February 1993 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: Remailer Use
by an5877＠anon.penet.fi 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > I would like to let everyone who hasn't already figured it out > know that I did *not* originate the message that was posted to > Cypherpunks through my account. I do not know where it came from, > but it reached my account with the destination address of the > cypherpunks list because the message that came back to me from the > list said that "Anonymous <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" originated the > message. That indicates that it went through the remailer. If it > were from me, it would say "Chael Hall <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" > as the return address. Another identifying characteristic is the > "X-Remailed-By: Anonymous <nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu>" header line. > Just remember, don't believe everything you read. In the case of pseudonymous mail, don't believe _anything_ you read! I don't see why Chael Hall is going to all this trouble to refute a message that I don't even remember ... Did I miss something important? (Or outre?) Or (duh!) is he talking about _my_ earlier message? DEADBEAT -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.1 iQBFAgUBK4lx8vFZTpBW/B35AQGnfwF/YdHtdc6B+oslFno9+rCowlph7GteEZF+ ot8jlZRA+gW+Sa1bpBUkV6ZryBlHYQMQ =KMZW -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi. *IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update(a)anon.penet.fi for details.

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Re: Unbreakable MacHD encryption
by mark＠coombs.anu.edu.au 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

I have used a product in the past called Hard Disk Deadbolt. It has from memory three encryption methods; quick-and-nasty hard-disk-deadbolt's-own (no idea on the security of this one) and DES. The first is fastest for stuff you dont want anyone to read but isnt super secret, whilst DES takes the longest. I liked the package all things considered. It was friendly, files didnt change size and it was speedy enough for my uses. Availability is unknown at this stage, ask in comp.sys.mac.* if you want. Mark mark(a)coombs.anu.edu.au

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Rambo Lives
by deltorto＠aol.com 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

>>kelly(a)netcom.com >> >> [stuff removed] >> ...the military in general and the >>army , marines and and special intelligence agencies>, they >>are after all as their prime mission capable of extreme violence and the >>taking of human life, as a means of social control. >>Law enforcement seems to have very similiar mentality as well, >>with CONTROL being the agenda and reason for existance-- >>Suppose we think of guerilla products such as PGP and anoynmous >>posting mechanisms and forwarders in their larger social sense >>As behaviour modification for those who would have our privacy >>as well as our lives ...and thus the government's decision to consider PGP (a privacy mechanism) as "munitions." At first I thought it was outrageous, but it all makes curious sense somehow when you bop yourself on the head the right way, doesn't it? I say we should ensure that as many citizens as possible get ahold of PGP as soon as possible. After all, the NRA would have us believe that it's every citizen's right to "bear arms," so why shouldn't we (especially those who choose not to carry firearms like me) all have whatever sort of weapon we choose to "carry?" That's all for now, excuse me while I go hurl. All this crap really makes me a bit ill, to tell you the truth. I only want the same respect I give to other people, not a lot of static from a bunch of haircuts with sidearms. d2t PS: Keep this in mind the next time you see someone you love patronize a Rambo-style movie or play a game of shoot-'em-up Ninten do - this is where the Bad Guys get their funding, lads.

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No Subject
by nowhere＠bsu-cs.bsu.edu 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Xavier hit the nail on the head -- my note was a subterfuge, intended to reveal the association between anonymous id's and email addresses. I think it's wrong for anon.penet.fi to operate this way. > DEADBEAT -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.1 iQBFAgUBK4lD7/FZTpBW/B35AQGiCQF9HFeDhXk7FV9mhIMh9zGmxblLvCt8bszr 4daRmyo8/cJMK7Y5V7kfQN05CEdJo6oc =KalQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi. *IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update(a)anon.penet.fi for details.

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Re: Trapdoors
by jim＠tadpole.com 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

> The specific instruction is the so-called "NSA instruction" which John Gilmore > identified some time ago. > > Sun Microsystems was ordered by the NSA to redesign their chips to capture > keys, which is why the SPARC processor was introduced. SPARC stands for > "Sun Processor Allowing Remote Capture." Interestingly enough, V9 SPARC has a population count (number of bits set in word) instruction that was put in specificly at the request of No Such Agency. Jim

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Unforgotton topic
by fergp＠sytex.com 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

I realize that this has already been an old topic amonst you folks, but I just wanted to post a summary I found rather striking and an issue I know still leaves a bad taste in our collective mouths - "Threats to Privacy", "FBIs Wiretapping Proposal Thwarted", extracted from Boardwatch Magazine, February, 1993, pages 19 - 22 ( BBS Legislative Watch, Shari Steele, EFF) - "In a move that worried privacy experts, software manufacturers and telephone companies, the FBI proposed legislation to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to make it easier for the Bureau to perform electronic wiretappiing. The proposed legislation, entitled 'Digital Telephony,' would have required communications service providers and hardware manufacturers to make their systems 'tappable' by providing 'back doors' through which law enforcement officers could intercept communications. Furthermore, this capability would have been provided undetectably, while the communications was in progress, exclusive of any communications between other parties, regardless of the mobility of the target of the FBI's investigation, and without degradation of service. "The privacy implications are frightening. Today, all sorts of information about who we are and what we do, such as medical records, credit reports and employment data, are held on electronic databases. If these databases have government-mandated 'tappability,' this private information could be accessed by anyone tapping in. In addition, the language in the proposed bill is vague. This is especially troubling since, under the proposal, the Department of Justice (DOJ) can keep communications products off the market if it determines that these products do not meet the DOJ's own vague guidelines. This will probably result in increased costs and reduced competitiveness for service providers and equipment manufacturers, since they will be unlikely to add any features that may result in a DOJ rejection of their entire product. And to add insult to injury, the FBI proposal suggests that the cost of this wiretapping 'service' to the Bureau would have to be borne by the service provider itself, which ultimately means you and I will be paying higher user fees. "The Electronic Frontier Foundation organized a broad coalition of public interest and industry groups, from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibilty (CPSR) and the ACLU to AT&T and Sun Microsystems, to oppose the legislation. A white paper produced by the EFF and ratified by the coalition, entitled, 'An Analysis of the FBI Digital Telephony Proposal,' was widely distributed throughout the Congress. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and Representative Don Edwards (D-California), chairs of two key committees, referred to the EFF paper as they delayed the introduction of the FBI's proposal. As Leahy stated before the Senate, 'Our goal is to assist law enforcement,' but 'without jeopardizing privacy rights or frustrating the development of new communications technologies.' The Justice Department lobbied hard in the final days to get Congress to take up the bill before Congress adjourned, but the bill never even found a Congressional sponsor (and was therefore never officially introduced). The FBI will almost certainly reintroduce "Digital Telephony" when the 103rd Congress convenes in January." 8<------------ End Article -------------- Take a stance. Voice your opinion. Write your congressman! Paul Ferguson | "Sincerity is fine, but it's no Network Integration Consultant | excuse for stupidity." Alexandria, Virginia USA | -- Anonymous fergp(a)sytex.com (Internet) | sytex.com!fergp (UUNet) | 1:109/229 (FidoNet) | PGP public encryption key available upon request. --- fergp(a)sytex.com (Paul Ferguson) Access <=> Internet BBS, a public access internet site Sytex Communications, Arlington VA, 1-703-358-9022

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Re: Beware of anon.penet.fi message!
by an5877＠anon.penet.fi 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Xavier hit the nail on the head -- my note was a subterfuge, intended to reveal the association between anonymous id's and email addresses. I think it's wrong for anon.penet.fi to operate this way. > DEADBEAT -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.1 iQBFAgUBK4lD7/FZTpBW/B35AQGiCQF9HFeDhXk7FV9mhIMh9zGmxblLvCt8bszr 4daRmyo8/cJMK7Y5V7kfQN05CEdJo6oc =KalQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- To find out more about the anon service, send mail to help(a)anon.penet.fi. Due to the double-blind system, any replies to this message will be anonymized, and an anonymous id will be allocated automatically. You have been warned. Please report any problems, inappropriate use etc. to admin(a)anon.penet.fi. *IMPORTANT server security update*, mail to update(a)anon.penet.fi for details.

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Remailer to anon.penet.f
by Hal 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

Chael Hall points out that remailer operators who use their personal accounts for the remailing are vulnerable to having their anon.penet.fi pseudonyms (if any) discovered by users who request remailing to that site. For those operating remailers based on the Perl scripts originally written by Eric Hughes which I modified, I use the following maildelivery file to prevent the attack Chael mentioned: # # field pattern action/ string # result (quote included spaces) # Request-Remailing-To anon.penet.fi file A Bitbucket Anon-To anon.penet.fi file A Bitbucket Request-Remailing-To "" pipe A remail.pl Anon-To "" pipe A remail.pl Encrypted PGP pipe A pgpmail.pl * "" pipe ? recurse.pl This puts any message to anon.penet.fi into a file called Bitbucket. My slocal.pl script does not support the slocal/maildelivery feature which deletes a message, so this is the closest I can come. (I suppose another alternative would be to pipe it into "cat > /dev/null". That would look like: Request-Remailing-To anon.penet.fi pipe A "cat > /dev/null" I haven't tried this one.) BTW, if anyone has made changes to the remailer scripts, please send them to me. I would like to clean up the scripts a little, add more error checking, and submit a new version to the FTP site. Hal Finney

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No Subject
by JTUCKER＠VAX2.CSTP.UMKC.EDU 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

Unsubscribe

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Being kind to 8086 users - was: Re: msdos perl
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 23 Feb '93

23 Feb '93

The discussion on porting perl to MS-DOS led to the following comment: > >*requires* access to extended memory. There is approx. 300+ Kbytes of memory available > > ^^^^^^^^ > Which means a 286, not a 386. If there are a lot of people out there on > 8086 machines, sorry. People with that particular problem are going to > have a hard time running most modern software, let alone Unix ports. There's one part of the market that's still heavily populated with 8086 machines - portables. Especially cheap, lightweight portables, and palmtops like the HP95LX, which people might use to do their private email from, or carry around to exchange PGP keys with, or use as a smartcard for digicash and remote access to networks. Another part is DOS emulation running on real machines - I think lots of that is 8086-like. 640K RAM is a hard limit to live with, and sometimes you just can't do it, but it's nice if people don't *gratuitously* make their software not fit here. There's lots of real work that can still be done on them, and really patient people can even run Unix-like operating systems such as Minix. Bill Stewart

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