April 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Mykotronx and VLSI data sheets
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

The data sheets arrived today! (Steve - I gave Matt a copy; I can fax it to you if yours hasn't shown) (Cypherpunks - Mykotronx 310-533-8100 fax-0527, VLSI 408-434-3100 fax-263-2511) The VLSI material didn't have anything Clipper-specific - lots of stuff on their ASIC libraries and chips, and some information on their tamper-proof technology. Their DES chip does 192 Mb/s, and they've got a vocoder chip for 13 kb/s GSM as well as 32 kb/s ADPCM G.721, ARM RISC, Z80 cores, high-speed comms stuff, PC support ASICs, etc. The Mykotronx material was interesting. It was about 18 pages long, and there are functional diagrams, pinouts, timing diags, command sets. It looks like there may be two versions, one commercial, one industrial-hard. The chip is 28-pin PLCC, with 4 bits control input, 8 leads for input/ output/config/status/test/alarm depending on command, the usual power, clock, strobe, busy, reset, and alarm leads, and two leads for higher-voltage write-once PROM. The internal clock is 15 MHz, and I'm not sure how fast it goes if you clock it externally (it uses the internal clock when it's doing the fun stuff, but can use externals for I/O, etc.) It looks like the encryption phase takes 64 clock cycles, but I'm not an electrician so I can't guarantee that that's what the timing diags mean; if that's the case it would seem to be slower than 16 mb/s throughput given I/O time? There are 5 functional blocks: controller, algorithm, Data Bus Buffer, self-test, and clock. There's an internal data bus (how wide? 8 bits?) with the controller, data buffer, and external clock accessible from outside, the self-test generating two output leads only, and the algorithm block isolated (only connected to the bus and self-test.) The basic sequence of operations, once the chip has booted and tested, is that you feed commands to initialize cryptographic variables (key, IV), tell it to encrypt or decrypt, strobe in data, let it crunch, and strobe out results. It's picky about getting commands in the right order, and rejects anything it isn't willing to do for security reasons. It can operate in 7 different modes: ECB-64, CBC-64, OFB-64, CFB-64/32/16/8. The number of bytes read or written depends on the mode, but I was interested to find that I couldn't tell from the data sheets how many bytes that is, which either means they deliberately aren't telling us where the wiretap block is or else they assume that the Output Buffer Full and Input Buf Empty leads are all you care about; I'll try to find a tasteful way to ask them. Commands: - Reset - Write Random Seed - must be done at startup; there's a pseudo-random generator for IVs. If you give it a zero, it asks for a better seed. - Write Config Register - done second, picks operating mode. If you're in IDLE mode, you need to do this before writing the CV or IV. - Write Crypto-Variable (CV) (loads 10 bytes key, 3 bytes checksum, automagically checks key when loaded.) - Write Initialization Vector (IV) - you can load it or generate. - Generate IV - using the pseudo-random. Outputs to data bus when done. - Start Encrypt Block - read data off bus, crunch, wait for Read Output, IDLE - Read Output - strobes out output - Start Decrypt Block - read data, crunch, wait for Read Output, repeat until you get a Terminate or other command - Terminate Encrypt/Decrypt - stop doing encryption (IDLE?) - Save Current State - output 8 bytes of state to data bus - Restore Current State - input 8 bytes of state from data bus - Read Status Register - outputs to bus - Read Test/Alarm Register - outputs to bus - Write Test/Alarm Register - read from bus, do tests If you want to order a copy, they were pretty quick about delivering it. The person I talked to was John Droge, VP, Program Development. Approximate prices are $30 (qty. 10,000), no mention of engineering samples, quotations on a case-by-case basis for now. Bill Stewart # Bill Stewart wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com +1-908-949-0705 Fax-4876 # AT&T Bell Labs, Room 4M-312, Crawfords Corner Rd, Holmdel, NJ 07733-3030

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He's all yours...
by gnu 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

I'll send him the master list of cypherpunks questions. You-all can do the rest. John ------- Forwarded Message From: schneier(a)chinet.com (Bruce Schneier) Subject: Comments on Clipper for Publication To: gnu(a)toad.com Date: Mon, 26 Apr 1993 20:27:26 -0500 (CDT) I am writing an article on Clipper for Network World. I am looking for comments and opinions (that I can quote) on the scheme, its implications for security and privacy, its acceptance here and overseas, etc. I am on very tight deadline (I need to finish this Wednesday night). Please call or E-Mail responses. If there is someone else at EFF I should be talking to, please send me his address and telephione number. Thanks, Bruce (708) 524-9461 ------- End of Forwarded Message

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A correction, and another motive for Clipper
by tcmay＠netcom.com 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

Jim Bidzos of RSA informs me that Capstone does in fact use public key methods, and that his company will presumably receive royalty payments. (I remember this being discussd, now. The government itself has royalty-free access to the various public key patents, so I understand, but corporations selling equipement using the patents would presumably have to negotiate their own deals.) On another matter, I saw in the April 19th issue of "Network World," the headline on the front page: "Clinton security plan hints of Big Brother," with the subtitle: "Clipper Chip would let government eavesdrop on encrypted voice and data communications." The article is by Ellen Messmer. Along with the usual quotes from the White House announcement came this curious admission from an AT&T manager when asked why anyone, especially a criminal or terrorist, would use a tappable phone when alternatives exist. ---begin quote--- "A criminal probably wouldn't use it," said Mike Agee, marketing manager for secure products at AT&T, adding that the Clipper Chip is for the rest of the world. ---end quote--- Now I've heard several explanations for Clipper, ranging from buying market share to the stupidity of criminals (i.e., criminals _could_ buy non-Clipper alternatives under the current plan, but in practice they're too stupid to). Assuming non-Clipper encryption remains legal, why Clipper? It just occurred to me that perhaps the government is primarily interested in tapping its *own* phones! Not necessarily as part of a paranoid conspiracy plan, but because of the graft and bribery cases that keep coming up, such as the Defense Department scandals uncovered by Operatin Ill Wind a few years back. Ditto for "leaks" from offices. The Powers That Be may have looked at the coming age of untappable phones and concluded that at least they make sure they could tap the phones of those in government and defense contractors and suppliers, who will be the only ones actually _required_ to buy the Clipperphones. (Under the precise wording of the White House announcement; we can all still worry that this move is preparatory to wider restrictions.) Lest you think I'm becoming like David Sternlight and looking for the silver lining in every government move, I'm only floating this as a minor wrinkle on why the Clipperphones may be being deployed so quickly. --Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available.

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a quick non-technical writeup on the Clipper chip...
by composer＠Beyond.Dreams.ORG 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

The following is something I wrote for "What's Out There?", a column I write about what's available on the net. It's more for pointing out where to find out more information and such, but also includes a few of the concerns about the announcement. Feel free to send me comments. I'll be posting this to various USENET newsgroups in the near future, as the column won't be in hardcopy until about June, 1993. FYI... -jeff Jeff Kellem Internet: composer(a)Beyond.Dreams.ORG p.s. This is excerpted with permission, of course, since I am the author. ;-) ===CUT HERE=== [ NOTE: Please see the COPYRIGHT/LICENSE notice at the end of this document before ANY redistribution. ] The following is a portion of Volume 1, Issue 03 of "What's Out There?" written by Jeff Kellem <composer(a)Beyond.Dreams.ORG>. This is expected to appear in the May/June 1993 issue of the USENIX Association's hardcopy newsletter, ";login:". Excerpted from "What's Out There?", Volume 1, Issue 03... White House and NSA (Encryption) Clipper Chip Announcement ---------------------------------------------------------- On April 16, 1993, the White House announced the development of an encryption chip for voice communications developed in conjunction with the National Security Agency (NSA) called the Clipper Chip, along with an initiative regarding telecommunications and privacy which could literally affect almost every citizen in the United States. On the same day, AT&T announced a "secure" phone which incorporated this chip. Some important things to point out: o the encryption algorithm is remaining classified [ In the cryptography community, an encryption algorithm is only considered secure after it has been examined extensively and independently by a wide array of experts around the world. With an algorithm which is kept secret, there is no guarantee that it is secure and that the encryption method has no "back door" (allowing easy decryption for those, such as the NSA, that know the "back door"). ] o though the government has announced plans to use the chip in their own phones, they do NOT plan to use it for CLASSIFIED information, only for unclassified information. o this chip has been in the making for 4 years; it would seem that the Clinton Administration has already made plans to use the chip, without public comment or discussion on a matter which is so important to the privacy of that same public. o it would seem that the Government might be granting a monopoly to Mykotronx, Inc. and VLSI Technology. It's unclear whether each company makes the entire chip or just parts thereof. o the key, which allows the information encrypted with this chip to be decrypted, is embedded in the chip [ This means that once the key is known, the chip needs to be replaced to maintain private communications. In other words, a new encryption device, if the key is ever divulged, which could just mean a wire-tap. ] o the 80-bit key is split into two (2) 40-bit pieces and kept in databases at two different escrow agencies [ It's not clear how the key databases will be kept secure. It is also unknown if the classified encryption algorithm is any less secure to brute-force attacks, once half the key is known. ] o a successor chip has already been announced, called the Capstone chip. The Capstone chip is supposed to be a "superset" of the Clipper chip and will include the "digital signature standard" (DSS), which many in the cyprotgraphy community seem to consider insecure, as I recall. The NSA also developed DSS, which wasn't disclosed until CPSR filed a FOIA request with NIST (the National Institute of Standards & Technology). This announcement, in one way, is a step in the right direction -- privacy and encryption technology are important to the general public and for international economic competitiveness. An inquiry on whether export restrictions on encryption technology is good or bad is also a good thing. Currently, companies that want to include encryption as part of their products need to make two versions -- one for domestic distribution and one for international distribution. On the other hand, there are too many things about the announcement which are bothersome and need to be discussed publicly. Some of these items have been mentioned above. I recommend talking with your local congressman, writing letters, and discussing this with friends. Both the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) have made public statements against the announcement. The CPSR has filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests regarding the plan. Online discussions of the announcement have been occurring all over the Net in various USENET newsgroups and mailing lists. Here's a sample of where you might find discussions of the Clipper Chip: USENET newsgroups: alt.privacy.clipper sci.crypt alt.security alt.privacy comp.org.eff.talk comp.security.misc comp.society.cu-digest comp.risks Mailing lists: cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com Also, check the archives for the various groups listed above, as things may have changed by the time this comes to print in hardcopy come June 1993. The official White House press release of the Clipper Chip can be found via anonymous ftp from: csrc.ncsl.nist.gov in the /pub/nistnews directory, or via the NIST Computer Security BBS at +1 301 948 5717. It should also be available with the rest of the White House press release archives mentioned above. The EFF comments were first published in the EFFector Online Issue 5.06, which is available via anonymous ftp from: ftp.eff.org in the /pub/EFF/newsletters directory. Information from CPSR is available online via anonymous ftp from: ftp.cpsr.org in the /cpsr directory. The cypherpunks mailing list also maintains an archive. Information on the Clipper Chip can be found via anonymous ftp from: soda.berkeley.edu in the /pub/cypherpunks/clipper directory. Please do read the announcement of the Clipper Chip encryption technology, think about and discuss the implications of this with your friends, congressmen, and anyone else. ...End of excerpt. COPYRIGHT/LICENSE: This document is Copyright (c) 1993 Jeff Kellem/Beyond Dreams, composer(a)Beyond.Dreams.ORG. This copyright notice must be kept with each document. You have permission to freely redistribute this for non-commercial and non-profit purposes. It would be nice if you let the author know about any redistributions that are expected to reach more than a single person. :-) (This would include mirroring ftp sites, etc.) Please contact the author if you wish to use this document in ANY other fashion. Most likely, there won't be a problem. If you wish to redistribute this document for commercial purposes, you MUST contact the author for permission. Thank you. Jeff Kellem Composer of Dreams Beyond Dreams Internet: composer(a)Beyond.Dreams.ORG

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Re: MEETING SUMMARY:
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

Tim May closes his excellent summery with > May you live in interesting time, indeed! The rest of this curse is not as well known, but it goes "and attract the attention of important people." I suspect we are doing just that. Keith Henson

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mycotoxin
by Anonymous 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

NOTE to the person who sent this (if on the list) that I forwarded it to the list, you forgot the space after the colon on request-remailing-to. -- nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu Here's some stuff I dug up on Mykotronyx. The are privately held (at least there are no SEC filings on the database). I also checked the patent database, but it came up empty. Note the discrepency in the first two entries: one lists sales of $252,900,000 and the other says $2,500,000. "Myko" apparently means "enchantress" in Japanese. Check out their company motto: "Securing the world of communications bit by bit" ---------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright (c) 1992 American Business Information Trinet America COMPANY DATABASE MYKOTRONX INC 357 VAN NESS WAY # 200 TORRANCE , CALIFORNIA 90501-1488 310-533-8100 NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES: 25 EXECUTIVE: CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER: BOB GOTTFRIED NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS: 1 SALES INFORMATION: TOTAL SALES ( $ ): 252,900,000 SIC CODE-INFO: PRIMARY: 8731 COMMERCIAL PHYSICAL/BIOLOGICAL RES CODE INFORMATION: STATE CODE (FIPS): 06 COUNTY CODE (FIPS): 037 LOS ANGELES TRINET NUMBER: 808764096 ---------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright (c) 1992 American Business Information Trinet America ESTABLISHMENT DATABASE MYKOTRONX INC 357 VAN NESS WAY # 200 TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA 90501 310-533-8100 SIC-CODES: PRIMARY SIC CODE: 8731 COMMERCIAL PHYSICAL/BIOLOGICAL RES SALES INFORMATION: SALES ( $ ): 2,500,000 SHARE OF MARKET (%): .09 NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES: 25 EXECUTIVE: BOB GOTTFRIED OWNER CODE INFORMATION: STATE CODE (FIPS): 06 COUNTY CODE (FIPS): 037 LOS ANGELES MSA: 4480 PARENT COMPANY INFORMATION: MYKOTRONX INC 357 VAN NESS WAY # 200 TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA 90501 310-533-8100 STATE CODE (FIPS): 06 PRIVATE OWNED ESTABLISHMENT NUMBER: 808764096 ---------------------------------------------------------------- CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, SALES AND USE TAX INFORMATION NUMBER: AB127112520000 OWNER-NAME: MYKOTRONX INC. TYPE OF OWNERSHIP: CORPORATION MAILING-ADDRESS: 357 VAN NESS WAY,STE.200 TORRANCE, CA 90501 COUNTY: LOS ANGELES START-DATE: 04/1987 TYPE-OF-BUSINESS: PUBLISHERS, LIGHT INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT AND ALL OTHER PERMITTEES N.E.C. TAX-PROGRAM: REGULAR SALES TAX ---------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 1993 Business Wire, Inc. Business Wire April 19, 1993, Monday DISTRIBUTION: Business Editors & Computers/Electronics Writers LENGTH: 697 words HEADLINE: Mykotronx develops "Clipper" chip designed to ensure communications privacy DATELINE: TORRANCE, Calif. BODY: "Securing the world of communications bit by bit" is not only the motto but the guiding philosophy of Mykotronx Inc., a Torrance small business specializing in the design and manufacture of unique digital components and equipment. Mykotronx Monday announced the introduction of an electronic chip -- designated "Clipper" -- that it believes will ensure the protection of sensitive information transmitted via cellular or regular phones, computer networks or fax machines. This chip and follow-ons will also find application in many other systems, e.g., cable TV and personal computers. Leonard J. Baker, president of Mykotronx, said: "This chip is a good example of the transfer of military technology to the commercial and general government fields with handsome cost benefits. For 15 years we have been evolving this technology to protect government and commercial spacecraft from being tampered with and to protect the data transmitted by the spacecraft to its ground users. This technology should now pay big dividends to U.S. taxpayers." Economic data of incalculable value is transmitted each day over various telecommunications media, including telephones, facsimiles, telex, cable and other communications networks. Each message is vulnerable to interception through relatively simple techniques. Exploitation of illegally obtained information can do tremendous damage to the parties involved, ranging from embarrassment to the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars to a hacker who knows the specifics of a competitor's business plans. Said Baker: "Just as technology provides the means for communicating the data, it can now minimize the threat of its loss." It is in this arena that the chip developed by Mykotronx comes into play. It contains an ENCODE and DECODE capability using the government's recently announced new algorithm (more than 16 million times more keys than available on DES -- the existing system) to defeat hackers or eavesdroppers attempting to intercept voice or data messages. This first of a series of Mykotronx chips, developed by a team under the direction of Richard J. Takahashi, vice president of engineering, has been delivered to AT&T for use in its Telephone Security Device (TSD). This device, PAGE 3 Business Wire, April 19, 1993 placed between the handset and base of an ordinary telephone, allows the encryption and decryption of conversations so that eavesdropping cannot occur. This inexpensive capability will first be utilized by government agencies to protect sensitive conversations. A similar chip has been delivered to Motorola for use in its secure telephone products and digital radios. More advanced chips, those that protect other data transmissions, will be available in the coming months. These chips are manufactured by VLSI Technology Inc. of San Jose, Calif., using its unique FSB technology. VLSI was selected by Mykotronx based on its ability to develop high-performance semiconductor chips. Mykotronx, a.k.a. Myko, was founded by Robert E. Gottfried and Kikuo Ogawa to develop cryptographic units to protect the communication channels between spacecraft and ground stations. The company has delivered equipment to the Department of Defense, NASA and most aerospace companies. The strength of Mykotronx lies in its people and their unrelenting drive for excellence. Their "can-do" attitude has allowed the company to deliver high-quality products on very short time schedules. Mykotronx has received numerous commendations for its quality program and was recently named "Supplier of the Year" for the second consecutive year by IBM's Federal Systems Co. of Boulder, Colo. Sales of more than $5 million in 1992 are expected to double in 1993. Transferring this technology from spacecraft to everyday uses will allow the company to fulfill its ambitious motto of "Securing the world of communications bit by bit." For further information concerning these products, contact John C. Droge, vice president of program development, at 310/533-8100, or fax 310/533-0527. CONTACT: Mykotronx Inc., Torrance John Droge, 310/533-8100 (phone) 310/533-0527 (fax) ORGANIZATION: MYKOTRONX -INC GEOGRAPHIC: CALIFORNIA COLORADO INDUSTRY: COMPUTERS/ELECTRONICS PRODUCT ---------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright 1993 PR Newswire Association, Inc. PR Newswire April 16, 1993, Friday SECTION: Financial News DISTRIBUTION: TO BUSINESS EDITOR LENGTH: 742 words HEADLINE: AT&T TO INCORPORATE NEW 'CLIPPER' CHIP INTO SECURE COMMUNICATIONS PRODUCT LINE DATELINE: GREENSBORO, N.C., April 16 KEYWORD: bc-AT&T-Clipper-chip BODY: AT&T (NYSE: T) said today it is moving to improve the security and privacy of telephone communications by incorporating a just-announced new U.S. government technology for voice encryption into its secure communications product line. AT&T will use the Clipper chip, announced today by President Clinton as a new technology for voice encryption, in all of its secure telephone products except those specially designed for government classified customers. The Commerce Department has announced a six-month timetable for the final certification of Clipper. "AT&T is pleased to be the first company to publicly commit to adoption of the Clipper chip," said Ed Hickey, AT&T vice president, Secure Communications Systems. "We believe it will give our customers far greater protection in defeating hackers or eavesdroppers attempting to intercept a call. "And now all commercially available AT&T voice encryption products will be compatible with each other, a major step forward in bringing secure communications capabilities to the business community." In standardizing AT&T voice encryption products on the Clipper chip, AT&T will include the algorithm in the Telephone Security Device as well as in the Secure Voice/Data Terminal. The AT&T Telephone Security Device is a compact, lightweight unit that brings advance encryption technology to conventional land-line and cellular telephones. It provides a powerful, convenient and reliable way to protect the most sensitive telephone conversations. The device works with a conventional land-line or transportable/mobile cellular phone. It turns the phone's signal into a digital stream of encrypted information that is decrypted by a Telephone Security Device attached to the phone at the receiving end of the call. The AT&T Telephone Security Device connects easily to desk telephones or tranportable or mobile phones. It weighs 1.5 poun PAGE 5 PR Newswire, April 16, 1993 inches wide and 1.5 inches high. And it's as easy to use as it is portable. The AT&T Secure Voice/Data Terminals are desktop telephones that provide encryption for both telephone calls and data transmissions. These AT&T secure communications products use an enhanced voice encryption technique that provides very high voice quality. This technology allows calls placed with these products to approach the voice quality of normal calls. To further enhance interoperability, AT&T will consider licensing to other manufacturers its enabling technologies for interoperability. Interoperability of encryption devices requires common technology beyond the use of a common encryption algorithm, specifically common methods of digital voice encoding and signaling. AT&T has already performed integration tests with Clipper chips manufactured by the government's supplier, Mykotronx Inc., of Torrence, Calif., and is preparing to integrate the chip into the manufacturing of its secure products. AT&T's Clipper-equipped telephone security devices will be available to customers by the end of the second quarter. The federal government intends to adopt the Clipper chip as the standard for voice encryption to help protect proprietary information, protect the privacy of personal phone conversations and prevent unauthorized release of data transmitted electonically. At the same time, use of the Clipper chip will preserve the ability of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to intercept lawfully the phone conversations of criminals. "Adoption of Clipper will support both the government's efforts to protect the public and the public's right to privacy," Hickey said. AT&T Secure Communication Systems provides products to protect voice, data, fax, cellular and video communications. It also engineers and integrates secure communications applications. Its customers include the governments of the United States and other nations as well as major corporations around the world. AT&T Secure Communications Systems is headquartered in Greensboro. For more information about the AT&T Telephone Security Device 3600 and other AT&T Secure Communications Products, call David Arneke at 919-279-7680. CONTACT: David Arneke of AT&T Secure Communications Systems, 919-279-7680, or after hours, 919-273-5687, or Herb Linnen of AT&T Media Relations, 202-457-3933, or after hours, 202-333-9162 ORGANIZATION: AT&T TICKER-SYMBOL: T SUBJECT: New Products; Services GEOGRAPHIC: North Carolina INDUSTRY: Telecommunications CO: AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO INC; PR Newswire, April 16, 1993 TS: T (NYSE); IND: 111 COMMUNICATIONS; ----------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Consumer phone privacy info sheet
by karn＠qualcomm.com 27 Apr '93

27 Apr '93

>From: rustman(a)netcom.com (Rusty Hodge) I suspect the Clipper chip will be used heavily in digital cellular phones, if it isn't too much of a power hog. I seriously doubt it. I could easily have done DES in software on our CDMA digital cellphones using spare cycles in the CPU we already have (a '186) had I been allowed to do so. Why should I re-engineer my already designed products to use a $30 IC instead? Power is not the only issue. Phil

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Clipper letter
by peter honeyman 26 Apr '93

26 Apr '93

here is the letter i sent my senators and representative, w/ a copy to clinton and gore. don't forget to write yours. peter =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= April 26, 1993 I'm writing to share my concern about the White House announcement of April 16, 1993, which provides for wiretap ability in telecommunica- tions networks and wireless communications links. The particulars of the announcement are not in and of themselves altogether alarming, but the implication is that this is just a foot in the door: Q: If the Administration were unable to find a technological solution like the one proposed, would the Administration be willing to use legal remedies to restrict access to more powerful encryption devices? A: This is a fundamental policy question which will be considered during the broad policy review. Thanks to the widespread use of software that provides for information protection and privacy, the most common "powerful encryption device" is the personal computer. The suggestion that computers and software in everyday use be declared contraband worries me. But at a more fundamental level, I am concerned about the right to privacy. Privacy in the modern day means information privacy: keeping to oneself computerized data about oneself. Because encryption is widely regarded by computer security experts as the only effective means of ensuring computer privacy, the White House's "broad policy review" promises to examine whether citizens should have the right to determine whether and how to provide for their own privacy. Your voice is needed in this debate. I hope that when the question is raised whether the government should hold exclusive rights to the protection of individual privacy, or whether the people should hold that right to themselves, you will stand on the side of the people. Sincerely yours,

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Re: MEETING SUMMARY: 4-24-93 Cypherpunks Meeting
by John (FuzzFace/Fast-Eddie) McMahon 26 Apr '93

26 Apr '93

>>> "4. Educating the Public." I've seen several public/private debates open up just from "grass roots" circulation of the announcements and such. My only concerns are that: a) It's all pretty unfocused. b) It's being circulated on mailing lists (et al) where the discussion is inappropriate and probably would be viewed as annoying. But then again, any topic discussed on the network seems to have these problems initially. Fuzz

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Report on Adi Shamir talk
by fnerd＠smds.com 26 Apr '93

26 Apr '93

Last Friday, the 23rd, Adi Shamir (the S of RSA) gave a talk at MIT about some recent crypto results of his. (He was introduced by Ron Rivest, the R of RSA.) Shamir is in the country to give a talk about the history of crypto, in Washington DC, I think. It was actually two related talks, one on each of two papers of his: "On the Generation of Multivariate Polynomials which are Hard to Factor" and "Efficient Signature Schemes Based on Birational Permutations" Any misrepresentations and misunderstandings here are mine. The first paper is about factoring polynomials that are products of two polynomials, F = PQ where all these polynomials are on numbers that are mod the product of two primes. n = pq There are a lot of cases where F is easy to factor, and sometimes the easy cases seem to be only slightly different from the hard cases, but Shamir has found a large, easy-to-specify class of forms of (P, Q) where factoring their product is as hard as factoring n (the notorious hard problem that's the basis for the supposed strength of RSA). The second paper is about looking for public key crypto methods that are as strong as RSA but don't require such large amounts of computing on one end. In regular RSA, for instance, the number of multiplications for decrypting (for the legitimate key owner) goes up with key size, and so does the difficulty of multiplication. Shamir has found a scheme that takes about 20 multiplies on each side, period. However, it would be easily breakable as a crypto scheme, so he shows a variation that doesn't give as much info to an attacker, but works as a signature scheme. It *looks* secure to him and others he's shown it to, but it isn't proven as hard as factoring big numbers. The tie between the two papers is that the keys used in the scheme in the second paper are polynomials of the form discussed in the first paper. --fnerd(a)smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)

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