April 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

No FTP? You can still get PGP!
by Stanton McCandlish 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

************************************************************************* DEFEAT THE BIG BROTHER PROPOSAL! JUST SAY F!CK NO TO THE PRIVACY CLIPPER! ************************************************************************* ************************************************************ The security of PGP encryption for those without FTP access! ************************************************************ This is not an ad, but a public service announcement. NitV-BBS is FREE. This info (and my system!) has been updated to make it easier for you to obtain Pretty Good Privacy (PGP): Secure RSA pubkey encrytion for all! Due to the overwhelming response, I have sought out as many ports as possible. After a week of exhaustive FPT/Archie searches it appears to me that NitV-BBS is the world's singlemost comprehensive PGP site, with executables and/or source code for the following platforms: Platform exec source patch extras MS-DOS (PC-DOS, etc.) X X X Macintosh X X Archimedes X ? OS/2 X X Amiga X X Unix X X NeXT X In one case I do not have the means to open the archive to see if it comes with the source code, thus "?". WARNING: My DallasFax 14.4k v32bis modem does not always cooperate too well with USR/Miracom Dual Standards. BY MODEM TO BBS: Call NitV-BBS (see .sig at end of message for details) Here you will find: File area file name description LOGIN PGP22.ZIP DOS version of PGP LOGIN PGPSHEL1.ZIP menu/shell for PGP (DOS only) NONIBM PGP22B-A.LHA PGP for Amiga (w/source) NONIBM ARCPGP22 PGP for Archimedes (format unknown; w/src??) NONIBM MACPGP22.CPT PGP for Mac (.cpt archive) NONIBM PGP22.TAZ PGP for Unix (compressed .tar; w/source) WIN PGP22OS2.ZIP PGP for OS/2 (w/source patch) LOGIN PGP22SRC.ZIP PGP source code & utils for DOS NONIBM MPGP22SC.S_H PGP source code for Mac (BinHex .hqx encode of a .sea self-extracting archive) MONIBM MPGP22SC.SIG PGP signature for validation of Mac source NONIBM NXTPGP22.ASC PGP source code diff (patch) for NeXT. ASCII A quick <T>ext search for "pgp" will yield the files for flagging quickly. Note: original name of Mac version is: MacPGP_2.2.cpt original name of Unix version is: pgp22.tar.Z original name of Mac source is: MacPGP2.2src.sea.hqx original name of Mac signature is: MacPGP2.2src.SIGNATURE NeXT patch is a concatenation of: PGP.random.c.diff and PGP.random.c.diff.README These names were changed because of the 12 char limit of MesSDOS filenames. All files are direct from these FTP sites: nic.funet.fi, sony.com, garbo.uwasa.fi, and ftp.uni-erlangen.de. They are NOT uploaded by BBS users, nor gotten from other BBSs. You can rest assured that they are "clean" (the superparanoid^H^H^H^H^H^H^H^Hcautious may wish to obtain additional copies and compare them for further validation.) You may login anonymously as ANONYMOUS, password GUEST. If you want the whole lot you won't have time, as that acct. is limited. In that case, login normally, but if you never intend to call again, please be courteous, and leave a <C>omment to sysop to delete your account. Disk space is limited! All user accounts are free. There is no charge (other than your phone expenses of course) for obtaining PGP from NitV-BBS. BY FIDO-PROTOCOL FREQ Anyone in FidoNet or any other FTN/FTSC network (such as RBBSNet, etc.), or anyone with a working Fido-type mailer, can get PGP from the same source, via File REQuest, as long as they can send mail to Fido address 1:301/2 (you will need a Fido nodelist to pull that off). You do not have to be nodelisted to do this. You can even be a point system. Just send a DIRECT not routed netmail To: Sysop, NitV (1:301/2) From: <your info here> Re: <filename>,<filename>,<etc> St: Crash, Direct, FilReq, <etc> <filename> can be a full file name, or a "magic name". Status is not that important, as long as the message is set for at least these 2: Direct and FilReq. You can use the following magic names (which will still hold for future releases of PGP): Magic Name files description PGPDOS PGP22.ZIP, PGPSHEL1.ZIP DOS PGP and menu/shell PGPAMI PGP22B-A.LHA Amiga PGP & source PGPARC ARCPGP22 Archimedes PGP PGPMAC MACPGP22.C_H Mac PGP PGPNXT NXTPGP22.ASC NeXT PGP source code diff (requires a full src package) PGPOS2 PGP22O2.ZIP OS/2 PGP & patch PGPUNX PGP22TAR.Z Unix PGP & source PGPSDOS PGP22SRC.ZIP PGP source & utils (DOS fmt.) PGPSMAC MPGP22SC.S_H, MPGP22SC.SIG PGP source & sig (Mac fmt.) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Please upload, file-attach via netmail, uuencode and email, or just tell me where to find, any interesting utils, FAQs, etc for PGP that you come across, so that I can make them available to the needy but FTPless hordes. Please do NOT further distribute this copy of PGP, especially to BBSs. Part of the Good Thing about getting it from NitV is that you know it came right from one of the original FTP sites for it, not from some cheezy BBS via the hands of 27 other people and systems, any of which might harbour a baddie. This is not to say that BBSs are bad (hell, I run one!) but rather that too much is left to chance (and ill-will!) in it's distribution methods. PGP is a security program, and needs to be guaranteed to be secure. Thank you. This offer, due to IDIOTIC export restrictions, must of course be limited to the USA. <snort> Authors are stongly encouraged to upload, mail, etc. their ports of PGP, their PGP utilities, etc. directly to me or the system listed below so that non-FTP-using PGP afficionados can be certain that they are getting a "pris- tine" copy. Thanks! ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Distribute ENTIRE contents of this message freely. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- Testes saxi solidi! ********************** Podex opacus gravedinosus est! Stanton McCandlish, SysOp: Noise in the Void Data Center BBS IndraNet: 369:1/1 FidoNet: 1:301/2 Internet: anton(a)hydra.unm.edu Snail: 8020 Central SE #405, Albuquerque, New Mexico 87108 USA Data phone: +1-505-246-8515 (24hr, 1200-14400 v32bis, N-8-1) Vox phone: +1-505-247-3402 (bps rate varies, depends on if you woke me up...:)

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PGP: pgp -ke
by Chuck Lever 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

so, like, what's to stop me from writing a program (based on pgp source code) which can delete user IDs from my own keys after other folks have signed them? in fact, how *can* i change the user ID on a key after it has been signed? the pgp docs are unclear on how this works. can someone help me to understand what it means exactly when a key is signed? what parts of the key are certified by the signature?

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Program to measure entropy
by Peter Meyer 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

Cypherpunks write code, so here's some (at the end, anyway). Someone asked awhile back (just before the deluge of postings on the Wiretap Chip swamped my announcement of the release of new versions of our Dolphin Encrypt encryption software) about (something like) how to tell whether a file consists of something like English text or just (apparent) garbage. Here's one way, a program to calculate the entropy (and the relative entropy) of the set of bytes in a file. First the documentation (extracted from Appendix III in the manual for the Dolphin Encryption Library): Information theorists have attempted to formalize and to quantify the notion of randomness, also called entropy. The usual definition of entropy in a string of letters from some alphabet is due to Claude Shannon (who formulated this concept in the 1950s). Let S be a string of letters from some alphabet A = { a(0), a(1), ..., a(k-1) } of k letters, and let p(i) be the probability (that is, the relative frequency) of occurrence of a(i) in the string S, then the entropy E of the string S may be defined as: k-1 E = - Sigma ( p(i) * ln ( p(i) ) ) i = 0 where ln is the natural logarithm. It can be shown that this value is maximized when all letters occur in S with equal frequency (in this case E = ln(k)), and is minimized when one letter occurs all the time (in this case E = 0). Since E ranges between 0 and ln(k), we may obtain a modified entropy value E', which we call relative entropy, which ranges between 0 and 1 by dividing E by ln(k) thus: E' = E / ln(k). The program ENTROPY1.EXE calculates the relative entropy of the bytes in a given file. For a DOS text file consisting of English text the relative entropy value is typically in the range 0.48 - .68. The relative entropy values for most non-random files, including .OBJ, .COM and .EXE files, usually fall in the range 0.50 through 0.95. Files consisting of bytes generated by pseudo-random-number generators typically have relative entropy values in the range 0.970 - 0.999. Thus a file with a relative entropy value of at least .98 looks (at least according to this test) very much like a file consisting of random bytes. ENTROPY.EXE can thus be used to test whether a file appears to consist of random bytes or something like natural language. The ENTROPY1.EXE program takes two parameters on the command line, a file specification (wildcard characters are not allowed in this version) and (optionally) a byte space size, e.g. ENTROPY1 FILE.TXT 150. The program produces results such as: File Size Entropy Rel. entropy Diff. bytes HAMLET.TXT 1459 3.037405 0.547756 42 PTRS.TXT 3683 3.415741 0.615984 108 CHAP04.TXT 51162 3.339292 0.602198 100 FILE1.RND 1762 5.473655 0.987102 255 FILE2.RND 3400 5.503647 0.992511 256 FILE3.RND 29225 5.541324 0.999305 256 HAMLET.ENC 1762 5.478605 0.987995 256 PTRS.ENC 3400 5.501231 0.992075 256 CHAP04.ENC 29225 5.540785 0.999208 256 NULLFILE 20000 0.000000 0.000000 1 The file called NULLFILE consists of 20,000 null (zero) bytes, and has a relative entropy value of zero (as do all files which contain only a single byte value). Note that the relative entropy values for the .ENC files (encrypted using Dolphin Encrypt) are about .99, as are those for the .RND files (created by using a pseudo-random-number generator similar to Microsoft's rand() function) of the same size. The last column gives the number of different bytes found in the file. This may be less than the size of the byte space for the file. If the size of the byte space is less than 256, as is the case with text files, then the space size parameter may be included in the command line, as in ENTROPY1 HAMLET.TXT 108. In this case the program produces results such as: File Size Entropy Rel. entropy Diff.bytes HAMLET.TXT 1459 3.037405 0.648723 42 PTRS.TXT 3683 3.415741 0.729527 108 CHAP04.TXT 51162 3.339292 0.713199 100 Thus decreasing the value for the byte space increases the entropy measure. Relative entropy tends to be larger for larger files. Now the C source code: /* ENTROPY1.C * Written by Peter Meyer, last revised 1993-04-27. * Calculates the relative entropy of the bytes in a file * defined as the negative of the sum for each byte of the product of * the relative probability of that byte times the natural log * of that byte, divided by the natural log of the number of * different bytes occurring in the file; values can range from 0 to 1. */ #include <STDIO.H> /* Microsoft header files */ #include <STDLIB.H> #include <MEMORY.H> #include <MATH.H> unsigned long n[256]; double p[256]; unsigned char *usage = "\nUse: ENTROPY1 filespec [space_size]" "\nspace_size = number of possible bytes (default = 256)\n"; void measure_entropy(unsigned char *filename, unsigned long *total, double *entropy, double *relative_entropy, unsigned int*num_diff_bytes, unsigned int *space_size, int *err_flag); /*-----------------------------*/ void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int err_flag; unsigned int num_diff_bytes, space_size; unsigned long total; double entropy, relative_entropy; if ( argc == 1 ) { printf(usage); exit(0); } if ( argc == 2 ) space_size = 256; else { space_size = (unsigned int)atoi(argv[2]); if ( space_size == 0 || space_size > 256 ) { printf("\nInvalid space size.\n"); exit(1); } } measure_entropy(argv[1],&total,&entropy,&relative_entropy,&num_diff_bytes, &space_size,&err_flag); switch ( err_flag ) { case 0: /* no error */ printf("Space size = %u\n",space_size); printf("\n%15s%15s%15s%15s%15s", "File","Size","Entropy","Rel. entropy","Diff. bytes"); printf("\n%15s%15lu",argv[1],total); printf("%15.6f%15.6f%15d\n",entropy,relative_entropy,num_diff_bytes); exit(0); case -1: printf("\nCannot open file %s.\n",argv[1]); exit(2); case -2: printf("\n%15s is inconsistent with space size %d.\n", argv[1],space_size); exit(3); } } /*-----------------------------------------*/ void measure_entropy(unsigned char *filename, unsigned long *total, double *entropy, double *relative_entropy, unsigned int *num_diff_bytes, unsigned int *space_size, int *err_flag) { int j; FILE *file; *err_flag = 0; file = fopen(filename,"rb"); if ( file == NULL ) { *err_flag = -1; return; } /* zero the frequency array */ memset(n,0,256*sizeof(unsigned long)); /* count the byte values */ while ( !feof(file) ) n[fgetc(file)]++; /* get the number of bytes and the number of different byte values */ *num_diff_bytes = 0; *total = 0L; for ( j=0; j<256; j++ ) { *num_diff_bytes += ( n[j] != 0 ); *total += n[j]; } if ( *num_diff_bytes > *space_size ) { *err_flag = -2; fclose(file); return; } /* calculate the probabilities */ for ( j=0; j<256; j++ ) p[j] = ((double)n[j])/(*total); /* calculate the entropy */ *entropy = 0.0; for ( j=0; j<256; j++ ) { if ( p[j] ) *entropy += p[j]*log(p[j]); } *entropy = -1.0*(*entropy); /* calculate the relative entropy */ *relative_entropy = *entropy/log(*space_size); fclose(file); } If anyone wants the MS-DOS executable version of this program then send me (meyer(a)mcc.com) a snailmail address and I'll send it to you on the Dolphin Encrypt demonstration disk. -- Peter Meyer

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(fwd) Re: Clipper Chip Questions
by tcmay＠netcom.com 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

Cypherpatriots, Here's a fairly long posting I made to sci.crypt and comp.lsi about reverse engineering the Clipper chip. Especially on the technical issues about tamper-resistant modules and electron-beam probing. -Tim Newsgroups: sci.crypt,comp.lsi From: tcmay(a)netcom.com (Timothy C. May) Subject: Re: Clipper Chip Questions Date: Wed, 28 Apr 1993 20:26:51 GMT (followup to comp.lsi added, as they may have something to say on this) allyn (allyn(a)netcom.com) wrote: : My question is what is to prevent someone who has one of these chips : (from a cellphone or computer or whatever) from taking the chip to : a microelectronic facility with a decent scanning electron microscope and : other equipment that is used to testing and analysis of microcircuits : and taking the darn thing abart and reverse engineer it? : : There must be plenty of microelectronic facilities that are under : relatively minimal security (such as universities) for someone to : try to reverse engineer one of these classified chips that the government : plans to put into the public's hands. I ran an electron microscope/chip testing lab for Intel, circa 1981-84. (We built a kind of "time machine" for imaging the internal states of complex chips--the 286 in those days--and displaying them on an image processing system which "subtracted out" the states of bad chips from known good chips and thus allowed us to analyze the nucleation and propagation of logic faults through the chip. Very useful for finding subtle speed and voltage problems, as well as gross faults, of course.) Analyzing the Clipper chip, or any "tamper-resistant module," will not be trivial, but neither will it be impossible. Some issues, questions, problems: 1. Getting through the package to the chip surface itself is problematic. Proprietray molding compounds may be used to make this tough. (For example, carborundum and sapphire particles are often mixed in, so that mechanical grinding and lapping also destroys the chip. And plasma ashing won't work.) 2. Sometimes the package itself has "traps" which wipe the chip (the data) if breached (fiber optic lines mixed in the epoxy, for example). This seems unlikely for a relatively low-cost solution like the Clipper. Papers presented at the "Crypto Conference" have dealt with this. (The main uses: nuclear weapons "Permissive Action Links" and credit card "smart cards," which use less intensive measures, obviously.) 3. Once at the chip surface, via grinding, chemical etch, plasma ashing, etc., the chip can be analyzed. 4. Carefully photographing the chip as layers are etched away (or even carefully lapped away) can reveal much about the internal operation, though not the data stored in internal ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, Flash EPROM, etc. If the Clipper/Capstone algorithm is embedded in the microcode and not apparent from the visible circuitry, then it must be read by other means. 5. Voltage contrast electron microscopy allows internal chip voltages to be read with good reliability. Cf. any of the the many papers on this. Commercial e-beam probers are available. (How voltage contrast works is itself an interesting issue, and there are many good references on this.) 6. However, operating the chip is necessary to read the internal states and voltage levels, and opening the chip under "hostile conditions" (read: limited numbers of samples, no knowledge of the molding compound, no help from the manufacturer) often destroys the functionality. It can be done, but count on lots of trial and error. 7. Metal layers may be used to shield lower signal-carrying layers from scrutiny by electron beam probes. Intel, for example, builds the new Pentium on a 3-layer metal process in which the top layer almost completely covers the lower layers. (Extremely sophisticated measurements using lasers (Kerr effect) and magnetic field sensing may be possible. Count on a very expensive set-up to do this.) 8. Other "tricks" may route parts of the key circuitry through buried layers, polysilicon lines, several layers of metal, etc. 9. VLSI Technology, Inc., the company with the "tamper-resistant technology" used by Mykotronx (VTI will fab the chips), may also be storing bits in very small EEPROM cells, which are very hard to e-beam probe (especially without disrupting them!). Note also that Intel bought a partial stake in VLSI. (I'm not imputing anything and don't know if Intel is somehow involved in the Clipper/Capstone effort. In fact, I left Intel in 1986.) 10. The easiest way to get the Clipper/Skipjack/Capstone details is probably the old-fashioned way: offer money for it. With anonymous remailers and digital cash, this may be much easier. Just some thoughts on this extremely interesting issue of reverse-engineering the Clipper. -Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

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othercrypt
by Peter Honeyman 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

does anyone know how to get the a5 eurocrypt stuff? also there is rumored to be russian cryptosoftware on the street. clue? peter

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Re: PGP: USA-Legal PGP Project
by markh＠wimsey.bc.ca 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

> Unfortunately, wide distribution in the USA of PGP, the most popular > product, is inhibited because it violate's RSA's patents. PGP has > already been chased off some USA FTP Sites. But this problem has a > solution! I confirmed with Jim Bidzos, President of RSA, who was > present at the meeting, that a USA Legal version of PGP could be > constructed by just replacing certain sections of code with free code > from RSAREF. Since source for both PGP and RSAREF are available, this > sounds like an easy job. Since no-one's actually done it yet, perhaps > it's not, but I will try. I hope I haven't bitten off more than I can > chew. At best, I can compile and test only the MSDOS version of PGP. I > will certainly need help if USA-Legal MAC, AMIGA, UNIX, etc. versions > are to be available. You should be able to do it. But, you will first have to get permission from RSADSI to access RSAREF in ways other than by the published interface. I trust they'll grant it, given what you say above. Also, be sure to get the RSAREF version included with RIPEM (wait for version 1.07 if you can). It has several significant performance enhancements (generic and some platform specific asm versions of time critical code). You won't be able to export this 'legal' version of PGP. Tracking and updating to new PGP releases will be a pain as much of the development is done outside of North America. Mark -- Mark Henderson markh(a)wimsey.bc.ca RIPEM key available by key server/finger/E-mail MD5OfPublicKey: F1F5F0C3984CBEAF3889ADAFA2437433

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ANON: Cryptographic MIX
by /home/kelly/.sig 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

#<text/x-pgp -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hi All, At the first cypherpunks meeting I cam to, A speaker was giving a presentation on cryptographic MIX protocols. My memory fails me as to who that was... so thats the question and what is the progress on an implementation??? cheers kelly - -- Parts of this .sig borrowed with permission from T.C.May. Perhaps it will indeed get me busted also. .......................................................................... Kelly Goen | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, kelly(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero Intelligence Systems | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Specialists Inc. | black markets, face banks, data havens, dark | tech, covert channels, shared secrets, | alt.whistleblowers, collapse of governments. Technical Monkeywrench | Public Key: PGP 2.2. | .......................................................................... PGP 2.2 Key available from PGP Keyservers on the Internet. pub 1024/1BA573 1992/09/09 kelly <kelly(a)netcom.com> Key fingerprint = EF 7A 38 99 22 84 E3 3B 90 2A DB 80 DC 65 DA 31 STOP THE WIRETAP CHIP(Clipper Chip)!! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBK93QvfgXinP2G6VzAQHAzQP/aaSiiBlKIrZUP+xe4xuC6pzyeS/xM0Hd FdDOJ4ttsOiBPkSm+C6WxLZQvsdhSpe9e947YZmM2afQWgDFBynkcaUG3RS6eh7P Q35Fqaof6WEAqZO+IRg2KYarRA60CB1hUu082B3/9DSSCnr2CsPPMgtQGo8ULg/x WnHX6cN/9Xo= =AtWx -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- #

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Liddy; There's a Chip in the Middle of the Phone
by fnerd＠smds.com 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

> In <9304231457.AA22562(a)gmuvax2.gmu.edu>, 7025aj(a)gmuvax2.gmu.edu writes: > |> > |> send him [Limbaug] some convincing words, please? > |> > |> G. Gordon Liddy would be another good target, but I don't know his address. cp(a)jido.b30.ingr.com (Serrzna Penvt Cerffba) [!Is that real rot13!?] replies: > My guess would be that Liddy and Limbaugh would both be very > happy about the Tapper chip proposal... Isn't Liddy the guy who wanted to be able to get at someone's private information later, and so he... he... wait, I hear a melody... There's some Dems at the Watergate Hotel, There's some Dems at the Watergate Hotel, There's some Dems, There's some Dems, There's some Dems at the Watergate Hotel. There's a suite for the the Dems at the Watergate Hotel, ... There's a door on the suite of the Dems at the Watergate Hotel, ... There's a lock on the door on the suite of the Dems at the Watergate Hotel, ... There's a tape on the lock on the door of the suite of the Dems at the Watergate Hotel, ... There's a finger on the tape on the lock on the door of the suite of the Dems at the Watergate Hotel, ... There's a chip in the middle of the phone, There's a chip in the middle of the phone, There's a chip, There's a chip, There's a chip in the middle of the phone. There's a lock on the chip in the middle of the phone, ... There's a key in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone, ... There's a crack in the key in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone, ... There's a tap on the crack in the key in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone, ... There's a speaker on the tap on the crack in the key in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone, ... There's an ear at the speaker on the tap on the crack in the key in the lock on the chip in the middle of the phone, ... -fnerd keep your oxides dry --fnerd(a)smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham) quote me

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(fwd) Capstone & Preliminary Message Security Protocol
by tcmay＠netcom.com 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

Cypherfolks, Some info on Capstone and another program called "Tessera." -Tim From: mrr(a)scss3.cl.msu.edu (Mark Riordan) Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: Capstone & Preliminary Message Security Protocol Date: 28 Apr 1993 01:35:50 GMT Organization: Michigan State University Summary: Defense Message System to use Capstone chip Keywords: Clipper, Capstone, PMSP, Mykotronx, NSA An article in the 26 April 93 issue of Network World mentions encryption technology to be used in a proposed Department of Defence email network: Next year, the DOD will issue an RFP for a one million-user Defense Message System (DMS). DMS will not be completely compatible with X.400 messaging. Therefore, to make it easier for vendors to bid on what will be a non-standard email system, the DOS plan to release prototype source code for its version of X.400. The article contains the interesting sentence: "Along with source code, it will release the nonclassified encryption algorithm application called Preliminary Message Security Protocol (PMSP)." DMS places security features in the Mail User Agent, rather than the Message Transfer Agent, as is done with stock X.400. Furthermore, PMSP will use the NSA's Capstone public key algorithm, rather than RSA, which is used in X.400. Therefore, gateways will be required to translate between encryption systems when DMS is exchanging messages with other networks. As its data encryption algorithm, Capstone uses the same unpublished private-key algorithm as the Clipper chip. [In a Usenet posting, Dorothy Denning says that Capstone uses the Skipjack algorithm, the Digital Signature Standard (DSS), and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA).] Capstone chips will be provided by Mykotronx, Inc., the Torrance, Calif firm that also designed Clipper. Military DMS users will be issued PCMCIA-compliant cryptocards containing the Capstone chip. (PCMCIA is an add-on interface card standard oriented toward subnotebook PC compatibles.) This interface card is dubbed "Tessera". Mykotronx claims to have already shipped 10,000 Capstone and 20,000 Clipper chipsets. Does anyone know anything else about PMSP? Mark R. mrr(a)ripem.msu.edu --

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Markey Hearing Thursday 930AM
by gnu 28 Apr '93

28 Apr '93

------- Forwarded Message Date: Wed, 28 Apr 1993 13:04:20 -0400 From: jberman(a)eff.org (Jerry Berman) Subject: Markey Hearing DATE AND TIME: Thursday, April 29, 1993 at 9:30am ROOM: 2123 Rayburn House Office Building SUBJECT: Oversight hearing on issues relating to the integrity of telecommunications networks and transmissions including consumer privacy, encryption, computer hacking, toll fraud and data security. WITNESS LIST Technical Presentation Mr. John B. Gage Director, Science Office Sun Microsystems, Inc. 2550 Garcia Avenue, MS PAL01-505 Mountain View, CA 94043-1100 [I think Tsutomu Shimomura and Ron Rivest will also appear as part of this presentation. --gnu] Panel Mr. Raymond Kammer Acting Director National Institute of Standards and Technology Building 101, Room A1111 Gaithersburg, MD 20899 Mr. John P. Lucich State Investigator Organized Crime and Racketeering Bureau New Jersey Division of Criminal Justice 25 Market Street Trenton, NJ 08625 Mr. Bruce Sterling 4525 Speedway Austin, TX 78751 Author: The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier Mr. Joel Reidenberg Associate Professor of Law Fordham University School of Law 140 West 62nd Street New York, NY 10023-7485 ------- End of Forwarded Message

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