November 2000 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact...
by Kevin E. Fu 19 Nov '00

19 Nov '00

Of relevance to SSL and trust in DNS... Even without stealing keys, there are unconventional ways of circumventing SSL server authentication. That is, pretending to be an SSL server that you are not. For instance, a client might forget to verify in a resumed SSL session that the server hostname matches the CN involved with the original connection. If the client starts a resumable session with a server, that server can pretend to be other hosts. Examples: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-05.html http://snafu.fooworld.org/~fubob/netscape-ssl.html There is not a well-defined trust model for proxied SSL content. SSL authenticates servers, not content. Example: http://www.mit.edu:8008/menelaus/bt/17272 Even if SSL were perfect, implementing certificate management will remain tricky. -------- Kevin E. Fu (fubob(a)mit.edu) PGP key: https://snafu.fooworld.org/~fubob/pgp.html >Unless that problem is fixed, man in the middle is hardly made more >difficult - for example, Mallory could break into some random machine on >the net and steal it's public key, then hijack local DNS and when someone >goes to amazon.com redirect them to amazon.hackeddomain.com, and then >proxy to amazon.com - now even SSL says the connection is safe. > >-Bram Cohen

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Re: Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact...
by Lynn.Wheeler＠firstdata.com 19 Nov '00

19 Nov '00

specifically with respect to SSL server certificates ... their primary objective was supposedly to overcome shortcomings in the domain name infrastructure integrity (and as stated, most of the SSL server certificate issuing entities actually also have dependencies on that integrity). Fixes for the integrity of the domain name infrastructure ... eliminates the domain name infrastructure as a business case/justification for the existance of those certificates. Specifically with respect to SSL server certificate, the remaining issue is possibly merchant/server trust (not trust with respect to internet operational integrity ... but fusiness/fraud trust with respect to the business operation of the merchant/server). Establishing that trust goes beyond just having the comfort that if you are defrauded that you might be able to identify the guilty party. That can be addressed with an online BBB &/or consumer report type of service providing real-time information. Eliminating both justifications for SSL server certificates ... then makes the vast majority of the existing SSL server certificates redundant and superfulous (and I believe would severely impact the business case justification for setting up an operation to provide such a service). Now this is applicable to the current existing dominant PKI deployment in the world today (possibly accounting for 99.999999999% of instances where there is a certificate transmitted and a client checks the contents of that certificate). It possibly is not applicable to any other hypothetical PKI implementation which may or may not currently exist. Ben Laurie <ben(a)algroup.co.uk> on 11/19/2000 05:03:20 AM

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Re: Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact...
by Lynn.Wheeler＠firstdata.com 19 Nov '00

19 Nov '00

actually ... not really ... this was discussed early this summer as to what they actually check ... and how trivial it is to fabricate necessary details to pass such checking random ref: http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsmore.htm#client3 in general it is sufficient to have registered any DBA name & have a d&b entry plus some misc. other stuff ... all relatively easy to establish. Since the DBA name & d&b entry aren't cross-checked as part of the SSL certificate validation ... just the domain name in the certificate against the domain name used ... you could be really surprised at what comes up for DBA names. I've had credit card statements that listed the DBA names which had absolutely no relationship to the name of the store I had been to ... which i eventually had to call both the credit card company/bank and the store to figure out what was going on. Ben Laurie <ben(a)algroup.co.uk> on 11/19/2000 04:08:39 AM

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Re: Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact...
by Lynn.Wheeler＠firstdata.com 19 Nov '00

19 Nov '00

oh yes, as to the other kinds of certificates. basically this is an issue of trust establishment. there are various forms of trust establishment, advertisement, brand, word-of-mouth, previous history, etc ... not just BBB or consumer report like stuff. Transactions are highly skewed ... with the majority of transactions having some form of trust establishment not needing BBB, consumer report, etc. (i.e. previous history, brand, etc) on the internet, for the minority of transaction w/o other forms of trust establishment and which would benefit from a BBB, consumer report, etc solution ... there can actually be two approaches: 1) offline paradigm; certificates are offline paradigm solution ... they've been manufactored at some time in the past with potentially out-of-date and/or really stale information. 2) online paradigm; a BBB, consumer report, etc online web site that gives up-to-date, real-time information about a merchant. these would be well-known web-sites and merchants could even have buttons that take the consumer to such a web-site. Some number of the certification, licensing, & trust organizations have actually expressed preference for the online paradigm, in part because it creates a tighter bound with the consumer, they have better tracking of consumer reliance on their services, and the information provided is current & up-to-date.

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RE: Schneier: Why Digital Signatures are not Signatures (was Re :CRYPTO-GRAM, November 15, 2000)
by Lynn.Wheeler＠firstdata.com 18 Nov '00

18 Nov '00

there are issues about authentication ... like conceptual frame-works of something you have, something you know, and something you are. it is possible to put together digital signature authentication technology/frame-works involving digital signature that are dependent on one or more pieces of 3-factor authentication. legal "signatures" as indication of intent have involved issues like counterfeit and understanding (and various regulations about font-sizes, wording, different expectations about prudent person, etc). a digital signature, once executed is a lot harder to counterfeit (compared to various written signatures) ... however there is much less direct correlation between intention and the act of executing a digital signature. digital signature in conjunction with various process that can proove that every digital signature executed was directly dependant on various combinations of 3-factor authentication (for each and every digital signature executed) attempts for a tighter correlation and demonstrate some degree of actual binding (between intention and signature execution). however, they also introduce new technology challenges ... there is now a significantly wider gap between the presentation of the information that a person may be agreeing to ... and the actual representation that is involved in executing digital signatures. paper documents also have had the advantage that the presentation of the information and the signature application is nearly identical technology .... much closer binding between the representation of what is being agreed to and the method of indicating that agreement. There are not a whole lot of cases where as the person is using a pen to sign a specific piece of paper ... that the pen can wonder off and sign a totally different piece of paper (like radar getting week-end passes signed in the MASH show). So the understanding issue pretty much stays the same in both environments (digital signature and paper signature) ... digital signatures (in conjunction with the appropriate authentication framework) can reduce the instances of counterfeit signatures being applied to documents ... but also opens up the instances where what a person is presented isn't necessarily what the person is signing. So one issue might be ... all other factors being equal ... is the magnitude of any counterfeit reduction significantly greater than the increase in the "what you see is what you sign" problem and the "did the person actually intend/confirm that particular signature" problem. "Paul Kierstead" <paul.kierstead(a)alcatel.com> on 11/17/2000 06:09:02 AM Please respond to paul.kierstead(a)alcatel.com

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Re: Atlanta Fed on a Theory of Financial Privacy
by Somebody 18 Nov '00

18 Nov '00

No, it doesn't use the "B" word, but it is fun to see someone _define_ money as "a technology that allows consumer A to anonymously conduct a transaction with firm B." I am stirred to view the referenced literature in which record-keeping and credit are related to currency. One of the most common counter-arguments to bearer transactions has been to point out that the cost of centralized bookkeeping is falling and our ability to scale it is rising (e.g. DTC, FederalReserve, NSCC, CREST. These, the argument goes, handle huge centralized bookkeeping and credit scorekeeping chores with a very low per item cost.) In fact this argument is mentioned in this tract. The insight here is to note that transactions carry a "privacy right" with them, iff they can be conducted anonymously, and this can affect the bargaining process. For the time being, it remains an intellectual/academic exercise whether anonymous e-money is the most cost effective solution, or whether privacy can be economically grafted onto huge bookkeeping data processing systems. To some of us the answer is intuitive, but I'm sure it will come down to "bits on the wire" before we have very many believers. "R. A. Hettinga" wrote: > Lions and Tigers and Coasian Microeconomics, oh, my... > > http://www.frbatlanta.org/publica/work_papers/wp00/wp0022.pdf > > No mention of the "B" word, but, then, they're not supposed to, yet, right? > > :-) > > Cheers, > RAH > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Name: Theorytrxpriv.pdf > Theorytrxpriv.pdf Type: Acrobat (application/pdf) > Encoding: base64 > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > -- > ----------------- > R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> > The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> > 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA > "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, > [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to > experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: Atlanta Fed on a Theory of Financial Privacy
by Somebody 18 Nov '00

18 Nov '00

No, it doesn't use the "B" word, but it is fun to see someone _define_ money as "a technology that allows consumer A to anonymously conduct a transaction with firm B." I am stirred to view the referenced literature in which record-keeping and credit are related to currency. One of the most common counter-arguments to bearer transactions has been to point out that the cost of centralized bookkeeping is falling and our ability to scale it is rising (e.g. DTC, FederalReserve, NSCC, CREST. These, the argument goes, handle huge centralized bookkeeping and credit scorekeeping chores with a very low per item cost.) In fact this argument is mentioned in this tract. The insight here is to note that transactions carry a "privacy right" with them, iff they can be conducted anonymously, and this can affect the bargaining process. For the time being, it remains an intellectual/academic exercise whether anonymous e-money is the most cost effective solution, or whether privacy can be economically grafted onto huge bookkeeping data processing systems. To some of us the answer is intuitive, but I'm sure it will come down to "bits on the wire" before we have very many believers. "R. A. Hettinga" wrote: > Lions and Tigers and Coasian Microeconomics, oh, my... > > http://www.frbatlanta.org/publica/work_papers/wp00/wp0022.pdf > > No mention of the "B" word, but, then, they're not supposed to, yet, right? > > :-) > > Cheers, > RAH > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > Name: Theorytrxpriv.pdf > Theorytrxpriv.pdf Type: Acrobat (application/pdf) > Encoding: base64 > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > -- > ----------------- > R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> > The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> > 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA > "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, > [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to > experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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CDR: Re: Aces high (long reply)
by jonathan＠screaming.org 18 Nov '00

18 Nov '00

> >And despite all the talk, chad pregnancy is still a problem in America > >today. You know all those chads are just going to end up on welfare. > > They burn real well. Just feed them into the incinerators. Hell that's funny. It really is. Now something that sucks: I just saw a report on CNN-or-some-such, that the Bush Camp was outraged that they'd seen some Techie "rifling the punchcard ballots" before feeding them into the machine!!! How many of us here can harken back to the days of punchcards in computing? Did you not, routinely, rifle them prior to feeding them in to the reader, in order to dislodge the "chads"? WTF, I respectfully ask? Morons will begin raining from the damn sky. Skeet shooting anyone? /jonathan

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CDR: Re: Aces high (long reply)
by Allen Ethridge 18 Nov '00

18 Nov '00

On Friday, November 17, 2000, at 09:37 PM, jonathan(a)screaming.org wrote: > I just saw a report on CNN-or-some-such, that the Bush Camp was > outraged that they'd seen some Techie "rifling the punchcard ballots" > before feeding them into the machine!!! > > How many of us here can harken back to the days of punchcards in > computing? Did you not, routinely, rifle them prior to feeding them in > to the reader, in order to dislodge the "chads"? WTF, I respectfully > ask? I can, barely, and, no, I didn't. But I get your point. The card punching machines I used did a good job of punching a clean hole. And I noticed on my Texas ballot just how cleanly the holes were punched. If there were many chads hanging about then either the punching equipment, the cards or both were faulty. Maybe the butterfly wasn't the only flaw in the design of the ballots.

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CDR: Re: Florida Supreme Court freezes certification
by jonathan＠screaming.org 17 Nov '00

17 Nov '00

Mr. not-so-well said: > > Florida Supreme Court freezes certification. > > > > (That's it.) (As they well should have, given its statistical invalidity.) To which replied some entity which cannot distinguish Bush Spin from actual events: > Hmmm. That would seem to be a violation of separation of powers. > > The Florida deadline law is very clear. If the Florida Supreme > Court wishes to rule on a suit that the Dems bring up then that > is their authority, but preventing the Secretary of State from > doing her duly appointed job seems to be a violation of > separation of powers. Except that the legal motion was filed by the Reps, not the Dems, originally. They brought it on them-damn-selves. Idiots. Christ. Is the entire Republican Establishment as fucking low-IQ as GWB? What a bunch of morons/amateurs. The only--*only*--aspect of AG that I can respect is the fact that he can read at at least an 8th grade level. Fuck. For those of us that understand that our Constitutional Rights(tm) may hang in the balance (for, oh, say the next 20 years or so), I can't say that having an illiterate moron in The Office is a reassuring idea--I mean, I thought that at least the Puppet Masters weren't such lamerz. Thank <your favorite entity here> that whomever takes the Oval office, he'll swear in with his proverbial intestines around his proverbial ankles. Evisceration2000 /jonathan

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