December 2001 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Argentina has decisively entered the road of revolution.
by mattd 25 Dec '01

25 Dec '01

>>Great propaganda piece. Take a revolt against government manipulation of the economy and portray it as the death of capitalism... Kinda gives himself away by describing the fall of Saigon as "foreign invaders fleeing from an army of national liberation." Marc de Piolenc mattd wrote: > > Argentina - The Revolution has Begun > > By Alan Woods Thanks Marc,Its from Indymedia.org,main board.It had some marxist dreck that I edited out.I fear for the anarchists if the leninists simply inherit the torture tables.Its vital more people know how dangerous these authoritarian socialists are. C/punks calling for crypto-anarchy are liable to be burned alive as commies.OR if the fucking MLers actually win,we could be toasted as crypto-fascists.Monkee's on a rock.There could be e-cash/barter opps though,doncha reckon?

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RE: Illusional delusions
by Anonymous 25 Dec '01

25 Dec '01

>> cash is not a solution, since it is observable. Anything observable is >> not a solution. > >Therefore murder, if not witnessed, never happened. If a body falls in the >forest...? You have a problem with simple sentences. Also, when you want to switch the arguments you must do it in more intelligent and coherent way. Payments should happen. The solution is to make them invisible. But let me do it in simpler terms: I owe Mr. Melon 100 credits, which is well-established and provable (to me and him) in our private currency. Mr. Melon owns Mr. Nomen 50 credits. It is very easy to transfer my debt and then I can perform some task for Mr. Nomen worth 50 credits. This happens often in real life. It's called barter and it is taxable, if it can be proved. Never converting anything to paper/book dollars makes it extremely hard to prove. People do favours to each other essentially on the same bases, sans bookkeeping or crypto. Once I did some programming for the guy and instead of paying me he gave his $2000 WW1 rifle to the mutual friend who wanted it and he took it towards commission on a real-estate transaction he did for me. This is a rare. Software could make it more convenient. Just peg a credit to a dollar for the start. >The fact that party X commits a crime without being witnessed does not >eliminate the crime. It merely makes prosecution a bit harder. That is the whole point of crypto. Once I declare your breathing to be a crime (and I have a bigger gun than you do) you better conceal it. >to. Remember that multiple-issuer currencies have been tried before in just I am talking about single-issuer currency. >> whose reputation you can't instrument. But someone can start a business >> for reputation building. Again, hardly new. > >Not new? Name 5 prominent reputation brokers. Reputation services? >Reputation clearing agents? What manner of reputation do they measure? High-interest credit cards or store credit-cards (same as high-interest since they limit you to a single source) that young people or people with no credit can get, for instance ? Mortgage insurance for those with low down-payment ? Maybe Mr. Anonymous who frequents South Africa will mediate transactions between canadians and south africans, since he knows both sides, for a fee ? High-priced shysters introducing their clients to each other ? >> some fine Afghan pot is a small price to pay for getting out of the >> state's sight. > >You want work too hard to stay out of the state's sight. Of course. I never buy controlled substances from dealers, for instance. Always from end-users I knew for years. >(Incidentally, it's "Illusory Delusions." "Ilusional" isn't a word. It's You are just plain stupid, aren't you ? It takes some intelligence to do ad hominems, you know. I sometimes make this mistake, taking plain idiocy for misinformed insight worth arguing. Go to a bookstore, there is a shelve labeled "Reference", take a book called "Dictionary" and look up Illusion (two "l"s, not one): Main Entry: il7lu7sion Pronunciation: i-'l|-zh&n Function: noun Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French, from Late Latin illusion-, illusio, from Latin, action of mocking, from illudere to mock at, from in- + ludere to play, mock -- more at LUDICROUS Date: 14th century 1 a obsolete : the action of deceiving b (1) : the state or fact of being intellectually deceived or misled : MISAPPREHENSION (2) : an instance of such deception 2 a (1) : a misleading image presented to the vision (2) : something that deceives or misleads intellectually b (1) : perception of something objectively existing in such a way as to cause misinterpretation of its actual nature (2) : HALLUCINATION 1 (3) : a pattern capable of reversible perspective 3 : a fine plain transparent bobbinet or tulle usually made of silk and used for veils, trimmings, and dresses - il7lu7sion7al /-'l|zh-n&l, -'l|-zh&-n&l/ adjective

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Remailer Stats (was: Swiss Bank in a Box)
by Ryan Lackey 25 Dec '01

25 Dec '01

I just did some statistical analysis on a logfile accidentally kept by an MTA which I didn't know was keeping it a few months ago. (which I've deleted, and made sure is not being kept anymore) Remailer traffic: approximately 3000-5000 messages/day (mix II + cpunk) Unique input addresses over 13 days: 539 (which would include case variations, aliases, etc.) This is *not* statistically significant. At the time the stats were taken, HavenCo was a new remailer. Also, if *I* were an end-user using remailers, I would use havenco as an *exit* remailer, not an entry remailer, since it is topologically close to no one; one would wish to get the message into the remailer network as soon as possible. HavenCo only has, say, 3000 active tcp sessions at any one time in or out of the facility, so if someone were monitoring, that's a small set too. A completely out of ass argument is that this points to a stable remailer-user population of 1-10k users, with <1% responsible for most of the traffic (web-based gateways, pingers, spammers, people using scripts to send abuse messages) IMO most "real" remailer users are actually using web-based gateways, rather than initial SMTP, to enter the network. So these stats are utterly flawed anyway. A population of even 10k is certainly well within FBI (or even my personal) resources to investigate, at least to a cursory level. Given that most likely a lot of those users are located at large and "compliant" ISPs or mail providers, gaining access to their normal outgoing mail feed, connection logs, and identity information is just not that hard. Especially if you're willing to break the law. So, I'd estimate the cost to recover the *average* remailer user's identity at < USD 500 (assuming repeated use). Monitor the ~15 big remailers (knocking the ones off which you can't monitor, either through legal or covert technical means...spamming via them as exit and complaining to isp might be good enough). You should be able to get samples of mail from the same users without much difficulty, monitoring their non-remailed communications at the originating ISP. Presumably, the users may be sending some volume of related traffic via non-remailers; this may be sufficient (could "used an evil anonymous remailer" be sufficient to get wiretap authority on regular mail in a terrorist case?) Traffic analysis is *hard* to defeat. Especially when your set is small enough that you can do out of band analysis on all the participants. If ZKS had, as some were saying, <500 customers for the freedom product, it would have been even worse for them. With a small enough number of customers, you can blackbag users, intimidate, or whatever. I think unless there is a compelling [non-privacy reason] for end-users to participate in a mix, it's hopeless to try for >10k users. If participation in a mix were incidental to some other activity, such as posting normal text postings to usenet, browsing a very popular website which happens to use padded SSL for all communications, using an encrypted IM system which did a mix of some kind as an automatic part of operation, or participated in a large-scale p2p system. I think if participation in a mix is incidental to *normal* email use, that would be sufficient as well. I think there are a few possible routes to doing this: 0) Cypherpunk applications continuing to be few and far between, not up to "commercial" standards, and not widely deployed. The default. 1) Cypherpunks writing widely-used applications: this has been tried in the past and seems to fail. Few developers of widely-deployed commercial software are explicitly cypherpunks, even though they may be libertarians. They often don't understand crypto at any deep level, at BEST they use a pre-packed crypto library like OpenSSL if it is a mostly drop-in replacement for a non-crypto counterpart, or otherwise widely documented. Witness the large number of conventional security weaknesses in applications today, failure to manage keys properly in the few crypto applications, etc. 2) Cypherpunks modifying existing open-source applications to incorporate crypto. Despite the open source ideal, most developers don't like taking "outside" patches, especially where security or network functions are concerned. Applications designed for modularity are a lot better. Many apps are a "moving target". 3) Cypherpunks developing "libcypherpunks" or some other library which includes cryptographic secure, anonymous, etc. replacements for existing functions -- the md5 passwords vs. crypt in various unix OSes is a good example. Things which have no conventional analogue should be packaged in a programmer-friendly way. Some of these could include distributed operations; general distrbution is really hard, but certain specialized functions are easy, and having a good way to do it would support experimentation. 4) Cypherpunks producing a "this is how to develop secure, privacy protecting applications" document and training for conventional developers. I assume most people who develop worthwhile software already understand roughly "why" they should do this kind of thing, but that don't know "how". 5) Participation in standards bodies to make "MUST" or "SHOULD" security for protocols (with the hope that standard/reference implementations will be available). I hate standards bodies, but some people seem to get off on this, and it's not unhelpful. -- Ryan Lackey [RL7618 RL5931-RIPE] ryan(a)havenco.com CTO and Co-founder, HavenCo Ltd. +44 7970 633 277 the free world just milliseconds away http://www.havenco.com/ OpenPGP 4096: B8B8 3D95 F940 9760 C64B DE90 07AD BE07 D2E0 301F

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Re: http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/12/23/plane.investigation/index.html
by Nomen Nescio 25 Dec '01

25 Dec '01

> This just gets better and better... > > "Meanwhile, the Federal Aviation Administration announced Sunday all > U.S. airports are required to add random shoe checks of passengers to the > already established practice of random baggage checks." Those of us travelling over the holidays can be thankful that the bomber did not hide the explosives up his ass.

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Re: simplest possible ecash mint
by Nomen Nescio 25 Dec '01

25 Dec '01

Ryan Lackey writes: > * Some protocol for external communication (direct sockets is easiest, > but message-based protocols are far better, and allow a front end > processor to handle communications details) A message is simply a packet of data. Using a message-based protocol says nothing about the underlying transport, sockets or carrier pigeons. If you did this as a computational box with a communications front end then a simple socket-based RPC protocol would probably be best between the mint box and the comm box. > * Reissue operation (powers of two coins; so you can pay with 1 x 2 coin > and get 2 x 1 coins back) Sure. You give a collection of coins worth $X, along with the blinding factors appropriate to a different set of coins worth the same amount. This fits well into the simple exchange mint concept. > * A clock (decent rate RNG or PRNG is useful too, obviously) > * A double spending database maintained internally Right, and you better make sure it's not going to grow too big. It may be necessary to expire coins at fixed time intervals (every two years or so). > * Two account counters maintained internally: treasury and float > * "Signed float": tell anyone who asks exactly how much has been > issued, signed as the mint. > * A means of increasing or decreasing the treasury value, after > authentication, and ideally an internal log of these changes (which > could be published as well, signed) Does this have per-user accounts in it? If not, how does the float amount ever change? Do some people donate ecash to the bank's treasury voluntarily, reducing the float? No one would do that. Are some people entitled to receive ecash from the treasury? Who and why? Is this the transfer-in mechanism, or simply a way for the banker to use the treasury account as his personal slush fund? What you really have are three kinds of transactions: those within the system (pure ecash transfers), those out of the system (cashing in ecash for dollars), and those into the system (purchasing ecash with dollars). Maybe you could explain how you see these kinds of transactions working in terms of your float and treasury account counters. > * Key management functionality (signing keys generated onboard; some > kind of hierarchy so non-coins can be linked to coins) What is this linkage for? > * Ability to publish a description of some sort of the coins Yes, and whatever public keys are appropriate for the protocol. > * Power switch Don't forget the light that tells you its on. Really, this level of detail is redundant.

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county to use GPS, polygraph on paroled sex offenders
by David Honig 25 Dec '01

25 Dec '01

Orange County is taking what some civil libertarians consider troubling steps to keep tabs on released sex offenders, giving them periodic lie detector tests and, starting next year, requiring some to wear wristbands linked to satellite tracking systems. The county will become the first in the state, and one of only a dozen or so nationwide, to track sex offenders on parole and probation with global positioning satellites, which allow officials to pinpoint offenders' locations around the clock. <snip> http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-000101626dec23.story?coll=la%2Dheadline s%2Dcalifornia%2Dmanual

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Re: Tim May on the end of a rope.
by mattd 25 Dec '01

25 Dec '01

>>Gaston Leval,Bookchin,Paz,Chomsky and > even H.Thomas. Commie liars, except for Thomas, who does not say what you claim he does. Ahwell! Still if you want to lump stalinists,trots and anarchs together thats OK.Its a free country. Mind you don't get shot for being a crypto-anarchist though and if your red triangle fades to pink,don't come crying to me.Id still luv to keep this thread going, I get a picture of Tim May as Amon Goethe whenever I see the heading.)Ill also be sure and ask all my anarchist mates if we cant do better next time at http://www.infoshop.org/ and http://www.ainfos.ca/A-Infos/

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None
by owner-cypherpunks＠Algebra.COM 25 Dec '01

25 Dec '01

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Ode to John Ashcroft and Civil Liberties
by Matthew Gaylor 25 Dec '01

25 Dec '01

Some thoughts to think about regarding our constitutional rights <http://www.nonviolence.org/commentary/114.php> Ode to John Ashcroft and Civil Liberties Sung to the tune of Santa Claus is Coming to Town You better watch out, You better not pout, You better not cry. I'm telling you why. John ashcroft's coming to town. He sees you with your lawyer. He listens to every phone; He reads everyone's email, and he locks you all alone. With little tin guns And tiny cellphones Rooty hoot, hoot, he's breaking in homes, Big Brother is coming to town. He knows when you are traveling. He knows who you're around; Tried in military courtrooms, Not a lawyer can be found. He's makin' a list, and checking for race, Gonna arrest those who are dark of face. Big Brother's coming to town. You better watch out, You better not pout, You better not cry. I'm telling you why. Big Brother's coming to town. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Maintained by The Nonviolence Web:nvweb@nonviolence.org Page created December 03, 101. NVWeb, Philadelphia USA ************************************************************************** Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) Matthew Gaylor, (614) 313-5722 ICQ: 106212065 Archived at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fa/ **************************************************************************

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Slashdot | Carnivore Comes To India
by Jim Choate 25 Dec '01

25 Dec '01

http://slashdot.org/articles/01/12/25/0524224.shtml -- -- ____________________________________________________________________ Day by day the Penguins are making me lose my mind. Bumper Sticker The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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