September 2004 - cypherpunks-legacy

Flying with Libertarian Hawks
by R. A. Hettinga 10 Sep '04

10 Sep '04

<http://www.techcentralstation.com/090904A.html> Tech Central Station Flying with Libertarian Hawks By Max Borders Published 09/09/2004 And covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all. -- Thomas Hobbes Is it possible for one to be libertarian about policies at home and neo-conservative about policies abroad? After all, isn't the principle of non-coercion incompatible with the interventionist policies of the current Administration? Simply put: is there such an animal as a libertarian hawk and if he exists, why do we so seldom hear from him? There is a reticence among many libertarians to speak out about their bellicosity. You might say they're doves at the dinner table, perhaps worried they'll be shunned by their peers. But I think it's time we give some substance to what, at the moment, may be little more than an intuition, and speak up about our support for foreign policies that require armed conflicts -- even preemptive ones. Most libertarians fall in line behind the superficial notion that domestic and foreign policies should be mirror images of each other, each reflecting classical liberal principles where self-defense is applied universally like some scriptural edict. Alas, were the threats of the twenty first century so simple to counter, the complexities of world so easily distilled. The libertarian hawk takes her cues from Hobbes, not Locke, as the spaces mostly untouched by globalization are, in her view, like a state-of-nature. She sees threats that organize themselves in the shadows beyond civilization; operating, no less, in an age of deadly weapons proliferation. She fears the world's great, but nimble powers coalescing into a slothful and ineffectual global body -- where the toughest decisions of life and limb must be made in committee. She understands that freedom does not drop like manna from heaven, but is earned drop-for-drop and coin-for-coin by the sacrifices of blood and treasure. And this is the crux of the libertarian hawk's position: "rights" as such, are not some Cartesian substance that animates the body in the manner of a soul. Rights are a human construct, just like money. The more we believe in them, the better they work. But there are situations in which the currency becomes, uh, devalued. Better said: there are limits to those on whom we can ascribe rights. We get rights by virtue of some sort of social contract, not from our Creator. In this way, social contract theory splits the difference in many respects between libertarianism and conservatism. The social contract is an idea that people would rationally choose certain constraints on their behavior, constraints which culminate in certain reciprocal rules under which to live. I won't harm you if you won't harm me. We benefit through cooperation. And so forth. Those who would choose the rules enjoy the full benefits they confer. Criteria of mutual benefit are embedded in the social contract condition -- which is devoid of: "natural rights" notions that have failed in the libertarian tradition on metaphysical grounds; the totalitarian-leaning "social" aspects which can creep into utilitarian theories (requiring individuals to be sacrificial lambs to the "many"); and of the stodgy moralizing that tends to weigh on domestic conservatism. The overall beauty of social contract theory is that it offers us a justification for political liberalism and pluralism that rests neither on the foundational axioms associated with traditional moral theories, nor on the nihilism and disorderly assertions of the so-called Postmoderns. In short, social contract theory is a constructivist enterprise. And if you stand outside the covenants of Man, you are presumed "enemy." In light of all this, I find it sad that so many otherwise bright libertarians seem so unreflective about war. Some of my favorite freedom-loving publications have steered their editorial styles into the hashish den of protest music and anti-Bush priggishness. Some of my favorite think tanks issue press releases almost daily, calling for the immediate withdrawal of troops from Iraq, calling for the US to extend Constitutional privileges to enemy combatants, and claiming that it will be impossible to bring democracy and the Rule of Law to the Middle East. Which brings me to what could be the best criticism against the current conflict in Iraq. Let's call it the Hayekian Argument. It can be summarized in the following way: a complex order, like a country, is very difficult to plan or impose upon a people. It emerges, pace Hayek, "spontaneously." Under certain institutional conditions backed by years of tradition and certain entrenched cultural mores, civil societies can form. But these conditions simply are not in place in Iraq, so we may have gotten ourselves into a (OK, here goes) a quagmire. Much of the Hayekian Argument depends on considerations in complexity theory. That is, preference for "networks" over "hierarchies," as the former tend to do a better job of sustaining complexity among agents in a society. But further investigation along these lines may reveal something like a "feed-forward network" that is formed when inputs of a certain type allow a system is changed, in a sense, by example. Of course, this is somewhat of a metaphor in the context of Iraq. And, of course, nation-building isn't an exact science. But I would have always preferred to hedge my bets that given enough of the appropriate initial conditions, Iraqis would find that -- in the absence of a dangerous dictator -- they would begin to form of the mutually beneficial relationships with one another that bring about prosperity and peace. I doubt they could've done this alone. I think the Coalition was right to help them towards a tipping point. And if we fail, the failure will have been a practical one, not a moral one. My guess is that there are others who would like to see less of this accretion of libertarians around the Dove. I am one of those who doesn't fancy the idea of staring down the point of a chemical warhead before I decide to act. (Even if such warheads turn out to be a chimera today, they won't likely be tomorrow.) In the nuclear age, when the degree of certainty that you will be attacked is at fifty percent, you are as good as done for in terms of your ability to protect yourself. Thus, preventive action in a world of uncertainty is, unfortunately, the only reasonable course. In the meantime, it behooves us to try to make our enemies more like us and then allow globalization to proceed apace. For the more like us they are, the more likely they are to enter into the tenuous human covenants that are our only means of having peace. The author is a TCS contributor. He is Program Director, Institute for Humane Studies. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

1 0

Intego ChatBarrier X3 10.3.2
by R. A. Hettinga 10 Sep '04

10 Sep '04

<http://www.versiontracker.com/dyn/moreinfo/macosx/23714> VersionTracker Intego ChatBarrier X3 encryption for iChat instant messaging E-mail a Friend about Intego ChatBarrier X3 Download Now ( File Size: 5.0M ) All Time: Overall Rating:? (2.2) This Version: Overall Rating: Not rated (0.0) Ease of Use: Not rated (0.0) Support: Not rated (0.0) Features: Not rated (0.0) Quality / Stability: Not rated (0.0) Price: Not rated (0.0) Company: Intego Developer Page: Product Info Current Version: 10.3.2 Release Date: 2004-09-09 License: Update Downloads (this version) 85 Downloads (all versions) 671 Price: $39.95 View Screenshots Select Intego ChatBarrier X3 Version: What's this Product Description: Intego ChatBarrier works in conjunction with Apple's iChat instant messaging software to provide two-way, real-time encryption of text chats. Intego ChatBarrier is easy to use, transparent, and inviolable, using military-grade 512-bit encryption that no one can break. When Intego ChatBarrier is installed, a simple click of a button turns on its functions, and any text you send during a chat using iChat is encrypted. Only a user who also has Intego ChatBarrier installed, and to whom you send a message, will be able to decrypt it. Neither the sender nor the receiver has to do anything other than activate Intego ChatBarrier for encryption and decryption to occur. What's new in this version: Bug fixes. Product Requirements: Mac OS X 10.2.3 or later Screen Shots: See More: View Slideshow (new window) Download Links: Download Intego ChatBarrier X3 Now (File Size: 5.0M) Latest Feedback:View All (8) | Finally tombovo ?? Version: 10.3.1, 7/11/2004 06:18PM PST This is a long needed product. Installation was easy, and using it seems a little too easy. I would like to see more information on the encryption type and how it works, its priced a little high for a one-trick-pony, and its pretty simplistic in how you use this, so i have to reduce its rating one star. I do like its integration with NetUpdate so i can update NetBarrier along with this product. More Info Post a comment | alert admin | Vendor without a clue LEoOfBORG ?? Version: 1.0, 7/6/2004 06:18PM PST I installed this, and while I didn't have anyone to try this out with, here are some observations. 1 Why does this hack need -2- Preference Panes? Prefpane #1 (The on-off switch) is simply that. This should not be in PrefPanes, but in iChat itself. 2 The 'Net Update' Pref Pane does more of a service for Intego than the user. There are -2- checkboxes for 'Opt-in Spam' from Intego. And -why- do they need an email address -and- password for the updater? All in all, this comes across as some marketing flunkys idea of what's good for Windows is good for MacOSX. It's obvious that Intego doesn't know how to integrate with MacOSX. So, to recap; 1/ Put Settings and functionality for the app you are enhancing IN THE APP ITSELF -- NOT IN THE OS. If you need a primer on how to do this, look at the FREE sofware PithHelmet with its Safari integration. 2/ If you expect to receive $40 for your hack, don't add insult to injury by bloating our systems with extra flotsam like 'Opt-in Spam' in the Net Update. That is just plain insulting. Shareware authors have version checking down to one menu item. Why do you need such a convoluted updater, Intego? To top off what others have been saying about how Apple may just have this functionality in the next version of iChat anyway (it's SSL, and Windows folks already have it), Bitwise and Fire have encryption capabilities for FREE. Also, if you really NEED crypto, PGP also has an Encryption service built into the service menu. You can encrypt text to your chat partner's public key and -know- that its meant only for them (and is not just some SSL stream). Concieveable you could mix 'chatty' cleartext with PGP's 2048-bit encryption, which blows Intego's away. In short, if you're willing to do some homework, there are alternatives out there that smoke this hack. Don't fall for this Windows vendor's price taking, learn about Crypto. At the very least, pick up PGP Freeware. Or personal desktop, which costs the same, is applicable to a number of applications, and DOES NOT EXPIRE after one year (I read Intego's license). That being said, at least it comes with a de-installer. More Info Comments: 2 | alert admin | 2 of 3 users found this helpful ChatBarrier V3 Helpinghand ?? Version: 1.0, 6/27/2004 06:01PM PST I have used it and it works as they say as far as I can tell. Price could be better but over all its not a bad product, I also use their netbarrier and it works great. Its a nice product for saying things you don't want carnivor to see but its not a must for everyone. More Info Post a comment | alert admin | View All(8) | -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

1 0

The Garwin Archive
by Major Variola (ret) 09 Sep '04

09 Sep '04

A nuke physicist talks about taking out a US city, nonlethal weapons, and more http://www.fas.org/rlg/index.html http://www.fas.org/rlg/040000-nonlethal.pdf http://www.fas.org/rlg/040309-drell.htm

1 0

[ISN] Mitnick movie comes to the US
by InfoSec News 09 Sep '04

09 Sep '04

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/09/09/mitnick_movie_us/ [ http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/B0002L57YQ/c4iorg - WK] By Kevin Poulsen, SecurityFocus 9th September 2004 Nearly six years after it was filmed, Hollywood's trouble-plagued movie version of the hunt for hacker Kevin Mitnick is headed for video stores in the US Originally titled Takedown, then Cybertraque, the film is set for a September 28th U.S. release on DVD with the new title, Track Down. The movie is from Miramax's horror and sci-fi label Dimension Films, and is based on the book Takedown: The Pursuit and Capture of America's Most Wanted Computer Outlaw - By The Man Who Did It, authored by computer scientist Tsutomu Shimomura and New York Times reporter John Markoff. Shimomura electronically tracked Mitnick to his Raleigh, North Carolina hideout in February, 1995, and sold the book and movie rights for an undisclosed sum amidst the storm of publicity following the fugitive hacker's arrest. Early versions of the screenplay for the movie adaptation of Takedown cast Mitnick - played by Scream star Skeet Ulrich - as violent and potentially homicidal. In July, 1998, supporters of the then-imprisoned cyberpunk rallied against the film outside Miramax's New York City offices. Writers later revised the script, and shooting wrapped on the project in December, 1998. The film then languished without a US release date amid rumors of poor test screenings and a re-shot ending. Perhaps hoping to recoup some of their losses, Miramax finally released the movie to French theatres in March, 2000, as Cybertraque. It was generally panned by critics: a reviewer for the newspaper Le Monde noted the film's problems in translating a virtual manhunt to the action-adventure genre. "Can the repeated image of faces sweating over keyboards renew the principles of the Hollywood thriller?," the paper asked. "It's easy to say that the filmmaker hardly reaches that point, regardless of his saturation of the soundtrack with rock music to defeat the boredom of the viewer." Cybertraque was later released in Europe on DVD with French subtitles, and enjoyed some underground circulation on peer-to-peer networks, often misidentified as the sequel to the 1995 film Hackers. The real-life Mitnick cracked computers at cellphone companies, universities and ISPs. He pleaded guilty in March, 1999, to seven felonies, and was released from prison on 21 January, 2000, after nearly five years in custody. Now a security consultant and author, the ex-hacker says he's not happy to see the movie come to America. "I didn't expect the film would ever be released to the US, so this is kind of shock to me," he says. "I'm kind of disappointed because the film depicts me doing things that are not real." The fictionalized plot of Track Down centers around Shimomura's efforts to capture Mitnick before the hacker can access a terrifying computer program capable of causing blackouts, disabling hospital equipment and scrambling air traffic control systems. Hollywood's Mitnick character is portrayed somewhat sympathetically, but is prone to random outbursts of rage, and suffers a creepy penchant for electronic eavesdropping and a lurking hatred of women. "You wouldn't believe the amount of emails I get from all around the world saying, 'I saw this movie about you, it's great, you're my hero, it was a fantastic movie,'" says Mitnick. "I'm thinking, these guys are a little bit off... It's not an interesting film. I think it was done pretty poorly." _________________________________________ Donate online for the Ron Santo Walk to Cure Diabetes - http://www.c4i.org/ethan.html --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

1 0

[ISN] Mitnick movie comes to the US
by InfoSec News 09 Sep '04

09 Sep '04

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/09/09/mitnick_movie_us/ [ http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/B0002L57YQ/c4iorg - WK] By Kevin Poulsen, SecurityFocus 9th September 2004 Nearly six years after it was filmed, Hollywood's trouble-plagued movie version of the hunt for hacker Kevin Mitnick is headed for video stores in the US Originally titled Takedown, then Cybertraque, the film is set for a September 28th U.S. release on DVD with the new title, Track Down. The movie is from Miramax's horror and sci-fi label Dimension Films, and is based on the book Takedown: The Pursuit and Capture of America's Most Wanted Computer Outlaw - By The Man Who Did It, authored by computer scientist Tsutomu Shimomura and New York Times reporter John Markoff. Shimomura electronically tracked Mitnick to his Raleigh, North Carolina hideout in February, 1995, and sold the book and movie rights for an undisclosed sum amidst the storm of publicity following the fugitive hacker's arrest. Early versions of the screenplay for the movie adaptation of Takedown cast Mitnick - played by Scream star Skeet Ulrich - as violent and potentially homicidal. In July, 1998, supporters of the then-imprisoned cyberpunk rallied against the film outside Miramax's New York City offices. Writers later revised the script, and shooting wrapped on the project in December, 1998. The film then languished without a US release date amid rumors of poor test screenings and a re-shot ending. Perhaps hoping to recoup some of their losses, Miramax finally released the movie to French theatres in March, 2000, as Cybertraque. It was generally panned by critics: a reviewer for the newspaper Le Monde noted the film's problems in translating a virtual manhunt to the action-adventure genre. "Can the repeated image of faces sweating over keyboards renew the principles of the Hollywood thriller?," the paper asked. "It's easy to say that the filmmaker hardly reaches that point, regardless of his saturation of the soundtrack with rock music to defeat the boredom of the viewer." Cybertraque was later released in Europe on DVD with French subtitles, and enjoyed some underground circulation on peer-to-peer networks, often misidentified as the sequel to the 1995 film Hackers. The real-life Mitnick cracked computers at cellphone companies, universities and ISPs. He pleaded guilty in March, 1999, to seven felonies, and was released from prison on 21 January, 2000, after nearly five years in custody. Now a security consultant and author, the ex-hacker says he's not happy to see the movie come to America. "I didn't expect the film would ever be released to the US, so this is kind of shock to me," he says. "I'm kind of disappointed because the film depicts me doing things that are not real." The fictionalized plot of Track Down centers around Shimomura's efforts to capture Mitnick before the hacker can access a terrifying computer program capable of causing blackouts, disabling hospital equipment and scrambling air traffic control systems. Hollywood's Mitnick character is portrayed somewhat sympathetically, but is prone to random outbursts of rage, and suffers a creepy penchant for electronic eavesdropping and a lurking hatred of women. "You wouldn't believe the amount of emails I get from all around the world saying, 'I saw this movie about you, it's great, you're my hero, it was a fantastic movie,'" says Mitnick. "I'm thinking, these guys are a little bit off... It's not an interesting film. I think it was done pretty poorly." _________________________________________ Donate online for the Ron Santo Walk to Cure Diabetes - http://www.c4i.org/ethan.html --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

1 0

potential new IETF WG on anonymous IPSec (fwd from rah@shipwright.com)
by Eugen Leitl 09 Sep '04

09 Sep '04

----- Forwarded message from "R. A. Hettinga" <rah(a)shipwright.com> -----

1 0

Re: Savvis dropping major spammers (cypherpunk sighting.)
by Tyler Durden 08 Sep '04

08 Sep '04

I see Savvis has a sales office in a Building I used to work in here in NYC. They also seem to be be somewhat deadbeat-ish with respect to paying some of their bills, so I bet they need that Spam revenue. That exec probably needed that revenue in order to qualify for some absurd bonus. -TD >From: "J.A. Terranson" <measl(a)mfn.org> >To: Bill Stewart <bill.stewart(a)pobox.com> >CC: cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net >Subject: Re: Savvis dropping major spammers (cypherpunk sighting.) >Date: Wed, 8 Sep 2004 18:45:52 -0500 (CDT) > >On Wed, 8 Sep 2004, Bill Stewart wrote: > > > http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3634572.stm > > > > John Young and John Gilmore aren't the only cypherpunks > > in the news lately. J. Alif Terranson was in a BBC article > > about getting the company to agree to drop the > > hundred or so major spammers who've been using their network. > > > > Some of them are former C&W customers, some are new, > > and they've been estimated to be about $2M/month business for Savvis, > > so this is a non-trivial step for Savvis. > > On the other hand, Savvis risked getting its whole network blacklisted > > by the major spam anti-spam groups if it didn't do something. > > > > We'll see if they follow through. > >The actual memos are at http://www.savvis.info > >Other articles (mostly with greater detail) include: > >http://www.nwfusion.com/edge/news/2004/0908leakmemos.html >http://www.computerworld.com/managementtopics/outsourcing/isptelecom/story/… >01,95769,00.html >http://arstechnica.com/news/posts/20040908-4168.html >http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3634572.stm >http://techdirt.com/articles/20040908/103247.shtml >http://ads.osdn.com/?ad_id=4985&alloc_id=10663&site_id=1&request_id=1806376 > >-- >Yours, > >J.A. Terranson >sysadmin(a)mfn.org >0xBD4A95BF > > "...justice is a duty towards those whom you love and those whom you do > not. And people's rights will not be harmed if the opponent speaks out > about them." Osama Bin Laden > - - - > > "There aught to be limits to freedom!" George Bush > - - - > >Which one scares you more? _________________________________________________________________ On the road to retirement? Check out MSN Life Events for advice on how to get there! http://lifeevents.msn.com/category.aspx?cid=Retirement

2 1

RE: Gilmore case...Who can make laws?
by Tyler Durden 08 Sep '04

08 Sep '04

Hum. Another wrinkle in this thing occurred to me here, though I'm sure various Cypherpunks will (rightly) declare me naive. This describes the "Government" as creating secret laws. But, theoretically, only the congress and the Senate can create new laws, correct? The Executive branch has never been empowered to create laws, and I'm thinking these travel laws did not go through congress or the senate. So not only are these laws secret, they emanate from a body that is not empowered to make laws within the US. Is there a precedent, or perhaps because the "War on Terror" must be waged everywhere, the Commander in Chief can claim the right to make new domestic laws as a function of his wartime leadership. -TD >From: "J.A. Terranson" <measl(a)mfn.org> >To: "cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net> >Subject: Gilmore case: CNN >Date: Tue, 7 Sep 2004 06:50:16 -0500 (CDT) > >http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/09/06/airline.id.ap/index.html > > >Government wants ID arguments secret >Monday, September 6, 2004 Posted: 4:07 PM EDT (2007 GMT) > > >SAN FRANCISCO, California (AP) -- The U.S. Department of Justice has asked >an appellate court to keep its arguments secret for a case in which >privacy advocate John Gilmore is challenging federal requirements to show >identification before boarding an airplane. > >A federal statute and other regulations "prohibit the disclosure of >sensitive security information, and that is precisely what is alleged to >be at issue here," the government said in court papers filed Friday with >the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Disclosing the restricted >information "would be detrimental to the security of transportation," the >government wrote. > >Attorneys for Gilmore, a 49-year-old San Francisco resident who co-founded >the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a civil liberties group, said they >don't buy the government's argument and that its latest request raises >only more questions. > >"We're dealing with the government's review of a secret law that now they >want a secret judicial review for," one of Gilmore's attorneys, James >Harrison, said in a phone interview Sunday. "This administration's use of >a secret law is more dangerous to the security of the nation than any >external threat." > >Gilmore first sued the government and several airlines in July 2002 after >airline agents refused to let him board planes in San Francisco and >Oakland without first showing an ID or submitting to a more intense >search. He claimed in his lawsuit the ID requirement was vague and >ineffective and violated his constitutional protections against illegal >searches and seizures. > >A U.S. District Court judge earlier this year dismissed his claims against >the airlines, but said his challenge to the government belonged in a >federal appellate court. > >Now in his appellate case, Gilmore maintains the federal government has >yet to disclose the regulations behind the ID requirement to which he was >subjected. > >"How are people supposed to follow laws if they don't know what they are?" >Harrison said. > >The government contends its court arguments should be sealed from public >view and heard before a judge outside the presence of Gilmore and his >attorneys. The government, however, said it would plan to file another >redacted public version of its arguments. > >A date for a hearing on the matter has not yet been set. _________________________________________________________________ Is your PC infected? Get a FREE online computer virus scan from McAfee. Security. http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963

5 6

potential new IETF WG on anonymous IPSec
by R. A. Hettinga 08 Sep '04

08 Sep '04

--- begin forwarded text

1 0

Seth Schoen's Hard to Verify Signatures
by hal＠finney.org 08 Sep '04

08 Sep '04

Seth Schoen of the EFF proposed an interesting cryptographic primitive called a "hard to verify signature" in his blog at http://vitanuova.loyalty.org/weblog/nb.cgi/view/vitanuova/2004/09/02 . The idea is to have a signature which is fast to make but slow to verify, with the verification speed under the signer's control. He proposes that this could be useful with trusted computing to discourage certain objectionable applications. The method Seth describes is to include a random value in the signature but not to include it in the message. He shows a sample signature with 3 decimal digits hidden. The only way to verify it is to try all possibilities for the random values. By controlling how much data is hidden in this way, the signer can control how long it will take to verify the signature. This idea is nice and simple, but one disadvantage is that it is probabilistic. It works on average, but occasionally someone might choose an n digit value which happens to be low (assuming the values are chosen at random). Then they don't get as much protection. They could fix this by eliminating too-low values, but then verifiers might exploit that by doing low values last in their testing. Another problem is that this method is inherently parallelizable, so that someone with N computers could solve it N times faster, by having each computer test a subset of the values. An alternative is based on the paper, "Time-lock puzzles and timed release Crypto", by Rivest, Shamir and Wagner, from 1996, http://theory.lcs.mit.edu/~rivest/RivestShamirWagner-timelock.pdf or .ps. They are looking more at the problem of encrypting data such that it can be decrypted only after a chosen amount of computing time, but many of their techniques are applicable to signatures. The first solution they consider is essentially the same as Seth's, doing an encryption where n bits of the encryption key are unknown, and letting people search for the decryption key. They identify the problems I noted above (which I stole from their paper). They also point out BTW that this concept was used by Ralph Merkle in his paper which basically foreshadowed the invention of public key cryptography. Merkle had to fight for years to get his paper published, otherwise he would be known as the father of the field rather than just a pioneer or co-inventor. The next method they describe can be put into signature terms as follows. Choose the number of modular squarings, t, that you want the verifier to have to perform. Suppose you choose t = 1 billion. Now you will sign your value using an RSA key whose exponent e = 2^t + 1. (You also need to make sure that this value is relatively prime to p-1 and q-1, but that is easily arranged, for example by letting p and q be strong primes.) The way you sign, even using such a large e, is to compute phi = (p-1)*(q-1) and to compute e' = e mod phi, which can be done using about 30 squarings of 2 mod phi. You then compute the secret exponent d as the multiplicative inverse mod phi of e', in the standard way that is done for RSA keys. Using this method you can sign about as quickly as for regular RSA keys. However, the verifier has a much harder problem. He does not know phi, hence cannot reduce e. To verify, he has to raise the signature to the e power as in any RSA signature, which for the exponent I described will require t = 1 billion modular squaring operations. This will be a slow process, and the signer can control it by changing the size of t, without changing his own work factor materially. The authors also point out that modular squaring is an intrinsically sequential process which cannot benefit from applying multiple computers. So the only speed variations relevant will be those between individual computers. Another idea I had for a use of hard to verify signatures would be if you published something anonymously but did not want to be known as the author of it until far in the future, perhaps after your death. Then you could create a HTV signature on it, perhaps not identifying the key, just the signature value. Only in the future when computing power is cheap would it be possible to try verifying the signature under different keys and see which one worked. Hal Finney

2 1