October 2000 - cypherpunks-legacy

CDR: smile all the time
by Anonymous Remailer 17 Oct '00

17 Oct '00

Warning for German motorists FRANKFURT, Germany -- German motorists have been told to stop making rude gestures at traffic cameras or they could be charged with offending the police. A Bavarian court has ruled that a driver who held up his middle finger while passing a traffic camera was addressing police officers rather than the equipment itself, German auto association Automobil Club Europe said. The motorist in question had argued that he didnt think the camera was switched on. Germany is renowned for having no speed restrictions on many of its motorways but rigorously enforces limits on other roads, often with the help of speed monitoring equipment.

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CDR: $$$ chico.cablelan.net crazy.html (1/1)
by no＠aol.com 17 Oct '00

17 Oct '00

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CDR: cell phones
by anonymous＠openpgp.net 17 Oct '00

17 Oct '00

>Can anyone help me on encrypting the numbers i punch and messages i have in a cell phone that is NOT WAP ennabled . > and can anyone tell me how is cell phone encryption dependent on wap ? The Fedz can watch who you call and what DTMF tones you press without the same warrant they need to listen to voice. Your cellphone location (ergo, yours) is 0wn3d by them too. As is your cellphone-stored address book, in practice. WAP encrypts data between your phone and the basestation, at which point it is cleartext, and may continue on as a new ssl session, and you trust your cell service provider dont you? Oh, and dont think GSL, which stands for voice encryption for gullible europeans, is going to help :-) Clearly cellphones need more low-power MIPS to do the crypto they really should be doing. And the OEMs need a few uncoercable paranoids on their design staff. Otherwise theyre just deceiving customers, or even making them more exposed than before. Ann Fibian -------- "You have no privacy. Now bend over and smile" ---Scott McNealy

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CDR: Letter from the President of Match.com
by president＠match.com 17 Oct '00

17 Oct '00

Dear Match Member, As we worked to launch a new Match.com, our number one goal was to deliver a site that met the high expectations set by members like you. Despite careful planning, we were forced to move to the new Match sooner than desired as a result of serious technical problems with the old system. This prevented the important testing and perfecting necessary in the roll out of anything new. During the transition to the new site, we encountered some unanticipated difficulties. I sincerely apologize for the inconvenience and frustration these difficulties may have caused you. I would also like to thank you for your patience during the transition and express my sincerest gratitude to the many members that have provided invaluable feedback. Be assured that the entire Match Team is working around the clock to deliver the highest quality site possible. I think that it is equally important for me to address a collective sentiment felt by many members, which is Why fix something if it isnt broken? In fact, the main impetus for this latest change was driven by two key challenges. First, the previous technical platform for Match was not stable and close to broken. This ultimately created serious limitations that would hamper our ability to serve you and the growing Match membership in the future. Secondly, in order to add exciting new features and functionality to the site, we had to move to a new platform. On a closing note, I am pleased to announce at the time of this letter, everything on Match.com should be fully functional. What does this mean to you the user: 1) We have your photos and are posting them to the site as quickly as possible. However, due to a backlog of approximately 19,000 photos, it may be early next week before all photos are visible. 2) All Member email correspondence is being delivered. At one point, our email processor did experience an interruption in service, but weve resolved all email issues. 3) Your Customer Care questions should be answered promptly. As you can imagine when the site experienced difficulties, many users sent in email to the Customer Care Team causing a large backlog that took a while to work through. 4) Matching now functions as it did before, returning the types of Matches you have come to expect. Again I thank you for your patience and understanding and wish you the best of luck in finding your perfect match. Sincerely, Cindy Hennessy President, Match.com

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CDR: GEMA / tax Lars
by drt＠un.bewaff.net 17 Oct '00

17 Oct '00

I just checked the Legal Status of the GEMA - http://www.gema.de/eng/ GEMA is a "eingetragener Verein" (registered Club) and has no direct association with the state. But there is the "Urheberrechtswahrnehmungsgesetz", sometimes called Lex GEMA. It basically says that you have to proof to GEMA (it doesn't spell out GEMA) that you haven't played music registered with GEMA. If you don't they can sue you for royalities in court. They don't have to proof anything. drt -- DC hat so einen cryptischen Syntax, den muß man einfach lieben. ---Ingo Schwitters http://koeln.ccc.de/~drt/

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CDR: fairyisis invites you to join the "Power Promotion" SmartGroup
by powerpromotion-subscribe-conf-971753768.ommpnddifdbmladlbblp＠smartgroups.com 17 Oct '00

17 Oct '00

* An Invitation fairyisis (fairyisis(a)hotmail.com) has invited you to join the "Power Promotion" SmartGroup. * JOINING To join the group and see the calendar of events, documents, pictures, questionnaires and group emails, go to our site at http://www.smartgroups.com/joingroup?gid=313442&p=4tbk6d9t&u=5154977 and register. -OR- Send a reply to this message if you only want to see the group emails. The following terms and conditions apply: http://www.smartgroups.com/text/en/legal.cfm * What is SmartGroups.com? SmartGroups.com is an effective tool for group communication. Each group has its own email address allowing members to post and receive messages from the group, as well as a calendar, an area for storing group documents, a voting facility and even its own database area. Managers of SmartGroups.com can customise the group's home page, and turn functionality on or off to suit their requirements. If you'd like to learn more about SmartGroups.com generally, you can take the tour on the website. * Unsubscribing Once you join the group, if you decide to leave, you can do so either from the group's homepage or by sending an email to powerpromotion-unsubscribe(a)smartgroups.com Yours sincerely The SmartGroups.com Team

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CDR: I have invited you to join the "Power Promotion" SmartGroup
by fairyisis＠hotmail.com 17 Oct '00

17 Oct '00

Hi, Please don't use any responders! Remember when you join an e-mail group you will recieve e-mails, this is not spam!!! (Please note if bouncing occures your membership will be delieted) I've discovered this great online community service called SmartGroups.com. I have created this group, 'Power Promotion', which I think you will also be interested in. I've asked SmartGroups.com to send you an invitation to join, which should be in your inbox just after this email. Email me back if you need any help on how to join, or what it's all about... Regards

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CDR: Re: Anonymous Remailers cpunk
by Bill Stewart 17 Oct '00

17 Oct '00

I've reordered several sections of the discussion. At 07:18 PM 10/13/00 -0500, Jim Choate wrote: > On Fri, 13 Oct 2000, Trei, Peter wrote: > > It is only exit remailers (ie, the remailer which sends > > to the final recipient) which get hassled for sending spam. >And it has NOTHING to do with the encryption. >The lack of log's is what prevents back tracing. Back tracing is only necessary if They weren't eavesdropping in the first place. Remember that the goal of remailers is to prevent serious attackers from tracing traffic, not just to prevent complainers from succeeding. If you allow unencrypted incoming traffic, you lose. If you allow unencrypted outgoing traffic, you also lose, unless the destination is a public Usenet forwarder or something. The only unencrypted email you should be delivering to normal recipients is something like "Hi! An anonymous person who you know wants to send you a secret message. Get PGP at www.pgp.com and publish your keys" Eric Hughes and Raph Levien did some work a few years ago indicating that message sizes may be enough to analyze traffic flows in a Type I remailer network anyway - you need to go with Mixmaster or maybe even Pipenets for security. Of course, no Bad Guy would *ever* think of eavesdropping the PGP.com or MIT keyservers to do traffic analysis on key requests. >> A spammer (or your spammer's proxy) is not going to >> individually encrypt messages to thousands or ... >They do it now, sans encryption. The mass distribution is what makes it >economical. If the encryption can be gateway'ed then it's useless and >doesn't raise the cost significantly. >A more useful mechanism would be to distribute the keys and appropriate >client software to spammers. What's a flat $50?... If the spammer can get a gateway to do the work of fetching keys and encrypting messages for millions of spam targets, the gateway is probably toast for a few weeks anyway. Remember that the spammer has all the time they want for pre-computation - they're only vulnerable once they start sending out mass quantities of messages. (On the other hand, what spammers do lack is clues and creativity.) It used to be possible to extract keys from the PGP keyservers, which meant that a low-tech spammer could nab 5-20000 email addresses and a high-tech spammer could also nab that many crypto keys. I've heard people say there are over a million keys in the current LDAP servers; I haven't explored whether it's easy to bulk extract them (e.g. query on "email address includes '@'".) If you wanted to build a custom crypto-spamware for this volume, you've got a few advantages over vanilla PGP. The bulk of the mail message is the same for everybody, so there's no need to encrypt the body multiple times - just encrypt it once and use the same symmetric key for each, and only do the public-key part separately for each target. If there are message parts that do change, e.g. the encrypted part contains the "Request-Remailing-To: target37(a)wherever.com" and the remailer doesn't enforce encrypted-outgoing-only, you can still make it work by exploiting CBC's self-synchronization. Set up the message so the variable line is padded to a whole number of cypher blocks (e.g. N*8 byte) ending with two of whichever Carriage Return/Linefeed you need, then two more blocks of disposable junk, then more real text (again, probably starting with CR/LF), and the CBC will misdecrypt the disposable blocks but sync up again afterwords. Ugly, but shouldn't be particularly destructive, if you can survive the occasional unprintables. This lets you only do hard work for the public-key encryption and the symmetric-key parts that surround it, without having to do symmetric-key encryption on the whole message every time. It's much tougher to pull this off for something that needs to create good cyphertext as its output, so it's much tougher to trick remailers with encrypted-outgoing-only. You at least have to duplicate encryption for more PGP header, but you might be able to get past it into the message body safely. If you're doing a long spam, it may still be worthwhile, though if all you're sending is two blinking multicolored lines of Get your RED-HOT SPAM HERE http://www.spam-monger.com/ you probably weren't creative enough to have done this much work :-) >> The goal is to make remailer operators life easier by >> preventing them from being used to spam random >> lusers, who may initiate complaints against the >> remailer operator. > >No, the goal is to stop spammers. >In addition, there are aspects of remailer operation that make the >complaints about spam pretty irrelevant. There are two problems - spammers and harassers. The prevalent cypherpunks remailer attitudes toward spammers seems to be keeping them from overwhelming your resources and making sure complaints about spam go to /dev/null or the apology autoresponder instead of your real mailbox, but more serious harassers can get you shut down faster. A harassment apology autoresponder helps a bit, but encrypted-only-outgoing radically reduces the threat, and keeps most of the spammers abusing other people. If you're running your own Tier 1 ISP, and you host Spamford, you can become the next Dead AGIS, but it takes a *lot* of complaint. If you're running your own small ISP, you're relatively safe, but enough complaints can get your Tier 1 upstreams to drop you. But if you're just a customer, your ISP may have some tolerance level but a determined abuser can still get you shut down. >> It is not to prevent spam passing through a remailer >> somewhere in mid-cloud. While such encrypted >> spam will increase the volume of traffic, for most >> remailers that is a Good Thing - more material to >> confuse the traffic analysis. As long as it gets >> dropped before leaving the remailer network, no >> harm is done. > >Nobody said anything about the interim processing until now. >How is this relevant to the 'free speech' aspect of requiring >the use of particular forms of encryption end-to-end. Middleman remailers don't get complaints except about resource utilization - Peter had addressed the issue that exit remailers need some protection from spam complaints, but for middle remailers you just don't need to worry. (You still need encrypted outgoing for security, but if your output only goes to remailers that enforce encrypted incoming you don't need to implement anything yourself, though it doesn't hurt you.) >I'm in Zimbabwe and the remailer is in the US, how do I manage the keys to >enter the network in such a way that it is secure? PGP web of trust works fine, just a bit slower from there. Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, bill.stewart(a)pobox.com PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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CDR: Re: Anonymous Remailers cpunk
by Bill Stewart 17 Oct '00

17 Oct '00

At 07:18 PM 10/13/00 -0500, Jim Choate wrote: >Where's the key management mechanism to ensure the security of the traffic >in the remailer network? That's unfortunately a potentially serious problem given current practice. Most remailer keys are unsigned, or at best self-signed, so the only way to know if a key is the real one is to compare it with the first announcement of the remailer on the remailer-operators list - which as far as I know isn't archived anywhere. *Sloppy* practice, and not hard to change if people wanted to. And some remailers occasionally change their keys, either for periodic hygiene or because they lost a disk drive, or at least there are announcements to the list claiming they have, usually not even signed with the old key. Of course, no Bad Guy would *ever* think of eavesdropping the PGP.com or MIT keyservers to do traffic analysis on key requests. Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, bill.stewart(a)pobox.com PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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CDR: Wireless Location Technology for 3G - Nortel / CambridgePositioning
by Bill Stewart 17 Oct '00

17 Oct '00

Big Brother will know where you are. Advertisers will know where you are. But will *you* know where you are? Or when they know where you are? http://www.nortelnetworks.com/corporate/news/newsreleases/2000c/10_11_000066 9_cambridge_positioning.html Nortel Networks, Cambridge Positioning Systems Plan to Develop Location Technology BARCELONA, Spain - Nortel Networks* [NYSE/TSE: NT] and Cambridge Positioning Systems (CPS) have signed a letter of intent to jointly develop Location Technology for 3G (UMTS) wireless networks. The resulting products, to be developed once the parties successfully negotiate a final license agreement, will provide location-based, value-added services for 3G network operators. CPS will develop Location Technology based on the Observed Time Difference of Arrival (OTDOA) standard. This is an extension of its success in promoting the 2G equivalent - Enhanced Observed Time Difference (E-OTD). Nortel Networks will integrate and market CPS products into its e-mobility* Location Center, part of an end-to-end solution for Wireless Internet. Nortel Networks believes that OTDOA will become a powerful location method that will have minimal cost impact on both handsets and infrastructure. Nortel Networks e-mobility Location Center is a pivotal component in the next generation Wireless Internet. The e-mobility Location Center is the intelligent hub/gateway between a suite of location determination technologies and mobility applications and services. Nortel Networks strategy is to pursue an open standard and standards compliant universal platform that will enable integration of best-in-class location determination technologies. This will allow Nortel Networks to provide a fully tested and integrated, carrier grade, end-to-end solution for location determination, management and interface into value-added applications and services. In a recent study, the Strategis Group projected a mobile location market estimated at more than US$30 billion in 2005. "We are driving the evolution of a profitable, new high-performance Internet," said Alastair Westgarth, vice president, Wireless Internet, Nortel Networks. "With this effort, CPS and Nortel Networks will be able to provide consumers and businesses with speedy downloads of location-based services on mobile devices, whether they be mobile phones, handheld devices or laptop computers." "This letter of intent today builds on the work in 2G that we have been concluding with Nortel Networks," said Chris Wade, chief executive officer, Cambridge Positioning Systems. "We believe that location enablement will be a fundamental technology platform for 3G networks." Cambridge Positioning Systems Limited (CPS) is a company focusing on the provision of Mobile Location systems and services for mobile phone users. CPS has two product streams to its business: its high accuracy location technology called Cursor and a wide range of location-based applications for corporate and consumer use called Coverge. Visit us at www.cursor-system.com. Nortel Networks is a global Internet and communications leader with capabilities spanning Optical, Wireless, Local Internet and eBusiness. The Company had 1999 U.S. GAAP revenues of US$21.3 billion and serves carrier, service provider and enterprise customers globally. Today, Nortel Networks is creating a high-performance Internet that is more reliable and faster than ever before. It is redefining the economics and quality of networking and the Internet, promising a new era of collaboration, communications and commerce. Visit us at www.nortelnetworks.com. Certain information included in this press release is forward-looking and is subject to important risks and uncertainties. The results or events predicted in these statements may differ materially from actual results or events. Factors which could cause results or events to differ from current expectations include, among other things: the impact of price and product competition; the dependence on new product development; the impact of rapid technological and market change; the ability of Nortel Networks to make acquisitions and/or integrate the operations and technologies of acquired businesses in an effective manner; general industry and market conditions and growth rates; international growth and global economic conditions, particularly in emerging markets and including interest rate and currency exchange rate fluctuations; the impact of consolidations in the telecommunications industry, the uncertainties of the Internet; stock market volatility; the ability of Nortel Networks to recruit and retain qualified employees; and the impact of increased provision of customer financing by Nortel Networks. For additional information with respect to certain of these and other factors, see the reports filed by Nortel Networks with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. Nortel Networks disclaims any intention or obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. *Nortel Networks, the Nortel Networks logo, the Globemark and e-mobility are trademarks of Nortel Networks. Contact for Press and Analysts: Beatrice Germain Nortel Networks 33 6 85 74 35 65 germainb(a)nortelnetworks.com Susan Kwon Nortel Networks 972-684-5701 skwon(a)nortelnetworks.com Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, bill.stewart(a)pobox.com PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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