sure one will tend to become dominant, or at least the competition between them will have them covering different areas (such as FAQs in newsgroups work). this idea really has FANTASTIC protential imho. in fact I propose that Community Connection is in a really excellent position to latch onto this idea-- they already have many press releases and the industry is watching them. notice that this sticker could be used to handle the key escrow issues as well-- like one of the levels being that the company is ideologically opposed to mandatory key escrow or something. different levels of cryptography could be involved. someone will have to experiment with perhaps multiple logos and different grades. remember, the thing should be as absolutely obvious and easy to comprehend as possible for even Joe Sixpack to get it. let's create a cpunk "approval" rating that has as much recognition some day as the "intel inside" ad campaign has generated!!!

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[NOISE] Re: AWARD: CHRISTMAS NET SCROOGE - AT&T & NETSCAPE
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[ More non-crypto garbage deleted ] > > God, you are annoying Fred, ER, I meant, "Alice". > My dearest Perry. > I am not Fred. I am not he. He is not me. Got it?? We aren't even in > the same category or the same country. Fred's an American, and I am not. But you do have much in common. Perry did not say that you are Fred, but instead implied he mixed the two of you up (quite understandable). > Scary, isn't it?? A non-American ... What's scary is a non-American foaming at the mouth about American politics when I'm sure his own country is far from perfect. P.S. This post is in the public domain. G. E. T. A. F. U. C. K. I. N. G. C. L. U. E.

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Re: another anonymous poster helping to destroy our rights
by Daniel Miskell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

You know, you are really starting to annoy me with this $*i+ about how anon users are destroying our rights by abusing theirs. If you dont like it, ignore it. but stop cluttering bandwith with your aimless complaints. if you want cypherpunks to do somthing, SUGGEST somthing! Stop wining and shut up!! *sigh* its like people cannot handle their own problems today, except by bleating to the public. I am requesting that anybody who has a problem with anon users TALK TO THE OWNER OF THE LIST. Munster --- _________________________________ *!Cheese Doctrine:!* Though cultured over time, and aged to perfection, one must not yield to produce mold. One must also not belittle themselves by conforming to the "whiz", but melt over the unprocessed ideas of Ghuda. _________________________________

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[NOISE] Re: AWARD: CHRISTMAS NET SCROOGE - AT&T & NETSCAPE
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [ More non-crypto garbage deleted ] > > God, you are annoying Fred, ER, I meant, "Alice". > My dearest Perry. > I am not Fred. I am not he. He is not me. Got it?? We aren't even in > the same category or the same country. Fred's an American, and I am not. But you do have much in common. Perry did not say that you are Fred, but instead implied he mixed the two of you up (quite understandable). > Scary, isn't it?? A non-American ... What's scary is a non-American foaming at the mouth about American politics when I'm sure his own country is far from perfect. P.S. This post is in the public domain. G. E. T. A. F. U. C. K. I. N. G. C. L. U. E. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMOGt6yoZzwIn1bdtAQHvtwGAyZvsHKR64N1cPI6R95HiyMfuSuATVQNP BeXflQ0LGAhRHeXH9V8TUO79RBTe0y80 =m+al -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: DejaNews and Alta Vista Search Tools, and Privacy Implications
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 03:28 AM 12/27/95 -0800, tcmay(a)got.net (Timothy C. May) wrote: >Anyway, a point of clarification of a point, lest there be the belief that >_all_ Cypherpunks are opposed to comprehensive Web search tools: ...... ...offshore... ...... >Face it, every single word written by any of us to any Usenet newsgroup, >going back to the beginning of Usenet, and expanding out to many >ostensibly-private mailing lists, will fairly soon be searchable. The Internet not only makes it easier for everybody to get their 15 minutes of fame, it guarantees that anything stupid you've said in public over the last 15 years will be available to the entire world. So deal with it... I'm more bothered by people indexing what I read. What kinds of Cypherpunk technology can we use to affect this? I don't think we need to do too much work on _increasing_ data collection; the commercial markets will figure that one out fast enough, though understanding technical possibilities enough to stay ahead is good. Remailers and nymservers are obvious starts on the information-hiding end, and even the basic non-encrypted cypherpunks remailers are good enough for most applications. The problem is getting them widely deployed. I've seen a couple of web-page-based remailers, and they're probably easy to deploy widely; they're not very secure without SSL, but they're a start, and people on SSL-equipped systems can run them securely. Anon web proxies are more work to deploy, but they're not mysterious, and the main limits to deploying them are economics. Nymservers, however, are still pretty new - technology like anon.penet.fi is generally good enough for most people if you've got an operator you trust, and an economic base that makes it worth running them. But the more secure nymservers are still complex, and probably not something the average hacker can just pop up and run - we probably need to explore them more before it'll be easy to do. While I like getting services provided through community spirit, like most of the remailers, I suspect Tim's right that pay-per-use privacy services are going to evolve, and probably dominate. Among other things, they're in the balance between the couch-potato on-line services and real Internet connections; they're probably more likely to be offered by people who want full-time connectivity, and will be used to offset the slightly higher costs of real service. However, partly due to patent issues, and partly just to convenience, I don't think they all need to use fully-anonymous digicash for every transaction; most of them can get by with service-provider tokens that may be paid for by digicash or by less-anonymous systems. One of the main threats I see to privacy services is the Exon bill - it's pretty obvious that most US service providers will have to limit access to people over 18, in spite of any of the Good Senator's claims otherwise. If the Feds start making examples of people before any serious court cases get decided (or after, if the good guys lose), that probably means that service providers will have to check ID to protect themselves. There may be a market for services that validate that their customers are over 18, but provide anonymity within that. #-- # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com, Pager/Voicemail 1-408-787-1281 # .... Heading back to The Big Phone Company

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Re: AWARD: CHRISTMAS NET SCROOGE - AT&T & NETSCAPE
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- [ Non-crypto garbage deleted ] The Vince Foster articles were more relevant than this garbage (not to mention the fact they made more sense). P.S. This post is in the public domain. G. E. T. A. F. U. C. K. I. N. G. C. L. U. E. - --- [This message has been signed by an auto-signing service. A valid signature means only that it has been received at the address corresponding to the signature and forwarded.] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Gratis auto-signing service iQBFAwUBMOGjoCoZzwIn1bdtAQHRJwF/fATfL+ZmsLlB8wgGdme5QkXExqw8Fa0G MZuaH93wUT5B+VgTQSuWPfqfd+zaUUTo =jf8w -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Did anyone see...
by Marshall Clow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On C-Span today: 2:06 pm ET/11:06 am PT Secret Codes Used in World War II National Security Agency -- Marshall Marshall Clow Aladdin Systems <mailto:mclow@mailhost2.csusm.edu> "Eternal vigilance is the price of PostScript" -- MacUser Jan 96 DTP and Graphics column

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Re: COMMUNITY CONNEXION ANNOUNCES APACHE-SSL COMMERCE
by Alex de Joode 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

: At 01:12 PM 12/26/95 -0800, sameer wrote: : > The Apache-SSL Commerce webserver is the only commercial encrypting : > webserver with source available. Ian Goldberg, graduate student at : > U.C. Berkeley, well-known for his work on SSL security, commented on : > the importance of available source, ftp://ftp.hacktic.nl/pub/replay/pub/apache/ -AJ-

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GEY_ser
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

12-27-95. W$Jug: A test of superfast cable modems at Boston College prove addictive to speed freak faculty and students downloading junk data in seconds not minutes and hours, thus accelerating mind-rupture. And, an editorial red flags the telecom billions giveaway; nags Republicans to shut the geyser and not-reg the I-Way. GEY_ser

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Crypto specialist wanted
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CSI's most recent _Computer Security Alert_ has a listing for: Cryptographic specialist for a San Diego based firm. Headhunter's address is: vfalcon(a)onramp.net (I know this is isn't jobs.misc, but traffic having been relatively light, I'm passing this on to others who may be interested in crypto, but aren't on CSI's mailing list. Now back to frequency hopping radios and Anti-Fred)

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DOS - MD5 - Thanks
by P.J. Ponder 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to everyone who offered help on the MD5 for DOS. Greg Broiles pointed me to the pgp source, which may do the trick. (There is MD5 module in pgp[?]) I will investigate. For everyone's info, didn't find a freestanding dos implementation, tho. My copy of Schneier didn't have the disk, so I don't know if it's there, either. -- PJP

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URL for cypherpunks
by norm＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am putting up some solutions to the Garage Door problem that was discussed here perhaps a year ago. I would like to refer to the cypherpunks by URL. Are there currently any appropriate URLs ?

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