July 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Encrypted postings.
by hfinney＠shell.portal.com 23 Jul '93

23 Jul '93

From: Chris Claborne <claborne(a)ccgate.sandiegoca.NCR.COM> Could we send our postings to the mailer in encrypted format? That is... I would encrypt the message with the public key for the mailer, the mailer would decrypt and re-post to the clear-text mailer and to the PGP group. You can already do this, in a way. Just post to the list using one of the existing encrypted remailers like the one at extropia (or the one at portal, for that matter). You need to put: :: Request-Remailing-To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: <your subject here> And a blank line at the top of your message, encrypt the whole thing with the public key of the remailer, and add: :: Encrypted: PGP and a blank line to the PGP file just before the "-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----" line. There are some scripts on the cypherpunks ftp site (soda.berkeley.edu, /pub/cypherpunks/remailer) to automate this process. The one disadvantage with this approach is that the source of the message (namely, you) gets stripped off. We might want to think about changing our remailers to have a non-anonymous remailing command as well as an anonymous one. This way you could have "local" privacy from any sysop who snoops on your mail going out, while still making it easy for people to reply to you. Hal

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Re: PGP progress report
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 23 Jul '93

23 Jul '93

> > PGP-RSAREF negotiations are plodding along with J. Berman of EFF as > an intermediary. The developers are unsure of the reasons for the slow > pace. J. Bidzos is supposed to make a major public announcement on > this avenue very soon. This is good news. I believe I've managed to overcome the legal obstacles to RSAREF+GNU MP. This is of interest because PGP+RSAREF+GNU MP is actually considerably faster than PGP on a number of platforms (at least Sun Sparc, IBM RS6000, 80486 Linux). Mark (for those who are interested, overcoming the obstacles involved my writing a public domain implementation of a subset of the functionality of libgmp with the same interface. The subset is, in fact, pretty much what you want to do RSA, LUC &c. My free code is slower than GNU gmp, but it is functional. For more details, see the last few weeks of gnu.misc.discuss). -- Mark Henderson markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca (personal account) RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433

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No Subject
by UCX_SMTP＠crc.monroecc.edu 23 Jul '93

23 Jul '93

---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA06943; Wed, 21 Jul 93 23:22:44 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA21927; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:16:03 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA21680; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:02:20 PDT Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA21676; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:02:19 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA18750; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:00:31 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA03218 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Wed, 21 Jul 1993 21:36:21 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA16552 ; Wed, 21 Jul 93 21:27:59 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307220127.AA16552(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Wed, 21 Jul 93 21:25:09 EDT Resent-Date: Wed, 21 Jul 1993 21:21:26 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Wed, 21 Jul 1993 21:21:18 EDT Received: from relay2.UU.NET by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA12591 ; Wed, 21 Jul 93 20:34:47 -0400 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA14330; Wed, 21 Jul 93 20:31:29 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA18642; Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:09:44 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA18609; Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:07:26 PDT Return-Path: <lock60!snark!boojum!esr(a)gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM> Received: from gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM ([128.126.220.104]) by toad.com id AA18605; Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:07:15 PDT Received: from lock60.UUCP by gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM (4.1/mls/4.0) id AA04653; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:07:13 EDT X-Info: VFL.Paramax.COM is the new name for GVL.Unisys.COM Please change any mailing lists or aliases. Both the old and the new addresses will work for a short time. Received: by lock60.Canal.Org (smail2.5) id AA16551; 21 Jul 93 18:50:24 EDT (Wed) Received: by snark.thyrsus.com (/\==/\ Smail3.1.21.1 #21.19) id <m0oIjLP-00020KC(a)snark.thyrsus.com>; Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:56 EDT Received: by boojum.uucp (Smail3.1.28.1 #2) id m0oIiVK-000BQZC; Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03 EDT Message-Id: <m0oIiVK-000BQZC(a)boojum.uucp> From: <boojum!esr(a)gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM> Subject: FAQ, round 2 To: boojum!cypherpunks(a)uunet.uu.net Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03:02 EDT X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11] I've written some more material for it. Criticisms and additions welcome. --- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION --- From: esr(a)snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond) Newsgroups: news.answers Followup-To: poster This is the Cypherpunks FAQ. It explains the projects and purposes of the Cypherpunks mailing list. It is also intended to serve as a general introduction to privacy and encryption issues. For details on the technical and theoretical aspects of computer cryptography, see the sci.crypt FAQ, available for FTP from rtfm.mit.edu (18.172.1.27) in the directory pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt. The cypherpunks archive is available for FTP at soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany, including the most up-to-date version of this FAQ. This FAQ is maintained by Eric S. Raymond <esr(a)snark.thyrsus.com>; send additions and corrections to that address. Sections contributed by others are credited to individual authors. We gratefully acknowledge, in addition, feedback and comments from David Mandl <dmandl(a)lehman.com> and Eric Hughes <hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu>. Here is a table of contents for this FAQ: 1. Why cypherpunks? 2. What are the essentials of privacy software? a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication. b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication. c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing. 3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software? a. Secure communications. b. Digital cash. c. Electronic voting. d. Electronic contracts. e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters. f. <more?> 4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy software? a. RSA b. DES c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS d. PGP e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions. 5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software? a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade. b. Expansion of the counter-economy. c. Disempowerment of government. d. Anonymity for whistleblowers. 6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles? a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab. b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight. c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete. 7. What can I do to help? a. Work on cryptographic software. b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals. c. Promote the use of encrypted communication. To join the cypherpunks mailing list, send a request to: cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com Working with us could be your best shot at stopping Big Brother. So if you have skills to contribute, act now. The freedom you save could be your own. 1. Why cypherpunks? Because privacy is essential to freedom. If the government (or any other oppressor that behaves like one) can effectively monitor communications, it can control or suppress them. And it will do so, because the natural tendency of controllers is always to seek more control. The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights. Nor can anyone else --- certainly not your employer, or the corporations that want to know all about you so they can sell you things. Given half the chance, governments and corporations will always push for security standards that protect *them*, but not *you*. Computer technology can help protect you against would-be snoopers, but only if somebody is sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the tools. The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software. Our aim is to give you the tools to keep your private information private, and to communicate with other people and computers in ways snoopers cannot tap. 2. What are the essentials of privacy software? a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication. A conventional cryptosystem consists of an encoding/decoding method and a single key. Two users who share a key can exchange private messages. A public-key cryptosystem uses a *pair* of keys; one private, one public. Anyone with either key can decode messages encoded with the other. For privacy, it must be impossible (or at least impractical) to deduce the private key from the public one. Public-key cryptosystems imply many exciting things --- unforgeable electronic signatures, digital cash, and secure electronic contracts are among them. The basic idea behind all of these is that, as long as your private key is secure, people can verify that an encoded message containg known text came from you by decoding with your public key. In the remainder of this FAQ we use `PKC' as an abbreviation for `Public Key Cryptosystem'. The best-known PKCs are the RSA system, the Federal Government's DES standard, and the government's Clipper proposal. We'll discuss these, and others, in more detail below. b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication. There are many circumstances in which you want to be able to check a public clear-text message for tampering. To do this, the message must contain a `digital signature' or `message digest code' or `message hash' derived from its clear text, which can be checked against the clear text by a receiver. For security, the message hash should have the property that no one knows how to modify a message in a way that preserves its hash. PKCs give you unforgeable signatures as a side-effect. Unfortunately, known PKCs are too slow to use practically for message hashing. Thus, there is a separate category of `Digital Signature Systems'. The three major DSS techniques are Snefru, MD5, and DSS. Snefru, invented by Ralph Merkle at Xerox PARC, is of historical interest only as it has been broken. MD5 is described in Internet RFC 1321, which also gives a reference implementation in C. As of July 1993 it is believed to be secure, but has not been *proved* to be secure. DSS is a Federal Government proposed standard associated with the Clipper proposal. <more needed here> c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing. <more needed here> 3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software? a. Secure communications. With a PKC, you can send a message that no one but the intended receiver can decrypt by encoding it with the receiver's public key. If you encode it with *your* public key, the receiver can verify that it came from you. This means that it is possible to do secure communications even over public channels. Neither nosy neighbors, business competitors, nor the government or any (other) criminal gang can interfere with it. b. Digital cash. Unforgeable messages also imply digital cash. You could use a PKC to send to the receiver a code permitting them to draw a particular amount of money from your bank account. The bank, with access to both yours and the payee's public keys, can verify that the order is genuine. This means that it is possible to do trade over electronic links, without any part trusting any other party beyond the bounds of normal commercial risk. c. Electronic voting. Unforgeable messages also imply secure electronic voting. If you encode your voting form with a PKC, the vote-collecting authority can verify it with your public key. d. Electronic contracts. If two or more people encode known text with their private keys applied in succession, all their public keys will be required to decode it. This is an unforgeable contract. Furthermore, it is an unforgeable *private* contract. e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters. <more needed here> 4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy software? a. RSA RSA stands for `Rivest-Shamir-Adelson', the names of the three computer scientists who developed the technique. RSA has withstood determined attacks for over a decade and is widely believed to be secure. It has been proposed as an Internet standard. The RSA technique is patented. The patents are held by RSA, Inc. <contact information should go here>. An implemenation in C called RSAREF is available for research and certain noncommercial uses. b. DES <more needed here> c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS <more needed here> d. PGP <more needed here> e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions. <more needed here> 5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software? a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade. <more needed here> b. Expansion of the counter-economy. <more needed here> c. Disempowerment of government. <more needed here> d. Anonymity for whistleblowers. <more needed here> 6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles? <more needed here> a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab. <more needed here> b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight. <more needed here> c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete. <more needed here> 7. What can I do to help? a. Work on cryptographic software. <list of current projects should go here> b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals. <more needed here> c. Promote the routine use of encrypted communication. <more needed here> You can help spread PGP and other appropriate tools far and wide (both to help get a better foothold to thwart the Clipper proposal and its ilk, and to work towards making crypto as commonplace as envelopes). --- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION --- -- >>eric>>

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PGP progress report
by L. Detweiler 23 Jul '93

23 Jul '93

A query was made about the Macintosh version of PGP and the bug fixes in 2.3. There was a bug in random number generation routines apparently introduced in a recent version that caused some decrease in security of the process but nothing seriously weakening. The Macintosh version is developed mostly independently of the `official' PGP version and the bug is not present in the 2.3 release. The 2.3a PGP release fixes the bug. PRZ writes, `The security problem was mostly theoretical, not a practical one for most scenarios.' (more information below). Queries were made about the effort to streamline the Macintosh user interface. In general, this has been underway for a long time in slow but consistent progress (the improvement from say 2.1 to 2.2 was significant). In MacPGP 2.3 a new online help system has been added based on Norstadt's excellent Disinfectant code (a system which exceeds the sophistication of many commercial software packages). There is an announcement currently on sci.crypt for the FTP site. All GUI versions of the PGP code are somewhat limited in sophistication by internal organization of PGP code toward the `teletype output' mindset. A major effort is underway to remodularize the code to internally encapsulate algorithms from the input & output (user interface) to make future GUI versions more accessable to programmers, and ultimately with new versions for users. A Windows version is in the works. PGP-RSAREF negotiations are plodding along with J. Berman of EFF as an intermediary. The developers are unsure of the reasons for the slow pace. J. Bidzos is supposed to make a major public announcement on this avenue very soon. Finally, some concern has been raised about bugs in the PGP code. The various developers are aware of the slightly disconcerting quality control on recent versions. One of the most direct ways that PGP users can help improve the quality of the software is to volunteer to beta-test versions on their platform in a timely manner at the release of new versions. Surprisingly few volunteers are available. If you would like to contribute in this area, please send mail to prz(a)acm.org. Following is information from Z. Fiedorwicz, the MacPGP developer. (Feel free to redistribute my message in its entirety.) ===cut=here=== Date: Wed, 21 Jul 1993 10:08:33 -0500 From: Zbigniew Fiedorowicz <fiedorow(a)math.ohio-state.edu> Subject: MacPGP 2.3 randseed bug fix There is a small bug in MacPGP 2.2 and MacPGP 2.3 in the handling of the randseed.bin file used in the generation of the random session IDEA keys used to encrypt outgoing messages. (This bug is also present in the Unix and MS-DOS versions.) Due to this bug only the first four bytes of the 24 byte randseed.bin file are ever read into memory. Since MacPGP also uses keyboard and mouse timings to generate random bytes, this does not give rise to any predictability which could easily be exploited for cracking MacPGP messages. While a special bug fix version 2.3a was released for the Unix and MS-DOS versions of PGP, this was necessitated by the presence of several other bugs NOT present in MacPGP 2.3 (eg. verification of clear-signed messages didn't work). Hence NO version 2.3a release of MacPGP is planned. If you are concerned by this bug, you can fix it by hand with ResEdit following the instructions below. The usual precautions when using ResEdit apply: FIRST MAKE A BACKUP COPY OF MACPGP 2.3 The patch: open the CODE 4 using the Hex Editor (under the Resource menu). Then using the Find menu, find the following offsets in CODE 4 and apply the patches indicated: Offset 0005E8 4878 0004 4878 0001 ^^^^ 0018 <--- replace 0004 by 0018 0005F8 5980 4FEF 0010 640A ^^^^ 5180 <--- replace 5980 by 5180 Then choose "Save" under the File menu. Exactly the same instructions apply to MacPGP 2.2 as well. Technical Explanation: The bug is caused by a single line in the open_strong_pseudorandom(byte key[16], byte buf[24]) function in the crypto.c module: if (fread(buf,1,sizeof(buf),f) < sizeof(buf)) /* empty file? */ ^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^ Since buf is an argument to the function, it gets reinterpreted by the C compiler as simply char *buf and hence sizeof(buf) is taken to be 4 instead of 24 as intended. This line of C gets compiled into the following machine/assembly code: 0005E6: 2F0C MOVE.L A4,-(A7) 0005E8: 4878 0004 PEA $0004 0005EC: 4878 0001 PEA $0001 0005F0: 2F2E 000C MOVE.L $000C(A6),-(A7) 0005F4: 4EAD 067A JSR $067A(A5) 0005F8: 5980 SUBQ.L #$4,D0 0005FA: 4FEF 0010 LEA $0010(A7),A7 0005FE: 640A BCC.S *+$000C ; The patch converts this to 0005E6: 2F0C MOVE.L A4,-(A7) 0005E8: 4878 0018 PEA $0018 0005EC: 4878 0001 PEA $0001 0005F0: 2F2E 000C MOVE.L $000C(A6),-(A7) 0005F4: 4EAD 067A JSR $067A(A5) 0005F8: 5180 SUBQ.L #$8,D0 0005FA: 4FEF 0010 LEA $0010(A7),A7 0005FE: 640A BCC.S *+$000C ; which corresponds to if (fread(buf,1,24,f) < 8) This is of course still not quite right, but unfortunately there is no SUBQ.L #24,D0 instruction. (SUB.L #24,D0 is a 4 byte instruction which would mess up relative offset references all over CODE 4.) However the chances of this causing any problem are extremely small.

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FAX on Internet
by L. Detweiler 23 Jul '93

23 Jul '93

Here's some information on using the Internet to fax messages. This gives me a lot of ideas. First, there was some talk here about encrypting FAXes. Since somebody is already getting the data on the internet, this would be trivial for someone to do here with PGP. Secondly, I don't know if they are using mail or FTP to transmit, but if they converted it to mail we could have `anonymous faxes' by coupling with the cypherpunk remailers (then to a receiver site that supports the FAX service via email reception). Finally, it seems to me that this is the first glimmer of a very massive new market opening up. Maybe the first entrepreneurs in cyberspace will be developing this service. Digital cash will be extremely useful here. So far, no one has told them `no' (`is this legal?' he asks) but I'm sure there's a lot of people that will be mighty upset by all this stellar progress! The problem with services like these is that once they become wildly successful and popular the weasels whine and clamp down. Note the developers are also behind the Internet Radio. Boy, when a universal network is built where commercial activity is not considered some kind of shady taboo, our economy is going to just GO CRAZY and EXPLODE. I'd like to set up a hypertext library with modest transaction charges, and will do so once the opportunity is there (BTW, also heard that Brewster Kahle, major mastermind between WAIS, has formed his own company and is now marketing workstation `electronic printing presses'.) All the elements are there. We're all dressed up and ready to go, with no way to get there! Somebody go and kick your legislator, and phone and cable company reps! - ------- Forwarded message Date: Thu, 22 Jul 1993 07:04:57 -0800 From: farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu (David Farber) Subject: actually it is really an experiment and should be viewed as one but .. From: the terminal of Geoff Goodfellow <geoff(a)radiomail.net> Today's SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS Business Section had the following front page story (From the New York Times - by John Markoff): "USERS AVOID FAX COSTS WITH INTERNET MESSAGES" The dividing line between paper facsimile documents and electronic mail is vanishing. Thanks to the volunteer efforts of a group of computer network designers, the network of networks known as Internet now permits users to send an e-mail message to be printed out on fax machines at a growing number of sites around the world. Because transmission charges on the Internet are minimal compared with those of the long-distance phone calls normally used for faxes, the system is a cheap way to send faxes across the country or around the world. To use the system, begun this month as an experiment in remote printing, computer mail users include a fax telephone number in the address portion of their message. The message, which may include both text and graphics, will then be automatically routed to a site that has agreed to serve a local geographic ``cell'' for delivery of the fax message. So far, participating regions include all of Japan, Australia, the Netherlands and Ireland, and in the United States, metropolitan Washington, Silicon Valley and parts of the San Francisco Bay area, as well as other pockets of the country. Leading the project is Marshall T. Rose, a computer communications consultant at Dover Beach Consulting in Mountain View, Calif. He has worked with another Internet researcher, Carl Malamud, who has created Internet Talk Radio, a weekly commercial audio program that is distributed internationally and can be played on computer work stations. The fax cell sites are computers on the Internet that are also connected to inexpensive computer-controlled fax modems that can route the files to virtually any fax machine. Each site can designate the size of the area that it will serve - whether an entire city or just the fax machines within a particular company. So far, in keeping with the utopianism that still permeates Internet culture, none of the fax middlemen and -women are charging for their services. Rose noted that the blurring of fax and electronic mail would raise thorny questions. ``Is this global and local bypass of the telephone companies using the Internet?'' he asked rhetorically. ``Is this legal? We need to think about this.'' (Information on Internet Fax Bypass can be obtained by sending a message to tpc-faq(a)town.hall.org) ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: forged mail
by karn＠qualcomm.com 22 Jul '93

22 Jul '93

You should also bear in mind a fatal mistake that most people make when they forge email. They test it first by sending themselves a forged note! I'm told that when the guilty parties are confronted with the sendmail logs, they usually confess quickly... Phil

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setting up a mailing list?
by Dwayne Campogan 22 Jul '93

22 Jul '93

I have been looking for information or a FAQ for setting up a mailing list of my own.. I would like to compose a list that used PGP encryption by default supported a key-server swap like enviorment with online extraction of specific keys, as the server lists are huge and PGP's extract and sort routines often do not work on them and when they do take quit long.. information and direction needed, recommended, and thnaked for.. -Paris

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Webs
by Paul Goggin 22 Jul '93

22 Jul '93

Thomas thus said: >And that is where cryptographically secure models of trust comes in. >If we are going to continue to be coherent in our future virtual world, >we are going to have to "filter out" information which originates from >sources which we do not have a cryptographic web of trust to. I understand the predictament and security that it entails. However, I am not sure as I understand you, that this is a good solution. Let's say if everyone jumps on the cryptographic bandwagon, how does the web of trust help out the end user who's feelings have been hurt? Or if the user is not in the web of trust does that eliminate their information from the field? Sorry, its late and I probably should'nt post but what the hell. Probably get flamed in the morning. >Does this make any sense? I decided for about 2 weeks to accept only PGP messages as authenticated, so to speak -- and it sucked even friends that have PGP and such would not go in for the idea of a total security blanket. Just my .02, probably give another .02 in the next 12 hours. Paul -- R O All Comments Copyright by | Technofetisht A N Paul S. Goggin (1993) | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos V Information Broker | Ergoflux, Interzone E chaos(a)aql.gatech.edu | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744(a)charcoal.com ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden

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No Subject
by technopagan priest 22 Jul '93

22 Jul '93

Recently, there has been some talk on here concerning anonymous remailers and harassment. I don't think we will ever exist in a society where anonymous information sources will be eliminated. Even 50 years ago, the "rumour mill" was the equivalent of the modern anonymous remailer. And yes, harassing rumours got started and hurt people. But the fault, as I see it, lies not so much in those who started the rumour, but more in the people who believed the rumour without trust in the source. And that is where cryptographically secure models of trust comes in. If we are going to continue to be coherent in our future virtual world, we are going to have to "filter out" information which originates from sources which we do not have a cryptographic web of trust to. Does this make any sense? -Thomas (I'm not signing this message on purpose ;)

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Re: ANON: remail abuse
by peter honeyman 22 Jul '93

22 Jul '93

> The reason anonymous remailers are not the same as payphones or junk mail is > that the latter two leave tangible clues behind. While I'm not entirely happy > with the US justice system, it seems to me that given society's current > limitations, a police force of some sort is generally a good thing (if strict > controls are kept on it). (Sorry, I realize that this is a bit of a fringe > opinion in *this* group, but. . . .) Both payphones and mail leave tangible > clues which can be investigated and traced by law enforcement authorities. > Anonymous mail doesn't---at least, not without actually running a process or a > logger on the machine itself. wow, much to disagree with in that paragraph. tell you what, though. since you have such faith in the bloodhounds of the justice system, why don't you post your home phone number here and invite a test of the efficacy of those tangible clues etc.? i haven't a clue, tangible or otherwise, how you would trace a carefully plotted campaign of harrassment, whether by phone or postal mail. perhaps you could elaborate? peter

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