June 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: one reaction: early FOIA results
by bear＠eagle.fsl.noaa.gov 22 Jun '93

22 Jun '93

"L. Detweiler" writes >The >arguments `against' are even labelled `true' and `persuasive'. I wonder >if any of this means anything. It could just be a gimmick to suggest >that `all concerns were fairly balanced in the proposal'. It's always a dangerous strategy to recognize your opponent has a legitimate position. If they dismissed our concerns with hand-waving they could also defuse Congressional (or other) inquiries with an appeal to authority; but with these documents they've acknowledged the legitimacy of our concerns. >Does anyone >suppose that the important military aides anticipate FOIA requests and >come up with bland and benign documents to satisfy them? You mean they _wouldn't_? Refusal to provide all documents and the dates of these documents (i.e., not during the initial design stages) suggests that they could well be covers for other documents. If nothing else, I would like to see correspondence at the same level from a year ago, back when it appeared Bush was a shoo-in for reelection. I suspect we will find a substantially different tone.... >For the first time we have an official confirmation that the original >intent of Clipper (or similar technology) was to make it *mandatory*. I don't think we have _any_ information about the *original* intent. We have some indications of what they intended after Clinton was elected, but none of these documents are from the Bush era. >>at least AT&T has been >>reported willing to do so (having been suitably incentivised by >>promises of Government purchases). > >`incentivised' -- a cute euphemism for collusion. I wonder to what >extent they were `incentivised'. Why not accept this at face value -- the government asked AT&T how many phones they would need to purchase to make it worthwhile for AT&T to make the things, AT&T gave them a number, and the government said "Okay!" >>(U) The President has also directed that the fact that law >>enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be >>concealed from the public. National security officials are not >>mentioned. > >eeks, that sounds amazingly ominous. Why would they say in one sentence >`law enforcement officials have access to the keys' and then in the >next `the security of the scheme for national security purposes is not >revealed'? I read this as "National security officials will have access to the keys, but this will not be revealed to the public." Nothing I hadn't already assumed. :-( >`narcotraffickers' -- doesn't sound as hysterically paranoid as `drug >dealers'. No, "narcotraffickers" are the people who bring the drugs into the country. Apparently the Feds have decided to leave persecution of alleged drug dealers (note tenses) to local authorities using forfeiture laws, while the Feds concentrate on the people bringing the drugs into the country and the major distribution networks. >>Thus far, widespread availability has not >>led to widespread use. > >hm, how could that be? It wouldn't have anything to do with draconian >export regulations, would it? More likely the tendency of people to pretend "this can't happen to me!" After all, most people only deal with other residents of North America and there are no internal cryptographic restrictions. Yet. Bear Giles

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FOIA differences
by Derek L Davis 22 Jun '93

22 Jun '93

Note that the 30 APR version of the memorandum (for the acting assistant secretary of defense) and the May 3 version (from the assistant secretary of defense to the deputy secretary of defense) has some differences. In particular, the "required" reference is dropped on the second version.

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comments on your recent post of FOIAed documents.
by sommerfeld＠apollo.hp.com 21 Jun '93

21 Jun '93

1) The first document is particularly compelling, especially considering the apparant references to the censored paragraph in the un-censored paragraph... it makes it obvious that there are two sets of reasons for clipper; the ones that they'll admit, and the ones which are classified and which they won't admit in public. 2) The second document makes it clear that requiring the use of key escrow is a goal of law enforcement and national security. 3) The dates on the documents are dated after Ms. Denning's infamous "trial balloon".. 4) From the second document: > In one recent experiment it took three minutes and > fourteen seconds to locate a source-code version of DES on the > INTERNET. Hmm. It only took me under minute when I tried it (using the command "archie -s des.tar"). Maybe they tried it when the archie servers were overloaded :-), or maybe they counted the time needed to read the archie man page.. 5) What kind of a dork uses words like "incentivized"? - Bill

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Some FOIA results re Clipper
by gnu 21 Jun '93

21 Jun '93

Lee Tien and I have submitted a pile of FOIA requests about Clipper. Here is scanned-in text from some of the more interesting results, courtesy of Lee. Search for "required", for a mention of the proposal to require the use of Clipper. Also note that the role of the "national security community" has been deliberately withheld from the public statements (search for "mentioned"). Most agencies have not yet responded with documents. FBI is claiming it will take them a year, and we are preparing to file suit to force them to do it within 10 days like the law requires. (Our NSA suit over the same thing, is continuing through the gears of the court process.) John Gilmore [This page originally XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX TOP SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED] OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3040 COMMAND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM FOR MS. JOANN H. GRUBE, NSA REPRESENTATIVE/NSC PRD-27 EXPORT CONTROL WORKING GROUP SUBJECT: Comments on PRD-27/NSA Draft (U) (U) Following are comments concerning your proposed memorandum to Jim Lewis, Department of State: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX blacked out via FOIA (b)(1) exemption. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (U) The assertions in this draft are merely unsupported statements. Recommend that the memorandum provide more empirical evidence to back up its assertions, and that the above comments be reflected in its contents. (signed) Daniel J. Ryan Director, Information Systems Security CLASSIFIED BY: OASD(C3I)/DIR, ISS DECLASSIFY ON: OADR [This page originally XXXXXXXX SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED] OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC 20301-3040 COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE 30 APR 1993 (stamped) MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (C3I) Subject: PRD/NSC-27 Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U) (U) Advances in telecommunications have created the opportunity for public use of encryption to ensure the privacy and integrity of business and personal communications. These same advances threaten the capabilities of law enforcement and national security operations that intercept the communications of narcotraffickers, organized criminals, terrorists, espionage agents of foreign powers and SIGINT targets. Diverse interests are in diametric opposition with regard to industry's right to sell and the public's right to use such capabilities. A highly-emotional, spirited public debate is likely. (U) In its simplest construct, this complex set of issues places the public's right to privacy in opposition to the public's desire for safety. The law enforcement and national security communities argue that if the public's right to privacy prevails and free use of cryptography is allowed, criminals and spies will avoid wiretaps and other intercepts and consequently prosper. They propose that cryptography be made available and required which contains a "trapdoor" that would allow law enforcement and national security officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered communications. Such cryptography exists, and while there are many practical problems to be solved, this proposal is technically possible to achieve. (U) Opponents of the proposal argue that the public has a right to and an expectation of privacy, that a trapdoor system would be prone to misuse and abuse, and that the proposed solution would not work in any practical sense. They assert that people who are deliberately breaking much more serious laws would not hesitate to use cryptography that does not have a trapdoor, and that secure cryptography will inevitably be supplied by offshore companies. Thus, freedom will be lost and many tax dollars spent to no effect. (U) This situation is complicated by the existence of other interests. For example, there currently exist strict controls on the export of cryptography. The computer industry points out that it has one of the few remaining positive trade balances and that it is vital that the dominance of the American computer industry in world markets be preserved. The industry fears that this will be lost if offshore developers incorporate high-quality cryptography into their products while U.S. industry either cannot do so or suffers higher costs or delays due to requirements for export licenses. The industry argues persuasively that overseas markets (much less drug lords or spies) will not look with favor on U.S. products which have known trapdoors when offshore products which do not have them are available. In support of their argument, they note that powerful public-key cryptography developed and patented by RSA using U.S. tax dollars is free to developers in Europe, subject to royalties in the United States, and cannot be exported without expensive and time-late export licenses. These charges are true. (U) The national security community is especially interested in preventing the spread of high-quality encipherment routines overseas, and argues that more extensive use here at home will inevitably result in such a proliferation. Actually, it is too late. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is already widely available throughout the world in both hardware and software forms, and DES software can be downloaded anywhere in the world from public bulletin boards by anyone with a PC, a MODEM and a telephone. In one recent experiment it took three minutes and fourteen seconds to locate a source-code version of DES on the INTERNET. Widespread availability of DES and RSA will enable offshore developers to provide high-quality encipherment for voice and data communications in competition with U.S. industry's products. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX blacked out via FOIA exemption (b)(1) XXXXXXXXXXX (U) Despite these concerns, the President has directed that the Attorney General request that manufacturers of communications hardware use the trapdoor chip, and at least AT&T has been reported willing to do so (having been suitably incentivised by promises of Government purchases). The Attorney General has also been directed to create a system for escrow of key material. The Secretary of Commerce has been directed to produce standards based on the use of the trapdoor chip. (U) The President has also directed that the fact that law enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be concealed from the public. National security officials are not mentioned. (U) The new administration is committed to the development of an information superhighway and a National Information Infrastructure in support of the economy. This worthy goal is independent of arguments as to whether or not law enforcement and national security officials will be able to read at will traffic passing along the information superhighway. A full-scale public debate is needed to ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with regard to their privacy, and the impact on public safety of preserving privacy at the expense of wiretapping and communications intercept capabilities of law enforcement and national security personnel. It is not clear what the public will decide. In the meantime, DoD has trapdoor technology and the Government is proceeding with development of the processes needed to apply that technology in order to maintain the capability to perform licit intercept of communications in support of law enforcement and national security. (signed) Ray Pollari Acting DASD (CI & SCM) [This page originally SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED] ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON DC 20301-3040 May 3, 1993 COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM: CHARLES A. HAWKINS, JR., ACTING ASD(C3I) (initialed C. Hxxx) SUBJECT: Advanced Telecommunications and Encryption (U) PURPOSE: INFORMATION DISCUSSION: (U) In response to DEPSECDEF's tasking of 21 Apr 93 (TAB A) this information is provided. Advances in telecommunications have created the opportunity for public use of encryption to ensure the privacy and integrity of business and personal communications. These same advances threaten the capabilities of law enforcement and national security operations that intercept the communications of narcotraffickers, organized criminals, terrorists, espionage agents of foreign powers and a broad range of SIGINT targets. Diverse interests are in diametric opposition with regard to industry's right to sell and the public's right to use such capabilities. A highly-emotional, spirited public debate is likely. (U) The law enforcement and national security communities argue that if the public's right to privacy prevails and free use of cryptography is allowed, criminals and spies will avoid wiretaps and other intercepts. They propose that cryptography be made available to the public which contains a "trapdoor" that would allow law enforcement and national security officials, under proper supervision, to decrypt enciphered communications. Such cryptography exists, and while there are many practical problems to be solved, this proposal is technically possible to implement. (U) Opponents of the proposal argue that the public has a right to and expectation of privacy, that such a system would be prone to misuse and abuse, and that the proposed solution would not work in any practical sense. They assert that criminals and spies will not hesitate to use secure cryptography supplied by offshore companies. Thus, the loss of privacy would outweigh any advantages to law enforcement or national security. (U) The computer industry points out that it has one of the few remaining positive trade balances and that it is vital that the dominance of the American computer industry in world markets be preserved. The industry fears that this will be lost if offshore developers incorporate high-quality cryptography into their products while U.S. industry either cannot do so or suffers higher costs or delays due to requirements for export licenses because of strict controls of export of cryptography. The industry argues persuasively that overseas markets (much less drug lords or spies) will not look with favor on U.S. products which have known trapdoors when offshore products which do not have them are available. CLASSIFIED BY: DASD(CI&SCM) DECLASSIFY ON: OADR [This page originally XXXXXXXX SECRET; now UNCLASSIFIED] (U) The national security community is especially interested in preventing the spread of high-quality encipherment routines overseas, and argues that more extensive use here at home will inevitably result in such a proliferation. This would increase the cost of performing the SIGINT mission or decrease the amount of intelligence, or both. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is already widely available throughout the world in both hardware and software forms, and DES software can be downloaded anywhere in the world from public bulletin boards by anyone with a PC, a MODEM, and a telephone. Thus far, widespread availability has not led to widespread use. However, widespread availability of DES and RSA will make it possible for offshore developers to provide high- quality encipherment for voice and data communications in competition with U.S. industry's products. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXX blacked out under FOIA exemption (b)(1) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (U) The President has directed that the Attorney General request that manufacturers of communications hardware use the trapdoor chip. The Attorney General has also been directed to create a system for escrow of key material. The Secretary of Commerce has been directed to produce standards based on the use of the trapdoor chip. The President has also directed that the fact that law enforcement officials will have access to the keys will not be concealed from the public. National security officials are not mentioned. (U) The new administration is committed to the development of an information superhighway and a National Information Infrastructure in support of the economy. This worthy goal is independent of arguments as to whether or not law enforcement and national security officials will be able to read at will traffic passing along the information superhighway. A full-scale public debate is beginning which will ascertain the wishes of U.S. citizens with regard to their privacy and the impact on public safety of preserving privacy at the expense of wiretapping and communications intercept capabilities of law enforcement and national security personnel. It is not clear what the public will decide. In the meantime, DoD has trapdoor technology and the Government is proceeding with development of the processes needed to apply that technology in order to maintain the capability to perform licit intercept of communications in support of law enforcement and national security. Prepared by: Dan Ryan/ODASD(CI & SCM)/x 41779/28 Apr 93/OSD ------- End of Forwarded Message

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A public experiment in how private our lives really are
by gnu 21 Jun '93

21 Jun '93

A reported has asked me for help in finding people who will help to pentrate the privacy of four volunteers, for a major newspaper story. Any takers? Contact the reporter: Reporter for major metro paper is interested in help finding out anything there is to find on four prominent people who have volunteered to have their privacy breached. Financial fundamentals. Lives of crime. Aches and pains. How rich they are, where they vacation, who they socialize with. You name it, we're interested in seeing if it's out there. All for a good cause. If you're willing to advise this computer-ignorant reporter, or dig in and get the dope on these volunteers, please contact him at tye(a)nws.globe.com Or call at +1 617 929 3342. Soon. Thanks. Feel free to forward this far and wide. -- John Gilmore gnu(a)toad.com -- gnu(a)cygnus.com -- gnu(a)eff.org Creating freedom, rather than longer chains, bigger cages, better meals, . . .

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Re: Patent libraries
by jim＠tadpole.com 21 Jun '93

21 Jun '93

If there are any other Austin-based cypherpunks, UT is a federal IP depository. Jim

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No Subject
by tye＠nws.globe.com 21 Jun '93

21 Jun '93

Reporter for major metro paper is interested in help finding out anything there is to find on four prominent people who have volunteered to have their privacy breached. Financial fundamentals. Lives of crime. Aches and pains. How rich they are, where they vacation, who they socialize with. You name it, we're interested in seeing if it's out there. All for a good cause. If you're willing to advise this computer-ignorant reporter, or dig in and get the dope on these volunteers, please contact him at tye(a)nws.globe.com Or call at 617-929-3342. Help especially appreciated from anyone in the BOSTON area. Soon. Thanks.

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The other Clipper
by Tom Keenan 21 Jun '93

21 Jun '93

Just to avert any confusion... I see (Communications Week, June 7, 1993, pg 1) that the code name for IBM's soon to be announced ATM (asynchronous transfer mode) switch happens (?) to be "Clipper." It's apparently based on "IBM's experimental Planet switch, a 6 gigabit per second switch that handles both variable and fixed length packets" and is in test at Rogers Communications in Toronto. (Just in case you hear communications types using the term "Clipper" in a different sense from the one usually seen on this list.) -- Dr. Tom Keenan, I.S.P. Associate Dean, R&D, Faculty of Cont. Ed. University of Calgary 2500 University Dr. NW Calgary, AB T2N 1N4 CANADA (403) 220-4715 (voice) (403) 284-5702 (fax) keenan(a)acs.ucalgary.ca (email)

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No Subject
by cdodhner＠indirect.com 21 Jun '93

21 Jun '93

Just checking out a "patently false rumor" I heard about... <g> Yeah I'll bite. Drop me a note or not... -Happy Hunting.

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A cite desired...
by Peter Wayner 21 Jun '93

21 Jun '93

I remember reading that IBM originally started looking into cryptosystems like DES after they were informally tipped off that the Russians were evesdropping on their internal network. Can anyone give me a pointer to this fact? Thanks, Peter Wayner

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