February 2001 - cypherpunks-legacy

Slashdot | Micropayments: Effective Replacement For Ads Or ?
by Jim Choate 28 Feb '01

28 Feb '01

http://slashdot.org/articles/01/02/26/1756207.shtml -- The Laws of Serendipity: 1. In order to discover anything, you must be looking for something. 2. If you wish to make an improved product, you must first be engaged in making an inferior one. Tivoli Certification Group, OSCT James Choate jchoate(a)tivoli.com Senior Engineer 512-436-1062

11 13

Bell Subpoena 2
by John Young 28 Feb '01

28 Feb '01

Another subpoena was served on me today by Treasury Agent Tom Jack to appear at Jim Bell's trial on April 2, 2001 9:00 AM, in Tacoma, WA. I have tried three times to get a transcript of my grand jury testimony: faxed letter to the Grand Jury Foreman and AUSA Robb London January 27; a phone message left for Robb on February 12, and another faxed letter to Robb and the Foreman on February 20 with copy to Judge Tanner, presiding in Jim's case. No answer to any of the 3 requests -- except today's subpoena dated February 21.

3 2

disconnect
by steven moore 28 Feb '01

28 Feb '01

somehow my e-mail address got linked to yours and I'm receiving dozens of (unwanted) messages daily addressed to your e-mail. Any idea how I can get disconnected from your address? (I'm a computer novice.)

1 0

Bell and "Journalists"
by John Young 28 Feb '01

28 Feb '01

Twice since my grand jury appearance I've been contacted by persons claiming to be journalists for comment on Jim Bell's case. I referred them to Cryptome for the best representation of my views. Both resisted that, claiming they wanted to hear from me personally. What is striking is the similarity of their questions to those asked during the grand jury appearance by Robb London and by jury members, in particular my view of "anti-government activity," stalking of federal officials, and Assassination Politics, as well as why AP was on Cryptome. I explained to both callers that due to the possibility my grand jury testimony may be used against me it was prudent for me to refer them to files on Cryptome, and when it became available, the testimony transcript. That I did not want to go beyond what was already publicly available. Neither caller was satisfied with that, and persisted in asking leading questions about AP and anti-government activities. They also asked who else could they talk to about these topics. I said there was nobody I could suggest to talk to; that AP was a provocative exploration of digital technologies but not at all lethal; and that I was not anti-government but opposed to government abuse of power and its excessive secrecy. That I did not advocate violence against public officials, though insults, ridicule, disrespect for their career ambitions were duties of the conscientious citizen. Now that the feds have subpoenaed me for the trial and have refused to provide a transcript of my grand jury testimony, it seems to me that the feds are behaving characteristically treacherously (as others have warned), and are likely to have used "journalists" to get me to incriminate myself and/or to name other targets for investigation or subpoenas. So in case others are being queried for stories here are the names and affiliations of the "journalists" who called and would not take my referral to Cryptome for an answer. Adam Ciralsky 60 Minutes CBS News, Washington, DC 202-973-0777 Scott Canon Kansas City Star Kansas City, MO 816-234-4754

1 0

TIME.com: Nation -- The Supreme Court Clears the Air
by Jim Choate 28 Feb '01

28 Feb '01

Ehaaa! They can get something right on occasion... http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,100828,00.html -- The Laws of Serendipity: 1. In order to discover anything, you must be looking for something. 2. If you wish to make an improved product, you must first be engaged in making an inferior one. Tivoli Certification Group, OSCT James Choate jchoate(a)tivoli.com Senior Engineer 512-436-1062

1 0

spook bugs hosed by Hanssen
by Blank Frank 28 Feb '01

28 Feb '01

Spy Suspect May Have Revealed U.S. Bugging Espionage: Hanssen left signs that he told Russia where top-secret overseas eavesdropping devices are placed, officials say. By ERIC LICHTBLAU, Times Staff Writer WASHINGTON--U.S. intelligence officials said Tuesday that they fear suspected spy Robert Philip Hanssen may have provided Russia with top-secret information about how and where the United States has planted its most sophisticated overseas eavesdropping devices. U.S. spy-catchers said they are trying to determine whether the former FBI agent compromised a highly sensitive "black-budget" program run jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. The elite program, known innocuously as the Special Collection Service, plays a critical role in U.S. intelligence operations by conducting bugging operations in or near embassies, communications centers and other facilities on foreign soil. The program's mission is so sensitive that intelligence officials never have acknowledged its existence publicly. Its funding is hidden within the federal budget and little is known about the technologies and techniques it employs. Hanssen was arrested on Feb. 18 after FBI agents said they saw him leave a cache of secret documents at a "dead drop" in a park near his home in Vienna, Va. He is accused of having provided classified material to the Russians since 1985 in exchange for $1.4 million in cash and diamonds. According to documents filed in federal court Tuesday, the package of material included an encrypted letter in which Hanssen said that he feared the FBI suspected him and that he needed to "seclude" himself. "Something has aroused the sleeping tiger," said a letter signed by "Ramon Garcia," one of the aliases allegedly used by Hanssen. The letter said that the FBI had promoted him to "a higher do-nothing" job without regular access to counterintelligence. "It is as if I am being isolated," the letter said. As U.S. officials try to assess the damage caused by Hanssen's alleged spying, the CIA-NSA bugging program "is going to be a focus," confirmed an intelligence official who asked not to be identified. "That's certainly going to be looked at." Hanssen is believed to have shared office quarters for several years at the State Department with NSA agents and may have obtained information about the bugging program through this and other means in his role as a Russian counterintelligence specialist, U.S. officials said. If Hanssen did breach the security of the program, it could represent one of the most damaging consequences of the data he allegedly sold to the Russians and their Soviet predecessors over a 15-year period. An affidavit outlining the government's case against Hanssen asserts that he "compromised an entire technical program of enormous value, expense and importance to the United States." It suggests obliquely that Hanssen gave the Russians information about a "new technique" developed by the NSA and described to them a "sensitive office" where an NSA employee worked. Although the affidavit does not mention the Special Collection Service by name, intelligence experts outside the government said that these and other references point to the global eavesdropping operation. FBI officials already have described some of the information they believe Hanssen passed to the Russians over the years. He allegedly confirmed for Moscow the identities of three Russian double agents who were working for the United States--leading to the execution of two of them. And in 1989, he allegedly let the KGB know about a secret FBI investigation into the activities of Felix Bloch, a high-ranking U.S. diplomat suspected of spying for the Soviets. The investigation was "compromised," U.S. officials said, and Bloch was never charged. But intelligence officials said that Hanssen may have caused far more damage to U.S. national security, and they are still trying to assess the extent of that damage. FBI Director Louis J. Freeh, along with Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft and CIA Director George J. Tenet, will brief congressional officials today in a closed session. If the bugging program was seriously compromised by Hanssen, "that's something that would be extremely serious," said a former intelligence official who requested anonymity. "You're talking about very specific, very pointed information that's usually the gold nuggets of the intelligence community." Said James Bamford, an author and expert on the NSA: "Once [the Russians] find out how this eavesdropping is done and where in essence the bugs are, they could quickly do one of two things--take them apart, or worse yet, send disinformation over them." Intelligence officials started the program in the late 1970s in the midst of the Cold War to devise and plant sophisticated eavesdropping devices at overseas sites that have access to sensitive data. The aim is to intercept sensitive information on espionage, nuclear arms, terrorist networks, drug trafficking and a range of other issues that U.S. officials say are vital to national security. The bugging program "marries the CIA's covert people who know how to get into places--by bribing the right person or whatever is needed--with the NSA people who can design the right bug to go in the right environment so the information can be secreted across the border," said Bamford, who wrote a landmark study of the NSA and will soon release a sequel called "Body of Secrets." The CIA and the NSA use the program to bug not only obvious targets such as embassies and government centers, but also computer facilities, fiber-optic cable networks and communications centers carrying sensitive data, Bamford said. Bamford said that he knows Hanssen well, both personally and professionally. Hanssen, he said, was in an ideal position to penetrate the bugging system because he was intimately familiar with Russian counterintelligence, computers and sophisticated electronic eavesdropping techniques. "Those are exactly the kinds of things that [Special Collection Service] is involved in," he said. <snip> http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/updates2/lat_spy010228.htm

1 0

Sex, drugs, and technology - demonizing crypto
by Jim Choate 28 Feb '01

28 Feb '01

http://www.sunworld.com/unixinsideronline/swol-02-2001/swol-0223-unixsecuri… -- The Laws of Serendipity: 1. In order to discover anything, you must be looking for something. 2. If you wish to make an improved product, you must first be engaged in making an inferior one. Tivoli Certification Group, OSCT James Choate jchoate(a)tivoli.com Senior Engineer 512-436-1062

1 0

Animal Passports
by Amanda Ramm 28 Feb '01

28 Feb '01

Can you please advise on the following: We are considering moving back to England from Canada and have the following pets: 2 cats approx 8 yrs old where their vacc are up to date 1 cat approx 4 yrs old who as above is up to date with vacc Also 1 puppy who is now only 10 wks and doesn't have his rabies vac for a few more weeks yet Can you please advise what the procedure would be and if they would have to be quarantined or not Thanks for your help

2 1

FBI leaks Top Secret code cracking capabilities- NOT. (Was: Re: weird (fwd))
by aluger＠hushmail.com 28 Feb '01

28 Feb '01

At Wed, 28 Feb 2001 08:49:43 -0800, Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> wrote: > >At 7:16 AM -0600 2/28/01, Jim Choate wrote: >> >>---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>Date: Tue, 27 Feb 2001 22:23:04 -0800 >>From: Jon Stevens <jon(a)latchkey.com> >>To: coderpunks(a)toad.com >>Subject: weird >> >>> The comment came from a letter that FBI officials said was encrypted on a >>> computer diskette found in a package -- taped and wrapped in a black plastic >>> trash bag -- that Hanssen dropped underneath a foot bridge in a park in >>> Northern Virginia, immediately before his arrest. >>> >>> The FBI decrypted the letter and described it in an affidavit filed in support >>> of its search warrant. >>#1. I wonder what was used to encrypt the letter and how they were >able to decrypt it. Did he give them the password? Was the encryption weak >(it would be funny if he had used DES)? Blah blah blah... > >The FBI acknowledged that they'd done some black-bag jobs on Hanssen, > >including wiretaps and access to his computer. > >Not surprising at all that they had access to both his private key, >assuming he was using something like PGP, and his pass phrase, no >matter what system he was using. Keyboard sniffers are easy to >install. If he was using PGP to encrypt this letter for a deaddrop then having his private key would do no good. Only the recipiant's private key would make any difference. (Unless he had "encrypt to self" set on- which seems rather silly). I rather doubt that the Russian Secret Services would use PGP anyhow for encoding dead-drop messages. No, likely it was either something of (clearly inferior) Russian design, or it is a misleading quote. I suspect the latter. Why would the FBI allow to leak (much less leak themselves) the fact that they could decrypt whatever cipher the Russian handlers were using to give to their agents for dead drops? Quite the reverse. That's just basic OpSec. They would have invented some other plausable way to have obtained the information. Free, encrypted, secure Web-based email at www.hushmail.com

1 0

CNN.com - U.S. Supreme Court strikes down welfare gag - February 28, 2001
by Jim Choate 28 Feb '01

28 Feb '01

http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/02/28/scotus.legalservices.ap/index.html -- The Laws of Serendipity: 1. In order to discover anything, you must be looking for something. 2. If you wish to make an improved product, you must first be engaged in making an inferior one. Tivoli Certification Group, OSCT James Choate jchoate(a)tivoli.com Senior Engineer 512-436-1062

1 0