- cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Re: [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - rumors
by Eugen Leitl 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Maxim Kammerer <mk(a)dee.su> ----- Date: Sat, 7 Sep 2013 00:51:19 +0300 From: Maxim Kammerer <mk(a)dee.su> To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - rumors Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 10:34 PM, Andy Isaacson <adi(a)hexapodia.org> wrote: > This is not to say that RdRand is completely unusable. Putting RdRand > entropy into a software pool implementation like /dev/urandom (or > preferably, a higher-assurance multipool design like Fortuna) is a cheap > way to prevent a putative backdoor from compromising your system state. Nearly nothing from what you wrote is relevant to RDRAND, which is not a pure HWRNG, but implements CTR_DRBG with AES (unclear whether 128/192/256) from NIST SP 800-90A [1,2]. Interaction with hardware entropy source (ES) is implemented in microcode, so in case the relevant microcode is reverse-engineered (or relevant documentation obtained from Intel), it is possible to verify correctness of most of RDRAND operation. ES operation could be perhaps analyzed in a lab. The choice of CTR_DRBG over (probably much faster) Hash_DRBG seems weird on first sight, but secure hashes are not yet available in Intel processors [3]. Of course, an interesting conspiracy theory would then be that NSA influenced Intel to delay secure hash instructions deployment after breaking AES in order to exploit an AESNI-based RDRAND. [1] http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-digital-random-number-genera… [2] http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf [3] http://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-sha-extensions -- Maxim Kammerer Liberté Linux: http://dee.su/liberte -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Quantum Computer Access on the 20th
by Steven Greeran 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

http://www.bristol.ac.uk/physics/research/quantum/qcloud/registration/ ---------------------------------------------------------- IMPORTANT WARNING: This email (and any attachments) is only intended for the use of the person or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is privileged and confidential. You, the recipient, are obligated to maintain it in a safe, secure and confidential manner. Unauthorized redisclosure or failure to maintain confidentiality may subject you to federal and state penalties. If you are not the intended recipient, please immediately notify us by return email, and delete this message from your computer. ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: [Freedombox-discuss] [James Vasile] tinc rollout and fbox
by Eugen Leitl 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Guus Sliepen <guus(a)tinc-vpn.org> ----- Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2013 23:36:34 +0200 From: Guus Sliepen <guus(a)tinc-vpn.org> To: freedombox-discuss(a)lists.alioth.debian.org Subject: Re: [Freedombox-discuss] [James Vasile] tinc rollout and fbox User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) On Sat, Aug 10, 2013 at 03:37:06PM -0400, Sandy Harris wrote: > " On the 15th of September 2003, Peter Gutmann posted a security > analysis of tinc 1.0.1. He argues that the 32 bit sequence number used > by tinc is not a good IV, that tinc?s default length of 4 bytes for > the MAC is too short, and he doesn?t like tinc?s use of RSA during > authentication. We do not know of a security hole in this version of > tinc, but tinc?s security is not as strong as TLS or IPsec. We will > address these issues in tinc 2.0. > > Gutmann is a well-known and respected expert. His best-known > paper was one back in the 90s on reading "erased" disk drives > and what bit patterns it took to block that. Most "secure erase" > utilities around use those suggestions (even though current > drives are quite different, so those may be inappropriate now). > He has done /a lot/ of other stuff as well. > > The current Tinc release is 1.0.21 > > My reading of that is that Tinc has known problems and > they probably will not be fixed soon. To me, that means > it is not ready for serious consideration as a component > for FreedomBox. The documentation is perhaps a little outdated. All problems mentioned by Gutmann have been adressed in a new protocol that has been included in tinc 1.1pre3 and later. If people are interested in using tinc to connect freedomboxes together, I would be happy to help fix any problems that might come up. Even if tinc (as it is) is not suitable for the Freedombox, I am very interested in discussing what the requirements are for the Freedombox regarding VPN functionality. -- Met vriendelijke groet / with kind regards, Guus Sliepen <guus(a)tinc-vpn.org> _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list Freedombox-discuss(a)lists.alioth.debian.org http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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[liberationtech] Find, fix and finish: Syrian activists targeted for online activities
by Eugen Leitl 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Rafal Rohozinski <r.rohozinski(a)psiphon.ca> ----- Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2013 17:20:10 -0400 From: Rafal Rohozinski <r.rohozinski(a)psiphon.ca> To: liberationtech Technologies <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: [liberationtech] Find, fix and finish: Syrian activists targeted for online activities X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1508) Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> A sad story from Syria, part of our activities there. Depressing to see the Syrian regime forces adopting tactics developed by US joint special operations command against nonviolent activists. Rafal Find, fix and finish: Syrian activists targeted for online activities 6 September 2013. Assad regime forces arrested a Syrian non-violent activist in a regime-controlled area near Damascus. Recent reports suggest that he has been killed. Available information strongly suggests he was detained as a result of poor digital security practices. The case indicates that the Assad regime is still able and willing to monitor the online activities of Syrians. The regime is also prepared to detain and kill individuals for their online activities. Please see the linked FlashNote for further information. http://gallery.mailchimp.com/eb7c0bde6ff78e88f9b0c8662/files/SecDev_FlashNo… Reportedly a member of the opposition, this individual's prominence in social media made him a target: his poor online security practices made him a victim. In Syrian shorthand, his crime was using social media to communicate with foreigners about the conflict. It is tempting to assume that the Assad regime is too busy conducting a shooting war to monitor digital communications. That is clearly not the case. The regime continues to use social media SIGINT to find, fix and finish activists who are reliant on popular social media platforms. In this case, a life was lost because of poor digital security practices. But the repercussions are wider. The information obtained from the individual's unprotected cell phone and computer are a roadmap for Syrian security forces to intimidate, capture, and kill many others. -------- More about our Syria activities here: https://www.facebook.com/SalamaTech https://syria.secdev.com https://salamatechwiki.org/index.php?title=الصفحة_الرئيسية -------- -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Random number generation influenced, HW RNG
by grarpamp 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

On 9/6/13, Eugen Leitl <eugen(a)leitl.org> wrote: > ----- Forwarded message from Andy Isaacson <adi(a)hexapodia.org> ----- > > From: Andy Isaacson <adi(a)hexapodia.org> > Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - > rumors > > On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 10:45:46AM -0700, Joe Szilagyi wrote: >> Does anyone put any stock into the rumors floating lately that the >> government may have influenced Intel and/or AMD into altering > However, I claim that the fear is well founded and should be taken into > account by all threat models. > > HWRNG is a nearly-uniquely difficult security problem to crack. By > definition it is impossible to prove that a black-box HWRNG is safe. > This is different from the security properties of a blackbox AES or > MODMUL accelerator, which can be demonstrated to conform > ... > By contrast, a properly functioning HWRNG cannot be tested in a way that > distinguishes it from the output of a stream cipher seeded with a > backdoor key. And there's no way to test the behavior of HWRNG on an > ongoing basis; even if you had a test to run, it might switch to "stream > cipher mode" under the covers. Even dieharding the stream since inception is insufficient test. > If your AES instructions don't do AES, then testing > against a software implementation will show it! Unless some of those billion gates are dedicated to recognizing and modifying software AES to match, and every separate processor you might have handy to run software test on since AES came out has also been backdoored. There is always custom test rig or by hand. > This is not to say that RdRand is completely unusable. Putting RdRand > entropy into a software pool implementation like /dev/urandom (or > preferably, a higher-assurance multipool design like Fortuna) is a cheap > way to prevent a putative backdoor from compromising your system state. > Weighing towards distrusting HWRNG we have the fact that NSA is reported > (yesterday) to have intentionally backdoored Dual_EC_DRBG, and to have > spent significant amounts of money to backdoor chip implementations, > with enough success that they brag about it in administrative summaries. > > So, I put a lot of credence in distrusting HWRNG black box > implementations. But unfortunately we need a lot more reliable entropy. > A fully open source, nothing up my sleeve hardware entropy source would > be a huge improvement. True, if you can't see and verify it you can't trust it. Assuming there is no aforementioned subversion in other parts of the CPU, an RNG is then of base importance to much crypto... So what would be the cost per box to build 10,000 open source [1] RNG's [2] and sell them for middling/no profit? As assembled boxes, as you-build kits, or as free blueprints. If you don't need speed/quantity for speedy/large OTP XOR streams, these hobby jobbers would suffice to seed software prngs, and work well in combination with other software sources. What would be the cost bumps for speedy units, still complying with [1 and 2], for various definitions of speed? Dieharding this and any rng since inception over various block sizes would seem warranted to catch component and other failures [3], whereupon the /dev/<rng> device would block and warn until fixed. No one is doing this extra step in kernel or even in userland yet afaik. Why not? [1] For example, entirely from breadboard discrete logic you can buy and validate from any local parts supplier. ie: not using embedded asics or fancy usb fobs... but resistors, diodes, 74 series gates, etc. [2] Based on radiation, radio, audio/video, environmentals, etc. [3] Neutrino and other hits, Intel/AMD on-die gate failure, etc.

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Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)
by Eugen Leitl 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn(a)garlic.com> ----- Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2013 16:48:01 -0400 From: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn(a)garlic.com> To: ianG <iang(a)iang.org>, cryptography(a)metzdowd.com Subject: Re: [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption) User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:26.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/26.0a1 we were brought in as consultants to a small client/server startup that wanted to do payment transactions on their server, they had this technology they called "SSL" they wanted to use, the result is now frequently called "electronic commerce". The two people at the startup responsible for the "commerce server" we had worked with in prior life on parallel Oracle cluster scaleup. As part of mapping "SSL" technology to payment transactions we had to audit operations selling "SSL" digital certificates and also came up with recommendations on how browsers and servers would deploy and use the technology. Almost immediately several of the recommendations were violated, resulting in some number of the exploits that continue to this day. We were then tangentially involved in the Cal. data breach notification legislation, having been brought in to help wordsmith the Cal. electronic signature legislation. Many of the parties were heavily involved in privacy issues and had done numerous, indepth, public surveys. The number one issue was "identity theft" of the form involving fraudulent financial transactions ... frequently as result of data breach. The issue was nothing was being done about the problems and so it was hoped that the publicity from the notifications might motivate corrective action. Part of the issue is normally institutions take security measures in self-interests ... however, the institutions having breaches weren't at risk, it was the account holders. PCI DSS shows up some time after Cal. data breach notification and frequently the joke is that if you have a breach ... you loose your PCI DSS certification. It turns out that there was a number of Federal "data breach notification" bills introduced, preempting state legislation and effectively eliminating notification requirements ... citing PCI DSS industry effort as justification for no longer needing notification. Another problem we've frequently pointed out is current paradigm with "dual use" paradigm and even if the planet was covered in miles of information hiding encryption, it wouldn't stop data leakage. Account information is used for authenticating new transactions and so has a requirement that it be kept totally confidential and never divulged to anybody ... but at the same time, account information is needed in dozens of business processes at millions of locations around the planet. disclaimer: we were co-authors of the x9.59 financial transaction standard that slightly tweaked the current payment paradigm and eliminated the dual-use characteristic .... which then also eliminated the need to hide account information and as a result it also eliminated the need for SSL to hide account information in electronic commerce transactions .... eliminating the major requirement for SSL in the world today. -- virtualization experience starting Jan1968, online at home since Mar1970 _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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[Cryptography] Bruce Schneier calls for independent prosecutor to investigate NSA
by Eugen Leitl 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> ----- Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2013 17:03:30 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com Subject: [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier calls for independent prosecutor to investigate NSA X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.9.0 (GTK+ 2.24.20; x86_64-apple-darwin12.4.0) Quoting: All of this denying and lying results in us not trusting anything the NSA says, anything the president says about the NSA, or anything companies say about their involvement with the NSA. We know secrecy corrupts, and we see that corruption. There's simply no credibility, and -- the real problem -- no way for us to verify anything these people might say. https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/conspiracy_theo_1.html -- Perry E. Metzger perry(a)piermont.com _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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[cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG
by Eugen Leitl 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com> ----- Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2013 17:03:27 -0400 From: grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com> To: cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net Cc: cryptography(a)randombit.net Subject: [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG On 9/6/13, Eugen Leitl <eugen(a)leitl.org> wrote: > ----- Forwarded message from Andy Isaacson <adi(a)hexapodia.org> ----- > > From: Andy Isaacson <adi(a)hexapodia.org> > Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - > rumors > > On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 10:45:46AM -0700, Joe Szilagyi wrote: >> Does anyone put any stock into the rumors floating lately that the >> government may have influenced Intel and/or AMD into altering > However, I claim that the fear is well founded and should be taken into > account by all threat models. > > HWRNG is a nearly-uniquely difficult security problem to crack. By > definition it is impossible to prove that a black-box HWRNG is safe. > This is different from the security properties of a blackbox AES or > MODMUL accelerator, which can be demonstrated to conform > ... > By contrast, a properly functioning HWRNG cannot be tested in a way that > distinguishes it from the output of a stream cipher seeded with a > backdoor key. And there's no way to test the behavior of HWRNG on an > ongoing basis; even if you had a test to run, it might switch to "stream > cipher mode" under the covers. Even dieharding the stream since inception is insufficient test. > If your AES instructions don't do AES, then testing > against a software implementation will show it! Unless some of those billion gates are dedicated to recognizing and modifying software AES to match, and every separate processor you might have handy to run software test on since AES came out has also been backdoored. There is always custom test rig or by hand. > This is not to say that RdRand is completely unusable. Putting RdRand > entropy into a software pool implementation like /dev/urandom (or > preferably, a higher-assurance multipool design like Fortuna) is a cheap > way to prevent a putative backdoor from compromising your system state. > Weighing towards distrusting HWRNG we have the fact that NSA is reported > (yesterday) to have intentionally backdoored Dual_EC_DRBG, and to have > spent significant amounts of money to backdoor chip implementations, > with enough success that they brag about it in administrative summaries. > > So, I put a lot of credence in distrusting HWRNG black box > implementations. But unfortunately we need a lot more reliable entropy. > A fully open source, nothing up my sleeve hardware entropy source would > be a huge improvement. True, if you can't see and verify it you can't trust it. Assuming there is no aforementioned subversion in other parts of the CPU, an RNG is then of base importance to much crypto... So what would be the cost per box to build 10,000 open source [1] RNG's [2] and sell them for middling/no profit? As assembled boxes, as you-build kits, or as free blueprints. If you don't need speed/quantity for speedy/large OTP XOR streams, these hobby jobbers would suffice to seed software prngs, and work well in combination with other software sources. What would be the cost bumps for speedy units, still complying with [1 and 2], for various definitions of speed? Dieharding this and any rng since inception over various block sizes would seem warranted to catch component and other failures [3], whereupon the /dev/<rng> device would block and warn until fixed. No one is doing this extra step in kernel or even in userland yet afaik. Why not? [1] For example, entirely from breadboard discrete logic you can buy and validate from any local parts supplier. ie: not using embedded asics or fancy usb fobs... but resistors, diodes, 74 series gates, etc. [2] Based on radiation, radio, audio/video, environmentals, etc. [3] Neutrino and other hits, Intel/AMD on-die gate failure, etc. _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [liberationtech] NYTimes and Guardian on NSA
by Eugen Leitl 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Shava Nerad <shava23(a)gmail.com> ----- Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2013 16:54:45 -0400 From: Shava Nerad <shava23(a)gmail.com> To: railmeat(a)gmail.com, liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] NYTimes and Guardian on NSA Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2013/04/dsclea.html Basically the regulation says, in keeping with new DHS structures, if the governor is taking a bath and can't be disturbed, and there's an emergent situation, we get to just use any DHS chain of command and communications structure to call in reinforcements however we like, so WHEE! DRONE STRIKE! Or whatever. In Massachusetts, we're actually having to pass a *law* forbidding the SWAT teams in MA from deploying drone strikes. No kidding. They at least had the good graces to ask permission rather than forgiveness. Not sure if it was directly related, but it came up in June of this year. So we're turning them down in code. No toyz, boyz. It's the implicit, not explicit, issues that are disturbing. There have been a number of issues in the US having to do with energy, food security, border security and other converging simulation scenarios that are not necessarily overlapping with cybersecurity that have been used to wedge "reforms" out of civil liberties and LE/military/prison industry/border patrol practice in recent years by waving nightmare/doomsday scenarios in front of executive and congressional folks in the same way we see "children on the Internet" used over and over again. The same sort of erosion of rights, and the same asshattery. It's not all our military, or LE, or whomever. But there does seem to be (forgive me gentlemen) a lot of unbridled testosterone out there, who think that the wargames on counters or on computers are the same things as life on the ground. They are "protecting our precious bodily fluids" as it were, and some few of the beltway companies and various contracting interests are making serious money off of all this I'm more than sure. I had a lovely chat with the head of the MA ACLU last year, when Bill Binney came to speak at MIT. I told her that conspiracy theories were just made-for-TV-drama versions of history -- all the bits resolve too neatly, and really, they make people feel safer, because they are more understandable than studying real history, which is never a finite game. Conspiracy theories are chaff thrown against the sort of thing that happens like these NSA things, which are real conspiracies, which then seem unbelievable, and people deny, and decline to take action against. Likewise, when boring Brazil-like executive orders float by tearing down checks and balances, or when folks like Binney & Co with their officerly demeaner telling us that the sky is falling in calm words respecting the Constitution and the dignity of the corps, it misses the public's conditioned response to expect excitement and bread and circuses with their conspiracies. Why did Snowden get press when Binney did not? Because Snowden was a brave, disproportional, total dumbass, and exposed himself to be assassinated and called a traitor or as Ron Paul said -- have Obama send a drone up his ass. He stole government documents, he committed espionage, he exposed things that compromised government programs. In all likelihood in most cases, deserved every bit of it, but I cringe here and there too that it came to this rather than internal and Congressional accountability -- please understand this is catastrophic that it had to come to this as an *external* reveal and is a failure of OVERSIGHT as well as internal common freaking sense -- and now it's criminal. Snowden broke the law, committed civil disobedience in such a flamboyant way we may never be able to clear it up regardless of how much the wound needed to be cleansed. And there are people here who are going to say I am a bad person for saying that. I'm not judging him (I might have made the same decisions -- it's hard to know -- God, I hope I would never ever ever be in that position! I think I'd turn inside out...). It's an assessment. It would take full on whole culture truth and reconciliation in DC to sort this out. And although I would love to see that happen, I can hardly imagine such a thing in the current climate. It's like Watergate. Should never have happened. But there really is starting to feel like some systemic rot, and we need to start laying in more and more support to the folks we know who are working on the bolstering side of this... I haven't talked to Ron Wyden for a while...hmm... Not much I can do from here though... yrs, On Fri, Sep 6, 2013 at 1:28 PM, Matt Johnson <railmeat(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Hello Shava, > > You wrote: "...the president essentially struck down posse comitatus > in May, they won't know what you are talking about..." I don't know > what you are talking about either, but I am curious. Could you send a > link or two. > > > Thanks > -- Matt Johnson > > On Thu, Sep 5, 2013 at 5:00 PM, Shava Nerad <shava23(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > Part of the tone is also adopted in order to wake the sleeping baby > > anti-intellectual giants either side of the pond. The smart magazines > can > > publish smart crypto articles, but mass market newspapers have to bring > > their audiences along, even the Times and Guardian. > > > > Very few stories even bother to explain what the NSA does or what its > > function in government is, which actually rather stuns me, because I find > > that when I ask the general public that question I find that most of them > > don't know what the NSA does for the government. Most of them assume it > > works for the executive branch, but for the DOJ as part of the whole > > civilian/State/FBI sort of DHS bits, because those lines are so muddied. > > (And yes, I am conflating Justice and State on purpose there because it's > > been done in conversation with The (Wo)Man on the Street.). > > > > People don't know basic civics. At all. If you tell them they should be > > upset because the military is conducting domestic surveillance, they > look at > > you like "what?" "East Germany?" you say. "Stasi?" you say. Blank > looks. > > No history. Those who do not learn from history, etc. > > > > If you tell them that they should be upset because the president > essentially > > struck down posse comitatus in May, they won't know what you are talking > > about, but if you say, "Basically, if a local SWAT team decides they need > > backup in some kind of emergency situation and they can't get hold of the > > governor to call for National Guard? They can call a local military > airbase > > for an airstrike if they want to." Then the people will decide you are > > cold stoned mad and a total tin hat. "Sherman?" you say. And if > they're > > from the south, they might go off in a rant, but they still won't relate > it > > to current affairs or do anything. But that is literally what the law > says > > in the US now. That's a bit beyond elementary civics, but it's a bit > beyond > > what the press is reporting on here too. Because the press doesn't > really > > have much literacy in elementary civics or history either. They seem to > be > > drawing mostly on marcom majors these days. > > > > This is what the "attention economy" has done to us. Our culture is a > deep, > > nutrient rich ocean, full of wonders and cthonic monsters that can eat > us. > > And we all surf. Nothing below the surf-ace is important anymore. > > > > Yay. > > > > SN > > > > On Sep 5, 2013 3:31 PM, "Richard Brooks" <rrb(a)acm.org> wrote: > >> > >> Latest articles: > >> > >> > >> > http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.htm… > >> > >> > >> > http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-secu… > >> > >> > >> I find most of this (if not all) silly. They seem shocked that the > >> NSA does cryptanalysis. It would be nice if the newspapers had > >> people with some knowledge of the domain writing articles. > >> > >> -- > >> Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. > >> Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: > >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, > >> change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > >> companys(a)stanford.edu. > > > > > > -- > > Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. > > Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, > > change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > > companys(a)stanford.edu. > -- > Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. > Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > companys(a)stanford.edu. > -- Shava Nerad shava23(a)gmail.com -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [tor-talk] Tor users are not anonymous
by Eugen Leitl 07 Sep '13

07 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from "Carsten N." <cane(a)jondos.de> ----- Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2013 19:16:08 +0000 From: "Carsten N." <cane(a)jondos.de> To: tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Tor users are not anonymous Reply-To: tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org On 06.09.2013 18:55, grarpamp wrote: > Can you build, from the TC source, hash identical binaries to > the TC binaries TC distributes? No - you can not compile the TC source without modification. The source code you can download from the website doesn't compile. An analysis of Truecrypt was done by the Privacy-CD team: en: https://www.privacy-cd.org/downloads/truecrypt_7.0a-analysis-en.pdf de: https://www.privacy-cd.org/downloads/truecrypt_7.0a-analysis-de.pdf Best regards cane -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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