August 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Key-Escrow (black) Humor
by Anonymous 09 Aug '93

09 Aug '93

Thanks to <ld231782(a)LANCE.ColoState.Edu> - Q. How many endangered bureacrats does it take to screw in a light bulb? A1. We're not sure, they prefer to hide in the shadows. A2. We don't know, we can't find any. Have you seen any? A3. You only need one, but each only works once because they invariably manage to electrocute themselves in the process. A4. You must fill out form KT-398930-0-3893-1z(321.31x*) in sextuplicate, "Requisition for Light Amplification and Enhancement Device Facilities and Staff Resources and Efficacy Data Measures Projections and Speculations." Invisible ink only. Reply will be shipped on punch cards by carrier pigeon after brief administrative period. Offer void where prohibited. Prohibited in this universe. Q. How many FBI agents does it take to wiretap? A1. All of them. One to hold the alligator clips and the rest to convince the Congress and American public "he's just doing his job." A2. FBI doesn't actually `wiretap,' a groundless popular myth. They only participate in wholesome law-enforcement activities at all times. A3. Two. One to do the job and one to botch it. Public relations is automatically handled by a new AI program that endlessly constructs almost-coherent sentences from keywords like `dead bodies', `airplane explosion', `innocent children', `drug dealers', `terrorists', `criminals', `law-abiding public,' `American businesses'. A4. B.C. (Before cryptography), several. After, none. (See also `endangered bureacrats.') Q. How many NSA agents does it take to spy on U.S. citizens? A. Sorry, that's classified information. Q. Why does D. Sternlight favor Clipper technology? A1. It's the kind of idea he could have come up with himself. A2. Doesn't like to be bothered by details. That's what the NSA is for. A3. No unsound idea has ever emanated from the U.S. Government. A4. Having been to many subversive foreign countries, he recognizes the necessity of spying on them. Q. Why is D. Denning promoting Clipper? A1. Peer pressure (all her friends are doing it). A2. Wanted to beat the rush. A3. Looks good on her resume. A4. Everyone needs a hobby. A5. Coincidentally got an NSA employee after signing up for the Adopt an Endangered Bureacrat program. Q. Why is D. Denning's cryptography book so successful? A1. It's cornered the lucrative NSA textbook market. A2. The NSA bureacrats love to shred their reading material, and order new copies each time they need to look something up (which is frequent). A3. People marvel at the writing by an expert endorsed by the NSA. A4. NSA afraid someone will read it so they buy all the copies. Q. Why is the Clinton administration wholeheartedly promoting Clipper? A1. The neato secret decoder rings handed out at the briefing won everyone over immediately. A2. Opportunity for another authoritative and stunning nose-tweaking at `the previous administration'. A3. First installment of the fabulous new and comprehensive `Orwell Plan'. A4. Anything to get those creepy NSA guys to go away. Q. Why did the NSA come up with the Clipper chip? A1. Job security. A2. Entertainment. A3. Scared silly of `economic espionage' monsters hiding in the closet. A4. Got bored that day. A5. Great joke on those Mykotronx bozos. - -- This is a carbon copy of a message that was sent to 4 different e-mail to USENET gatewys: 1. to alt.privacy.clipper via cs.utexas.edu via nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu 2. to alt.privacy via demon.co.uk via ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu 3. to sci.crypt via decwrl.dec.com via elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 4. to misc.legal.computing via news.cs.indiana.edu via phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu Let's see how they fare.... Ye olde Spooge Meister spooge /spooj/ 1. Inexplicable or arcane code <spooge(a)dev.null.net> or random and probably incorrect output from a computer program.

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CFP '94 announcement
by L. Detweiler 09 Aug '93

09 Aug '93

There was a huge amount of interest in this last time around, so I'm posting this to the list for anyone who hasn't seen it. p.s. look who's running the `student paper competition'... ===cut=here=== From: faigin(a)aero.org (Daniel P. Faigin) Newsgroups: comp.security.misc,comp.org.acm Subject: Computers Freedom and Privacy 1994 Date: 4 Aug 93 11:31:10 Message-ID: <FAIGIN.93Aug4113110(a)soldan.aero.org> Conference Announcement Computers, Freedom, and Privacy 1994 23-26 March 1994 The fourth annual conference, "Computers, Freedom, and Privacy," (CFP'94) will be held in Chicago, Il., March 23-26, 1994. The conference is hosted by The John Marshall Law School; George B. Trubow, professor of law and director of the Center for Informatics Law at John Marshall, is general chair of the conference. (E-Mail: 7trubow(a)jmls.edu) The program is sponsored jointly by these Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) Special Interest Groups: Communications (SIGCOMM); Computers and Society (SIGCAS); Security, Audit and Control (SIGSAC). The advance of computer and communications technologies holds great promise for individuals and society. From conveniences for consumers and efficiencies in commerce to improved public health and safety and increased participation in government and community, these technologies are fundamentally transforming our environment and our lives. At the same time, these technologies present challenges to the idea of a free and open society. Personal privacy is at risk from invasions by high-tech surveillance and monitoring; a myriad of personal information data bases expose private life to constant scrutiny; new forms of illegal activity may threaten the traditional barriers between citizen and state and present new tests of Constitutional protection; geographic boundaries of state and nation may be recast by information exchange that knows no boundaries in global data networks. CFP'94 will present an assemblage of experts, advocates and interest groups from diverse perspectives and disciplines to consider freedom and privacy in today's "information society." A series of pre-conference tutorials will be offered on March 23, 1994, with the conference program beginning on Thursday, March 24, and running through Saturday, March 26, 1994. The Palmer House, a Hilton hotel located in Chicago's "loop," and only about a block from The John Marshall Law School, is the conference headquarters. Room reservations should be made directly with the hotel after September 1, 1993, mentioning John Marshall or "CFP'94" to get the special conference rate of $99.00, plus tax. The Palmer House Hilton 17 E. Monroe., Chicago, Il., 60603 Tel: 312-726-7500; 1-800-HILTONS; Fax 312-263-2556 Communications regarding the conference should be sent to: CFP'94 The John Marshall Law School 315 S. Plymouth Ct. Chicago, IL 60604-3907 (Voice: 312-987-1419; Fax: 312-427-8307; E-mail: CFP94(a)jmls.edu) CALL FOR CFP'94 PARTICIPATION AND PROGRAM SUGGESTIONS It is intended that CFP'94 programs will examine the potential benefits and burdens of new information and communications technologies and consider ways in which society can enjoy the benefits while minimizing negative implications. Proposals are requested from those who desire to present an original paper in a relevant area of technology, policy analysis or law, or to suggest a program presentation. Any proposal (1) should not exceed three typewritten double-spaced pages; (2) must state the title of the paper or program; (3) briefly describe its theme and content; and (4) set out the name, address, credentials and experience of the author or suggested speakers. If a proposed paper has already been completed a copy should be attached to the proposal. STUDENT PAPER COMPETITION Full time college or graduate students are invited to enter the student paper competition. Papers must not exceed 2500 words and should address the impact of computer and telecommunications technologies on freedom and privacy in society. Winners will receive a scholarship to attend the conference and present their papers. All papers should be submitted by November 1, 1993 (either as straight text via e-mail or 6 printed copies) to: Prof. Eugene Spafford Department of Computer Science Purdue University West Lafeyette, IN 47907-2004 E-Mail: spaf(a)cs.purdue.edu; Voice: 317-494-7825 REGISTRATION Registration information and fee schedules will be announced by September 1, 1993. Inquiries regarding registration should be directed to RoseMarie Knight, Registration Chair, at the JMLS address above; her voice number is 312-987-1420. -- [W]: The Aerospace Corp. M1/055 * POB 92957 * LA, CA 90009-2957 * 310/336-8228 [Email]:faigin@aero.org, faigin(a)acm.org [Vmail]:310/336-5454 Box#68228 "I have a spelling checker/It came with my PC/It plainly marks four my revue/ Mistakes I cannot sea/I've run this poem threw it/I'm sure your pleased too no/ Its letter perfect in it's weigh/My checker tolled me sew." Pennye Harper

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EXE/COM encryptions
by IE63＠vaxb.acs.unt.edu 09 Aug '93

09 Aug '93

This is a message I received for an excellent idea on the run-time encryptions. Once I finish my current project(s), I may start on it, but in the mean time... any of you out there want to try this one? BTW - the program I mentioned in the post at the beginning of this thread has been uploaded to soda.berkeley.edu - when (if) it gets posted, anyone who's interested can FTP it... it contains full source code and is titled BWFPU21S.ZIP. As of yet, It has rather poor encryption techniques, but after all the suggestions I've been receiving, I hope to change that ASAP. Thanks Everyone! Michael Ellison ie63(a)vaxb.acs.unt.edu Forwarded Message: From: IN%"rarachel(a)ishara.poly.edu" "A1 ray arachelian" 8-AUG-1993 13:18:00.86 To: IN%"IE63(a)vaxb.acs.unt.edu" CC: Subj: RE: EXE/COM encryptions.... Return-path: <rarachel(a)ishara.poly.edu> Received: from ishara.poly.edu by vaxb.acs.unt.edu (PMDF #3644 ) id <01H1I5P1HL3K001KB3(a)vaxb.acs.unt.edu>; Sun, 8 Aug 1993 13:17:49 CDT Received: by ishara.poly.edu (5.59a/25-eef) id AA05059; Sun, 8 Aug 93 10:16:57 EDT Date: 08 Aug 1993 10:16:55 -0400 (EDT) From: A1 ray arachelian <rarachel(a)ishara.poly.edu> (library) Subject: RE: EXE/COM encryptions.... In-reply-to: <01H1H4U3WNYQ001JGI(a)vaxb.acs.unt.edu>; from "IE63(a)vaxb.acs.unt.edu" at Aug 7, 93 7:42 pm To: IE63(a)vaxb.acs.unt.edu Message-id: <9308081416.AA05059(a)ishara.poly.edu> Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT > That sounds like an excellent idea - I may start experiment with > that soon if I get time, if not, you might want to send the idea to the > cypherpunks list as a whole as it would be really cool to see implemented. > The program I've written attaches to already compiled .EXE and .COM files > after compiling, so it would be of little use in that application (and > it is in .ASM), but writing another one at some point would be interesting... > haveta find someone with some _really_ technical docs on a good commercial > compiler..... > I hope I'm right about this, but when you do a reply to a message coming from the cypherpunks newsgroup (from my mailbox as I subscribed to it) doesn't the reply go through toad.com rather than just as a reply to the person to whom I'm responding? (If not, then I've been needlessly posting private messages!) Anyhow, you could always go for a compiler whose sources are readily available such as GCC. Commercial grade compilers will generally not provide a way to patch the back end. >HOWEVER< you can get around this by writing your own linker, and if the linker is smart enough to know where a function call is made, you can add in your own code to do the decryption to some free memory area off the disk, execute that area, and when the code returs back out, you free that memory area. It would be a somewhat disk intesive execution, but hey, it could be done from RAM as well. :-) There are several excellent third party linkers out there such as RTLINK and Blinker in the DOS world that do all sorts of nifty things such as overlays and dynamic memory management for compilers that don't give these features. Another possiblility is to write your own assembler as for instance Borland C will produce assembly output if told to do so rather than obj code. Then the assembler does the encryption handlink and I suppose a regular linker would work too. However, with most compilers, you should be able to write an engine in C code which will open up a datbase or some other file which is encrypted then grab portions of that file, decrypt them to memory, and do a call to them as if they were functions. Then when the call is done, you free that memory block, and continue to do the same.. This would deal with the ability to load up functions in overlays or just execute functions via a pointer than a direct call to a function. So the main code of your program is a decryption engine which loads up modules from an encrypted overlay file (or from the end of the EXE file,) decrypts them in RAM, calls them, and frees the memory they took up. (This may fail with STATIC variable declarations within functions!) It would work very nicely, but instead of doing direct function calls your program's source would need to be modifyied to do a whole song and dance before it can call a protected function. With a linker or compiler that does this automatically it makes it much easier to just recompile existing code, and much much easier to write such code from the programmer's point of view. Now an interesting situation is to be found on Macs which have individual code resources which can be compressed. There is no built in decompression/compression scheme in the system software. Rather it makes use of a special code resource labeled as DCMP for decompress which of course you could replace with a decrypt code resource, though the system would think the code resources are compressed. :-) This would not require any modifications to a compiler or linker. Just encrypting resources and adding in a decryption code resource which would pop up a dialog box asking for a key the first time it runs. (IF this winds up being private just to you, please post it as public for me by forwarding it to the cypherpunks newsgroup.)

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RE: (fwd) Wolf's got a thing or two to say here...
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 08 Aug '93

08 Aug '93

That almost looks like a posting from "NewsGrazer" on the NeXT, but I can't confirm it. That app could post Ritch text, and it often appeared as garbage unless you use NewsGrazer to decode it, but it also had something in the header about NewsGrazer... who knows? -nate

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NIST contact information (further)
by bart＠netcom.com 08 Aug '93

08 Aug '93

Forwarded message: > From: fergp(a)sytex.com (Paul Ferguson) > Date: Sat, 07 Aug 93 16:52:31 EDT .... > > This file is on the NIST's publicly available system as > JUL93BLT.TXT. Other reports, announcements and bulletins are available In a forest of other information. The full recursive directory of /pub is itself 78346 bytes! The file referenced above is found in /pub/nistbul, but I downloaded several megabytes of interesting stuff.

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How does it really work, anyway?
by fergp＠sytex.com 08 Aug '93

08 Aug '93

As an aside, all this talk about anonymous remailers is intriguing. Does anyone know with certainty what happens at the remailer site, within the software process of stripping headers and the likes, where the original sender of the message could be tracked? SENDMAIL logs, etc.? What would be preferrable, in ideal scenario, would be that all traces of the incoming message was discarded altogether. In this fashion, the operator of the remailer would be less likely to be "persuaded" to divulge the originator(s) of messages, if found in such a precarious position. Paul Ferguson | "Government, even in its best state, Network Integrator | is but a necessary evil; in its worst Centreville, Virginia USA | state, an intolerable one." fergp(a)sytex.com | - Thomas Paine, Common Sense Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15 Paul Ferguson <fergp(a)sytex.com> Key fingerprint = EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05 AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58

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Anonymous remailer to USENET gateway testing continues
by Anonymous 08 Aug '93

08 Aug '93

This a summary of the anonymous e-mail to USENET gateway posts that I sent earlier today (8/7/93) - All messages included: :: Request-Remailing-To: <group.name or group-name>@<gateway>.<domain> Subject: Key-Escrow (black) Humor Organization: Shadows 'R Us in the remail header (per suggestions of Chael Hall, thanks). ----------------------------- --------------------------------------- nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu alt-privacy-clipper(a)cs.utexas.edu ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu alt-privacy(a)demon.co.uk elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu sci.crypt.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu misc.legal.computing(a)news.cs.indiana.edu Based upon the following e-mail to USENET gateway templates: group-name(a)ucbvax.berkeley.edu group-name(a)cs.utexas.edu group-name(a)pws.bull.com group-name(a)demon.co.uk group.name.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com group.name(a)news.cs.indiana.edu And also based upon the following list of anonymous remailers: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu The message sent consisted of the following message: :: Request-remailing-To: <host>@<gateway>.<domain> Subject: Key_Escrow (black) Humor Organization: Shadows 'R Us Thanks to <ld231782(a)LANCE.ColoState.Edu> - Q. How many endangered bureacrats does it take to screw in a light bulb? A1. We're not sure, they prefer to hide in the shadows. A2. We don't know, we can't find any. Have you seen any? A3. You only need one, but each only works once because they invariably manage to electrocute themselves in the process. A4. You must fill out form KT-398930-0-3893-1z(321.31x*) in sextuplicate, "Requisition for Light Amplification and Enhancement Device Facilities and Staff Resources and Efficacy Data Measures Projections and Speculations." Invisible ink only. Reply will be shipped on punch cards by carrier pigeon after brief administrative period. Offer void where prohibited. Prohibited in this universe. Q. How many FBI agents does it take to wiretap? A1. All of them. One to hold the alligator clips and the rest to convince the Congress and American public "he's just doing his job." A2. FBI doesn't actually `wiretap,' a groundless popular myth. They only participate in wholesome law-enforcement activities at all times. A3. Two. One to do the job and one to botch it. Public relations is automatically handled by a new AI program that endlessly constructs almost-coherent sentences from keywords like `dead bodies', `airplane explosion', `innocent children', `drug dealers', `terrorists', `criminals', `law-abiding public,' `American businesses'. A4. B.C. (Before cryptography), several. After, none. (See also `endangered bureacrats.') Q. How many NSA agents does it take to spy on U.S. citizens? A. Sorry, that's classified information. Q. Why does D. Sternlight favor Clipper technology? A1. It's the kind of idea he could have come up with himself. A2. Doesn't like to be bothered by details. That's what the NSA is for. A3. No unsound idea has ever emanated from the U.S. Government. A4. Having been to many subversive foreign countries, he recognizes the necessity of spying on them. Q. Why is D. Denning promoting Clipper? A1. Peer pressure (all her friends are doing it). A2. Wanted to beat the rush. A3. Looks good on her resume. A4. Everyone needs a hobby. A5. Coincidentally got an NSA employee after signing up for the Adopt an Endangered Bureacrat program. Q. Why is D. Denning's cryptography book so successful? A1. It's cornered the lucrative NSA textbook market. A2. The NSA bureacrats love to shred their reading material, and order new copies each time they need to look something up (which is frequent). A3. People marvel at the writing by an expert endorsed by the NSA. A4. NSA afraid someone will read it so they buy all the copies. Q. Why is the Clinton administration wholeheartedly promoting Clipper? A1. The neato secret decoder rings handed out at the briefing won everyone over immediately. A2. Opportunity for another authoritative and stunning nose-tweaking at `the previous administration'. A3. First installment of the fabulous new and comprehensive `Orwell Plan'. A4. Anything to get those creepy NSA guys to go away. Q. Why did the NSA come up with the Clipper chip? A1. Job security. A2. Entertainment. A3. Scared silly of `economic espionage' monsters hiding in the closet. A4. Got bored that day. A5. Great joke on those Mykotronx bozos. These resulting messages have been posted thus far: Newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper Subject: Key-Escrow (black) Humor Date: 7 Aug 1993 12:48:57 -0500 Organization: Shadows 'R Us Lines: 91 NNTP-Posting-Host: cs.utexas.edu Newsgroups: misc.legal.computing Subject: Key-Escrow (black) Humor X-Sender: phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu Organization: Computer Science, Indiana University Date: Sat, 7 Aug 93 10:49:08 -0700 Remailed-By: Anon Remail <phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu> Lines: 92 Further results will be posted as I receive them. Ye olde Spooge Meister spooge /spooj/ 1. Inexplicable or arcane code <spooge(a)dev.null.net> or random and probably incorrect output from a computer program.

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NIST contact information
by fergp＠sytex.com 07 Aug '93

07 Aug '93

For anyone interested, this text was excerpted from the Computer Systems Laboratory (CSL) Bulletin for July 1993, entitled, "Connecting to the Internet: Security Considerations." Ironically, one paragraph specifically states the admitted security concerns for unencrypted traffic: "Ease of Spying and Spoofing: The vast majority of Internet traffic is unencrypted and therefore easily readable. As a result, e-mail, passwords, and file transfers can be monitored and captured using readily available software. Intruders have been known to monitor connections to well-known Internet sites for the purpose of gaining information that would allow them to crack security or to steal valuable information. This information sometimes permits intruders to spoof legitimate connections, i.e., trick system security into permitting normally disallowed network connections." Surprisingly, the article also acknowledges the mind-boggling growth of the Internet in a statement that says, "Consequently, the Internet is now growing faster than any telecommunications system thus far, including the telephone system." With that in mind, the "key-ecrow" system is, in my opinion, just the beginning in a systemmatic approach which I believe the NSA and the Justice Department will attempt to entrench in their ever-elusive "War on Drugs" (WoD), etc. This may become even more sinister in that the RICO statutes may empower them with the ability to effectively eavesdrop at will, monitoring voice and data communications in the shadows. This file is on the NIST's publicly available system as JUL93BLT.TXT. Other reports, announcements and bulletins are available on their system which may be of interest to you. Information about how to connect to the system is included below: "NIST maintains a computer security bulletin board system (BBS) and Internet-accessible site for computer security information open to the public at all times. These resources provide information on computer security publications, CSL Bulletins, alert notices, information about viruses and anti-virus tools, a security events calendar, and sources for more information. To access the BBS, you need a computer with communications capability and a modem. For modems at 2400 bits per second (BPS) or less, dial (301) 948-5717. For 9600 BPS, dial (301) 948-5140. Modem settings for all speeds are 8 data bits, no parity, 1 stop bit. Internet users with telnet or ftp capability may telnet to the BBS at cs-bbs.nist.gov (129.6.54.30). To download files, users need to use ftp as follows: ftp to csrc.nist.gov (129.6.54.11), log into account anonymous, use your Internet address as the password, and locate files in directory pub; an index of all files is available for download. For users with Internet-accessible e-mail capability, send e-mail to docserver(a)csrc.nist.gov with the following message: send filename, where filename is the name of the file you wish to retrieve. send index will return an index of available files." Paul Ferguson | "Government, even in its best state, Network Integrator | is but a necessary evil; in its worst Centreville, Virginia USA | state, an intolerable one." fergp(a)sytex.com | - Thomas Paine, Common Sense Type bits/keyID Date User ID pub 1024/1CC04D 1993/03/15 Paul Ferguson <fergp(a)sytex.com> Key fingerprint = EE D2 93 7D 04 6D C6 05 AC 36 AD 9D 8E 4F 41 58

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Files re Inslaw
by greg＠ideath.goldenbear.com 07 Aug '93

07 Aug '93

I have uploaded three files to /pub/cypherpunks/incoming on soda.berkeley.edu - CASOLARO.Z Boston Globe article re Danny Casolaro INSLAW.Z Barron's articles re Inslaw v U.S. HAMILTON.Z Transcript of radio interview with Inslaw founder I will mail copies to folks who explicitly asked that they be mailed. If you mailed me to say you're interested, but can't FTP, please write again, and I'll mail them. -- Greg Broiles greg(a)goldenbear.com Golden Bear Computer Consulting +1 503 342 7982 Box 12005 Eugene OR 97440 BBS: +1 503 687 7764

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Ayn Rand and Crypto-Anarchy
by hnash＠mason1.gmu.edu 07 Aug '93

07 Aug '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I recently read Atlas Shrugged by Ayne Rand. I noticed two crucial technologies that seem like good analogs for cypherpunk technology. In case your not familiar with the story, the most productive industrialists, engineers, etc. decide to remove themselves from society until the government stops interfering. They create their own little community in a secluded valley where they can work without supporting the government. The first relevant technology is a mirror that hides the valley. The industrialists have built a small town, but from the air it looks like a barren desert. The mirror conceals their transactions from everyone else. This sounds like encrypted, untraceable communications and transactions. Black markets flourish, but from outside they look like barren static. The second technology is a self-destructing laboratory. This allows an engineer to experiment with secret technology without the need for physical security. When the police break down the lab door, they find nothing but a fine powder, and they can't even guess what he's been up to. This sounds like tamperproof hardware or software. To the authorized user, it's useful equipment. To everyone else, it's nothing more than random instructions. Did Ayn Rand anticipate crypto-anarchy? --- Yours Truly, ][adon Nash --- in founding a family or a state, or acquiring fame even, we are mortal; but in dealing with truth we are immortal, and need fear no change nor accident. --- ][enry David Thoreau, 1850 --- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3 iQCVAgUBLGOgRjIwr9YMSTuBAQEF9gQAuTn0qIBBg/rgJFFdpnaWZHeVQBc9BBX0 6MPz3a9FfOen4MSL00XD+dOn96Fc4gzXma6h1kXU70i8u5L/uysVJvSrBEPjQEHv Gt8JuWxgvZoQSAkrv0Q0KhKA6cI4Tv15PhGiEN2jGoBE2qHO9T1CTfrJSrF/FsZt RFYGUqK1KEo= =JvXB -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -------------- Yours Truly, ][adon Nash -------------------------------- in founding a family or a state, or acquiring fame even, we are mortal; but in dealing with truth we are immortal, and need fear no change nor accident. --------------------------------- ][enry David Thoreau, 1850

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