December 2003 - cypherpunks-legacy

Remailers and ecash
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- An anonymous brother wrote: >Given: We want more (reliable) remailers > But someone has to pay for them > >Conjecture: New remailers can be financed by charging the users a fee per > message to use the remailers. > > If a remailer charges a fee, the number of users will be reduced to > those who are willing to pay the fee. > > When the number of users is reduced, the potential for traffic analysis > is increased, which reduces the value of the remailer. > > If the value of the remailer is reduced, it will not be worth the cost > to many users, and those users will seek a less expensive, higher > traffic remailer. > > Thus, the commercial remailer is forced to lower its prices until it is > unprofitable. > >Conclusion: Pay-per-message commecial remailers are not economically viable. You know how the remailer operators do all their work now for free because they believe in it? And how all this software has been written and given away because people believe in it? Maybe some other people will help pay for the maintenance of the remailers because they believe it is the right thing to do. Especially since it need not be forever. And, I have to believe that out of the millions of well heeled Internet users, there are enough privacy oriented people to pay for a small remailer network, at the very least. We just have to get the ball rolling, that's all. > - Pay a flat fee per month for remailer access This is isormorphic to using ecash if you want to keep the messages of each user disassociated from each other. > - Everyone a remailer. Remailers only accept messages from other > remailers. To use remailers you must run a remailer. I don't grow my own wheat, grind it up, and then make my own bread. I also prefer not to run a remailer. > - Pay for access to an anonymous message pool Interesting! > - Sell cpu cycles in exchange for remailer access If we use ecash, you can sell anything in exchange for remailer access. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDP8VpaWtjSmRH/5AQEMNgf9FY0zq4+p1R6F4GPIvLCqQQsXJ9TeeNSX v8sH99yUpYm+FmJuxwoGzel0Q0VRaR6NakuTx/Q1tKzSA4H2cnslEixyft9c0CsE 5dWEXe7694x/el4xXJcoX3+XNrKjo8qAERe9jcttPUtEgwT+2+JnfcMOudX7UZd6 LL8OvpD9CJrwQuJIeaNgbftwuVukuLkCRWJ1wrsJAs37Y9w9GqA+RTlqNXbElyi6 ryC17sysWOaFVryjLEHYXL9r60Ct9ZHp1hQoP0O1yCyKa5BMrTsVfXWOXuU/qSDe w0cfkcZ6lI8EmZObcOLr3sRdblq7nojoBctypSkILwEtEqgbpW0HXg== =TgmT -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto"
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- My brother VerityMonger wrote: >Fascism hadn't died, it has just gone underground and crept into >every facet of life through the corporate and government power >mongers. The government and the mass media are working the citizens >like dumb fish on a hook, who are still trying to swallow the >worm. There is a New World Order on the way, and it isn't going to be >any prettier than the last time it was tried. No doubt VerityMonger knows this, but many others may not: "New World Order" was a phrase originally coined by Josef Goebbels. Interestingly, the term "European Community" arose out of German industrial discussion groups in ~1944 who were trying to find a way to salvage the German position at the time. One idea was to make peace and attempt to establish a "European Community". Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDP5BJaWtjSmRH/5AQFnGwf9HBs0DDAjhc0PPHjnKsGQ1JRaB797fIaO Cbz+QvUs/OzClpSrPQAighJ5DlE3yNWseBxCaYDQ/dOxhpB/vnFI509FRBqgDgOp qaYqaQVdWjeirrAlWFpeMV9yjKlk09fTe3ospvenDFkNvrJedTeP73t8bCceq/Iz +I2dWn3/eCmm0+Xlblm/ljETBXCh6i4WpfnRuA0htJQQJwctPjopuxOo3vpde4JH //clHjOckrkqo/H4+D1iX7BeAJOYUnToGO4r/w1vvGEWEZG4pGfB9MNZ74P71JFs 3lmCXJ2p+D55fmhjmHrNQFfi+oFmbnt0u/yuxlI2O0Qr/obwje7oIA== =6SBY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Crypto-continuation in Washington: FBI/DoJ keep up the pressure
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Crypto is hot in Washington. Don't think the battle's over; it's just beginning: * This afternoon when the Senate Intelligence committee met to consider a new CIA deputy director, Sen. Bob Kerrey said "there's a real urgency" to get an encryption bill passed. (Presumably, that would be his bill, the "Key Escrow Infrastructure" McCain-Kerrey/S.909.) Anyone still think that the Senate will do the right thing on crypto? Think again... * Last week Janet Reno talked at her weekly press conference about balancing law enforcement rights with privacy rights -- through mandatory domestic key escrow. * Yesterday Louis Freeh spoke at length before the House International Relations committee about the spread of nuclear weapons... and reminded committee members about the problems the FBI has with nonescrowed crypto... * Sen. Jon "Mandatory Domestic Key Escrow" Kyl said on Sunday that the Clinton administration's export controls on crypto were *not tight enough*... More info: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1385,00.html http://www.jya.com/declan8.htm -Declan **************** HEARING OF THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE NOMINATION OF LT.-GEN. JOHN A. GORDON TO BE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CHAIRMAN: SENATOR RICHARD SHELBY (R-AL) 106 DIRKSEN SENATE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC 2:00 P.M. EDT WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1997 SEN. KERREY: I hope no doubt that you've heard of and perhaps had the opportunity to read the recommendations made by Senators Helms and Moynihan, but I think they're excellent. It's an excellent examination of, first, the need in some instances to classify, as well as the need to examine that classification system. It's not really a question, General Gordon. I think it's imperative that, on the issue of encryption, that the president exert some authority and try to pull together the congressional leaders and say, "We need a secure public network." There's counter-intelligence concerns. There's national security issues here at stake, obviously, balanced against the concerns for civil liberties and the concern for commercial interests and the need to develop. But there's lots of action up here on the Hill, both in the House and the Senate, in half a dozen committees or eight or nine committees, or Lord knows how many altogether, more than I realized existed. And I think there's a real urgency to get something passed both for the private sector, so they can have some stability, but also on the public-sector side, so we can protect the nation's interests. MR. GORDON: Senator, I have not delved that deeply into the encryption issue. I certainly take your point on this point. But I do know that if the Senate does confirm me that that will be squarely on my plate. **************** ATTORNEY GENERAL JANET RENO'S WEEKLY MEDIA AVAILABILITY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON, DC THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1997 Q No, wait - ATTY GEN. RENO: You've got to be quicker than that. Q (Inaudible) - yes, ma'am. Director Freeh and Director Constantine both have complained that U.S.-made encryption devices are giving the drug cartels an advantage whereby interdiction becomes impaired. Would you favor, as Mr. Freeh does, some kind of giving of the keys to these devices to the FBI and DEA? ATTY GEN. RENO: I don't think that Director Freeh favors giving keys to the FBI and to the DEA. Q No? ATTY GEN. RENO: What Director Freeh has talked about is what we have today - if someone is going to tap a phone, they don't just go in and tap the phone, if they're going to do it legally. What law enforcement does is it develops probable cause to believe that the telephone is being used to commit a crime and that to overhear would provide evidence of a crime. That is submitted to a judge, both in federal court and in many states courts where wiretapping is authorized. The judge reviews the sufficiency of the affidavits in support of the petition and enters an order directing the telephone company to provide that opportunity. What Director Freeh is hoping to achieve is the same thing with respect to encrypted products; so that the court would direct that the key be provided to the telecommunications system, or the other system, in order to decrypt the encoded message. What we're trying - what the administration is trying to do is to recognize that there are two important interests at stake here. One is the law enforcement interest, which is so vital with respect to terrorists, with respect to being able to decrypt the drug dealer's computer when I - I can get a search warrant now and seize his black book and I can read his black book or decipher what he's talking about. But if he can encrypt the information on his computer, that will be a significant obstacle to law enforcement. At the same time, the whole purpose of encryption with modern telecommunication is to provide for the privacy interest, of commercial interest of the average citizen. And so I think it's important that we work together to ensure the law enforcement capacity and ensure that the present capacity to get court-ordered authorities for surveillance are continued and are made real, while at the same time ensuring privacy. Q So you're saying that the phone company would have the responsibility? Do they have the capability of encrypting? ATTY GEN. RENO: The phone company doesn't have it. There would be a system whereby a key would be provided through third parties or otherwise. But this is something that we need to work together on to ensure that law enforcement interests are protected and that privacy interests are protected as well. **************** HEARING OF THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE SUBJECT: ORGANIZED CRIME CHAIRED BY: REPRESENTATIVE BEN GILMAN (R-NY) LOUIS FREEH, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 2172 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1997 10:00 A.M EDT REP. : Following up on what Mr. Hyde said on your need to fight international crime and terrorism, what do you need, as an agency director and for your agency, in terms of specifics to wage a fight that you can win? MR. FREEH: Yes, sir. As I mentioned in my statement, I think we need it on three levels. We need the permanent and minimal FBI presence overseas to develop the kinds of relationships that Dr. de Gennaro and I have had now for 18 years. We have asked for, and the Congress approved last year, in August of 1996, a plan to expand the FBI's Ligat (sp) program from approximately 23 to 43 Ligats. That would call for, by the end of 1999, 146 special agents in 42 different countries with 116 support employees. That's a total of 262 people. As I mentioned, the plan was submitted last year. It wasn't just an FBI plan. It was jointly submitted by the State Department and the attorney general. And we've asked for funding in the 1998 and 1999 budgets to reach that level. We've also asked for a continuation of the training. As I mentioned, we've been able to train thousands of police officers around the world. The benefit of that training is two-fold. First of all, we can give them what they need most of all, which are the basic tools to conduct their own investigations. Just as importantly, we develop through those relationships, as Dr. de Gennaro described it, the cop-to-cop contacts and relationships. So an FBI agent or a DEA agent can pick up the phone and speak to a police commander in Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, if that's the place where we need to do our work. So the training is a very important part of the whole program. And again, and finally, we need the technological tools to do our work. We have to be able to communicate rapidly and securely. We have to deal with encryption. We have to deal with cyber-crime. And those are all part of a larger technological challenge which we're trying to meet. [...] REP. LINDSEY GRAHAM (R-SC): Thank you, John. Director Freeh, appreciate your testimony. It's been quite riveting, actually. One of the briefing papers we have indicates that the American public, in a recent poll, whatever you want to take polls worth, say that 70 percent of the American people who were surveyed found it likely that the United States could be attacked by terrorist groups within the next decade using smuggled nuclear devices. If you were asked that, what category would you be in? MR. FREEH: I think it's a threat and a possibility that should occupy our highest priority. I think we've seen attacks certainly in Oklahoma, in New York City. We know that many of the state sponsors of terror, including Iran, are rapidly and very aggressively acquiring nuclear technology, both in terms of warheads and launching devices. We know that many of the state sponsors of terrorism, particularly Iran, sponsor and fund and control Hezbollah groups, including groups which have connections and operations in the United States. So the links, although I don't think I've seen them in a documented form, clearly suggest that if a terrorist is willing to use a truck bomb to blow up a building with thousands of people at risk, the accomplishment of the particular objective would not be changed or influenced by the opportunity to use a much more devastating (nuclear?) or biological or chemical agent. So I think we have to take the possibility extremely seriously and we have to take drastic steps to try to prevent and detect that. **************** [This thanks to John Young. --Declan] Remarks by Senator Jon Kyl at the First International Conservative Congress--September 28, 1997 [...] The Clinton Administration pursues a foreign policy without clear goals or the will to act decisively and is squandering the national security means left to it by a dozen years of Republican presidency. It emphasizes hope over reality and reliance on arms control agreements like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) over a stronger defense. And political benefit over national security, as in its decisions to cave in to the concerns of some in industry in irresponsibly relaxing export controls on key items like encryption technology and supercomputers. **************** ------------------------- Declan McCullagh Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/

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Re: Forwarded mail...
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 10/2/97 11:36 AM, Mark Rogaski (wendigo(a)ne-wendigo.jabberwock.org) passed this wisdom: >An entity claiming to be Brian B. Riley wrote: > >:: ... nothing personal, but why is it people keep deluding >themselves : with the idea that they can shoot to wound. You cannot >know what a > >Because that's what all the cops on TV do. Most people see >non-lethal leg shots on TV all the time, so they assume that it's >probable. Even worse was "The A-Team" where hundreds of rounds were >fired, but no one ever got hurt. It was intended to reduce the >amount of violence on TV, but (in my opinion) only made gunplay >seem like a safe recreational activity. ... oh, I well know the answer to the question ... just waxing a little bit rhetorical ... I would seriously like to be there to look into they eyes of the yahoos who so bithely espouse dropping the hammer on a person right after they have watched the life drain from someones eyes the for very first time and see just how well they feel and how cocky and cavalier they still are. I wouldn't wish that burden on anyone. You just can have no idea unless you have been there. We send men off to war and then get all upset when so many come back with there brains on crooked ... the sheeple have no idea what they have done to these men (and now women) !!! -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNDQS3sdZgC62U/gIEQLMfACdEDkNNtzbeccxGJGcuvuUkp810IoAoJZV 0HbGxZ0ogu2gzzGNIYhilxM+ =8vrU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://www.macconnect.com/~brianbr For my PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "...error reading WinOS. (A)bort, (R)etry, (M)acintosh?"

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Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto"
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Alex Le Heux wrote: >On 2 Oct 1997 00:24:27 +0200, Anonymous (sic) <anon(a)anon.efga.org> wrote: >>Alex Le Heux wrote: >>>Maybe you haven't noticed, but seen on 2000 year scales, the entire >>>world is constantly in a state of war. Europe isn't special in that >>>regard. >> >>I guess the conclusion, then, is that gun control is bad for the >>whole world, not just Europe. > >Eh, no. The conclusion would be that gun control or no gun control >does not affect the amount of war in the world at all. It certainly affect civilians! Most of the people who die in wars are not in armies. They are in villages, towns, and cities. Roughly 50 million people died in World War II. Perhaps 15 million (numbers approximate) were soldiers. Being unarmed is often unlucky. >>>And even if I had my AR15 then, it wouldn't help me a lot against >>>guided missiles and mortar fire. >> >>It's harder to police a hostile population which is well armed. > >True, but imho this will only result in more people getting killed. It can result in that, certainly. But somehow the next time your country is overrun, I doubt you would take your weapons (assuming you had any) and give them to the invader in the hope that this will increase the likelihood of your survival. >Any invader would not beat about the bush in the US, they'll make >very clear that they'll have nothing to do with citicens defending >their own homes. They'll just blow up the home from a distance. Ah, if they know which home to blow up they will. But they won't. (Unless they get their hands on the government gun registration records. Then they'll know which homes to go to.) >>>And anyway, "to defend yourself in a war" is not one of the usual >>>arguments against gun control. >> >>The popularity of an argument can be independent of its worth. >> >>"To defend yourself in general" is commonly used. War, oppressive >>government, and political turbulence are the most likely situations >>in which people need their weapons, even in the United States. > >Bullshit. People in the US rarely use their weapons against oppressive >governments or political turbulence. Sometimes we do. Study the Black Panthers. You raise a good point, though. I believe that widespread gun ownership acts as a dampener on conflict. People discover that they really can respect Group X enough to cut some kind of deal rather than herding them into concentration camps. The dynamic here is probably complicated. It isn't as simple as "Oh, we don't want to go after them, they have guns!" That underlies the process, but usually it translates into respect. (Look at how people feel about a "Mafia Don" versus "some greaseball working in a restaurant". Most people despise the man in the restaurant, even though when presented in neutral terms they claim to respect his behavior. What's the difference between these two people? It isn't that one is the nicer guy.) Should things progress to the point where armed troops are attempting to haul people out of their homes, the availability of firearms acts to drawn attention to what is happening. The people committing the acts are getting very strong signals that Something Is Wrong. The cost of collecting people increases dramatically when they are armed. In Berlin the assembly area for Jewish people was originally somewhere in the center of the city where other civilians could see what was going on. This caused discomfort and a certain amount of unrest amongst the population, so they moved the assembly area to the outskirts. But, there would be no denying the implications of automatic weapons fire all over the city. Would this guarantee survival? No, it would not. But, in my opinion, it would increase the odds. You can imagine it going wrong: "We won't be safe until we get rid of all those Jews and they damned assault rifles!" But, probably it would go the right way. >Most guns that are used against another person there are used to >commit crime or to defend against those armed criminals. - From day to day this may be true. But we are talking about those exceptional circumstances that arise every few decades, especially in countries where the peasants are not allowed to own weapons. And, you might want to take a look at the numbers. How many people have been murdered outright by their own governments in the 20th century? (This number excludes wars, which probably isn't reasonable.) It clocks in at well over 100 million. (Anybody have the actual number?) It takes a lot of bar shootings to get up to those kinds of numbers. >>I have to confess that I am surprised at the level of resentment >>among the members of various Europeans countries feel towards other >>European countries. For example, the Germans don't like the Dutch >>because when they visit they are treated badly by, among others, the >>police. The Dutch don't like the Germans because, well, they got to >>know them a little too well in the 1940s and they are nursing the >>grudge. >> >>With that sort of situation, anything can happen and it can happen >>quickly, even if things seem mellow right now. And these little >>resentments and jealousies are felt between far more groups in >>Europe than just between the Dutchies and the Germans. > >Excuse me? Have you ever even been in Europe? In the last 50 years I >mean? You are so full of shit here, it's incredible. I hereby invite >you to come over, and stay a while. I have a comfy couch. Thank you for your kind offer. If things go to hell here in the U.S. in the next couple of years I may take you up on it. Yes, I have been in Europe. I drew my conclusions from talking to and observing many Europeans. It wasn't what I expected, but it caused me to understand European history a little better. In the U.S., even when we are ragging on another ethnic group or another country, there is always this feeling in the air that is sort of naughty and low class to be doing it. In Europe, I did not sense this at all. (That's not all bad. It's not hypocritical.) People had all sorts of interesting views about people in other countries. I was particularly shocked by European anti-semitism. You can find people in the U.S. who will talk about "those New York Jew bankers" and the like, but I hadn't really seen hardcore anti-semitism before. By hardcore, I mean people who see all Jewish people as belonging to the same nationality, regardless of their passport. And, they don't think of this as a particularly remarkable thing. They see it as just one of those obvious facts that it would be foolish to deny. Jewish friends who travel in Europe have had repeated experiences where people want to treat them as Jews, rather than as Americans of the Jewish religion, which is what they are. >Anyone in Europe can go anywhere else, and be treated reasonably to >very well. We in Europe have put the crap of WWII behind us a long >time ago. Something that you haven't managed to do apparently. > >The Dutch are absolutely not 'nursing a grudge'. Come and visit. >You'll see. I did see. It was most interesting. I had a long conversation with a Dutch man once. He was very pleasant, civilized, and intelligent. Then he started telling me about the Germans and how pushy they were, how they always butt in line, etc. etc. I've heard similar things from other Dutch people. I personally witnessed a (very minor) incident. I have some German friends who were foully treated by the police in the Netherlands, too. These people are decent, polite, professional people. I have no doubt they did nothing whatsoever to provoke this treatment. (By "no doubt" I mean that we are talking about the most civilized people I have ever known.) But, they will never return to the Netherlands and I don't blame them. You might want to try a little experiment. Are you capable of appearing to be German? If you can get the style and the body language down, try coming into the Netherlands as a German visitor and see what kinds of response you get. If you can really fool people into thinking you are German you will probably learn something interesting about your country. (It might be hard to pull this off, though.) >>Let's also take a look at the Dutch performance during their >>occupation. While there certainly were many courageous Dutch people >>who helped refugees (at great personal risk, to say the least), and >>there were many courageous Dutch people who were in the resistance, >>there were also many Dutch people who did not perform so well. Not >>only were a large number of Jewish people turned in by Dutch >>informers, but there were even Dutch SS units. > >You have a nerve. You, coming from a country where people are still >regularly killed in the name of racism, tell me this?! Now, now, now. Don't get all excited. I said it was nice country, didn't I? I said some bad things about my own country, didn't I? The fact is, I think if you randomly selected people from the Netherlands, in general you would do pretty well. However, let's not deny what happened historically. Even nice appearing people do bad things. And they aren't always Nazis, either. As for racism, Europe is not without racism. It's hard to quantify it and hard to compare, but I suspect to a very great extent, America is seen as being racist because we discuss it, feel guilty about it, and try (sort of) to do something about it. (Never mind all of the ethnic groups in the U.S. that find they are able to live together harmoniously, even though their ancestors in Europe were continuously at each other's throats.) I've had two American friends who were beaten in Europe in racial incidents. One was white, one was black. One of them spent time in the hospital. Both crossed the racial line all the time in the U.S. without incident. >>I basically think well of the Netherlands and its people, but it is >>important to recognize that certain unpleasant characteristics exist >>in a large portion of the population of even a nice country. It is >>unlucky to pretend that these characteristics can never be expressed. > >We absolutely not pretending that this can never be expressed. In >fact, it's being expressed every day. We have our neo-nazi political >parties too. It's just that we here have learned our lesson, and very >few people actually listen to them. This may be true, but it's hard to tell. The climate is not conducive right now, either. What would happen if it suddenly became clear that anti-semitism would promote one's career? I think you would find them coming out of the woodwork again. >>What would have happened if the citizens of El Salvador were >>adequately armed? One thing you wouldn't see is a death squad going >>into a neighborhood to kick down some innocent's door and murder him >>or his family. At least, you wouldn't see it twice. > >Sure you would. It just would be that more bloody. The fact that >someone is armed has never stopped anyone from attacking. You just >make sure that your shot is the first and hits. What are people in death squads like? Believe it or not, they are not so different from ourselves. They also have fears. People do, in fact, act on their fear from time to time. If you think that while you are busy "shooting first" at some guy that maybe his neighbors won't mind blowing your head off for it, you are going to behave more cautiously. At the very least, it will cut down your nightly "take" by at least 70%. That's a big deal if you are part of the surviving group. >>People who are well armed are less likely to become pawns, victims, >>or slaves. That is desirable. > >They are just more likely to become dead. If you were faced with somebody you believed would enslave you, would you throw away your weapon in the hopes your life would be spared? I doubt this very much. >>Incidentally, the consistent support the U.S. government has shown >>for murderous or even genocidal governments is of great concern to >>those of us who live in the U.S. It is unlikely that these tactics >>won't be used here were there a serious political struggle and a >>disarmed population. > >- From over here it appears that the majority of Americans doesn't >really give a shit. Correct me if I'm wrong. It was hypothetical. I don't know if such a serious political struggle will arise in the near future. If most Americans don't give a damn, it will be very unlucky for troublemakers like the cypherpunks. In fact, though, most Americans do give a damn. Look at the great effort the government has to go through to get Americans into wars. It is a source of endless frustration to the elite that the population won't just hop into wars. Wilson and Roosevelt were both elected on peace platforms before getting us into the World Wars. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDPwxpaWtjSmRH/5AQHswAf/WD4jWejWmUX4GAaEkWcJW5uhnEXjiLap G2lhu5E4/htFDe791IK6iZ1Pn9i7y8FnyzQMKwoA4sFlgFl4ZAZWCGktnLPBryOY Mqk2ckQGdYEa87vsFVSPZsVCJ51vJadqeAE/dZgWSbB+Vhck+2AcNypw5gCFHT3F N92K+KGvw/bKMS4oucomNaD1kpEsGcCBL95zcv/ZbgMKCz9LkdgHoS/GyzdssNCj BCZWhnUci5gFM1Pa1AAM7HNwkohFMfEsX1dpKr56NbziT1QwUXLHUzW8Qxf+OB2h 6p+xLwcWzFNzpyN6CzJHbxaB0S9PVIuy9zMDz3xMynaAy3S+2zmVaw== =tIFo -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Stronghold
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>> C2Net was wrong to censor the cypherpunks list in the guise of >> moderation. It was wrong to send threatening letters to people who >> claimed its products were weak. The whole moderation/censorship >> experiment was a terrible mistake. The actions taken by C2Net were >> completely unjustified. > >Where do people get these bizarre ideas? C2 didn't censor the list. A >guy who happened to work for C2 dropped some messages from one >list. The messages still went out on the unfiltered list. Had he >worked for Mc Donald's or the the NYC Sanitiation Department, would >you blame them for this as well? C2 employees informally mentioned libel suits to several cypherpunks, such as Tim May. Given that a good percentage of the company, perhaps a majority, was involved with this incident, it seems reasonable to judge the character of the company based on these actions. This incident changed my view of C2 considerably. Initially I held them in the highest regard. No longer. (Your employment by C2 should have been mentioned in your post. Many people on the list may not know about it. It is relevant.)

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Re: Forwarded mail... (fwd)
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 10/2/97 2:35 AM, Jim Choate (ravage(a)ssz.com) passed this wisdom: >Remember: A gun is like a finger, just point it at what you want to >hit. > >I have met hundreds of great shots in my life, there are many >people forwhom this sort of behaviour would not be delusional. My >grandfather (who you'll hear more about in a minute) used to >delight us as small kids by lighting matches stuck in wood fence >posts with a .22 pistol from about 50 yds. My cousin from Louisiana >likes to shoot squirrels (if you can callit that) by passing the >bullet just in front of their nose, causes lung hemorraghes and >they just fall off the limb. Me, I always miss or blow theirteeny >little head off, it's apparently a game of 1/4 inches. I work with >anex-gomer (ie USMC) pilot who is quite phenomenal with his .357 >Desert Eagle,his groupings are just about an inch at 25 yds. None of these targets shoots back ... none of these targets pump up much adrenaline. I would never call myself a great shot (I did qualify expert at both rifle, M-14, "A" course and pistol, .45, 1911A1), and I can tell you of making several 25-35 yard snap shots in the jungle at moving shooting targets with the adrenaline driving my eyeballs through the roof ... but they were exactly that, pure reflex, center of body mass shots, under max pressure. I must in all fairness recall the other three to six shots each time that could have gone anywhere and probably did. The point is, "shooting to wound" is a dangerous delusion! *no one* can predict what a bullet will do when it enters the body. The rule I have always followed is don't take out your gun unless you are going to use it; don't use it unless you intend to kill. Makes decisions much easier on that basis. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQA/AwUBNDQjysdZgC62U/gIEQL2pwCfYadqKN/3+wKF1BYC7MZxp8y3ud0An1L4 yXD3o+rsefpV8FO8MqD6OEtl =GHfD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://www.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "The Box said Win '95 or better - So I used a Macintosh!" -- Harold Herbert Tessman

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Re: Quor's cipher
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Antonomasia <ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> wrote: > My attack takes a long chunk of known text and looks for repetition. > > ppppppppppppppp.11.pppppppppppppppppppppp > ccccccccccccccc.22.cccccccccccccccccccccc > > When a two neighbouring p-c pairs are the same you can test > whether they have the same value of a and b. > (That is a_n == a_n+1 and b_n == b+n+1, a != b usually.) > > This involves 16 inputs to each byte - very cheap. > What I really want next is to know "a". nobody(a)REPLAY.COM wrote: > Wouldn't this only happen (on average) in one out of every 65536 p-c > pairs? Yes (counting only those we test). > Since the state array is changed entirely with every 128 bytes > encrypted, 1 out of 2^16 doesn't seem to help much. This finding doesn't uncover a great deal, I agree, and what it does uncover is transient. 1 out of 2^16 is the number of pairs we test to find a point with the property we're looking for. The measures to compare this to are: message length several times 65k is fairly low cost of testing low benefit of test when passed also low :-( The changes are regular though, progressing through the array in two places. That's why I proposed testing neighbouring p-c pairs because you can be almost sure the relevant state (and it's which part of the state array is relevant that's uncertain) is the same for the two. In fact it would be nice to spot this: ppppppppppppppp.11.ppppppppppppppppppppp ccccccccccccccc.22.ccccccccccccccccccccc and see that a and b were the same, but the underlying state array changed in a relevant way. This would be indicated by a slightly less than total match, but still rare enough not to be a fluke. This could allow you to test possible values of a and b, and perhaps get 4 bits of a. But a and b don't persist over nearby bytes so I'm not clear what I'd do if I got them. What it would be nice to have next is a more damaging result emerge from this or some other observation so that we could determine more of the state without going to long range comparisons. This cypher is constructed differently from RC4 or fish - not as simple as WAKE but broadly comparable to Sapphire II. I think I'll enlist the help of a search engine. It's more than likely there other things waiting to be done to this. Quor's friend 'nobody' has actually put some crypto on the list -let's see what we can do with/to it. -- ############################################################## # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ##############################################################

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Hansa.net's LOCI encourages development of e-commerce financial products and services
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Authentication-Warning: fma66.fma.com: majordomo set sender to owner-espam(a)lists.espace.net using -f X-Orig-From: "Bell, Lynwood" <hansa(a)ibm.net> X-e$pam-source: Various X-Sender: rah(a)pop.sneaker.net Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 13:44:21 -0400 To: espam(a)intertrader.com From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: Hansa.net's LOCI encourages development of e-commerce financial products and services Sender: owner-espam(a)lists.espace.net Precedence: bulk Reply-To: e$(a)thumper.vmeng.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- This mail is brought to you by the e$pam mailing list --------------------------------------------------------------------- From: "Bell, Lynwood" <hansa(a)ibm.net> Reply-To: hansa(a)ibm.net Organization: The Span-Hansa Group MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Hettinga, Robert" <rah(a)shipwright.com> CC: "Cate, Vince" <vince(a)offshore.com.ai> Subject: Hansa.net's LOCI encourages development of e-commerce financial products and services Bob, I just announced this today for our public company. It might be appropriate to send it to either or both of your e$lab and FC98 mailing lists. I am not going to be able to accommodate hundreds of ventures but, given that some will have their own resources, money, etc. and only want the venue and the Bank to play with... it may be very interesting for all of us. Add this to the pot in whatever way you feel is appropriate. Cheers, Lyn ------------- Hansa.net Global Commerce, Inc. The Hansa Bank Bldg, Box 213, Landsome Road, The Valley, Anguilla, B.W.I., TV1 02P Phone (264) 497-3800, Fax 497-3801, email hansa(a)ibm.net PRESS RELEASE FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Hansa.net and Hansa Bank join forces to encourage the development of e-commerce financial products and services to further expand Hansa.net's offerings of Location Optimized Commerce on the Internet (LOCI ). October 1, 1997 - Hansa.net Global Commerce, Inc. together with Hansa Bank & Trust Company Limited, both of Anguilla, British West Indies, and both members of the Span-Hansa Group, have agreed to jointly sponsor emerging Internet technologies which will enhance e-commerce through specifically tailored banking and financial applications. Lynwood S. Bell, Chairman of Hansa Bank, the controlling shareholder of Hansa.net a publicly traded company, said "Many excellent start-up companies lack a vehicle through which to perfect their product or service and to test their market acceptance. Most traditional domestic banks, encumbered with vast legacy systems and bureaucracies are reluctant to entertain these developers in live trials. The Hansa Bank, a British regulated private merchant and investment bank offering a full range of banking and brokerage services, has agreed to provide platforms for approved developers and to participate actively with them. All applications will be thoroughly screened, carefully controlled in their development and testing phases and will be completely isolated from the Bank's existing business. The Bank expects that some of these products may eventually result in leading edge products and services for the Bank." Hansa.net's role will be to assist in marketing any developed products to other banks and financial institutions. As well Hansa.net's existing LOCI clients are expected to benefit from the Bank's new or enhanced services. The first project, currently undergoing final review prior to being accepted by the Bank for testing, involves a Dutch developer of digital chequing. Plans are to demonstrate the product at the Financial Cryptograph 98 Conference, February 23-26, 1998 (see http:www.fc98.ai). Hansa Bank is one of the sponsors of this conference. Vince Cate, an Internet and cryptography expert recently featured in Forbes and Wired Magazines is participating with Hansa.net and Hansa Bank on this project. He said, "Many brilliant e-commerce ideas and products never reach the market because they have no incubator or no real life environment in which to test. Hansa.net and Hansa Bank provide both. As well, Anguilla is the perfect venue for such development in terms of sample size, global perspective, government support, and of course, the absence of any taxes. We fully expect that many of the products developed will end up in companies which are incorporated and reside here in Anguilla." About Hansa.net and the related Span-Hansa Group Hansa.net was founded in 1978 for computer systems development and software design. In 1985 the company went public, and subsequently expanded into software product development, marketing, and international trade technology. Hansa.net's primary role is to coordinate all of the elements of Location Optimized Commerce on the Internet (LOCI pronounced "low-see") for its clients. Hansa.net trades on the Vancouver Stock Exchange under the symbol "HAN" Both companies are part of the Span-Hansa Group comprised of ten organizations doing business in as many international locations. The Group's activities also include the financing of intellectual property, public stock offerings, acquisitions and mergers, and consulting on international business structures and trade. The Group maintains offices in Amsterdam, Barbados, and Anguilla, More information on the Span-Hansa Group and on other Span-Hansa strategic partners can be found on the Company's Internet home page: http://www.hansa.net. Lynwood S. Bell President Contact: Hansa.net - Lynwood Bell Vince Cate (264) 497-3800 hansa(a)ibm.net (264) 497-3255 vince(a)offshore.com.ai The Vancouver Stock Exchange has neither approved nor disapproved of this release. ====================================================================== LYNWOOD BELL - Span-Hansa Group, Hansa.net Global Commerce, Hansa Bank http://www.hansa.net ====================================================================== --------------------------------------------------------------------- Where people, networks and money come together: Consult Hyperion http://www.hyperion.co.uk info(a)hyperion.co.uk --------------------------------------------------------------------- Like e$? Help pay for it! See <http://www.shipwright.com/beg.html> Or, for e$/e$pam sponsorship, <mailto:rah@shipwright.com> --------------------------------------------------------------------- --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

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Re: Stronghold
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green <shamrock(a)cypherpunks.to> writes: > On Thu, 2 Oct 1997, Anonymous wrote: > > > > > C2Net was wrong to censor the cypherpunks list in the guise of moderation. > > It was wrong to send threatening letters to people who claimed its > > products were weak. The whole moderation/censorship experiment was a > > terrible mistake. The actions taken by C2Net were completely unjustified. > > Where do people get these bizarre ideas? C2 didn't censor the list. A guy > who happened to work for C2 dropped some messages from one list. The > messages still went out on the unfiltered list. Had he worked for Mc > Donald's or the the NYC Sanitiation Department, would you blame them for > this as well? Are you serious? The messages dropped were those which made (spurious) claims of weaknesses in C2 products. And later messages were dropped which attempted to discuss the dropping of earlier messages. The effect was that subscribers to the filtered list not only were not exposed to the messages critical of C2, they were prevented from knowing that a controversy existed about the filtering policies. There can be little doubt of the truth of these facts. One of us is remembering things wrongly. And yes, if the moderator were a McDonalds employee and he not only dropped messages which criticized McDonalds, but also filtered out later messages complaining about his actions, then I'd jolly well blame him.

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Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto"
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Individuals need ways to defend themselves from the physical aggression of others. One of the reasons why people associate into societies, cities, and governments, is for the advantages of protection which can be achieved by large numbers of people acting in concert against their common enemy. They also insitute police forces and national defense agencies for the same reason: defense against physical aggression. Everyone on the planet has enemies, and anyone can become, or behave essentially as, an enemy - even someone's physically stronger kid brother who decides to hit them with a stone because of talking on the phone too long, even a former lover/husband who decides to kill their girlfriend/wife out of jealousy. Stalkers, thieves, rapists, drug addicts, perverts, etc., or just real animals from the animal kingdom, strike at the most inopportune times, when there are no officially sanctioned police forces around to be of help. But even if there were security guards constantly available at every street corner or planted inside one's house, the principle is the same: people are physially vulnerable and need defense from those who would take advantage of them, who would by weaken them and do physical harm. Guns are imperfect tools and humans are often imperfect fools in the use of them. Se la vie. Nevertheless, until the design of guns is improved, or until there is a better weapon, a better tool invented which can be used by individuals - independently of organized defense agencies - for their own use in regard of their own safety, guns will be manufactured, sold, and bought. And used. Killing people is a Bad Thing, but there exist people who don't prevent themselves from doing harmful, destructive things to others. At that particular point in time, when they are about to commit their crime against another, their potential victims are in the position of having to do something of practical use, and quickly. They could use karate, or ju-jitsu, or ninja stars, or call their dog to attack, or yell for help, or use their special pocket knife, or run, or use a gun. But they must do *something*, they must employ some means to prevent from being harmed, or from having their valuables taken, or else suffer the consequences of debility or death. Such is the position which an "out-of-control" person can put one in. It is possible to reason that such uncontrolled people need to have been raised better, could have received psychological assistance, should have been given an alternative view of life, might have been presented with better values and philosophies, etc. But you have to also consider how much intellectual support any individual must be provided - must they be programmed from birth with the proper structure of behavior, in order to have around oneself the convenience of living with "good people" who are not inimical to the society? (and would that be a society of real humans, of interest to other real humans) Is what a person makes of themselves ultimately a personal project, or is it to be pre-determined and continuously managed by others (parents, teachers, guidance counselors, psychologists, government clerks, policing agencies, government agencies, government leaders). When you relate to a person, will you be relating to someone with their own identity and personal ambitions, who make independent decisions about the actions they take, or only to a product of other people's influence? In any case, when someone behaves counter to your own wishes and seeks do with you what they will, or to take from you what they will, including your life, you must determine whether to allow it or how to prevent it - and if moved to prevent it, what will work to accomplish that. It might be necessary to kill that Bad Person (though not their whole family or relatives or neighborhood or race or country). .. Blanc

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Re: Forwarded mail... (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: Forwarded mail... (fwd) > Date: Thu, 2 Oct 97 18:52:18 -0400 > From: "Brian B. Riley" <brianbr(a)together.net> > None of these targets shoots back ... none of these targets pump up > much adrenaline. I have been shot at several times, some were hunting accidents and some were intentional. I did not freek out nor did my adrenalin rush impede my ability to think or to react. I did shoot back in each case. I am still alive and don't have a single bullet hole in my body so I must be doing something right. Don't know about them, I left the area in every case ASAP. > can tell you of making several 25-35 yard snap shots in the jungle at > moving shooting targets with the adrenaline driving my eyeballs > through the roof My house at 1am is not comparable to the jungle nor is the psychological situation comparable either. I am not confused about where or what is going on nor am I worried about making my tour. I am faced with the clear situation of somebody who wants to do me bodily harm. That doesn't scare me, it pisses me off to no end. When I get a rush I don't shake and such, I get very calm and methodical. It's only after the crisis has passed that I tend to sit down and shake like hell. > The point is, "shooting to wound" is a dangerous delusion! No shit. Let me make this clear. The ONLY way I would even consider shooting to wound was if the burglar was CLEARLY UNARMED, and the only reason that would happen was because in Texas shooting unarmed persons, even burglars, is illegal other than that you'd be dead. In any other situation my intent is to kill, kill, kill. As I said before, I would start with a center chest body shot and work up (which is natural since the aim point for successive shots will rise). > have always followed is don't take out your gun unless you are going > to use it; don't use it unless you intend to kill. Makes decisions > much easier on that basis. We agree on this point. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 02 Oct 1997 18:22:26 -0700 > From: Blanc <blancw(a)cnw.com> > Subject: Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or > crypto" > Stalkers, thieves, rapists, drug addicts, perverts, etc., or just real > animals from the animal kingdom, strike at the most inopportune times, when > there are no officially sanctioned police forces around to be of help. I have to object to the inclusion of drug addicts, they do what they do because the legislators and police want to stick their noses in other peoples business. If drug addicts resort to crime then society as a whole must garner some of the responsibility of putting them in that situation. In short the methods we use to control drug use in this country promote crime. This does not apply to others who would do this anyway and happen to take drugs, which means the drug laws are clearly unreasonable. > something of practical use, and quickly. They could use karate, or > ju-jitsu, or ninja stars, or call their dog to attack, or yell for help, or Isn't killing dogs a bad thing? I am shure my dog thinks so. Perhaps their is a lesson to be had in comparative psychology here. It's much easier to ask another entity to die for you because you consider them different and therefore of less value in the grand scheme of things. Human history is full of such instances. This also happens to be the rationale a lot if not all burglars use to justify their actions as well. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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None (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 22:04:09 +0200 (MET DST) > Subject: Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd) > From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) > When all your customers are anonymous, you don't get to be very choosy. Shure you can. The operator offers a simple service, resend email anonymously. If the result of that email is the anon user bringing hardship on the remailer cancel their account. If they do it again, cancel it again. Such is the woes of a commercial remailer. Outside of that, if they don't like the fact that I won't do other things for them when they are anonymous that is too bad. Like I said, I offer specific services with specific goals for a specific fee. If the results are not what you wanted, too bad. You want my other services then you'll have to give up the anonymity because I need a certain level of security that dealing with anonymous customers simply can't provide. I would operate a commercial remailer, I would limit my services to keeping the remailer up and the accounts valid so long as the money flowed in from the users, period. I don't do dedicated lines, security audits, development, etc. to anonymous customers. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto" (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 16:47:32 -0400 > From: Anonymous <anon(a)anon.efga.org> > Subject: Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or crypto" > The only conclusion that can be drawn is that civilians, even armed > civilians with combat experience, are so overwhelmingly peace loving > that they will bend very far backwards to avoid trouble, even if it > means thousands of hours of work. Can the same be said of career > military or government people? A D E C L A R A T I O N By the REPRESENTATIVES of the U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A, In GENERAL CONGRESS assembled. [deleted material] Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient Causes; and accordingly all Experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they are accustomed. [deleted material] ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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RE: counter-intuitive -- spam is good for you. anonymous assholes are your friend
by Phillip Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Thursday, October 02, 1997 11:54 AM, Attila T. Hun [SMTP:attila@hun.org] wrote: > if Phill is secure, what difference does it make if you assault > him? my guess is he is not secure, and probably has no clue how > to get from there to secure. Because when you ring the alarm bell on my system it is answered by law enforcement and it costs about $10,000 a time to deal with the issue. Setting off fire alarms costs real money. Incidentally the security line you are pushing is a crock. To get real security I believe you have to have feedback and monitoring. This is especially important in an institutional setting where you may not have complete control of critical infrastructure. For my application simply hoping the guys with the white hats find security holes before those in the black ones do is simply not enough. In any case I'm not as complacent as Attila seems to think the security model has been amply reviewed by the best in the field. Threatening to catch the malefactor and put him behind bars is a valuable additional security tool. The more bad guys there are behind bars the less time I have to spend worrying. Phill

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Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 2 Oct 1997 11:33:00 -0400 > From: Anonymous <anon(a)anon.efga.org> > Subject: Re: Remailers and ecash (fwd) > Jim Choate: > > >For the sender to chain from remailer to remailer to destination the > >destination has to be in the header info somewhere. Now in the most secure > >system each packet header will only contain the address of the next hop. When > >the next site gets it the packet contents are de-crypted (otherwise reading > >the chaining info is trivial) and the contents are uncovered to reveal another > >packet with the next hop header and another encrypted block. And on and on > >we go. > > > ><Question: Are there any remailer sets that impliment the encrypted nested > > packet system?> > > Jim Choate has been amazingly clueless throughout this discussion, but > this takes the cake. Does he really not know about encrypted nested > chaining? My God! Of course remailers work this way, Jim. They've > worked this way practically from the beginning. All remailers work this > way. No they don't, all remailers do not encrypt their outgoing as a matter of course (do any currently do it as a matter of course? I would bet not if I were a gambler). The remailer you used to send this didn't use encryption on its outgoing or else I wouldn't be able to read it. The last time I looked about a year ago the vast majority of remailers didn't encrypt their outgoing traffic as a matter of course, it required the user to do it (I suspect this is still true). Furthermore I specificaly used the word 'set' to mean a group of remailers acting in concert such that this encryption happened automaticaly - I know the answer already - No, there are no sets (ie a cooperative network) of remailers (Mixmaster operaters included) implimenting this unless the user goes to extreme and does it all themselves. As a matter of fact there appears to be little to no cooperation between remailer operators. There are no remailer key servers to manage the server and user keys so the user must contact each remailer and obtain the key which is itself open to traffic analysis, note that such first contacts by definition have to be in the clear. Hope that Mallet starts their analysis AFTER you get your keys or else. If this process can't occur automagicaly there is little commercial utility for the system - it's too cumbersome. > The mixmaster remailers are built around this idea, making each > packet a constant size and adding dummy packets as new ones are stripped > off, so outgoing messages look just like incoming ones. First off, the size of the packets in no way effects the succes of a traffic analysis, only a cryptanalysis of their contents. Traffic analysis looks at four things: the incoming packet header, the outgoing packet header, and the times of receipt and transmission. The idea behind latency is that if it is chosen correctly and the packet re-transmission falls outside the analysis window there is no way to correlate the incoming and outgoing traffic. From the analysis engines perspective the events are distinct and non-related. Simply re-ordering the packets at re-transmission time does nothing if I set the window larger than the time it takes to resend the original traffic and the cover traffic. Setting the analysis window to infinity also causes the analysis overhead to grow quickly though this means that re-ordering and latency are irrelevant. A party implimenting traffic analysis is probably not going to look at the contents until they have a clear understanding of the traffic flow between the surveiled parties. At that point it is cheaper to look at the involved parties and see if one of them has a weakness that can be exploited (ie offer immunity to a herion addict) over doing actual expensive cryptanalysis. If you can subvert a member you are in the classic man-in-the-middle position. When the Austin Cpunks looked at Mixmaster about 1.5 years ago for several months it became clear that as implimented currently Mixmaster can't easily support public remailer key servers or automated non-user-involved chaining and processing (encryption & decryption). Shure the packets look the same, but unless you as the sender go in and manage that material you are shit out of luck. The remailers can't do it themselves without user intervention, that's economicly not viable. > ><speculation: an encrypted chain could be made stronger if the next > > hop header depended on which key was used to decode it. > > In other words, remailer A's key will produce one next hop > > address while remailer B's key will send it elsewhere. This > > is a subset of the different plaintext - same cyphertext > > problem - a hard problem as I understand it. Find two > > distinct texts that encrypt with different keys to the > > same cyphertext> > > That won't help. There would be no point in doing this. I'd ask you > to explain, but that would just prolong the agony. It is actualy quite simple why you would want to do this. You could then in effect send the same packet (identical in every bit) to a set of remailers. Each remailer would then decode the packet and send it on. All but one would go to bogus addresses and the one remailer with the right key would get to resend to the next remailer(s). Plus none of the outgoing traffic would be to the same server, further complicating analysis. This also gives the user some control over how much cover traffic gets generated. However Mallet doesn't know which packets are which and therefore must follow every packet. This multiplies the number of hops in the traffic analysis that need to be analyzed. As mentioned in one of my previous posts, in this situation the complexity goes up by a power causing the required computing resources to trace the traffic to quickly become excessive. Sine this is so painful for you, I assume this is the end of this discussion. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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None (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 04:05:48 +0200 (MET DST) > Subject: Re: Remailers and ecash > From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) > A pinging system can be set up to verify that all the remailers are > operating correctly. It will certaily tell you if the system is network aware, as to internal operation and its validity it says nothing. If you want to test it you must send each remailer in the network a message with a final destination of the source. If you don't get it back you know the remailer is not online. This is called a 'loopback'. > Thus forwarding within the remailer network is free, So as long as I only send traffic to other remailers the electricity and such are not charged? How does my local electric company measure this? If the remailer is turned on there is a cost. Unless you are getting charged by the packet the cost of operating is indipenant of the traffic until you have to increase your clogged pipe. Commercialy irrelevant approach. > insert new messages. This scheme is a little more flexible than attaching > ecash to each message because you can arrange any type of fee schedule you > like, such as a flat rate per month. But it doesn't pay for the cover traffic. It also short changes the man-in-the-middle remailers since they have to spend resources without getting recompensed. This would indicate that there is little financial motive to operate a remailer that deals only with other remailers. > There's also the reverse of this, where remailers accept from anyone, but > only send to other remailers. Thus you have to pay to get your messages > out of the remailer network. This is more restrictive because the payment > must be anonymous. So what keeps me from submitting message after message and never pulling them out? I guess you just keep paying the bills to pay for the increasing traffic and the need to increase your pipe to carry it. Commercialy irrelevant. Also, consider the exponential expansion from cover traffic. > Sign up with an ISP that offers alt.anonymous.messages. This one is a > no-brainer. (and profitable for the ISP) > > This results in a system where sending messages is essentially free (since > free remailers exist) but it costs money to receive them. So far it seems > to be successful, at least for those who pay a flat fee for usenet access. So what if I use a free-net or perhaps one of the free machines at the public library or at the local college? Or the system at work? ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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And with the money you save on rent, you can...
by The Same Guy 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

* A Washington Post report in March on prison corruption in Mexico revealed that drug traffickers supposedly under maximum security actually have "spacious rooms, cooks and maids, cellular phones, a gymnasium, a sauna, and manicured gardens where they host barbecues," among other things. And in May, the New York Times revealed that a federal jail in Brooklyn has been run as a "Mafia social club," where family business "sit-downs" featured smuggled-in meatballs, manicotti, vodka, and wine. And in May, imprisoned Gangster Disciple leader Larry Hoover was convicted in Chicago of running a vast prison drug operation in which he typically issued memos and gave orders by cellular phone while wearing $400 alligator boots and eating specially prepared food in his cell. To read these News of the Weird newspaper columns from the past six months, go to http://www.nine.org/notw/notw.html (That site contains no graphics, no photos, no video clips, no audio. Just text. Deal with it.)

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Kitsch!
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- - From the "Unberable Lightness of Being" by Milan Kundera. Part Six, "The Grand March" Section 6 Sabina's initial inner revolt against Communism was aesthetic rather than ethical in character. What repelled her was not nearly so much the ugliness of the Communist world (ruined castles transformed into cow sheds) as the mask of beauty it tried to wear - in other words, Communist kitsch. The model of Communist kitsch is the ceremony called May Day. She had seen May Day parades during the time when people were still enthusiastic or still did their best to feign enthusiasnm. The women all wore red, white, adn blue blouses, and the public, looking on from balconies and windows, could make out various five-pointed stars, hearts, and letters when the marchers went into formation. Small brass bands accompanied the individual groups, keeping everyone in step. As a group approached the reviewing stand, even the most blase faces would beam with dazzling smiles, as if trying to prove they were properly joyful or, to be more precise, in proper agreement. Nor were they merely expressing political agreement with Communism; no, theirs was an agreement with being as such. The May Day ceremony drew its inspiration from the deep well of the categorical agreement with being. The unwritten, unsung motto of the parade was not "Long live Communism!" but "Long live life!" The power and cunning of Communist politics lay in the fact that it appropriated this slogan. For it was this idiotic tautology ("Long live life!") which attracted people indifferent to the theses of Communism to the Communist parade. Section 7 Ten years later (by which time she was living in America), a friend of some friends, an American senator, took Sabina for a drive in his gigantic car, his four children bouncing up and down in the back. The senator stopped the car in front of a stadium with an artificial skating rink, and the children jumped out and started running along the large expanse of grass surrounding it. Sitting behind the wheel and gazing dreamily after the four little bounding figures, he said to Sabina, "Just look at them." And describing a circle with his arm, a circle that was meant to take in stadium, grass, and children, he added, "Now, that's what I call happiness." Behind his words there was more than joy at seeing children run and grass grow; there was a deep understanding of the plight of a refugee from a Communist country where, the senator was convinced, no grass grew and no children ran. At that moment an image of the senator standing on a reviewing stand in a Prague square flashed through Sabina's mind. The smile on his face was the smile Communist statesmen beamed from the height of their reviewing stand to the identically smiling citizens in the parade below. Section 8 How did the senator know that children meant happiness? Could he see into their souls? What if, the moment they were out of sight, three of them jumped the fourth and began beating him up? The senator had only one argument in his favor: his feeling. When the heart speaks, the mind finds it indecent to object. In the realm of kitsch, the dictatorship of the heart reigns supreme. The feeling induced by kitsch must be a kind the multitudes can share. Kitsch may not, therefore, depend on an unusual situation; it must derive from the basic images people have engraved in their memories: the ungrateful daughter, the neglected father, children running on the grass, the motherland betrayed, first love. Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession. The first tear says: How nice to see children running on the grass! The second tear says: How nice to be moved, together with all mankind, by children running on the grass! It is the second tear that makes kitsch kitsch. The brotherhood of man on earth will be possible only on a base of kitsch. Section 9 And no one knows this better than politicians. Whenever a camera is in the offing, they immediately run to the nearest child, lift it in the air, kiss it on the cheek. Kitsch is the aesthetic ideal of all politicians and all political parties and movements. Those of us who live in a society where various political tendencies exist side by side and competing influences cancel or limit one another can manage more or less to escape the kitsch inquisition: the individual can preserve his individuality; the artist can create unusual works. But whenever a single political movement corners power, we find ourselves in the realm of totalitarian kitsch. When I say "totalitarian," what I mean is that everything that infringes on kitsch must be banished for life: every display of individualism (because a deviation from the collective is a spit in the eye of the smiling brotherhood); every doubt (because anyone who starts doubting details will end by doubting life itself); all irony (because in the realm of kitsch everything must be taken quite seriously); and the mother who abandons her family or the man who prefers men to women, thereby calling into question the holy decree "Be fruitful and multiply." In this light, we can regard the gulag as a septic tank used by totalitarian kitsch to dispose of its refuse. Section 10 The decade immediately following the Second World War was a time of the most horrible Stalinist terror. It was the time when Tereza's father was arrested on some piddling charge and ten-year-old Tereza was thrown out of their flat. It was also the time when twenty-year-old Sabina was studying at the Academy of Fine Arts. There, her professor of Marxism expounded on the following theory of socialist art: Soviet society had made such progress that the basic conflict was no longer between good and evil but between good and better. So shit (that is, whatever is essentially unacceptable) could exist only "on the other side" (in America, for instance), and only from there, from the outside, as something alien (a spy, for instance), could it penetrate the world of "good and better." And in fact, Soviet films, which flooded the cinemas of all Communist countries in that cruelest of times, were saturated with incredible innocence and chastity. The greatest conflict that could occur between two Russians was a lovers' misunderstanding: he thought she no longer loved him; she thought he no longer loved her. But in the final scene they would fall into each other's arms, tears of happiness trickling down their cheeks. The current conventional interpretation of these films is this: that they showed the Communist ideal, whereas Communist reality was worse. Sabina always rebelled against that interpretation. Whenever she imagined the world of Soviet kitsch becoming a reality, she felt a shiver run down her back. She would unhesitatingly prefer life in a real Communist regime with all its persecution and meat queues. Life in the real Communist world was still livable. In the world of the Communist ideal made real, in that world of grinning idiots, she would have nothing to say, she would die of horror within a week. The feeling Soviet kitsch evoked in Sabina strikes me as very much like the horror Tereza experienced in her dream of being marched around a swimming pool with a group of naked women and forced to sing cheerful songs with them while corpses floated just below the surface of the pool. Tereza could not address a single question, a single word, to any of the women; the only response she would have got was the next stanza of the current song. She could not even give any of them a secret wink; they would immediately have pointed her out to the man standing in the basket above the pool, and he would have shot her dead. Tereza's dream reveals the true function of kitsch: kitsch is a folding screen set up to curtain off death. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDRQjT7jyGKQlFZpAQFY2wf+OVzGMbHNobPuwJERYJm5NWVUicscI+8I k+6GI7tHbj+g5XnKU8xCjB6k69AFTWTP9YOC4M6+WUsQx17BrbKd6rlZIQ95xh8o aleWPsdsESFgarGO6PV7496I8xl6BXixqiySHCkUlZ7YQXsTMFknGO/81ndrJqMU UgZLGIem6CMkc8qAOvwa6bd3N8qvv8ShBFnkYZ+8SFWC3I5EhCARLYjlijhVYqcK EPnBZVmKcpP6ojOxCWiKzARh1Z66y1Xf+GBdsRCYrHU7NoUfqqo9quMyNFX6eM7u AehRJZ7rOG30mhWcRfuCrT++uGKOFfKUsWLDJIzG/4mkEmhU9801GQ== =qoeS -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Traffic Analysis
by Robert A. Costner 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm curious about traffic analysis capability. While I don't know the exact figures involved, I'd say that Cracker throws away about 10% of the messages it receives. Admittedly, these are probably not encrypted messages (I don't know. Humans do not get to read the messages.) Does this make traffic analysis more difficult? On the other side, if Cracker were to send out more messages that it takes in, or just replace these thrown away messages with random noise messages, perhaps encrypted, would this foil traffic analysis? Or suppose Redneck sent each nym an encrypted message each day, or more often? This would be a pure nonsense message just sent out to foil traffic analysis. Since the server generated the nonsense message internally, there would be no matching incoming message for Redneck. -- Robert Costner Phone: (770) 512-8746 Electronic Frontiers Georgia mailto:pooh@efga.org http://www.efga.org/ run PGP 5.0 for my public key

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Not that I'm a troublemaker...
by Tim W. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

THE CLASSIC MIDDLE NAME (continued) * In Alabama, murderer Billy Wayne Waldrop was executed in January, and the next month, murderer Dudley Wayne Kyzer was turned down for parole. Two weeks later, murderer Coleman Wayne Gray was executed in Virginia. In May, murderer Larry Wayne White was executed in Texas. In July, Maryland inmate Richard Wayne Willoughby was sentenced to life in prison for killing another inmate. And once again this April 19, the nation was reminded that the Oklahoma City bombing date commemorated not only the seige at Waco, but the 1995 Arkansas execution of murderer and militia hero Richard Wayne Snell. AUTHENTICITY: All news stories mentioned in News of the Weird are from news stories appearing in daily newspapers in the U. S. and Canada (or occasionally, reputable daily newspapers in other countries or other reputable magazines and journals). No so-called supermarket tabloid, and no story that was not intended to be "news," is ever the source of a News of the Weird story.

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Re: Remailer advertising (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 02 Oct 1997 10:31:37 -0400 > From: "Robert A. Costner" <pooh(a)efga.org> > Subject: Re: Remailer advertising > this, and decided that users would be bothered by getting return email when > they send the remailer a message. We considered sending a return message > not with each message, but say only once per month, or only once every two > weeks. Feedback I got on this was that users would not like the remailer > acknowledging them. Of course not: - it provides even more non-covered traffic for Mallet to analyze - it proves that the remailer is keeping long-term records of its activity, further prompting Mallet to use rubber-hose crypto or a covert break-in to recover the data. A commercial remailers should keep no records and this means that each submission must include some form of token for immediate payment of access fees. Further, a secure remailer should NEVER send traffic to a subscriber as the result of anything other than normal traffic handling. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Traffic Analysis (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Thu, 02 Oct 1997 23:28:10 -0400 > From: "Robert A. Costner" <pooh(a)efga.org> > Subject: Traffic Analysis > I'm curious about traffic analysis capability. While I don't know the > exact figures involved, I'd say that Cracker throws away about 10% of the > messages it receives. Admittedly, these are probably not encrypted > messages (I don't know. Humans do not get to read the messages.) Does > this make traffic analysis more difficult? Why/how does it decide to throw them away? Does the incoming produce cover traffic even if its thrown away? Traffic analysis generaly does not look at the contents of the packets, encrypted or not is irrelevant. I suspect it would lower the estimated ratio of cover traffic if nothing gets sent out. This would in general lower the cost to analyse the traffic. I would set it up to send bogus outgoing even if the message was dropped. That way the analysis would correlate the dropped message to the outgoing and produce a cover ratio closer to the actual value. Also remember to send n+1 bogus traffic to make up for the dropped outgoing. > Or suppose Redneck sent each nym an encrypted message each day, or more > often? By 'nym' you mean each subscribed address or to each address used in the outgoing? I would say it is bad to send to subscribers. It provides non-covered traffic that identifies your subscribers specificaly (really not a threat since Mallet already has their original incoming and therefore their source address) as well as demonstrating that you are keeping long-term traffic records. The long-term records represent a clear threat to the security and stability of the remailer. If you send out this cover traffic regularly then be shure to use some mechanism to select email addresses randomly or else Mallet will get a list of your bogus addresses and begins to filter them immediately. A commercial remailer should not keep records of its use. However, I suspect that eventualy remailers will be required to keep usage records by law. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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update.339 (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From physnews(a)aip.org Thu Oct 2 16:07:42 1997 > Date: Thu, 2 Oct 97 12:42:29 EDT > From: physnews(a)aip.org (AIP listserver) > Message-Id: <9710021642.AA00390(a)aip.org> > To: physnews-mailing(a)aip.org > Subject: update.339 > > > PHYSICS NEWS UPDATE > The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Physics News > Number 339 October 1, 1997 by Phillip F. Schewe and Ben > Stein > > A NEW THEORY OF NMR FOR EXTENDED OBJECTS. > Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) isn't just an imaging > technique, but a valuable spectroscopic tool for deducing the > chemical environment and structural layout of atoms in different > environments. This is because the NMR spectrum of an atom (or > to be more precise, the spectrum of the atom's nuclear magnetic > states) is different depending on the local geometry, just as an > atom's allowed electron energies will be different if the atom is > suddenly lodged in a crystal with many other atoms. Previous > NMR theories have been able to explain accurately what the > NMR spectrum ought to be only for atoms or atom clusters in > isolation. Now, physicists at UC Berkeley (Steven Louie, > louie(a)jungle.berkeley.edu, 510-642-1709) have devised a > method which for the first time makes possible rigorous > calculations of the NMR spectra of extended systems such as > crystals, surfaces, polymers, or even amorphous materials; given > the coordinates of the atoms, the Berkeley researchers were able > to predict the spectrum. They tried out their theory on an > industrially important material---synthetic diamond films used, > for example, as coatings for tools and engine parts. The > prediction of the NMR spectrum for carbon atoms in the diamond > films was in close agreement with the observed spectrum. > (Francesco Mauri et al., Physical Review Letters, 22 Sept. > 1997.) Hell of a way to reverse-engineer just about anything. How long you figure it will be before they start coming out wit industrial units just for materials analysis? I wonder how good it would be at determing the layout of a die through the carrier... > PARTICLE IDENTIFICATION WITH PROBE MICROSCOPY. > Scanning tunneling microscopes (STM) provide pretty pictures of > atoms and can even be used to pluck single atoms from the > sample surface. But often the identity of that atom (especially if > it is an impurity) remains unknown. Physicists at Arizona State > (John Spence, Uwe Weierstall, weierstall(a)asu.edu) have > addressed this problem. First, they use a small voltage to remove > a surface atom or molecule with an STM probe; then a larger > voltage launches the object from the probe toward a distant > detector. A measurement of the time of flight (TOF) supplies a > mass-to-charge ratio for the mystery particle, which in most cases > will supply the identity of the unknown species. The best > resolution achieved by other methods of chemical identification > on surfaces is about 2 nm. This new STM + TOF identification, > with essentially atomic-level resolution, should be handy in a > number of research areas, such as catalysis and the study of the > role of foreign atoms at kinks and steps in crystal growth. This > work will be reported in a session (NS-TuA, Oct. 21) at the > upcoming meeting of the American Vacuum Society (Oct. 20-24 > in San Jose). The program for this meeting can be viewed on the > Internet at this address: > www.vacuum.org/symposium/program.html. (General press > contact at the meeting: 408-271-6000.) Pretty nifty materials analysis tool. Maybe they should shoot the atom toward the NMR... > FISSION HELPS SUPERCONDUCTIVITY. One of the > problems of using high temperature superconductors as wires in > magnets is that the bundles of magnetic field lines that normally > stay put in the presence of low currents start to move around > (dissipating energy thereby) when larger currents are sent through > the wire sample. Scientists working at Los Alamos have now > used a proton beam to induce nuclear fission in mercury atoms in > a mercury/copper oxide superconductor. The defects caused by > the fissioning atoms splay out in all directions in the > superconductor crystal and help to snag the wayward field lines. > This permits the sample to carry much more current. (Nature, 18 > Sept.) ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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index.html
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

CNN logo Navigation Infoseek/Big Yellow Pathfinder/Warner Bros Main banner Move the corporate ladder to your back yard. Because you can. VAIO/Sony rule JUDGE THROWS OUT RUBY RIDGE CHARGES Randy Weaver's house October 2, 1997 Web posted at: 8:36 p.m. EDT (0036 GMT) Latest developments: * Judge invokes double-jeopardy law * Harris accused of killing U.S. marshal * Charges against FBI agent unaffected BONNERS FERRY, Idaho (CNN) -- An Idaho judge dismissed a state murder charge against a man accused of killing a federal agent in the Ruby Ridge shootout, saying he can't be tried again after his acquittal of murder in federal court. Idaho Magistrate Judge Quentin Harden ruled Thursday that the charge against Kevin Harris violate a state law barring prosecution of someone who faced the same charges in another "state, territory or country." Prosecutor Denise Woodbury, who charged Harris and FBI marksman Lon Horiuchi in state court in August, had argued that the state double-jeopardy law was meant to cover prosecutions in other countries, not the United States. "I find that (Idaho law) bars further prosecution of Kevin Harris for the acts set forth ... in the complaint in this case," Harden said. "To rule that the courts of the United States of America do not come under 'another state, territory, or country' would be an anomalous result -- giving more credence to the courts of another country than to the courts of our own nation," Harden wrote. Harris accused of killing U.S. marshal Standoff scene Harris, 29, of Republic, Washington, was accused in the shooting death of deputy U.S. Marshal William Degan and of shooting at another agent in the August 21, 1992, shootout that precipitated an 11-day siege at the cabin of white separatist Randy Weaver. A friend of Weaver's, Harris was staying at the cabin during the shootout and was wounded by an FBI sniper's bullet. Weaver's 14-year-old son, Sam, was killed in the gunfight. His wife, Vicki Weaver, was later shot and killed during the siege by the FBI's Horiuchi. The shootout has become a rallying point for some groups who believe federal law enforcement has encroached too much on citizens' rights. Weaver and Harris were tried and acquitted of federal charges in 1993. But in August, Woodbury charged Harris with first-degree murder in Degan's death and assault with a deadly weapon against Arthur Roderick, another law enforcement officer. Harden also dismissed the assault charge. Woodbury also charged Horiuchi with involuntary manslaughter in the death of Vicki Weaver. Charges against FBI agent unaffected Harden's ruling doesn't affect the charge against Horiuchi, who has never been tried in any court. His lawyers have indicated they will try to move his case to a federal court. Harris was at his job as a welder when he received the news that the murder charge against him had been dismissed, said Diane Peters, his business partner at Eagle Industries. "We were hoping what was fair and just would turn out," Peters said. Harris himself did not return a phone call, and Woodbury declined to comment on Harden's ruling. Reuters contributed to this report. rule Related stories: * Both sides decry new Ruby Ridge charges - August 21, 1997 * FBI senior officials won't be charged in Ruby Ridge siege - August 15, 1997 * Former FBI section chief pleads guilty, admits destroying Ruby Ridge report - October 30, 1996 * FBI official charged with obstruction after concealing Ruby Ridge report - October 22, 1996 Related sites: Note: Pages will open in a new browser window * United States Department of Justice Home Page * Federal Bureau of Investigation External sites are not endorsed by CNN Interactive. _________________________________________________________________ Infoseek search ____________________ ____ ____ _________________________________________________________________ rule Message Boards Sound off on our message boards You said it... [INLINE] Move the corporate ladder to your back yard. Because you can. VAIO/Sony rule To the top © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Terms under which this service is provided to you.

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Re: http:--www.cnn.com-US-9710-01-shooting.update-
by geeman＠best.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Crypto relevance? Naturally: this wouldn't have happened if strong crypto were outlawed! At 09:51 PM 10/1/97 -0500, Jim Choate wrote: > > CNN logo > Navigation > > Infoseek/Big Yellow > > TEEN KILLS 2 AT SCHOOL; MOTHER FOUND DEAD AT HOME > > Woodham October 1, 1997 > Web posted at: 3:38 p.m. EDT (1938 GMT) > > PEARL, Mississippi (CNN) -- A Mississippi teen-ager slashed his > mother's throat Wednesday morning before going on a shooting rampage > at his high school that left two students dead and at least six > wounded, authorities said. > > The high school junior, Luke Woodham, was arrested and charged with > three counts of murder shortly after the shooting at Pearl High > School, about three miles east of the state capital, Jackson. > > Police Chief Bill Slade choked back tears as he told reporters, > "This was a disgruntled girlfriend-boyfriend thing... We talked to > the youth. He gave us a statement and his manifesto was that he felt > he had been wronged." > etc,..,. obligatory pgp key: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 4.5 mQENAjMPX3sAAAEIAL8U6IqpMkqM3TcIqU/q7iot8pYk4ifVNaNlIYwwoYmPXH/T dabDzgkQg7h1QsEJU71Ze8EdHmKksfeBEVppJV6X9SyzpFOCgrI/Qr7hMbxnecci SVk2/B2lf4tUPuqm/DGRfAUcd4iG7Gjhw5GRh9Us/jrEtkqr3iIES+9pSNvrEsgB xYYR39eaYwe0gheExaO7vtvDDPUM7C3spbcnwOyLCpURpLCAMHUO8DQc2FO/fN4z TqqIFOect2ea4LYHr0o29RrtY9J85lQj3df8LQvIJWjwzAFfBqOU1KUdXqTayzUj rvY4ZL/1vhTJ5QmlBJ6ognqwk7PVN0SesspU2okABRG0IGdyZWdnIHBlcnNvbmFs IDxnZWVtYW5AYmVzdC5jb20+ =H0bC -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: http:--www.cnn.com-US-9710-01-shooting.update- (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: geeman(a)best.com > Date: Thu, 02 Oct 1997 20:47:35 -0700 > Subject: Re: http:--www.cnn.com-US-9710-01-shooting.update- > Crypto relevance? Naturally: this wouldn't have happened if strong crypto > were outlawed! > > TEEN KILLS 2 AT SCHOOL; MOTHER FOUND DEAD AT HOME > > > > Woodham October 1, 1997 > > Web posted at: 3:38 p.m. EDT (1938 GMT) > > > > PEARL, Mississippi (CNN) -- A Mississippi teen-ager slashed his > > mother's throat Wednesday morning before going on a shooting rampage > > at his high school that left two students dead and at least six > > wounded, authorities said. This list is involved with much more than just crypto. These were submitted as further datum in the ongoing guns discussion. You might try using procmail filtering on 'gun' to eliminate such traffic. The Cypherpunks Creedo: Empower yourself and quit bothering me. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Remailers and ecash
by nobody＠neva.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Anonymous wrote: >> > - Everyone a remailer. Remailers only accept messages from other >> > remailers. To use remailers you must run a remailer. >> >> I don't grow my own wheat, grind it up, and then make my own bread. I >> also prefer not to run a remailer. > >You don't have to. You pay someone to bake your bread for you, and >you can pay someone to run your remailer for you. > >This idea has been around since remailers began. The basic premise >is that a group of remailers are set up which only accept mail from >other remailers. A pinging system can be set up to verify that all >the remailers are operating correctly. > >The catch is that in practice each remailer is only required to >accept mail from other remailers, but can actually accept mail from >anybody the operator wants to. So if you don't want to run a >remailer, just pay someone to run a remailer on your behalf, and then >you can send anonymous messages through that person's site. > >Thus forwarding within the remailer network is free, but it costs >money to insert new messages. This scheme is a little more flexible >than attaching ecash to each message because you can arrange any type >of fee schedule you like, such as a flat rate per month. This is interesting. One nice feature is that there doesn't need to be a standardized payment arrangement with all remailers, just the one you use for your entry point. And, there's nothing that prevents many remailer networks from overlapping. (Actually, the geometry could create some neat problems.) This would be fairly easy to set up, not even really needing client software modifications. However, it does have a "commons" problem. No remailer operator has an incentive to provide really good service. They are all encouraged to provide the bare minimum remailer service and take advantage of the other remailers in the network. For example, what would encourage somebody to have a 24 x 7 remailer service with continuous staffing? This would be desirable because when the bad guys kick down the door, there is somebody awake to pull the plug. There are a zillion other features which won't happen if there isn't a proper incentive. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDR4w5aWtjSmRH/5AQEG4gf+M/7L0iR3qLoXB1jhLkCyuq2iasP+7dO8 nv3QkA3LcTk6gcIMvJKYAfGUlsqISOFOhIfB2G37bLIQ9PjPeP99x48lBklwZ61A 64JeiD187qEkS0bXy5Q5OLNnoQ1jhsQOF9dSqDgA7c3n6kDVv0fsIZ3gdCimFNqR 53qBcUQG14NcPIsYURmNUfX8p68T01yc+8rQUkh3xmmXCr89cgodCFoFpwKUojYp tumpPTdDYMZkjflAm2ZQxOgfrKryvtI/ESjy5R2xFxEcxB4nvJ1qZ2fVhhy/dQbS 9EdjT1WSG99rfOKRkJNd/ANeB3HU5ynq1WdrBq95TCRb+/znnguyaw== =HbZJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Kevin Harris Charges Dismissed
by Mike Duvos 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An Idaho magistrate dismissed state murder and other charges against Ruby Ridge defendent Kevin Harris today, citing double jeopardy. -- Mike Duvos $ PGP 2.6 Public Key available $ enoch(a)zipcon.com $ via Finger $ {Free Cypherpunk Political Prisoner Jim Bell}

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Re: Digital Postage (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Subject: Re: Digital Postage (fwd) > Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 00:09:22 -0500 (CDT) > From: "snow" <snow(a)smoke.suba.com> > He of the Hyperlong .sig said: I could make it even longer if it would irritate you more... > > Ask yourself this, how attractive would the Internet have been if it had > > required users to install and manage multiple communications protocols for > > every connection? > > You mean like FTP, NNTP, HTTP, SMTP & etc.? > > Rudy can't fail. No, not services, network protocols TCP/IP/UDP...IPX...NetBUI...Lantastic...MosesLAN...ParNet...etc. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Newbie Question
by Law Abiding Citizen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm new to encryption, having just purchased PGP. I want to abide by the law, but I don't know who to send a copy of my secret key to. Do I send it to the FBI guy who shot the unarmed woman, the FBI guy, Kahoe, who ordered evidence of the FBI murder of citizens destroyed, or to one of the other four top FBI officials who helped with the cover-up? Do I have to send a copy of my secret key to the CIA, as well? If so, do I just give it to my drug dealer and have him pass it along to his connection, or should I just give it to a Jewish person and tell them to have the Mossad pass it along to the CIA? Also, I like sticking large, foreign objects in my rectum. Can I legally do that myself, with a toilet plunger, or are they restricted to only use by LEA's in meeting the legitimate needs of law enforcement. Insincerely, A.L-A. Citizen

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Re: Traffic Analysis (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Fri, 03 Oct 1997 01:34:56 -0400 > From: "Robert A. Costner" <pooh(a)efga.org> > Subject: Re: Traffic Analysis > Remailers in general will throw away messages at times. Sometimes on > purpose, sometimes by accident. This is not replaced by any cover traffic. Perhaps this should be added. > For purposes of argument, we could say that a remailer throws away > messages that violate usage policies. This accounts for some amount of > traffic, let's just say 10% to name a figure. Way too high for commercial use. Get it down to something like .01 and that would be workable I suspect (haven't done the math). Course this raises the issue of who pays for dumped mail on a commercial box. Should the customer pay since it was their action that instigated the drop? Or perhaps the remailer since they were selling a service which they didn't provide at their discretion? > Of course this sounds > reprehensible, Not to me. It's your box and your money, set any policy that you desire. If I as a user don't like it, I'll beat feet... > so you ask what sort of message gets thrown out? Some > examples might be: > > * 3,000 copies of the same message to the same person > * Any mail from Sanford Wallace at Cyberpromo.com > * A 300MB mailbomb Let's generalize a bit to see if we can get a clearer picture. - traffic that seems to be duplicate. What if the digital signature on each one is valid implying the originator intended to send the 3,000 pieces. Do you dump them and take the money? - traffic from specific parties whose reputation capital is low. As a business should this really matter as long as the creetin pays the bill? - traffic of an abnormal format Don't see any issues with this one. Are there any other classes that you can think of that you might want to filter on? > Basically some messages that constitute abuse (without examining actual > content) get tossed. Ok, so you are doing header filtering. > These are "valid" messages from people which the > remailer might decide to not continue to send. Much of this mail never > even reaches the remailer code as it gets tossed at an earlier level. > Since about 10% of incoming traffic gets tossed, it would seem that this > would somehow effect traffic analysis. This traffic is not replaced, and > much of the dropped traffic is not even know to the remailer. How much > would this actually effect traffic analysis? Let's see if we can put some numbers to it... We receive n pieces of mail. n/10 is tossed at reception based on header filtering. For each mail that gets to the remailer code we sent m cover messages and 1 real message. So the remailer handles a total of (n - n/10) + (m + 1)(n-n/10) pieces in a given time period, t. Let z stand for (n - n/10) the actual number of processible traffic, we can reduce this to z + (m + 1) z. Let's assume now that we go ahead and transmit cover for those emails we get something like z + (m + 1) z + m ( n/10 ). We don't add a 1 to the m(n/10) because we don't have a real outgoing to process. So the total traffic load of the remailer can be represented by: L = z + (m + 1) z + m ( n/10 ) or, L = (n - n/10) + (m + 1)(n - n/10) + m(n/10) Now if you look at a travelling salesman problem you see quickly that the complexity grows quite quickly. This produces a traffic analysis load of something of the form, T = L ^ v Where v represents the complexity factor in dealing with the possible combinations possible. So, without actualy plugging numbers in there, I would say it looks like a small increase in output could grow pretty quickly because of the power growth factor in the extra traffic and processing it. > As a side point, software problems will at times cause chained messages to > get tossed. From time to time certain remailers become incompatible with > each other, or user held public keys do not get updated properly. This > will also cause messages to get tossed. Ok, let's add a 'software failure' category. > Cracker sends messages as "Anonymous" and does not allow replies to be > returned to the sender. Redneck on the other hand allows each user to pick > a pseudonym and allows relies to be returned to the sender. This is known > as a "nym". The whole point of a nym is to be able to receive replies (as > well as establish reputation capital). People who have nyms on the > remailer want to receive email back to them. Nyms are managed and > authenticated with PGP. My question is would it foil traffic analysis if a > number of remailer server generated messages were to go out to the nyms > without ever having matching incoming traffic? If I understand you the remailer would send outbound traffic to its input for distribution to your subscribers? I don't believe it would factor into the analysis at all if all the source destinations are the same. Outbound traffic from party A that went to party B would be important to track. So, if you wanted to do this sort of stuff and you wanted Mallet to chase their tail I would randomly pick source addresses from my subscriber base and send the bogus messages to my subscribers making shure nobody received an email from themselves. Then it looks like everyone is involved in a conspiracy... > >A commercial remailer should not keep records of its use. However, I suspect > >that eventualy remailers will be required to keep usage records by law. > > I'd be willing to be involved in a first amendment challenge against any > such law. I suspect we would win in the US. At least we won the last 1st > amendment challenge against remailers. (ACLU vs Miller) It has nothing to do with limiting speech so I doubt you'd have a 1st leg to stand on. Furthermore, the 1st doesn't guarantee the right to anonymity. If you want to claim that as a fundamental right you'd need to use the 9th and 10th. It does have to do with being able to trace the perp back if needed. I am not saying I agree with it, just recognize that reasonable people will see this lack of tracability via a court order as a clear threat to their security at all levels. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or (fwd)
by Blanc 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jim Choate wrote: >> Stalkers, thieves, rapists, drug addicts, perverts, etc., or just real >> animals from the animal kingdom, strike at the most inopportune times, when >> there are no officially sanctioned police forces around to be of help. > >I have to object to the inclusion of drug addicts, they do what they do >because the legislators and police want to stick their noses in other >peoples business. If drug addicts resort to crime then society as a whole >must garner some of the responsibility of putting them in that situation. .................................................... We weren't discussing why people commit crimes against others, Jim. We were discussing the disagreeability of having & using guns. And yes, killing doggies is also a Bad Thing. Generally. ('cept when they're foaming at the mouth, snarling, with red blazing eyes, lunging directly at you. That is a Very Bad Doggie.) .. Blanc

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NYTimes Editorial slams F[reeh,uck] and calls on Clinton to stamp it out!
by Attila T. Hun 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The lead editorial, the stated opinion of the paper itself, in this mornings NYTimes slams F[reeh.uck]'s initiative as "crossing the line" and that Clinton "needs to stamp out a bad idea." strong words, newspaper policy editorial, important words. The NYTimes actually has a clue, a strong clue. support the NYTimes! The NYTimes syndicate feeds thousands of the US papers, particularly the small town papers and is considered gospel by many. http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/editorial/03fri4.html The Clinton Administration has proposed several unworkable plans over the years to keep powerful encryption programs that scramble telephone and computer messages out of the hands of foreign terrorists and criminals. But it has never tried to put the need to eavesdrop on criminals above the privacy rights of ordinary Americans. Last month the F.B.I. Director, Louis Freeh, crossed that line by urging Congress to outlaw the manufacture and distribution of encryption programs the Government cannot instantly crack.... ...The plan is unworkable because uncrackable encryption software is readily available abroad. Congress could try to forbid Americans to use any unbreakable encryption, regardless of who makes it. But that would trample on rights that Americans jealously protect to communicate free of Washington's interference. The best way to reduce many types of industrial and financial crime is to provide citizens powerful encryption so they can communicate without fear of corporate spies and thieves.... ... Before encryption controls pick up more momentum, the White House needs to stamp out a bad idea. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3i Charset: latin1 Comment: No safety this side of the grave. Never was; never will be iQCVAwUBNDS47L04kQrCC2kFAQFFJAQA1/jnXjczlvUyVZ/8G6iVnLdD7+dmGw5k 8DnMy5Gw4nuR6cPBFjGLnomvZI2OXgJ4RFR/8Mv3pG9MBohPxOKq6nGdWjZV60F/ 8GpInE/Unb6hzFIxjET7a3wbjgt93PrmZjjSwfHCSiUBqUQXYcH0RUpyNF9zl0o8 HD7uS5WgVow= =7ZNz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Low blow (but a *good* one!)
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alex Le Heux wrote: Anonymous <anon(a)anon.efga.org> wrote: >Let's also take a look at the Dutch performance during their >occupation. While there certainly were many courageous Dutch people >who helped refugees (at great personal risk, to say the least), and >there were many courageous Dutch people who were in the resistance, >there were also many Dutch people who did not perform so well. Not >only were a large number of Jewish people turned in by Dutch >informers, but there were even Dutch SS units. You have a nerve. You, coming from a country where people are still regularly killed in the name of racism, tell me this?! Alex ------------ The Same Old Guy replied: Want the cold, hard facts of life, Bubba? You didn't put WWII 'behind' you. We did! Gun-loving Americans conquered your continent and gave you your countries back instead of enslaving you, like every other winner in history has done. *** Certified Low Blow *** Some of us discriminate against Jews. Do you know why? Because we HAVE some! *** Certified Low Blow *** We were giving them refuge while Europe was massacring them by the millions. Now you have the balls to say we're not all treating them right all of the time. Buy a fucking clue!

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IPO ALERT: C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. Available Through Wit Capital
by edwin＠witcapital.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Wit Capital Corporation is pleased to announce that we are able to provide first-come first-serve participation in the following initial public offering: Issuer: C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. is the largest third party logistics company in North America with 1996 gross revenue of $1.6 billion. The company is a global provider of multimodal transportation services and logistics solutions through a network of 116 offices in 38 states and Canada, Mexico, Belguim, The United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, Singapore and South Africa. Security: Common Stock Expected Size of Offering: 10,578,396 shares Expected Price Range: $15.00 to $17.00 Managing Underwriters: BT Alex Brown Incorporated, Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated, Piper Jaffray Inc. If you think you may be interested in this Initial Public Offering available first- come first-serve through Wit Capital, please visit http://www.witcapital.com. You can view, print or download the Preliminary Prospectus from our New Issues Section. Investors can also call Wit Capital at (888) 4-WITCAP for more information. A REGISTRATION STATEMENT RELATING TO THESE SECURITIES HAS BEEN FILED WITH THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION BUT HAS NOT YET BECOME EFFECTIVE. THESE SECURITIES MAY NOT BE SOLD NOR MAY OFFERS TO BUY BE ACCEPTED PRIOR TO THE TIME THE REGISTRATION STATEMENT BECOMES EFFECTIVE. THIS COMMUNICATION SHALL NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFER TO SELL OR THE SOLICITATION OF AN OFFER TO BUY, NOR SHALL THERE BE ANY SALE OF THESE SECURITIES IN ANY JURISDICTION IN WHICH SUCH OFFER, SOLICITATION OR SALE WOULD BE UNLAWFUL PRIOR TO REGISTRATION OR QUALIFICATION UNDER THE SECURITIES LAWS OF SUCH JURISDICTION. Wit Capital Corporation Member NASD SIPC

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Re: Stronghold
by phelix＠vallnet.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Nope. Like I said, I'm not selling Stronghold or any competing product, I >don't lose anything when someone foolishly buys it, so why should I present >any evidence? I (and several other people on this mailing list) were threatened >by C2Net's lawyers; so to avoid unpleasant disputes, I told them I won't be >publishing whatever I might know about their product. > So, why don't you (and several other people on this mailing list) use the ananymous remailers to present your evidence. Others have wondered why people would use remailers. Here's a prime example. Use the remailer (if you have anything to say).

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Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Fri, 03 Oct 1997 00:08:09 -0700 > From: Blanc <blancw(a)cnw.com> > Subject: Re: "Show me an example of terrorists using the Internet or > (fwd) > >> Stalkers, thieves, rapists, drug addicts, perverts, etc., or just real > >> animals from the animal kingdom, strike at the most inopportune times, when > >> there are no officially sanctioned police forces around to be of help. > > > >I have to object to the inclusion of drug addicts, they do what they do > >because the legislators and police want to stick their noses in other > >peoples business. If drug addicts resort to crime then society as a whole > >must garner some of the responsibility of putting them in that situation. > > We weren't discussing why people commit crimes against others, Jim. We > were discussing the disagreeability of having & using guns. True but my objection is to the line of reasoning you use to get to where you are. Let me try another example... "Stalkers, thieves, rapists, Jews, perverts, etc., or just real animals..." ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: Traffic Analysis (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Fri, 03 Oct 1997 05:41:58 -0400 > From: "Robert A. Costner" <pooh(a)efga.org> > Subject: Re: Traffic Analysis > At 02:07 AM 10/3/97 -0500, Jim Choate wrote: > >> For purposes of argument, we could say that a remailer throws away > >> messages that violate usage policies. > > > >Way too high for commercial use. Get it down to something like .01 and that > >would be workable I suspect (haven't done the math). > > You may be confusing actual traffic, with valid customer traffic. (BTW - > the 10% reject figure was totally pulled out of the air. Since there is no > logging on a remailer, I'm just making an educated guess.) Almost all > commercial sendmail implementations reject a large amount of traffic and > call it "spam filtering". It's very effective, but the fact is that > incoming mail traffic is blocked before any program such as a remailer can > see the messages. Some of this is done by IP address, some is done through > other methods. I'm merely suggesting that a commercial remailer will have > similar policies. Duh. Look you picked the numbers and the scenarios, if you got a bitch about 'em talk to yourself...their your ugly baby. > >Course this raises the > >issue of who pays for dumped mail on a commercial box. Should the customer > >pay since it was their action that instigated the drop? Or perhaps the > >remailer since they were selling a service which they didn't provide at > >their discretion? > > For usage policies, I would think it is the originating user's fault. Acceptable. > For > middleman mail rejects, it is the middleman remailer's fault. So how do we rollback the payments if say the nth hop breaks the delivery? If I were a user and one of the remailers dropped the traffic I would want all my money back, I'm paying for delivery to a specific party. It is clear that the n-1 remailers has no claim to the charges since the email was not delivered to the recipient. Yet, it is not fair to take their income simply because some other remailer dropped mail due to a policy problem, which they clearly didn't have since they delivered the traffic to the next hop successfuly. Perhaps the remailer with the restrictive hop should pay the n-1 remailers. This would certainly provide clear financial incentive for remailers to have liberal fair use policies (which I support fully) and act as true commen-carries simply doing a job mechanicaly like the phone system or the network infrastructure itself. The bottem line is that if commercial anonymous remailers will survive they have to be as liberal with handling traffic as my routed is. > For public > key errors, it is the originating user's fault. Is it? If this were commercial systems the key server would NOT be on any remailers involved otherwise we have a prime target for man-in-the-middle attacks. So, assuming the user gets the key and the remailers get the keys from a 3rd party server which delivers the incorrect keys for whatever reason. Who pays for the failure then? To me it looks like the key server, but they aren't involved in traffic control but key control. While it is clearly fair to charge them for costs (say 1 remailer hop) incurred due to bad keys (which could be the original submitters fault), who pays the other remailers who handle the traffic and loose the income through no fault of their own? Also, what happens if the key is good but the software glitches (which is indistinguishable from a bad key at the source level)? Are you proposing we re-send for free all along the chain? I don't think the remailers which succeded will take kindly to that. If the MTBF for a remailer is n then the MTBF for m remailers is n*m. In other words the remailer chain gets less reliable as it gets longer. > >If I understand you the remailer would send outbound traffic to its input > >for distribution to your subscribers? I don't believe it would factor into > >the analysis at all if all the source destinations are the same. Outbound > >traffic from party A that went to party B would be important to track. > > Giving an example that overly simplifies things... I think my idea here was > that for some number of nyms, they would each receive an average of, say, > five messages each day. All five messages would be addressed from the > remailer and PGP encrypted. Let me say it again, traffic analysis doesn't look at the contents, cryptanalysis does. Whether the contents are encrypted or not is irrelevant. The word 'encrypted' NEVER occurs in traffic analysis. You encrypt the contents because it is assumed that the network analysis has already succeeded. Ok, so the recipient has no way to reply to specific parties unless the contents contain the source address in a source encrypted block. In such a case Mallet is going to look at the recipient and begin traffic analysis on them. Which Mallet is going to do as soon as they either submit or recieve traffic from that node anyway. Seems moot. An effective Mallet collects statistics on all participants indiscrimenantly. This is another example of the apparently unrecognized and implicit assumption that Mallet is only going to look at one party in the chain. Bad assumption. Traffic analysis will succeed ONLY if the *network* is analyzed, not some specific node in that network. This sounds like a message pool where a recipient must attempt decode on every packet they recieve. The ones not meant for them fail. I don't believe this is a commercialy viable process because of the amount of work on the recipients machine. I have a further question. The cover traffic that shows up in the recipients mailbox unrequested is spam isn't it? Also, when the recipient uncovers the last block is it going to say "This space intentionaly left blank"? Or can users of your remailer expect to recieve email full of hex gibberish they can't decode since they don't have a key? My suspicion is that if you are sending cover traffic to anything other than a /dev/null recipient with an a priori agreement you are not going to keep your users long. > Four of the messages would be from real people > trying to communicate with the owner of the nym. One would be a bogus > message sent to confuse traffic analysis. Turn those numbers around and you might manage to cover the traffic. The cover traffic MUST be greater than the 'real' traffic to be effective. My suspicion based on about 4 months of playing with MixMaster 1.5 years ago is that this ratio must be several orders of magnitude unless your traffic is measured in the millions+ of transactions per day. > All four real messages would > come into the remailer encrypted to the remailer and addressed to the > remailer. My thought was that fake outgoing messages to the nym would look > identical to real messages, thereby helping obscure the "mix" just a little > better. This helps hide the identity of the sender of the email that is > headed to a nym. All the outgoing traffic better look the 'same' it's nothing but a standard TCP/IP routing header and the contents (which we never look at). The remailer software is irrelevant on this issue. Traffic analysis relies on the stability of the protocols and their source & destination info not what they are used for. As for the rest of it, take the equation I gave in a previous email and feed it into a spreadsheet. Develop the equations that define the network using the same sort of structures and proceedures you use for a travelling salesman problem (check a local library). If you're asking me to do that work then I need money, I'll talk about work for free - I don't do work for free. > email. The remailer keeps this info in an internal database (as it must) > and is not available to anyone other than the remailer software. The remailer only needs records of transactions while a transaction remains un-committed. The only long term record it should keep is the number of transactions processed and how much money is currently on the books. The records are not available unless somebody cracks the box and begins to tool around the OS ... Mallet is pretty sneaky he reads CERT and collects hacker software too. If your remailer is keeping records of transactions after the transactions close you are not secure. You are actualy providing further incentive to Mallet. > Having just spent a year and a half involved in a federal court case over > the 1st amendment right to anonymity on the net, and winning, I'd have to > disagree with you here. Our affidavit specifically mentioned remailers, > among other things. Just exactly where is anonymity mentioned in the 1st? And since it clearly is not how do you extend: ARTICLE I. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. Is your claim that the remailer is a press? (I rhetoricaly bet not) If so then every computer irrespective of use is a press and protected. Are you going to follow this line in future cases? Or is your argument that the traffic is speech and therefore the carrier of the traffic is immune to prosecution? If so you may have some problems in the future when the judges and prosecutors get a better clue. Because the 1st's speech clause protects the source of speech not the carrier - that's why the founding fathers specificaly mention freedom of the press - to extend that protection to the carrier. Or did you use the commen-carrier approach? My money is that you used the second line of reasoning which means you can expect it to be over-turned in the coming years. Unless somebody manages to get a court to recognize computers as presses and extend those protections fully or networked computers (not the applications they are put to) in general as commen-carrier the battle isn't over. Now if you throw the 9th and 10th in there (which I further rhetoricaly bet you didn't) you got a winning combo. Rhetorical question: do you realize that all networked computers are remailers at the routed level? Did you extend your argument thusly? ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there | | be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves. | | | | -Alan Greenspan- | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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New PGP "Everything the FBI ever dreamed of"
by Martin Minow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An article in today's (Fri, Oct 3) New York Times (CyberTimes) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/100397pgp.html> describes the new release of "PGP for Business Security 5.5," which contains mechanisms that incorporate key recovery mechanism that can either be volontary or be enforced by using PGP's software for controlling a company's SMTP server -- the server can verify that all encrypted messages include the corporate public key (or conform to other corporate policies): "The new version also includes some of the most sophisticated techniques for enforcing this policy through the corporation. The most novel may be a new version of software controlling a company's SMTP server, the machine that acts as the central mailroom for a corporation. PGP provides a software agent that will read all of the mail to make sure that it complies with the corporate policy. This may include requiring all messages to be signed with digital signatures or include a backdoor that the management can use to read the message. If the software agent discovers a message violates the policy, it can either return it to sender or simply log a copy. "PGP implements the backdoor with a central key. Each message is encrypted with both the public key of the recipient and the public key of the management. The message can only be read by someone holding the corresponding private keys, in this case the recipient and the management. The software allows the management to use different master keys for different departments by customizing the software. ... "Bruce Schneier, an encryption expert and author of the popular book Applied Cryptography, said that the new announcement "sounds like everything the FBI ever dreamed of." He also predicts that criminals will find ways to circumvent the restrictions while honest people may be more vulnerable to illicit use of the master key." --- Coincidently, the same issue of the New York Times has an editorial <http://www.nytimes.com/yr/mo/day/editorial/03fri4.html> attacking FBI director Louis Freeh's request that Congress "outlaw the manufacture and distribution of encryption programs the Government cannot instantly crack. Martin Minow minow(a)apple.com

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legal question of DSA-based signatures?
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have before me a statement made by Information Security Corp.: "The Comptroller General has ruled that, for the purposes of electronic commerce, DSA-based digital signatures are as legally binding as hand- written signatures." Can anyone verify this?

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Netly News special report: "The Privacy Snatchers"
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Recently the FBI has started to demand a creepy new anti-privacy law. It requires that all future technologies -- from cell phones to WordPerfect -- include a kind of electronic peephole to let law enforcement agents snoop through your private files and communications without your knowledge or permission. One House committee has already approved the FBI's bill. Such easy access is the fantasy of every unethical policeman and corrupt bureaucrat. Now, the police say they'll never peek through this peephole without a judge's approval. But history reveals that time and again, the FBI, the military and other law enforcement organizations have ignored the law and spied on Americans illegally, without court authorization. Government agencies have subjected hundreds of thousands of law-abiding Americans to unjust surveillance, illegal wiretaps and warrantless searches. Eleanor Roosevelt, Martin Luther King, feminists, gay rights leaders and Catholic priests were spied on. Even Supreme Court justices were monitored. Can we trust the FBI? Visit the Netly News for a special report on The Privacy Snatchers: http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1466,00.html -Declan ------ http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1466,00.html The Netly News (http://netlynews.com/) October 3, 1997 The Privacy Snatchers By Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) ------ ------------------------- Declan McCullagh Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/

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Re: Stronghold
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Jeff Barber <jeffb(a)issl.atl.hp.com> writes: > This is revisionist history. I can't recall any intimation at the > time that any messages were filtered from the unfiltered list. There were three lists. The unfiltered list did not go through the moderator's hands in any way and continued to received all messages (which is how unfiltered subscribers found out about the problem). The filtered list had the posts approved by the moderated. Then there was supposed to be a "flames" list where the moderator sent posts he had rejected. In theory, the moderated+flames lists should have the same contents as the unfiltered list. Here is the original statement by the moderator laying out his policy: > 3) Cypherpunks who wish to read all posts to the list may do so > by taking advantage of either of two optional lists. The first > (cypherpunk-flames(a)toad.com) will consist solely of messages > expurgated from the main Cypherpunks list. (Those who subscribe > to "flames" will be able to easily monitor my moderating > decisions.) The second (cypherpunks-unedited(a)toad.com) will > contain all posts sent to Cypherpunks. It will be the equivalent > of the current open, unmoderated list. It will appeal to those > who don't want list moderation. > > 6) Because every message submitted to Cypherpunk will be posted > to two of the three sister lists, I don't intend to lose much > sleep over whether or not this or that moderating decision was > perfect. I will do the best job I can, within the constraints > listed here. If I err, it isn't fatal. Everyone who wants one > will have two Cypherpunk venues for their posts. Sounds fair > enough to me. What do you think? Here is a message from a pseudonymous poster laying out what actually happened. Many list members may not have seen this message, unless they were subscribed to the unfiltered list. > Well, as it turns out, a number of messages have made it neither to > cypherpunks nor to cypherpunks-flames. Making matters worse, however, > not only are certain messages being suppressed from both lists, but > even messages mentioning that fact get suppressed from both the > cypherpunks and the cypherpunks-flames lists! and here is a letter to him from the moderator, confirming this fact: > Hi, > > On 7 Feb 1997, Against Moderation wrote: > > > What I object to more strongly and think is wrong is the > > fact that it went to *neither* list. > > Unfortunately, it's not as simple as that. As soon as I can > arrange it with John, I am going to stop moderating the list. > In the interim, I *will not* be sending your post onto either > the Flames or the Moderated lists. This is done for legal > reason. As it is, you have already published a libel on the > unedited list by repeating Dimitri's libel. This exposes you to > legal liability, but as an anonymous poster, you are somewhat > insulated from the consequences of your act. In sum, no messages were filtered from the unfiltered list, which is how cypherpunks who avoided moderation learned of the situation. The messages were eliminated from the regular (moderated) list, but they were not sent to the "flames" list, contrary to the stated policies. No hint was given to the subscribers to the moderated list, which was the majority, that this was being done. Messages referring to these facts were also filtered. A sad episode indeed.

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Anne Wells Branscomb and other information
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Anne Wells Branscomb has died. She was 68. A longtime communications and computer lawyer, she significantly shaped the world of information and Net-policy. (I met her once, at a Computers Freedom and Privacy conference.) Her short biography is at: http://www.ngi.org/AWB/ On a different note, congratulations to: * Solveig Singleton, the new director of information studies at the Cato Institute. * Bruce Schneier and EPIC's Dave Banisar, for their book released last month, "The Electronic Privacy Papers." * EPIC's Marc Rotenberg and Phil Agre, for their book released this month: Technology and Privacy: The New Landscape, edited by Philip E. Agre and Marc Rotenberg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). * Bob Palacios, former webmaster for the Center for Democracy and Technology, who's moving on to a new job at a Rockville, MD software company. (I understand CDT needs a new webmaster.) Also, I hear the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a free-market thinktank in Washington, DC, is looking for a full-time analyst to do Internet policy work for them. Stuff like privacy, Net-regulation, free speech. Email me for contact info. -Declan ------------------------- Declan McCullagh Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/

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Re: legal question of DSA-based signatures?
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: kaye(a)popd.ix.netcom.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 12:18:36 -0700 Reply-To: Digital Signature discussion <DIGSIG(a)VM.TEMPLE.EDU> Sender: Digital Signature discussion <DIGSIG(a)VM.TEMPLE.EDU> From: Kaye Caldwell <kaye(a)IX.NETCOM.COM> Subject: Re: legal question of DSA-based signatures? To: DIGSIG(a)VM.TEMPLE.EDU The document to which this refers is posted at: http://www.softwareIndustry.org/issues/docs-org/cg-opinion.pdf At 01:23 PM 10/3/97 -0400, you wrote: >I think I already know the answer to this, but it might be fun to have the >word with the bark on it... > >If you reply to this, I'll pass it on to the cypherpunks list. > >Notice that the question comes through an anonymous remailer. > >Cheers, >Bob Hettinga >--- begin forwarded text > > >Date: Fri, 3 Oct 1997 12:17:32 -0400 >From: Anonymous <anon(a)anon.efga.org> >Comments: This message was remailed by a FREE automated > remailing service. For additional information on this service, > send a message with the subject "remailer-help" to > remailer(a)anon.efga.org. The body of the message will be > discarded. To report abuse, contact the operator at > admin(a)anon.efga.org. Headers below this point were > inserted by the original sender. >Subject: legal question of DSA-based signatures? >To: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net >Precedence: bulk >Reply-To: Anonymous <anon(a)anon.efga.org> >X-Loop: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net > >I have before me a statement made by Information Security Corp.: > >"The Comptroller General has ruled that, for the purposes of electronic >commerce, DSA-based digital signatures are as legally binding as hand- >written signatures." > >Can anyone verify this? > >--- end forwarded text > > > >----------------- >Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox >e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA >"... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, >[predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to >experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' >The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ >Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http:www.fc98.ai> > > --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/ Ask me about FC98 in Anguilla!: <http:www.fc98.ai>

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C'Punk Action Project - Help the Newbie
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

A Law Abiding Citizen wrote: > > I'm new to encryption, having just purchased PGP. I want to abide by > the law, but I don't know who to send a copy of my secret key to. We need to compile a list of people that law-abiding citizens can send copies of their secret keys. I will start the list with those that the LAC has already mentioned. Surely other C'punks will have their own nominees for this position of supreme trust. 1. The FBI guy who shot Randy Weaver's wife. 2. The FBI guy, Kahoe, who ordered evidence of the FBI murder of citizens destroyed. 3. One of the other four top FBI officials who helped with the cover-up? 4. Your drug drug dealer, to pass along to his CIA connection. 5. A Jewish person, to give to the Mossad, to pass on to the CIA. 6. The NYC cop with the toilet plunger in his hand.

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Note to cypherpunks in Chile
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Next week I'll be speaking at REUNA-InternetWorld'97 in Santiago, Chile, staying at the Hotel Plaza San Francisco. I'd love to meet anyone who wants an update on U.S. Net-politics (or vice versa). -Declan ------------------------- Declan McCullagh Time Inc. The Netly News Network Washington Correspondent http://netlynews.com/

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D. DENNING's report
by Jerome Thorel 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi folks, Did you saw an onine version of the study by D. Denning & William E. Baugh, Jr., "ENCRYPTION AND EVOLVING TECHNOLOGIES AS TOOLS OF ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM". I've got the paper version, but am seeking an online one. Excerpt here: http://guru.cosc.georgetown.edu/~denning/crypto/oc-abs.html If there is no digital version, I can scan it for the community. PLEASE ANSWER ME PRIVATLY - am not a cypherpunk sub' --> Jerome Thorel lambda bulletin Paris, France www.freenix.fr/netizen <--

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Guilt
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Anonymous wrote: >Alex Le Heux wrote: >Anonymous <anon(a)anon.efga.org> wrote: >>Let's also take a look at the Dutch performance during their >>occupation. While there certainly were many courageous Dutch people >>who helped refugees (at great personal risk, to say the least), and >>there were many courageous Dutch people who were in the resistance, >>there were also many Dutch people who did not perform so well. Not >>only were a large number of Jewish people turned in by Dutch >>informers, but there were even Dutch SS units. > >You have a nerve. You, coming from a country where people are still >regularly killed in the name of racism, tell me this?! >Alex >------------ >The Same Old Guy replied: > >Want the cold, hard facts of life, Bubba? >You didn't put WWII 'behind' you. We did! >Gun-loving Americans conquered your continent and gave you your >countries back instead of enslaving you, like every other winner in >history has done. > >*** Certified Low Blow *** >Some of us discriminate against Jews. Do you know why? >Because we HAVE some! >*** Certified Low Blow *** > >We were giving them refuge while Europe was massacring them by the >millions. Now you have the balls to say we're not all treating them >right all of the time. >Buy a fucking clue! Monty Cantsin is feeling a bit guilty about starting this. While there is some value in taking the smug Europeans down a few notches, it is beginning to look as if some Americans need to be taken down a few notches as well. "The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People" by John Loftus and Mark Aarons. Pages 49-50: "In 1943 the Holocaust was in full operation, but in April of that year in Bermuda, a conference of British and American officials formally decided that nothing should be done about it. They 'ruled out all plans for mass rescue.' The British Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department were both afraid that the Third Reich would be quite willing, indeed eager, to stop the gas chambers, empty the concentration camps, and let hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of Jewish survivors emigrate to freedom in the West. The Foreign Office 'revealed in confidence' to the State Department its fear that Hitler might permit a mass exodus. If approaches to Germany to release Jews were 'pressed too much that is exactly what might happen.'[46] "The bigoted reality behind the Secret Report of the Easter 1943 Bermuda Conference was that not a single Allied nation wanted to let teh Jews settle in its country. The unspoken consensus was that it was better to let Hitler handle them than arrange a mass evacuation to the United States, England, or Canada. In short, the Jews were expendable to the war effort.[47] Only after the war was it confirmed that a rescue operation to the Nazi concentration camps could have been successful. 'Marshal of the RAF Sir Arthur `Bomber` Harris declared afterwards that a rescue plan was `perfectly feasible, but I was never asked to undertake it.`'[48] "No one campaigned to rescue the Jews because the leaders of the Western nations had deliberately withheld the truth about the Holocaust from their own citizens. After verification by each of the Allied intelligence services, the body counts of murdered Jews were quietly classified as early as September 1941." Pages 70-71: "Ibn Saud had no intention of ever letting a single Jew emigrate to Palestine. President Roosevelt discovered this for himself, but too late. "In February 1945, just before he died, President Roosevelt personally met Ibn Saud. He attempted to enlist the king's support for the Zionist solution, but Ibn Saud firmly rejected the idea, instead suggesting that the Allies should give 'them and their descendants the choicest lands and homes of the Germans who oppressed them' or that the Allied countries take in the Jews themselves.[57] "The king's vehement opposition to Jewish migration was a bit of a shock to Roosevelt, who was strongly sympathetic to the Zionist cause. Yet none of the Western nations was ever prepared to take more than a handful of Holocaust survivors. As one book showed, the Canadian policy was 'none is too many.' The king seemed to recognize this, and he reminded Roosevelt that Palestine had already taken 'its fair share of refugees from Europe.' "Suddenly the president's sympathy for the Jews was wavering. He told Ibn Saud that 'he would do nothing to assist the Jews against the Arabs and would make no move hostile to the Arab people.' Roosevelt's new policy was to be netural, but neutral in favor of the Arabs.[58] It was an uncomfortable lesson for the ailing president. The choice seemed clear enough. The United States could help the Jews found their home in Palestine, or it could have Saudi Arabia's oil as the engine room for postwar dominance. It seemed to Roosevelt that could not have both. He chose oil." Footnotes, Chapter 2: [46] David Wyman, "The Abandonment of the Jews" (New York: Pantheon, 1984), p. 342 [47] For accounts of the official policies of the various Allied governments, see Walter Laqueur, "The Terrible Secret" (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1981); and Martin Gilbert, "Auschwitz and the Allies" (London: Michael Joseph/Rainbird, 1981). [48] Ricahrd Deacon, "The Israeli Secret Service" (London: Sphere, 1979), p. 29. Footnotes, Chapter 3: [57] The king's ". . . firmness disconcerted Roosevelt, who seems to have believed a few hours' personal chitchat and some lavish Lend-Lease assistance would win the King of Arabia to his purpose. "The president tried another tack. He was counting on the legendary hospitality of the Arab, he said, to help solve the problem of Zionism. But [the king] did not see why the Arabs of Palestine should feel especially hospitable towards the Jews. "'Make the enemy and the oppressor pay,' he said; 'that is how we Arabs wage war.' "It was not the Arabs of Palestine who had massacred the Jews. It was the Germans and, as 'a simple bedouin,' the Sa'udi king could not understand why the president seemed so eager to save Germany from the consequences of its crimes. . . ." Kelly, "Arabia, the Gulf and the West" (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 271-272. [58] Returning to Washington, a chastened Roosevelt told Congress that "from Ibn Saud, of Arabia, I learned more of the whole problem of the Moslems and more about the Jewish people in 5 minutes than I could have learned by the exchange of a dozen letters." Ibid., p. 272. Monty Cantsin Editor in Chief Smile Magazine http://www.neoism.org/squares/smile_index.html http://www.neoism.org/squares/cantsin_10.html -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNDVRD5aWtjSmRH/5AQGxqgf+Mc4zodAP9o7ymAVZpslQbrI+EuZhqhqA Wp86+KRsihdDU67YsqlEFAUz8gZXVeWsx7yJEIf94byDlP2BkeZoXhTaafrOpsne yj8tlpjhgVgFJopM3FX8PmNHK0YHrGdv7O2G+2k02z6B9jlDIv3VXbcvleX2O0iW 1o7syi6sUE9yt9ZozQS8H4AQZypPxg0OmkY/O0WunyXGOZJcSWthCgomwNAt/tz6 OBzj7csVq1lw4/+yUegEQmsimWSy+Q88HJeuiS5jJH3/jiNCaIStsBLBMYv+ql0X 7aNK7F48ckoVbC/OC5QobH2ELYs56BjqZ3N2yRnuOudhtVUO/b8Iqw== =QySR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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