December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Choosing to not become a member of the collective society/mindset the government has put in place will soon become illegal. Money laundering is illegal for a very simple reason everything is becoming illegal: Control. Money laundering prevents the government to "control" your money. When they could not take your money in the interest of national/public/child safety for such wasteful ventures like the perpetual war on drugs ,and when you thought for yourself and realized how wasteful it all was and that you would not willing give your money the government made it illegal to hide your money. Then they came up with asset forfeiture laws to legally take your vaporware, commonly referred to as 'money'.

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Re: Book Review - Coordinating the Internet
by damaged justice 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- forwarded message -- >From: danny(a)staff.cs.su.oz.au (Danny Yee) Newsgroups: aus.books,usyd.net,rec.arts.books,alt.books.reviews,rec.arts.books.reviews,alt.culture.internet,misc.books.technical,alt.books.technical,aus.computers,aus.org.efa,comp.org.eff.talk,talk.politics.misc Subject: Book Review - Coordinating the Internet Followup-To: alt.culture.internet,talk.politics.misc Date: 12 Dec 1997 11:37:48 GMT Organization: Basser Dept of Computer Science, Uni of Sydney, Australia Lines: 103 Approved: danny(a)cs.usyd.edu.au Message-ID: <66r7mc$3kk$1(a)crux.cs.su.oz.au> NNTP-Posting-Host: staff.cs.su.oz.au X-Server-Date: 12 Dec 1997 11:37:48 GMT http://www.anatomy.su.oz.au/danny/book-reviews/h/Coordinating_Internet.html title: Coordinating the Internet edited: Brian Kahin + James H. Keller publisher: The MIT Press 1997 other: 491 pages, references, index The superstructural politics and economics of the Internet (such issues as censorship and taxation) have long held centre stage. Increasingly, however, the politics and economics of the low level operation of the Internet have emerged from the shadows. It is these -- the governance and pricing of routing, addressing, and naming services -- which are the subject of _Coordinating the Internet_. The first four essays consider general issues in Internet governance. Gillet and Kapor explain how 99% of the Internet operates without centralised control and suggest that coordination of domain name assignment and IP address allocation will eventually look "a lot more like coordination of the rest of the Internet". Gould provides a UK perspective, suggesting the evolution of English constitutional law and the supranational powers of the European Union as possible models for the Internet. Johnson and Post argue for decentralised governance, highlighting serious problems with alternatives such as extending national sovereignty, international treaties, or governance by international organisations. Rutkowski is less enthusiastic, claiming that "the notion of Internet self-governance is in fact an illusion arising from the relative unfamiliarity of many people associated with the Internet with either its history or the surrounding legal and regulatory constructs in which it exists". The domain name system is probably the most visible area of contention at the moment; it is the subject of seven of the papers in _Coordinating the Internet_. Five of them take different positions on the legal arguments over its interaction with trademark law and the political arguments over which organisations should be involved in its administration: the United Nations, the United States Federal government, InterNIC, and the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority just some of the contenders. Taking a step back, Andeen and King compare the DNS with telephony addressing in World Zone 1 (the North American Numbering Plan) and Mitchell, Bradner and Claffy argue that the obsession with the DNS is a red herring, that issues of Internet governance and sustainability are far broader. Moving on to less prominent but probably more fundamental issues, Rekhter, Resnick and Bellovin write about the need to provide financial incentives for route aggregation and efficient use of the address space, and suggest a framework for property rights and contracts that will achieve this. And Hoffman and Claffy evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of metro-based addressing (based on geography rather than provider). There are five papers on interconnection and settlement systems and agreements between service providers. Bailey and McKnight survey the variety of interconnection agreements and argue for the introduction of usage-sensitive pricing in conjunction with integrated services with guaranteed quality of service. Cawley, in contrast, extols "the virtues (and appropriateness) of capacity-based pricing and flat-rate tariffs", but suggests that many kinds of pricing models can coexist and that "interconnection and settlement are best left to market forces". Chinoy and Salo review what the transition from the NSFnet to commercial backbones teaches us about oversight and scaling issues. Farnon and Huddle use theoretical efficiency modelling to argue that the present "sender keeps all" settlement system is flawed. And Mueller, Hui and Cheng recount the history of the Hong Kong Internet Exchange. The final two papers deal with quality of service evaluation, with performance monitoring and statistics. Almes presents an overview of the IETF IP Provider Metrics effort, while Monk and Claffy suggest ways of overcoming practical obstacles -- political and economic as well as technological -- to adequate data acquisition. _Coordinating the Internet_ is moderately technical (though it avoids plumbing the complexities of protocols such as BGP) and on some issues its presentation of so many different viewpoints may be more confusing than clarifying. But it is an accessible and informative collection -- and an important and timely one, given the increasing urgency of some of the issues it debates. -- Disclaimer: I requested and received a review copy of _Coordinating the Internet_ from The MIT Press, but I have no stake, financial or otherwise, in its success. -- %T Coordinating the Internet %E Brian Kahin %E James H. Keller %I The MIT Press %C Cambridge, Massachusetts %D 1997 %O paperback, references, index %G ISBN 0-262-61136-8 %P xviii,491pp %U http://mitpress.mit.edu/book-home.tcl?isbn=0262611368 %K Internet, politics, economics, law 12 December 1997 --------------------------------------------------- Copyright (c) 1997 Danny Yee (danny(a)cs.usyd.edu.au) http://www.anatomy.usyd.edu.au/danny/book-reviews/ --------------------------------------------------- -- end of forwarded message --

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Only criminals don't support concealed-carry laws
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Fri, 12 Dec 1997 08:18:04 -0800 To: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> From: Somebody Subject: Only criminals don't support concealed-carry laws >.> > =============================================== > NEWS FROM THE LIBERTARIAN PARTY > 2600 Virginia Avenue, NW, Suite 100 > Washington DC 20037 > =============================================== > For release: December 9, 1997 > =============================================== > For additional information: > George Getz, Deputy Director of Communications > Phone: (202) 333-0008 Ext. 222 > E-Mail: 76214.3676(a)CompuServe.com > =============================================== > > > The evidence is clear: Only criminals don't > support concealed-carry laws, say Libertarians > > WASHINGTON, DC -- If you want to reduce crime, allow more > people to carry more concealed guns, the Libertarian Party said today. > > And that opinion is confirmed by a new Cato Institute study, > which found that violent crime rates dropped dramatically in the 24 > states that have passed "concealed-carry" laws -- which allow ordinary > citizens to carry concealed weapons. > > "At this point, the only people who don't support > concealed-carry laws are criminals," said Steve Dasbach, the party's > national chairman. > > In those 24 states, concealed-carry laws force local police to > grant most citizens a concealed weapon permit after meeting certain > qualifications. Usually, that includes getting fingerprinted, passing a > criminal background check, and taking a gun safety course. > > "For years, gun-control advocates claimed that laws allowing > concealed weapons would lead to murder and mayhem," said Steve Dasbach, > chairman of the Libertarian Party. "But the exact opposite is true: > Concealed weapons actually save lives." > > The Cato Institute study, timed to coincide with the 10-year > anniversary of Florida's controversial concealed-carry law, found that > in the 24 states with concealed-carry laws, murders dropped by 7.7%, > rapes fell by 5.2%, robberies decreased by 2.2%, and aggravated > assaults were reduced by 7%. > > And in states where politicians continue to outlaw concealed > weapons? > > "There's blood in the streets," Dasbach said. "After accounting > for all other factors, the study calculated that in 1992 alone, 1,414 > more people were murdered than would have been if concealed-carry laws > were in effect." > > And the carnage doesn't end there: An additional 4,177 people > were raped, 11,898 more were robbed, and 60,363 more assaulted solely > as a result of the increased criminal activity that apparently comes > with concealed weapons bans, the study said. > > "But who is surprised that violent street thugs prefer to prey > on people who can't shoot back?" Dasbach asked. "By refusing to approve > concealed-carry laws, politicians in other states have painted a target > on the back of America's most vulnerable citizens." > > The study also shoots a hole in two other gun-control myths, > Dasbach said. One is that concealed-carry laws will resurrect the "Wild > West," turning ordinary Americans into trigger-happy gunslingers. > > "The study found that the number of concealed-carry > permit-holders convicted of murder committed in public is exactly zero, > and less serious crimes are extremely rare," he said. For example, only > one in 5,000 Floridians have had their permits revoked for crimes > involving a firearm. > > The other myth: That accidental shootings will become > commonplace. > > "The number of accidental deaths increased so slightly (less > than half of 1%) that implementing concealed-carry laws in every > remaining state would result in less than one additional death per year > - -- far less than the number of lives saved because of the reduced > murder rate," said Dasbach. > > "In other words, the real danger comes not from concealed > weapons, but from the lack of them," he said. > > Dasbach emphasized that although concealed-carry laws are a > major step in the right direction, they're not the perfect solution for > Libertarians. > > "Right-to-carry laws are only a partial victory because > Americans shouldn't have to seek government permission to exercise any > Constitutional right. Imagine what would happen if politicians dared to > require every journalist to pass a writing test to get a permit to > cover city hall, or tried to force ministers to demonstrate a basic > knowledge of religion before giving a sermon," he said. > > But requiring a permit is better than the alternative, he said: > Sentencing innocent people to death because they can't legally defend > themselves. > > "Denying terrified Americans the right to carry a gun is like > putting them at the front of the line on Death Row," he said. "At they > very least, politicians should have the decency to stop disarming > America's most vulnerable citizens: Crime victims." > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: 2.6.2 > > iQCVAwUBNI4ttdCSe1KnQG7RAQGH+wP9E9V7Qz84YFPtuo/ccCLGoYfU5C11G7dD > lr9oHNdd+JtkaBhoDB+NmDpO3lccNueq5Cl4ZxO8uJ67LjeMU4gvFhev8eMUr3Rs > Cj2zuWTEa94Xnl4gR3BBKnlykyIIc5WCpN9ftsmA3zB4bP4rpVNfJgcKPW2BQs+U > dMEaQprF4V8= > =GkYU > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > The Libertarian Party http://www.lp.org/ > 2600 Virginia Ave. NW, Suite 100 voice: 202-333-0008 > Washington DC 20037 fax: 202-333-0072 > __________________________________________________________________________ <somebody's.sig> --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http://www.fc98.ai/>

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Re: Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Sam" <sam-001(a)dpinc.ml.org> wrote: > > Three examples: Speculation about Wotan and MailMasher, Speculation about > > DataBasix and one of many posts from the anon asshole complaining that ^^^^^^^^^^^^ > > > > Here are selected paragraps from each. The full messages follow: > > [snip] > > I'd rather look at full messages. Good idea. Notice Gary's usage of ad hominem argumention to avoid the issues on the faulty premise that if you hate the messenger then you can safely ignore the message. To Gary Burnore, his constant use of the perjorative "anonymous asshole" is apparently intended in the same manner as "heretic" was in the Middle Ages or "witch" was in 17th century New England. > This is something about warez and remailer, and Burchell discussing the > possible identity of whoever was behind whatever was discussed here. > Nothing is said regarding the issue here of forging databasix addresses > through the remailer, who was doing it, and why. > > I happen to recall that this was what this thread is supposed to be about. The original premise was that since the Mailmasher pseudonym server was allegedly allowing forgeries, it should be shut down. McClatchie's problem was that he mistook Mailmasher for a remailer and sought to prove that it allowed forgeries through the pasting of From: headers when, in fact, Mailmasher never had this capability. (Some of the remailers formerly did, but that was corrected long before the June incident with Gary Burnore, Belinda Bryan, and Jeff Burchell.) The "evidence" that was posted back then in an attempt to implicate Mailmasher in forgery consisted of usenet posts with truncated Path headers which stopped at the mail-to-news gateway from which they were posted. And none of the messages was more recent than 2/97. Mailmasher was a predecessor to Hotmail and the other web-based e-mail providers. The difference was that Mailmasher didn't require you to identify yourself to establish an account, but you could choose a pseudonym and use that instead. It never had any capabilities to specify a From: address. This the forged messages apparently not only had forged "From:" lines, but a forged "Message-ID:" as well, to make it look as if it came from Mailmasher. The forger, however, apparently chose the wrong site to implicate. If you'll reread Jeff's post (the one in the URL that I previously posted), you'll get a little insight into Gary's actions and apparent motives for his later attacks on Jeff's other server, the Huge Cajones Remailer. Let me quote a short excerpt: -> I still don't know what the hell is going on with DataBasix, Wells Fargo -> and Gary Burnore, but I suspect that someone used huge.cajones to say -> something extremely unflattering about Burnore (from what I can tell, -> he had it coming). Burnore then decided that he would make things -> difficult for me. First, he wanted the user who had posted something -> "inflammatory" about him revealed. When I told him that I couldn't -> do that, he carried on about mail logs and identifying the host that -> a message came from (the usual). I didn't explain to him that my -> machine keeps logs, but not anything involving a *(a)cajones.com -> address. He then requested the logs, which I denied (and told him -> to get his lawyer to send a request...) The issue was an "unflattering post", not any sort of forgery or other abuse. The so-called "spam bait" only "conveniently" appeared later when DataBasix was in need of more ammo to use to get the remailer shut down: -> Between the time he first contacted me, and the time I received the -> letter from Belinda Bryan, is when the baiting of databasix addresses -> began (slowly, with just a few posts). Now how would a third party, who was not privy to Gary and Belinda's private dealings with Jeff be able to exploit that timing by initiating the spam baiting at just the "right" time? It was almost as if the abuse appeared right on cue, just in time to bolster the case of DataBasix vs. Huge Cajones. And notice that from Jeff's chronology, the demand by Gary Burnore and Belinda Bryan for Jeff Burchell to turn over his logs to them came BEFORE this alleged "spam baiting" and was based on the unflattering CONTENT of a post, not on any alleged "forgery". None of this can be called speculation. It's a factual, historical account of DataBasix' dealings with Jeff Burchell. Plain and simple, Gary's demand for Jeff's logs was a blatant attempt at censorship through intimidation. IOW, the clear implication was "if you dare to criticize me, I'll hunt you down and you'll be sorry". > Earlier, Anonymous wrote: ``Contrary to your accusations, not all of > Jeff's post was "speculation".'' You took issue with that, in the context > of your disputed attempt to obtain the remailer's logs. > > Well, in this very sizeable post, speculations do, indeed, comprise only a > portion of it. The rest is a detailed narrative of the communications > between the players involved so no, it was not all just a speculation. > > Furthermore, you are disputing the fact that you wanted to obtain the > remailer's logs. I fail to see what facts you have posted which dispute > Jeff Burchell's version of the story. I cannot find the portion that > supposedly supports your claim that you did not seek to violate the > anonymity of the remailer. Burchell accomodated your demands, and put in > place measures that would prevent the alleged abuse from taking place. > Yet, you still demanded the logs. That's precisely my point. And now he refuses to disclose his motives for that demand or what he intended to do with the names and addresses contained in those logs. Every time he's asked the question of why he attempted to violate the privacy of hundreds or perhaps thousands of remailer users, it elicits another tantrum that goes, "Lies! Prove it! Why are you harassing me? What are your demands?" > > Note: I have several more posts like these, if you're interested. > > This one is a fine example of someone (the anonymous asshole, no doubt) > > whining about the "content based censorship" > > because he couldn't spambait us anymore. > > [snip] > > That's fine, but I do not see why this is relevant. It's not relevant. His usage of "anonymous asshole" is apparently generic for anyone who dares to challenge him and who posts anonymously, and is an obvious attempt to demonize all such individuals to divert attention from his own tactics. The whole "spam bait" issue is obviously a smoke screen, since the alleged spam-bait came AFTER the demand for Jeff's logs.

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Re: Whoever thinks the "word" is censored, post the 'word' fool
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore+NOspam(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > :My only guess is that the posting person thinks that Replay censors more > :than one word, and that giveing the word away would tell Replay which > :filter to lift. If I had found something like that, I'd pass the info > :around privately to a bunch of friends first, and make sure that I was not > :the only one expereienceing the prob. > > Some have asked him to email it privately as well, seems he's not done that > either. I'm curious -- how would you know whether he's done so or not? I don't recall you making that invitation to him. Do you even accept incoming e-mail from remailers? > :Or, he could just be trolling. :) > > Doubt it. It really sounds like he believes the word is being censored. Maybe it's time for Alex to join this thread and either say "no, we don't filter on any words at the Replay remailer", or else "yes, here's a list of the words we consider to be objectionable, so please omit them from your posts through the Replay remailer". I'm half expecting that his posts aren't showing up either because he's screwed something up in the message to the remailer (like misspelling the word "Newsgroups" in the header, for example), because the posting gateway is flaky, or because some Net Nazi has taken it upon himself to indiscriminately forge cancels to posts he doesn't like. But some definitive word, one way or the other, would go a long way towards clarifying this situation. I see no rational reason for covertly blocking posts based on content. *IF* he didn't want something posted, then an announcement that the Replay remailer rejects posts containing certain words or phrases would make life simpler for all concerned. And to whoever created the subject line for this message, I'm tempted to either post the word "fool", or say that it's a lousy "Mr. T" impression. :)

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free ACM publications
by VaX#n8 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks readers may be interested in the ACM digital library, which is open free to the public until the end of this year, at which it becomes a rather expensive members-only luxury. Many complete articles are available online in PDF format. Reviews and abstracts will remain free. A search for "encryption", "cryptanalysis" or "cryptography" in the title and abstract reveals some interesting papers. As usual, use but don't abuse; I don't want to regret telling everyone about this, particularly since I haven't started reading yet myself. Information wants to be free: http://www.acm.org/dl -- VaX#n8, Junglist

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Smartcard demo canceled
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I won't be able to make it to tomorrow's meeting. Therefore, my smart card demo has been canceled. Sorry about that, -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred

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CDT VTW "aces" launch "bold" new Net-firm, by Brock Meeks
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- http://www.msnbc.com/news/129054.asp Noted Net lobbyists form for-profit firm Two non-profit cyberspace advocates now look to market Internet strategies By Brock Meeks WASHINGTON -- This is a story of defection. Two well-known voices on cyberspace advocacy issues Jonah Seiger of the Center for Democracy and Technology and Shabbir Safdar of Voters Telecommunication Watch said Tuesday they're forming a company specializing in "Internet campaign strategies." Spin doctors for fun and profit. And along they way, they hope to help make the Internet safe for Democracy. [...] The move is a dramatic shift for the two. In four years they have been at the forefront of the most contentious issues in cyberspace. They've created and honed their Internet strategies in the bare-knuckle world of Washington politics with incessant digital lobbying. No more. "We aren't going to be walking around the halls of Congress lobbying on behalf of anybody," Seiger said. IS ANYBODY HERE? The move is bold, even brash. Seiger and Safdar are banking that the Internet is, first, a viable medium for "moving an issue" as they call it and, second, that companies or organizations are going to be willing to pony up money to mount an Internet campaign. On second thought, maybe this is simply blind faith. If this defection is born of blind faith in a nascent medium, then Seiger and Safdar are true disciples. Seizer's own currency inside the Center for Democracy and Technology has been on a steady rise; he routinely is quoted on cyberspace issues. Now he's chucked all that for a start-up that depends on a medium that hasn't yet proven it can sustain a commercially viable site. [...] Whether or not the sound bite plays at the bank and with a host of potential clients, is another matter altogether. If Mindshare is going to be successful, it'll have to have an ace up its digital sleeve. It doesn't. It has two: Seiger and Safdar. ###

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Could a Jim Bell do the same thing?
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From a news.com feature: Sometimes, Daufenbach notes, a freshly arrested child pornographer facing a long sentence will agree to let his email account "hum" (continue running), with Customs picking up the traffic. A year ago, Daufenbach assumed the identity behind one such account. A molester and child pornographer (Daufenbach declined to reveal the person's name) began emailing Daufenbach's undercover account and then switched to real-time online chat, one of the biggest challenges for any cyberinvestigator. "A lot of people don't like doing it," says the Customs agent. "You have to think on your feet." Molesters often talk graphically about the children they abuse--and expect the same from their confidants. "If you get nervous and flustered," notes Daufenbach, "you'll blow it."

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"24 hour cybercops"
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message From: "Henry Ayre" <henri(a)alaska.net> Subject: SNET: Re: [CTRL] Janet Reno Promises Net Cops 24/7 Date: Fri, 12 Dec 1997 09:59:23 -0900 - -> SearchNet's SNETNEWS Mailing List It has been said that it takes a thief to catch one. Ergo, it must take a murderer to catch one. In both cases Janet Reno fits right into this program described below. H. Ayre - ---------- > From: Das GOAT <DasGOAT(a)aol.com> > To: CTRL(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM > Subject: [CTRL] Janet Reno Promises Net Cops 24/7 > Date: Friday, December 12, 1997 2:54 AM > > HIGH TECH COPS TO PROWL THE NET 24 HRS A DAY > > by Marcia Stepanek, Examiner Washington Bureau > San Francisco Examiner, Dec 11, 1997 > > WASHINGTON -- Top law-enforcement officials from the world's industrial > powers have announced plans to field cyber-SWAT teams to help catch criminals > who use the Internet and other computer technology to commit crimes. > <snip> > At the heart of the pact is a plan in which law enforcement officers with > computer expertise will be available 24 hours a day to assist investigations > of Internet crimes ranging from child pornography to fraud and money > laundering. > In addition, the nations [including the US, under Janet Reno] agreed to > form special police units to track Internet crime and criminals. > They also agreed to review police staffing levels to ensure that law > enforcement is adequately equipped to detect, prevent and punish computer > crimes. > US Attorney General Janet Reno initiated the meeting on computer crime, > the first-ever international gathering of justice ministers from the so-called > G-8 nations, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, germany, France, > italy, Japan and Russia. > > To subsribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: > SUBSCIBE CTRL [to:] LISTSERV(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM > > To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email: > SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] LISTSERV(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM > > Om - -> Send "subscribe snetnews " to majordomo(a)world.std.com - -> Posted by: "Henry Ayre" <henri(a)alaska.net> ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Freeh on how his encryption statements must be okayed
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

HEARING OF THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SUBJECT: THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL ACT CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE DAN BURTON (R-IN) WITNESSES: LOUIS FREEH, DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; DONALD SMALTZ, THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL'S OFFICE 2154 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 10:05 A.M. EST [...] REP. STEVE HORN (R-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director, going back to the Franklin Roosevelt administration, each administration has had a policy on the clearance of testimony, the review of testimony by high-ranking officials before they come up to the Hill. Was your statement cleared by OMB and/or the White House? MR. FREEH: As far as I know it was not. I gave a copy to the attorney general. She gave me a copy of hers. But there was no editing or suggestions done. I don't know if OMB got it or not. Maybe I can find out. (Confers with staff.) REP. HORN: Is that the usual procedure? MR. FREEH: I'm told they did not get a copy. REP. HORN: Yeah. Is that - what is the usual procedure to review MR. FREEH: The usual procedure would be, if I'm talking about counterterrorism or encryption, which I won't talk about today, yeah, we send it up to OMB, they review it. Sometimes they have suggestions, sometimes they have objections. We discuss that. That was not done in this case. [...]

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ACLU and EPIC comments on Digital Telephony/wiretapping
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Excerpt: > Before rushing to embrace any proposals to enlarge > the capability of government surveillance of its > citizens, the ACLU and EPIC urge the Commission to > take note of words written nearly 70 years ago -- > that remain true even today. As Justice Louis > Brandeis so aptly stated in Olmstead v. United > States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928): > > The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the > telephone is far greater than that involved in > tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line > is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends > of the line is invaded, and all conversations > between them upon any subject, and although proper, > confidential, and privileged, may be overheard. > Moreover, the tapping of man's telephone line > involves the tapping of the telephone of every other > person whom he may call, or who may call him. As > a means of espionage, writs of assistance and > general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny > and oppression when compared with wiretapping. -Declan ----------- Before the Federal Communications Commission Washington, D.C. 20554 In the Matter of ) ) CC Docket No. 97-213 Communications Assistance for ) Law Enforcement Act ) Reply Comments of the American Civil Liberties Union, Electronic Privacy Information Center and Electronic Frontier Foundation Introduction The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") is a non-partisan organization of more than 250,000 members dedicated to preserving the freedoms embodied in the Bill of Rights. The Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") is a non-profit public interest research center that examines the civil liberties and privacy implications of new technologies. The Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF") is also a public interest organization devoted to protecting civil liberties in digital media. The ACLU, EPIC and EFF respectfully submit comments in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") on implementation of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA") to urge the Commission to exercise its conferred authority by extending the deadline for compliance with the Act to no earlier than October 24, 2000. Law enforcement has derailed the implementation process from the statute's inception, and neither the public, nor the telecommunications industry are in a position to comprehend the scope of the capacity and surveillance requirements sought by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). We believe that the impasse in the enactment process alone makes the implementation of CALEA impossible under the current statutory deadline of October, 1998. Moreover, we believe that because the most pertinent issues, the actual technical standards that may be adopted by industry, are not addressed in this NPRM, the Commission must extend the deadline for compliance to allow for the public scrutiny contemplated by CALEA. In short, we base our conclusions on the foregoing: I. To date, the FBI has not met its public capacity notice requirements under the Act which require law enforcement to quantify the actual and maximum capacity technical needs, including projections with the number of anticipated interceptions. Industry, the public and the Congress need an accurate assessment of the capacity requirements to provide meaningful oversight and to ensure that they do not exceed the statutory scope. No implementation of CALEA should proceed without compliance with this statutory requirement. II. Law enforcement was not permitted to dictate system design under CALEA, but has placed a choke hold on the process by repeatedly preventing the adoption of industry standards and creating a "wish list" of technically infeasible and costly requirements. In addition, it has become abundantly clear that the FBI is seeking unprecedented surveillance capabilities never envisioned by the Congress. Simply put they have consistently requested that industry provide numerous capabilities for surveillance that go far beyond the current court-authorized electronic surveillance under the provisions of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and CALEA. Thus, the Commission must engage in detailed review of this process by extending the compliance date. III. Congressional limitations on information subject to interception have been disregarded. CALEA required the strengthening of privacy protections so that carriers do not intercept or disclose any information they are not authorized to. The additional surveillance features sought by the FBI contravene the Congress' intention to maintain current levels of surveillance and not expand them. We also address some incorrect assumptions in the NPRM that would expand CALEA's application. We conclude that these issues preclude "reasonably achievable" implementation of the Act. Background on Surveillance and CALEA Today, the revolutionary development of electronic infrastructures, that make it possible to easily communicate in a variety of ways, also make possible new forms of government intrusion and surveillance. Additionally, the actual use of government surveillance has grown faster in recent years than ever before and in past 10 years, the number of interceptions per year has more than doubled. According to statistics released by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and the Department of Justice: the use of electronic surveillance for criminal and national security investigations increased substantially in 1996; court orders for electronic surveillance by state and federal agencies for criminal purposes also increased, from 1058 in 1995 to 1150 in 1996 (a nine percent increase); for the first time in eight years, a court denied a surveillance application; extensions of surveillance orders increased from 834 to 887. In all, interceptions were in effect for a total of 43,635 days in 1996. The report also shows that the vast majority of interceptions continued to occur in drug-related cases: 71.4 percent (821 total) for drug investigations; 9.9 percent (114) for gambling; 9.1 percent (105) for racketeering; 3.5 percent (41) for homicide and assault and a few each for bribery, kidnapping, larceny and theft, and loan sharking. No orders were issued for "arson, explosives, and weapons" investigations. Moreover, the according to the report, electronic surveillance continued to be relatively inefficient. Overall, 2.2 million conversations were captured in 1996. A total of 1.7 million intercepted conversations were deemed not "incriminating" by prosecutors. Each interception resulted in the capture of an average of 1,969 conversations. Prosecutors reported that on average, 422 (21.4 percent) of the conversations were "incriminating." Federal intercepts were particularly efficient, with only 15.6 percent of the intercepted conversations reported as "incriminating." Notwithstanding the increase in government surveillance, in 1994, responding to FBI pressure and allegations that new technology hampers the ability to conduct electronic interceptions, the Congress enacted CALEA. The law was enacted during the final days of the 103d Congress amidst fervent opposition from the ACLU, EPIC, EFF and other concerned organizations that believed that the FBI had not substantiated the need for extraordinary government surveillance capabilities. We adhere to those views even today. Furthermore, the dramatic rise in the number of interceptions conducted rebuts the government claim that new technologies frustrate wiretapping abilities. CALEA requires telephone carriers to ensure continued government interception capabilities despite changes in technologies by October, 1998. The legislative history of CALEA makes clear that the Act was intended "to balance three key policies: (1) to preserve a narrowly focused capability for law enforcement agencies to carry out properly authorized intercepts; (2) to protect privacy in the face of increasingly powerful and personally revealing technologies; and (3) to avoid impeding the development of new communications services and technologies." To maintain that balance, Congress established detailed guidelines on how industry standard setting organizations would accomplish the costly mandate of CALEA and imposed several obligations on law enforcement to facilitate the process as well. Section 107 of CALEA, in pertinent part, provides that an industry association or a standards-setting organization will set the technical standards; the Attorney General must consult with the standards-setting organizations, with representatives of users of telecommunications equipment, facilities, and services, and with State utility commissions, "to ensure the efficient and industry-wide implementation of the assistance capability requirements." Section 107 further provides that if technical requirements are not issued by industry standards-setting organization or if any person believes any standards issued are deficient, the Federal Communications Commission may establish such requirements or standards. The Commission has promulgated the current NPRM in response to an impasse in the implementation process and the failure of law enforcement to effectively cooperate and fulfill its statutory obligation in providing detailed notice of its technical capacity requirements so that industry can promulgate technical standards. Section 50 of the NPRM states that this proceeding is being undertaken irrespective of the actual industry standard requirements to determine whether it is "reasonably achievable" to enact CALEA within its compliance period. The NPRM section 50 specifically states: Because it is not clear whether requests for extension of time of the Section 103 compliance date will be forthcoming, we do not propose to promulgate specific rules regarding requests at this time. We propose to permit carriers to petition the Commission for an extension of time under Section 107, on the basis of the criteria specified in Section 109 to determine whether it is reasonably achievable for the petitioning carrier "with respect to any equipment, facility, or service installed or deployed after January 1, 1995" to comply with the assistance capability requirements of Section 103 within the compliance time period. We seek comment on that proposal. We also seek comment on what factors, other than those specified in Section 109 of CALEA, the Commission should consider in determining whether CALEA's assistance capability requirements are reasonably achievable within the compliance period. The NPRM, section 45, sets out several statutory factors that the Commission may consider in determining whether CALEA's capability requirements are reasonably achievable within the compliance period. The legislative history of CALEA makes clear that the factors provided by Congress were "designed to give the Commission direction so that the following goals are realized: (1) Costs to consumers are kept low, so that 'gold-plating' by the industry is kept in check; (2) the legitimate needs of law enforcement are met, but that law enforcement does not engage in gold-plating of its demands; (3) privacy interests of all Americans are protected; (4) the goal of encouraged competition in all forms of telecommunications is not undermined, and the fact of wiretap compliance is not used as either a sword or a shield in realization of that goal." Our comments address these and other factors in concluding that the FCC should extend the compliance deadlines as permitted by Congress. I. CALEA's Capacity Notice Requirements: Section 104 of CALEA directed the Attorney General to issue a notice of capacity requirement to industry not later than one year after the law's enactment. Hence the deadline for the notice was October 25, 1995. Carriers were provided with a deadline of three years after notification by the Attorney General to install capacity that meets the notification requirements. Under the timetable that Congress proposed, industry's deadline would have been October 1998. Specifically, section 104(a)(2) requires the Attorney General to identify capacity required at specific locations, and to base the notice on the type of equipment or service involved, or by the type of carrier. In addition, it requires the Attorney General to provide a numerical estimate of law enforcement's anticipated use of electronic surveillance for 1998. The statute also defines the maximum capacity as the largest number of intercepts that a particular switch or system must be capable of implementing simultaneously. The initial capacity relates to the number of intercepts the government will need to make on the date that is four years after enactment. By mandating the publication of numerical estimates of law enforcement surveillance activity, Congress intended CALEA's notice requirements to serve as "mechanisms that will allow for Congressional and public oversight. The bill requires the government to estimate its capacity needs and publish them in the Federal Register." Congress made it clear that "[t]he purpose behind the provision is... to ensure that carriers receive adequate and specific notice from the Attorney General about the needs of law enforcement...". a. The First FBI Notice In October, 1995, the FBI, operating under delegated authority by the Attorney General, issued a first proposed capacity notice. The Notice was criticized for; (1) failing to comply with the notification and public accountability provisions mandated in CALEA; and (2) failing to substantiate the proposed capacity requirements with adequate documentation. Ultimately, it was withdrawn by the Bureau for these reasons. The FBI's Federal Register notice failed to identify the "actual number of communications interceptions" that the Bureau estimates will be needed by the end of 1998. Instead, the capacity requirements were "presented as a percentage of the engineered capacity of the equipment, facilities, and services that provide a customer or subscriber with the ability to originate, terminate, or direct communications." 60 Fed. Reg. 53643. Furthermore, in EPIC's comments on the initial FBI notice, they stated: "[t]he Bureau's "percentage" approach to capacity requirements allows neither telecommunications carriers nor the public to 'know the required level of capacity.'" The percentages contained in the Federal Register notice (e.g., maximum capacity of one percent of "engineered capacity" for geographic areas falling within Category I) also engendered a great deal of public confusion concerning the Bureau's proposed requirements and their impact on the privacy of personal communications. The confusion became readily apparent after an article appearing on the front page of November 2, 1995, New York Times interpreted the Bureau's notice as requiring "the capacity to monitor simultaneously as many as one out of every 100 phone lines." Asked about the issue at a press briefing later that day, Deputy Attorney General Jamie S. Gorelick said "there appears to be some misunderstanding or miscommunication as to the implications of what is contained in [the Federal Register] notice." In a letter to House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde, Director Freeh asserted that, "We have not and are not asking for the ability to monitor one out of every 100 telephone lines or any other ridiculous number like that. ... Information supplied by the FBI was simply applied in a manner not intended to reach erroneous conclusions." b. The Second FBI Notice The FBI offered a revised NPRM in January, 1997, but has yet to publish rules as a result of the proceeding. The second NPRM was also rejected by industry and privacy groups alike for requiring greater capacity for interceptions by carriers than actually required today. The second FBI notice called for substantial increases in surveillance of both landline and wireless communications over the next ten years, with a total maximum capacity of 57,749 simultaneous intercepts to be conducted in the United States. Calculating out the percentages provided by the FBI, by 1998 the FBI anticipates an increase of 33 percent of landline interceptions and 70 percent of wireless phones. By 2004, the Bureau estimates a total increase of 74 percent in interceptions of landline phones and 277 percent in wireless phones. The second notice also implied that every carrier serving a particular region would have to install capacity sufficient to meet the total surveillance needs for that area, even if the carrier only served a portion of the customers in the area. Such a plan would not only be cost prohibitive, but would provide for unauthorized and unnecessary capabilities. Moreover, the second notice failed to make any distinction between the interception of call content and call-identifying information, even though this too was expressly required by Congress. From both constitutional law and privacy perspectives, this distinction is critical since the interception of call content is inherently more intrusive than the interception of call-identifying information. Any number of innocent individuals, conveying private information could be subject to unwarranted invasions by allowing call content information without court authorization. It is for this reason that CALEA limits the type of information that may be intercepted under pen register and trap and trace authority. c. Law Enforcement is Actually Seeking Enhanced Surveillance Capabilities It is now three years since the CALEA's enactment and to date the government has not promulgated final rules. The Bureau's refusal to provide the actual capacity requirements in its Federal Register notice denies any possibility of meaningful public oversight. Recently, the FBI has stated that it intends to promulgate a final notice January, 1998. Even if final regulations are promulgated at this late date, it will be impossible for industry to adopt technical standards accordingly under the current deadline of October 25, 1998. If the Congressional mandate for "public oversight" of the FBI's implementation of CALEA is to be realized, it is incumbent upon the Bureau to make available additional information concerning its proposed capacity requirements and then for the Commission to require sufficient time for public review. Underscoring this point, on October 23, 1997, several representatives from the telecommunications industry testified before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on the implementation of CALEA. The consensus of each of the industry speakers was that the Bureau's failure to provide rules in a timely fashion has prevented CALEA's implementation. Roy Neel, President and CEO of the United States Telephone Association stated, "[t]he FBI's delay in announcing its final capacity notice has been a significant obstacle for industry standard setting organizations. Throughout 1995 and early 1996, industry participants often postponed resolving certain issues pending the release of the capacity regulations and the equally anticipated Electronic Surveillance Interface." Furthermore, it has become clear that the actual requirements that the FBI seeks go well beyond that authorized under CALEA. As we discuss below, we believe that the standards and the petitions submitted by industry and CDT/EFF make clear that the FBI has asked for capabilities not provided for by CALEA. The expanded capabilities sought by the FBI, along with their non-compliance with CALEA's capacity notice requirements warrant a Commission order delaying implementation. Additionally, since this NPRM does not address the actual technical standards being considered for industry adoption, the Commission must extend the deadline for compliance pending public review. It is entirely possible that industry and the FBI may achieve a compromise on the standards, but even if industry is strong-armed by the FBI into complying with their requests, we intend to petition the FCC to engage in through review of the issues not included in this proceeding. II. Law Enforcement Has Prevented Industry Adoption of Authorized Standards By "Gold Plating" its Stated Needs Congress expressly denied law enforcement agencies the authority to dictate the design of telecommunications networks under CALEA by conferring this authority to industry associations. Industry has proposed several standards proposals which may be adopted in the near future. However, industry organizations have publicly acknowledged that law enforcement agencies have played an extensive role in the process and have thwarted the opportunity to adopt reasonable standards. Realizing that industry could not promulgate standards in light of the FBI resistance, on July 16, Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association petitioned the FCC to assume the authority over standards adoption. The petition indicates, the organizations were compelled to adopt FBI requests. More recently, in hearings on the implementation of CALEA before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, October 23, industry groups explained how the FBI has prevented adoption of reasonable standards. Many members of the Committee were critical of both the Act and the FBI. Rep. Bob Barr (R-GA), who chaired part of the hearing, bluntly stated that the legislation would not have passed in the Republican 104th or 105th Congresses. A major area of contention was the FBI's demand for added features not required by the 1994 law. These include an enhanced ability to track geographical locations of cell phones, the ability to monitor conference calls when the targeted party has left, and the ability to separate out content from signaling data of packet-based communications. The FBI's efforts to lobby against the industry designed standards during a vote on the specifications also came under fire. The Bureau organized a campaign to vote down the industry-developed standards, which was described in the hearing as "ballot stuffing." Twenty-eight police agencies filed the same 74-page ballot comments, including a sheriff in Florida who included the FBI's letter requesting that he file the comments. CTIA's Wheeler described the FBI's actions as "rolling a hand grenade under the table." Another controversial issue was the FBI's effort, during its negotiations with the Telecommunications Industry Association (TIA) over the wiretap standard, to petition the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) to revoke the standards-settings authority of TIA after 50 years. The FBI apparently withdrew the request after several months. Jay Kitchen, President of the Personal Communications Industry Association explained that the impasse in the CALEA process was due in large part to FBI interference. He stated: "Unfortunately, a breakdown of monumental proportions has occurred. As of today, final standards have not been set, in large measure due to the actions of law enforcement officials. Initially, the FBI waited almost one and one-half years after the enactment of CALEA to submit its recommendations to standards setting bodies. After the submission of this list, industry representatives and the FBI were able to reach consensus on standards that provided, by PCIA's estimates, 90 percent of the capabilities that the FBI had requested. Since then, however, the FBI has held up the entire standards setting process in order to ensure that every capability on its "wish list" is made part of the standards." Similarly, Matthew J. Flanagan, President of the Telecommunications Industry Association, stated that industry concessions to FBI demands have been rejected by law enforcement and they have been pressured to concede even more: "During these meetings, industry made several concessions to law enforcement, agreeing to include features in the standard that many in industry were convinced were not required under CALEA. For example, law enforcement requested that it be provided with continuous information about the location of an intercept subject's cellular phone, irrespective of whether the phone was being used or not. Industry refused to provide this feature, finding that it greatly exceeded what CALEA permitted. In a compromise, however, industry agreed to provide law enforcement with the location of a cell phone at the beginning and end of each call -- even though many industry participants felt that even this compromise exceeded the scope of CALEA." As a result of all of the concessions, the proposed industry standard goes well beyond a fair reading of CALEA and incorporates several of the additional features and capabilities requested by law enforcement prior to CALEA's passage but which were rejected by the Congress. III Congressional Limitations on Information Subject to Interception Have Been Disregarded Congress stated that CALEA was meant to preserve and not expand government surveillance capabilities. To guarantee that surveillance is not expanded, CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to protect user privacy and security of information they are not authorized to intercept. Section 103 of CALEA, Assistance Capability Requirements, specifically imposes four industry requirements to protect privacy while assisting with law enforcement interceptions. Carriers are required to ensure that their systems are capable of: (1) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to intercept, to the exclusion of any other communications, all wire and electronic communications carried by the carrier within a service area...; (2) expeditiously isolating and enabling the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, to access call-identifying information that is reasonably available to the carrier-- (A) before, during, or immediately after the transmission of a wire or electronic communication...; and (B) in a manner that allows it to be associated with the communication to which it pertains, except that, with regard to information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for pen registers and trap and trace devices (as defined in section 3127 of title 18, United States Code), such call-identifying information shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber (except to the extent that the location may be determined from the telephone number); (3) delivering intercepted communications and call-identifying information to the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authorization, in a format such that they may be transmitted by means of equipment, facilities, or services procured by the government to a location other than the premises of the carrier; and (4) facilitating authorized communications interceptions and access to call-identifying information unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with any subscriber's telecommunications service and in a manner that protects-- (A) the privacy and security of communications and call-identifying information not authorized to be intercepted; and (B) information regarding the government's interception of communications and access to call-identifying information. (emphasis added) This section makes clear that Congress specifically limited the type of information that could be permissibly provided by industry to the FBI under CALEA by distinguishing between call content and call identifying information. Thus, we disagree with assumptions made in the NPRM that broaden the scope of communications information that may be intercepted. Section 20 states: "We tentatively conclude that providers of exclusively information services, such as electronic mail providers and on-line services providers, are excluded from CALEA's requirements and are therefore not required to modify or design their systems to comply with CALEA....[W]e seek comment on the applicability of CALEA's requirements to information services provided by common carriers. We also note, however, that Congress anticipated that calling features such as call forwarding, call waiting, three-way calling, speed dialing, and the "call redirection portion of voice mail" would be subject to CALEA's requirements. We tentatively conclude that calling features associated with telephone service are classified as telecommunications services for the purposes of CALEA, and carriers offering these services are therefore required to make all necessary network modifications to comply with CALEA." (emphasis added) Congress explicitly rejected any application of CALEA to information services including electronic mail and on-line services recognizing that interception of those communications is the equivalent of "call content" and is therefore, subject to a much higher degree of protection under the Constitution. The NPRM, however, incorrectly assumes there is a distinction between carriers that exclusively provide information services and common carriers that provide information services. There is absolutely no basis for such a distinction under CALEA. Congress did not exclude such services based on the carrier offering the services, but on the nature of the services and a recognition that content of communications has always been accorded greater protections. Furthermore, the tentative conclusion that calling features associated with telephone services are subject to CALEA as "call identifying" information is incorrect. CALEA restricts recording or decoding of electronic impulses to dialing and signaling information that relates to call processing only. Congress explicitly rejected the inclusion of "other dialing tones that may be generated by the sender that are used to signal customer premises equipment of the recipient are not to be treated as call-identifying information." Thus, the addition of these features is an expansion of current surveillance abilities and not permitted. Not addressed in the NPRM are nearly a half-dozen other features that Bureau contends are "call identifying" features and thus subject to CALEA. As the Response Comments on the Petition for Rulemaking of the Center for Democracy and Technology and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, August 11, 1997, correctly point out, the FBI has sought the addition of the following features not considered by Congress: (1) packet switching information (2) wireless telephone call location information (3) packet data content delivery information (4) multi-party monitoring information (5) an expanded definition of call identifying information (6) pen register information (7) feature status messages Instead of addressing these threats to privacy, Section B of the NPRM frames the discussion of privacy protection in solely in terms of the type of record keeping procedures to be used by telecommunications carriers that conduct interceptions on behalf of law enforcement. However, Congress made clear that protecting the privacy of innocent individuals from surreptitious surveillance was of paramount importance and charged the Commission with the task of seeing to the necessary safeguards. The additional surveillance features sought by the FBI contravene Congress' intention that the law would maintain current levels of surveillance and not expand them. These issues must be addressed by the Commission before the implementation of CALEA can be accomplished and before record keeping and industry security procedures are determined. Conclusion Before rushing to embrace any proposals to enlarge the capability of government surveillance of its citizens, the ACLU and EPIC urge the Commission to take note of words written nearly 70 years ago -- that remain true even today. As Justice Louis Brandeis so aptly stated in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928): The evil incident to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater than that involved in tampering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded, and all conversations between them upon any subject, and although proper, confidential, and privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other person whom he may call, or who may call him. As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wiretapping. The expanded capabilities sought by the FBI, along with their non-compliance with CALEA's capacity notice requirements warrant serious Commission response. Congress envisioned the implementation process as an open process to ensure that law enforcement did not surreptitiously gain unprecedented surveillance capabilities. Thus, before the adoption of industry standards, there must be careful scrutinization of law enforcement's capability requirements. We believe the only way to accomplish this task is for the Commission to extend the compliance deadline to October 24, 2000 under the authority provided by the Congress. Respectfully Submitted, Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director A. Cassidy Sehgal, William J. Brennan Fellow American Civil Liberties Union 125 Broad Street, 18th Floor New York, N.Y. 10004 (212) 549-2500 Electronic Privacy Information Center 666 Pennsylvania Ave., SE, Suite 301 Washington, D.C. 20003 (202) 544-9240 Electronic Frontier Foundation 1550 Bryant Street, Suite 725 San Francisco CA 94103-4832 USA (415) 436-9333

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hashcash spam prevention & firewalls
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I am looking at writing some hashcash (http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/hashcash/) based spam prevention software. The motivation for writing spam prevention software is that spam is better combatted with technical methods than legal or political (we do not want clueless politicians coming in ham-fisted and requiring "Internet Drivers Licenses" or anti-spam legislation or anything else, such actions will be hazardous for the future of remailers, in my opinion). (Hashcash is a way of proving that the sender has consumed a tunable amount of CPU time. The verification process consumes negligible CPU time. This allows us to require the would be spammer to spend say 20 seconds per mail, which will slow him down considerably, over his current tactics of 1000 long Bcc lists allowing him to hand off spamming tasks to mail servers.) So what we want is a filter to bounce messages without the required hashcash postage, we ideally want this to happen at the ISP or organisational SMTP server end, rather than at the recipients end, because a) it is simpler for 1 service provider to install software than 100,000 neophytes, and b) it reduces bandwidth consumption on dial up users pay per second lines as the spam is killed before they see it. The Right Way to do it perhaps is as an SMTP extension, however I consider this impractical in the short term because as far as I know there is no SMTP extension plug-in mechanism (other than access to the source code, and lots of development time) and because there are a large number of mail servers in use, and it will be expensive in developer (that's me) time to provide patches for them all (exarcebated by the fact that in many cases source will not be available). So these problems leave us scratching around for other more generic approaches. One method is to create a proxy which receives mail on port 25 (as the SMTP server normally does) filters examining for correct hashcash postage, and bounces if the postage is missing, and forwards the mail on to the real SMTP server if the hashcash postage is valid. The real SMTP server would then be set to run on another port... say port 26 which is reserved, and have the mail forwarded to it at that port. (You would want to disable non-local access to port 26 either at firewall or with SMTP server configuration if that is possible). Alternatively run the real SMTP server on another machine inside the local network. A few problems with this approach, firstly it may not be possible to configure some SMTP server software to run at ports other than 25. (I know you can do it with sendmail: OOPort=26 does it.) (If this is not possible with a given SMTP server you can still run a proxy by running the real SMTP server on another machine inside the network). Secondly the proxy approach prevents some of the SMTP server functions from operating properly because the process on the other end of the socket is our hashcash proxy on localhost rather than the remote mail hub (modern sendmails can be configured to perform reverse name lookups on IP addresses, call ident (ident sucks anyway IMO), or block based on IP address or domain, etc.) Is this kind of thing likely to be a big problem? Another approach is to try to hook in a hashcash SMTP proxy filter at the firewall. I am not that familiar with firewalls. Anyone have thoughts on the sorts of filtering you could install at the firewall level, and how portable this would be based on installed base of types of firewall? (ie It is not interesting if you can do nifty proxy functions with foobar firewall software if it is used by <1% of sites, and the function is impossible with other firewall software). The required filter functionality is something like this in order of desirability: Accept the SMTP session. Use an EHLO extension HASHCASH to say that this server expects hashcash. (Extended HELO is a method of specifying SMTP extensions (I think)). Accept the headers, and if a valid hashcash postage is not included, hand off to the real mailserver a site configurable bounce message. If the postage is valid, replay the headers to the real SMTP server (with IP masquerading so that the IP address appears to be coming from the originator, so that the SMTP server will not get upset about reverse DNS look up mismatches etc). Then act as a dumb proxy for the rest of the connection passing data through to the normal hashcash server. This still leaves open the question of the user generating their own hashcash postage. Again this could be problematic for neophytes. One solution is to include a URL for a web page including a javascript hashcash generator -- this means that no new software must be installed, the user cut and pastes the generated hashcash into their message. However things would be a whole lot simpler short term if the mail originators ISP created the hashcash for him at the ISPs SMTP hub where the user hands off his mail for further delivery. The main problem with this is that the SMTP mail hub would be overloaded by the CPU intensive task of generating hashcash. There are a few techniques to reduce the overhead of preventing spam with hashcash. One is to require valid hashcash only on the first message to a given address. (Spammers being hit and run types, and even having to generate hashcash for each spamee once would be expensive for a spam list of 10 million unwilling spam recipients). Better, is to require valid hashcash on all mail, _until_ the recipient replies to a mail. This is good because people rarely reply to spammers. Ordinary users who chit-chat backwards and forwards in mail generate little added overhead for the hand off SMTP server -- the only overhead being to generate say 5 seconds CPU worth of hashcash for each new recipient the user sends to. Then you add some hashcash accounting so that users who overspend (consuming more than say 1 minutes CPU consumption on the server in a 24 hour period have their email bounced with explanation of how to generate their own hashcash as a heavy user). Figures would need tuning to see how they worked out in practice, however it seems that it would be feasible to handle the whole operation entirely at the sending and receiving SMTP servers. Comments? Adam -- Now officially an EAR violation... Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/ print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

15 40

MEGA RESOURCE Makes MONEY
by freebizz＠simplyads.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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1 0

Re: Jim Bell's Sentencing?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

No news here about Jim Bell's scheduled sentencing today. Oddly, there have been no entries in the publically accessible electronic version of the court docket since October 24, including nothing about the November 21 delay in sentencing which we confirmed from another reporting service in Tacoma. Someone's going to check with the court clerk on Monday. Anyone in the NW see anything in the papers?

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Jim Bell Sentenced: AP Report
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From The Oregonian online: http://www.oregonlive.com/ Bell gets 11 months in prison, 3 years supervised release, fine The Associated Press 12/12/97 7:54 PM Eastern TACOMA (AP) -- A federal judge Friday imposed an 11-month sentence for tax violations on James Dalton Bell, whose 10-part Internet essay, "Assassination Politics," proposed apparent "bounties" on government officials. Federal prosecutors say he was advocating bounties on public officials he considered "miscreants" and "slimeballs." Bell has said he was theorizing, not advocating any killing. The Vancouver, Wash., man pleaded guilty in July to trying to impede Internal Revenue Service agents and to using false Social Security numbers to hide his assets. After his prison term, U.S. District Judge Franklin Burgess ordered Bell to undergo three years of supervised release. He also was ordered to pay $1,359 in restitution for damage caused by a stink bomb he set off at the IRS's Vancouver office. Bell's essay was cited in the indictment as a means by which he sought to intimidate IRS agents, Assistant U.S. Attorney Annmarie Levins said. A news release from federal prosecutors says that as part of his plea agreement, Bell "admitted advocating a scheme called `Assassination Politics' whereby persons would be rewarded with `digital cash' through the Internet for killing undesirable people. "Bell identified government employees, particularly IRS employees, as such undesirable people, and argued that the threat of `Assassination Politics' would intimidate them from enforcing Internal Revenue laws for fear of being assassinated." He also admitted proposing "Assassination Politics" as an enforcement mechanism for the anti-government Oregon extremist group Multnomah County Common Law Court, which purports to try government officials for performance of their duties, the release said. Prosecutors and Bell's public defender sought a sentence of 6 to 12 months as part of a plea bargain. Federal probation officers recommended 27 months, citing the "totality" of Bell's behavior. Bell described "Assassination Politics" as a means for ordinary citizens to take action against public officials they perceived as having violated their rights. "What if they could go to their computers, type in the miscreant's name and select a dollar amount. The amount they, themselves, would be willing to pay to anyone who `predicts' that officeholder's death," he wrote. "That donation would be sent, encrypted and anonymously, to a central registry organization and be totaled, with the total amount available within seconds to any interested individual." He noted that if one person in 1,000 "was willing to pay $1 to see some government slimeball dead, that would be, in effect, a $250,000 bounty on his head." In an April raid on the home Bell shared with his elderly parents, authorities found the home addresses of about 70 IRS employees, as well as three semiautomatic assault rifes, a handgun and potentially deadly chemicals. He was arrested in May.

3 2

court2.txt
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. C 94-03542 CW Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY v. JUDGMENT WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND REQUESTING STEPHEN P. DUNIFER, FURTHER BRIEFING Defendant. By this action, the United States, on behalf of its agency, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendant Stephen P. Dunifer for operating a radio station, "Free Radio Berkeley," without a license in violation of 47 U.S.C.S 301 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. S 151 et seq. Several amici curiae have filed a brief supporting the FCC. Mr. Dunifer does not dispute that he is broadcasting without a license and that he has never applied for a license. Mr. Dunifer does not question the constitutionality ot the statute that requires broadcasters to obtain a license. Mr. Dunifer asserts, however, that relief should not be granted to the FCC because he cannot obtain a license to broadcast under the FCC'S regulations, which he claims are unconstitutional. The FCC regulations do not allow for the licensing of micro radio broadcasters, that is, radio broadcasters who, like Mr. Dunifer, use ten watts or less to power their signals.(1) Presently before the Court is the FCC'S motion for summary judgement which Mr. Dunifer and several amici curiae oppose. The matter was heard on April 12, 1996.Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties and oral argument on the motion, the Court DENIES the FCC's motion without prejudice and requests further briefing. LEGAL STANDARD Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; CelotexCorp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Eisenberg v. Insurance Co. of North America, 815 F.2d 1285, 1288- 89(9th Cir. 1987). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true the opposing party's evidence, if supported by atfidavits or other evidentiary material.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, --------------------------------------------------------------- Footnote (1) 47 C.F.R.S 73.512(c) states, in relevant part: Except in Alaska, no new Class D [micro radio station] applications nor major change applications by existing Class D stations are acceptable for filing except by existing class D stations seeking to change frequencies. ----------------------------------------------------------------- 47 C.F.R.S 73.506(b) provides, in relevant part: Any noncommercial educational station except Class D may be assigned to any of the channels listed in S 73.501. Section 73.501 lists channels available for assignment. 813 F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). DISCUSSION JURISDICTION The FCC challenges this court'sjurisdiction to entertain Mr. Dunifer's constitutional defenses to this action. The FCC invoked the jurisdictional grant of 47 U.S.C. S 401 (a) in filing the instant action. Section 401(a) provides that: The district courts of the United states shall have jurisdiction, upon application of the Attorney General at the request of the [Federal Communications] Commission, alleginq a failure to comply with or a violation of any of the provisions of this chapter by any person, to issue a writ or writs of mandamus commanding such person to comply with the provisions of this chapter. The court thus has jurisdiction to enjoin any violation by Mr. Dunifer of 47 U.S.C.S 3Ol, which, simply put, prohibits operating a radio station without a license. The FCC argues, however, that the jurisdictional grant of 47 U.S.C.S 401(a) is not broad enough to encompass Mr. Dunifer's constitutional defenses which challenge the regulations that make it impossible for a micro radio broadcaster to obtain a license. The FCC argues that any court challenge to the FCC's regulations regarding licensing must be brought either: (1) as an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia under 47 U.S.C.§ 402(b) (1) [2] of the FCC's denial of a request for a waiver of the regulation prohibiting low power stations to apply for a license; or (2) as an appeal to the court of appeals for any circuit of the FCC's denial of a petition for rule-making under 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) [3] and 28 U.S.C. § 2342[4]. In support or its position, the FCC principally relies on Sable Communications of Californiav. FCC, 827 F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1987). In Sable Communications, the plaintiff provider of sexually suggestive telephone services sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the FCC claiming that a statute and the FCC regulation implementing that statute violated its First Amendment rights.Id. at 641. Relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2342, the Ninth circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's challenge to the regulation, finding that the court or appeals had exclusive jurisdiction over claims regarding the -------------------------------------------------------------------- Footnotes [2] section 402(b) (1) provides: Appeals may be taken from decisions and orders of the Commission to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in any of the following cases: (1)By any applicant for a construction permit or station license, whose application is denied by the Commission. [3]Section 402 (a) provides: Any proceeding to enjoin, set aside. annul, or suspend any order of the commission under this chapter (except those appealable under subsection (b) of this section) shall be brought as providea by and in the manner prescribed in chapter l58 cf Title 28 [28 U.S.C. § 2342J] [4] section 2342(1) provides: The court of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of-- (1) all final orders of the Federal Communications Commission made reviewable by section 402 (a) of title 47. ------------------------------------------------------------------ constitutionality of regulations made reviewable by 47 U.S.C. S 402 (a). Id. at 642-43. The FCC also relies on Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995). In Moser, the FCC questioned the district court's jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's challenge to a statute on the ground that the plaintiff was actually challenging FCC regulations. Id. at 973. The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court had jurisdiction over the case because the plaintiff's challenge did not reach the regulations. Id. The Ninth circuit noted in dicta that a challenge to the regulations would have been outside the jurisdiction of the district court. Id. Both of these cases were brought by plaintiffs who arguably sought to challenge FCC regulations in a district court. Neither involved a situation like that here, in which a defendant seeks to defend himself against a claim brought against him by the FCC in a district court. [5] Mr. Dunifer argues that while 47 U.S.C. S 402 (a) establishes the general rule that FCC actions are to be reviewed in the court of appeals, 47 U.S.C. 5 401(a) trumps this statute by specifically providing that the district courts have jurisdiction over writ proceedings filed by the FCC. He argues that this section grants jurisdiction to the district court to consider any defenses to such proceedings as well. For support, Mr. Dunifer cites Dougan v. FCC, 21 F.3d 1488 (9th cir. 1994). ---------------------------------------------------------------- Footnote [5] Wilson v. A.H. Belo Corp., 87 F.3d 393 (9th Cir. 1996), a recent Ninth Circuit case cited by the FCC, likewise did not involve a defendant's attempt to defend itself in district court by challenging an FCC action. ------------------------------------------------------------------- In Dougan, the petitioner, an unlicensed operator of a micro radio station, sought review in the Ninth circuit of an FCC notice of forfeiture under 47 U.S.C. § 504 (a) [6]. Id. at 1489. The FCC had issued the notice of forfeiture after it found that Mr. Dougan had violated 47 U.S.C. S 301 by operating a radio station without a license and had violated 47 C.F.R. S l5.29 by refusing to permit an FCC representative to inspect his station. [7] Id. Mr. Dougan disputed that he had violated 47 C.F.R. S 15.29 and challenged "the jurisdiction of the FCC over his intrastate broadcasts and the constitutionality of the licensing regulations." Id. at 1489- 90. Mr. Dougan's complaint apparently challenged the constitutionality of the same FCC regulation, prohibiting the issuance of a license to micro radio broadcasters, that is challenged here by Mr. Dunifer. Id. at 1489. Because a notice of forfeiture is a final order of the FCC, under 47 U.S.C. S 402 (a) and 28 U.S.C. 5 2342 such a proceeding would properly he brought in a court of appeals. At the FCC's urging, however, the court dismissed Mr. Dougan's case in favor of district court jurisdiction. Id. at 1489, 1491. The court of appeals did not retain its jurisdiction over the constitutional defenses that it ------------------------------------------------------------------ Footnotes [6]Section 504 (a) provides in pertinent part: The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be payable into the Treasury of the United States, and shall be recoverable, . . ., in a civil suit in the name of the United States brouqht in the district where the person or carrier has its principal operating office.... Provided, that any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture imposed pursuant to the provisions of the chapter shall be a trial de novo. [7] Section 15.29 provides, in relevant part, that any equipment or device subject to FCC regulations must be made available for inspection by a Commission representative upon reasonable request. ----------------------------------------------------------------- specifically noted Mr. Dougan had raised. Id. Following the decision of the District of Columbia Circuit in Pleasant Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 564 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "Congress did not intend to give petitioners two bites at the apple by allowing them to challenge the forfeiture in the appellate court, and if they lost, to sit back and await an enforcement action, at which time they would be entitled to a trial de novo in the district court."Dougan, 21 F.3d at 1491. The court concluded that 47 U.S.C. S 504 (a) is a special review statute which vests jurisdiction over forfeiture actions in the district courts. Id. The court held that this special review statute cuts off the simultaneous jurisdiction created in the court of appeals by 47 U.S.C. S 402 (a), the general review provision. Id. The FCC argued, and the court found, that this jurisdictional grant encompasses both actions filed by the government to enforce a forfeiture and those filed by individuals seeking to avoid enforcement. The instant case was brought under 47 U.S.C. S 401 (a) rather than 47 U.S.C. S 504 (a). Unlike The situation in Dougan, in this case Mr. Dunifer has not filed a complaint to avoid enforcement of the FCC's forfeiture order, nor hasthe FCC filed an action to enforce its forfeiture order.[8]Thus, There is no final order of the FCC before this court that is also reviewable by the appellate ---------------------------------------------------------------- Footnote: [8] In 1995, the FCC assessed a forfeiture against Mr. Dunifer in the amount of $10,000. See In the Matter of Stephen Paul Dunifer, FCC 95-333, August 2, 1995. Mr. Dunifer requests, in a footnote in his opposition, that the Court stay these proceeding for two weeks to permit him to file a complaint for declaratory relief seeking review of the FCC's forfeiture order. The Court will not stay these proceedings. Mr. Dunifer may file the complaint to which he refers at any time, if he wishes to do so. ------------------------------------------------------------------ court under 47 U.S.C. S 402 (a). This means that only the district court has jurisdiction over this action; this is not a situation where two courts have simultaneous jurisdiction. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's concern in Dougan about Mr. Dougan having two bites of the apple is not applicable. However, like 47 U.S.C. S 504(a), 47 U.S.C. S 401(a) provides that the FCC may initiate a specific type of enforcement action in the district court. The Ninth Circuit in Dougan determined that 47 U.S.C.S 504 (a) required Mr. Dougan to bring his lawsuit, including his constitutional challenges to the FCC regulation, in the district court. By analogy, it would appear that 47 U.S.C. S 401 (a) provides the district court with jurisdiction to hear not only the FCC's charge of broadcasting without a license, but also any valid defense to the charge. If the unconstitutionality of the FCC regulatory scheme that does not permit Mr. Dunifer to obtain a license would be a valid defense to a charge of broadcasting without a license, then that defense would be encompassed within the grant of jurisdictionto the district court provided in 47 U.S.C. S 401(a). The FCC has submitted a recent case decided in the District of Minnesota which, under facts similar to those in the case at bar, held that district courts do not have jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to FCC regulations raised as defenses in an FCC action to enforce a forfeiture order. United States v. Any and All Radio Station Transmission Equipment, et al., _ F. Supp. _, 1997 WL 591127 (D. Minn.) ("Transmission Equipment"). In Transmission Eqipment, the FCC filed suit in district court to enforce a forfeiture order against a micro radio station on the ground that it was broadcasting without a license. Id. at *1. The defendant admitted to broadcasting without a license but raised affirmative defenses challenging the constitutionality of the FCC regulatory scheme that did not allow the licensing of micro radio stations. Id. at *2. The court distinguished Pleasant Broadcasting on the grounds that the petitioners there disputed that they had violated a statute or regulation; the relevant language required "repeated" violations and both petitioners admitted to one, but not to repeated violations. Id. at *3. The court concluded that Pleasant Broadcasting did not apply to the facts before it because the defendant in Transmission Equipment did not dispute that he violated the statute prohibiting broadcasting without a license, but instead raised constitutional challenges to the FCC's regulatory scheme as affirmative defenses. Id. The court could not distinguish Dougan on the same ground because Mr. Dougan admitted that he had broadcast without a license, as did the defendant in Transmission Equipment. Id.at *4. Instead, the court interpreted Dougan as involving only a dispute over whether Mr. Dougan had violated 47 C.F.R. S 15.29 by refusing to permit FCC engineers to inspect his radio station. Id. The court distinguished Dougan on the ground that Mr. Dougan challenged the FCC's forfeiture order and did not challenge the FCC's prohibition against low power broadcasting. Id. However, as discussed above, in Dougan, the Ninth Circuit specifically noted that Mr. Dougan had raised constitutional defenses to the FCC's licensing regulations in addition to a defense based on 47 C.F.R. S 15.29. Dougan, 21 F.3d at 1489. Moreover, in ruling that the district court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear Mr. Dougan's action to avoid enforcement, the Ninth Circuit neither explicitly stated nor implied that the district court could only hear Mr. Dougan's defense based on 47 C.F.R.§ 15~29, and not his constitutional defenses. The court did not retain jurisdiction over Mr. Dougan's constitutional challenge to the regulation. A case cited by neitner party, United States v. Evergreen Media Corp of Chicago, involved an action brought by the government in district court to enforce a forfeiture order issued by the FCC. 832 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Ill. 1933). The forfeiture order was issued as a result of the FCC's determination that Evergreen Media, a radio station, had violated 18 U.S.C. § 1464, a criminal statute imposing a fine or imprisonment as punishment for uttering obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication. Id. at 1184. The defendant filed a counterclaim challenging the constitutionality of IS U.S.C. § 1464. Id. The counterclaim alleged that 18 U.S.C. § 1464 was facially unconstitutional both for vagueness and for overbreadth, and that 18 U.S.C. § 1464 was unconstitutional as applied, on the ground that the FCC's interpretation of the statute was not the least restrictive means of accomplishing the goals of the statute.Id. The defendant also alleged that the FCC's enforcement of the statute constituted a violation of substantive due process and of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. The FCC argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear any claims raised by the defendant which attacked the FCC's policies, practices or regulations. Id. at 1186. The court found that it had jurisdiction to hear the defendant's constitutional challenges to the FCC'S regulations interpreting 18 U.S.C. S 1464. Id. at 1184-86. Citing Pleasant Broadcasting, the court found that 47 U.S.C!. § 504(a), which gives district courts jurisdiction to hear forfeiture actions, provides an exception to the general rule that challenges to regulations must be heard in a court of appeal. Id. Evergreen Media provides additional support for the conclusion that this Court has jurisdiction to hear Mr. Dunifer's constitutional claims. Although the FCC and Mr. Dunifer address the issue of whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear Mr. Dunifer'sconstitutional challenges to tho FCC'S regulations, neither party has adequately briefed whether the alleged unconstitutionality of the licensing regulations is a valid defense to a request for an injunction against broadcasting without a license. That is, assuming arguendothat the regulations were unconstitutional, would this justify Mr. Dunifer's action of broadcasting without having, or even attempting to obtain, a license and prevent the FCCfrom obtaining an injuction? Dougan does not address this question. Mr. Dunifer asumes that the alleged unconstitutionality of the regulations would be a valid defense. While it criticizes Mr. Dunifer for failing to seak a license, the FCC largely confines its argument to its view that the Court is without jurisdiction to hear the unconstitutionality defense at all. If the unconstitutionality of the regulations would be a defense under these circumstances, this Court would be reguired to determine whether the regulations are in fact unconstitutional. Otherwise, the Court need not consider the constitutional issue. In support of hts argument, Mr. Dunifer analogizes his situation to that of a criminal defendant seeking to defend himself on the ground that the regulation under which he was being prosecuted was unconstitutional. The FCC responds that in United states v.Alloy, 755 F. Supp. 771, 775 (N.D. Ill. 1990), the court precluded the defendant from raising constitutional challenges to a regulation he was accused of violating. In Alley, however, the defendant did not argue that the regulation was unconstitutional. Rather the defendant argued that the regulation was unlawful because the administrative agency, in promulgating the regulation, had acted outside the scope of authority granted to it by Congress. Id.The court, moreover, noted that the statutory scheme specifically forbade judicial review in any civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement of the regulation under which the defendant was charged. Id. The FCC has not pointed to any provision of the Communications Act which specifically prohibits judicial review cf a licensing regulation in an enforcement proceeding. Furthermore, even if Alley were applicable here, a single district court case from another circuit is slim authority on which to base this decision. Therefore, the Court requests that the parties provide further briefing on the issue of whether the unconstitutionality of the FCC regulatory scheme would be a valid defense in an action brought by the FCC to enjoin broadcasting without a license. The FCC shall file with the Court and serve on Mr. Dunifer its brief on this issue 14 days from the date of this order. Mr. Dunifer's opposition is due 7 days thereafter. If the FCC wishes to file a reply, it may due so 7 days after the opposition is served. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the FCC's motion for summary judgment is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The parties are ordered to comply with the briefing schedule indicated above. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated November 12, 1997 Claudia Wilken UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1 0

Where is the c-p traffic?
by bureau42 Anonymous Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Am I the only one to notice that traffic has dropped from about 100 messages/day to only a few? Does anyone know what is broken? Does anyone care? Is the whole c-p list a giant MITM being run against a very few of us who are the only human participants? Oh dear! I just realized that c-p _could_ be subject to an interesting MITM attack: By subtlely modifiying the text of c-p messages arriving at certain key recipients, the bad guys could then correlate the quoted text in resulting anonymous replies to the list with individuals, and could probably also shave a layer or two off the remailer chains through which those messages were sent. The determination of individual's usage patterns of remailers would also benefit from this, and the info would go into a growing database which could then be used at some point down the road to nail key people and remove them as irritants and agitators. Isn't it odd that many key contributors to the list coincidentally live near nondescript neighborhood houses that bristle with antennae and are regularly visited by black helicopters and large unmarked vans? No, I didn't think so either. That's probably an unrelated operation. TrafficMongerII

2 1

Where is the c-p traffic? (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sat, 13 Dec 1997 00:30:30 GMT > From: bureau42 Anonymous Remailer <nobody(a)bureau42.ml.org> > Subject: Where is the c-p traffic? > > Am I the only one to notice that traffic has dropped from about 100 > messages/day to only a few? You are getting *lots* of bounces if you were getting anything like 100 messages per day. > Does anyone know what is broken? At this point either your arithmetic or your memory. Either way, it sounds like a personal problem. > Does anyone care? Is the whole c-p list a giant MITM being run > against a very few of us who are the only human participants? Damn, found out. > Isn't it odd that many key contributors to the list coincidentally > live near nondescript neighborhood houses that bristle with > antennae and are regularly visited by black helicopters and large > unmarked vans? No, I didn't think so either. That's probably an > unrelated operation. Just exactly what kind of drugs are you taking? There is a house rule you *must* bring enough for everyone. No helicopters, vans, jack-booted thugs, or anything else around here dude. Don't know about an opinion, a paranoia induced hallucination for sure. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

1 0

You can take it with you
by Mixmaster 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Last year, when a major financial columnist suggested that people should buy stocks and hold them until the day they died, we figured expectations had hit the ceiling. We were wrong. Apparently, in a mania of this magnitude, even the bounds of mortality can be sur- passed. The Luxemborg-based Prometh Societé is offering "reincarnation accounts" to people who are not willing to let death stand in the way of their financial planning (minimum account size is $30,000). When the claimant returns in the next life and provides a few key facts, he can claim the account, which will presumably have grown to quite a size at the generally-expected 30% per annum compounded." The Elliott Wave Theorist -- December 5, 1997

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GETS THE CREDIT CARD YOU DESERVE- GUARANTEED!
by hellen＠east.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

GET THE CREDIT YOU DESERVE! Hi! I just wanted to pass along some information that you will want to know. Its amazing! Listen to this..... I obtained a credit card with a $10,000 limit within days! I learned how to transfer my high interest rate credit card balances to a credit card with a 5.9% introductory rate and the rate stayed in the 9% bracket after the introductory period! Also, I learned how to obtain a credit card that will allow me to earn one free mile of flight for every dollar I charge on my card! And for those who are credit challenged, you can learn how to obtain an UNSECURED credit card that, if used wisely, can help re-establish your good credit. These cards are all LEGITIMATE VISA OR MASTERCARDS!! This information can be yours shortly! Save money and make a positive change in your financial future! This information could change your life! Simply click mailto:hed@goplay.com and then type "credit" as the subject. You'll be thankful you did. I know I was! I'll talk to you later. Cam PS: If this message reached you in error, please accept my apologies and delete it. This is a one-time mailing and you will not be mailed to again.

1 0

Columbian squib on Bell sentencing
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>From The Columbian's web site at <http://www.columbian.com/newsroom/topstories.html>: 'Assassination Politics' author gets 11 months TACOMA, Wash. - James Dalton Bell, the Vancouver man who wrote an Internet essay entitled "Assassination Politics," was sentenced this morning to 11 months in prison and two to three years of tightly supervised probation. Bell's attorney objected to the probation conditions, which bar Bell from possessing a firearm or chemicals or entering a federal office without prior approval. He may not advocate violence or overthrow of the government. Bell, 39, has been in custody since May. In July, he pleaded guilty to obstructing Internal Revenue Service agents and using false Social Security numbers. Bell also admitted collecting the names and home addresses of IRS employees; proposing the "Assassination Politics" idea that targeted federal employees, and planting a stink bomb in the IRS's Vancouver office in March. -- Marcia Wolf, Columbian staff writer -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | Export jobs, not crypto. http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | http://www.parrhesia.com

4 3

Re: Fw: Jim Bell Sentenced (fwd)
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To add to Greg Broiles' excellent recap of the case. What might be amplified is the way Jim's case was gnoshed in the media and here, with more attention to AP than to the basic facts, as exemplified in the news report on sentencing, as Phill did, as did the IRS spam of Jim's arrest. Fair enough, for that was clearly the purpose of AP, as with all publishing and speaking in a manner to get attention, whether by IRS-fed scare stories churned out by its PR department, by we advocates of earnest causes, and by the eager-to-oblige news, law and pol biz -- FC not excepted. Jim's case was happily churned by all parties, us foremost among them, and Jim (with aid and abet by others) is to be congratulated for success with AP: Agent Provocative, Apt Promo, Avid Preening for and against. May he quickly capitalize on his notoriety and beat the pack of envious competitors waving less risky, lawful docs which attract zip. Now, is it not true that we've self-censored ourselves into believing Jim is just a fool, rather than a gutsy guy willing to do what most of us will not, instead preferring covert self-censorship over the all-too-easily opposed group-think kind. If so, the IRS (with aid and abet by news, law and pol) has proven a gov-authorized version of AP and warning spam quite nicely intimidates us into censoring ourselves into well-behaved submission while believing its a shrewd move to protect careers from wiser fools like Jim Bell. Free Jim Bell, and pay lost salary and punitive damages!

1 0

Crypto-gathering today in DC (12/13) at 3 pm
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

We're having a crypto-gathering in Washington, DC today to coincide with the end of IETF. It probably would be a DC cypherpunks meeting if we had enough notice -- but since we don't it'll be a less formal gathering instead. Guests -- John Gilmore and Hugh Daniel When -- 3 pm, Saturday, December 13 Where -- Adams Morgan, Washington, DC What -- Probably IPsec, Bernstein lawsuit, crypto legislation If you're interested, email for details. -Declan

1 0

Make $2,000 - $5,000 per week -NOT MLM
by 03133071＠moneymakers.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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REMEMBER, THE ROAD TO HELL IS PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS! It's your choice, financial freedom or bondage! INTRODUCTION: Our international association is comprised of a large group of extremely diverse independent individuals from attorneys, physicians, CPA's, licensed financial consultants and other professionals to housewives, students and blue-collar workers. Since the original founders of our organization first banded together just over three short years ago, we have grown to over 20,000 members in the United States and Canada and we are adding literally hundreds of new associates every day. What's so incredible about our phenomenal growth rate is that we are not M L M'ers!! HERE ARE 16 REASONS YOU SHOULD TAKE A SERIOUS LOOK AT THIS: 1.YOU REALLY CAN EARN $2,000 - $5,000 PER WEEK, WORKING FROM YOUR HOME... By and large, the majority of us already are. Why not you too? 2. FAST AND EASY WITH REASONABLE STARTUP COSTS... You can be up and going, trained and generating huge cashflow, within 24 hours from the time you decide to pursue this venture. You won't need any personnel, office, liability or workers comprehensive insurance --- just a fax machine and a phone! 3. REASONABLE FIXED OVERHEAD/OPERATING COSTS... Your only overhead is your phone bill! 4. PROFITS THAT ENTREPRENEURS USUALLY ONLY DREAM OF.. A 90% profit margin on sales of $1,250 or $6,250 respectively, means you net either $1,125.00 OR $5,625.00 on **EVERY** sale! 5. EASY TO MARKET; We don't do any selling..everyone wants and needs our products! All we do is explain it and offer it to people! REAL? Don't take my word, prove it to yourself! Take a look at this and then do what over 20,000 of us have done. 6. NOT MLM... This is not some chain letter or any other kind of bogus, unethical or illegal scheme. (EXAMPLE: Our $1,250 product's actual value is estimated to be between $10,000 and$15,000!). 7. NO INVENTORY MAINTENANCE OR ORDER FULFILLMENT... WITH AN UNCONDITIONAL TEN DAY MONEY BACK GUARANTEE. . 8. 8. DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH ONLY INTERESTED PROSPECTS... 9. ALL PROCEEDS ARE ISSUED DIRECTLY TO YOU. 10. ALL THE FRESH HOT LEADS YOU CAN HANDLE.... 11. TRAINING, MARKETING, ADMIN. SUPPORT SECOND TO NONE... Most people who market our products make 1 or 2 sales their VERY FIRST WEEK, we're ALWAYS there to HELP YOU 12. OUR PRODUCTS...THE BEST THERE IS. Simply put, what we sell to earn our extraordinary living, is education, incredible and verifiable factual information that 99% of the world's population doesn't even know exists, including most Attorneys, CPA's, so called Tax Experts, Tax Consultants, Financial Consultants, Investment Strategists and the like. It's no big secret that the rich pay very little (if any) taxes on their incomes, but how do they get away with it? With these simply presented and easily understood educational products, ordinary people just like you and me are now learning to use the same complex tax avoidance and investment strategies that the wealthy have always used! Anyone who purchases our products quickly finds out that no matter what their current situation, they can substantially reduce (and in some cases even totally eliminate) ALL of their personal and/or business tax liabilities, forever and completely legally. And, interestingly enough, the informatio! n is just as valid for those who are wage earners as those who (already) have money! Consumers of these incredible educational products also learn that there are many safe (insured) investment vehicles that the wealthy use, which generate three to five times more yield on their cash investments in one month, than the rest of the world gets in a whole year? Our products not only identify these vehicles, but even show techniques and methodologies that an average person can use in taking advantage of them - even with very little cash to invest! (IMPORTANT NOTE: We, the salespeople who market these products, Do not sell investments or investment opportunities of any kind nor do we give any legal, investment, tax, or other "professional" advice). And, did you know that because our society has become so litigious, the odds of an individual being named as a defendant in a civil litigation in the next 12 months, are now more than 10 times greater than the odds that they'll be hospitalized? These products also show ! average people how to become leg ally "judgement proof" --- how to fully protect both their current and future assets from any form of liens, levies or judgements in any civil legal action wherein they are named as a defendant. 13. CREDIBILITY... Our association is only a little over three years old but has already established itself as a well recognized, well reputed and universally respected international organization. 14. INCREDIBLE, VERIFIABLE TRACK RECORDS OF SUCCESS... You'll be introduced to many others in our association who are already earning a great deal of money(mostly just average middle class people like you and I), and have been able to do so virtually immediately as soon as they started with us. 15. SPEND LOTS MORE TIME WITH YOUR FAMILY... Our turnkey system does not require long hours in order to be successful. 16. THIS IS IT -- NO HYPE -- NO EXAGGERATION... In over 35 years of owning and operating my own businesses, before I took a real good look at this, of course I thought I'd seen it all. Frankly, I was convinced that I already knew everything there was to know about anything relating to marketing and sales, if not business in general. I am well experienced and a professional who considers myself exceptionally savvy. But as soon as I got the full picture, it turned my previous view of business and even the views I had of myself, upside down! My experience then led me to the question, "If my logic as well as my calculations were even half accurate, and I could make great money not even having to sell much, what if I sold a lot?" With that I jumped in on Oct'97 and haven't regretted it for even a split second since. With some experience under my belt now, I can tell you two things without any hesitation whatsoever: 1) Expect to earn an enormous personal income, and 2) do so while enjoying yourself doing it. FROM ME TO YOU, PERSONALLY....... If you are a little skeptical of the above "unbelievable" outline of this opportunity, that's okay. At first, so was I (and so is everyone else who first runs into it). We understand, especially in this day and age, that it's prudent to be cautious. But from me to you, don't let anything, including any bitter memories you have of bad experiences, keep you from at least giving this an honest look. YOU OWE IT TO YOURSELF AND YOUR FAMILY! ". I give you my word, you won't be sorry you did. If you are interested in how you can earn a great deal of money quickly,call us at: (Note please read this letter completely before calling) 1-888-245-9163 - To set up an interview (24 Hours a day) 904-654-7727 (Ext. 6200) For money-making information 904-654-7727 (Ext. 5093) For information on taxes Please feel free to forward any specific questions or comments. We will return all calls in the order they were received. A telephonic interview is required before acceptance . Thereafter you will be given a toll-free number to contact us at any time. We are looking for 5 good people, you could be one of them! Sincerely, DENNIS AND DIETER

1 0

Smartcard update
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks Tonga announces yet another version of SIO/STEST, the universal smartcard software. Quick summary of changes: - Philips, Gemplus, and Schlumberger reader support added - Chipknip (IEP) specific commands added - new internal commands - infrastructure for implementing card specific commands has been added (which the chipknip commands are built on top of) At this point, we need others to start writing tables to support additional cards. If you have an ISO7816 compatible smartcard with programmer reference manual and minimal C knowledge, you can contribute to the project. Full source is at https://www.cypherpunks.to/scard/stest_download.php -- Lucky Green <shamrock(a)cypherpunks.to> PGP v5 encrypted email preferred. "Tonga? Where the hell is Tonga? They have Cypherpunks there?"

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Re: hashcash spam prevention & firewalls (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Fri, 12 Dec 1997 20:24:59 -0800 > From: Bill Frantz <frantz(a)netcom.com> > Subject: Re: hashcash spam prevention & firewalls > I think there needs to be a story for mailing lists. It might be > acceptable for the first pass to allow spamming of mailing lists but not of > individuals email addresses. (Apologies in advance to list moderators.) We have a moderator? This is news to me and I suspect the other CDR operators. Who is this person please, I would very much like to discuss a couple of issues with them... ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Radio Free Cypherpunks...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, With the recent changes in the law regarding Pirate Radio is anyone looking at sending the cypherpunks traffic over a low-power transmitter so that folks in your town can tune in and listen to the traffic? Seems like a perfect means to make the issues even better known. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

2 1

Re: Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Sam" <sam-001(a)dpinc.ml.org> wrote: > >:That's because there AREN'T any. Again, what are his motives in shutting > >:down something that he obviously considers to be a valuable asset? > > > > OBVIOUSLY? Why obviously? Obviously because he says so? > > Obviously, as in being very apparent, based upon his actions. "Obvious" because I'm the one using a remailer as a communications medium. To attempt to destroy my own means of communications would be ludicrous. Gary, on the other hand, has stated that he does NOT use remailers. He would thus have nothing to lose if any/all of them were closed down. It would be similarly ludicrous (though perhaps less so) to accuse Gary of annoying, flaming, and accusing people as part of a scheme to get Netcom shut down. Interestingly enough, Belinda Bryan, out of the blue, recently taunted a poster to netcom.general by saying, "Are you going to use anonymous remailers to attack Gary next?". It's almost as if the crew at DataBasix is INVITING "abuse" via remailers, and it has had an uncanny knack for appearing right on cue from them in the past, too. (Just like the so-called "spam bait" started showing up right after Gary's initial demand to Jeff that he turn over his logs to DataBasix.) Nor does it make sense that if I wanted to get remailers shut down, I'd limit myself to criticizing one little obnoxious clique on usenet, namely the DataBasix Gang. I doubt that anyone is likely to arouse a hue and cry against remailers from the masses by criticizing Gary, Belinda Bryan, and Billy McClatchie ("Wotan") anonymously. > > "Obviously because if he didn't find them valuable he wouldn't be using them"? > > So when he (and others) uses them to spam bait, is that finding them valuable? > > I do not recall any conclusive proof being posted, or even circumstantial > evidence, that he was responsible for spam baiting. Back when the alleged "spam baiting" was going on, Gary and Belinda were accusing "rfg" of doing it. For awhile, they accused Scott Dentice. Now they've gotten tired of accusing named individuals and have invented a mythical "anon asshole" who is supposedly responsible for just about everything imaginable. (I'm supposedly the latest re-incarnation of this evil, mean ogre.) Since Gary is adamant about there being one and only one "anon asshole" responsible for all of this, at least one of his accusations against people he's named in the past must have been a lie.

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Re: Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

"Sam" <sam-001(a)dpinc.ml.org> wrote: > >:That's precisely my point. And now he refuses to disclose his motives for > >:that demand or what he intended to do with the names and addresses contained > >:in those logs. Every time he's asked the question of why he attempted to > >:violate the privacy of hundreds or perhaps thousands of remailer users, it > >:elicits another tantrum that goes, "Lies! Prove it! Why are you harassing > >:me? What are your demands?" > > > > You still can't answer it so you ignore it. > > What is the nature of the harassment that you are complaining about? Has > this anonymous individual mailbombed you? Made threatening phone calls in > the middle of the night? All I see are a bunch of posts, without any > profanities, that make a bunch of cogent points, and claims. Is this what > you consider harassment? Is this what you call "harassment"? > > That must mean that I'm harassing you as well, right? That is exactly my objection to the tactics of Gary Burnore and the DataBasix gang. NOW Gary claims that he's not against remailers, yet his treatment of Jeff Burchell speaks for itself. In the past, he's said things like "remailers have their place, but their operators should prevent them from being used for abuse". That sounds reasonable, until you read between the lines. He calls the kind of discussion that the three of us are engaging in "harassment", and has even, upon occasion, accused posts critical of him of constituting "libel". Yet he offers no suggestion of how a remailer operator is supposed to detect and prevent "libel". He has offered no handy-dandy Perl script which will act as a "truth filter" and detect the truth or falsity of a particular post, since posting the truth about someone, as unflattering as it may be, is not "libel". Actually, Gary may unwittingly prove to be a "friend" of remailers, yet. His dealings with people who challenge him publicly should serve as an object lesson as to why people may wish to think twice before broadcasting their e-mail addresses to the world with every Usenet posts. Most people, I would suspect, would not consider it great fun to speak their mind and face retaliation by having an old state tax lien (complete with street address) dredged from the archives and posted worldwide to usenet, with the threat that unless the criticism ceases, "there's more where that came from". It's sort of hard to harass an anonymous poster in that fashion, so Gary has to settle for juvenile taunts of "anon asshole".

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Re: hashcash spam prevention & firewalls
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Adam Back <aba(a)dcs.ex.ac.uk>: > I am looking at writing some hashcash > (http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/hashcash/) based spam prevention > software. > So what we want is a filter to bounce messages without the required > hashcash postage, we ideally want this to happen at the ISP or > organisational SMTP server end, rather than at the recipients end, > because a) it is simpler for 1 service provider to install software > than 100,000 neophytes, Hashcash in this context suffers from the 'fax effect' - the catch 22 of "We won't install what isn't widely used". > and b) it reduces bandwidth consumption on > dial up users pay per second lines as the spam is killed before they > see it. I have not (yet) persuaded demon to allow user-defined procmail rules on the ISP end of the phone lines. Anybody know an ISP who does this ? I'll be with them in days if they match the other services I want. I can't imagine ISPs installing something at all exotic if they refuse to use procmail. > Secondly the proxy approach prevents some of the SMTP server functions > from operating properly because the process on the other end of the > socket is our hashcash proxy on localhost rather than the remote mail > hub No loss. > If the postage is valid, replay the headers to the real SMTP server > (with IP masquerading so that the IP address appears to be coming from > the originator, so that the SMTP server will not get upset about > reverse DNS look up mismatches etc). Then act as a dumb proxy for the > rest of the connection passing data through to the normal hashcash > server. The above paragraph looks like a strange (and IMHO wrong) way to mix firewall technologies. If you are passing mail through a proxy you won't want to either IP masq or lookup DNS records internally. > There are a few techniques to reduce the overhead of preventing spam > with hashcash. One is to require valid hashcash only on the first > message to a given address. (Spammers being hit and run types, and > even having to generate hashcash for each spamee once would be > expensive for a spam list of 10 million unwilling spam recipients). > Better, is to require valid hashcash on all mail, _until_ the > recipient replies to a mail. This is good because people rarely reply > to spammers. This means a huge database of who has replied to whom. Must the reply have headers indicating In-Reply-To a recognisable message ? -- ############################################################## # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ##############################################################

3 2

Re: Fw: Jim Bell Sentenced (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Sun, 14 Dec 1997 10:45:19 -0500 > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > Subject: Re: Fw: Jim Bell Sentenced (fwd) > Now, is it not true that we've self-censored ourselves into believing > Jim is just a fool, rather than a gutsy guy willing to do what most > of us will not, instead preferring covert self-censorship over the > all-too-easily opposed group-think kind. Spin-doctor alert. Jim Bell plea bargained period. Had he had one iota of the 'guts' you so blithely banter about the case would be going to trial. Plea-bargaining = capitulation = self-censorship ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

1 0

Re: Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

rashidk(a)mailexcite.com (Rashid Kaman) wrote: > X-No-Archive: yes > >The whole "spam bait" issue is obviously a smoke screen, since the alleged > >spam-bait came AFTER the demand for Jeff's logs. > > The spambaits, at a rate of a dozen a day in early and mid-April, came > BEFORE Jeff Burshell, presented with their existence, offered in late > April, to turn over his machine logs. I'm not sure how you're involved in this scenario, nor what your source of information is. I was quoting from a public post by Jeff Burchell, the operator of the remailer in question, and he specifically stated that the so-called "spam baits" began AFTER Gary Burnore had demanded that Jeff turn over his remailer logs to DataBasix, and BEFORE Belinda Bryan sent him the letter claiming to be with DataBasix' "legal department" and formalizing that demand. Read it for yourself: -> I still don't know what the hell is going on with DataBasix, Wells Fargo -> and Gary Burnore, but I suspect that someone used huge.cajones to say -> something extremely unflattering about Burnore (from what I can tell, -> he had it coming). Burnore then decided that he would make things -> difficult for me. First, he wanted the user who had posted something -> "inflammatory" about him revealed. When I told him that I couldn't -> do that, he carried on about mail logs and identifying the host that -> a message came from (the usual). I didn't explain to him that my -> machine keeps logs, but not anything involving a *(a)cajones.com -> address. He then requested the logs, which I denied (and told him -> to get his lawyer to send a request...) Here comes the key part: -> Between the time he first contacted me, and the time I received the -> letter from Belinda Bryan, is when the baiting of databasix addresses -> began (slowly, with just a few posts). It appears that his account differs from yours.

1 0

Earn $2,000-$5,000 per week...NOT MLM
by 95059550＠moneymakers.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<HTML><PRE><BODY BGCOLOR="#000000"> ARE YOU READY TO MAKE IT; WILL THE LIGHT GO ON? Are you tired of working 9-5 for peanuts, with little or no control over your financial destiny? Hello, my name is Dieter and my partners name is Dennis (By the way, please forgive this intrusion. We are looking for people who have an entrepreneurial spirit and can recognize an opportunity when they see it and move on it! If that's you, We'd like to invite you to join our team and work from your home making $2.000 to 5,000 per week and more....much more in some cases. One of our members quit her job of 14 years after one month! Another made the cover of a national magazine after just one quarter! Skeptical? You should be. You've seen every scam out there. So have the rest of us. But simply stated, this is the finest opportunity in America today. We can prove it. How? We have exactly what over-worked, under-paid, over-taxed Americans desperately want and need! REMEMBER, THE ROAD TO HELL IS PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS! It's your choice, financial freedom or bondage! INTRODUCTION: Our international association is comprised of a large group of extremely diverse independent individuals from attorneys, physicians, CPA's, licensed financial consultants and other professionals to housewives, students and blue-collar workers. Since the original founders of our organization first banded together just over three short years ago, we have grown to over 20,000 members in the United States and Canada and we are adding literally hundreds of new associates every day. What's so incredible about our phenomenal growth rate is that we are not M L M'ers!! HERE ARE 16 REASONS YOU SHOULD TAKE A SERIOUS LOOK AT THIS: 1.YOU REALLY CAN EARN $2,000 - $5,000 PER WEEK, WORKING FROM YOUR HOME... By and large, the majority of us already are. Why not you too? 2. FAST AND EASY WITH REASONABLE STARTUP COSTS... You can be up and going, trained and generating huge cashflow, within 24 hours from the time you decide to pursue this venture. You won't need any personnel, office, liability or workers comprehensive insurance --- just a fax machine and a phone! 3. REASONABLE FIXED OVERHEAD/OPERATING COSTS... Your only overhead is your phone bill! 4. PROFITS THAT ENTREPRENEURS USUALLY ONLY DREAM OF.. A 90% profit margin on sales of $1,250 or $6,250 respectively, means you net either $1,125.00 OR $5,625.00 on **EVERY** sale! 5. EASY TO MARKET; We don't do any selling..everyone wants and needs our products! All we do is explain it and offer it to people! REAL? Don't take my word, prove it to yourself! Take a look at this and then do what over 20,000 of us have done. 6. NOT MLM... This is not some chain letter or any other kind of bogus, unethical or illegal scheme. (EXAMPLE: Our $1,250 product's actual value is estimated to be between $10,000 and$15,000!). 7. NO INVENTORY MAINTENANCE OR ORDER FULFILLMENT... WITH AN UNCONDITIONAL TEN DAY MONEY BACK GUARANTEE. . 8. 8. DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH ONLY INTERESTED PROSPECTS... 9. ALL PROCEEDS ARE ISSUED DIRECTLY TO YOU. 10. ALL THE FRESH HOT LEADS YOU CAN HANDLE.... 11. TRAINING, MARKETING, ADMIN. SUPPORT SECOND TO NONE... Most people who market our products make 1 or 2 sales their VERY FIRST WEEK, we're ALWAYS there to HELP YOU 12. OUR PRODUCTS...THE BEST THERE IS. Simply put, what we sell to earn our extraordinary living, is education, incredible and verifiable factual information that 99% of the world's population doesn't even know exists, including most Attorneys, CPA's, so called Tax Experts, Tax Consultants, Financial Consultants, Investment Strategists and the like. It's no big secret that the rich pay very little (if any) taxes on their incomes, but how do they get away with it? With these simply presented and easily understood educational products, ordinary people just like you and me are now learning to use the same complex tax avoidance and investment strategies that the wealthy have always used! Anyone who purchases our products quickly finds out that no matter what their current situation, they can substantially reduce (and in some cases even totally eliminate) ALL of their personal and/or business tax liabilities, forever and completely legally. And, interestingly enough, the informatio! n is just as valid for those who are wage earners as those who (already) have money! Consumers of these incredible educational products also learn that there are many safe (insured) investment vehicles that the wealthy use, which generate three to five times more yield on their cash investments in one month, than the rest of the world gets in a whole year? Our products not only identify these vehicles, but even show techniques and methodologies that an average person can use in taking advantage of them - even with very little cash to invest! (IMPORTANT NOTE: We, the salespeople who market these products, Do not sell investments or investment opportunities of any kind nor do we give any legal, investment, tax, or other "professional" advice). And, did you know that because our society has become so litigious, the odds of an individual being named as a defendant in a civil litigation in the next 12 months, are now more than 10 times greater than the odds that they'll be hospitalized? These products also show ! average people how to become leg ally "judgement proof" --- how to fully protect both their current and future assets from any form of liens, levies or judgements in any civil legal action wherein they are named as a defendant. 13. CREDIBILITY... Our association is only a little over three years old but has already established itself as a well recognized, well reputed and universally respected international organization. 14. INCREDIBLE, VERIFIABLE TRACK RECORDS OF SUCCESS... You'll be introduced to many others in our association who are already earning a great deal of money(mostly just average middle class people like you and I), and have been able to do so virtually immediately as soon as they started with us. 15. SPEND LOTS MORE TIME WITH YOUR FAMILY... Our turnkey system does not require long hours in order to be successful. 16. THIS IS IT -- NO HYPE -- NO EXAGGERATION... In over 35 years of owning and operating my own businesses, before I took a real good look at this, of course I thought I'd seen it all. Frankly, I was convinced that I already knew everything there was to know about anything relating to marketing and sales, if not business in general. I am well experienced and a professional who considers myself exceptionally savvy. But as soon as I got the full picture, it turned my previous view of business and even the views I had of myself, upside down! My experience then led me to the question, "If my logic as well as my calculations were even half accurate, and I could make great money not even having to sell much, what if I sold a lot?" With that I jumped in on Oct'97 and haven't regretted it for even a split second since. With some experience under my belt now, I can tell you two things without any hesitation whatsoever: 1) Expect to earn an enormous personal income, and 2) do so while enjoying yourself doing it. FROM ME TO YOU, PERSONALLY....... If you are a little skeptical of the above "unbelievable" outline of this opportunity, that's okay. At first, so was I (and so is everyone else who first runs into it). We understand, especially in this day and age, that it's prudent to be cautious. But from me to you, don't let anything, including any bitter memories you have of bad experiences, keep you from at least giving this an honest look. YOU OWE IT TO YOURSELF AND YOUR FAMILY! ". I give you my word, you won't be sorry you did. If you are interested in how you can earn a great deal of money quickly,call us at: (Note please read this letter completely before calling any of the following numbers.) 904-654-7727 (Ext. 6200) For money-making information 904-654-7727 (Ext. 5093) For information on taxes Please call the above two numbers before calling the (888) number below. 1-888-245-9163 - To set up an interview (24 Hours a day) Please feel free to forward any specific questions or comments. We will return all calls in the order they were received. A telephonic interview is required before acceptance . Thereafter you will be given a toll-free number to contact us at any time. We are looking for 5 good people, you could be one of them! Sincerely, DENNIS AND DIETER

1 0

technical spam prevention
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

the problem of spam prevention has concerned me for a long time. the Internet was designed to withstand a nuclear attack-- yet it is incredibly vulnerable to spam. the initial assumption was that all nodes on the network are friend, not foe, i.e. trusted. this concept is breaking down as the net scales massively. some people warned long ago that spam would become an increasing problem on the net as it scaled, and that the technical visionaries would wise to try to cooperate and come up with approaches. such a point of view is not popular on this list, which is not really big on collaboration (despite that some of the greatest successes and fame have come from it, such as via the code cracking ring). but increasingly events are forcing people to come together to come up with solutions. there are many promising approaches to spam prevention. the one I like is a system whereby the receiver can specify how much money it costs to receive an email from anyone. the mail is rejected if it doesn't contain this fee. different people can configure their incoming mail different. Gates may charge, say, $1000. joe schmoe would charge, say, $1. an interesting part of this model is that if someone you like sends you mail, including the fee, there is nothing to prevent you from reimbursing them in a return message (or paying their own fee with the money they supply). such a system would be a very powerful spam prevention system. (due credit goes to TCM for being one of the first for advocating this.) however, I would like to suggest that spam prevention is a great test for a *reputation*system*, something we have talked about a long time here but found it very difficult to implement. the reputation system would rate people based on their lack of email complaints, and allow queries that could screen email based on poor ratings. such a system would not immediately block spam, but it could be implemented in a way such that spam becomes far less powerful. there are two problems with spam that any designer has to confront. there are some internet providers who do not want their users to spam. if they inserted a few header into the outgoing mail such as the following, it would allow excellent screening heuristics: 1. total bytes sent through this email address. 2. total age of this account in days. the sender is free to calculate the ratio if it prefers, or use various heuristics on the straight values themselves. now, I consider this pretty easy. the more difficult problem is that there are some IPs that do not wish to ban spammers-- they may be making a business out of it. a reputation system that weeds out these sites may be buildable-- but it's the most difficult problem. I think a lot of fame and glory will go to someone who invents effective spam prevention mechanisms-- increasingly I think the future of cyberspace depends on solving this very difficult and seemingly intractable problem. (if anyone can point me to a mailing list that focuses on technical spam prevention, I'd appreciate it.)

1 0

Not quite as much Blood in the Streets (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: frissell(a)panix.com > Date: Sat, 13 Dec 1997 09:32:46 -0500 > Subject: Not quite as much Blood in the Streets > The Net teaches even old dogs new tricks. From the Laissez Faire Books > catalog: > > http://www.lfb.org/investment.html#iv7644 > > ***************** > > James Davidson and William Ress-Mogg > > THE SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUAL > How to Survive and Thrive During the Collapse of the Welfare State > by James Dale Davidson and Lord William Rees-Mogg > > In their newest work, the authors of Blood in the Streets and The Great > Reckoning predict increased autonomy for the individual as information > technologies advance and old institutions crumbleincluding the welfare state > itself. Along with an array of provocative predictions (government will > declare war on groups that try to circumvent income tax through cyberspace; > central banks will lose control over the money supply as cybercash supplants > paper money; the U.S. government will shrink) Rees-Mogg and Davidson offer > investment advice and strategies for coping. Check the archives, I've made several posts about this book. It *SUCKS*, the authors can't make up their minds, use poor logic, use examples which if researched even a little become clearly incompatible with their thesis, etc. Spend your money elsewhere. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Gilmore to speak on encryption policy at UMBC (Tues, Dec 16)
by Dr. Alan Sherman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The UMBC Security Technology Research Group presents Two Divergent Views on Encryption Policy: I. Wisdom and Constitutionality in U.S. Cryptography Policy John Gilmore, Co-Founder, Electronic Frontier Foundation II. A Government Perspective on Encryption Policy [Will anyone from the U.S. Government agree to speak??*] Two divergent views on the topic of encryption policy by freedom activist John Gilmore and by a government official, if one agrees to speak. Journalist Peter Wayner will moderate the event, which is free and open to the public. Note: If no one from the U.S. Government is willing to explain and discuss Government encryption policy, then the event will proceed with John Gilmore alone. 8-10:30 pm Tuesday, December 16, 1997 Lecture Hall III (in Administration Building) University of Maryland Baltimore County http://www.cs.umbc.edu/events/fall97/crypto.shtml The fifth employee of Sun Microsystems and a strong believer in the U.S. Constitution, John Gilmore is currently involved in litigation against several government agencies over matters of freedom of information, freedom of expression, and encryption policies. He will discuss the constitutionality of controlling encryption. Directions: Take Exit #47B off interstate I-95 and follow signs to UMBC. LH III is on the ground floor of the (tall) administration building, adjacent the visitor's parking lot, near the I-95 entrance to UMBC. Host: Dr. Alan T. Sherman Associate Professor, Computer Science sherman(a)cs.umbc.edu http://www.umbc.edu (410) 455-2666 This event is held in cooperation with the UMBC Intellectual Sports Council Honors College Phi Beta Kappa honors society CMSC Council of Majors IFSM Council of Majors * The following U.S. Government officials declined to speak on December 16: Barry Smith (Supervisory Special Agent, FBI) [Mr. Smith has agreed in principle to speak at UMBC in the spring on a law enforcement view of encryption policy; the evening of Dec 16 turned out to be a bad time for him.] William Reinsch (Undersecretary for Export Administration, BXA) Bob Litt (Attorney General's Office, DoJ) Scott Charney (Computer Crimes, DoJ) Bruce McConnell (Information Policy, OMB) Ron Lee (General Counsel, NSA) Dr. Clint Brooks (Director, Cryptographic Policy, NSA) Charlotte Knepper (Co-Chair, Inter-Agency Working Group on Encryption Policy) Chris McLean (Staffer for Senator Bob Kerry; helped draft legislation on encryption policy) I am still hopeful to find a second speaker by Tuesday evening.

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Q
by Yuri Freneites 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

some body out there can tell me how can i get in boy boy web page without password thank...

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Re: Kong Re: Please Beta test my communications cryptography product.
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- 177 At 5:00 PM -0800 12/4/97, James A. Donald wrote: > > > I have produced a program that, like PGP, provides digital > > > signatures and communications encryption. > > > http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/Kong.htm > > >This is the first beta. Please beta test this product. At 07:06 PM 12/12/97 -0800, Bill Stewart wrote: > The web page says that the first beta had some problems, Beta 2 is now out. Please uninstall your old copy, using "Add/Remove programs" in the control panel, before installing the new copy, as overinstall does not work. (If you forgetfully overinstall, a warning comes up, but most people cheerfully disregard the warning) >- Signed Message: Delimiter, Message Body, ECC Public Key, ECC Sig. > I didn't notice what hash was used for the signatures -- SHA? > SHA: I failed to document that, will add it to the documentation. >- Encrypted Message: ECC(SessionKey), RC4(Message Body, SessionKey). > > I'm not sure if there are headers that include the recipient's key, > or if there's any special form for an encrypted-and-signed > message. I assume there's no multiple-recipient form? Multiple recipient form works, but the user interface to use it does not yet exist which makes it kind of useless. Coming soon. >1) Are the Signer's Name and the ECC key included in the > material that's hashed for signature? Doing that is > valuable, but depending on it makes it more difficult if > people change addresses. Yes: However the name is only hashed in a cryptographically weak manner, so a third party could change the name in a cleartext message. However if the message is cleartext there is nothing to stop him from copying the body and giving it any signature he pleases, so this does not actually gain the attacker anything. After all, that is what cleartext is. If he changes the name it looks to the user and Kong like a new and different signature. >2) It would be nice if the starting and ending delimiters were >different. > This would let you nest messages without needing >s. Can Kong > tell a nested opening -- from a closing --digsig ? Are --s > escaped, or at least <NL>--digsig? -- Yes: For example this message contains a nested message. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG J14rDU1EjUofOmSoHg1Ye0GF6/+6wdvxmCwMryE4 1jNcIP5kRfVPada+5w8zfIGEodi2Mrz80ZbvXsK1 >3) How are newlines and whitespace in the message body handled for >signatures? > Canonicalized? Ignored? Not worried about? Not worried about, which is probably a seriously bad idea. Will fix in a later release. In a later release I will canonicalise carriage returns to Microsoft conventions, but not whitespace. As this is alas, a Borg only product, and will remain so for some time, such canonicalisation will not break existing signed documents. > This affects not only reliability of signatures after > emailing, but also affects signing binary files. Signing binary files is not yet supported, and will not be for some time. >4) I'd guess, since you're using 240-bit ECC and base-64 encoding, > that the first 40 characters of garble in the signature are > the key, and the remaining 80 characters are the signature > itself? Yes > If so, is there some easy way to use the 40-char string, e.g. > type in a copy from the bottom of a business card? Yes If Kong says a signature is good, and the public key agrees with a business card then the guy who wrote the business card is claiming to be the author of the message. Actually you do not have to check all 43 characters. It is sufficient to check the first ten characters, or any ten characters. > Some of the documentation says something about the key being > derived from your passphrase and a randomness file hashed > together. How does this affect multiple keys generated by the > same user? I assume it means you can't share passphrases > between keys. If two keys have the same passphrase, but a different secret file, then they will be two completely different keys. However, the same passphrase, and the same file, means the same key. The secret file is merely concatenated with the secret file >5) Is the format of the signature freeform, or do the newlines and > whitespace have to be in their official locations? Minor flexibility. You can add or remove leading blanks, and use either lf or cr or both. It is not totally rigid, but it is pretty rigid. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG Uy36NbrQf/3FKV77cTtzFrHxsy0dcx9l6Svy/Fl5 xP+I6vLpjTgacrHEqXoD3gv+HF9Tx4Zl+0yDGhQF

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Re: Columbian squib on Bell sentencing
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 12/13/97 9:38 AM, frissell(a)panix.com (frissell(a)panix.com) passed this wisdom: >>>From The Columbian's web site at >><http://www.columbian.com/newsroom/topstories.html>: >> >> 'Assassination Politics' >> author gets 11 months >> >> TACOMA, Wash. - James Dalton Bell, the Vancouver man who >> wrote an Internet essay entitled "Assassination Politics," was >>sentenced this morning to 11 months in prison and two to three years >>of tightly supervised probation. > >Eleven *whole* months (8 months served already). They've got to be >kidding. > >This is misdemeanor territory. I know he was chicken enough to plead >but Milken pleaded and got 10 years! We're quaking in our boots out >here. ... hmmmm ... any hint of resrictions? i.e like not being able to use a computer or be on the Internet??? Considering how much they harped about the A.P. scheme I would have thought that would have been a centerpiece of any punishment they meted out to Jim. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJL02j7r4fUXwraZAQG1Ogf/W/3Sq5L+KNmWQuNryYqXSlykB0zELONA bsdlh7X6OslhB0vcfDzTlScfHTAV0dSI3PjHRvVIxAa8/ofQqNsD3zBxT8yoeJ79 ++KkprNFbDBleOR5OQk2R4dh8NkxeSe/j64snL8ra4duipjWfizqaM/5He2+dYgy SdI6IVzQUFPbXUQEk5AFb0r9s0E5/3YFPK7dp6KpXilIbFWPweTzsZKn5UamsdBR m0rmWu+uH+5xL0+xbE5P0zGOEJtXzdaovQS8RSfKfOd3Fdnh75NFewPufM1aNDKd yfvmRHZLt3zwn9bNqd0tavSPo2hO66pQsIIM3sP4S0hF7Xp0PLTV3A== =y+eC -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "One of the deep mysteries to me is our logo, the symbol of lust and knowledge, bitten into, all crossed with in the colors of the rainbow in the wrong order. You couldn't dream of a more appropriate logo: lust, knowledge, hope, and anarchy." -- Gassee - Apple Logo

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Jim Bell Revisited
by Human Gus-Peter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Gag Broiled wrote: >>Phillip M. Hallam-Baker <hallam(a)ai.mit.edu> wrote: >>>FC folk may find this interesting. What Jim Bell was charged >>>with and admitted was planning and executing attacks on the >>>IRS. >> >>No, that's not correct. Half-Baked knows that, but with his bowling-mentality, he thinks he has a better chance of throwing a strike if he puts a little spin on his balls, while twisting Jim's. >>He was charged with (and plead guilty to) >>obstructing an IRS agent (26 USC 7212(a)) and misuse of a Social Security >>number (42 USC 408). The "attack" he admitted to executing consisted of >>applying a stinky chemical to the doormat of an IRS office. (see >><http://jya.com/jimbell-dock4.htm> for more.) Was that FELONY 'Making a bad smell'? I farted in an IRS office once (on purpose). Am I a Jim Bell co-conspirator? Are my armpits considered a felony or a misdemeanor? The government misuses my Social Security Number to steal my money. Where do I press charges? Can I place airline employees under citizen's arrest when they demand it? >>It's >>interesting to note that the prosecutor and the defense concurred in >>recommending to the judge that Jim receive a sentence at the low end of the >>permissible range, while the probation department (which acts as an >>"attitude police") urged a sentence of 27 months, at or near the upper end >>of the applicable guidelines. >> >>Jim's analysis of AP and its relationship to our legal/political/social >>structure was poor, and his behavior juvenile and indefensible. He did not, >>however, present a credible threat to the IRS, nor should he be punished >>more harshly because of his political views/ideas. Winter winds blow both ways. >>We should not let distaste/disgust for Jim's ideas and tactics blind us to >>the important legal and constitutional questions lurking beneath the >>surface of this investigation and prosecution - there's some possibility >>that the IRS used its investigation of Jim as a threat to other prolific >>authors on the Internet. The government's armed assault on Ma and Pa Bell's residence took place within hours of an email being sent to him containing a rough draft of a chapter of an InterNet published manuscript describing and lauding Bell's AP system. >>For example, copies of the press release announcing the raid on Jim's home >>were mailed, apparently from computer systems inside the IRS, to >>individuals active on the Cypherpunks list. The IRS has never before (or >>since) bothered to notify those individuals about criminal investigations >>which might otherwise be of interest. It is interesting to note that the emails from treasury.gov constituted the same type of 'threat' that Bell was roundly accused of by government officials and the press. >>One easy conclusion to reach is that >>the raid was intended to chill those individuals' expressive activity on >>the Net with respect to Jim and his ideas and the interplay between >>taxation and anonymity and cryptography. The winter wind blows both ways. It is also easy to reach the conclusion that the AP-BOT results sent to the Oregonian and to the officials involved (via their internal email systems) played a hand in the judges 'vacation' before Bell's delayed sentencing. (Or that petty government officials involved in Bell's case were not impressed with the fact that they were becoming the source of valuable digital prizes in the AP-BOT community, without receiving the same protection as those who were behind the criminal malefeasance directed at Bell.) >>Further, it's worth considering carefully the relationship between Jim's >>legitimate and constitutionally protected political speech and the criminal >>trial process. To what extent did Jim's outspokenness about the IRS >>influence its interest in investigating and prosecuting him? To what extent >>was his protected speech used to argue that he was ineligible for release >>on bail pretrial? To what extent did his extended pretrial incarceration >>pressure him to plead guilty? Bell's persecution was straight out of the spook's political torture- indoctrination handbook. The only difference is that many aspects of the turning of Bell's thumbscrews were made public (just before tax-time, surprise, surprise). >>To what extent >>will his protected speech be used to measure his compliance with the terms >>of his supervised release? That was half of the purpose of his persecution. "We the people" were the other half of the sacrificial lamb targeted for cold-storage. >>But cases like Jim's demonstrate that there's a considerable >>gulf between the high-school-civics-class idea that we are all equal before >>the law and the practical world of the criminal trial system. Jim was >>treated specially at every stage of this process because of what he's >>written, and that should make every person who values free political >>expression uncomfortable. Jim's case demonstrates that we're moving closer >>to a country where one can be prosecuted for thoughtcrime. The corollary to this is that we are moving closer to a country where we will need to take up arms in both meatspace and cyberspace if we wish to defend our basic human rights. (Former NRA members are unlikely to take any more consolation from the government's expressed desire to only want to ban 'strong' crypto, than they were from the government's incremental announcements that they only want to ban criminal/assault/dangerous-looking/kind-of-scary/citizen's guns.) Rage Against The Machine Lock And Load Lock And Loll Human Gus-Peter-San <gold(a)toad.com>

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Re: Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > X-No-Archive: yes > :> That must mean that I'm harassing you as well, right? > : > :That is exactly my objection to the tactics of Gary Burnore and the DataBasix > :gang. > > You've posted no evidence tactics were EVER used. Naturally, you expect > everyone to believe you and naturally, a few like sam will. I don't expect anybody to "believe me". That's why I have posted a URL to a post by Jeff Burchell in which he outlines your tactics, such as your demand that he turn over his logs to you, which would have had the effect of compromising the remailer's security and eroding confidence in it. Is that really what you wanted? For remailer users to distrust the remailer net and stop using it? You have still not explained why you wanted the remailer logs and what you intended to do with the names and addresses contained therein. > : He calls > :the kind of discussion that the three of us are engaging in "harassment", and > :has even, upon occasion, accused posts critical of him of constituting > :"libel". > > You have from time to time constituted libel. Would you care to prove that? Saying something that Gary Burnore or Belinda Bryan don't like is not "libel". To be "libel" a statement must be both DEFAMATORY as well as FALSE. While being reminded of your own actions several months ago might prove to be embarassing, it's not libel. What was really laughable was when your fellow DataBasix staff member Billy McClatchie accused another anonymous usenet poster of "slander"! He must have gone to the same law school as Belinda. <g> > That's not abuse. Your > harassment is only that, harassment. The ABUSE is UCE-Baiting. The fact that > some remailer operators are now taking measures to prevent UCE-Baiting is > evidence not only that the problem existed, but that something COULD be done > about it. That's not what Jeff's post said. It said that your pretext for demanding his user logs was an "unflattering post", not all this nonsense about "spam baiting" that you invented later. My "harassment"? You keep whining about my so-called "harassment", but you have yet to prove ANY of it. > :Actually, Gary may unwittingly prove to be a "friend" of remailers, yet. > > > Unwittingly? I was never NOT a friend of remailers. YOU on the otherhand may > simply be unwittingly trying to shut them down. I happen to believe you're > doing it on purpose, but maybe, just maybe, you have no clue what you're > doing. What would people have to be smoking (and inhaling) to believe that nonsense? Anyone who demands that a remailer operator violate the privacy of all of his users to placate one chronic whiner is no "friend" to remailers. Such "friends" they can do without. What do you think it would have done for the reputation of remailer security if Jeff had actually kept logs and had turned them over to individuals such as you and Belinda? Do you really think it would be more "pro remailer" to just pretend that your attempt to attempt to obtain sendmail logs from the Huge Cajones Remailer didn't occur? Of the two of us, I'm the one that admits to actually USING remailers. For me to try to shut them down would make no sense. > If you don't like being called the anon asshole, stop being an asshole. If you don't like being called anti-privacy, stop being anti-privacy.

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Ok children...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Would you gentlemen be so kind as to take your personal and apparently petty squabble elsewhere? Thanks for your prompt help with this matter. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________| Forwarded message: > From owner-cypherpunks(a)ssz.com Sat Dec 13 16:27:26 1997 > Date: Sat, 13 Dec 1997 23:04:07 +0100 (MET) > Message-Id: <199712132204.XAA04453(a)basement.replay.com> > To: mail2news(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, > mail2news(a)basement.replay.com, m2n(a)alpha.jpunix.com > From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) > Organization: Replay and Company UnLimited > > X-001: Replay may or may not approve of the content of this posting > X-002: Report misuse of this automated service to <abuse(a)replay.com> > X-URL: http://www.replay.com/remailer/ > Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server,alt.cypherpunks,news.admin.net-abuse.email,alt.privacy,alt.censorship,comp.org.eff.talk > Subject: Re: Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed > References: <66ssjm$bei(a)examiner.concentric.net> <199712131402.PAA10108(a)basement.replay.com> <3494afd2.148597235(a)nntp.best.ix.netcom.com> > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)ssz.com > Precedence: bulk > X-Mailing-List: cypherpunks(a)ssz.com > X-List-Admin: list(a)ssz.com > X-Loop: ssz.com > X-Language: English, Russian, German > > gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > > > X-No-Archive: yes > > > :> That must mean that I'm harassing you as well, right? > > : > > :That is exactly my objection to the tactics of Gary Burnore and the DataBasix > > :gang. > > > > You've posted no evidence tactics were EVER used. Naturally, you expect > > everyone to believe you and naturally, a few like sam will. > > I don't expect anybody to "believe me". That's why I have posted a URL to a > post by Jeff Burchell in which he outlines your tactics, such as your demand > that he turn over his logs to you, which would have had the effect of > compromising the remailer's security and eroding confidence in it. Is that > really what you wanted? For remailer users to distrust the remailer net and > stop using it? You have still not explained why you wanted the remailer logs > and what you intended to do with the names and addresses contained therein. > > > : He calls > > :the kind of discussion that the three of us are engaging in "harassment", and > > :has even, upon occasion, accused posts critical of him of constituting > > :"libel". > > > > You have from time to time constituted libel. > > Would you care to prove that? Saying something that Gary Burnore or Belinda > Bryan don't like is not "libel". To be "libel" a statement must be both > DEFAMATORY as well as FALSE. While being reminded of your own actions > several months ago might prove to be embarassing, it's not libel. > > What was really laughable was when your fellow DataBasix staff member Billy > McClatchie accused another anonymous usenet poster of "slander"! He must have > gone to the same law school as Belinda. <g> > > > That's not abuse. Your > > harassment is only that, harassment. The ABUSE is UCE-Baiting. The fact that > > some remailer operators are now taking measures to prevent UCE-Baiting is > > evidence not only that the problem existed, but that something COULD be done > > about it. > > That's not what Jeff's post said. It said that your pretext for demanding his > user logs was an "unflattering post", not all this nonsense about "spam baiting" > that you invented later. > > My "harassment"? You keep whining about my so-called "harassment", but you > have yet to prove ANY of it. > > > :Actually, Gary may unwittingly prove to be a "friend" of remailers, yet. > > > > > > Unwittingly? I was never NOT a friend of remailers. YOU on the otherhand may > > simply be unwittingly trying to shut them down. I happen to believe you're > > doing it on purpose, but maybe, just maybe, you have no clue what you're > > doing. > > What would people have to be smoking (and inhaling) to believe that nonsense? > Anyone who demands that a remailer operator violate the privacy of all of his > users to placate one chronic whiner is no "friend" to remailers. Such > "friends" they can do without. What do you think it would have done for the > reputation of remailer security if Jeff had actually kept logs and had turned > them over to individuals such as you and Belinda? > > Do you really think it would be more "pro remailer" to just pretend that your > attempt to attempt to obtain sendmail logs from the Huge Cajones Remailer > didn't occur? > > Of the two of us, I'm the one that admits to actually USING remailers. For me > to try to shut them down would make no sense. > > > If you don't like being called the anon asshole, stop being an asshole. > > If you don't like being called anti-privacy, stop being anti-privacy. >

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Ad Gaolas Deliberandas
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Y2K ANNOUNCE>> If I were President/Dictator
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Fri, 12 Dec 1997 09:06:22 -0600 (CST) >To: Year2000.com-Announcement-List(a)year2000.com >From: Year2000_Outbound_Mail_See_Below(a)year2000.com >Subject: Y2K ANNOUNCE>> If I were President/Dictator >Sender: owner-year2000-announce(a)year2000.com > >Last month Peter de Jager announced a contest to submit >suggestions about what you would do about the year 2000 >problem if you were president (of any country) for a day. >Peter also suggested that humorous entries be submitted >with the title "If I were supreme dictator!" Below you >will find the winning entries along with some of the >honorable mentions. --Cliff Kurtzman > >-------------------------------------------------------- >Greetings folks, > > The "If I were President" contest winner (out of 99 >entries) is Nancy L. Osterhaus. The "If I were Dictator" >contest winner (out of 20 entries) is Richard Kennard. >You will find both entries below, along with a number of >the honorable mentions. > > Contests are tough... I find a 'winner' out of the >many good and excellent submissions to always come down >to a handful of choices... and choosing at that point >is honestly a random event. It is seldom a winner is a >'certain' winner. Nancy... you won... and the others? >several came very close and two others were a toss up. > > The "If I were Dictator" entries were even tougher >to judge. Especially since after awhile... some were >beginning to make sense!!! (I need to get a life!) >Sad thing is... some of these are considered as serious >suggestions by some of the people I've spoken with over >the years. > > > I can only do my best... > Peter de Jager, pdejager(a)year2000.com >======================================================== > > >IF I WERE PRESIDENT >=================== > >Winning Entry: > >From: "Nancy L. Osterhaus" >To: pdejager(a)year2000.com >Date: Tue, 21 Oct 1997 16:55:37 -0500 >Subject: If I were President > >Action Items: > >1. Communication to the world the magnitude of the problem, the real >issues, the real impact > >This is a denial project. Most people do not understand the impact of the >year 2000 on them.. on their lifestyle, the way they do business, and their >health and future. I work in a large company that has a strong awareness >campaign, but during my "time off" talk to local businesses, hospitals, >etc. They are very unaware of the issues. If the grand Y2K world-wide >project, is to succeed, we need to get past the first phase .... >Communication & Commitment. The president could enable this by holding a >Town Meeting with a panel of experts to explain the problem, impact, >solution, and government plans for compliance. > >2. Commitment to prioritize and repair of what he's responsible for >(Government systems, banking, infrastructure, etc.) > >Publishing a plan to show people that this is a serious issue, and the >government has taken the step of prioritizing their systems and developed a >plan to ensure compliance. Publish the individual department plans, >lessons learned, etc. > >3. Publicly report on the progress of government Y2K projects on a regular >basis (at least quarterly) > >Report to the nation and to the world on the progress of year 2000 >compliance in the government sector. By providing regular updates to the >nation we will gain increased awareness of the issues and in addition we >can hold our government accountable for their projects and progress towards >compliance. > >Nancy > >========================================================================== > >And here are a selection of other suggestions: Some of the good ones, >most of the great ones and a handful of ringers. You decide which is which. >Yours truly, Peter. > >From: "Dyer, Wayne" > >1. Request congress to modify tax code > The costs of a company making corrections for Year 2000 should be >considered an investment in the future - therefore they should be >treated favorably at tax time. Everything possible should be done to >encourage companies to deal with the problem - and tax policy is the key >way to influence business decisions. > >2. Limit year 2000 liability > The year 2000 problem was caused by "standard practices" in the >software industry. No company should have to worry about mega lawsuits >because of year 2000. Companies can be held accountable for the quality >of their products, but absolutely nothing will be gained by shareholder >suits against companies merely because they didn't start early enough to >fully correct the problem > >3. Change Social Security earnings limits > Retired programmers should be encouraged to "come out" of >retirement to >work on year 2000. Because social security benefits are reduced for each >dollar earned above a set limit, many will probably not want to work. >This limit should be waived for people working on YR2K. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: Kevin Whelan > >1. Require Y2K preparedness report from all organizations. >Require all organizations to file a standard report that would be >available via Internet on their Y2K preparedness status. > >2. All software/hardware vendors publish Y2K info on Internet. >Require all manufacturers and software vendors to publish by specific >model and/or version the Y2K compliance status of each of their products in >use, to be viewable on the Internet. > >3. Monthly Y2K TV program during prime time. >The government will sponsor an hour Y2K awareness TV program monthly >during prime time from 1998 until it's over. > >Kevin >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: Iain MacKenzie > >1. Raise awareness. Real awareness. Tell the people that this is a *real* >problem, on *all* makes, models, types of computer. Tell them that >*everything* >should be checked. Explain *why*. Explain the difference between 'is >capable of >storing' and 'is actually populated with' and the connection this has to >2-digit data entry, for example. > >2. Explain what every computer-owner should be doing. Tell them what they need >to do to check and resolve their own problems. This is the 'facts and data' >part of the message. > >3. Talk about scheduling and panic. There *is* time to fix the problem. (There >*has* to be, the time is fixed. We (Y2k folk) will have to vary our >solution as >time goes by). If all companies establish a plan and follow it we will all end >up with a h*** of a party on 31/12/1999 but no major problems. A sort of 'Your >*Company* Needs YOU' message. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: "Mau, Michelle" > >IF I WERE A PRESIDENT.. >1. Make Giants Pay >Make the major computer giants - SUN, IBM, MICROSOFT, SAP, ORACLE, >etc, to contribute $1 billion each for each year until the year 2001 to >fund the awareness campaign of the y2k. The idea is to highlight the >criticality side of y2k which is a business problem - not just an IT >problem. Everyone from floor operations right through to the middle >management up to the senior management should be aware of this bug and >its impact to the running of the business. School children should also >have some idea what this is all about as they are our growing IT >customers. Most of them are already familiar with the Internet and >computer games. It is time for IT to lift its game and include everyone >on y2k - equity through IT is great to break down the social barriers >and the barriers of haves and haves-not. > >2. TAX Incentives >Have an incentive program for SMEs (Small and Medium sized enterprises) >to have at least 70 percent tax deductions for their expenses in >managing and fixing y2k bug before Dec 31, 1999. After Dec 31, 1999, the >tax deduction will be lowered to 30 percent so that these organisations >will be motivated to start their y2k project now than later to make such >claims from their tax. This is already happening in Singapore. It will >be great if developed nations like Australia could bring this policy >into effect immediately rather than leaving it a bit too late. SMEs >are the backbone of the industries in this country and they should be >assisted and motivated to launch their y2k project. y2k compliance >definition and testing tools should be made available to everyone via >the NET, brochures and awareness campaign which I have already >mentioned. Perhaps the example set by our Victoria Premier Jeff Kennett >in providing jobs to the unemployed to test software compliancy with >y2k using a set of standard tools should be applauded. > >3. Product Compliance Info through the NET >Use the web to publicise which products are y2k compliant. If these >products are not yet compliant, where do users get more updated info and >when will these products be compliant? Which version or model? What >course of action is recommended to users - retire, replace or risk it? >What about products which have embedded technology that may have impact >on the organisation? >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: "Dyer, Wayne" > >1. Request congress to modify tax code > The costs of a company making corrections for Year 2000 should be >considered >an investment in the future - therefore they should be treated favorably at >tax time. Everything possible should be done to encourage companies to deal >with the problem - and tax policy is the key way to influence business >decisions. > >2. Limit year 2000 liability > The year 2000 problem was caused by "standard practices" in the >software >industry. No company should have to worry about mega lawsuits because of year >2000. Companies can be held accountable for the quality of their products, >but absolutely nothing will be gained by shareholder suits against companies >merely because they didn't start early enough to fully correct the problem > >3. Change Social Security earnings limits > Retired programmers should be encouraged to "come out" of retirement >to work >on year 2000. Because social security benefits are reduced for each dollar >earned above a set limit, many will probably not want to work. This limit >should be waived for people working on YR2K. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: Noel Goyette > >1. Fire the head (not the CIO) of agencies which have not made real >progress now. Time is a lever which is rapidly getting shorter, and >agencies are laying this problem on the CIOs without resources. > >2. Get the SEC to investigate the real Y2K project status of industry, >starting with the embedded systems in the utilities. > >3. Reconsitute the Continuity of Operations Plans of the federal >government, which have been abandonded and unfunded as a result of the end >of the cold war. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: "Joe Allegra" > >1. Convene a meeting for a couple of days in Washington DC with >Government and Business Leaders to discuss this issue. I would prep >the meeting by coming up with a list of 10 questions that CEOs need >to ask themselves. For example: Do you a credible plan to become >Year 2000 compliant? How big is this IT project relative to other >IT projects? Has your IT staff ever attempted a project of this >size? What is the track record of your IT department in completing >large projects on time? If you lost all of your computer systems, >what would be the impact to your business. etc. etc. I would also >bring in people that could document through real live experiences >how big the project really is. > >Having a Washington based meeting convened by the President would get >the media into this in a big way. > >2. I would convene a high level group to monitor and report monthly >on the compliance activities of the key sectors of the economy. >Alan Greenspan to monitor the banking system; others to monitor >transportation, power, telecommunications. > >3. I would ask the Group of 7 (or is it 8) countries to convene a >special meeting to discuss this issue at the president/prime minister >level. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: Eugene Hatting > >1) Institute legislation that ALL government institutions must have >started taking adequate steps by December 1997, in order to address the >year 2000 problem. > >2) Institute legislation that all large non-governmental >companies/corporations who make a positive contribution towards the >economy, must have started taking adequate steps by December 1997, in order >to address the year 2000 problem. > >Hefty penalties and possible criminal prosecutions could follow if the >above institutions do not abide by these rulings. > >3) I would institute certain tax benefits or other insensitives to >those companies who have taken adequate steps to address the problem and/or >who have obtained year 2000 compliance (as defined by my governmental >department) by date x. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: Yvonne Rediger > >1. Tax break/incentive program for companies that are compliant by a >specific date. > The companies would have to prove compliancy by a set of citeria, >put in >place by a board, and that board would award #2. > >2. A CSA approved Logo. > The Logo could be placed on their products and displayed on >advertising >etc. proclaiming them Year 2000 Compliant. Thus selling insurance that >their company will be around in the coming years. Right now any company >can make that claim. > >3. Make government departments set specific delines for their own >compliancy and stick to them. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: Dr. Ibrahim El-Miligi > >a) Set up a presidential working group (please not a committee) to over see >that :- > * All government and semi-government organizations have or set up a >plan and initiated action to be Y2K compliant. If not then some penalties >should be levied (including the firing of some heads) > * Should report to me regularly in special meeting of cabinet >ministers. > >b) Media awareness! Medial will be instructed to focus on the Y2K problem >with interviews, discussion groups, research programs, case studies .. etc. >I noticed in my country that there is a miserable state of media awareness!! > >c) I will sponsor conferences and other forums to give the right perspective >to the public of the seriousness of the problem. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: Rick Mol > >The government should not be in the business decision business. The year >2000 issue is basically an issue for the various companies to solve >themselves. > >Historically, when government gets involved in making these types of >decisions, it doesn't do near as good of a job as the free market. What we >would end up with is a series of legislative fiats that are made by people >that have no concept of the problem. They seem to have this idea that "we >can pass a law and fix this". What will happen is that this will cost the >industry money and add more requirements. >So, if I were President, I'd get out of the they way and let industry solve >it themselves. They will do a MUCH better job than legislation will. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: Barry Blauer > > 1. Appoint a leader: > Choose a project leader to direct a project to make the entire > government (our enterprise) compliant for the Year2000. Give this > person authority to marshall the resources, establish the plan, and > direct the effort. > > 2. Issue the challenge: > Request every direct report to deliver a complete plan of handling > the Year2000 problems within his/her organization, including > resource requirements, Require prioritization from each group, > identifying mission-critical systems which would cause disasters if > they were allowed to fail. The plan needs to include a completion > date of 12/31/1998 for all renovation. > > 3. Inform the customers: > Develop a mechanism to report to the public the regular progress of > the project, within national security boundaries. Challenge > private industry to follow our lead, to ensure the entire country > will be prepared when the clock rolls over. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: MATTHEW CHAPMAN > >1) Ensure that there was a "Year 2000 Czar" in charge of Government >compliancy. This position/person would be chartered with first >establishing the state of where the Federal Government stands as a >whole in the scope of making the government systems Y2K compliant. >The fist "charter" of this Czar, would be to make sure the military is at the >head of the list, and that all possible scenarios are being investigated, >analyzed, and ultimately made to be compliant. > >2) I would personally address my fellow world leaders with the same >charge, for them to actively pursue this issue as a "top" priority, once >again with initial focus on their weapons stockpiles and missile silos. > >3) I would provide periodic updates to the nation, as to the status of the >country as a whole. This would acknowledge the Y2K issue as one of >importance, that should not be ignored or postponed any longer. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: Ric Kelperis > > 1) Recognize the importance of resource continuity, and waive taxes > for all I/S employees that maintain their current employment. This > would not only incent people to stay where they are, but to perform > well also. > > 2) Assign a United States Year 2000 Secretary > > 3) Require a public quarterly status report from all departments of > government. > > 4) Require independent certification for all life threatening > situations, such as air traffic controlling software, etc. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: "William Baker" > >1. Assess the outcome which is most predictable, given the > actions in motion in government and the private sector. > Charter a highly visible and media exposed team to report > this assessment by Q1 1998. > >2. Pass legislation limiting legal and liability ramifications of > non-compliant systems, try to avoid a disaster in the courts, > frivolous law suits, and the destruction of the US economy > by lawyers. > >3. Establish a SWAT team ( or teams ) which can be directed at > the most serious problems of internal and interfacing > conversion and education issues within pinpointed Federal > government " hot spots." >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: nara > >Rename the year after 1999 as 199A (A for 10 in hex): > >Call an international conference of all world leaders (UN would have >served a useful purpose) and rename the year after 1999 as 199A. > >Declare 'A' as a character as well as a integer in all new programs. > >This would at least buy us some time and name the year after 199A as >2000. We can buy more time by renaming the following year as 199B and >so on... >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: John Austin > >1. Let the public know. The American public is still mostly unaware >that there is a problem. The president needs to let the American public >know that everyone may have problems in 2000 or even before--and that it >might be your bank, gas station, power company, etc. that might fail. > >2. Wake the US government up. Many agencies still have not got a >workable Year 2000 plan. Chief concerns are the Defense Department and >the IRS (which finds itself asking for more and more money). While more >attention is being paid to the latter, with budget crunches we are >likely to come a cropper on 1 January 2000 (or later). > >3. Sell Y2K Budget to Congress. To do all this will cost many many >dollars. A chief issue will of course be to get these increased budgets >for these agencies through this Congress, which wants to cut deficits. >A sales job showing that money spent now will save more later is needed. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: "Vernon K. Jacobs" > >(1) begin the development of a backup system to substitute >a national sales tax (either temporary or permanent) to secure >government revenues when the IRS computer systems stop working >after 12/31/99, > >(2) veto any legislation that will require added time and funds >to be spent on computer systems to the extent that any new >projects would compete with resources needed for the year-2000 >efforts > >(3) require an immediate study of all government agencies and >activities that are not essential to the survival of the country >and develop a plan to shut down the systems of those agencies >or projects until all other agencies have become 2000-compliant. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: "Bruins, David " > >First: >I would request a press conference in the morning with representatives >from both national news and computing periodicals. Representatives from >companies that have successfully converted their software would be >asked to attend and answer questions. The emphasis would NOT be on what >COULD happen, but on what to do to fix it so NOTHING happens. Enough >has been said on the potential problems and almost nothing has been said >on how to fix it. > >Second: >I would request that any Government organization that is still running >this effort as a development project to halt the "development cycle" and >start identifying and fixing code. The point must be made clear that >this is not a 'Development' project. This is a system bug. The process >that is required to correct system bugs must be followed, not the >development cycle. We are not developing anything new, we are fixing >code that does not work. > >Third: >I would propose a bill that would require that all systems, that may >cause the loss of human life due to a software or hardware failure due >to the turn of the century, be certified by 12/01/1998. All identified >systems would be published, monthly up to that date and weekly after >that date, as being certified or not certified. Use of uncertified >systems would be illegal after November 1999 attempted manslaughter. >The number 1 criteria for certification would be that the system can be >tested for what will happen at the turn of the century. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: "Rice, Bernie" > >1. I'd use the bully pulpit. Encourage public not to panic but to >be aware, and encourage the business community to pool efforts to >address the problem, like they did with regard to High Definition >Television. >2. Establish a national telephone tree among Fortune 500 companies >to allow them to assist each other in the event of a crisis in any one >organization. >3. Take this unprecedented opportunity to deliberately dismantle >the IRS as we know it. If no one else does, Year-2000 complications >undoubtedly will, and with no forethought at all. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: Capers Jones > >1) Suspend anti-trust regulations for all year 2000 repairs and >encourage key industries to pool their year 2000 work. Key industries >include banks, insurance, defense, telecommunications, airlines, public >utilities, etc. > >2) Have the IRS issue a public statement that they will not >automatically come after taxpayers whose returns are messed up due to >year 2000 errors. Since the IRS itself will probably not be compliant, >this is the least they could do. > >3) Have the OMB publish a weekly update on year 2000 status of all >federal agencies, with contact information on all Y2K offices so that >citizens who have problems will know who to deal with. This should >start in January of 1999 if not earlier. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: "Dominic Ng" > > 1) Setting up the standard for the Y2K problem solution > > Nowaday, the Y2K solutions between different consulting firms > are different. If each systems are stand alone, well that's ok. > However, they are communicating with each other through EDI or > network, incompatibility between each system may worsen the > situation. Therefore solution standard is very important in > term of windowing or date format. > > 2) Asking the supervision from Federal Reserve department > and Technology department > > In the Y2K problem, the most suffering group would be financial > institution because their business are highly depend on electronic > exchange in term of date calculation. For this reason, Federal > Reserve department and Technology department should supervise their > Y2K projects meeting the deadline. The main aim is to avoid the > crashdown of financial market. > > 3) Financial assistance for the poor companies > in Y2K project > > Y2K project is a expensive project especially for the old system > because the skill is uncommon. Some small-sized or medium-size > companies may not be able to prepare resource for Y2K project > within a short period of time. Therefore government should provide > financial assistance such as loan for the poor companies in Y2K > project. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- >From: (no name only e-mail address) > >I would just ignore the whole year 2000 and leave it for the Republicans to >deal with > >I would raise taxes to help the government deal with the problem and redirect >the tax revenue to my pet projects > >I would assign the project to Hillary to set up a task force and raise public >awareness and get them off my back about the other issues >------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > >============================================================ >============================================================ >============================================================ >============================================================ >============================================================ > > >IF I WERE DICTATOR: >=================== > >Here's richard winning entry. >From: Richard Kennard >Date: Thu, 23 Oct 1997 08:50:29 -0500 > >"If I were supreme dictator" > >I'd give it to Hilary to fix. > >============================================================ > >Honorable mentions: > >From: "jtepley" > >1) Declare martial law and appoint a Y2K Czar to triage government, >industry, and company functions and systems. > >2) Draft anyone with professional computer experience, leaving 50% at their >current employer and using the other 50% to work on high priority (triaged) >government, industry, and company systems. Shoot selected protesters as >examples. > >3) Pass and enforce a law that requires all citizens to "kiss their ass >goodbye" every morning when they wake up until the year 2025. >----------------------------- > >From: "Dyer, Wayne" > >1. Declare that year 2010 follows year 1999. Then declare that 1999 was >really 2009, 1998 was really 2008, etc. etc. It would be much more >efficient to just change all the dates in files without changing date >logic. This would work in about 75% of the instances where companies only >deal with a few years in the future or the past. > >2. Change our current 7 day a week calendar to a 10 day a week calendar. >That way nobody would know what days of the week dates fell on in the past, >so nobody would care if date logic was fouled up! > >3. Make anybody who screams about the imminent collapse of society on Jan >1, 2000 write 10,000,000 times "I will not try to incite panic for my own >benefit anymore". >----------------------------- > >From: Brad_Balassaitis > >1. Copyright the Phrase "Year 2000" >The first thing I would do is copyright the phrase "Year 2000" so that I >could charge royalties (or sue for infringement as the case may be) every >time it is printed, spoken, or even thought of. (I'm supreme dictator, so I >can copyright common words!) I would make a fortune (which I would keep in >cash under my mattress, of course). > >2. Collect the Royalties and Infringement Damages >Next, I would assign the entire staff of the CIA to spend all of their time >checking for copyright infringements, so that I could collect my rightful >royalties and infringement damages. > >3. Move to a Country that is Compliant! >Finally, I would move myself, my family, and my fortune to the first >country that is totally year 2000 compliant!!! Thus, I have (a) made a >fortune because of the problem, (b) put no thought, stress, or effort into >solving it, and (c) gone to a place where the problem is already taken care >of! (How truly American of me!) >----------------------------- > >From: Eric de Katow > >Plan-A: Hire Superman to rotate the earth backward, just like he did to >save Lois Lane, except he will go a couple years back. Then he will be in >charge of convincing the World of the magnitude of the Y2K problem and need >for readiness. > >Plan-B: Enact a law that will make the Year 2000 the Year 1900. > >Plan-C: Become a lawyer. >----------------------------- > >From: Eugene > >1) Have all calendars in America changed to tick over on 31 December >1999, to 1900 when the clock strikes 12:00. All other countries (trade >partners) would then just have to fit in with this arrangement (In South >Africa we have a saying: "Adapt or Die"). > >2) In case some companies forgot to change their calendars to the >above ruling, these companies/individuals will be forced to do business >with ONLY those who are not year 2000 compliant and will pay a penalty of >$1 000 000,00 per day for every day they are not compliant. > >3) If the above two rules are not feasible, I would use the satellites >which Bill Gates planes to have put into space, to automatically download >the latest Windows 2000 and Office 2000 software on all computers across >America. A rule would then be implemented that everybody WILL be forced to >use the Microsoft products. >----------------------------- > >From: Marilyn Nolin > >I would declare that when the year rolls over to 2000, it would actually be >1900! Like any good politician, I would pass the buck to the next >generations. > >----------------------------- > >From: Dr. I. El-Miligi > >Dear Peter, >As in many countries (first, second or third world) scapegoats are required >to celebrate the turn of the centure. So, if I were a Zomba King, this is >what I would do :- > >a) Set up a royal commission headed by the most hated minister and assign >to them to solve the year 2YK problem > >b) Set up another royal commision to see that the first commission does NOT >achieve its goals > >c) Set up a court martial on the eve of the first day of the 21 first >century to execute the responsible persons In this way, the blame is place >somewhere the our good people will get rid the hated minister, Sorry, but >the Y2K is not solved yet. > >May our royal blessings be with you, >----------------------------- > >From: Herve Klein > >i would first ban all computers in my country and replace all of them with >chinese type abacuses. > >second, it would create so many jobs that all economical crisis would >disappear, giving all unemployed enough work for centuries : replacers of >obsolete plastic computers by sweet wooden frames, manufacturers of modern >automatic abacuses, finger assisted trainers, ... > >third, wait for 1st january 2000 world crisis to sell (high price) my >nation's knowledge to all other worldwide countries in need as i would have >become, then, a visionary precursor ! > >----------------------------- > >From: "Rice, Bernie" > >If I were supreme dictator... >1. I'd Issue Year-2000 bonds. Lots of 'em. Redeemable when government >computer (non-Y2K compliant) reaches 2000 AD (1999,1900,1901...) > >2. Simplify things and decree AD 2000 shall be The Year of Rice One. >(Well, Rice Zero, I suppose.) > >3. Avoid holiday travel in year-end 1999. >----------------------------- > >From: "Hughes, Rich" > >If I were Supreme Dictator/President Clinton for a day, what would I tell >the world about the Year2000 problem? I would: > >1.) Tell the CIO's/CEO's of all american companies that this Year2000 >"problem" is a fabrication by some opportunistic consulting companies and >that they really have nothing to worry about. If they haven't started by >January 1998, let them die (their company) with dignity, don't point out >their mismanagement. > >2.) Tell the world the truth, the US Federal Government has been treating >this so lightly that many of the agencies are going to be so screwed up >that they are going to have to hire 100,000's of thousands additional >do-nothings at exorbitant salaries and that the average citizen is going to >pay an additional $10,000 per year in income tax due to the poor planning >by the government managers. > >3.) Wish the Republican president that follows him the best of luck in >straightening out the mess.From: Tfshub(a)aol.com >Date: Sat, 25 Oct 1997 10:48:10 -0400 (EDT) To: pdejager(a)year2000.com >Subject: if I were supreme dictator > >I would announce a press release that welfare checks would be cut off >and ask everyone to write to their representative and threaten to not elect >them again if the problem was not solved. This would get the problem fixed >in short order > >i would change the calendar so the problem would not happen >we could just add another month to get us through the swearing in of the >new president > >----------------------------- > >From: Norbert Fassotte > >I would simply shoot everyone who has a Y2K-problem. > >A problem is only a problem if you make it a problem. So if I shoot >everyone who detects something and makes it a problem, I don't have a >problem. >----------------------------- > >From: mathew_hennessy > >...I'd remove any and all enforcement efforts towards Y2k compliance. I'd >then buy up lots of precious metals, flee to the Bahamas, and watch gold >prices spike above $1000/oz while the financial markets melt. > >Just a touch of fantasy before Halloween.. >----------------------------- > >From: Rob Janes > >If I were Dictator I would tell people to start at least 5 years ago on the >Year 2000 problem. > >I used that approach and all the applications I am responsible for are in >good shape. It's a lot of fun watching people going into panic mode now >over the problem. > >----------------------------- > >From: harold.carruther > >1) Proclaim the every CEO must personally renovate and implement at least >1,000,000 lines of COBOL code per year or be sentenced to death by being >folded, spindled, and mutilated like a Hollerith card > >then > >2) Proclaim Bill Gates to be the official CEO for the remainder of the >world he doesn't already control > >then > >3) Double the annual quota >----------------------------- > >From: Conor Brankin > >If I were dictator I would announce that the year 2000 was a virtual >concept, and that time shall revert to the year 1900, right after the year >1999. > >This would give the developers another 100 years to get it sorted out. >After all, we change an hour twice a year, why not a century one a >millenium. >----------------------------- > >That's all folks... Hope you enjoyed them... > >Have fun! >Peter de Jager > > >********** IF YOU WANT TO REMOVE YOURSELF FROM THIS LIST > >If you want to get off this list, please follow these >directions exactly. > >Replying to this e-mail will NOT work; your mail will be >returned. It's not that we don't want to hear from you, it's >just that we want to receive your communication in a way >that we can provide the best service to you. > >If you want to leave this list, e-mail ONLY the word >UNSUBSCRIBE in the body or content of the message to the >e-mail address: > > year2000-announce-request(a)year2000.com > >You should receive a message back saying that you have been >unsubscribed. > >Be aware that you are sending an e-mail to a computer list >processor, and any extra text you include in your message >will probably mess up your attempt to get off the list. So >please just send the word UNSUBSCRIBE without any signature >or other words. Please check that you spell the word >UNSUBSCRIBE and the e-mail address correctly, or it will >not work. > >If you receive a message back indicating that your e-mail >address "is not a member of list 'year2000-announce'", then >please send an e-mail, **with your subscription e-mail >address**, to us at owner-year2000-announce(a)year2000.com >and explain what happened. This usually occurs because you >subscribed using a different address than your e-mail >program reports as your return address. Just send us the >address you want removed at >owner-year2000-announce(a)year2000.com and our (human) mail >list administrator will help you out. > >This list is NOT the Year 2000 Discussion List. If you need >assistance with the Discussion List, please send >correspondence to amy(a)year2000.com > >

1 0

replay.com
by The Sheriff 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Greets, kiddies! Quick question. Has anything constructive come out of nobody(a)replay.com in the past month? I've just signed on with this mailing list, and all I ever read from that anon addy is a flame regarding one person or another. Personally, unless at least a couple folks using replay.com have pitched in usefull information in the past while, I'm irate enough to open up my .kill file. Thanks for your help, The Sheriff.

1 0

new
by wtshaw＠itexas.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

jsjia jixrb xpmmt i/bhi tigzz wvrsy smyvo rhxvi jrznw uvyjl nnpye ajsbq bwirh -- wtshaw(a)itexas.net--crypto: maintaining the right to develop, publish, and distribute works of my own creation. Bernstein case: appeal to be heard on December 8th

1 0

Nobody will debate John Gilmore on crypto?
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[John Gilmore stopped by for this afternoon's crypto gathering to update us on the Bernstein lawsuit. Seems odd to me that he can't find someone to defend the administration's stance on encryption, especially since NSA's headquarters is close to the University of Maryland. --Declan] ============== Subject: Gilmore speech in Baltimore on encryption policy, Tues night Date: Sat, 13 Dec 1997 21:35:12 -0800 From: John Gilmore <gnu(a)toad.com> To: cme(a)cybercash.com, declan(a)well.com From: "Dr. Alan Sherman" <sherman(a)cs.umbc.edu> The UMBC Security Technology Research Group presents Two Divergent Views on Encryption Policy: I. Wisdom and Constitutionality in U.S. Cryptography Policy John Gilmore, Co-Founder, Electronic Frontier Foundation II. A Government Perspective on Encryption Policy [Will anyone from the U.S. Government agree to speak??*] Two divergent views on the topic of encryption policy by freedom activist John Gilmore and by a government official, if one agrees to speak. Journalist Peter Wayner will moderate the event, which is free and open to the public. Note: If no one from the U.S. Government is willing to explain and discuss Government encryption policy, then the event will proceed with John Gilmore alone. 8-10:30 pm Tuesday, December 16, 1997 Lecture Hall III (in Administration Building) University of Maryland Baltimore County http://www.cs.umbc.edu/events/fall97/crypto.shtml The fifth employee of Sun Microsystems and a strong believer in the U.S. Constitution, John Gilmore is currently involved in litigation against several government agencies over matters of freedom of information, freedom of expression, and encryption policies. He will discuss the constitutionality of controlling encryption. Directions: Take Exit #47B off interstate I-95 and follow signs to UMBC. LH III is on the ground floor of the (tall) administration building, adjacent the visitor's parking lot, near the I-95 entrance to UMBC. Host: Dr. Alan T. Sherman Associate Professor, Computer Science sherman(a)cs.umbc.edu http://www.umbc.edu (410) 455-2666 This event is held in cooperation with the UMBC Intellectual Sports Council Honors College Phi Beta Kappa honors society CMSC Council of Majors IFSM Council of Majors * The following U.S. Government officials declined to speak on December 16: Barry Smith (Supervisory Special Agent, FBI) [Mr. Smith has agreed in principle to speak at UMBC in the spring on a law enforcement view of encryption policy; the evening of Dec 16 turned out to be a bad time for him.] William Reinsch (Undersecretary for Export Administration, BXA) Bob Litt (Attorney General's Office, DoJ) Scott Charney (Computer Crimes, DoJ) Bruce McConnell (Information Policy, OMB) Ron Lee (General Counsel, NSA) Dr. Clint Brooks (Director, Cryptographic Policy, NSA) Charlotte Knepper (Co-Chair, Inter-Agency Working Group on Encryption Policy) Chris McLean (Staffer for Senator Bob Kerry; helped draft legislation on encryption policy) I am still hopeful to find a second speaker by Tuesday evening.

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Foulmouthed Timothy May rehashes his lies like a rabid parrot choking on a stale mantra stuck in its poisonous beak. o/ \ / \ / / \o /# ##o # o## #\ Timothy May / \ / \ /o\ / |\ / \

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InfoWar EndGame (Part III of The True Story of the InterNet)
by Human Gus-Peter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<HTML> <HEAD> <META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1"> <TITLE>The True Story of the Internet Part II</TITLE> <META NAME="GENERATOR" CONTENT="Internet Assistant for Microsoft Word 2.04z"> </HEAD> <BODY> <HR> <HR> <CENTER>The True Story of the InterNet Part III </CENTER> <CENTER>InfoWar</CENTER> <CENTER>Final Frontier of the Digital Revolution</CENTER> <CENTER>Behind the ElectroMagnetic Curtain </CENTER> <CENTER>by TruthMonger <tm(a)dev.null> </CENTER> Copyright 1997 Pearl Publishing <HR> <HR> <CENTER>InfoWar Table of Contents </CENTER> <UL> <LI>Epilogue EG <LI>Nobody Calls From Vegas Just To Say Hello <LI>End Game / InfoWarez </UL> <HR> <CENTER><A NAME="Epilogue">Epilogue EG</A></CENTER> <HR> >From - Tue Dec 09 14:01:35 1997 Received: from toad.com (toad.com [140.174.2.1]) by orion.sk.sympatico.ca (8.8.6/8.8.6) with ESMTP id MAA14896 for <toto(a)sk.sympatico.ca>; Tue, 9 Dec 1997 12:57:24 -0600 (CST) Received: (from majordom@localhost) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) id KAA09835 for cypherpunks-unedited-outgoing; Tue, 9 Dec 1997 10:52:13 -0800 (PST) Received: from harrier.sasknet.sk.ca (harrier.sasknet.sk.ca [142.165.5.2]) by toad.com (8.7.5/8.7.3) with ESMTP id KAA09830 for <cypherpunks(a)toad.com>; Tue, 9 Dec 1997 10:52:10 -0800 (PST) Received: from smtp.sk.sympatico.ca (lohner27.sk.sympatico.ca [142.165.98.27]) by harrier.sasknet.sk.ca (8.8.6/8.8.6) with SMTP id MAA24686 for cypherpunks(a)toad.com; Tue, 9 Dec 1997 12:52:15 -0600 (CST) Message-Id: <199712091852.MAA24686(a)harrier.sasknet.sk.ca> Date: Tuesday, 09 Dec 97 13:51:52 EST To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com From: TruthMailer <hc(a)dev.null> X-Mailer: WinSock Remailer Version ALPHA1.3B X-Comments: - X-Comments: TruthMonger's Bait Shop & Plutonium Recycling Center X-Comments: - X-Comments: Does anyone know where I can get a transmission for a X-Comments: 49 Jimmy half-ton? X-Comments: Thanks, X-Comments: Ralph X-Comments: - X-Comments: This message is NOT from Ralph. 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NAME="NobodyCalls">Nobody Calls From Vegas Just To Say Hello </A></CENTER> FROM MOUNTAIN MEDIA FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE DATED DEC. 10, 1997 THE LIBERTARIAN, By Vin Suprynowicz How can we reduce voter turnout? Toby, somewhere in the Great Northwest, writes: "I am doing a research paper for my Sr. High School Government term paper. My assignment is 'How to increase voter turnout.' Are there any books or information that I could use to reference, and if you have time could you give me some of your ideas?" I replied: # # # Greetings, Toby -- The book "Votescam," widely available in paperback, is worth a look. But I'm not sure about the premise of your paper, in the first place. Before we can answer the question, "How to increase voter turnout," it seems to me we need to ask "WHO wants to increase voter turnout, and why?" Whether the next election sees 70 percent of registered voters show up at the polls, or 50 percent, or 30 percent, the result will be the same. A member of the incumbent Republicrat Party will be elected. He or she will go to the capital, raise taxes, and increase government meddling in our lives. Freedom will be further eroded. The only folks granted "loopholes" and "exemptions" from this ever-tightening vise are corporate, union, or other special interests who have ponied up tens of thousands of dollars worth of bribes -- euphemistically called "campaign contributions" -- to buy "access." If the folks running this protection racket thought that higher voter turnouts would upset their applecart, dumping them all out of office and replacing them with Libertarians (or anyone who might REALLY decrease the size and power of government), they would be doing everything possible to PREVENT higher voter turnout, starting with re-enactment of the poll tax. Instead, we see our state and local registrars -- FULL-TIME GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES -- urging HIGHER voter turnout, and making it so easy to register and vote that you can now actually do both by mail. Why? To discover their real motivation, look at the recent special presidential election in Bosnia. Because voter turnout was under 50 percent, the United Nations held that vote was INVALID and had to be redone, figuring terrorist gunmen had frightened too many folks away from the polls. The risk to governments now in power is not HIGH voter turnout -- their control over the courtesan press, and restrictions on the ability of third parties to get on the ballot or into televised debates, take care of that. Instead, their fear is that turnout among wised-up victims unwilling to continue endorsing their schemes will fall so low that they will no longer be able to claim any credible "mandate from the people" to continue building their metastasizing police state. So, if we want to see anything change, why isn't the title of your paper "How to REDUCE voter turnout?" "That's outrageous," you'll likely be told. "Voting is how we keep the democratic process strong." Precisely. And the Founders never meant for us to be exclusively or even mostly a democracy, or they'd never have let five Supreme Court justices overrule 218 congressmen. All this vote-counting has actually gotten people believing it's OK to throw away the Second Amendment and restrict the right of the people to keep and bear arms (for example) ... so long as you can get a majority to "vote" for it. Our current problem in this country is that there's TOO MUCH voting going on, on stuff never meant to be subject to government intervention, in the first place. But, if you insist, here's a way to "increase voter turnout": Place every state, local, and national ordinance which currently outlaws, taxes, or regulates any drug or medical device or practice, or any firearm, explosive, or militarily useful device up to and including tanks and shoulder-launched missiles, on the ballot. For good measure, also place on the ballot any existing law which authorizes any tax or fee. Then announce that, under the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a jury trial, it follows that no person may be punished for violating any of these laws unless he or she could reasonably expect to be convicted by a UNANIMOUS vote of a RANDOMLY-SELECTED jury of 12. Since one juror in 12 represents 8.33 percent of the populace, obviously no law which has only 91 percent popular support can be allowed to stand under the clear intent of the Sixth Amendment; only laws with 92 percent popular support can be allowed to stand. Therefore, any law which is OPPOSED BY 9 PERCENT (OR MORE) OF VOTERS IN THE NEXT ELECTION will be stricken from the books. No more prosecutions under that law will EVER be allowed, even if the Legislature tries to re-instate it. If the vote goes 91-9 to KEEP the drug laws, the drug laws are REPEALED. If the vote goes 91-9 to KEEP the gun laws, the gun laws are REPEALED. If the vote goes 91-9 to KEEP the income tax, the income tax is REPEALED. Giving folks the chance to finally CHANGE something, I think that would draw a pretty good voter turnout. Don't you? Vin Suprynowicz is the assistant editorial page editor of the Las Vegas Review-Journal. Readers may contact him via e-mail at vin(a)lvrj.com. *** Vin Suprynowicz, vin(a)lvrj.com "If ye love wealth greater than liberty, the tranquility of servitude greater than the animating contest for freedom, go home from us in peace. We seek not your counsel, nor your arms. Crouch down and lick the hand that feeds you. May your chains set lightly upon you; and may posterity forget that ye were our countrymen." -- Samuel Adams <HR> <CENTER>End Game / InfoWarez</CENTER> #1 Matt Blaze sucks donkey dicks #2 Matt Blaze sucks donkey dicks #3 Matt Blaze sucks donkey dicks <HR> Copyright "Human Gus-Peter <ualdv8(a)sk.sympatico.ca> <HR> <CENTER>"The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre"</CENTER> <CENTER>"WebWorld & the Mythical Circle of Eunuchs"</CENTER> <CENTER>"InfoWar (Part III of 'The True Story of the InterNet')</CENTER> <CENTER>Soviet Union Sickle of Eunuchs Secret WebSite</CENTER> <HR> </BODY> </HTML>

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