December 1992 - cypherpunks-legacy

anonymous remailer
by Karl L. Barrus 02 Dec '92

02 Dec '92

Fellow cypherpunks: There is a new anonymous remailer for our use. Its address is elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu, its name is "remailer03", and here is the public key: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.0 mQCNAiscKOYAAAED/jmrZbh5t5HgEHDGE2zzFZx3sIplEjIFRFsLpCfJYBfN36Rm uT8VGIyCcUSmCTqEOJ5HJZF58CUCOsy3B215ptOvbZdGijC3Qs7FbtGHKGA49q0v gBgVIcjjyppRI9YjfqlI2gUKDLPceCTw20ODAA7UTKYIa3IBS32zjcrFq/uzAAUR tCZyZW1haWxlcjAzIDxlbGVlN2g1QHJvc2VidWQuZWUudWguZWR1Pg== =9mBX -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Also, here is a script I have to use the remailers. It is the ultimate in brute force :-) Perhaps if more people implemented remailers, a general script can be written to bounce mail off them all, or a subset of them all, in the style of Bill's scripts which were recently posted. It didn't take long at all to set up: I spent most the time installing perl in my account, and tracing down an annoying bug that was my fault - I forgot to make the *.pl files executable. -----------8<--------->8---------- if [ $# != 3 ] then echo "Usage: anon.mail message destination remailer" exit 1 fi anon1=remailing mail1=hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu anon2=remailer mail2=remailer(a)rebma.mn.org anon3=remailer03 mail3=elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu message=$1 dest=$2 if [ $3 = remailing -o $3 = hal -o $3 = alumni -o $3 = 1 ] then remail=$anon1 mailaddr=$mail1 fi if [ $3 = remailer -o $3 = rebma -o $3 = 2 ] then remail=$anon2 mailaddr=$mail2 fi if [ $3 = remailer03 -o $3 = elee7h5 -o $3 = rosebud -o $3 = 3 ] then remail=$anon3 mailaddr=$mail3 fi t1=.anon1 t2=.anon2 echo "::" > $t1 echo "Request-Remailing-To: $dest" >> $t1 echo "" >> $t1 pgp -ea $t1 $remail echo "::" > $t2 echo "Encrypted: PGP" >> $t2 echo "" >> $t2 cat $t1.asc >> $t2 cat $message >> $t2 rm -rf $t1 $t1.asc mail $mailaddr < $t2 -----------8<--------->8----------

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whoops! Too much 8086 assembly,
by The Phantom 01 Dec '92

01 Dec '92

Too much assembly language and not enough FPU support. It was pointed out that I should simply try recompiling with the coprocessor option. :l Sure easier than writing it in assembly, eh? ahem. thanks for you time - Matt Thomlinson University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Internet: phantom(a)u.washington.edu phone: (206) 528-5732 PGP 2.0 key availaible via email or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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Re: PGP and Digi-money
by Richard Childers 01 Dec '92

01 Dec '92

"Should everyone on the list be given a set amount of digital cash to start the 'poker game', or will we choose a smaller, representative sample? " Maybe we should generate some digicash with a PostScript printer, just to make it interesting. I wonder how public key cryptology would effect efforts to counterfeit ? It seems to me that this same technology could make cash much harder to forge ... even allowing one to actually _print_ one's tender, authenticated by the information buried in the serial number of the bill ... and it would be the serial numbers that the bank would track, not the actual pieces of paper. -- richard ===== -- richard childers rchilder(a)us.oracle.com 1 415 506 2411 oracle data center -- unix systems & network administration Klein flask for rent. Inquire within.

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PGP and Digi-money
by The Phantom 01 Dec '92

01 Dec '92

Well, it looks like it is going to happen. I, too, am interested in seeing the experiment run. The way it was talked about earlier this week, I pictured a system where people would snail-mail an amount of money to a central authority (bank) and would be turned into credits. Since this was only a simulation (not to raise eyebrows) I was thinking that a cap could be established (say, $25). Now it looks as if we'll have no acutal cash backing for the first simulation. How will this be distributed? Should everyone on the list be given a set amount of digital cash to start the 'poker game', or will we choose a smaller, representative sample? For the game, we'll have to set up an account as an internet `bank', scripts to handle incoming cash requests, etc. Are these the least of our worries? I'm also willing to help in any way I can, although I too know little C. I have a decent background in various other areas which may be helpful. On an entirely different subject: Has anyone worked up a PGP version that may help me out? My 286 plugs along when working on keys. :) I am specifically wondering if anyone has hacked in and created a PGP that supports the '87 coprocessor. thanks- Matt Thomlinson University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Internet: phantom(a)u.washington.edu phone: (206) 528-5732 PGP 2.0 key availaible via email or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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Lazy man's PGP key collection
by fnerd＠smds.com 01 Dec '92

01 Dec '92

I collect PGP keys with a PGP keys mailbox. Instead of trashing a message when I'm through reading it, if it has a PGP key, I transfer it to the PGP keys mailbox. In Eudora that means pulling down the Transfer menu to the "-> PGP keys" entry. These are, of course, only play keys. They could be from people who aren't who they say they are, or they could have been tampered with on the way to me. Unless they've been signed by someone I trust and have a trustworthy key for. (Just a standard disclaimer anytime I mention public keys.) -fnerd only her cryptographer knows for sure fnerd(a)smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)

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Re: How far is to far?
by fnerd＠smds.com 01 Dec '92

01 Dec '92

Mark (mark(a)coombs.anu.edu.au) sed > Maybe it's not in the spirit of this mailing group but Seems on topic to me. > what of the question > of purposeful abuse of the anon mailers/newsposters? Say for instance some > person posts either a sh*tload of garbage to every known group, flooding > the USENET... Tim May and Fen Labalme have given good replies. I hate the sloppy setup of the internet/usenet/netnews/mailing-lists in general. The way things are gives anarchy a bad name, and I think they could use a good hosing off--if only that would mean they would get cleaned. Unfortunately the way people react to abuses is often just to add extra patches. Take "kill files," which Tim mentions. The thing I hate about that term (even more than that they're lists of people to "kill,") is that they're after-the-fact. Here's this mail that keeps pouring into my mailbox, and every day my robot has to find and burn the 90% that even a robot can be taught to recognize as junk. Prompt, temporary STUPID relief of symptoms. (I mean, while I'm at it, I hate the broadcast-and-filter model of netnews, CD ROMs, and cable TV. I want things available for me to go fetch.) That kind of filtering has a place, but I like more positive-reputation, positive-interest models. Like subscription mail groups. Also, I understand that Fido users have to pay their own transport charges. I don't know if that applies to the "echo" groups, but it should...Mr. Jennings?...because that's another natural kind of filtering against network hosing. You can flood my mailbox if you pay me enough. >> or a more personal attack whereby they send out anonymously >> information that was so fundamentally personal to someone they could >> possibly react very badly.... >> >> What if someone posted some top secret information and the various three >> letter acronyms all went out for someone's blood. I guess these won't happen much, just judging from how much they happen now even though they're not that hard to do. But sure, they'll happen. It would be nice if people learned information-hygene lessons like skepticism and protecting privacy, and accepting-life lessons like accepting what does get revealed about oneself and others...(whistful grin). More like, people will learn if we teach; things will change if we change them. Scary issues are good educational material when used right, especially when you can say, "This is stupid and it can be *fixed* and we can use your help." -fnerd quote me...within *reason* of course fnerd(a)smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)

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Nike says: Just Do It
by Karl L. Barrus 01 Dec '92

01 Dec '92

I agree with Mark's letter: we've philosophized enough - let's implement a digital bank. The only thing I have to go on is a recently posted summary of a digital cash scenario - apologizes to the poster, I don't have the article handy and I can't remember who nicely summarized the protocol. If that summary isn't good enough, I'll go look for more of Chaum's stuff. I'm willing to help pull such a feat off - even if to start I (and anybody else who wants to help!) take Email and respond by hand. The only high precision math routines I have are the rsa programs that are available @ghost.unimi.dsi.it (see Dave Vincenzetti's (sp?) recent message on sci.crypt) OR what I used during my crypto class for working through various protocols: Mathematica. Automating the procedure can come later, and I'm willing to work with anybody in doing that as well. If initially the transactions are handled by hand and Mathematica, don't expect a rapid turnaround! :-) The nice thing about Mathematica is that I can run it remotely and don't need to be in front of the NeXT to do it - especially since the command line version is good enough for out purposes: high precision integer math, etc. I remember the protocol involved a hash (MD5 is suggested) of an input to produce a number. Suggestions? Would turning the MD5 output into a hex number be good enough? Anyway, I'm going to work through the protocol a few times by hand and post again with more info in a bit... /-----------------------------------\ | Karl L. Barrus | | barrus(a)tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) | | elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu | \-----------------------------------/

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remailer scripts
by Karl L. Barrus 01 Dec '92

01 Dec '92

In a previous message, Hal Finney describes in general terms how the anonymous remailer works. I have a "spare" account I could use to set up such scripts - it's an HP9000 model 730 running HP-UX (if that matters). So if someone will send me the scripts, I will try to install them and test them myself. And if I get it working, there will be a new anonymous remailer for our use... /-----------------------------------\ | Karl L. Barrus | | barrus(a)tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) | | elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu | \-----------------------------------/

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Nonlinear CODEC of the digital domain
by mlf3＠Lehigh.EDU 01 Dec '92

01 Dec '92

Here is a new crypto idea - I would appreciate some feedback! Matt. My senior project is the extension of a grad student's *published* thesis entitled "Nonlinear CODEC in the digital domain". I use essentially a digitial filter to encode/decode the digital domain. I believe that it has applications to data security and I welcome people's input to this claim. The encoder. My prototype encodes 4-bits but I have software that works for n bits. If you would like to have the software let me know. I'm not an ASCII artist but here goes my best block diagram of the IIR digital filter encoder: x[n] ---------> + --------------------------> u[n] ^ | | | | | | | | -------------- | | z^(-1) | | -------------- | | | | | | + <------------------| ^ | | --------------- | | z^(-1) | | --------------- | | | | | --------------- | | Left Circ | | --------------- | | | | ---------------------- x[n] is the input data word, u[n] is the encoded output word, z^(-1) (z transform) is a delay element and Left_Circ is the left circulate function, i.e. Left_Circ(10)=5 (10 has binary representation 1010 and upon left circulation we get 0101 which has decimal representation 5). Another example is Left_Circ(3)=6. Clearly this filter is IIR with function: u[n] = x[n] + u[n-1] + Left_Circ( u[n-2] ) the decode is FIR and is found by solving for x[n] x[n] = u[n] - u[n-1] - Left_Circ( u[n-2] ) I won't bother you with another ASCII block diagram. I have run all kinds of signals (in software) through the filter pair. I get, what seems to me, a moderately secure coding of the digital domain with exact signal reconstruction from its coded form. Both Wavelet and Fourier techniques have failed to find anything "interesting" in the encoded domain. Please play around with this and send me feedback ( mlf3(a)Lehigh.EDU ) Matt. ________________________________________________________________ Matt Fante ________________________________________________________________

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Re: Secure key exchange
by karn＠qualcomm.com 01 Dec '92

01 Dec '92

>Just to point out, though, this is not foolproof. A good impressionist >can fool people, especially if they are extremely skilled. Perhaps. But if it's someone you know well, the imposter may have a hard time passing that particular Turing Test. For example, Jeff Schiller called me the other night, nominally to compare our RSA public keys before signing, but we ended up chewing the fat for nearly an hour. It would be hard for an imposter to duplicate that feat without arousing my suspicion. Another (somewhat more likely) possibility is that the NSA or FBI might be holding a gun to the guy's head when you call him up to verify the key you got with his name on it. Perhaps we need "duress" hash codes. :-) Phil

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