July 2018 - cypherpunks-legacy

[IP] New travel document requirements for USA citizens
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

________________________________________ From: Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2008 6:55 AM To: David Farber Subject: Re: [IP] New travel document requirements for USA citizens For IP... pls snip my name. As a USG employee, I can give a little background on the passport issue. The price primarily changed because Congress freaked when they found that processing offices (in the U.S., usually the Post Office) charged a little more than it cost to process the passports. So State reduced that fee, but increased the security fee. The security involves all those things that you didn't mention -- the huge amounts of data crunching that makes sure that you're really an American, not a terrorist, not selling your passport, and not owing child support, among other things. The biggest benefit of that is that it's only a little bit more, but it's a nice round number. And, truly... you're traveling abroad. You're probably buying a plane ticket. You really can't afford $10 per year? ($100 for a 10-year passport.) The Passport Card goes under less scrutiny -- hence the lesser charge -- and is much cheaper to produce. Does it make sense? Probably not if you're from Ohio, going to Toronto for vacation this summer -- you could use the passport on your next trip abroad. (Since it isn't just DHS that requires them -- every other country outside of North America will want to see it too.) But if you live on the Maine or Montana border? Perhaps it does. As for the Australian model.. I've used it before, and it works great. It's a hell of a lot easier than traveling to Ethiopia, where you get a visa at the airport; or China or India, where you have to wait for an actual visa foil. ------------------------------------------- Archives: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now RSS Feed: http://v2.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/ Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: Bitcoin v0.1 released
by hal＠finney.org 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Jonathan Thornburg writes: > In the modern world, no major government wants to allow untracable > international financial transactions above some fairly modest size > thresholds. (The usual catch-phrases are things like "laundering > drug money", "tax evasion", and/or "financing terrorist groups".) > To this end, electronic financial transactions are currently monitored > by various governments & their agencies, and any but the smallest of > transactions now come with various ID requirements for the humans > on each end. > > But if each machine in a million-node botnet sends 10 cents to a > randomly chosen machine in another botnet on the other side of the > world, you've just moved $100K, in a way that seems very hard to > trace. To me, this means that no major government is likely to allow > Bitcoin in its present form to operate on a large scale. Certainly a valid point, and one which has been widely discussed in the debates over the years about electronic cash. Bitcoin has a couple of things going for it: one is that it is distributed, with no single point of failure, no "mint", no company with officers that can be subpoenaed and arrested and shut down. It is more like a P2P network, and as we have seen, despite degrees of at least governmental distaste, those are still around. Bitcoin could also conceivably operate in a less anonymous mode, with transfers being linked to individuals, rather than single-use keys. It would still be useful to have a large scale, decentralized electronic payment system. It also might be possible to refactor and restructure Bitcoin to separate out the key new idea, a decentralized, global, irreversible transaction database. Such a functionality might be useful for other purposes. Once it exists, using it to record monetary transfers would be a sort of side effect and might be harder to shut down. > I also worry about other "domestic" ways nasty people could exploit > a widespread Bitcoin deployment: > * Spammer botnets could burn through pay-per-send email filters > trivially (as usual, the costs would fall on people other than the > botnet herders & spammers). > * If each machine in a botnet sends 1 cent to a herder, that can add > up to a significant amount of money. In other words, Bitcoin would > make botnet herding and the assorted malware industry even more > profitable than it already is. It's important to understand that the proof-of-work (POW) aspect of Bitcoin is primarily oriented around ensuring the soundness of the historical transaction database. Each Bitcoin data block records a set of transactions, and includes a hash collision. Subsequent data blocks have their own transactions, their own collisions, and also chain to all earlier hashes. The result is that once a block is "buried" under enough new blocks, it is essentially certain (given the threat model, namely that attackers cannot muster more than X% of the compute power of legitimate node operators) that old transactions can't be reversed. Creating new coins is indeed currently also being done by POW, but I think that is seen as a temporary expedient, and in fact the current software phases that out over several years. Hence worries about botnets being able to manufacture large quantities of POW tokens are only a temporary concern, in the context of Bitcoin. There have been a number of discussions in the past about POW tokens as anti spam measures, given the botnet threat. References are available from "Proof-of-work system" on Wikipedia. Analyses have yielded mixed results, depending on the assumptions and system design. If POW tokens do become useful, and especially if they become money, machines will no longer sit idle. Users will expect their computers to be earning them money (assuming the reward is greater than the cost to operate). A computer whose earnings are being stolen by a botnet will be more noticeable to its owner than is the case today, hence we might expect that in that world, users will work harder to maintain their computers and clean them of botnet infestations. Countermeasures by botnet operators would include moderating their take, perhaps only stealing 10% of the productive capacity of invaded computers, so that their owners would be unlikely to notice. This kind of thinking quickly degenerates into unreliable speculation, but it points out the difficulties of analyzing the full ramifications of a world where POW tokens are valuble. Hal Finney --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com

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Re: Help Iranian dissidents
by Andrew Lewman 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 06/24/2009 01:41 PM, Bill McGonigle wrote: > On 06/24/2009 11:44 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote: >> Speaking about guerilla, http://www.google.com/search?q=sheevaplug >> would seem like an ideal throwaway Tor appliance. With Bluetooth >> or WLAN dongles even casting a small (or long-distance, with >> suitable directional aerials) wireless cloud. > > The Fonera 2 might be a candidate platform. Half the price, 32MB RAM, > built-in wifi, support for 3g modems. IIRC, somebody already did a tor > mod for the first version. In general, we encourage people to work on these types of ports of Tor. We will work with you and help you turn this into a reality. However, be aware that it takes work, research, and effort to get tor to work correctly on these platforms. I'm sure there are a list of features "micro-environments" would need to have in Tor to make everything work better. We'd love to have the help and your experience in turning this into a reality. We have the beginnings of a certification program in place, so an end-user/customer can tell if this is really tor, works with the current tor network, is a solid design as good as Tor, or is complete bunk and merely includes the Tor tarball to say "uses Tor!" for their marketing purposes. However, coming up with the idea, and then punting all of the next steps to the Tor Project doesn't work too well. I have a list of platforms that people have stated, "If you can turn Tor into an appliance on device X, we'll sell it for you and donate x% back to you quarterly." These platforms include: fonera2, embedded linux variants, polar cloud's tomato, sheevaplugs, bug lab's modules, openwrt, ddwrt, windows ce, windows xp embedded, and the list goes on. In conversations with the requesters, they want: Step 1) Generate an idea. Step 2) Wait for Tor Project to do the technical work. Step 3) Profit! If only it were that easy. -- Andrew Lewman The Tor Project pgp 0x31B0974B Website: https://torproject.org/ Blog: https://blog.torproject.org/ Identica/Twitter: torproject ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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<nettime> FBI pushes for surveillance backdoors in Web 2.0 tools
by nettime's very avid reader 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

By Ryan Singel, wired.com | Last updated about 19 hours ago http://tinyurl.com/5w7sp4j The FBI pushed Thursday for more built-in backdoors for online communication, but beat a hasty retreat from its earlier proposal to require providers of encrypted communications services to include a backdoor for law enforcement wiretaps. FBI general counsel Valerie Caproni told Congress that new ways of communicating online could cause problems for law enforcement officials, but categorically stated that the bureau is no longer pushing to force companies like RIM, which offers encrypted e-mail for business and government customers, to engineer holes in their systems so the FBI can see the plaintext of a communication upon court order. "Addressing the Going Dark problem does not require fundamental changes in encryption technology," Caproni said in her written testimony (PDF). "We understand that there are situations in which encryption will require law enforcement to develop individualized solutions." ("Going Dark" is the FBI's codename for its multimillion-dollar project to extend its ability to wiretap communications as they happen.) That's a far cry from what Caproni told The New York Times last fall: "No one should be promising their customers that they will thumb their nose at a US court order," Ms. Caproni said. "They can promise strong encryption. They just need to figure out how they can provide us plain text." Those remarks indicated the FBI seemed to want to revisit the encryption wars of the 1990s. That largely ended with the government scrapping its plans to mandate backdoors in encryption, after security researchers discovered flaws in the idea, and the National Research Council concluded that strong encryption made the country safer. But that retreat didn't satisfy Susan Landau, a privacy and cryptography expert who testified alongside Caproni in front of a House Judiciary subcommittee Thursday. That's because the FBI is still pushing for more online-communications companies to build real-time spying capabilities into their software, which Landau said will harm innovation and introduce security flaws that will be used against American companies, government agencies and citizens. Innovation happens too fast on the Internet to require companies that provide chat and voice-calling capabilitiesbwhich these days includes online games, social networking sites and a myriad of online chat and photo-sharing servicesbto comply with detailed wiretapping specifications that cost hundreds of dollars just to read, according to Landau. "Requiring that Internet applications with communications systemsb[which] means anything from speak-to-tweet to Second Life to software supporting music-jam sessionsbbe vetted first will put American innovation at a global disadvantage," Landau said. "For American competitiveness it is critical that we preserve the ease and speed with which innovative new communications technologies can be developed." And she added the wiretapping holes are serious security risks. "Building wiretapping into communications infrastructure creates serious risk that the communications system will be subverted either by trusted insiders or skilled outsiders, including foreign governments, hackers, identity thieves and perpetrators of economic espionage," Landau said in her written testimony (PDF), pointing to incidents in Greece, Italy and the United States where equipment built to comply with US wiretapping rules were subverted. Those rules, known as CALEA, were enacted in 1994 to require phone companies to engineer their networks to be wiretap-compliant. The rules were expanded by the FCC in the George W. Bush Administration to apply to ISPs as well. The FBI's further push for expanded powers to wiretap online communications in real time comes against the backdrop of revolutions in the Middle East that relied heavily on social media communication tools and as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for worldwide internet freedom. "I urge countries everywhere to join the United States in our bet that an open internet will lead to stronger, more prosperous countries,b Clinton said Tuesday, speaking at George Washington University. But Caproni argued that law enforcement officials are occasionally running into cases where criminals are using online communication tools that aren't wiretappable in real-time, because the provider had not built-in that capability. Caproni did not mention that the FBI has not encountered a single case of encryption hampering its criminal investigations for the past four years, according to reports to Congress, nor that the FBI has never run into a single case over the last 10 years where it could not get the plaintext of a target's communications. Landau told Congress the FBI was overlooking some very good news. "While there is a genuine problem with intercepting some communications, the FBI now has access to more communications, and more metadata about communications, than ever before in history," Landau said. But Caproni said that's not enough and the FBI needs to find new technical solutions b though she did add that the Obama administration has no "formal position at this time" about needed changes to the law. But she warned Congress that the country was in danger from a surveillance gap. "As the gap between authority and capability widens, the government is increasingly unable to collect valuable evidence in cases ranging from child exploitation and pornography to organized crime and drug trafficking to terrorism and espionage -evidence that a court has authorized the government to collect," Caproni said. "This gap poses a growing threat to public safety." Also on Thursday, the Electronic Frontier Foundation released some government documents about the FBI's so-called Going Dark program, which it got under the Freedom of Information Act. Those documents show the project dates to 2006, and that the FBI had hired high-powered consultants from the Rand Corporation and Booz Allen Hamilton to help come up with solutions. # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mail.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)kein.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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<nettime> FBI pushes for surveillance backdoors in Web 2.0 tools
by nettime's very avid reader 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

By Ryan Singel, wired.com | Last updated about 19 hours ago http://tinyurl.com/5w7sp4j The FBI pushed Thursday for more built-in backdoors for online communication, but beat a hasty retreat from its earlier proposal to require providers of encrypted communications services to include a backdoor for law enforcement wiretaps. FBI general counsel Valerie Caproni told Congress that new ways of communicating online could cause problems for law enforcement officials, but categorically stated that the bureau is no longer pushing to force companies like RIM, which offers encrypted e-mail for business and government customers, to engineer holes in their systems so the FBI can see the plaintext of a communication upon court order. "Addressing the Going Dark problem does not require fundamental changes in encryption technology," Caproni said in her written testimony (PDF). "We understand that there are situations in which encryption will require law enforcement to develop individualized solutions." ("Going Dark" is the FBI's codename for its multimillion-dollar project to extend its ability to wiretap communications as they happen.) That's a far cry from what Caproni told The New York Times last fall: "No one should be promising their customers that they will thumb their nose at a US court order," Ms. Caproni said. "They can promise strong encryption. They just need to figure out how they can provide us plain text." Those remarks indicated the FBI seemed to want to revisit the encryption wars of the 1990s. That largely ended with the government scrapping its plans to mandate backdoors in encryption, after security researchers discovered flaws in the idea, and the National Research Council concluded that strong encryption made the country safer. But that retreat didn't satisfy Susan Landau, a privacy and cryptography expert who testified alongside Caproni in front of a House Judiciary subcommittee Thursday. That's because the FBI is still pushing for more online-communications companies to build real-time spying capabilities into their software, which Landau said will harm innovation and introduce security flaws that will be used against American companies, government agencies and citizens. Innovation happens too fast on the Internet to require companies that provide chat and voice-calling capabilitiesbwhich these days includes online games, social networking sites and a myriad of online chat and photo-sharing servicesbto comply with detailed wiretapping specifications that cost hundreds of dollars just to read, according to Landau. "Requiring that Internet applications with communications systemsb[which] means anything from speak-to-tweet to Second Life to software supporting music-jam sessionsbbe vetted first will put American innovation at a global disadvantage," Landau said. "For American competitiveness it is critical that we preserve the ease and speed with which innovative new communications technologies can be developed." And she added the wiretapping holes are serious security risks. "Building wiretapping into communications infrastructure creates serious risk that the communications system will be subverted either by trusted insiders or skilled outsiders, including foreign governments, hackers, identity thieves and perpetrators of economic espionage," Landau said in her written testimony (PDF), pointing to incidents in Greece, Italy and the United States where equipment built to comply with US wiretapping rules were subverted. Those rules, known as CALEA, were enacted in 1994 to require phone companies to engineer their networks to be wiretap-compliant. The rules were expanded by the FCC in the George W. Bush Administration to apply to ISPs as well. The FBI's further push for expanded powers to wiretap online communications in real time comes against the backdrop of revolutions in the Middle East that relied heavily on social media communication tools and as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called for worldwide internet freedom. "I urge countries everywhere to join the United States in our bet that an open internet will lead to stronger, more prosperous countries,b Clinton said Tuesday, speaking at George Washington University. But Caproni argued that law enforcement officials are occasionally running into cases where criminals are using online communication tools that aren't wiretappable in real-time, because the provider had not built-in that capability. Caproni did not mention that the FBI has not encountered a single case of encryption hampering its criminal investigations for the past four years, according to reports to Congress, nor that the FBI has never run into a single case over the last 10 years where it could not get the plaintext of a target's communications. Landau told Congress the FBI was overlooking some very good news. "While there is a genuine problem with intercepting some communications, the FBI now has access to more communications, and more metadata about communications, than ever before in history," Landau said. But Caproni said that's not enough and the FBI needs to find new technical solutions b though she did add that the Obama administration has no "formal position at this time" about needed changes to the law. But she warned Congress that the country was in danger from a surveillance gap. "As the gap between authority and capability widens, the government is increasingly unable to collect valuable evidence in cases ranging from child exploitation and pornography to organized crime and drug trafficking to terrorism and espionage -evidence that a court has authorized the government to collect," Caproni said. "This gap poses a growing threat to public safety." Also on Thursday, the Electronic Frontier Foundation released some government documents about the FBI's so-called Going Dark program, which it got under the Freedom of Information Act. Those documents show the project dates to 2006, and that the FBI had hired high-powered consultants from the Rand Corporation and Booz Allen Hamilton to help come up with solutions. # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mail.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)kein.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [liberationtech] Thoughts on decentralized DNS, and OpenNIC particularly?
by Rohan Dixit 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Thanks for this, really helpful. My purpose in doing this is to figure out what the most practical/quickest to deployment solution is for distributed DNS records, so this is definitely useful. I looked at both namecoin and CJDNS. Looks like namecoin has attracted most of the developers from the initial project, with CJDNS still limping along (I'm guessing based on activity here.) Links to the code: namecoin: https://github.com/cjdelisle/cjdns/graphs/impact CJDNS: https://github.com/vinced/namecoin/graphs/impact Could you speak to the structure of namecoin a bit more? Looks like it uses the "proof-of-work" trick from bitcoin to validate DNS records (and arbitrary key-value pairs), unless my skimming was totally off. That's pretty ingenious, for those who are interested I found a great blog post that serves both as an introduction to Bitcoin and explains how it could be used to make a distributed DNS. http://paulbohm.com/2011/06/17/bitcoins-value-is-decentralization It appears they're also proposing integrating with providers like OpenNIC, OpenDNS, etc. although I'm not qualified to judge how feasible that is. http://dot-bit.org/Project_Roadmap They also share computing resources with current bitcoin generators.... seems they've thought of everything. Someone mentioned DNSSEC in a new off-shoot thread. DNSSEC within the existing DNS paradigm is only a half-measure (although I think you'll agree, an important one.) *Notes on other dDNS providers:* So besides namecoin and CJDNS, there's also Dot-P2p, the dDNS system that was proposed based on the BitTorrent protocol. Some info was here: http://p2pfoundation.net/Dot-P2P but the link to http://dot-p2p.org/index.php?title=Main_Page looks dead. The first hit Googling "distributed dns" brings up another codebase that hasn't been modified seemingly since 2005 ( http://sourceforge.net/projects/distributeddns/files) I checked out DIANNA as well, but didn't see a link to active code so assumed it was mostly dead. http://dianna-project.org/wiki/Main_Page On Wed, Mar 14, 2012 at 4:36 PM, <liberationtech(a)lewman.us> wrote: > On Wed, Mar 14, 2012 at 02:19:47PM -0700, rohandixit86(a)gmail.com wrote > 14K bytes in 317 lines about: > : Curious if anyone had thoughts on OpenNIC as a provider of decentralized > : DNS. From my naive point of view, it often seems like dDNS is a good way > to > : stop lazy types of censorship. But perhaps I'm missing something and the > : problem is more complicated than that? > > It is not distributed. It is just a rebirth of the non-ICANN root > servers. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AlterNIC for past history on > this idea. > > See also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_DNS_root for more > history and current status. > > -- > Andrew > http://tpo.is/contact > pgp 0x6B4D6475 > _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[ZS] Re: Prestige Bitcoin
by Michael Hrenka 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Pasting a private mail exchange between me and Lodewijk "Lewis" Andri de la Porte: On Wed, May 9, 2012 at 1:30 AM, lodewijk andri de la porte <lodewijkadlp(a)gmail.com> wrote: Hey Michael, I figured it'd be more easier (and less taxing for others) if I'd send you this mail directly. I've send a quite critical e-mail which Eugen was kind enough to forward, in fact he send your answer back. My mail must have been a bit harsh to read and I apologize. The intuitive idea was based upon the mechanic of Bitcoins and a vague feeling about how a reputation based currency might work. He included a link to your paper-ish document "Pretige Fluido Documentation" V0.01. I'm glad it was worked out in more detail than I'd first expected yet somewhat saddened by the fact that none of the issues I felt were difficult were solved. I'm also glad I was quite on point when it came to guessing how it would work, but that's just personal vanity. Let me first say that I too think currency the way we use it now is limiting. Limiting in the sense that it doesn't accurately represent what it should, value added to the community. It should serve to allow you to balance that value, letting the community do things for you. It's obvious from the document you've worked, in the mathematical sense, hard to produce formula's that describe the mechanic. The system should in fact work excellently if everyone were benevolent. Sadly if everyone were benevolent there'd be no need for currency in the first place. On the other hand if everyone were benevolent the world would be a boring place. Currency is essential to motivate useful work. Useful is usually defined as that which others would work for. Food, tools, raw materials, medicine, knowledge but curiously also (imagery of) sex, music, art and other entertainment. It is not our task to determine what another thinks is right or wrong, neither what is useful and what is not. That I consider an axiom of ethics. That it motivates work to produce such things is also important. Sloth will not get anyone anywhere. I seem to have trailed off a bit too far. Bitcoins are the hardest of hard currencies. That is to say, there is no love. Just math. This is visible through irrevocable transactions. There's also no mass-market control mechanism like inflation in it. It is meant to be a digital perfect gold standard and it practically is that. The reason it can be that is because it's supply is limited and there is no notion of a person. Without persons there is no trust, no organisations, nothing. There's just hashes in a flow, so to speak. To combine that with the highly attributed principles of Prestige is ridiculous. Not only is the Prestige system heavily dependent on a per person limited amount of DP's. A problem Bitcoin geniously EVADES. This is actually on of the mentioned problems but I'm afraid it's also the show stopper. Not even governments can get identity right. Identities are regularly traded on black market. I have some wild ideas about how to deal with identification but it's a hard nut to crack. Skipping all the problems imported from politics and traditional currencies there is still simple cases of fraud that are effective. Take for example a DP pool, a group of uses simply agreeing to divide among each other as thinly as possible as many DP as they have. Join the pool and everyone becomes richer. In fact this will allow them to have the maximum amount of balanced income. Note also that evaporating Fluido (a pretty name) will simply encourage spending. This in the view of a planet with finite resources. Any bump in fame will cause a bump in Fluido. Just after your movie released you're the richest man on the planet. Halfway through the subsequent 10 year project your funds run low enough to bother working out fantasies. So what you do is buy a lot of some other currency. In fact you always do that. Lest materials are cheaper, in which case you always buy a ton of materials. In the worst case your a man with truly more than he can spend. I feel more for a (bit)coin with an evaporation rate. Ideally a fairly high one. That should make it more of a trade currency and less of a long term investment. The distribution ideas you've presented are readily usable in certain limited environments, like MMORPG's. And they would provide quite valuable an addition there. If ever you mange to work out the kinks in the Prestige system I'd love to help implement it. I currently operate an e-wallet (bitvau.lt) that is still under heavy development ("public testing" means just that, don't trust me yet and you don't have to like the homepage's looks. I've a new one in the pipeline) and I wouldn't mind at some point adding Prestige/Fluido to the mix. I love the idea of a continuous currency and currency flows, maybe I'll even emulate them somehow. And if I ever get around to working on identities properly I'll make sure you find out, Maybe even steal some ideas from you :). Feel free to repost (parts of) this message elsewhere, I've send it to you directly because I think it's too long to bother people without an interest in currency and I can never tell if my babbling makes enough sense, not because I don't want anyone to read it. Best regards, Lodewijk "Lewis" Andri de la Porte P.S.: If I could give you some DP, I totally would. Michael Hrenka (sent by metahorse(a)googlemail.com) 12:08 AM (0 minutes ago) to lodewijk Hi Lewis, thank you for your direct feedback. We actually seem to think very much alike. I am very much aware that the fixed quota of DPs is the most critical issue of the Prestige system, and that it could become a show stopper. It would work if identity could be verified reliably, but as you said that's extremely hard to do. At the moment the best approach to fix that problem is to include a kind of trust rating into the system. First you need to get some trust to "unlock" your DPs. Unfortunately I'm still far from having a clear idea how that would work exactly. This is the part of the project that needs work most urgently. The core of my system is definitely the Prestige system. I guess it makes more sense to add Fluido as add-on to that core. Also, Bitcoin integration with Prestige would be made with an add-on, too. It probably doesn't hurt to have a single reputation index and different currencies that are attached to that index. Bitcoin is great for storing value, but Fluido would have the advantage that it's more abundant and can be spent more freely on promising projects and other things (evaporation obviously encourages that). Both currencies have their own justification and purposes. From my point of view a crypto version of Fluido is essentially a (bit)coin with evaporation. You probably would be able to mine those "crypto Fluido". The only real problem with that is that is sounds weird ;) I am aware that the Prestige system could be applied in many limited environments. Basically, I want to create a web platform that makes doing so really easy, but that's a rather long-term project. Your e-wallet sounds good. I will definitely consider using it. :) And your "babbling" does make lots of sense. I'll repost it to the Zero State list. That's the place where most of the discussion is happening. Cheers, Michael Hrenka http://radivis.com Want a signature like mine? Click here. P.S.: Thanks for your potential DPs :) I wonder whether it would make sense to start with a simple private app that just manages DPs you want to attribute to others. You'll get at least 1 DP from me for the inspiration I got from you. ;) -- Zero State mailing list: http://groups.google.com/group/DoctrineZero ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [tor-talk] Tor and HTTPS graphic
by Andrew Lewman 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Tue, 06 Mar 2012 11:22:33 -0500 Ted Smith <tedks(a)riseup.net> wrote: > While I like the graphic overall, I think the "NSA as a global passive > adversary" element is an example of the graphic being overloaded with > information that will confuse/scare away most people. So far, there is one story where Eva claims the NSA can break tor easily, see this Tor and HTTPS graphic as proof: https://secure.security.nl/artikel/40574/1/%2522NSA_kan_Tor-gebruikers_iden… If your adversary is any rumored global passive adversary that can watch and record the entire Internet at once, then you've probably already lost the game. At PETS in 2009[0], Paul did a talk on 'why I'm not an entropist' and suggested that people need to start working on defeating a mythical global passive adversary. Maybe in the near future some government will have the capability of being the global passive adversary. [0] http://petsymposium.org/2009/program.php -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x6B4D6475 _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Lucrative update
by Patrick 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Lucrative release 4 is out. I know many people are used to seeing releases numbered like "0.000001", "0.000002", "2.0.3.0.14.657" etc. but release numbering systems are essentially arbitrary in nature so don't get excited as Lucrative goes toward version 50+. This release is a fairly minor one, but included some changes such as the client name that I wanted to get out as soon as possible. There is also a new development weblog at http://lucrative.thirdhost.com/weblog/. I went through an install with someone over IRC last night and made a blog entry summarizing the install notes. I recommend reading the notes before attempting an install. I am glad to help with an install, drop me a note at patrick(a)lfcgate.com if you have trouble. Some documentation on the various entities in the Lucrative system is now available on the website, http://lucrative.thirdhost.com/documentation.php but more is needed and coming. If Lucrative is interesting to you, please consider helping in any way you can: Feedback Installation reports Suggestions Comments Criticism Feature requests Source code patches Donations Are all very much welcomed. And criticism is more useful to me than praise. My sincere thanks to everyone who has participated so far by installing, testing, providing feedback, spreading the word, and donating. And finally I just received word from SourceForge that the project registration for Lucrative has been approved. Regards, Patrick -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.3 for non-commercial use <http://www.pgp.com> mQGiBD5ECKcRBADUvjXHwLtxIyS4AyjBs/dFtN6rdeP18Fhzh1hD5fJwkFevqY9Z I1ASROTh6eXYF7pU5sEvbcPshHyTB41ZtTqZvQvpwWN0fUzOuutuI0mtC5UPp9Rz j47SdWLdEXNHjwnHDCYSyqtqZu8GujGRQybR0eP3NIh/NwbSDUKdgz7IjwCg//Jo UtjP3zUFobm/0UYA+CJ5krED/091x9Js0gwNwvjbzM8DqO+r8qNz0kXI13FkrPRk QNd37lxt6m2m8HZD1WYM2wKwtMzHSwJcWzaDZ/tNc+ppYjzpw0EQCh9FqjGs8Vau guF6PA1M8lJTCcLKaL4e7ynic+PAw5Xa/tdOYgFCG+eLMU5RLvzRCYoOLIjgMJLJ yG98BACAMlDmFVYgC/UKvzZmHfZ5CtCKd8sPfCXrYLu5NeFRE0LR6D6zjzmhi1xX okfreR5o3T/y78VBM98js+m2/+7Z0AElqydeW/RnV1zqwDGjDr9z2MgARf3yLAbs n3BU8Fz61RwvHy6cRkT+2dR2f69QQUSpkupvLwZIGX/iwm4uKLQdUGF0cmljayA8 cGF0cmlja0BsZmNnYXRlLmNvbT6JAE4EEBECAA4FAj5ECKcECwMCAQIZAQAKCRBb mvb9yuOVfaA2AKDAu5tDj9F2KI8cJMrKKkQRAcUyxACg6/bei7lUJH+E5igJqGRx SjKrRA65BA0EPkQIpxAQAPkYoH5aBmF6Q5CV3AVsh4bsYezNRR8O2OCjecbJ3HoL rOQ/40aUtjBKU9d8AhZIgLUV5SmZqZ8HdNP/46HFliBOmGW42A3uEF2rthccUdhQ yiJXQym+lehWKzh4XAvb+ExN1eOqRsz7zhfoKp0UYeOEqU/Rg4Soebbvj6dDRgjG zB13VyQ4SuLE8OiOE2eXTpITYfbb6yUOF/32mPfIfHmwch04dfv2wXPEgxEmK0Ng w+Po1gr9oSgmC66prrNlD6IAUwGgfNaroxIe+g8qzh90hE/K8xfzpEDp19J3tkIt AjbBJstoXp18mAkKjX4t7eRdefXUkk+bGI78KqdLfDL2Qle3CH8IF3KiutapQvMF 6PlTETlPtvFuuUs4INoBp1ajFOmPQFXz0AfGy0OplK33TGSGSfgMg71l6RfUodNQ +PVZX9x2Uk89PY3bzpnhV5JZzf24rnRPxfx2vIPFRzBhznzJZv8V+bv9kV7HAarT W56NoKVyOtQa8L9GAFgr5fSI/VhOSdvNILSd5JEHNmszbDgNRR0PfIizHHxbLY72 88kjwEPwpVsYjY67VYy4XTjTNP18F1dDox0YbN4zISy1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy 1obEAxnIByl6ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWakXUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XrPdYX AAICD/wKwtF7Y4NKBe8PQ6jDbjWziiTv9Ac/EnRTJDQEoqgLa2LyE+6Ahw/VPGvp mfxkD2MKxC9E7kYVmasn6sHnSpvAv3e7O1Bqbo/qLzzCcJQ5VCurZ+elRM1GZ4Oc fM19FPKutb0/JFEv0nrqS4BGkF7WFBbu5dKYl/GIO7Co1mAerFIb719dOwMPVEIz OT08u8uB9jyR8gEElf+CVuNfOUkrUGg4HS4SbmTTrCSz3/8n5PkquSuAyjCB/dwM ZsZwA0/TTR8sDYlmlf9xPj5PGpGnV9OUwfig6eE0eWtRFeasmz0uiX+yp45ABtNh 6EXP/PFaBgXi9omXXjeeFYfpDvmfA6izvTIQfXTV6V9ZWrBfXarM+GQ+6guXWVbd 9fXvmCr982LkzuKQrK1OpRXBMUapXL+tOy/LYzz91InqKKhgPNGa12fvotZ4LzlM iqoM+Hpz5L9B5We1Ph0lD6RBVXDCqd+P8extnY/7AaDy7tC0UghaAaUuEZXJQPIc oQ3QGbpjM0nGe/VZN5EZhljau0NNENFaU56cOpvOhcO04gLGNNc2NS+rIpTMsaHh o1CG90c5zZZJuUbyx0mIHriNQXDgEwunSZPQorKK9KSppyyjeuOyi5F/mBBPXeyT weLhLqLvAr9se/+Z3aQvMADJi8zUZtGggLTw+N9R5XSwtSh2R4kARgQYEQIABgUC PkQIpwAKCRBbmvb9yuOVfWayAKC+mBhHdn1XZ5uH0RocAyJ32hx2kgCePyhB+IqM TjWLDLarQxcPYhbkFi4= =nx1M -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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Re: [tor-talk] Tor and HTTPS graphic
by Andrew Lewman 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Tue, 06 Mar 2012 11:22:33 -0500 Ted Smith <tedks(a)riseup.net> wrote: > While I like the graphic overall, I think the "NSA as a global passive > adversary" element is an example of the graphic being overloaded with > information that will confuse/scare away most people. So far, there is one story where Eva claims the NSA can break tor easily, see this Tor and HTTPS graphic as proof: https://secure.security.nl/artikel/40574/1/%2522NSA_kan_Tor-gebruikers_iden… If your adversary is any rumored global passive adversary that can watch and record the entire Internet at once, then you've probably already lost the game. At PETS in 2009[0], Paul did a talk on 'why I'm not an entropist' and suggested that people need to start working on defeating a mythical global passive adversary. Maybe in the near future some government will have the capability of being the global passive adversary. [0] http://petsymposium.org/2009/program.php -- Andrew http://tpo.is/contact pgp 0x6B4D6475 _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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