February 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Internet is Not the Long Term Solution
by tcmay＠netcom.com 25 Feb '93

25 Feb '93

Marc Horowitz writes, referring to my comments: >This is where I disagree strongly. We are entering a time when the >commercial advantages of internetworking are strong enough to cause >the formation of a real, commercially built, non-government-controlled >internet (small "i"). This network will be devoid of any AUP beyond >simple legality, and will operate much like a common carrier: They >won't care what you put on the wire unless someone brings it to their >attention. > >I highly doubt that FIDONET is the model of the future. People are >moving toward increased connectivity and real-time services, not the >slow, store-and-forward model of FIDO and UUCP. The example of >encrypted, untraceable real-time video requires internet technologies. >Mail forwarding just doesn't cut it. I wasn't very clear, or detailed, about this. I certainly didn't mean "like FIDONET" in the sense of a bunch of slow store-and-forward DOS-type machines. I agree with Marc that fast networks are the way to go. But the decentralized, privately-operated nature of FIODONET is intriguing, especially if combined with high-speed fiber optic networks and such. And many of the packetized messages we expect to see in with digital mixes will easily tolerate (and even require) some latency at each node. A large, diverse system of store-and-forward nodes may be very suitable for much of what we're talking about here. The long delays on the current FIDONET are of course unacceptable. (No point in arguing how much latency, how much delay is acceptable, etc., because it will all depend on the nature of the communications.) In summary, what I hope we get is a heterogeneous, decentralized, market-oriented mixture of networks, some very high speed, some slower speed, and some that are very slow but secure. So long as the Feds don't force the development in one direction, this is what I expect to see. >My major problem with this is that I'd rather not have to stamp each >piece. I'd like to see a remailer sell me an unlimited-use ticket for >a month, say. But this is what the free market is for. I'm sure >someone will see their way to offering the service I want to buy. Like Marc says, perhaps someone will offer this, though I doubt it. However, while passenger transportation systems can offer unlimited use tickets, the same is not generally the case with freight transportation (where someone might ship thousands of tons of freight on one ticket!). I doubt anyone will offer unlimited data transport for some fixed time period, for the same reason. -Tim -- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.

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Re: a project for those who like it
by mark＠coombs.anu.edu.au 25 Feb '93

25 Feb '93

>I have been working on an idea or a secure chat system for internet and have >up with some ideas. The concept is to runa server(a single server) to >process the chat for up to say 50 users(more may lag you to death) using >public key to secure the system. The server would be on an internet machine >and the client would be on the users home pc. We use the home pc concept >to avoid transporting raw data(unencrypted) over internet and phone lines. >The basic gist (in a pseudo pseudocode) is this: >Tell me what you think. People are already wrking on this project, but many >more may be needed to bring it to its completion. Since I am not >the IP programmer from hell, at this point I am doing the pc client. Hmmm, are you talking about '4m'? That is a similarly goaled communication system as well. Currently it exists in plain text format, between the clients and the (as of today, five) servers. The system has always been destined to have encryption built into it, from triple des and PK for the key transactions. To get into it quickly ftp /pub/misc/4m-212.tar.Z from ftp.santafe.edu and install. It runs on suns, bsd, aix and similar. I have an hpux port done by someone if it is required. It would seem smarter to develop an already existing and debugged instead of reinventing the wheel. Contact chasin(a)santafe.edu for details. Mark mark(a)coombs.anu.edu.au

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RE: Poor Man's Anonymous Remailer
by DrZaphod 25 Feb '93

25 Feb '93

In Message 24 Feb 93 10:13:44 EST, Duncan/Lois Frissell <CompuServe.COM!71562.3445(a)netcomsv.netcom.com> writes: >Isn't an account that can't be traced to you anonymous? How about an (email >only) account for $3/month billed to you (no credit cards required). I think you're confusing pseunonymous with anonymous. The goal is to send data somewhere WITHOUT A TRACE as to where it came from. If you used a single e-mail address, [someone] could track it down, watch for logins, and trace the line. If you used MANY e-mail addresses it would clog the net.. remailers seem to be the way to go these days. TTFN! DrZaphod [AC/DC] / [DnA][HP] [drzaphod(a)ncselxsi.uucp] Technicolorized

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Clinton/Gore on export controls
by Dave Banisar 25 Feb '93

25 Feb '93

------ Forwarded Message E X E C U T I V E O F F I C E O F T H E P R E S I D E N T THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary ______________________________________________________________ For Immediate Release February 22, 1993 REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT TO SILICON GRAPHICS EMPLOYEES Silicon Graphics Mountain View, California 10:00 A.M. PST .... (All sorts of higly intereresting but ultimately irrelevant to this list's purpose deleted) THE VICE PRESIDENT: Let me start off on that. As you may know, the President appointed as the Deputy Secretary of Commerce John Rollwagon who was the CEO at Cray. And he and Ron Brown, the Secretary of Commerce, have been reviewing a lot of procedures for stimulating U.S. exports around the world. And we're going to be a very export-oriented administration. However, we are also going to keep a close eye on the legitimate concerns that have in the past limited the free export of some technologies that can make a dramatic difference in the ability of a Gaddafi or a Saddam Hussein to develop nuclear weapons or ICBMs. Now, in some cases in the past, these legitimate concerns have been interpreted and implemented in a way that has frustrated American business unnecessarily. There are, for example, some software packages that are available off the shelves in stores here that are, nevertheless, prohibited from being exported. And sometimes that's a little bit unrealistic. On the other hand, there are some in business who are understandably so anxious to find new customers that they will not necessarily pay as much attention as they should to what the customer might use this new capacity for. And that's a legitimate role for government, to say, hold on, the world will be a much more dangerous place if we have 15 or 20 nuclear powers instead of five or six; and if they have ICBMs and so forth. So it's a balance that has to be struck very carefully. And we're going to have a tough nonproliferation strategy while we promote more exports. THE PRESIDENT: If I might just add to that -- the short answer to your question, of course, is yes, we're going to review this. And let me give you one example. Ken told me last night at dinner that --he said, if we export substantially the same product to the same person, if we have to get one permit to do it we'll have to get a permit every time we want to do the same thing over and over again. They always give it to us, but we have to wait six months and it puts us behind the competitive arc. Now, that's something that ought to be changed, and we'll try to change that. We also know that some of our export controls, rules and regulations, are a function of the realities of the Cold War which aren't there anymore. But what the Vice President was trying to say, and he said so well -- I just want to reemphasize -- our biggest security problem in the future may well be the proliferation of nuclear and nonnuclear, like biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction to small, by our standards, countries with militant governments who may not care what the damage to their own people could be. So that's something we have to watch very closely. But apart from that, we want to move this much more quickly and we'll try to slash a lot of the time delays where we ought to be doing these things. ..... (even more material deleted) END10:41 A.M. PST ------ End of Forwarded Message If anyone is interested in the whole conference, I weill put it up on the CPSR Internet Library at cpsr.org /cpsr/clinton. Dave

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Internet is Not the Long Term Solution
by tcmay＠netcom.com 25 Feb '93

25 Feb '93

I want to clarify some points about my earlier posting on how remailer fees fix the "anonymous flooding" problem which Marc Ringuette mentioned. Implicit in my comments were some assumptions which I ought to break out separately: * The current Internet, glorious as it is, is not the likely long term solution. The various bans and constraints on business interactions, on fees, on commercial use, etc., are major limits to what we're talking about here. (Some alternatives exist, like Alternet (sp?), but Internet is what most of us are now using.) * "Remailing fees" are the natural, free market solution to the costs of transmitting, decrypting, storing, and forwarding messages. But these fees run afoul of various Internet rules. * The Internet policy statements are often invoked by sysadmins and would-be censors (David Sternlight comes to mind) who are worried about uses, abuses, and out of the ordinary situations. Ditto for Prodigy and similar systems. The talk about bans on anonymous mail (nothing seriously proposed, so far as I know) reflect the government-dominated nature of the current Internet. * Though what we are doing with anonymous mail, remailers, digital pseudonyms, and even digital money is educational and even fun, I doubt any of us expects our "constructions" to persist, to be a real foundation for future digital economies. Well, at least I don't expect much to last. Instead, what we learn with these systems will be carried over to new kinds of networks, or on radically evolved descendants of today's networks. * These new kinds of networks may look more like descendants of FIDONet than of the Internet, in the sense of being more decentralized and outside the control of institutions and government agencies. (Some have argued that the Internet is already transnational and is already beyond the control of governments. This sounds plausible in theory, but in practice most Internet users _are_ subject to various rules about usage, about noncommercial use, etc.) * Some on this list have expressed distaste that remailing will have to be _paid for_ by someone (other than themselves). This is the way economics works. Remailers will act on the profit motive, and this in fact will do more to increase the numbers and types of remailers than anything else. When "Mom and Pop" remailer sites can be set up for the cost of a PC, hard disk, and perhaps a "hardware mix" (a Chaum-style tamper-resistant module which mixes incoming messages, stores them for sufficient latency, then remails them), then the profit motive will ensure lots of these remailers. * I'm not saying the current Internet will not evolve into such a network. In fact, the rapid growth in many countries and on many platforms may mean it already has enough momentum to become the type of network we need to develop these cyberspace constructs. But it's possible the form will be quite different. My crude timetable for the spread of crypto anarchy still has the 1993-5 period as a time of experimentation (such as we're doing), with more robust, profit-oriented enterprises appearing around 1996 or so. (A few brave souls may enter the market even earlier.) -Tim May -- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.

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Re: Anonymous flooding
by Marc.Ringuette＠GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU 25 Feb '93

25 Feb '93

[ Problem: anonymous flooding. Solution: digital postage stamps. ] Thanks, guys. Problem solved. Should've seen it myself. -- Marc Ringuette (mnr(a)cs.cmu.edu)

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unsubscribe
by tlr1＠acpub.duke.edu 25 Feb '93

25 Feb '93

Please remove me from your mailing list...thank you for your time. Tristan Reid tlr1(a)acpub.duke.edu

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unsubscribe
by Timothy E. Buchanan 25 Feb '93

25 Feb '93

Please unsubscribe.

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remove me from the list
by parish＠cactus.org 25 Feb '93

25 Feb '93

Overload ... please remove me from the list. Thanks, Tom

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Re: Anonymous flooding
by tcmay＠netcom.com 24 Feb '93

24 Feb '93

Marc Ringuette worries about anonymous messages flooding the nets: >I wonder if full crypto anonymity as we envision it will be stable? >I'm very concerned about the problem of anonymous users intentionally >flooding the network with garbage in order to bring it to its knees. >Current practice, in the non-anonymous world, is to trace excess >traffic to its source and stop it from being generated. This will no >longer be possible when true anonymity is available. The simple solution: paid transmissions. Remailers pass on messages only if they receive the payment they've announced is their fee. While _some_ remailers may pass on messages for free (charity, policy, etc.), _their_ recipients are under no obligation (obviously) to continue to forward them if no postage is attached. This means the nets may indeed be filled with junk, but at least somebody has to pay for it--and the remailers are making nice profits. Economics thus provides a damping effect against runaway situations (as it does in so many areas that at first seem unstable). (The analogy with junk mail in the current postal system is apt: you may not like getting 10 pieces of junk mail a day, but at least you never have to pay for it directly...and the Postal System _likes_ "direct mail" (junk mail), as it pays the bills.) >This would particularly be a problem if a remailer is willing to forward >an incoming message to more than one destination. In that case, by sending a >single anonymous message, a saboteur could generate an exponential amount >of net traffic. This would be bad. Again, a remailer "willing to forward" to multiple destinations must pay for the transmission--and the recipients will of course look to see that _their_ remailing fees are paid. It is thus extremely expensive to "flood" the nets, as each message costs some amount to transmit to remailers, to remail, etc. And don't forget that most folks will likely have various forms of reputation filters running. The may scan incoming messages for interesting content, for messages from senders known to them, etc. As with our ordinary mail, the junk can be thrown away very quickly. > >Two basic precautions for a remailer to take are > 1. To require a 1-1 correspondence between input and output messages. > 2. To require that the address portion of the message shrink at each step > (preventing infinite loops). >If this is done, then the saboteur's original message can be at most >n-fold replicated, where n is the maximum number of remailer hops >allowed. Fine, some remailers may insist on a 1-1 correspondence, others may remail to as many sites as postage is provided for. The market can then decide which remailer to use. Businesses who take all paying customers generally outcompete those with arbitrarily set policies or their own ideas of rationing services (e.g., "But, sir, we can't let you buy five tubes of toothpaste--what if _everyone_ tried to buy five tubes?"). >However, I still have some fundamental concerns that an anonymity-based >system is vulnerable to flooding and denial of service by the bad guys, >including Big Brother, who may wish to prevent effective use of such >systems. This may make operating a remailer a difficult proposition. > >I'm discouraged. Any thoughts? Little need to be discouraged. There are a great many "covers" for anonymous mail, including legal consultations (attorney-client privilege), psychiatric consultations (ditto), religions ("Digital Confessionals--the Latest in Catholic Computing"), games (role-playing), and "personals" ads (as in newspaper ads that match partners, dates, etc., except mediated electronically in this case). Stopping any one of these will be tough, stopping them all would be very hard indeed. -Tim May -- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: MailSafe and PGP available.

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