February 1994 - cypherpunks-legacy

interagency_workgroup.notice
by Dan Brown 04 Feb '94

04 Feb '94

>From the White House Feb. 4, 1994 ****************************************************************** WORKING GROUP ON DATA SECURITY The Administration has created a new interagency working on data security to deal with issues like encryption and digital telephony. This group will be chaired by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council and will include representatives of the agencies that have participated in Presidential Review Directive 27, which called for a comprehensive review of the impact of encryption technology and advanced digital telecomrnunications systems. Agencies participating in the new working group include the Office of Management and Budget, FBI, Department of Justice, Department of Comrnerce, National Security Agency, the Department of Treasury, and the Department of State. The group will work closely with the Inforrnation Comrnittee of the Information Infrastructure Task Force, which is responsible for coordinating Administration telecommunications and inforrnation policy. It will seek input from the private sector both informally and through groups like the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee and the U.S. Advisory Committee on the National Information Infrastructure. The working group will develop and irnplement Administration policies on encryption. Advanced encryption technology can provide better privacy protection for individuals, but can also thwart efforts by law enforcement agencies to use wiretaps to catch and prosecute criminals. The working group will attempt to reconcile the need of privacy and the needs of law enforcement. Last April, the Administration announced development of the Clipper chip, a new computer chip designed to provide better telecomrnunications security without compromising the ability of law enforcement to do wiretaps. The working group will work with industry to develop and apply technologies like the Clipper Chip, to evaluate possible alternatives to the Clipper Chip, and to review and refine Administration policies regarding encryption as developments warrant. In addition, the working group will coordinate Administration policies regarding digital telephony. As more and more telephone companies install high-speed, digital communications links, it becomes more and more difficult for law enforcement agencies to conduct wiretaps. The working group will work with industry to ensure that new digital telecommunications systems are designed in a way that ensures that do not prevent courtauthorized wiretaps. For more information on the interagency working group, contact Matt Heymann at NIST Public Affairs (301/975-2758), Mike Nelson at OSTP (202/395-6175), or Ray Mislock at NSC (202/395-4614).

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harris.statement
by Dan Brown 04 Feb '94

04 Feb '94

United States Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE, 3:00 PM EST, FEB. 4, 1994 Statement of Dr. Martha Harris Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs February 4, 1994 Encryption -- Export Control Reform The Secretary of State is announcing today measures arising from the Administration's decision to reform export control procedures applicable to products incorporating encryption technology. These reforms are part of the Administration's effort to eliminate unnecessary controls and ensure efficient implementation. The reforms will simplify encryption product export licensing and speed the review of encryption product exports, thus helping U.S. manufacturers to compete more effectively in the global market. While there will be no changes in the types of equipment controlled by the Munitions List, we are announcing measures to expedite licensing. Last year the President announced an initiative to encourage U.S. manufacturers and users of encryption to take advantage of a government technology (the key-escrow chip) that provides excellent security while ensuring that the Government has a means to decode the encryption when lawfully authorized, such as when executing a court-authorized warrant in connection with a criminal investigation. At the time he announced this initiative, the President directed a comprehensive review of U.S. policy regarding domestic use and export of encryption technology. The reforms we are announcing today result from that review. The President has determined that vital U.S. national security and law enforcement interests compel maintaining appropriate control of encryption. Still, there is much that can be done to reform existing controls to ensure that they are efficiently implemented and to maintain U.S. leadership in the world market for encryption technology. Accordingly, the President has asked the Secretary of State to take immediate action to implement a number of procedural reforms. The reforms are: * License Reform: Under new licensing arrangements, encryption manufacturers will be able to ship their products from the United States directly to customers within approved regions without obtaining individual licenses for each end user. This will improve the ability of our manufacturers to provide expedited delivery of products, and to reduce shipping and tracking costs. It should also reduce the number of individual license requests, especially for small businesses that cannot afford international distributors. * Rapid review of export license applications: A significant number of encryption export license applications can be reviewed more quickly. For such exports, we have set a license turnaround goal of two working days. * Personal use exemption: We will no longer require that U.S. citizens obtain an export license prior to taking encryption products out of the U.S. temporarily for their own personal use. In the past, this requirement caused delays and inconvenience for business travellers. * Allow exports of key-escrow encryption: After initial review, key-escrow encryption products may now be exported to most end users. Additionally, key-escrow products will qualify for special licensing arrangements. These reforms should have the effect of minimizing the impact of export controls on U.S. industry. The Department of State will take all appropriate actions to ensure that these reforms are implemented as quickly as possible. The Secretary of State asks that encryption product manufacturers evaluate the impact of these reforms over the next year and provide feedback both on how the reforms have worked out and on recommendations for additional procedural reforms. The contact point for further information on these reforms is Rose Biancaniello, Office of Defense Trade Controls, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Department of State, (703) 875-6644.

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gore_crypto.statement
by Dan Brown 04 Feb '94

04 Feb '94

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT EMBARGOED UNTIL, 3: 00 PM EST CONTACT: 202/456-7035 February 4, 1994 STATEMENT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT Today's announcements on encryption represent important steps in the implementation of the Administration's policy on this critical issue. Our policy is designed to provide better encryption to individuals and businesses while ensuring that the needs of law enforcement and national security are met. Encryption is a law and order issue since it can be used by criminals to thwart wiretaps and avoid detection and prosecution. It also has huge strategic value. Encryption technology and cryptoanalysis turned the tide in the Pacific and elsewhere during World War II. [end of statement]

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doj_escrow_intercept.procedures
by Dan Brown 04 Feb '94

04 Feb '94

U.S. Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530 February 4, 1994 AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF ENCRYPTION KEY COMPONENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTERCEPTS PURSUANT TO TITLE III The following are the procedures for the release of escrowed key components in conjunction with lawfully authorized interception of communications encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method. These procedures cover all electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (Title III), Title 18, United States Code, Section 2510 et seq. 1) In each case there shall be a legal authorization for the interception of wire and/or electronic communications. 2) All electronic surveillance court orders under Title III shall contain provisions authorizing after-the-fact minimization, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2518(5), permitting the interception and retention of coded communications, including encrypted communications. 3) In the event that federal law enforcement agents discover during the course of any lawfully authorized interception that communications encrypted with a key escrow encryption method are being utilized, they may obtain a certification from the investigative agency conducting the investigation, or the Attorney General of the United States or designee thereof. Such certification shall (a) identify the law enforcement agency or other authority conducting the interception and the person providing the certification; (b) certify that necessary legal authorization has been obtained to conduct electronic surveillance regarding these communications; (c) specify the termination date of the period for which interception has been authorized; (d) identify by docket number or other suitable method of specification the source of the authorization; (e) certify that communications covered by that authorization are being encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method; (f) specify the identifier (ID) number of the key escrow encryption chip providing such encryption; and (g) specify the serial (ID) number of the key-escrow decryption device that will be used by the law enforcement agency or other authority for decryption of the intercepted communications. 4) The agency conducting the interception shall submit this certification to each of the designated key component escrow agents. If the certification has been provided by an investigative agency, as soon thereafter as practicable, an attorney associated with the United States Attorney's Office supervising the investigation shall provide each of the key component escrow agents with written confirmation of the certification. 5) Upon receiving the certification from the requesting investigative agency, each key component escrow agent shall release the necessary key component to the requesting agency. The key components shall be provided in a manner that assures they cannot be used other than in conjunction with the lawfully authorized electronic surveillance for which they were requested. 6) Each of the key component escrow agents shall retain a copy of the certification of the requesting agency, as well as the subsequent confirmation of the United States Attorney's Office. In addition, the requesting agency shall retain a copy of the certification and provide copies to the following for retention in accordance with normal record keeping requirements: (a) the United States Attorney's Office supervising the investigation, and (b) the Department of Justice, Office of Enforcement Operations. 7) Upon, or prior to, completion of the electronic surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of the requesting agency to decrypt intercepted communications shall terminate, and the requesting agency may not retain the key components. 8) The Department of Justice shall, in each such case, (a) ascertain the existence of authorizations for electronic surveillance in cases for which escrowed key components have been released; (b) ascertain that key components for a particular key escrow encryption chip are being used only by an investigative agency authorized to conduct electronic surveillance of communications encrypted with that chip; and (c) ascertain that, no later than the completion of the electronic surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of the requesting agency to decrypt intercepted communications is terminated. 9) In reporting to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2519(2), the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division shall, with respect to any order for authorized electronic surveillance for which escrowed encryption components were released and used for decryption, specifically note that fact. These procedures do not create, and are not intended to create, any substantive rights for individuals intercepted through electronic surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures shall not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or other objection to the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence lawfully acquired. ************************************************************* U.S. Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530 February 4, 1994 AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF ENCRYPTION KEY COMPONENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTERCEPTS PURSUANT TO STATE STATUTES Key component escrow agents may only release escrowed key components to law enforcement or prosecutorial authorities for use in conjunction with lawfully authorized interception of communications encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method. These procedures apply to the release of key components to State and local law enforcement or prosecutorial authorities for use in conjunction with interceptions conducted pursuant to relevant State statutes authorizing electronic surveillance, and Title III of the Omnibus crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, Title 18, United States Code, Section 2510 et seq. 1) The state or local law enforcement or prosecutorial authority must be conducting an interception of wire and/or electronic communications pursuant to lawful authorization. 2) Requests for release of escrowed key components must be submitted to the key component escrow agents by the principal prosecuting attorney of the State, or of a political subdivision thereof, responsible for the lawfully authorized electronic surveillance. 3) The principal prosecuting attorney of such State or political subdivision of such State shall submit with the request for escrowed key components a certification that shall (a) identify the law enforcement agency or other authority conducting the interception and the prosecuting attorney responsible therefor; (b) certify that necessary legal authorization for interception has been obtained to conduct electronic surveillance regarding these communications; (c) specify the termination date of the period for which interception has been authorize; (d) identify by docket number or other suitable method of specification the source of the authorization; (e) certify that communications covered by that authorization are being encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method; (f) specify the identifier (ID) number of the key escrow chip providing such encryption; and (g) specify the serial (ID) number of the key-escrow decryption device that will be used by the law enforcement agency or other authority for decryption of the intercepted communications. 4) Such certification must be submitted by the principal prosecuting attorney of that State or political subdivision to each of the designated key component escrow agents. 5) Upon receiving the certification from the principal prosecuting attorney of the State or political subdivision, each key component escrow agent shall release the necessary key component to the intercepting State or local law enforcement agency or other authority. The key components shall be provided in a manner that assures they cannot be used other than in conjunction with the lawfully authorized electronic surveillance for which they were requested. 6) Each of the key component escrow agents shall retain a copy of the certification of the principal prosecuting attorney of the State or political subdivision. In addition, such prosecuting attorney shall provide a copy of the certification to the Department of Justice, for retention in accordance with normal record keeping requirements. 7) Upon, or prior to, completion of the electronic surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of the intercepting law enforcement agency or other authority to decrypt intercepted communications shall terminate, and the intercepting law enforcement agency or other authority may not retain the key components. 8) The Department of Justice may, in each such case, make inquiry to (a) ascertain the existence of authorizations for electronic surveillance in cases for which escrowed key components have been released; (b) ascertain that key components for a particular key escrow encryption chip are being used only by an investigative agency authorized to conduct electronic surveillance of communications encrypted with that chip; and (c) ascertain that, no later than the completion of the electronic surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of the requesting agency to decrypt intercepted communications is terminated. 9) In reporting to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 2519(2), the principal prosecuting attorney of a State or of a political subdivision of a State may, with respect to any order for authorized electronic surveillance for which escrowed encryption components were released and used for decryption, desire to note that fact. These procedures do not create, and are not intended to create, any substantive rights for individuals intercepted through electronic surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures shall not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or other objection to the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence lawfully acquired. ************************************************************* U.S. Department of Justice Washington D.C. 20530 February 4, 1994 AUTHORIZATION PROCEDURES FOR RELEASE OF ENCRYPTION KEY COMPONENTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTERCEPTS PURSUANT TO FISA The following are the procedures for the release of escrowed key components in conjunction with lawfully authorized interception of communications encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method. These procedures cover all electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), Pub. L. 95-511, which appears at Title 50, U.S. Code, Section 1801 et seq. 1 ) In each case there shall be a legal authorization for the interception of wire and/or electronic communications. 2) In the event that federal authorities discover during the course of any lawfully authorized interception that communications encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method are being utilized, they may obtain a certification from an agency authorized to participate in the conduct of the interception, or from the Attorney General of the United States or designee thereof. Such certification shall (a) identify the agency participating in the conduct of the interception and the person providing the certification; to conduct electronic surveillance regarding these communications; (c) specify the termination date of the period for which interception has been authorized; (d) identify by docket number or other suitable method of specification the source of the authorization; (e) certify that communications covered by that authorization are being encrypted with a key-escrow encryption method; (f) specify the identifier (ID) number of the key escrow encryption chip providing such encryption; and (g) specify the serial (ID) number of the key-escrow decryption device that will be used by the agency participating in the conduct of the interception for decryption of the intercepted communications. 4) This certification shall be submitted to each of the designated key component escrow agents. If the certification has been provided by an agency authorized to participate in the conduct of the interception, a copy shall be provided to the Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. As soon as possible, an attorney associated with that office shall provide each of the key component escrow agents with written confirmation of the certification. 5) Upon receiving the certification, each key component escrow agent shall release the necessary key component to the agency participating in the conduct of the interception. The key components shall be provided in a manner that assures they cannot be used other than in conjunction with the lawfully authorized electronic surveillance for which they were requested. 6) Each of the key component escrow agents shall retain a copy of the certification, as well as the subsequent written confirmation of the Department of Justice, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review. 7) Upon, or prior to, completion of the electronic surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of the agency participating in the conduct of the interception to decrypt intercepted communications shall terminate, and such agency may not retain the key components. 8) The Department of Justice shall, in each such case, (a) ascertain the existence of authorizations for electronic surveillance in cases for which escrowed key components have been released; (b) ascertain that key components for a particular key escrow encryption chip are being used only by an agency authorized to participate in the conduct of the interception of communications encrypted with that chip; and (c) ascertain that, no later than the completion of the electronic surveillance phase of the investigation, the ability of the agency participating in the conduct of the interception to decrypt intercepted communications is terminated. 9) Reports to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, pursuant to Section 108 of FISA, shall, with respect to any order for authorized electronic surveillance for which escrowed encryption components were released and used for decryption, specifically note that fact. These procedures do not create, and are not intended to create, any substantive rights for individuals intercepted through electronic surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures shall not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or other objection to the introduction of electronic surveillance evidence lawfully acquired.

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clipper_q-and-a.txt
by Dan Brown 04 Feb '94

04 Feb '94

>From the White House ***************************************************************** Embargoed until 3:00 p.m. EST Feb. 4, 1994 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S ENCRYPTION POLICY Q. What were the findings of the encryption technology review? A. The review confirmed that sound encryption technology is needed to help ensure that digital information in both computer and telecommunications systems is protected against unauthorized disclosure or tampering. It also verified the importance of preserving the ability of law enforcement to understand encrypted communications when conducting authorized wiretaps. Key escrow technology meets these objectives. Specific decisions were made to enable federal agencies and the private sector to use the key escrow technology on a voluntary basis and to allow the export of key escrow encryption products. In addition, the Department of State will streamline export licensing procedures for products that can be exported under current regulations in order to help U.S. companies to sell their products abroad. To meet the critical need for ways to verify the author and sender of an electronic message -- something that is crucial to business applications for the National Information Infrastructure -- the federal government is committed to ensuring the availability of a royalty-free, public-domain Digital Signature Standard. Finally, an interagency working group has been established to continue to address these issues and to maintain a dialogue with industry and public interest groups. Q. Who has been consulted during this review? The Congress? Industry? What mechanism is there for continuing consultation? A. Following the President's directive announced on April 16, 1993, extensive discussions have been held with Congress, industry, and privacy rights groups on encryption issues. Formal public comment was solicited on the Escrowed Encryption Standard and on a wide variety of issues related to the review through the Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory Board. The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy and the National Security Council will chair the interagency working group. The group will seek input from the private sector both informally and through several existing advisory committees. It also will work closely with the Information Policy Committee of the Information Infrastructure Task Force, which is responsible for coordinating Administration telecommunications and information policy. Q. If national security and law enforcement interests require continued export controls of encryption, what specific benefits can U.S. encryption manufacturers expect? A. The reforms will simplify encryption product export licensing and speed the review of encryption product exports. Among other benefits, manufacturers should see expedited delivery of products, reduced shipping and reporting costs, and fewer individual license requests -- especially for small businesses that cannot afford international distributors. A personal exemption for business travellers using encryption products will eliminate delays and inconvenience when they want to take encryption products out of the U.S. temporarily. Q. Why is the key escrow standard being adopted? A. The key escrow mechanism will provide Americans and government agencies with encryption products that are more secure, more convenient, and less expensive than others readily available today -- while at the same time meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement. Q. Will the standard be mandatory? A. No. The Administration has repeatedly stressed that the key escrow technology, and this standard, is for voluntary use by federal and other government agencies and by the private sector. The standard that is being issued only applies to federal agencies -- and it is voluntary. Does this approach expand the authority of government agencies to listen in on phone conversations? No Key escrow technology provides government agencies with no [sic] new authorities to access the content of the private conversations of Americans. Q. Will the devices be exportable? Will other devices that use the government hardware? A. Yes. After an initial review of the product, the State Department will permit the export of devices incorporating key escrow technology to most end users. One of the attractions of this technology is the protection it can give to U.S. companies operating at home and abroad. Q. Suppose a law enforcement agency is conducting a wiretap on a drug smuggling ring and intercepts a conversation encrypted using the device. What would they have to do to decipher the message? A. They would have to obtain legal authorization, normally a court order, to do the wiretap in the first place. They would then present documentation, including a certification of this authorization, to the two entities responsible for safeguarding the keys. (The key is split into component parts, which are stored separately in order to ensure the security of the key escrow system.) They then obtain the components for the keys for the device being used by the drug smugglers. The components are then combined and the message can be read. Q. Who will hold the escrowed keys? A. The Attorney General has selected two U.S. agencies to hold the escrowed key components: the Treasury Department's Automated Systems Division and the Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and Technology. Q. How strong is the security in the device? How can I be sure how strong the security is? A. This system is more secure than many other voice encryption system readily available today. While the algorithm upon which the Escrowed Encryption Standard is based will remain classified to protect the security of the system, an independent panel of cryptography experts found that the algorithm provides significant protection. In fact, the panel concluded that it will be 36 years until the cost of breaking the algorithm will be equal to the cost of breaking the current Data Encryption Standard now being used. Q. Is there a "trap door" that would allow unauthorized access to the keys? A. No. There is no trapdoor. Q. Whose decision was it to propose this product? A. The National Security Council, the Justice Department, the Commerce Department, and other key agencies were involved in this decision. The approach has been endorsed by the President, the Vice President, and appropriate Cabinet officials.

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Alert--Admin. names escrow agents, no compromise on Clipper - 7 files
by Stanton McCandlish 04 Feb '94

04 Feb '94

EFF Press Release 04/04/94 * DISTRIBUTE WIDELY * At two briefings, Feb. 4, 1994, the Clinton Administration and various agencies gave statements before a Congressional committee, and later representatives of civil liberties organizations, industry spokespersons and privacy advocates. The Electronic Frontier Foundation's position, based on what we have seen and heard from the Administration today, is that the White House is set on a course that pursues Cold War national security and law enforcement interests to the detriment of individual privacy and civil liberties. The news is grim. The Administration is: * not backing down on Clipper * not backing down on key escrow * not backing down on selection of escrow agents * already adamant on escrowed key access procedures * not willing to elminate ITAR restrictions * hiding behind exaggerated threats of "drug dealers" and "terrorists" The material released to the industry and advocacy version of the briefing have been placed online at ftp.eff.org (long before their online availability from goverment access sites, one might add). See below for specific details. No information regarding the Congressional committee version of the briefing has been announced. EFF Director Jerry Berman, who attended the private sector meeting, reported the following: "The White House and other officials briefed industry on its Clipper chip and encryption review. While the review is not yet complete, they have reached several policy conclusions. First, Clipper will be proposed as a new Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) next Wednesday. [Feb. 9] It will be "vountary" for government agencies and the private sector to use. They are actively asking other vendors to jump in to make the market a Clipper market. Export licensing processes will be speeded up but export restrictions will not be lifted in the interests of national security. The reason was stated bluntly at the briefing : to frustrate competition with clipper by other powerful encryption schemes by making them difficult to market, and to "prevent" strong encryption from leaving the country thus supposedly making the job of law enforcement and intelligence more difficult. Again in the interest of national security. Of course, Clipper will be exportable but they would not comment on how other governments will view this. Treasury and NIST will be the escrow agents and Justice asserted that there was no necessity for legislation to implement the escrow procedures. "I asked if there would be a report to explain the rationale for choosing these results - we have no explanation of the Administration's thinking, or any brief in support of the results. They replied that there would be no report because they have been unable to write one, due to the complexity of the issue. "One Administation spokesperson said this was the Bosnia of Telecommunications. I asked, if this was so, how, in the absense of some policy explanation, could we know if our policy here will be as successful as our policy in Bosnia?" The announcements, authorization procedures for release of escrowed keys, and q-and-a documents from the private sector briefing are online at EFF. They are: "Statement of the [White House] Press Secretary" [White House] file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/wh_press_secy.statement "Statement of the Vice President" [very short - WH] file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/gore_crypto.statement "Attorney General Makes Key Escrow Encryption Announcements" [Dept. of Just.] file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/reno_key_escrow.statement "Authorization Procedures for Release pf Emcryption Key Components in Conjunction with Intercepts Pursuant to Title III/State Statutes/FISA" [3 docs. in one file - DoJ] file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/doj_escrow_intercept.rules "Working Group on Data Security" [WH] file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/interagency_workgroup.announce "Statement of Dr. Martha Harris Dep. Asst. Secy. of State for Polit.-Mil. Affairs: Encryption - Export Control Reform" [Dept. of State] file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/harris_export.statement "Questions and Answers about the Clinton Administration's Encryption Policy" [WH] file://ftp.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Crypto/wh_crypto.q-a These files are available via anonymous ftp, or via WWW at: http://www.eff.org/ in the "EFF ftp site" menu off the front page. Gopher access: gopher://gopher.eff.org/ Look in "EFF Files"/"Papers and Testimony"/"Crypto" All 7 of these documents will be posted widely on the net immediately following this notice. -- Stanton McCandlish * mech(a)eff.org * Electronic Frontier Found. OnlineActivist F O R M O R E I N F O, E - M A I L T O: I N F O @ E F F . O R G O P E N P L A T F O R M O N L I N E R I G H T S V I R T U A L C U L T U R E C R Y P T O

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