December 2001 - cypherpunks-legacy

Council of Europe Cybercrime Treaty
by mikecabot＠fastcircle.com 03 Dec '01

03 Dec '01

The full text is at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/WhatYouWant.asp?NT=185 Note that no signatories have signed, and it requires at least 5 to sign before going into force. This is interesting because basically all of Western Europe's IP traffic crosses the U.S. at some point, and therefore creates some interesting ramifications for U.S. ISPs.... how do they respond to demands for subscriber records and copies of traffic? _______________________________________________________________________________ Want a FREE fast, secure, and permanent email address? Visit http://www.FastCircle.com

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details
by membership＠winnerspaid.com 03 Dec '01

03 Dec '01

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click here to drive away
by membership＠winnerspaid.com 03 Dec '01

03 Dec '01

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Re: Re: Council of Europe Cybercrime Treaty
by mikecabot＠fastcircle.com 03 Dec '01

03 Dec '01

OUTBOUND traffic is what I meant, of course :) Although, comedy aside, there's an interesting point herein: even a lot of traffic that you would normally assume would be intra-Western Europe traffic actually crosses into U.S. NAPs -- counterintuitively stupid, I know, but it happens more than you might imagine, especially for corporate traffic of multinationals and traffic inbound/outbound for webhosting companies that are European but in reality are getting their pipes from U.S. ISPs. The same is true of PacRim traffic too, btw (in some cases, even more so -- a large percentage of Hong Kong to Australia traffic goes through the U.S., for example) -- although of course PacRim traffic is not covered by this agreement. > mikecabot(a)fastcircle.com wrote: > > > The full text is at > > http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/WhatYouWant.asp?NT=185 > > > > Note that no signatories have signed, and it requires at least 5 to > > sign before going into force. > > > > This is interesting because basically all of Western Europe's IP > > traffic crosses the U.S. at some point, > > Que? > > Tracing route to members.ams.chello.nl [62.108.1.126] > over a maximum of 30 hops: > > 1 <10 ms <10 ms <10 ms 193.61.22.245 > 2 <10 ms <10 ms <10 ms 144.82.19.103 > 3 <10 ms <10 ms <10 ms 144.82.255.17 > 4 10 ms 10 ms 10 ms 128.40.255.29 > 5 <10 ms <10 ms <10 ms 128.40.20.190 > 6 30 ms 20 ms 20 ms ulcc-gsr.lmn.net.uk [194.83.101.5] > 7 <10 ms <10 ms <10 ms london-bar1.ja.net [146.97.40.33] > 8 <10 ms <10 ms <10 ms linx-gw.ja.net [128.86.1.249] > 9 <10 ms <10 ms <10 ms LINXRT1.chello.com [195.66.224.89] > 10 30 ms 30 ms 20 ms uk-lon-rc-02-pos-5- 0.chellonetwork.com > [213.46.1 > 60.57] > 11 10 ms 10 ms 10 ms nl-ams-rc-01-pos-0- 0.chellonetwork.com > [213.46.1 > 60.9] > 12 10 ms 10 ms 10 ms nl-ams-rd-01-pos-1- 0.chellonetwork.com > [213.46.1 > 60.14] > 13 10 ms 10 ms 10 ms pos15-0.am00rt06.brain.upc.nl > [213.46.161.54] > 14 20 ms 30 ms 20 ms srp10-0.am00rt02.brain.upc.nl > [212.142.32.42] > 15 10 ms 10 ms 10 ms srp0-0.am00rt03.brain.upc.nl > [212.142.32.35] > 16 10 ms 10 ms 10 ms gig3-0-0.h0rtr1.a2000.nl [62.108.0.82] > 17 10 ms 10 ms 10 ms members.ams.chello.nl [62.108.1.126] > > Trace complete. > > <br> _______________________________________________________________________________ Want a FREE fast, secure, and permanent email address? Visit http://www.FastCircle.com

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Fw: [Fwd: Fw: Cow philosophy] (fwd)
by Sunder 03 Dec '01

03 Dec '01

Speaking of cows and poly-ticks... THE "TWO COW" EXPLANATION OF WHAT MAKES... A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT: You have two cows.You keep one and give one to your neighbor. A SOCIALIST: You have two cows. The government takes one and gives it to your neighbor. AN AMERICAN REPUBLICAN: You have two cows. Your neighbor has none. So what? AN AMERICAN DEMOCRAT: You have two cows. Your neighbor has none. You feel guilty for being successful. You vote people into office who tax your cows, forcing you to sell one to raise money to pay the tax. The people you voted for then take the tax money and buy a cow and give it to your neighbor. You feel righteous. A COMMUNIST: You have two cows. The government seizes both and provides you with milk. A FASCIST: You have two cows. The government seizes both and sells you the milk. You join the underground and start a campaign of sabotage. DEMOCRACY, AMERICAN STYLE: You have two cows. The government taxes you to the point you have to sell both to support a man in a foreign country who has only one cow, which was a gift from your government. CAPITALISM, AMERICAN STYLE: You have two cows. You sell one, buy a bull, and build a herd of cows. BUREAUCRACY, AMERICAN STYLE: You have two cows. The government takes them both, shoots one, milks the other, pays you for the milk, then pours the milk down the drain. AN AMERICAN CORPORATION: You have two cows. You sell one, and force the other to produce the milk of four cows. You are surprised when the cow drops dead. A FRENCH CORPORATION: You have two cows. You go on strike because you want three cows. A JAPANESE CORPORATION: You have two cows. You redesign them so they are one-tenth the size of an ordinary cow and produce twenty times the milk. You then create clever cow cartoon images called Cowkimon and market them World-Wide. A GERMAN CORPORATION: You have two cows. You reengineer them so they live for 100 years, eat once a month, and milk themselves. A BRITISH CORPORATION: You have two cows. They are mad. They die. Pass the shepherd's pie, please. AN ITALIAN CORPORATION: You have two cows, but you don't know where they are. You break for lunch. A RUSSIAN CORPORATION: You have two cows. You count them and learn you have five cows. You count them again and learn you have 42 cows. You count them again and learn you have 12 cows. You stop counting cows and open another bottle of vodka. A SWISS CORPORATION: You have 5000 cows, none of which belong to you. You charge others for storing them. A BRAZILIAN CORPORATION: You have two cows. You enter into a partnership with an American corporation. Soon you have 1000 cows and the American corporation declares bankruptcy. AN INDIAN CORPORATION: You have two cows. You worship both of them. A CHINESE CORPORATION: You have two cows. You have 300 people milking them. You claim full employment, high bovine productivity, and arrest the newsman who reported on them. AN ISRAELI CORPORATION: There are these two Jewish cows, right? They open a milk factory, an ice cream store, and then sell the movie rights. They send their calves to Harvard to become doctors. So, who needs people? AN ARKANSAS CORPORATION: You have two cows. That one on the left is kinda cute...

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2002 USENIX Security Symposium - Call for papers
by Kevin Fu 03 Dec '01

03 Dec '01

Symposium's in San Francisco in August. Papers due January 28 for review. In case your mailer doesn't like the way Eudora munges headers while forwarding, it was originally sent by Kevin Fu <fubob(a)MIT.EDU> Bill Stewart =================================== 2002 USENIX Security Symposium - Call for papers OVERVIEW Tutorials: August 5-6, 2002 Technical Sessions: August 7-9, 2002 The USENIX Security Symposium brings together researchers, practitioners, system administrators, system programmers, and others interested in the latest advances in security of computer systems. If you are working on any practical aspects of security or applications of cryptography, the program committee would like to encourage you to submit a paper. Submissions are due on January 28th, 2002. This symposium will last for four and a half days. Two days of tutorials will be followed by two and a half days of technical sessions including refereed papers, invited talks, works-in-progress, and panel discussions. IMPORTANT DATES Conference registration information and program will be available in May 2002 on the symposium Web site at http://www.usenix.org/events/sec02/ If you would like to receive the program booklet in print, please email your request, including your postal address, to: conference(a)usenix.org. Paper submission deadline: January 28th, 2002 Notification to authors: March 25th, 2002 Camera ready due: May 13th, 2002 SYMPOSIUM ORGANIZERS Program Chair Dan Boneh, Stanford University Program Committee Steve Bellovin, AT&T Labs - Research Matt Blaze, AT&T Labs - Research Drew Dean, SRI International Kevin Fu, M.I.T. Brian LaMacchia, Microsoft Corporation Patrick Lincoln, SRI International Vern Paxson, ICSI Radia Perlman, Sun Microsystems Laboratories Mike Reiter, Bell Labs, Lucent Avi Rubin, AT&T Labs - Research Adam Stubblefield, Rice University Leendert van Doorn, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center Wietse Venema, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center Dan Wallach, Rice University Bennet Yee, University of California, San Diego Elizabeth Zwicky, Counterpane Internet Security SYMPOSIUM TOPICS Refereed paper submissions are being solicited in all areas relating to systems and network security, including but not limited to: Adaptive security and system management Analysis of malicious code Analysis of network and security protocols Applications of cryptographic techniques Attacks against networks and machines Automated tools for source code analysis Authentication and authorization of users, systems, and applications Denial-of-service attacks File and filesystem security Firewall technologies Intrusion detection Privacy preserving systems Public key infrastructure Rights management and copyright protection Security in heterogeneous environments Security of agents and mobile code Security of Internet voting systems Techniques for developing secure systems World Wide Web security Since Usenix Security is primarily a systems security conference, papers focusing on cryptographic primitives or electronic commerce models, are encouraged to seek alternative conferences. REFEREED PAPERS Wednesday - Friday, August 7-9 Papers that have been formally reviewed and accepted will be presented during the symposium and published in the symposium proceedings. The proceedings will be distributed to attendees and, following the conference, will be available online to USENIX members and for purchase. Best Paper Awards Awards will be given at the conference for the best paper and for the best paper that is primarily the work of a student. TUTORIALS, INVITED TALKS, PANEL DISCUSSIONS, WIPS, AND BOFS In addition to the refereed papers and the keynote presentation, the technical program will include tutorials, invited talks, panel discussions, a Work-in-Progress session (WIPs), and Birds-of-a-Feather Sessions. You are invited to make suggestions regarding topics or speakers for any of these formats to the program chair via email to sec02chair(a)usenix.org. Tutorials (August 5-6) Tutorials for both technical staff and managers will provide immediately useful, practical information on topics such as local and network security precautions, what cryptography can and cannot do, security mechanisms and policies, firewalls and monitoring systems. If you are interested in proposing a tutorial, or suggesting a topic, contact the USENIX Tutorial Coordinator, Dan Klein, by email to dvk(a)usenix.org. Invited Talks (August 7-9) There will be several outstanding invited talks at the symposium in parallel with the refereed papers. Please submit topic suggestions and talk proposals via email to sec02it(a)usenix.org. Panel Discussions (August 7-9) The technical sessions will also feature some panel discussions. Please send topic suggestions and proposals to sec02chair(a)usenix.org. Work-in-Progress Session (WIPs) (August 9) The last session of the symposium will be a Works-in-Progress session. This session will consist of short presentations about work-in-progress, new results, or timely topics. Speakers should submit a one- or two-paragraph abstract to sec02wips(a)usenix.org by 6:00 pm on Wednesday, August 7, 2002. Please include your name, affiliation, and the title of your talk. The accepted abstracts will appear on the symposium Web site after the symposium. The time available will be distributed among the presenters with a minimum of 5 minutes and a maximum of 10 minutes. The time limit will be strictly enforced. A schedule of presentations will be posted at the symposium. Experience has shown that most submissions are usually accepted. Birds-of-a-Feather Sessions (BoFs) (August 6-8) There will be Birds-of-a-Feather sessions (BoFs) on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday evenings. Birds-of-a-Feather sessions are informal gatherings of persons interested in a particular topic. BoFs often feature a presentation or a demonstration followed by discussion, announcements, and the sharing of strategies. BoFs can be scheduled on-site, but if you wish to pre-schedule a BoF, please email the conference office, conference(a)usenix.org. They will need to know the title of the BoF with a brief description, the name, title and company and email address of the facilitator, your preference of date, and whether an overhead projector and screen is desired. HOW AND WHERE TO SUBMIT REFEREED PAPERS Papers should represent novel scientific contributions in computer security with direct relevance to the engineering of secure systems and networks. Both the work described in the paper and the paper itself must be substantially complete at the time of the submission. Full papers are encouraged, and should be about 8 to 14 typeset pages using an 11pt font or larger. Submissions must be received by January 28th, 2002. Papers will only be accepted electronically, via the symposium Web site, and must be in PDF format (e.g. processed by Adobe's Acrobat Distiller). Note that LaTeX users can use the "dvipdf" command to convert a DVI file into PDF format. Please make sure your submission can be opened using Adobe Acrobat 4.0. For more details on the submission process, authors are encouraged to consult the detailed author guidelines available at http://www.usenix.org/events/sec02/cfp/guidelines.html All submissions will be judged on originality, contribution to the field, and correctness. Each accepted submission may be assigned a member of the program committee to act as its shepherd through the preparation of the final paper. The assigned member will act as a conduit for feedback from the committee to the authors. Authors will be notified of acceptance by March 25th, 2002. Camera-ready final paper due date is May 13th, 2002. The USENIX Security Symposium, like most conferences and journals, requires that papers not be submitted simultaneously to another conference or publication and that submitted papers not be previously or subsequently published elsewhere. When appropriate, authors should arrange for a release for publication from their employer prior to submission. Papers accompanied by non-disclosure agreement forms are not acceptable and will be returned to the author(s) unread. Submissions will be read by the program committee and other selected members of the technical community for the purposes of technical review, but otherwise will be held in confidentiality. Specific questions about submissions may be sent via e-mail to sec02chair(a)usenix.org. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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CFP: PKI research workshop
by Carl Ellison 03 Dec '01

03 Dec '01

[Sorry if the headers munge, but I'm using the Eudora Annoying Redirect command to keep >s from interfering with signatures. It's actually from Carl Ellison <cme(a)acm.org> ] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Included below is the ASCII CFP for our upcoming PKI research workshop. We're especially soliciting papers on ways to use public key authentication/authorization that solve real problems, rather than merely follow the traditional marketing patter about PKI. ====================================================================== === 1st Annual PKI Research Workshop April 24-25, 2002. NIST, Gaithersburg MD, USA. www.cs.dartmouth.edu/~pki02/ Sponsors include NIST, NIH, and Internet2. To a large extent, the hoped-for public key infrastructure (PKI) has not "happened yet." PKI for large, eclectic populations has not materialized; PKI for smaller, less diverse "enterprise" populations is beginning to emerge, but at a slower rate than many would like or had expected. Why is this? This workshop among leading security researchers will explore the issues relevant to this question, and will seek to foster a long-term research agenda for authentication and authorization in large populations via public key cryptography. The workshop is intended to promote a vigorous and structured discussion---a discussion well-informed by the problems and issues in deployment today. We solicit papers, panel proposals, and participation. * Papers and Proposals Due: January 28, 2002 * Authors Notified: March 5, 2002 * Final Materials Due: April 1, 2002 * Workshop: April 24-25, 2002. Submitted works for panels and papers should address one or more critical areas of inquiry. Topics include (but not are not limited to): * Cryptographic methods in support of security decisions * The characterization and encoding of security decision data (e.g., name spaces, x509, SDSI/SPKI, XKMS, PGP, SAML, KeyNote, PolicyMaker), policy mappings and languages, etc. * The relative security of alternative methods for supporting security decisions; * Privacy protection and implications of different approaches; * Scalability of security systems; (are there limits to growth?) * Security of the rest of the components of a system; * User interface issues with naming, multiple private keys, selective disclosure * Mobility solutions * Approaches to attributes and delegation * Discussion of how the "public key infrastructure" required may differ from the ``PKI'' traditionally defined Papers should be submitted electronically in PDF. The final version of refereed papers should ideally be between 8 and 15 pages, and in no case more than 20 pages. Proposals for panels should be no longer than five pages in length, and should include possible panelists, and an indication of which of those panelists have confirmed participation. Full instructions will appear on our Web site by December 15, 2001. Program Committee Peter Alterman NIH Steve Bellovin AT&T Labs Research Stefan Brands McGill University Bill Burr NIST Carl Ellison Intel Stephen Farrell Baltimore Technologies Richard Guida Johnson and Johnson Peter Honeyman University of Michigan Ken Klingenstein University of Colorado Larry Landweber University of Wisconsin Neal McBurnett Internet2 Clifford Neuman USC Sean Smith (chair) Dartmouth College Steve Tuecke Argonne National Laboratory Contacts General Chair: Ken Klingenstein, University of Colorado. Ken.Klingenstein(a)Colorado.edu Program Chair: Sean Smith, Dartmouth College. sws(a)cs.dartmouth.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.5.8 iQA/AwUBPAlWFHPxfjyW5ytxEQL0tQCeIrRXXnbSpIMeSBxWFonre4VQGpoAnRzG h4JpL3OKU+ah4WizoLzP4qbj =wN/e -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- +------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Carl M. Ellison cme(a)acm.org http://world.std.com/~cme | | PGP: 08FF BA05 599B 49D2 23C6 6FFD 36BA D342 | +--Officer, officer, arrest that man. He's whistling a dirty song.-+ --------------------------------------------------------------------- The SPKI Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe spki" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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Russian Party of Pensioners Manifesto
by mattd 03 Dec '01

03 Dec '01

Thanks for that,Im going to publish it on Indymedia soon,real soon. If you are into cryptoanarchy with the emphasis on the anarchy,you may enjoy this... Elliott Abrams, who had pleaded guilty in 1981 to lying to Congress over the conduct of the war, was installed by the president to head his "office for democracy and human rights". See Tom Lehrer again. His criminal offence was described by White House spokesman Ari Fleischer as "a matter of the past". We used to say, NO to Western Imperialism and NO to Soviet Imperialism both. Self determination for ALL PEOPLES! One Empire has fallen. One still has to fall. But we should not mourn the passing of the Soviet prison of nations. The Minister of Education and the Minister of the Interior were assassinated. Students and young workers, determined to destroy the existing order, turned to the writings of Bakunin and Kropotkin for inspiration and with dynamite and pistol hurled themselves against the State. Working people, many of them recently arrived from the countryside to find employment in the vast new factories, elected representatives from their own class whom they could trust and whom they could remove at once if unsatisfactory. Strikes paralysed production, oppressed national groups on the borderlands rebelled, peasants burned and looted, and insurrection broke out The revolt, although short-lived, inspired the young anarchist movement. In spite of increased repression, its 'Battle Detachments' raided gunshops and armouries in search of the Browning pistols they cherished. Officials, police and bosses were murdered and countless 'expropriations' of banks and houses of the wealthy took place. Gun battles with police ended in death, jail or torture. This revolution, as a participant observed, was 'a purely spontaneous phenomenon, not at all the fruit of party agitation.' People were 'fired by a sense of unlimited freedom, a liberation from the restraints of their society.' 'Down with Authority and Capitalism' on black banners. Anarchists seized the mansions of the rich. One became 'The House of Rest', with rooms for reading, discussion and recreation and a children's playground in the garden. world-wide revolution based on free federations of urban and rural communes. In 1908 Nestor Makhno had been given a life sentence for the assassination of a police chief. Freed in 1917, he was elected head of the Soviet of Peasants and Workers in Gulyai-Polye. With an armed band marching behind a huge black banner on which was proclaimed 'Liberty or Death- The Land to the Peasants, the Factories to the Workers', Makhno began re-distributing the estates to the peasants. In 1918, when Austrian and White armies invaded the Ukraine, Makhno's partisans fought back: 'We will conquer not so that we may follow the example of past years and hand over our fate to some new master, but to take it in our own hands and conduct our lives according to our own will and our own conception of truth'. By the following spring the invaders were driven out and Gulyai-Polye was free from external control. Organising regional conferences of peasants, workers and insurgents, Makhno began to establish anarchist communes based on equality and mutual aid. At first the Bolsheviks hailed him as a 'courageous partisan' and 'great revolutionary', but subsequently attacked him as an 'anarcho-bandit'. Two Cheka agents were sent to assassinate Makhno, but the agents were caught and themselves shot. When Makhno invited Red soldiers to the Congress, a furious Trotsky declared him an outlaw, banned the Congress and sent troops to break up the anarchist communes. At this moment the Whites invaded again, driving on Moscow. Bolsheviks and anarchists were sent reeling, yet Makhno's army counter-attacked successfully. Trotsky used the time he had been given to re-organise the Red Army. By Christmas the Whites were expelled. Makhno's anarchists promptly entered Ekaterinoslav, threw open the jails and told the people that they were now free to organise their own lives. Freedom of speech, press and assembly was declared for all except authoritarian parties, which were dissolved. Bolsheviks were advised to 'take up some honest trade'. Again Trotsky outlawed Makhno and serious fighting raged for eight months until Whites invaded yet again. Trotsky appealed for Makhno's help, promising in return the release of all imprisoned anarchists and complete freedom of expression, short of urging the overthrow of the Bolshevik government. The Whites were finally defeated. With victory secure, Trotsky shot all the Makhnovist military commanders, attacked Makhno's HQ and wiped out the staff. The Cheka arrested members of the Nabat in Kharkov; throughout Russia, anarchist clubs, groups and newspaper offices were raided and closed down. Although badly wounded, Makhno, together with the remnants of his insurgent army, evaded the Bolsheviks for a year. Escaping eventually to Paris, he died in 1934 of alcohol and TB. Surviving anarchists launched a campaign of terror against the Bolsheviks. In September 1921, they blew up the Communist Party Moscow, leaving 67 dead or wounded. The anarchists were an immense influence on the popular revolution because their aims coincided with the people's desire to sweep away state and capital. For a brief moment it did seem possible that a social revolution would destroy all authority and create a decentralised society of voluntarily cooperating free individuals. But the anarchists' warning that power corrupts all who wield it - that authority stifles the revolutionary spirit and robs people of freedom - was ignored.

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Re: in praise of gold,
by mattd 03 Dec '01

03 Dec '01

"...nothing more than a cop-out. So it seems to me, at any rate. ~Faustine. " Like you last week (agent ?) faustine (cop-in?) Silence speaks volumes in this house.

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Re: 256 Bit Encryption for Secure Email and Secure Online File Storage
by Bill Stewart 03 Dec '01

03 Dec '01

At 04:31 PM 12/01/2001 -0800, Meyer Wolfsheim wrote: >Another proprietary key format. Why not base such a system on OpenPGP? OpenPGP, ClosedPGP, GPG, PGP2.x, and X.509 all have blazingly ugly data formats, especially for keys. The main advantages of recycling one of the N variations on PGP formats or one of the K variations on X.509 are that you can reuse code, and in some cases you can gain compatibility with existing user bases. On the other hand, you can gain compatibility with existing user bases by letting PGP users sign messages saying "My Cryptoheaven Public Key For Messages is <key1> and for Signatures is <key2>" and similarly letting X.509 users do the same if they want. It's not automated, but it can work ok. Also, of course, you'd need to register the Rijndael and SHA-256 entities onto the **PG** formatspaces, but they're generally designed for it. The cleanest key format I've seen is in CryptoKong - it has the advantage that Elliptic Curve cryptosystems let you use short keys, at least if you believe that the math works adequately, and it's not trying to use any "KeyID" as an abbreviation for the key, so it's just a simple direct encoding of the key, without PGP's annoyances of KeyID lookup and risks of KeyID forgery. Of course, it's also not mapping KeyIDs to users, only to messages, so if you want to maintain relationships between them, you've got to do it yourself, and if you want to have senders of some messages vet senders of other messages, you need to track the messages yourself. James Donald's implementation uses an Evil Microsoft Access database to save messages, but you could do a different implementation if you wanted to. Was the real motivation for using their own format simplicity? Or not-invented-here-ness? Or not-thinking-ness? Or unwillingness to wade through the huge amount of existing ugly code just for compatibility with existing ugly formats? Does it matter much? They're in the Software / Internet Services business, so either they'll find a niche where they get lots of users (in which case it's worth reviewing their code for real security), or they'll fail to do so and Darwin Will Get Them, like so many other projects out there, or they'll end up with a small but fanatic group of users who keep them going, or somebody will discover a Serious Bug which will blow away their security (though they do have at least semi-open source available for review.)

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