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Re: Petrodollar further analysis - Putin buying gold with “little fanfare, but on a large scale”
by Zenaan Harkness 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

Further, I found this a good read: http://sputniknews.com/russia/20160226/1035375018/russia-gold-reserves-incr… Against the Dollar? What Russia’s Increase of Bullion Reserves Could Mean 10:30 26.02.2016(updated 10:52 26.02.2016) Get short URL 11643350 Russia seems to be launching a silent attack on the supremacy of the dollar and the Western countries, as President Putin is buying gold with “little fanfare, but on a large scale”; as there is no evident economic reason for such an increase, the move will provide Russia with an insurance against crises, according to German media. “It is a silent attack on the supremacy of the dollar,” states German newspaper Die Welt, referring to Russia’s recent increased resupply of its gold reserves. The outlet notes that “it is a declaration of independence, proclaimed in secret.” ( Bank bar manufacturing line opens at Yekaterinburg Plant ( © Sputnik/ Pavel Lisitsyn ( Can Russia's Big Gold Hedge Save the Ruble? “Russian President Vladimir Putin is buying gold at the moment — with little fanfare, but on a large scale,” it says, noting that in January alone Russia’s gold reserves increased by 20 metric tons. Russia’s stock now stands at more than 1,300 tons, it adds (according to statistics portal Statista, as of February 2016, it is already almost 1,400 tons — 1,392,9). “While politicians fear a new Cold War between Moscow and the West, it has already begun in the financial sector,” the newspaper further states. It also explains that there are no evident economic reasons for such an increase, therefore it might be also an attack on the supremacy of the reserve currencies of America and Europe. “One who buys gold reduces the dominance of the Western currencies,” the newspaper states. ( Yekaterinburg Non-Ferrous Metals Processing Plant ( © Sputnik/ Pavel Lisitsyn ( Putin's Payoff? Gold Surges Amid Stock Market Mayhem Since 2005, Russia’s gold reserves have nearly quadrupled, it says, adding that in the last twelve months they had grown by more than 200 tons. Ian Bremmer, an American political scientist specializing in US foreign policy and the president of Eurasia Group, a political risk research and consulting firm told the newspaper that money is often used as a financial weapon and in fact, Washington has used the dollar in the past to put pressure on Russia. Therefore the Russian head of state apparently wants to avoid such dependency in the future by using bullion reserves to insure against crises. The metal is recognized and is sought after worldwide, and its stockpile can’t be increased artificially. The newspaper also notes that there is only one country that is buying gold even more actively, and that is China. Its reserves now total nearly 1,600 tons (according to Statista — 1,762,3) – it ranks fifth globally, after the US, Germany, Italy and France. Russia comes sixth. Apparently, China also hopes to get rid of the dominance of Western reserve currencies.

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Update: [tor-talk] How does one remove the NSA Virus off the BIOS Chip as described by Snowden in the ANT Program
by coderman 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

belated catch-up: - YES! i am still looking for anyone who kept the copies of taobios-v2.tar.bz2 downloaded on the 10th, 11th, or 13th and not the expected sha256sum as in https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2015-December/039678.html - this or some FOIAs or maybe *ahem* got peertech.org dedi burned; (~_~;) , shit rained - keys died in a fire... at least learning was enjoyed in large measure? *grin* [ see addendum. ] - if you didn't get the bios captures the first time, they are also now at: http://cubicmeteryhbozt.onion/taobios-v2.tar.bz2 L1-bios-readA.bin and L2-bios-readA.bin images have been submitted to VirusTotal, no hits. however, remember it is looking at UEFI code modules, and as discussed, both payloads take pains to avoid common BIOS forensic techniques - they're not rogue UEFI malmodules sitting in easy reach! :) - the FOIAs are, = Meta-FOIA: https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/procnopenopes-2417… = New Req(FBI): https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/keykeeperkomikal-2… = New Req(DoJ): https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/keykeeperkomikalde… and list at ello still excellent, too: https://ello.co/ohj2eevi/post/SDNS4ZsILYAG_SQ8yMl9Ew … :P ... Addendum: the incident and response info: https://ello.co/ohj2eevi/post/AcOPfljWjTmfuFEkpc5Pbg , however it seems they've lost the 8 comments which contained the detailed updates. i can find archives in PDF if anyone cares? - the "signal" honey token service used to detect the TLS MitM is described here: https://ello.co/ohj2eevi/post/JwQUX_nGF4OhtaJXDySzjg . best regards, [ fwd is for posterity; with apologies by the megabyte, :o ] ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 19:31:28 -0800 Subject: Re: [tor-talk] How does one remove the NSA Virus off the BIOS Chip as described by Snowden in the ANT Program To: <PARTIED TO REMAIN NAMELESS...> are you going to take a look, at least? there is a write up, using rpi2: $ flashrom -r bios.bin -V -p linux_spi:dev=/dev/spidev0.0 . . . Found Winbond flash chip "W25Q64.V" (8192 kB, SPI). with the pre-built program (flashrom): flashrom-piprebuilt-0.9.8.tar.bz2 i show you binwalk diff, with a rogue storage area: < Scan Time: 2015-12-05 23:14:56 < Target File: L1-bios-readA.bin < MD5 Checksum: 26857cc3e814d5e924c133e961d1a993 --- > Scan Time: 2015-12-05 23:15:16 > Target File: L2-bios-readA.bin > MD5 Checksum: b47e3205e77e94b8f2e9400d4f915e76 9d8 < 806912 0xC5000 LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, dictionary size: 16777216 bytes, missing uncompressed size ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ See also, https://jbeekman.nl/blog/2015/03/reverse-engineering-uefi-firmware/ and even take pictures for you to replicate, [ see attached ] don't you want to learn to fish, young padwan?

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Instead of Apple tasking a coder to work on cracking that iPhone...
by Rayzer 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

FWIW I don't see how the feds can force Apple to assign an employee to do anything not in their job description without violating that employee's contract, or their civil rights, and writing code to crack phones isn't in any Apple job description, but tightening phone security is... This is getting interesting. -- RR "Through counter-intelligence it should be possible to pinpoint potential trouble-makers ... And neutralize them, neutralize them, neutralize them" Apple Is Said to Be Working on an iPhone Even It Can’t Hack By MATT APUZZO and KATIE BENNER FEB. 24, 2016 WASHINGTON — Apple engineers have already begun developing new security measures that would make it impossible for the government to break into a locked iPhone using methods similar to those now at the center of a court fight in California, according to people close to the company and security experts. If Apple succeeds in upgrading its security — and experts say it almost surely will — the company would create a significant technical challenge for law enforcement agencies, even if the Obama administration wins its fight over access to data stored on an iPhone used by one of the killers in last year’s San Bernardino, Calif., rampage. The F.B.I. would then have to find another way to defeat Apple security, setting up a new cycle of court fights and, yet again, more technical fixes by Apple. The only way out of this back-and-forth, experts say, is for Congress to get involved. Federal wiretapping laws require traditional phone carriers to make their data accessible to law enforcement agencies. But tech companies like Apple and Google are not covered, and they have strongly resisted legislation that would place similar requirements on them. “We are in for an arms race unless and until Congress decides to clarify who has what obligations in situations like this,” said Benjamin Wittes, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Companies have always searched for software bugs and patched holes to keep their code secure from hackers. But since the revelations of government surveillance made by Edward J. Snowden, companies have been retooling their products to protect against government intrusion. Apple built its recent operating systems to protect customer information. As its chief executive, Timothy D. Cook, wrote in a recent letter to customers, “We have even put that data out of our own reach, because we believe the contents of your iPhone are none of our business.” But there is a catch. Each iPhone has a built-in troubleshooting system that lets the company update the system software without the need for a user to enter a password. Apple designed that feature to make it easier to repair malfunctioning phones. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/25/technology/apple-is-said-to-be-working-on…

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Relevant technical info re Apple iPhone cryptosecurity
by Steve Kinney 26 Feb '16

26 Feb '16

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Verry interesting... "The CIA Campaign To Steal Apple's Secrets" By Jeremy Scahill and Josh Begley, published in The Intercept: https://tinyurl.com/p9wtmdf "These machines have two separate keys integrated into the silicon of their Apple-designed processors at the point of manufacture. The two, paired together, are used to encrypt data and software stored on iPhones and iPads. One, the User ID, is unique to an individual’s phone, and is not retained by Apple. That key is vital to protecting an individual’s data and — particularly on Apple’s latest devices — difficult to steal. A second key, the Group ID, is known to Apple and is the same across multiple Apple devices that use the same processor. The GID is used to encrypt essential system software that runs on Apple’s mobile devices." -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJWz010AAoJEDZ0Gg87KR0LE78QAIUPc8cfT7wkWUKuY1XcpewY FyuFOM2feDiQDcLCxDk0jgGISS+0G3V7lK+JRoN83LPrd0WiXKi2Ermp2VKMNkN/ G4FMTVkLE6b3VJ0yPYOjXGR0kFg8pHmBsxn6TTeHkefe7sNMijaq9lXaIQqRXqBA xXfyKGzbEwUaQW7AZB0gpS51HVMFA/NJpeGkfiJ/HxzQOHU8BoyXKHqvTEPryQEG wvncgg16w3NRIlpYP4RAbYCyqwAGZQ9wt98bZbl74zQO4oIm6a2eUVKpdu80ymk6 KKZXWO/28ujZ+Tdya5dppso1QheY4UUIkTfaExAsJZTVCZQA3Or6DCXKpt8w2+kv 0OxpfQ3XdSMfPZVwijvPIzp/qrD3cbyoOc4eUQWe7fQ8YaVZyiLtggH0ZT07XFiB BQ/gC3bAg2HHN01BhGMMQ84MwHTtqHyQJsxSWaQn2IK0hsAe1391Xk1yF23luw5/ TMuLXJ0GKDMMlT8CAdn3lpMzwG2mbU9igKmR9sZyz7jTRx710pCvxZOdfi4Ld0ru eNNguLdWg14iYFFkZqSj4qxwkscnhPT3Uub0Yh4MnTVa6Yh7Ud4Dw11x0+43HqO8 96cqArs8Hx9qj+7czaK73uRBerVYicfZwtwsmLOeDpUhFv3CEhC+t3X7T0al3sv6 185sCwU15KQpcsii4r9R =tvGR -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order
by John Young 26 Feb '16

26 Feb '16

At 11:13 AM 2/26/2016, Henry Baker wrote: >If this interpretation of the All Writs Act is upheld, then the DOJ >will have to consult with the intelligence community prior to >compelling companies like Apple to decrypt phones. It would be quite >interesting for DOJ to publicly stipulate that NSA could (or could >not) break into iOS 8 or 9. This is truly a sticky wicket, since the >intelligence community is generally prohibited from working on >domestic issues. We asked for an opinion of Michael Froomkin, Law Professor at University of Miami, on Henry Baker's comments: https://cryptome.org/2016/02/can-spies-break-apple-crypto.htm

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Re: [tor-talk] Fwd: Cryptopolitik and the Darknet
by Zenaan Harkness 26 Feb '16

26 Feb '16

On 2/25/16, eliaz <eliaz(a)riseup.net> wrote: > Elaboration: I said in my previous post that I never quite believed that > "there are more good than bad people." I think it's more to the point > of upgrading tor architecture to say that I don't feel comfortable > relying on "there are more good than bad people" as a justification for > the Tor Project's laudable aims. Regardless of numbers there *are* > people who will misuse tor, and the article gives good evidence that > those people are the ones who employ anonymous content platforms. - eliaz There is a principle: to give up anonymous publishing for the ~2% of bad actors, you will give up that right for the rest of us as well. Same goes for other rights, not just anonymity. By allowing people to drive on public roads, we accept that occasionally some nutcase will also drive on the roads, run down a pedestrian or cop and or cause a lot of damage to property. It's part of the bargain. Then some people will suggest "time for full time GPS tracking of all vehicles, you know, to stop the crazies", thereby giving up our right to anonymous travel. Once again, you will not stop the crazies, and you give up a basic right, something fundamental to being human, to being in society/ community. There's probably a fancy logical name for this "bad bargain" that "well meaning" humans seem to always want to make. Somehow they are wired differently to me and many others on this list. You see I always ask another question immediately to the thought or suggestion to "give up a liberty" (e.g. anonymous publishing, private phone calls, anonymous travel, pseudonymous travel, freedom of thought, etc), and that question I always ask is "do we lessen our humanity by treating ourselves as children, with cotton wool gloves?" Guns, knives, cars and communication are topical examples these days. I find it mind bending, but some folks actually think mandatory registration, rego plates and licensing, is a great idea for bicycles - you see, some folks on bikes have run into pedestrians, ride fast on footpaths, and if they're being chased on foot by police they can get away, not to mention how dangerous they are to the rider, there's just so many problems with bicycles we could probably raise a good argument to ban them completely - perhaps a govt buy back scheme and a govt financial compensation scheme for stationary exercise bikes to compensate for the health problems which would statistically arise due to the reduction in exercise of the population when bicycles are banned. These are serious problems. We must not be flippant about the dark dangers of cyclists traveling anonymously and dangerously, not to mention their rogue machinery!

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A look at the latest French laws on intelligence collection
by Michael Best 26 Feb '16

26 Feb '16

http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2016/02/a-look-at-latest-french-laws-on.h… -- Veritas aequitas liberabit vos Veri universum vici That 1 Archive <http://that1archive.neocities.org/> @NatSecGeek <https://twitter.com/NatSecGeek>

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Re: from Zenaan - was Fwd: Delivery Status Notification (Failure)
by coderman 26 Feb '16

26 Feb '16

hey Zenaan! got some copy-pasta stuck in the dest; probably not censored :) > Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently: > > cyphercypherpunks(a)cpunks.org .... ^- >> cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org On 2/26/16, Zenaan Harkness <zenaan(a)gmail.com> wrote: > OK, new threads by me are definitely getting rejected, and > instantaneously too... > > Due to a separate rejection, I take it that cross-posting has also > been banned for my email address. > > I will not do any run around of creating (or using) an alternate email > address especially for cp@. > That's just an arms race and as I've always said: > - it has been and remains my intention to respect the intentions of > the founders/ creators of this mailing list > > So whoever is running/ administrating this list has decided they want > to clip my wings. In principle that's fair enough, BUT: > > - no one ever emailed me offlist or onlist saying that they are an > administrator of the list and that they wanted me to post less, or to > meet some other conditions > - such behaviour is cowardly, like a stab in the back > - such behaviour provides no opportunity for me to respect the > administrator(s) of the list - since they never owned up to being an > administrator, and never admitted to me their requirements about > posting less or in some other way, they are being cowardly and > providing no opportunity to me, to meet their requirements > - I do not accept cowardly behaviour from list administrators > - I thought cp@ was not a list of cowards, or for cowards > > I am not interested in participating in half a mailing list (one where > I can only receive emails and reply to other people, but not post new > threads and not cross-post). > > I am not interested in participating in a mailing list where temporary > (or permanent) restrictions are put in place without notice to the > person being restricted. I will not accept such cowardly behaviour. > > SO, short of the cypherpunks list administrator(s) apologising to me > for their cowardliness, and reinstating my posting privileges for my > primary email address, and stating clearly their requirements for > posting to the list, and doing this publicly on the list so other > people know the requirements for posting to the list, then I shall > remove myself from this so-called "community" and find some other > place where who I am is respected, and where cowards are told to grow > the fuck up! Some place where children are not pretending they're > adults with their cowardly behaviour. > > Alex, Juan, Jim, coderman and Steve, in one way or another you have > eached gained my respect. Thank you each for being who you are. If any > of you have a suggestion for an alternate mailing list, I would > certainly consider joining. I am still not in a stable enough living > environment nor with any ADSL internet access, so I am still not in a > position to set up an email server myself - but I am confident that > this situation will change within about 1 year. > > Best regards, > Zen > > PS, if anyone wants to post this email publicly, I certainly consent > to you doing so. > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Mail Delivery Subsystem <mailer-daemon(a)googlemail.com> > Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2016 22:38:22 +0000 > Subject: Delivery Status Notification (Failure) > To: zenaan(a)gmail.com > > Delivery to the following recipient failed permanently: > > cyphercypherpunks(a)cpunks.org > > Technical details of permanent failure: > Google tried to deliver your message, but it was rejected by the > server for the recipient domain cpunks.org by mail.jfet.org. > [209.141.47.85]. > > The error that the other server returned was: > 550 5.1.1 <cyphercypherpunks(a)cpunks.org>... User unknown > > > ----- Original message ----- > > DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; > d=gmail.com; s=20120113; > > h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject > :from:to:content-type; > bh=HTwElgxrr/XkjYUfGVqhcjP320J6MHEbke6eOismL/I=; > > b=OryopE3gJFsd/caCZuD8w1+IDk09WC0poE5hGpLdKz0PcleP2Fb4gISlOFiDMoA3yI > > ATBy5Fycqg7yclQpt20kzkfZlrCxBjW/ZycH5NHzx6y95XCziQqg+axWtPEmv0KKFC45 > > Js6Y+Ixg60h2h5kw40efPheUILIf4Jo1c3oT1gjR2zAK1NoIWKVbsT/j71vFHRioAcyh > > mSvEmJwCAeAbgrvB6sOm1RLRavRK+kf8smc1r9XrVYfhmc5AW9ImVgBfuW/NFVu3dC/G > > FfpvhSbiEqnubkZO4SA7lv2L6NvVzSCUQEp18lcOtvsFQNWJ9Ynb9rKWuiwAyHkukLO0 > R9oA== > X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; > d=1e100.net; s=20130820; > > h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date > :message-id:subject:from:to:content-type; > bh=HTwElgxrr/XkjYUfGVqhcjP320J6MHEbke6eOismL/I=; > > b=m0iSFBE5X6LXASFuLy3LtbH87fh29RwudGRyAY+fCs5Zf9ycQjszLti6G2v/ZyLYs4 > > dzz5xfGGdRxQ9nP8BwKUStgkKEx3+sDeAxhGEGaXTV31nkJCkkM/zU6S58Q9BFqnuglv > > qxMmQ9b0t6y6HYV6KFbzbExNm1eZGyhUATvmQuJin4xSqMccTg5yCmaFMZCWNVQvi97o > > fkvjLhNdXGlFa7LZF64+bSZo3DaQ3A4Lie5PzMIHwJ45fiYGmEQ9k19FA3coKXLgBbJt > > iYP1ru7+NgHxOj3kYN4b1c5e7Mk0XL1YMtpXXOu/FGPAnnHrwF9cQdx02cHBxcKK9AEh > 1hMQ== > X-Gm-Message-State: > AG10YOQkeCLfQTlTygaAo2pvfPPTrKtT4dHj+741KUByO3hji+2FOcqAJ1QD4HYl9thETnU47zL4LNVBBwIieg== > MIME-Version: 1.0 > X-Received: by 10.140.93.166 with SMTP id > d35mr58532521qge.29.1456439895793; > Thu, 25 Feb 2016 14:38:15 -0800 (PST) > Sender: zenaan(a)gmail.com > Received: by 10.55.64.68 with HTTP; Thu, 25 Feb 2016 14:38:15 -0800 (PST) > In-Reply-To: > <CAOsGNSQG=0z3uT0WaTWQvK8th3v2B6p3fd9u7+6ML_Txhib_OQ(a)mail.gmail.com> > References: > <CAOsGNSQG=0z3uT0WaTWQvK8th3v2B6p3fd9u7+6ML_Txhib_OQ(a)mail.gmail.com> > Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2016 22:38:15 +0000 > X-Google-Sender-Auth: CnxMVt6WvC7DvbEQhsq0PMLZarg > Message-ID: > <CAOsGNSQRsHDjaBqo_5b1K8jPknD2yN6LR1A6ruHoKs7N44r=rA(a)mail.gmail.com> > Subject: Re: A sane platform for president - what is your fundamentals for > Eben Moglen? > From: Zenaan Harkness <zen(a)freedbms.net> > To: cyphercypherpunks(a)cpunks.org > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > I've had an offlist comment that the following is a great start, so > I'll try sending it again. Good luck little email... > > > On 2/25/16, Zenaan Harkness <zen(a)freedbms.net> wrote: >> So Eben is going to run for president. >> >> Let's make his job easy - write a first draft of his platform. >> >> There is the detailed version, for the geeks 'round these parts, and >> the simple version, for the footy tribe. >> >> 0. Constitutional basis - executive orders affirming each and every >> (??) clause of the Constitution of the United States of America. >> >> 1. Eliminate all non-court ordered (by a human judge, and with no >> order covering more than two target individuals at a time) monitoring >> (monitoring of all forms). >> >> 2. Eliminate the CIA. Eliminate Machiavellian military "exploration" >> and all state-sponsored and any other coups and regime changes. >> >> 3. ??? >> >

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Former CIA Agent Barry Eisler w/ DemocracyNow!
by coderman 26 Feb '16

26 Feb '16

http://www.democracynow.org/2016/2/25/will_fbi_take_a_bite_out , http://www.democracynow.org/2016/2/25/part_2_former_cia_agent_barry --- Will FBI Take a Bite Out of Apple? Former CIA Agent on Showdown Between Apple & U.S. Government February 25, 2016 As the government continues to take a bite out of Apple, Apple CEO Tim Cook says the FBI’s request to unlock the iPhone of one of the San Bernardino shooters is the "software equivalent of cancer." In an interview on ABC, he explained why the tech giant is resisting a court order to help unlock the phone. The FBI says Apple is overstating the security risk to its devices, and argues the litigation is limited. "It won’t be unique to this one phone. It would be something that the government can use against any phone. And even if you think that it’s OK for the government to be able to break the encryption of anybody’s phone … what backdoor is accessible to the U.S. government would also be accessible to whatever is the American enemy du jour," says our guest Barry Eisler, who has written about government surveillance in fictional form. He is also a former CIA agent. Eisler is the author of several books, most recently, "The God’s Eye View." TRANSCRIPT This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form. NERMEEN SHAIKH: We turn now to the ongoing dispute over privacy and encryption between the FBI and the computer giant Apple. In an interview last night on ABC, Apple CEO Tim Cook explained why his company is resisting a court order to help unlock the iPhone of one of the San Bernardino attackers. In December, Syed Farook—Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife killed 14 people and injured 22 others. The two attackers were killed in a shootout with police. Cook said what the U.S. government was asking Apple to do was the, quote, "software equivalent of cancer." TIM COOK: This case is not about one phone. This case is about the future. What is at stake here is: Can the government compel Apple to write software that we believe would make hundreds of millions of customers vulnerable around the world, including in the U.S.? The only way we know would be to write a piece of software that we view as sort of the software equivalent of cancer. We think it’s bad news to write. We would never write it. We have never written it. And that is what is at stake here. AMY GOODMAN: The FBI says Apple is overstating the security risk to its devices, and argues the litigation is limited. In an open letter earlier this week, FBI Director James Comey wrote, quote, "The particular legal issue is actually quite narrow. ... We don’t want to break anyone’s encryption or set a master key loose on the land," he said. Apple phone systems have a function that automatically erases the access key and renders the phone permanently inaccessible after 10 failed attempts. To talk more about the case, we’re joined by Barry Eisler, who has written about government surveillance—in fictional form. But he’s also a former CIA agent. Eisler is the author of a number of books, most recently, The God’s Eye View. It’s great to have you with us. BARRY EISLER: Thank you, Amy. Good to be here. AMY GOODMAN: So, let’s talk about what the government is doing and the pushback of Apple. BARRY EISLER: Yeah, I like Tim Cook’s metaphor. It’s nice to see someone hitting back linguistically this way. You would expect the FBI to say what it’s saying: It’s only about one phone. This is the kind of thing the government always says. And I’m reminded of the time the CIA acknowledged that it had made two torture tapes. Fifteen months later, it acknowledged that it was in fact 92. In this case, the government said this is only going to be about one phone, and it took them only a day to say, "Did we say one phone? Actually, we’re talking about 12." If you talk to any encryption or security expert anywhere, they’ll all tell you that what the FBI is asking for is impossible. You can’t create a backdoor for one phone without making all phones vulnerable. So that’s one important issue here. But there’s another one that I think is not adequately understood. As Julian Sanchez, a guy I follow pretty closely because he knows a lot about these things, works with the Cato Institute, put it, this just isn’t about encryption, it’s about conscription. And I wish people would understand this a little bit better. It’s unprecedented for the government to be telling a private company what products it can create and what features it has to include in those products. As Tim Cook pointed out, where does this stop? What if the government said, "We want to have a feature on the iPhone that enables the FBI to turn on the iPhone camera, to turn on the iPhone microphone, anytime we want? Would that also be OK?" So, I hope this isn’t going to happen. It’s sort of odd have to be championing the world’s richest corporation in its fight with the government. AMY GOODMAN: I mean, they’re asking the Apple to write a program, which would then create a backdoor. BARRY EISLER: Exactly. And it won’t be unique to this one phone. It would be something that the government could use against any phone. And even if you think that the U.S. government—it’s OK for the government to be able to break the encryption of anybody’s phone, even if you trust the U.S. government and think the U.S. government has never lied anyone, never abused its powers, even if you believe anything like that, what backdoor is accessible to the U.S. government would also be accessible to whatever is the American enemy du jour—could be the Chinese government, Russia, Iran, and, of course, not just to state actors, but also to criminal groups and hackers. A vulnerability in a phone is not accessible to just one actor. It becomes vulnerable to everyone. AMY GOODMAN: But he killed 14 people, he and his wife. BARRY EISLER: Yeah. AMY GOODMAN: And they just want access to see if there’s other plans. I mean, who knows what would be? BARRY EISLER: So this is another thing the government is typically good at. It tries to find the most attractive fact pattern it can to use as the thin edge of a wedge that it can then use in other less obvious fact patterns. And I see this again and again. People don’t remember that well now, but José Padilla—I’m sure you guys remember—the so-called dirty bomber, I mean, José Padilla was accused of trying to create a radiological bomb and detonate it in Chicago, and a whole lot of people were going to die. And so, to keep us safe from that kind of thing, the government arrested him, held him on a Navy ship, offshored him—no due process, no charges, no trial, no access to a lawyer. It was unprecedented. But they were careful to choose what for them was an attractive fact pattern, before doing something so unprecedented. They picked a scary-looking guy and accused him of doing scary things. And people didn’t protest the way they would have if they had chosen someone a little bit different. So it’s the same thing here. They’re not doing this in the name of, I don’t know, preventing someone from shoplifting or something like that. They’ve chosen a very attractive fact pattern so that they can say the talking points that you were just parroting, which is like, "Come on, this is just to keep us safe from the really scary people who want to kill us all in our beds," and who indeed did kill a lot of people in San Bernardino. NERMEEN SHAIKH: So, to what extent do you think that accounts for public opinion? Because a recent Pew [Research] Center poll found that 51 percent of Americans think Apple should comply with the FBI and unlock the iPhone of one of the perpetrators of the attacks, and only 38 percent said that the FBI should not, and the rest had no opinion. BARRY EISLER: Yeah, which is not actually—which is not a bad response to anyone who thinks that Apple is doing this as some sort of publicity stunt. I mean, for the moment, anyway, more people think that Apple should comply than think that it shouldn’t. I think the fact that so many people, actually, that 38 percent, think it’s a really bad idea for Apple to be forced to do this is, in part, a tribute to the educational value of the Snowden revelations and all the journalism that’s been built on them, because I’m pretty sure—can’t really conduct this experiment, but I’m pretty sure that if it hadn’t been for Snowden’s revelations, the public would be focusing entirely on the keep-us-safe-from-the-terrorists aspect of this whole thing, and not on the but-this-is-going-to-destroy-privacy aspect. AMY GOODMAN: I mean, interestingly, Apple has made the iCloud available. It’s not like they haven’t done that. I mean, there have been many requests of these different phone manufacturers to get access to the iCloud. BARRY EISLER: Right. AMY GOODMAN: And, I mean, the government can’t just get access to it; they have to get permission. BARRY EISLER: Right. AMY GOODMAN: So they’re making a distinction between the actual physical phone— BARRY EISLER: Right. AMY GOODMAN: Apparently they turned off the iCloud at some point— BARRY EISLER: Right. AMY GOODMAN: —so it’s what’s remained on that phone since the point they turned it off. BARRY EISLER: Right. So, the idea here is that some of your data is not accessible even by the company that created the product. It’s on your local device, and no one else should have access to it but you. Apple has, in fact, complied with the government in the government’s request to turn over data to which it has access. Maybe people might like that, they might not like it. My own feeling is, look, as long as it’s pursuant to a warrant and it’s not secret and it’s out in the open, I can live with it. But the notion that now Apple is going to crack encryption that its users have come to rely on to keep their data private is—is an entirely new thing. NERMEEN SHAIKH: Well, I want to turn to comments made by Bill Gates, the co-founder of Microsoft. He was asked about the ongoing dispute between Apple and the FBI, and said it was important to strike a balance between privacy and government access. Gates was speaking to Bloomberg. BILL GATES: The extreme view that the government always gets everything, nobody supports that; having the government be blind, people don’t support that. ... I do believe that—that with the right safeguards, there are cases where the government, on our behalf, like stopping terrorism, which could get worse in the future, that that is valuable, but striking that balance. Clearly, the government’s taken information historically and used it in ways that we didn’t expect, going all the way back, say, to the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover. So, I’m hoping now we can have the discussion. I do believe there are sets of safeguards where the government shouldn’t have to be completely blind. NERMEEN SHAIKH: That was Bill Gates speaking to Bloomberg News. Your response? BARRY EISLER: It’s interesting. He’s so close to an epiphany. He talks about J. Edgar Hoover. Maybe he knows about COINTELPRO. He acknowledges that the government has abused powers that it’s been given in the past. And so, you think he’s going in a certain direction with this, and then he just comes up with this platitude, which is we have to strike a balance. Like who doesn’t think that we shouldn’t strike a balance? It’s just meaningless. There’s no one who would say, "I don’t think we need a balance. I think it’s just one or the other." So, I don’t know. Maybe it’s not a coincidence that Microsoft is a fading technology company and Apple is a premier one. AMY GOODMAN: Microsoft has said that in the past, that 80 tech companies have cooperated—I mean, WikiLeaks has said that 80 tech companies in the past have cooperated with the NSA, the National Security Agency, including Microsoft. BARRY EISLER: Yeah, so much of the—of Snowden’s revelations were about this very thing. And the fact that the public knows about corporate cooperation with the government now is in part, I think, what has emboldened Apple to push back, because, again, if we didn’t know about these things, I would expect that Apple would be quietly cooperating. There would be no cost to their doing so. But they realize now that there’s a significant constituency among their customers that wants robust privacy features in Apple products, and to please those customers, Apple realizes that in this public battle with the FBI, it can’t just roll over and serve the FBI; otherwise, it might turn into the next Microsoft. --- Part 2: Former CIA Agent Barry Eisler Turned Writer on Imagining/Predicting Gov't Surveillance February 25, 2016 In our extended conversation with Barry Eisler, a former CIA agent turned writer, he discusses his political thrillers, most recently, "The God’s Eye View." "There have been a lot of things I’ve written about that surprisingly turned out to be true," Eisler says. "If you read the news ... and you use your imagination, you can read between the lines in ways that will allow you to predict in somewhat depressing fashion what the government is really up to." Watch Part 1: Will FBI Take a Bite Out of Apple? Former CIA Agent on Showdown Between Apple & U.S. Government Watch Part 2: Former CIA Agent Says Edward Snowden Revelations Emboldened Apple to Push Back Against FBI TRANSCRIPT This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form. AMY GOODMAN: This is Democracy Now!, democracynow.org, The War and Peace Report. I’m Amy Goodman, with Nermeen Shaikh, with Part 2 of our interview with the thriller writer, The New York Times best-selling author, Barry Eisler. His latest book is called The God’s Eye View. Now, while it is fiction, he had his own experiences within the CIA, in the covert wing of the Central Intelligence Agency, so there’s a lot here. Well, you call it, Barry, reality-based. BARRY EISLER: Yeah. AMY GOODMAN: You have written a number of books, that have made it to all levels of The New York Times best-seller list. And while at the time they may have seemed speculative, so many of them have proven to be true. Talk about A Clean Kill in Tokyo, which you published, what? Like 13, 14 years ago? BARRY EISLER: Yeah. AMY GOODMAN: Where you write about remotely hacking the pacemaker and so many other things. And go through A Lonely Resurrection and Fault Line and "London Twist," how what, you deem them, might be a little futuristic actually panned out. BARRY EISLER: Yeah, there have been a lot of things I’ve written about that, surprisingly and somewhat depressingly, have actually turned out to be true. The one about hacking a pacemaker, I did in my first book in 2002, turns out to be the case. I mentioned earlier Dick Cheney had his doctor turn the wireless accessibility feature in his pacemaker off. And there’s been a lot of—a lot of studies now about vulnerability of not just medical devices, but of cars and even airplanes, because everything is wired now. Probably the closest I think I’ve ever come to something that turned out to be true was in my third book, which I was writing in 2004. There’s a CIA guy who’s explaining to my contract assassin, John Rain, that the government has this thing they call a list. It’s a list of terror targets, terrorist targets, that the government wants to take out. And the guy, my CIA guy, Kanozaki, says, "There’s—of course nobody calls this thing an assassination list. That would be gauche and would be hard to explain in front of some outraged congressional committee down the road. What we call it is a disposition list." And then, a couple years ago, it turns out that the White House has Terror Tuesdays, and what they call their assassination list is the disposition matrix. I was like, "Damn! I’m even getting the—I’m almost getting the nomenclature right." But yeah, that’s the government, right? They’re never going to call it a kill list. In fact, we don’t even do assassinations. We have "targeted killings." There are so many words like that, that the government uses to obscure what’s really going on. You know, if we wind up making another war in Libya, it’s not going to be a war, it will just be an intervention. We never call these things what they really are. So that was another one that I was surprised to get right. My second book, A Lonely Resurrection, published in 2003, I was talking about Tokyo Electric Power Company, TEPCO, and the kind of corruption and cover-ups they were using to conceal shoddy work on their nuclear reactors. And then, of course, there was the 2011 tsunami and meltdown at Fukushima nuclear reactor, and it turned out that, yeah, TEPCO was doing all this kind of stuff. So, I tell people a lot of times that if you read the news, real news, closely, if you watch shows like Democracy Now! and some other good ones, and you use your imagination, you can read between the lines in ways that will allow you to predict, in somewhat depressing fashion, what the government is really up to. AMY GOODMAN: Can you talk about facial recognition? BARRY EISLER: Yeah. I’m no facial recognition expert, but there have been some great articles about it. Kashmir Hill in Fusion wrote about this about a year ago, and I used her article as part of my bibliography. This technology gets better and better. I mean, it’s—if you think about like speech recognition, 10 years ago, it was a little bit kludgy; now it’s really, really good. Facial recognition is the same. The biggest problem with facial recognition, as I understand it, is false positives. So it’s hard to weed those out. But the technology keeps getting more accurate. And if you think about what will happen when facial recognition—as facial recognition technology grows increasingly robust and is paired with the government’s efforts to hack into closed-circuit television systems and all sorts of monitors, all sorts of cameras—for example, the ones on the laptops you guys have right here on your desk—you really might want to put stickies over those, over those cameras, right?—but when it gets to the point where the government has access to cameras deployed in public spaces all over the world and pairs that with facial recognition technology, we’re going to be living in a world that is reminiscent of Minority Report. And if we do wind up living in that world, as Edward Snowden was saying in a clip you played earlier, I personally don’t think that would be a good thing, but at the very least, we ought to be able to make an informed decision about that and vote on it as a democracy. NERMEEN SHAIKH: You’ve also said that no one serves up great plots for thriller writers like the U.S. government. BARRY EISLER: Yeah. NERMEEN SHAIKH: So, is the government the principal source of all of these different books that you’ve written? BARRY EISLER: Yeah, yeah. As I say, it’s kind of depressing, again, as an American citizen, but I’m embarrassed also to admit that as a thriller writer, every time the government does some crazy thing, I’m like, "Oh, my god! My next book!" I mean, when Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras first started reporting on the Snowden revelations, I was like, "This is it! This is my book!" So, thank you, Edward Snowden. I mean, you helped me write a really great book. I remember reading in 2002 when the CIA essentially took a public bow for blowing up some suspected terrorists—which the government never calls suspected terrorists, by the way; they’re always just terrorists—blowing up a car full of suspected terrorists in Yemen, including an American citizen. And that’s when I got the idea for this list. I thought, "Wow! The rules have really changed post-9/11. The government is now conducting assassinations"—sorry, targeted killings—"of people, including American citizens. No due process whatsoever, no judicial process. They must have some sort of list. Who would they want to kill? How would my guy, John Rain, get involved?" So, yeah, every time the government does a new crazy thing, it’s just like another plot for another one of my books. AMY GOODMAN: Well, Barry Eisler, we thank you for being with us and for the latest book, The God’s Eye View, New York Times best-selling author and former CIA agent in the covert division of the CIA, Barry Eisler. This is Democracy Now! I’m Amy Goodman, with Nermeen Shaikh.

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by John Young 26 Feb '16

26 Feb '16

USG is not USA. Apple is not its buyers. USG v Apple is not about citizens and privacy. It's about secretkeepers against the public.

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