July 2002 - cypherpunks-legacy

NASDAQ:IRPC - Special Report Alert
by Profile To Investors 30 Jul '02

30 Jul '02

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re: How to Defeat DVD Zone Controls
by mean-green＠hushmail.com 30 Jul '02

30 Jul '02

Most players cannot be hacked. And many hacks do not operate properly. How about just rent or borrow DVDs, reprocess to remove the region controls and reburn to a DVD-R? DVD-Rs are only about $1.25 or less each. Test burn on a DVD-RW to help prevent expensive coasters. See http://mpucoder.dynodns.net/derrow/copy.html Communicate in total privacy. Get your free encrypted email at https://www.hushmail.com/?l=2 Looking for a good deal on a domain name? http://www.hush.com/partners/offers.cgi?id=domainpeople

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July Handset Blow Out Sale
by Richard Hidalgo 30 Jul '02

30 Jul '02

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Quantum cryptography: Can you keep a secret? RSA is DOA.
by Matthew X 30 Jul '02

30 Jul '02

http://www.nature.com/cgi-taf/DynaPage.taf?file=/nature/journal/v418/n6895/… Quantum cryptography: Can you keep a secret? Practical products are about to emerge from the weird world of quantum mechanics. Erica Klarreich finds out how quantum cryptography made it from the lab to the marketplace The Enigma code machine, used by the German military during the Second World War, was a masterpiece of complexity. Each letter of the alphabet was encoded by a system of wheels that could be set in an almost endless array of configurations, creating a seemingly unbreakable cipher. But Enigma had a chink in its armour. Messages could not be decoded unless the receiver knew which wheel settings the sender had used. Users exchanged this information, known as a key, at the beginning of the message and encoded it using another, prearranged, key. But security for this second key was not perfect. Enigma users changed it only once a day. After cracking a few messages by focusing on commonly used words, code-breakers could tease out the second key and decipher all of the day's transmissions. More then half a century later, secret messages are still only as secure as the keys used to encrypt them. Sensitive data are exchanged every day, yet no one has developed a system that ensures that the keys to these messages are absolutely secure. This may soon change. Companies are close to marketing cryptographic systems that use quantum mechanics to offer absolute security guaranteed by the laws of physics. Devices that can securely transmit keys through fibre-optic cables may soon be available. And it might eventually be possible to transmit quantum keys using satellites, allowing users across the world to form secure connections. The keys used to encrypt most messages, such as those used to exchange credit-card information over the Internet, are themselves encrypted before being sent. The schemes used to disguise keys are thought to be secure, because cracking them would take too long for even the fastest computers. The widely used RSA algorithm is one example. Anyone wanting to receive a message publishes two numbers, one of which is the product of two very large prime numbers. Senders convert their message into a series of digits, and perform a simple mathematical calculation on the series using the publicly available numbers. Messages are deciphered by reversing the calculation. Prime movers This is easy to do if you know the values of the prime numbers, which are not published. An eavesdropper can, in principle, work them out, but for big enough numbers this would take millions of years with the computing power available today. The future performance of such systems depends on estimates about the speed of future computers, and such guesses have proved wrong is the past. In 1977, for example, Scientific American challenged computer scientists to decode a message encrypted using a 129-digit number1. Ron Rivest, a computer scientist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and one of RSA's creators, estimated that it would take 4 1016 years to factor such a number. But in 1994, a team of computer scientists and amateur volunteers managed to decipher the message by applying 1,600 computers to the problem over a period of eight months2. In the same year, computer scientist Peter Shor of AT&T Labs in Florham Park, New Jersey, described a new kind of threat. Shor was interested in quantum computers hypothetical machines that should be able to carry out a large number of calculations simultaneously. He showed that if such a computer is ever built, it will be able to factor large numbers rapidly, and could quickly crack all the commonly used public key systems3. A quantum computer or new factoring technique might not come along for decades. But some secrets encrypted today, such as the design of nuclear weapons, will still be important then. "We have to assume that any information encrypted today is probably being recorded by eavesdroppers in the hope that it will be of value 10 or 20 years into the future," says Richard Hughes, a physicist at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico who works on quantum cryptography. "If they have quantum computers, they'll be able to look at information encrypted today and learn useful things from it." But while quantum computers remain no more than an interesting possibility, another quantum technology could soon be ensuring total security. In quantum mechanics the act of measurement changes the properties of the very thing being measured. This is a boon to cryptologists, because it means that eavesdroppers cannot listen to certain types of information without leaving an unmistakable disturbance. Polarized opinion G. RIBORDY/UNIV. GENEVA Light work: keys encoded using polarized photons have been sent between Alice and Bob (top) through 67 km of fibre-optic cable under Lake Geneva. The details of a quantum cryptography system were first described in 1984 by theoretical physicists Gilles Brassard of the University of Montreal in Canada and Charles Bennett of IBM's Thomas J. Watson Research Center in Yorktown Heights, New York4. In their scheme, Alice sends Bob a series of ones and zeros, which are used to generate the key. Each 'bit' is represented by a photon of light with one of four possible polarizations: horizontal, vertical or one of the two diagonals. Alice and Bob agree that a horizontal polarization corresponds to a zero and a vertical polarization corresponds to a one, and make a similar decision for the two diagonal polarizations. Quantum mechanics says that Bob can either look to see whether the photon is horizontally or vertically polarized, or which of the diagonal polarizations it has, but he cannot do both. When a photon arrives at Bob's end, he randomly chooses which of the two types of orientation to test for. If Alice has sent a vertically polarized photon and Bob makes a horizontalvertical measurement, he will discover the polarization correctly and read off a one. But if Bob makes a diagonal measurement, the vertical polarization of the photon lies exactly midway between the orientations he is looking for. The photon will instantly switch to one of the diagonal polarizations, each with the same probability, and Bob has an equal chance of recording a one or a zero. Bob will also get a random result if he makes a horizontalvertical measurement on a diagonally polarized photon. At the end of the transmission, Bob knows he has correctly measured the polarizations of about half of the photons, but doesn't know which ones. So Bob contacts Alice on a channel that doesn't have to be secure, and tells her which type of measurement he made for each photon, but not the outcome of those measurements. Alice tells him which measurements were correct. They discard the incorrectly measured photons, and keep the rest for their key. To make sure that a third party, Eve, hasn't listened in to their original exchange, Alice and Bob next sacrifice a small amount of their key and check it over the public channel for errors. If Eve has been assessing the polarization of the photons somewhere between Alice and Bob, she will have changed the polarization of about half of them. This makes about one in every four entries in Bob's key different from those that Alice sent a clear indication that Eve has been snooping. And there is no way consistent with the laws of physics for Eve to cover her tracks. In reality, noise in the channel through which the photons pass introduces a small number of errors into the transmission. So a clever eavesdropper could gain some information about the key by measuring such a small number of photons that Alice and Bob cannot distinguish the errors this introduces from those caused by noise. Alice's single-photon generator could also cause problems by occasionally sending out two photons instead of one. Eve can divert and measure one of the photons, while allowing the other to proceed to Bob. But in each case, Bob and Alice can generate a new key by applying an algorithm to their existing key. Eve, who is missing the bulk of the original key, cannot hope to predict the outcome of this algorithm. Gilles Brassard (left) and Charles Bennett laid the foundations of quantum cryptography. In 1989, a team led by Bennett and Brassard built a working device, and sent photons through the air to a receiver about 30 centimetres away5. By the mid-1990s, other groups were sending encrypted keys through tens of kilometres of optical fibre. And over the past few years, the first steps towards commercializing such systems have been taken. "Quantum cryptography is very much a reality," says Brassard. Gone in a flash Last October, a group of physicists at the University of Geneva in Switzerland launched a company called id Quantique, which will supply a system integrating the cryptography hardware photon sources and detectors, and fibre-optic connections needed to exchange keys. In March this year, they used the system to send single photons through 67-km telecommunication cables running under Lake Geneva6. "The system is very stable, and has the potential to be very fast," says Nicolas Gisin, a member of the team. MagiQ Technologies, a New York firm that specializes in quantum technologies, is trying to a build a system in which the discussion about which photons have been received correctly is streamlined and integrated with the photon generators, detectors and fibre-optics. The firm hopes to market a full quantum-cryptography system by early next year. MagiQ and id Quantique's systems are designed to connect users who are linked by a single dedicated fibre, but other groups are working on systems that can support a network of users. Last September, BBN Technologies, an information-technology company based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, began a five-year collaboration with teams at Boston and Harvard universities to build a quantum network connecting the three institutions. Photons will be routed round the network using mirrors. "The mirrors send the photon along without measuring it, so they don't create the kind of disturbance an eavesdropper would," explains Chip Elliott, an engineer at BBN. Working devices may soon be on the market, but that does not mean that the engineers involved can rest on their laurels. Reliable single-photon generators, for example, are not yet commercially available. Today's systems, such as those developed by id Quantique, instead use lasers that generate pulses so weak that they almost never contain more than one photon. But at such low intensities, nine out ten attempts to fire a photon fail. Current photon detectors also present some problems. To spot a single photon, the detectors must be so sensitive that they will sometimes register photons that are not there. Even then, they will typically miss 90% of the transmitted photons. What's more, many photons are absorbed by the optical fibre and never make it to the receiver. "We send five million bits per second, but by the time we get done with all the detectors and the specialized protocols that shorten the key during the public discussion, we get somewhere between 100 and 1,000 bits per second," says Elliott. But this is enough for cryptographic uses. The Advanced Encryption Standard, the encryption algorithm used by the US government, uses a key with a maximum of 256 bits. A key distribution that sends 500 bits per second would allow users to change the key roughly twice per second, more than ample for most purposes. The distance that the key can be transmitted is a more important technical limitation. Most experts agree that the Geneva group's 67-km transmission is close to the maximum that can be achieved with current technology. Beyond about 80 km of cable, too few photons make it from Alice to Bob. Both id Quantique and MagiQ are reluctant to discuss who is interested in their products, but this limitation means that the first users are likely to be organizations that want to transfer highly secret material within a single city, such as government offices, banks and businesses. Long-range forecast The range could be extended by devices that strengthen the signal as it passes by, like those used to send telephone conversations over long distances. But unlike telephone repeaters, quantum versions would have to bolster the signal without measuring the photons. "A repeater that doesn't measure was thought to be impossible in the early 1980s, but since then scientists have shown that it is feasible in principle," Brassard says. "But we're nowhere near the technology to build one." Satellites could provide an alternative means of achieving long-distance transmission. Hughes' team at Los Alamos is developing a key-distribution system that sends single photons through open air. So that the photons can be distinguished from all the others bombarding the detector, the team uses various techniques to filter the incoming light. The detector only accepts photons within a narrow range of wavelengths about 0.1 nanometres and ignores photons that arrive from angles outside a window of about a hundredth of a degree. A bright pulse of light is also sent 100 nanoseconds ahead of each photon, cueing the detector to expect the next signal. LANL In the air: Richard Hughes has sent a photon-encrypted code from a laser source (circled, inset) to a receiver. "When we threw in these three filters, we could get the amount of light down to the level where we could detect the photons we wanted, even if the Sun was shining directly on the receiver," says Hughes. In a paper published this month7, Hughes and his colleagues describe how they sent keys over a distance of 10 km with rates similar to those achieved using optical fibres. Ten kilometres is still a long way short of the hundreds of kilometres between the Earth's surface and satellites. But because air turbulence, the factor that most disrupts the photons, occurs predominately in the lower two kilometres of the atmosphere, Hughes believes his system should be able to send signals to satellites. "I don't see any showstoppers at all to doing this from ground to satellite," he says. The team is now trying to make the receiver light and sturdy enough to fit in a satellite and survive a rocket launch. Combined with optical fibres, satellites could eventually form part of a long-distance transmission system. In the shorter term, the technology might help to protect the security of satellite television broadcasts. In one embarrassing breach, a hacker known as Captain Midnight interrupted a 1986 broadcast by US company Home Box Office and sent over half of the company's customers a five-minute broadcast of a message complaining about the firm's new subscription charges. Quantum cryptography may soon be helping to prevent similar lapses, and to protect sensitive transmissions. Within the next few months, such systems could start encrypting some of the most valuable secrets of government and industry. Cryptography is about to lose its Achilles' heel. http://www.idquantique.com http://www.magiqtech.com http://www.bbn.com ERICA KLARREICH Erica Klarreich is journalist in residence at the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute in California. References 1. Gardner, M. Sci. Am. 237, 120-124 (1977). | ISI | 2. Atkins, D., Graff, M., Lenstra, A. K. & Leyland, P. C. in Advances in Cryptology -- ASIACRYPT '94 (eds Pieprzyk, J. & Safavi-Naini, R.) 263-277 (Springer, Heidelberg, 1995). 3. Shor, P. W. in Proc. 35th Annu. Symp Foundations Comp. Sci. (ed. Goldwasser, S.) 124-134 (IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, California, 1994). 4. Bennett, C. H. & Brassard, G. in Proc. IEEE Int. Conference on Computers, Systems & Signal Processing 175-179 (IEEE Press, Los Alamitos, California, 1984). 5. Bennett, C. H., Bessette, F., Brassard, G., Salvail, L. & Smolin, J. J. Cryptol. 5, 3-28 (1992). 6. Stucki, D., Gisin, N., Guinnard, O., Ribordy, G. & Zbinden, H. New J. Phys. 4, 41 (2002). | Article | 7. Hughes, R. J., Nordholt, J. E., Derkacs, D. & Peterson, C. G. New J. Phys. 4, 43 (2002). | Article | FROM NATURE,REG REQUIRED.

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Keep prying eyes out of your computer.
by pitster265500359＠hotmail.com 30 Jul '02

30 Jul '02

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[Announce] OpenSSL 0.9.7-beta3 (Security)
by Lutz Jaenicke 30 Jul '02

30 Jul '02

The third beta release of OpenSSL 0.9.7 is now available from the OpenSSL FTP site <URL: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/>. Quite a lot of code changed between the 0.9.6 release and the 0.9.7 release, so a series of 3 or 4 beta releases is planned before the final release. SECURITY INFORMATION: o Several security fixes were newly introduced to OpenSSL 0.9.6e, see OpenSSL Security Advisory [30 July 2002]. o OpenSSL 0.9.7-beta3 is the first 0.9.7-beta release containing these fixes. Users of older beta versions or snapshots are urged to upgrade to 0.9.7-beta3. To make sure that it will work correctly, please test this version (especially on less common platforms), and report any problems to <openssl-bugs(a)openssl.org>. Application developers that use OpenSSL to provide cryptographic routines or SSL/TLS support are kindly requested to test their software against this new release to make sure that necessary adaptions can be made. Changes between 0.9.6x and 0.9.7 include: o New library section OCSP. o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code. o CRL checking in verify code and openssl utility. o Extension copying in 'ca' utility. o Flexible display options in 'ca' utility. o Provisional support for international characters with UTF8. o Support for external crypto devices ('engine') is no longer a separate distribution. o New elliptic curve library section. o New AES (Rijndael) library section. o Change DES API to clean up the namespace (some applications link also against libdes providing similar functions having the same name). Provide macros for backward compatibility (will be removed in the future). o Unifiy handling of cryptographic algorithms (software and engine) to be available via EVP routines for asymmetric and symmetric ciphers. o NCONF: new configuration handling routines. o Change API to use more 'const' modifiers to improve error checking and help optimizers. o Finally remove references to RSAref. o Reworked parts of the BIGNUM code. o Support for new engines: Broadcom ubsec, Accelerated Encryption Processing, IBM 4758. o Extended and corrected OID (object identifier) table. o PRNG: query at more locations for a random device, automatic query for EGD style random sources at several locations. o SSL/TLS: allow optional cipher choice according to server's preference. o SSL/TLS: allow server to explicitly set new session ids. o SSL/TLS: support Kerberos cipher suites (RFC2712). o SSL/TLS: allow more precise control of renegotiations and sessions. o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages. o SSL/TLS: add draft AES ciphersuites (disabled unless explicitly requested). -- Lutz Jaenicke jaenicke(a)openssl.org OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org/~jaenicke/ --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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Announcement: OpenSSL 0.9.6e (Security related upgrade)
by Lutz Jaenicke 30 Jul '02

30 Jul '02

OpenSSL version 0.9.6e released =============================== OpenSSL - The Open Source toolkit for SSL/TLS http://www.openssl.org/ The OpenSSL project team is pleased to announce the release of version 0.9.6e of our open source toolkit for SSL/TLS. This new OpenSSL version is a security and bugfix release and incorporates several changes to the toolkit (for a complete list see http://www.openssl.org/source/exp/CHANGES) The most significant changes are: o Important security related bugfixes. o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. We consider OpenSSL 0.9.6e to be the best version of OpenSSL available and we strongly recommend that users of older versions upgrade as soon as possible. OpenSSL 0.9.6e is available for download via HTTP and FTP from the following master locations (you can find the various FTP mirrors under http://www.openssl.org/source/mirror.html) o http://www.openssl.org/source/ o ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/ [1] OpenSSL comes in the form of two distributions this time. The reasons for this is that we want to deploy the external crypto device support but don't want to have it part of the "normal" distribution just yet. The distribution containing the external crypto device support is popularly called "engine", and is considered experimental. It's been fairly well tested on Unix and flavors thereof. If run on a system with no external crypto device, it will work just like the "normal" distribution. The distribution file names are: o openssl-0.9.6e.tar.gz [normal] o openssl-engine-0.9.6e.tar.gz [engine] Yours, The OpenSSL Project Team... Mark J. Cox Ben Laurie Andy Polyakoff Ralf S. Engelschall Richard Levitte Geoff Thorpe Dr. Stephen Henson Bodo Möller Lutz Jänicke Ulf Möller -- Lutz Jaenicke jaenicke(a)openssl.org OpenSSL Project http://www.openssl.org/~jaenicke/ --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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RE: today in dc
by Albion Zeglin 30 Jul '02

30 Jul '02

There are consumer protection laws that may be used to open this up. Manufacturers are required to provide for repair parts for a minimum amount of time. Being able to take your car to an independent repair services has in the past been defined as an owner's right. Data pertaining to the specific car will probablly be required to be available. Data only used to build aggregate fleet data might still be protected. Being able to modify the parameters might impair the manufacturers "Fleet" air quality/fuel efficiency averages, without a exeption which may be part of the final law. An owner could of course replace the entire control system with a retrofit. This practice of encryption might also be to protect the market for computerized tools sold to repair shops. At $5000 apiece per car make per repair shop that's a lot of money. If safety is really the issue then tamper evident seals on the systems might be able to absolve the manufacturers, unless the ability to hack the systems is considered an "Attractive Nusiance". Consumer Protection laws are pretty harsh in the country, remember computers don't usually kill people when they fail, cars certainly can. And all this is just the complexity that I can think of. Imagine a team of lobbyists and their presenations. Albion. Quoting "Major Variola (ret)" <mv(a)cdc.gov>: > At 09:49 AM 7/30/02 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote: > >Actually, this clicks neatly onto cp debates over open vs closed > >systems, TCPA, DRM, and 'freedom to hack'. > > > >Most modern cars are substantially computerized. Diagnosing a > >problem usually involves hooking up a PC to a port on the car's > >engine management system, and studying the readouts. > > > >The 'problem' that the congresscritters are trying to 'solve' is > >that some car manufacturers are now closing this interface - > >they are refusing to document the protocols, and/or encrypting > >the data. > > Yes, a note about this appeared on this list a few weeks > ago, along with a Blacknet Automotive Division request > for these diag codes. > > \begin{ethicsrant} > It is perfectly within the rights of an individual (or corp) to > retain trade secrets. It is also within the rights of others to > reverse engineer these secrets particularly for interoperability > reasons. These observations are not only based on > libertarian-ethical principles but US law history. > \end{ethicsrant} > > >As a result, the manufacturers are able to restrict who has > >access to this diagnostic data, and are using this power to > >shut out independent repair shops and other competition to > >their own dealerships. The meeting is going to discuss > >whether 'something should be done'. I have no idea what will > >happen, if anything. > > > >So, let's see: > > > >* The manufacturers are using DRM technology, including crypto, > >to restrict access to the data. > > That's fine. > > >* If you reverse-engineered the system, the DMCA could get > >involved (not sure on this one). > > Were that true, that would NOT be fine. It is not acceptable to > abuse the violence of the state (ie law) in this way --to deny > the ability to reverse engineer. > > >* The manufacturers are closing the system to outside inspection, > >and actively working to make it impossible for owners to tinker with > >or modify their own cars. > > (As a hacker) Regrettable but fine. "Potting the fucker in epoxy" > is their right. > > >* There is absolutely no benefit to the car's owner - this is simply > >large corporationsfiguring out another way to get more revenue. > > So what? Buy a car from someone else then. The GNUmobile project? > > >This is essentially 'Palladium for cars'. > > The carmakers say this is for safety. Perhaps this is as lame as the > political powergrabs justified fnord in the name of "national security". > > Clearly, as engineers, we know that IFF the carmakers > documented what their employees know, then third-parties could > do as good a job. But there is no obligation to document what you > sell. Or make it easy for others to fix your stuff ---those stupid > proprietary screws used on some equiptment to keep you out > are not illegal. But neither is defeating them. Modulo your > warrantee, which is fair. > > Of course, the State might well use the "safety" lever to open > the codes; or it might simply extend a tentacle of fascism > and require it for the nominal benefit of the sheeple. Consider > if this behavior were applied more generally. > > Anyway, PT is right on, this is right up our alley.

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RE: today in dc
by Major Variola (ret) 30 Jul '02

30 Jul '02

At 09:49 AM 7/30/02 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote: >Actually, this clicks neatly onto cp debates over open vs closed >systems, TCPA, DRM, and 'freedom to hack'. > >Most modern cars are substantially computerized. Diagnosing a >problem usually involves hooking up a PC to a port on the car's >engine management system, and studying the readouts. > >The 'problem' that the congresscritters are trying to 'solve' is >that some car manufacturers are now closing this interface - >they are refusing to document the protocols, and/or encrypting >the data. Yes, a note about this appeared on this list a few weeks ago, along with a Blacknet Automotive Division request for these diag codes. \begin{ethicsrant} It is perfectly within the rights of an individual (or corp) to retain trade secrets. It is also within the rights of others to reverse engineer these secrets particularly for interoperability reasons. These observations are not only based on libertarian-ethical principles but US law history. \end{ethicsrant} >As a result, the manufacturers are able to restrict who has >access to this diagnostic data, and are using this power to >shut out independent repair shops and other competition to >their own dealerships. The meeting is going to discuss >whether 'something should be done'. I have no idea what will >happen, if anything. > >So, let's see: > >* The manufacturers are using DRM technology, including crypto, >to restrict access to the data. That's fine. >* If you reverse-engineered the system, the DMCA could get >involved (not sure on this one). Were that true, that would NOT be fine. It is not acceptable to abuse the violence of the state (ie law) in this way --to deny the ability to reverse engineer. >* The manufacturers are closing the system to outside inspection, >and actively working to make it impossible for owners to tinker with >or modify their own cars. (As a hacker) Regrettable but fine. "Potting the fucker in epoxy" is their right. >* There is absolutely no benefit to the car's owner - this is simply >large corporationsfiguring out another way to get more revenue. So what? Buy a car from someone else then. The GNUmobile project? >This is essentially 'Palladium for cars'. The carmakers say this is for safety. Perhaps this is as lame as the political powergrabs justified fnord in the name of "national security". Clearly, as engineers, we know that IFF the carmakers documented what their employees know, then third-parties could do as good a job. But there is no obligation to document what you sell. Or make it easy for others to fix your stuff ---those stupid proprietary screws used on some equiptment to keep you out are not illegal. But neither is defeating them. Modulo your warrantee, which is fair. Of course, the State might well use the "safety" lever to open the codes; or it might simply extend a tentacle of fascism and require it for the nominal benefit of the sheeple. Consider if this behavior were applied more generally. Anyway, PT is right on, this is right up our alley.

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Need To Know if you Got It 29644
by James 30 Jul '02

30 Jul '02

Dear Friend: As America's brave men and women continue the assault on terrorism abroad, Sen. Tom Daschle and his accomplices in Washington, D.C., have launched their own assault attempting to twist reality to gain an advantage in the coming political season. These self-absorbed liberals are trying to operate under the radar in an effort to secure a stronghold in the capital and in the hearts of American culture, demonstrating their interest in power, rather than in the Truth. Truth is the enemy of those who hunger for power. Truth must be pursued vigorously, honestly, and intelligently. Truth is what we offer in the pages of the Conservative Chronicle. The Conservative Chronicle is a weekly 32-page tabloid featuring the best syndicated conservative columnists and cartoonists. It accepts no advertising and thus is not held hostage by the requirements of satisfying marketers. It is mailed and delivered weekly at a cost of $47.50 per year, that's just 91 cents per issue. You can also subscribe for six months for $26 or give us a try for 13 weeks for just $13. We are inviting you to join our family of subscribers. If you are interested, contact us by e-mail at: MailTo:pub1947@excite.com?Subject=More-Info or better yet, just pick up the phone and call us at: 641-456-3544 to start your subscription. You will receive top-notch analysis and opinion from the very best conservative thinkers in the nation, such as Cal Thomas, Walter Williams, William Buckley, Bill O¹Reilly, Robert Novak, Charley Reese, George Will, Mona Charen, Ann Coulter, Pat Buchanan, Samuel Francis, William Rusher, William Safire, John Leo, David Limbaugh, Phyllis Schlafly, Thomas Sowell, Brent Bozell, Linda Chavez, Maggie Gallagher, Jeff Jacoby, Michelle Malkin, and Oliver North, just to name a few. Plus, you'll laugh at the characterizations of an outstanding corps of cartoonists, a collection unmatched by any publication in the world. Obviously, your interest in reading a quality conservative newspaper isn't going to be enough, in and of itself, to defeat the horrific array of enemies facing us right now, but it is essential. An informed citizenry is a powerful deterrent to those who would take away our freedom and disrupt our cherished way of life, whether they live outside our nation or are trying to assume control from within our borders, or even the Capitol itself. Conservative Chronicle readers benefit from the insight, experience and expertise of our columnists and cartoonists as they comment on emerging and breaking issues facing America. Join the thousands who are in the know when it comes to separating the power-hungry from the truth-seeking. Contact us by e-mail at: MailTo:pub1947@excite.com?Subject=More-Info or just pick up the phone and call us at 641-456-3544 to start your subscription. The Truth can't wait. We look forward to hearing from you soon. Sincerely, The Publishers of the Conservative Chronicle P.S.: If you still aren't convinced, here are some testimonials from just a few of the thousands of readers of the Conservative Chronicle, as well as from some of our columnists: Please allow me to add my thanks, along with millions of other conservatives, for the fine job you people do in bringing us the thoughts and feelings of so many fine columnists. I don't know how you do it. We can't get this side of the news through our local papers or, for that matter, the television media. Keep up the fine work. I couldn't get through the week without you. -- Wow. I wish everyone I know could subscribe to this paper. -- Wish to thank you for your publication, and the great writers. It is nice not to have to rely on the TV media for their views. -- The first thing I do when I get my copy of the Conservative Chronicle is to look at a choice selection of political cartoons. It's truly a laugh-and-learn experience. Then I settle down to read political cartoons from the most brilliant conservative writers in America. The Conservative Chronicle is more than a publication; it is a revered institution, whose pages are reserved for the most talented, conservative columnists and cartoonists in America. That's why I frequently send gift subscriptions to special friends and fans. (Linda Bowles) -- It's rare to find columnists who haven't fallen into the immoral trap of situational ethics. the good think about the Conservative Chronicle is that it provides badly needed moral leadership all in one place. (Walter E. Williams) -- It amazes me how many people stop me on the street to say they read my column in the Conservative Chronicle. People really devour this publication, and for good reason: it tells you everything you need to know about the conservative perspective on current events, and more. (L. Brent Bozell III) To Be Taken Off Our Mailing list please send a E-mail by clicking on the link below. MailTo:jeffr6142@yahoo.com?Subject=Take-Me-Off

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