November 1992 - cypherpunks-legacy

Why remailers...
by Hal 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

Tim mentioned that not many people on the list have expressed interest in the remailers, and it occurs to me that maybe people don't all share the vision of why this crypto technology is important. I'm trying to recall how I learned about the possibilities of this technology. I recall reading "True Names" a few years ago. Vinge had his netters exchanging mail anonymously. The hero downloaded a big batch of messages from a BBS and tried decrypting all of them to see which were for him. Okay, I thought, that would be a way of disguising which messages you were _receiving_. Then Vinge said something like "and using more elaborate techniques, the sender of a message could be hidden as well." Hold on, I thought. That will never work. If they tap your line, they're going to know exactly what messages you're sending. Too bad. Vinge had a clever idea going, but it's flawed. I only learned about Chaum's crypto stuff last year. Somebody on the Extropians list mentioned PGP, and I'd always had a casual interest in crypto, so I downloaded it and played with it some. I thought it was great and really got into it in a big way. This got me interested in crypto in general, so I started doing some library research. When I found Chaum's stuff, it just blew me away. The first article I found, I think, was his CACM paper which is an overview of many of the things that are possible. I started trying to track down other papers by Chaum. Here were all the technologies needed to make Vinge's world work, technologies which Vinge apparently knew about long before I did. It seemed so obvious to me. Here we are faced with the problems of loss of privacy, creeping computerization, massive databases, more centralization - and Chaum offers a completely different direction to go in, one which puts power into the hands of individuals rather than governments and corporations. The computer can be used as a tool to liberate and protect people, rather than to control them. Unlike the world of today, where people are more or less at the mercy of credit agencies, large corporations, and governments, Chaum's approach balances power between individuals and organizations. Both kinds of groups are protected against fraud and mistreatment by the other. Naturally, in today's society, with power allocated so disproportionately, such ideas are a threat to large organizations. Balancing power would mean a net loss of power for them. So no institution is going to pick up and champion Chaum's ideas. It's going to have to be a grass-roots activity, one in which individuals first learn of how much power they can have, and then demand it. Where do the remailers fit in? They represent the "ground floor" of this house of ideas - the ability to exchange messages privately, without revealing our true identities. In this way we can engage in transactions, show credentials, and make deals, without government or corporate databases tracking our every move as they can today. Only by securing the ability to communicate privately and anonymously can we take the next steps towards a world in which we each have true ownership and control over information about our lives. Chaum's ACM paper is titled, provocatively, "Security Without Identification - Transaction Systems to Make Big Brother Obsolete." The work we are doing here, broadly speaking, is dedicated to this goal of making Big Brother obsolete. It's important work. If things work out well, we may be able to look back and see that it was the most important work we have ever done. Hal Finney 74076.1041(a)compuserve.com

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Re: Rander box and other stuff
by George A. Gleason 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

So we need to set up UPSs (uninterruptable power supplies, i.e. backup power) for our u-wave ovens, and build a standard interface which will set the appropriate parameters (5 sec on high cook) and start, which can be connected to a burglar alarm with panic switches and keypad with duress code. Then if the barbarians come to the door, it's one-two-three-FLUSH! Somewhat inconvenient if the barbarians come a-callin' when you're in the middle of a crypto session ("'scuse me while I put something in for dinner...") but doable... -gg

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Digital Cash bibliography
by Tim Oren 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

As a followup to Tom's bibliography, here's a list I compiled about six months ago on digital cash, including Chaum's basic articles, others published in this area, and a list of relevant U.S. patents. - Tim O. ----------- Bibliography for Digital Cash and Checks using Cryptographic Techniques Articles Chaum, D., Showing credentials without identification: transferring signatures between unconditionally unlinkable pseudonyms. (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, West Germany, p. 246-64, 1990)(Conference: Advances in Cryptology-AUSCRYPT '90 International Conference on Cryptology. Proceedings, Sydney, NSW, Australia, 8-11 Jan. 1990) Chaum, D. den Boer, B. van Heyst, E. Mjolsnes, S. Steenbeek, A., Efficient offline electronic checks. (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany, p. 294-301, 1990)(Conference: Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT '89. Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques Proceedings, Houthalen, Belgium, 10-13 April 1989) Chaum, D., Online cash checks. (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Germany, p. 288-93, 1990)(Conference: Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT '89. Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques Proceedings, Houthalen, Belgium, 10-13 April 1989) Chaum, David, Security without Identification: Transaction Systems to make Big Brother Obsolete; Communications of the ACM 28/10 (1985) 1030-1044. Chaum, D. Fiat, A. Naor, M., Untraceable electronic cash. (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, West Germany, p. 319-27, 1990)(Conference: Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '88. Proceedings, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, 21-25 Aug. 1988) Okamoto, T. Ohta, K., Disposable zero-knowledge authentications and their applications to untraceable electronic cash. (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, West Germany, p. 481-96, 1990)(Conference: Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '89. Proceedings, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, 20-24 Aug. 1989) Even, S., Secure off-line electronic fund transfer between nontrusting parties. (North-Holland, Amsterdam, Netherlands, p. 57-66, 1989)(Conference: Smart Card 2000: The Future of IC Cards. Proceedings of the IFIP WG 11.6 International Conference, Laxenburg, Austria, 19-20 Oct. 1987) Tunstall, J.S., Electronic currency. (North-Holland, Amsterdam, Netherlands, p. 47-8, 1989)(Conference: Smart Card 2000: The Future of IC Cards. Proceedings of the IFIP WG 11.6 International Conference, Laxenburg, Austria, 19-20 Oct. 1987) Hayes, Barry, Anonymous One-Time Signatures and Flexible Untracable Electronic Cash, in AusCrypt '90: A Workshop on Cryptology, Secure Communication and Computer Security, January, 1990. U. S. Patents W. M. Benton, Funds Transfer System using Optically Coupled, Portable Modules, US Pat. #4,454,414, Jun 12, 1984. W. G. Bouricius and P. E. Stuckert, Method and Apparatus for Secure Message Transmission for Use in Electronic Funds Transfer Systems, US Pat. #4,302,810, Nov. 24, 1981. D. Chaum, "Cryptographic Identification, Financial Transaction, and Credential Device," US Pat #4,529,870, Jul. 16, 1985. W. S. Powell, "Information Communicating Apparatus and Method," US Pat. #4,320,387, Mar. 16, 1982. P. E. Stuckert, "Personal Portable Terminal for Financial Transactions," US Pat. #4,277,837, Jul. 7, 1981.

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November 21 meeting, 12 noon, at Cygnus offices
by Eric Hughes 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

ANNOUNCEMENT ============ The Third Physical Cypherpunks Meeting: Project Planning It has become clear that lots of code needs to be written, and that we will be writing it. Therefore the Third Meeting will be devoted to project planning and design review. Date: November 21 Time: 12 noon Where: Cygnus Support offices Who: you, and anybody you know who wants to come, and so on. (Please do not post this announcements to public places, but do encourage private circulation.) Positive-Confimation: Please tell me if you are coming. Replies to hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu. Please, I urge all of you on the list that can make to attend this time. This will be a pivotal meeting, since we are deciding priorities here. If you want to affect the course of development, you ought to show up. If you can't attend, corner someone on the list who will be there and convince them to represent your position. Eric Hughes AGENDA ====== 1. Key exchange. Bring a diskette with your PGP public key on it. Bring a machine which can read this diskette. Bring extra diskettes to collect keys on and to give out. Let us not be hypocrites and let us all know each other's public keys. 2. Project planning. We need a list of crypto projects and who is working on them. This will help coordination and avoid duplication of effort. We need to prioritize the projects to avoid premature development. We need to create strategies and design criteria. 3. Project logistics. We need to talk about the best ways to do widely distributed software development in this fairly anarchic environment. 4. Design review. Hal Finney and I have been duking it out behind the scenes working on a design schema for the next generation remailer. I'd like to present the design and have people critique it. (would be 5.) We won't be playing the crypto-anarchy game this time. It's not a dead duck, but this time we've got more urgent things to do. DIRECTIONS ========== Here is a reposting of the directions to the meeting place. ------------------------------------------------------------------ To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Subject: Better directions to the meeting on Saturday at noon From: gnu(a)cygnus.com Someone asked for better directions, and the original ones were pretty skimpy anyway. Here's a better try. Cygnus Support 1937 Landings Drive Mt. View, CA 94043 There's no phone service there yet. Take US 101 toward Mt. View. From San Francisco, it's about a 40-minute drive. Get off at the Rengstorff Ave/Amphitheatre Parkway exit. If you were heading south on 101, you curve around to the right, cross over the freeway, and get to a stoplight. If you were heading north on 101, you just come right off the exit to the stoplight. The light is the intersection of Amphitheatre and Charleston Rd. Take a right on Charleston; there's a right-turn-only lane. Follow Charleston for a short distance. You'll pass the Metaphor/Kaleida buildings on the right. At a clump of palm trees and a "Landmark Deli" sign, you can take a right into Landings Drive; this gets you into the complex from the north. Or you can go slightly further along Charleston and take the next right, into a driveway with a big "Landmark" sign in the middle. No matter which way you got into the complex, follow around it until you are on the side that faces the freeway. There's a clock tower that rises out of one of the buildings, to the right (south) of the deli. Enter through the doors immediately under the clock tower. They'll be open between noon and 1PM at least. (See below if you're late.) Once inside, take the stairs up, immediately to your right. At the top of the stairs, turn right past the treetops, and we'll be in 1937 on your left. If you are late and the door under the clock tower is locked, you can go to the deli (which will be around a building and left, as you face the door), cut between the buildings to the right of the deli, and into the back lawns between the complex and the farm behind it. Walk around the buildings until you see a satellite dish in the lawn. Go up the stairs next to the dish, which are the back stairs into the Cygnus office space. We'll prop the door (or you can bang on it if we forget). Or, you can find the guard who's wandering around the complex, who knows there's a meeting happening and will let you in. They can be beeped at 965 5250, though you'll have trouble finding a phone. Don't forget to eat first, or bring food at noon! I recommend hitting the burrito place on Rengstorff (La Costen~a) at about 11:45. To get there, when you get off 101, take Rengstorff (toward the hills) rather than Amphitheatre (toward the bay). Follow it about ten blocks until the major intersection at Middlefield Road. La Costen~a is the store on your left at the corner. You can turn left into the narrow lane behind the store, which leads to a parking lot, and enter by the front door, which faces the intersection. To get to the meeting from there, just retrace your route on Rengstorff, go straight over the freeway, and turn right at the stoplight onto Charleston; see above. See you there! John Gilmore

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Re: Apple including PKS?
by whitaker＠eternity.demon.co.uk 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

Phil Karn says: > > I've learned an important lesson in this business. You can never depend on > someone else to ensure your privacy. You have to do it yourself. > The same goes for the ultimate standard of physical security: defence of one's person against physical attack. Arguments for the right to keep and bear arms can often be directly mapped onto arguments for the right to keep and use pkeys. Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker(a)eternity.demon.co.uk Communications Editor 71750.2413(a)compuserve.com EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought AMiX: RWHITAKER Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI) ================ PGP 2.0 public key available =======================

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AUSCRYPT '92
by avalon＠coombs.anu.edu.au 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

Hmmm...after reading the announcement in alt.security it seems quite a huge conference for ppl interested in cryptology...anyone going ? (Rather large number of papers being presented too!) darren

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Re: Cryptographer jailed for selling crypto to political opposition?
by mark＠coombs.anu.edu.au 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

>Chances are that Crypto AG has sufficient connexions in high places as to be >able to get its people out of there. I'm familiar with another case >involving a large northern Euro maker of telecom systems who had two >engineers taken hostage in Iraq on some inflated charge, and sentenced to 7 >years... the company fully expects to have its engineers out of there within >six months, no question about it. Shades of Ross Perot. Is it illegal to attempt to attack Iraq's computer systems if you were sitting in your room one day and decided it was time to play havoc right back at them? I realise the CIA etc would be involved in that sort of thing anyway but if a private citizen decided to quietly have a dabble, and he wasnt spotted by the Iraqi's at least, would many people get upset? There is the possibility of encroaching on USA clandestine operations I guess... Are there any precedents for this? Has anyone actually become aware of attempts? :) Mark

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Re: Cryptographer jailed for selling crypto to political opposition?
by George A. Gleason 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

Crypto AG is the current name of the Hagelin company, which was founded by Boris Hagelin shortly before WW2. Hagelin's main contribution was the advancement of the mechanical rotor system; their M-209 was a basic part of Allied battlefield operations. This machine was about the size of a desk phone base, and had a little knob which you'd turn to the letter you wanted to enter, one letter at a time, and after each letter you'd press a handle, whicc would operate the mechanism and printo out both a cleartext and ciphertext strip on paper. The ciphertext would be handed to the radio operator to be sent in morse (or in civilian use, via telegraph land-lines). Hagelin made various versions of their basic rotor machine. One was a pocket-sized unit, like 3" x 5", with a rotary alphabetic dial on the front. Hagelin supplied most of the noncommunist world with crypto tech after WW2. Chances are that Crypto AG has sufficient connexions in high places as to be able to get its people out of there. I'm familiar with another case involving a large northern Euro maker of telecom systems who had two engineers taken hostage in Iraq on some inflated charge, and sentenced to 7 years... the company fully expects to have its engineers out of there within six months, no question about it. -gg(a)well.sf.ca.us

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Unsubscribe
by Michael Gleibman 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

Unsubscribe me from this list, please, it is a huge value of mail:-)... Thank you in advance. c0408982(a)techst02.technion.ac.il

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Balancing National Interests
by gnu 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

Date: Sat, 14 Nov 1992 20:17:06 -0500 To: interesting_people(a)aurora.cis.upenn.edu From: Dave Farber <farber(a)central.cis.upenn.edu> Subject: from RISKS Reprinted with permission ("do with it as you wish. Granger") A "Viewpoint " piece in The Institute, November 1992 Balancing National Interests The September/October issue of The Institute carried a front page story reporting that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is promoting legislation that would require all telephone systems to be designed in such a way that they can be wiretapped by law enforcement officials. The argument is that wiretapping is a key tool in much of law enforcement, particularly in fields such as drugs, racketeering, conspiracy and white collar crime, and that unless care is taken in the design of future telecommunications systems, this tool may become difficult or impossible to exercise. To solve this problem the FBI is promoting legislation that would establish design requirements on future telephone systems. Not surprisingly, civil liberties groups and telephone companies are reported to be less than enthusiastic. While interesting and important in its own right, this controversy is perhaps even more important as a symbol of a broader set of conflicts between a number of important national interests. As a country, we want to promote: * Individual privacy (including the right of citizens and other residents of the U.S. to keep personal records private, hold private communications with others, and move about without being "tracked".) * Security for organizations (including protection of financial transactions, and the ability to keep corporate data, plans, and communications confidential.) * Effective domestic law enforcement (including the ability to perform surveillance of legitimately identified suspects, and the ability to audit and reconstruct fraudulent activities.) * Effective international intelligence gathering (including the ability to monitor the plans and activities of organizations abroad that may pose a threat to the U.S. or to other peaceful states and peoples.) * Secure world-wide reliable communications for U.S. diplomats and the military, for U.S. business, and for U.S. citizens in their activities all around the world (including the ability to maintain and gain access to secure, reliable, communications channels.) Just as with most of our society's other fundamental objectives, these objectives are in conflict. You can not maximize them all because getting more of some involves giving up some of others. A dynamic tension must be created that keeps the various objectives properly balanced. That socially optimal point of balance may change gradually over time as world conditions and our society's values evolve. An electrical engineer who thinks for a moment about the problem of achieving any particular specified balance among the various objectives I have listed will quickly conclude that communications and information technology design choices lie at the heart of the way in which many of the necessary tradeoffs will be made. We would like easy portable communications for all, but doing that in a way that allows people to keep their legitimate travels private poses significant design challenges. Banks and other businesses would like secure encrypted communications world-wide, but promoting the general availability of such technologies all around the world severely complicates the signal intelligence operations of intelligence organizations. The troubling thing about the FBI's legislative proposals is not that they are being made, but that we lack a broader institutional context within which to evaluate them. In making such choices, we need to look systematically at all the legitimate interests that are at stake in telecommunications and information technology design choices, consider the ways in which technology and the world are evolving, and integrate all these considerations to arrive at a reasoned balance. In the old days, if things got too far out of line in some balance (for example, between freedom of the press and protection against liable), the courts simply readjusted things and we went on. Today, and increasingly in the future, with many of these balances hard wired into the basic design of our information and communication systems, it may be much harder to readjust the balance after the fact. There are several organizations that should be working harder on these issues. On the government side the Telecommunication and Computing Technologies Program in the Office of Technology Assessment should be doing more systematic studies of these tradeoffs to help inform the Congress; The National Telecommunications and Information Administration in the Department of Commerce (or some appropriate interagency committee) should be doing similar studies to develop more coherent and comprehensive executive branch policy; and the Office of Policy and Plans in the Federal Communications Commission (which is an independent regulatory agency not directly subject to executive branch policy) should be giving these issues more attention so it can better support the Commissioners when they confront such tradeoffs. On the non-government side, the Office of Computer and Information Technology at the National Research Council might appropriately mount a comprehensive study. There is an ideal opportunity here for a private foundation to fund an independent blue-ribbon commission. Finally, the computer and telecommunications industries, both individually and collectively through their industry associations, should be taking more interest in how the country will strike these all important balances. M. Granger Morgan M. Granger Morgan (F) is head of the Department of Engineering and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University where he is also a Professor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering and in the H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management. He teaches and performs research on a variety of problems in technology and public policy in which technical issues are of central importance.

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