December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Re: cypherpunk listserve usefulness
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 2:33 PM 9/18/96, Chip Mefford wrote: >As much as it shames me, I have recently discovered that by filtering >messages from only 2 participants and setting body filters on 3 keywords >have remarkably improved the usefulness of this listserve. > >As much as I do enjoy some of the filtered subject matter, I really feel it >is very off subject and makes this listserver useless for the intended task. > >I guess that makes me a censor and it has me reexamining some things. No, it certainly does not make you a "censor." It makes you more _discriminating_, but this is often a good thing. A _censor_, by all standard definitions one can find, is one who restricts what _others_ may read. The form that concerns many of us the most is when a government uses its monopoly on force to censor. (But the term can also apply to when churches or corporations act as censors of what worshipper-units or employee-units may read or view.) I hope by "has me reexamining things" you do not mean that your experience with filters means support for government telling us all which filters we must use. Certainly the CP list is undergoing one of its periodic "sunspot cycles," where spambots and loonies are attempting to trash it, and where the discussions of meaty issues are being affected. We've survived half a dozen or so such periods, and will survive this. The best way to increase the S/N ratio is to post more signal. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Snakeoil FAQ edits/comments
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Matt: Thanks, and good work. My comments are indicated by [your text] in brackets, my comments >>> set off by >>>'s. To help separate, look for "-----------------------------" --------------------------- snake-oil-faq ---------------------------- Snake-Oil Warning Signs Encryption Software to Avoid $Id: snake-oil-faq.html,v 0.4 1996/09/16 13:52:26 cmcurtin Exp $ Distribution Please do not distribute this beyond the circles of cryptographic competence yet. This is an incomplete work-in-progress. Feedback is greatly appreciated. The Snake Oil FAQ is (to be) posted monthly to cypherpunks, sci.crypt, alt.security, comp.security, and comp.infosystems. We're targeting those who have influence over or direct involvement in the purchasing decisions of computer security software and equipment in the corporate and academic worlds, as well as individual users who wish to assert their privacy through the use of good cryptography. ----------------------------- >>> I wonder what a good assumption is about level-of-expertise. I should think rather low, since a more experienced person will not be in as much need of the doc in the first place. Think moderately-informed user: like the readers of InfoWorld, eh? Given that, there are several places where knowledge of the subject is assumed that the real consumer of the FAQ doesn't have. ----------------------------- Disclaimer All contributors' employers will no doubt disown any statements herein. We're not speaking for anyone but ourselves, based on our own experiences, etc., etc., etc. This is a general guideline, and as such, cannot be the sole metric by which a security product is rated, since there can be exceptions to any of these rules. ----------------------------- >>> Actually, I think there are some rules in here that there are no exceptions to. Check; nothing comes immediately to mind tho. ----------------------------- ----------------------------- [(But if you're looking at something that sounds familiar on several of the 'things to watch out for,' you're probably dealing with snake oil. ] >>> But if many of the items on the "Things to look out for" list seem to apply to a product, the product is very likely weak. ----------------------------- ----------------------------- >From time to time, a reputable and decent vendor will produce something that is actually quite good, but will use some [braindead] marketing technique, so be aware of exceptions. >>> "Braindead", eh, hmmmmm. Too dignified ;) ----------------------------- Every effort has been made to produce an accurate and useful document, but the information contained herein is completely without warranty. If you find any errors, or wish to otherwise contribute, please contact the document keeper, C Matthew Curtin <cmcurtin(a)research.megasoft.com> Introduction Good cryptography is an excellent and necessary tool for almost anyone. However, there is a multitude of products around. Many good cryptographic products are available, both commercial (including shareware) and free. However, there are also some extremely bad cryptographic products (known in the field as "Snake Oil"), which not only fail do their job of providing security, but are based on, and add to, the many misconceptions and misunderstandings surrounding cryptography and security. ----------------------------- >>> They also prey on the inexperience of the consumer, rely on the mystery and mystique of mathmatical-sounding jargon, to make poorly engineered products seem to be something they are not. ----------------------------- Superficially, it is difficult for someone to distinguish the output of a secure encryption utility from snake oil: both look garbled. The purpose of this document is >>> to <<< present some obvious "red flags" [so that] >>> which <<< people unfamiliar with the nuts and bolts of cryptography can use as a guideline for determining whether they're dealing with snake oil or the Real Thing. For a variety of reasons, this document is general in scope and does not mention specific products or algorithms as being "good" or "Snake Oil". When evaluating any product, be sure to understand what your needs are. For data security products, what do you need protected? Do you want an archiver that [supports strong encryption? ] ----------------------------- >>> Problem: what is "Strong Encryption" ??? From a user's point of view this term is too fuzzy. Try: "that will keep data secure from your kid sister? A rogue government? For 5 minutes? Etc. etc. " ----------------------------- ----------------------------- [An E-mail client? Something that will encrypt on-line communications? Do you want to encrypt an entire disk or partition, or selectively some files? Do you need on-the-fly (automatic) encryption and decryption, or are you willing to select when and which files you want encrypted? ] >>> I'd leave that out: not pertinent to snake-oil vs. Good Stuff, but is about the kind of application user requires. How secure is "secure enough?" Does the data need to be unreadable by third parties for 5 minutes? One year? 50 years? 100 years? >>> see above. ----------------------------- ----------------------------- [Different products will serve different needs, and it's rare that a product will serve every need. (Sometimes a product won't be needed: it may be better to use a utility to encrypt files, transmit them over a network using standard file transfer tools, and decrypt them at the other end than to use a separate encrypted utility in some cases.)] >>> I don't understand: "sometimes a product won't be needed?" I think this paragraph could be left out. After all, OS utility or Snoop-Dooper-Doggy-Doo-Ware product, ya still gotta know what you're doing, right? So you everthing in the FAQ still applies; or maybe I'm missing the point here. ----------------------------- Some basics The cryptography-faq (found at ftp://rtfm.mit.edu/pub/usenet/cryptography-faq/) is a more general tutorial of cryptography, and should also be consulted. In an effort to make this FAQ more complete, some very basic topics are included below. Conventional vs. Public Key Cryptography ----------------------------- There are two basic types of cryptosystems: symmetric (also known as "conventional," [sometimes also called] >>> or <<< "private key") and asymmetric (public key). Symmetric ciphers require both the sender and the recipient to have the same key. That key is [applied] >>> used by the cryptographic algorithm <<< to encrypt the data >>> originated <<< by the sender, and again by the recipient to decrypt the data. Asymmetric ciphers are much more flexible, from a key management perspective. Each user has a pair of keys: a public key and a private key. The public key is shared widely, given to everyone, while the private key is kept secret. If Alice wishes to mail Bob some secrets, she simply gets Bob's public key, encrypts her message with it, and sends it off to Bob. When Bob gets the message, he uses is private key to decrypt the message. Asymmetric [cryptosystems] >>>algorithms<<< are much slower than [their symmetric counterparts.] >>> symmetric algorithms, and are almost exclusively used to encrypt short "session keys," which are then used to encrypt a message using the speedier symmetric algorithms. This use of public key cryptography is called "key exchange." ----------------------------- ----------------------------- [Also, key sizes must be much larger.] >>>I agree with one comment that discouraged comparing the 2 algo types. ----------------------------- See the cryptography FAQ for a more detailed discussion of [the topic.] >>>these topics.<<< Key Sizes ----------------------------- Some ciphers, while currently secure against most attacks, are not considered viable in the next few years because of relatively small keysizes and increasing processor speeds [(making a brute-force attacks feasible).] >>> Again, I maintain that the audience for this stuff can't be relied upon to even know what that means. Try: "which makes the cipher vulnerable to breaking by trying every possible key combination (called a brute-force attack)." --- or something like that. ----------------------------- The tables below should give some general guidelines for making intelligent decisions about the key length you need. If the key is too short, the system will be easily broken, even if the cipher is a good one. In [1] and [2], we're presented with some guidelines for deciding appropriate key length. (It is important to note that this is based on the ability to predict computing power 40, 65, and 100 years from now. Major breakthroughs in computing power 30 years from now might render everything on this chart kiddieplay.) Security Requirements for Different Information Type of Traffic Lifetime Minimum [Symmetric] Key Length Tactical military information minutes/hours 56-64 bits Product announcements, mergers, interest rates days/weeks 64 bits Long-term business plans years 64 bits Trade secrets (e.g., recipe for Coca-Cola) decades 112 bits H-bomb secrets >40 years 128 bits Identities of spies >50 years 128 bits Personal affairs >50 years 128 bits Diplomatic embarrassments >65 years at least 128 bits U.S. Census data 100 years at least 128 bits ----------------------------- >>> Where is the attribution for the table? ----------------------------- As mentioned earlier, asymmetric ciphers require significantly longer keys to provide the same level of security as their symmetric cipher counterparts. Here is a comparison table, again, from Applied Cryptography, second edition. Symmetric and Public-Key Lengths With Similar Resistance to Brute-Force Attacks Symmetric Key Length Public-key Key Length 56 bits 384 bits 64 bits 512 bits 80 bits 768 bits 112 bits 1792 bits 128 bits 2304 bits ----------------------------- >>> BEWARE, Danger: comparing public/private key cryptosystems again. I think if you really want to do so, then the comparison should really be explained. ----------------------------- Some Common Snake-Oil Warning Signs The following are some of the "red flags" one should watch for when examining an encryption product * Technobabble The vendor's description of the product may contain a lot of hard-to-follow use of technical terms to describe how the product works. If this appears to be confusing nonsense, it may very well be (even to someone familiar with the terminology). Technobabble is a good means of confusing a potential user and masking the fact that the vendor doesn't understand anything either. A sign of technobabble is a descrption which drops a lot of technical terms for how the system works without actually explaining how it works. Often specifically coined terms are used to describe the scheme which are not found in the literature. * New Type of Cryptography? Beware of any vendor who claims to have invented a "new type of cryptography" or a "revolutionary breakthrough". Truly "new break-throughs" are likely to show up in the >>> scientific <<< literature, and [many in the field] >>> professionals won't <<< [are unlikely to] trust them until after years of analysis, by which time they are not so new anymore. Avoid software which claims to use 'new paradigms' of computing such as cellular automata, neural nets, genetic algorithms, chaos theory, etc. Just because software uses to different method of computation doesn't make it more secure. ----------------------------- >>> As a matter of fact, these techniques are the subject of ongoing cryptographic research and nobody has published successful results based on their use yet. ----------------------------- Anything that claims to have invented a new [public key] cryptosystem without publishing the details or underlying mathematical principles is highly suspect. Modern cryptography, especially public key systems, is grounded in mathematical theory. The security is based on problems that are believed, if not known to be hard to solve. ----------------------------- >>> There are some other comments in cpunks on this last bit. I defer. ----------------------------- The strength of any encryption scheme is only proven by the test of time, >>> involving exhaustive analysis by cryptographers<<<. New crypto is like new pharmaceuticals, not new cars. * Proprietary Algorithms Avoid software which uses "proprietary" or "secret" algorithms. Security through obscurity is not considered a safe means of protecting your data. If the vendor does not feel confident that the method used can withstand years of scrutiny by the [academic] >>> professional and academic cryptographic <<< community, then you should be wary of trusting it. (Note that a vendor who specializes in the cryptography may have a proprietary algorithm which they'll show to others if they sign a non-disclosure agreement. If the vendor is well-reputed in the field, this can be an exception.) ----------------------------- >>> How can you tell a well-reputed vendor? I am thinging of one co. that promises to release their algo. details upon NDA, but at least in my case the details never showed up! This is slippery here! ----------------------------- Beware of specially modified versions of well-known algorithms. This may intentionally or unintentionally weaken the cipher. The use of a trusted algorithm, >>> availability of <<< [if not with] technical notes explaining the implementation ([if not availability of] >>> and preferably <<< the source code for the product) are a sign of good faith on the part of the vendor that you can take apart and test the implementation yourself. A common excuse for not disclosing how a program works is that "hackers might try to crack the program's security." While this may be a valid concern, it should be noted that such 'hackers' can reverse engineer the program to see how it works anyway. If the program is implemented properly and the algorithm is secure, this is not a problem. (If a hypothetical 'hacker' was able to get access you your system, access to encrypted data might be the least of your problems.) ----------------------------- >>> Add: The strength of a cryptosystem should depend ONLY on the security of the keys involved, and not the security of the algorithm. ----------------------------- * Experienced Security Experts and Rave Reviews Beware of any product claiming that "experienced security experts" have analyzed it, but it won't say who (especially if the scheme has not been published in a reputable journal). Don't rely on reviews in newspapers, magazines or television shows, since they generally don't have cryptologists (celebrity hackers who know about telephone systems don't count) take the software apart for them. Just because the vendor is a well known company or the algorithm is patented doesn't make it secure either. * Unbreakability Some vendors will claim their software is "unbreakable". This is marketing hype, and a common sign of snake-oil. Avoid any vendor that makes unrealistic claims. ----------------------------- >>> The reader is not qualified to evaluate realistic/unrealistic. ----------------------------- No algorithm is unbreakable. Even the best algorithms are breakable using "brute force" (trying every possible key), but if the key size is large enough, this is impractical even with vast amounts of computing power. One-time pads are unbreakable, but they must be implemented perfectly, which is, at best, very difficult. See the next section for a more detailed discussion. ----------------------------- >>> Add: Avoid products that use huge numbers to impress you that it would take massive amounts of time to break them. This is ONLY true under the assumption that the only way to break the system is by exhaustively trying every possible key, and this assumption hass to be proved before the claim is valid. A cryptosystem using a keylength of 50,000 bits theoretically would take 2 raised to the 50,000th power to break (a ridiculously large number) if, AND ONLY IF the algorithm had no weaknesses. The hard part of cryptosystem design is making an algorithm with no weaknesses, such that exhaustive brute-force search is the only method of breaking it, not using long keys. ----------------------------- * One-Time-Pads A vendor might claim the system uses a one-time-pad (OTP), which is theoretically unbreakable. That is, snake-oil sellers will try to capitalize on the known strength of a OTP. It is important to understand that any variation in the implementation means that it is not an OTP, and has nowhere near the security of an OTP. A OTP system is not an algorithm. It works by having a "pad" of random bits in the possession of both the sender and recipient. ----------------------------- >>> Explain what you mean by a "pad" --- using a term which to the newbie may not usually be associated with crypto. Origin being the pads of paper that they used to use etc.etc. ??? ----------------------------- ----------------------------- The message is encrypted using [the next n bits in the pad as they key, where n is the number of bits in the message] >>> as many bits from the key as there are bits in the message. That is, for each bit in the message, there is a random bit from the one-time-pad.<<< ----------------------------- After the bits are used from the pad, they're destroyed, and can never again be used. The bits in the pad must be truly random, generated using a real random source, such as specialized hardware, radioactive decay timings, etc., and not from an algorithm or cipher. Anything else is not a one-time-pad. The vendor may confuse random session keys or initialization vectors with OTPs. * Algorithm or product XXX is insecure Be wary of anything that makes claims that particular algorithms or other products are insecure without backing up those claims (or at least citing references to them). Sometimes attacks are theoretical or impractical (requiring special circumstances or massive computing power running for many years), and it's easy to confuse a layman by mentioning these. * Keys and Passwords The "key" and the "password" are often not the same thing. The "key" generally refers to the actual data used by the cipher, while the "password" refers to the word or phrase the user types in, which the software converts into the key (usually through a process called "hashing" or "key initialization"). >>> Other comments addressed this paragraph. I defer. The reason this is done is because the characters a user is likely to type in do not cover the full range of possible characters. (Such keys would be more redundant and easier for an attacker to guess.) By hashing a key can be made from an arbitrary password that covers the full range of possible keys. It also allows one to use longer words, or phrases and whole sentences as a "passphrase", which is more secure. Anything that restricts users' passwords to something like 10 or 16 or even 32 characters is foolish. If the actual "password" is the cipher's key (rather than hashing it into a key, as explained above), avoid it. If the vendor confuses the distinctions between bits, bytes and characters when discussing the key, avoid this product. Convenience is nice, but be wary of anything that sounds too easy to use. ----------------------------- >>> Instead, try: be wary of any product that overly emphasizes ease-of-use without due attention to its cryptographic strength. ----------------------------- Avoid anything that lets anyone with your copy of the software to access files, data, etc. without having to use some sort of key or passphrase. Avoid anything that doesn't let you generate your own keys (ie, the vendor sends you a key in the mail, or it's embedded in the copy of the software you buy). Avoid anything by a vendor who does not seem to understand the difference between public-key (asymmetric) cryptography and private-key (symmetric) cryptography. * Lost keys and passwords If there's a third-party utility that can crack the software, avoid it. >>> Which - the utility or the crypto? If the vendor claims it can recover lost passwords (without using a key-backup or escrow feature), avoid it. If there is a key-backup or escrow feature, are you in control of the backup, or does the vendor or someone else hold a copy of the key? * Exportable from the USA If the software is made in North America, can it be exported? If the answer is yes, chances are it's not very strong. Strong cryptography is considered munitions in terms of export from the United States, and requires approval from the State Department. Chances are if the software is exportable, the algorithm is weak or it is crackable (hence it was approved for export). If the vendor is unaware of export restrictions, avoid the software: the vendor is not familiar with the state of the art. Because of export restrictions, some legitimate (not-Snake Oil) products may have a freely exportable version for outside of the USA, which is different from a separate US/Canada-only distribution. Also note that just because software has made it outside of North America does not mean that it is exportable: sometimes a utility will be illegally exported and posted on an overseas site. Other Considerations Interface isn't everything: user-friendliness is an important factor, but if the product isn't secure then you're better off with something that is secure (if not as easy to use). No product is secure if it's not used properly. You can be the weakest link in the chain if you use a product carelessly. Do not trust any product to be foolproof, and be wary any product that claims it is. Contributors The following folks have contributed to this FAQ. Jeremey Barrett <jeremey(a)forequest.com> <geeman(a)best.com> Jim Ray <liberty(a)gate.net> Robert Rothenburg Walking-Owl <wlkngowl(a)unix.asb.com> References 1. B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, second edition, John Wiley & Sons, 1996 2. M. Blaze, W. Diffie, R. L. Rivest, B. Schneier, T. Shimomura, E. Thompson, M. Wiener, "Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers to Provide Adequate Commercial Security," available via ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/mab/keylength.ps ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ---- C Matthew Curtin Last modified: Mon Sep 16 09:51:41 EDT ---------------------------------------------------------------------- -- C Matthew Curtin MEGASOFT, INC Chief Scientist I speak only for myself. Don't whine to anyone but me about anything I say. Hacker Security Firewall Crypto PGP Privacy Unix Perl Java Internet Intranet cmcurtin(a)research.megasoft.com http://research.megasoft.com/people/cmcurtin/

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Interactive Edition free access ends this week
by The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Subscriber: This Friday is the last day of your free trial subscription to The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition. We hope you've enjoyed this extensive free period and that you will--if you haven't already--join us as a charter annual subscriber. You don't need to re-register. Just fill out a brief online form and provide us with payment information. An annual subscription costs just $49 a year or $29 a year if you subscribe to any print edition of The Wall Street Journal. To convert to an annual subscription, just access http://wsj.com and click on the "Convert Now" graphic. If you do not wish to convert to an annual subscription, you do not need to do anything -- you will not be billed and your subscription will be canceled automatically at the end of the trial. You may also be interested in a special offer available to users of Microsoft's Internet Explorer. Microsoft has made arrangements with several premier publishers on the Web, including the Interactive Edition, to offer subscriptions to Internet Explorer users at no charge through the end of this year. If you use Internet Explorer as your Web browser, you will be able to keep reading the Interactive Edition through Dec. 31, 1996, and there is no need for you to provide us with payment information at this time. For more information on this offer, you can visit http://wsj.com/ie.html or ask us questions at the e-mail address below. If you have questions or comments, e-mail us at the address below or call Customer Service at 1-800-369-2834 or 1-609-514-0870. Neil Budde Editor The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition info(a)interactive.wsj.com -------------------------------------------------------- The WSJ-ANNOUNCE3 list is a service of The Wall Street Journal Interactive Edition (http://wsj.com) If you no longer wish to receive messages from the WSJ-ANNOUNCE3 list, simply reply to this message and in the body of your message type: UNSUBSCRIBE WSJ-ANNOUNCE3

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Re: Informal Renegotiation of the Law
by Adamsc＠io-online.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, 15 Sep 1996 17:54:49 -0500 (CDT), snow wrote: >> For example, you will not read anywhere that compulsory education laws have >> been repealed -- but they have. When the home schooling movement started in >> the late 1970s, there were occasional harassment and prosecution of parents. >> The home schoolers won some and lost some. As time went on, the authorities >> came to accept home schoolers so that at this point, legal problems are >> rare. Compulsory education has been effectively repealed by the actions of >> refusenicks in both the subject population and the enforcement population. > Their children are still getting educated. Not thoroughly enough in >some cases, but educated in the basics. It has always seemed somewhat amusing that we will have a) a widespread opinion that homeschooling is of lesser value and b) numerous studies, surveys, testimonials, reports, etc, that show what a rotten job public education is doing*. This raises the question of how anyone even remotely concerned with their children's welfare could do worse. . . Yet another unexplained mass insanity. * - I can add to the testimonial side of things here. I'm one of those rare teenagers who went straight to the professional workplace (bypassing college), but it's in spite of the best effort of our educational system, especially the so-called GATE programs (Gifted & Talented Education - more like stultification from my experience in 3 widely separate districts) or honors classes. They're real big on the "touchy-feely" but actual academic performance lags. My physics teacher was actually expected to teach AP level physics to a bunch of students who hadn't even had Algebra 2. (I never took Calculus, but that didn't prevent me from understanding a derivative or integral) I won't even rant about the English classes where a 400 page book (about 1.5 hours for me) is a semester's reading... # Chris Adams <adamsc(a)io-online.com> | http://www.io-online.com/adamsc/adamsc.htp # cadams(a)acucobol.com | V.M. (619)515-4894 "I have never been able to figure out why anyone would want to play games on a computer in any case when the whole system is a game. Word processing, spreadsheets, telecoms -- it's all a game. And they pay you to play it." -- Duncan Frissell

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RE: Risk v. Charity (was: RE: Workers Paradise. /Political.
by jbugden＠smtplink.alis.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Duncan Frissell <frissell(a)panix.com> wrote: >Canada has the world's second most expensive system (after ours) and I > think is a bit closer to 80% of our per cap expenditures. [...] >Canadian costs have risen at approx the same rate as ours. Thanks for the figures and historical background. I'll keep trying to verify the figures I cited, but I see no reason to disagree with you. > Interestingly, even though government expenditures here are 60% of the > total, per cap government expenditures on health care are higher here > than in the UK under the Nattie Health. This is a surprise. I guess it would also be an example. >Course Canada lost it when smuggling defeated the high tax levels on >cigarettes. This will be more of a problem in the future as more efficient >markets enable more smuggling. At present, provinces west of Ontario have not dropped taxes, while Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick dropped them significantly (+50%). The drop had a predictably negative effect on the smuggling, although due to the rapid increase in smoking rates among adolescents pressure is mounting to increase the taxes again. Most systems have undesired side-effects (e.g. remailers and spam). But if you can keep second order effects from becoming first order, you're heading in the desired direction. Ciao, James

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Re: GAK, GAP, GAY
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:52 AM 9/18/96 -0700, Timothy C. May wrote: >On a related note, I read an article yesterday about the proposed new >Health Data Base, with all encounters with any medical institution or any >health care provider of any sort being cross-linked and cross-referenced. Which is why some of us lie when we buy private insurance or seek treatment. If you "go bare" of course and use different identifiers whenever you seek treatment there are no problems. Hospitals have to treat people anyway under Hill-Burton Act rules and since they have accepted oligopoly status and have conspired with the Feds to do all sorts of nasty privacy invasions, I don't see many libertarian problems in taking them up on their offer of free care. Private health insurance in Mexico and the UK is also cheap (by US standards). If Canada legalizes private insurance, it will be cheaper too. >And such data bases will be tied to True Names, of course, thus allowing >the "freezing out" of anyone who is not a True Name, who has fallen behind >in child support payments, who is late on his income taxes, and so on. No proposals yet along these lines although smokers might be denied care. >It doesn't matter if cash is still allowed if one cannot interact with any >health care person without a proper citizen-unit data base entry. They've >got you tracked even if you pay in gold dust. Claim to be a foreigner. >(Putting on my Duncan cap--not to be confused with dunce cap--I wonder what >will happen the first time someone dies because a hospital wouldn't treat >someone without a proper citizen-unit health care card?) So far it's just for reporting and not authorization purposes. >P.S. I fully understand that some doctors will treat patients for cash, >without reporting to The Authorities, just as some doctors will treat >gunshot wounds without the mandatory reporting of same to the police. This >does not mean such doctors will be easy to find. The System, if allowed to >win, will win. Particularly libertarian physicians. Also everyone goes to Mexico for (prescription) drugs these days. Maybe they will also seek treatment there or in Canada. >P.P.S. Many of the things we talk about on the list are being made >possible--the good and the bad--by computerization. Obviously. Burnham's >"Age of Privacy" (or maybe it was "The Age of Surveillance"--my copy is not >handy) made this point many years ago. We are taking the mechanization and >systematization procedures the Germans used so efficiently in the 1930s and >modernizing them, with every movement and every transactions tracked and >recorded in data bases. And yet, has anyone noticed any greater sense that we are orderly or in control. I think that we are more disordered than we have been in my lifetime at least. It obviously hasn't worked yet. DCF

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Re: Wealth Tax vs. Capital Gains Tax Reduction
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 5:27 PM 9/18/96, Jason Vagner wrote: >On Tue, 17 Sep 1996, Timothy C. May wrote: > >> >> I've been thinking a lot about the prospects of a "wealth tax," or "asset >> tax," in the U.S. With the stock market averages at record levels (and, >> hey, Intel has gone up $6 just so far today, to an unheard of $94.5 level), >> and with increasing fractions of people's overall net worth tied up in >> equities, bonds, houses, property, etc., it may be that the looters will >> take a more serious look at taxing people's overall wealth, e.g., the 5% of >> net worth per year that some countries have. > >Forgive me if this is a stupid question, but could this lead to >"engineering" the market at particularly times of the year to decrease the >"official" value of an entity's value and complicating the pricing of >equities? Would this become a viable means for those with less wealth to >capitalize on the momentary "dip" in prices? Certainly people would look for "loopholes" and mechanisms for reducing their officially-calculated wealth, were such a wealth tax to be implemented. For example, they might find ways to transfer their wealth to trusts, corporations, foundations, etc., and then "use" this wealth by hiring themselves as high-priced consultants, providing "company cars" and "company yachts." (Arguably this already happens, with such corporate perquisites considered part of the compensation package for many highly-paid executives.) As to whether there are schemes for reducing the valuation of equities only at certain times of the year, I can't think of any that would have a significant effect. Deals to sell stock at artificially low prices are frowned upon. As are "parking" schemes. --Tim May We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1,257,787-1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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official statement from Lexis-Nexis about P-Trak
by Jim Byrd 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This statement was issued today: -------- STATEMENT FROM LEXIS-NEXIS 9/18/96 Incorrect information is being distributed on Internet newsgroups regarding the data displayed in LEXIS-NEXIS' P-TRAK file. P-TRAK is like an electronic "white pages." The only information displayed is the name of the individual, current address and up to two previous addresses and telephone number. In some cases, the individual's maiden name may appear and as well as the month and year of birth. That is the ONLY information displayed in the P-TRAK file. Contrary to some messages that have been posted to some Internet discussion and news groups, the P-TRAK file DOES NOT contain any credit histories, bank account information, personal financial data, mother's maiden name or medical histories. This misinformation has been posted over and over again to various news groups. An example of a record appears below: Name: DOE, JOHN E Current Address: 1066 Anywhere Drive, Dayton, OH 95454 Previous Address: 106 Somewhere Drive, Dayton, OH 92454 Birthdate: 9/1965 Telephone Number: 555-1212 On File Since: 6/1/1994 The information displayed in the P-TRAK file is the type of information readily available from public information sources such as telephone directories (in print and CD-ROM format) and public records maintained by government agencies. LEXIS-NEXIS markets the P-TRAK file to the legal community for use by general legal practitioners, litigators and public attorneys, as well as law enforcement agencies and police departments. These professionals use the P-TRAK file to assist in locating litigants, witnesses, shareholders, debtors, heirs and beneficiaries. LEXIS-NEXIS is aware of the sensitivities regarding the potential misuse of information. Business competitors of LEXIS-NEXIS have for some time made Social Security numbers available to users of their services. In addition, Social Security Numbers and other information are available on the Internet from a number of sources. Despite this wide availability of Social Security numbers in the market place, LEXIS-NEXIS discontinued the display of Social Security numbers in the P-TRAK file as of June 11, 1996, eleven days after the product was introduced. Through its actions, LEXIS-NEXIS is balancing the privacy concerns of the public with the legitimate needs of legal, business and government professionals for access to accurate sources of publicly available information. By discontinuing the display of Social Security numbers in P-TRAK and only providing information that is already available to the public from other sources, LEXIS-NEXIS believes it has responsibly met the expressed concerns of the public. Individuals interested in having their names removed from the P-TRAK file can e-mail their full name and complete address to: p-trak(a)prod.lexis-nexis.com or mail this information to ATTN: P-TRAK, P. O. Box 933, Dayton, OH 45401.

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Re: Informal Renegotiation of the Law
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 09:36 PM 9/17/96 -0800, Adamsc wrote: >It has always seemed somewhat amusing that we will have a) a widespread opinion >that homeschooling is of lesser value and b) numerous studies, surveys, >testimonials, reports, etc, that show what a rotten job public education is >doing*. This raises the question of how anyone even remotely concerned with >their children's welfare could do worse. . . Yet another unexplained mass >insanity. 'Gubmint Skools one of the most common forms of child abuse in America today. Luckily, the same contradictions in the Stalinist methods of production that brought the old SU to its knees are working their wonders on Education as well. Expect it to die from the top as tertiary education is seduced away by the cash derived from selling its wares over the Net. Then with the Web easing Primary and Secondary education at home and the schools worsening, more people will opt out. They will be further encouraged as the schools become the nexus for ever tighter regulation of family and personal life. After all, teachers, nurses, and social workers, work on and with their "charges" to uncover, child abusers, illegal aliens, substance abusers and who knows what all among the parents. The schools also keep loads of records on their "customers." Those who have never turned their kids over to the government for brain massage, find that they have many fewer run ins with the authorities. They also find that their kids are more likely to be able to infer, imply, and know the difference between the two. DCF

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monkey-wrenching GAK
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is along the lines of a technical monkey-wrenching of GAK: 1) The state of email encryption If the NSA decides they would like to get a decrypt of an email that you sent, they turn up with a copy of the encrypted email and request that you decrypt it. The reason that this is so bad is that you have effectively secret shared your plaintext between the NSA (who has archived all of your encrypted email), and yourself who still has they key. This is not in your interests. 2) Mandatory GAK In a future with mandatory GAK, the NSA has all your keys already, because they have a nice database of them, and so they can decrypt any thing they feel like. 3) Monkey-wrenching Even with GAK, where you are forced to give the government the keys, you can do much to make the job of administering GAK very expensive. You start by ensuring that the government can not get your encrypted data (the other half of the secret share), so that the key is of no use :-) You can do this by using a forward secret protocol such as Diffie-Hellman to exchange data, then you can't provide the encrypted text to the NSA even if you want to. But won't they make forward secret protocols illegal at the same time as enforcing GAK? Well, maybe they've left it too late already, consider: IP security layers in general - they provides an extra layer of encryption that the NSA has to obtain the keys for to make sense of their tap. They may have to archive impossible amounts of IP traffic if they can't recognize the type of IP traffic through the IP level encryption (www traffic has its uses as cover traffic :-) IP security layers which use Diffie-Hellman: forward secrecy means that the site owners can't decrypt old IP traffic even if they want to. When using an IP security layer, email delivered via SMTP will be transparently sent over an encrypted link with a random symmetric encryption key negotiated with DH. So the NSA can't get your encrypted email so the fact that they have the decryption key doesn't help them. Even if the NSA had access to the signatory keys used to authenticate DH key negotiation, this means that they still have to do an active MITM attack on the link. This is not something they can do after the fact. Bang goes the ability to archive it all and present it to people afterwards for decryption. Also the expense and complexity of fishing expeditions become impractical. To do a successful MITM attack, the NSA must also subvert the authentication key infrastructure, and hope that no one uses a subliminal, or out-of-band channel to verify the authentication. The above arguments, depending on how quickly things like John Gilmore's S/WAN are deployed, will quickly reduce the Governments options to: attempting to revoke de facto international standard internet protocols after the fact requesting the authentication keys used to sign DH negotiations, so that they can do MITM attacks, and get an IP packet modification infrastructure built (something significantly harder, and more expensive than the digital telephony bill which is still floundering at an estimated $4Bn) So, to monkey wrench GAK, be an early adopter of IP link level security, make sure that everybody is using link level security with forward secrecy, long before Clipper IV gets forced into use as a voluntary, or possibly later mandatory scheme. Adam -- #!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj $/=unpack('H*',$_);$_=`echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[lN*1 lK[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/)

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