- cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

RE: Re: request for comment re "contributor-covenant.org"
by shakeitoff＠ghostmail.com 11 Feb '16

11 Feb '16

Hi Ted, Yes, I agree with you. Supposedly, this list was for anarchists who wanted to advance strong cryptography and individual liberty. However, it seems like the large majority of postings here are unfortunately not about cryptography, nor anarchy. Agreed about the white fascism. The ideal would be idea to have more code, more crypto. However, as you said, it might be a lost cause. Which is quite sad, considering what it originally represented. But thanks for writing this nonetheless :) On Mon, Feb 8, 2016 at 1:42 PM, Ted Smith <tedks(a)riseup.net> wrote: Somewhat confusing threading here Cari. I see a few possibilities as to what I could do here: * Be vigilant in calling out patriarchal, racist, and generally neoliberal or fascist ideas promoted by some of the more recent arrivals. * This would provided a benchmark on the list indicating that these ideas are not generally accepted. * This would also require me to argue with assholes on the Internet. As the say goes, pigs, mud, etc.. * Filter these people out and try to maintain productive on-topic discussion. * This would be of limited usefulness since people who I generally find to be quality contributors continue to respond to the Stormfront-esque crowd. * Filter the whole list, comb through it periodically to see if there is any useful signal, and call out the most egregious offenses I can find. * This is what I've chosen to do since it is optimal from my time perspective. I think this list is a lost cause at this point. Ever since around the time it became more discoverable after the switch from al-qaeda.net to cpunks.org, and some possibly overzealous cross-posting, the discourse has shifted from actual cypherpunkery to white men complaining about having their privilege eroded on other mailing lists. There are a number of quality contributors that no longer post here, reducing the signal and allowing more noise. I can't bring them back. But I can at least remind anyone more moderate listening that the cypherpunks list wasn't always a far-right discussion group, which I think is the reverence due to the community that used to exist. I'd appreciate any suggestions, onlist or offline, from anyone who thinks similarly of the ideological drift of this list from generally anti-authoritarian to crypto-white nationalism. Mon Feb 08 2016 6:30:25 PM from dan(a)geer.org ------------------------------ By my records, the word "sheeple" appears in 2% of all messages posted on this list, making it demonstrably ironic that we are even discussing a call for something other than meritocracy. --dan Sent from secure GhostMail. Easy and free encrypted email, chat and cloud storage, free sign up here: https://www.ghostmail.com

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"Welcome to London!" aka, the Internet is now DEF CON Wireless
by coderman 10 Feb '16

10 Feb '16

https://conspicuouschatter.wordpress.com/2016/02/03/a-technical-reading-of-… A technical reading of the “HIMR Data Mining Research Problem Book” 3 February 2016 Boing Boing just released a classified GCHQ document that was meant to act as the Sept 2011 guide to open research problems in Data Mining. The intended audience, Heilbronn Institute for Mathematical Research (HIMR), is part of the University of Bristol and composed of mathematicians working for half their time on classified problems with GCHQ. First off, a quick perusal of the actual publication record of the HIMR makes a sad reading for GCHQ: it seems that very little research on data mining was actually performed post-2011-2014 despite this pitch. I guess this is what you get trying to make pure mathematicians solve core computer science problems. However, the document presents one of the clearest explanations of GCHQ’s operations and their scale at the time; as well as a very interesting list of open problems, along with salient examples. Overall, reading this document very much resembles reading the needs of any other organization with big-data, struggling to process it to get any value. The constrains under which they operate (see below), and in particular the limitations to O(n log n) storage per vertex and O(1) per edge event, is a serious threat — but of course this is only for un-selected traffic. So the 5000 or so Tor nodes probably would have a little more space and processing allocated to them, and so would known botnets — I presume. Secondly, there is clear evidence that timing information is both recognized as being key to correlating events and streams; and it is being recorded and stored at an increasing granularity. There is no smoking gun as of 2011 to say they casually de-anonymize Tor circuits, but the writing is on the wall for the onion routing system. GCHQ at 2011 had all ingredients needed to trace Tor circuits. It would take extra-ordinary incompetence to not have refined their traffic analysis techniques in the past 5 years. The Tor project should do well to not underestimate GCHQ’s capabilities to this point. Thirdly, one should wonder why we have been waiting for 3 years until such clear documents are finally being published from the Snowden revelations. If those had been the first published, instead of the obscure, misleading and very non-informative slides, it would have saved a lot of time — and may even have engaged the public a bit more than bad powerpoint. Some interesting points in the document in order: It turns out that GCHQ has a written innovation strategy, reference [I75]. If someone has a copy it would be great to see it, and also understand where the ACE program fits in it. GCHQ, at the time used heavily two families of technologies: Hadoop, for bulk processing of raw collected data (6 months for meta-data apparently), and IBM Streams (DISTILLERY) for stream, real-time, processing. A lot of the discussion, and open problems, relate to the fact that bulk collection can only provide a limited window of visibility, and intelligence related selection, and processing has to happen within this window. Hence the interest in processing streaming data. Section 2 is probably the clearest explanation of how modern SIGINT works. I would like to congratulate the (anonymous) author, and will be setting it as the key reading for my PETS class. It summarizes well what countless crappy articles on the Snowden leaks have struggled to piece together. I wish journalists just released this first, and skipped the ugly slides. The intro provides a hit at the scale of cable interception operations as of 2011. It seems that 200 “bearers” of 10 Gigabit / sec were being collected at any time; it makes clear that many more sources were available to switch to depending on need. That is about 2 Terabit / sec, across 3 sites (Cheltenham, Bude, and LECKWITH). Section 2.1.2 explains that a lot (the majority) of data is discarded very early on, by special hardware performing simple matching on internet packets. I presume this is to filter out bulk downloads (from CDNs), known sources of spam, youtube videos, etc. The same section (2.1.2) also explains that all meta-data is pulled from the bearer, and provides an interpretation of what meta-data is. Finally (2.1.2) there is a hint at indexing databases (Query focused databases / QFD) that are specialized to store meta-data, such as IP traffic flow data, for quick retrival based on selectors (like IP addresses). Section 2.1.3 explains the problem of “target development”, namely when no good known selectors exist for a target, and it is the job of the analyst to match it though either contact chaining or modus-operandi (MO) matching. It is a very instructive section, which is the technical justification underpinning a lot of the mass surveillance going on. The cute example chosen to illustrate it (Page 12, end of 2.1.3): Apparently GCHQ developed many of those techniques to spy on foreign delegations during the 2009 G20 meeting. Welcome to London! Section 2.2.2 provides a glimpse at the cybersecurity doctrine and world-view at GCHQ, already in 2011. In particular, there is a vision that CESG will act as a network security service for the nation, blocking attacks at the “firewalls”, and doing attribution (as if the attacks will be coming “from outside”). GCHQ would then counter-attack the hostile sources, or simply use the material they intercepted from others (4th party collection, the euphemism goes). Section 2.2.3 provides a glimpse of the difficulties of running implants on compromised machines: something that is openly admitted. Apparently ex-filtrating traffic and establishing command-and-control with implants is susceptible to passive SIGINT, both a problem and an opportunity. Section 3 and beyond describes research challenges that are very similar with any other large organization or research group: the difficulty of creating labelled data sets for training machine learning models; the challenges on working on partial or streaming data; the need for succinct representations of data structures; and the problem of inferring “information flow” — namely chains of communications that are related to each other. It seems the technique of choice when it comes to machine learning is Random Decision Forrests. Good choice, I also prefer it to others. They have an in-house innovation: they weight the outputs of each decision tree. (Something that is sometimes called gradual learning in the open literature, I believe). Steganography detection seems to be a highlight: however there is no explanation if steganography is a real problem they encountered in the field, or if it was an easy dataset to generate synthetically. Section 4, deals with research problems of “Information Flow in Graphs”. This is the problem of associated multiple related connections together, including across types of channels, detecting botnet Command and Control nodes, and also tracing Tor connections. Tracing Tor nodes is in fact a stated problem, with a stated solution. Highlights include the simple “remit” algorithm that developed by Detica (page 26, Sect. 4.2.1); PRIME TIME that looks at chains of length 2; and finally HIDDEN OTTER, that specifically targets Tor, and botnets. (Apparently an internal group codenamed ICTR-NE develop it). Section 4.2.2 looks at communications association through temporal correlation: one more piece of evidence that timing analysis, at a coarse scale, is on the cards for mining associations. What is cute is the example used is how to detect all GCHQ employees: they are the ones with phones not active between 9am and 5pm when they are at work. Beside these, they are interested in change / anomaly detection (4.4.1), spread of information (such as extremest material), etc. Not that dissimilar from say an analysis Facebook would perform. Section 5 poses problem relating to algorithms on streaming graph data. It provides a definitions of the tolerable costs of analysis algorithms (the semi-streaming paradigm): for a graph of n vertices (nodes), they can store a bit of info per vertex, but not all edges, or even process all edges. So they have O(n log n) storage and can only do O(1) processing per event / edge. That could be distilled to a set of security assumptions. Section 5.2.2 / 5.2.3 is an interesting discussion about relaxations of cliques and also point of that very popular nodes (the pizza delivery line) probably are noise and should be discarded. As of 2011 (sect 5.2.4) it was an open problem how far contact chaining is required. This is set as an open problem, but states that analysis usually use 2-hops from targets. Note that other possible numbers are 3, 4, and 5 since after 6 you probably have included nearly everyone in the world. So it is not that exciting a problem and cannot blame the pure mathematicians for not tackling it. Section 5.5.1 asks the question on whether there is an approximation of the correlation matrix, to avoid storing and processing an n x n matrix. It generally seems that matching identifiers with identifiers is big business. Section 6 poses problems relating to the processing, data mining, and analysis of “expiring” graphs, namely graphs with edges that disappear after a deadline. This is again related to the constraint that storage for bulk un-selected data is limited. In section 6.3.2 the semi-streaming model where only O(n log n) storage per vertex is allowed, and O(1) processing per incoming event / edge is re-iterated. Appendix A deals with models of academic engagement. I have to say it is very enlightened: it recognizes the value of openly publishing the research, after some sanitization. Nice. Appendix B and C discuss the technical details and size of the IBM Streams and Hadoop clusters. Section D presents the production clusters (652 nodes, total 5216 cores, and 32 GB memory for each node). Section E discusses the legalities of using intercepted data for research, and bless them they do try to provide some logging and Human Rights Justification (bulk authorization for research purposes).

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USA To Require Govt Issued ID To Use Internet, No More Anonymous
by grarpamp 10 Feb '16

10 Feb '16

http://yro.slashdot.org/story/16/01/20/1321243/senior-homeland-security-off… A senior Homeland Security official recently argued that Internet anonymity should outlawed in the same way that driving a car without a license plate is against the law. "When a person drives a car on a highway, he or she agrees to display a license plate," Erik Barnett, an assistant deputy director at U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and attache to the European Union at the Department of Homeland Security, wrote. "The license plate's identifiers are ignored most of the time by law enforcement. Law enforcement will use the identifiers, though, to determine the driver's identity if the car is involved in a legal infraction or otherwise becomes a matter of public interest. Similarly, should not every individual be required to display a 'license plate' on the digital super-highway?"

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I'll reveal the scandal I've been sitting on that's on the scale of Making a Murderer
by Ryan Carboni 10 Feb '16

10 Feb '16

I've inferred that somehow I'm being investigated as part of the 2013 Santa Monica College mass shooting which has taken a suspiciously long time to issue a report regarding (typically it appears to take a year or less). I've been subjected to police harassment before and after that point though. For legal reasons I can't explain further. Yes, exceptional claims require exceptional evidence. Fortunately systems are incapable of treating people as individuals, so there must be others. Obviously the claims of "gangstalking" are nuts. But there is the Rancid Honeytrap. http://i.imgur.com/19i7ik1.png Who for some reason is being trolled by Wikileaks? And Greenwald seems to be fine with people trolling him? https://ohtarzie.wordpress.com/2014/02/24/the-friends-of-glenn/ Perhaps there is now probable cause for a reasonable person to conclude that there's the potential of a pattern of government misconduct waiting to be uncovered. I made every reasonable effort to contact various advocacy / legal aid organizations when I felt I had enough evidence to merit some help and they have rejected me (I've sent large envelopes to them of multiple pages). I have made anonymous letters to various journalists hoping they would attempt to investigate a possible pattern of misconduct but I have seen no evidence that they have done it yet. I do not plan on acknowledging those anonymous letters as they were made a while ago, my memory isn't so great, and they could have been intercepted and modified in transit (especially since I didn't sign them). Now I'm going to shift to a rather benevolent interpretation of public events. Dianne Feinstein condemns Hoover, but the times were much more ambiguous in the Cold War, the commies were funding and supporting radicals, and there was a greater quantity of Progressive terrorism then than Islamic terrorism today (although the quality seems to be different since people are more afraid of Islamic terrorism). Director Comey condemns Hoover. Senator Wyden asked Clapper a question in public, under oath, and Clapper lied. Wyden is on the Senate's oversight committee over Clapper and Clapper still has his job. Lying to Congress is obviously an impeachable offense (unless Congress wants people to be employed by the taxpayers who lie to Congress). Clearly all these people are under duress, if their public statements are to taken as sincere expressions of opinion. Only legally allowed explanation I can give. An employee of the ACLU says: Over the past three years, it has become clear that the government often performs legal acrobatics in order to justify surveillance that was never authorized by Congress in the first place. Such acrobatics appear to extend to the NSA’s “Upstream surveillance,” which it operates under Section 702. ( https://www.justsecurity.org/29161/questions-congress-section-702/ ) Perhaps Neema Singh Guliani is simply not representing the ACLU properly, afterall the ACLU sued the government over FISA on the grounds it would intercept privileged communications. ( https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Foreign_Intelligence_Surveillanc… ). The same law granted retroactive immunity to telecommunications companies, authorizing their complicity in warrantless wiretapping. But then again, the ACLU isn't simply a legal aid organization, Ben Wizner is acting as a secretary for Snowden, assisting him in setting up videoconferences. And there's no legal acrobatics involved in that conclusion. Maybe a journalist will contact me after I post this, to which I won't respond for one of two reasons: you're complicit and you're aware, or you have failed to engage in an investigative followup, the type you like to second guess the police about. I do think this is an opportunity for our members of Congress to start a joint committee to investigate. Naturally I won't testify unless I'm given immunity, but I'm also willing to waive all legal liability against any party willing to testify before Congress if I'm granted immunity. I only desire the truth.

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Fwd: [tor-talk] Cicada 3301: 2016
by grarpamp 09 Feb '16

09 Feb '16

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Jonathan Wilkes <jancsika(a)yahoo.com> Date: Tue, Feb 9, 2016 at 3:29 PM Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Cicada 3301: 2016 To: "tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org" <tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org> > I suspect that Cicada 3301 is run by some old-time cypherpunks looking for more people who are interested in building and deploying tech and not just posting to a mailing list. That seems odd, but then I don't know much about old-time cypherpunk ethos. Anyhow, are there examples of quality open source software built using this "secret cathedral" approach? -Jonathan On Tuesday, February 9, 2016 1:37 PM, The Doctor <drwho(a)virtadpt.net> wrote: -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Mon, 08 Feb 2016 22:13:10 +0000 Sean Lynch <seanl(a)literati.org> wrote: > I'm surprised anyone thinks this could possibly be anything besides a viral > marketing campaign. AR games are all the rage these days. Some AR games are run for fun and not as advertising (White Roses and Whence Comes the Time come immediately to mind). I suspect that Cicada 3301 is run by some old-time cypherpunks looking for more people who are interested in building and deploying tech and not just posting to a mailing list. The problems are way too technical for it to be 'just' an ARG. - -- The Doctor [412/724/301/703/415] [ZS] PGP: 0x807B17C1 / 7960 1CDC 85C9 0B63 8D9F DD89 3BD8 FF2B 807B 17C1 WWW: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/ Being wrong is not the same as lying. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJWujIFAAoJED1np1pUQ8RkZ1QP/3o2nNmJsLBCjdMOXfzLaf+d M/aYXGpAvPJWg8atJAnu0iZNlyj4gtHJtGVRGtUgj31PfRaIUS4SLxlPm2862JF/ WSatYV6VRBg3b7gGHtyaMNuqaOciotwWsxoZb8o9GJE3krZKEZSHcbOKg0Vzu2MZ Vn6s8Q0Vyp6NGJkl7etHyCPiXU38lOx52PyaP579Q4KuSF2Zm8XMmo8fHSSqsbxx ++GJkHcVzZZoAPZE0YrTbWzsha76JoYiBbxWR4zmEjPDJTTpL+kNcujb7qcusO+q 09dnWY3+SxZwgRp1uxDg26C1pH8FQYWTRdebY0z58k0i/sEvKn7nQLoKl47h96B9 lP56/QIFPLZ77Iz9hZKHE9Dh1NkVGLanqCpVWN1twlf38iZhhM/I+lg5SfFXECwS udFSzdUQJMBwQG8Fh0sFarwUtqh0CfEo5d/B22y4PqwvcRWV1ENa2CrIgDU0SjXX cASF/AuWsReYIqWnnkpCvmkfgdPEodUXobTF159EwFWxdJE9jDVMFAEYChHczw8h Iwapo7dXgICre407IPDdZA/MxxGPA6f0hYny+Jm+yV45zLv5GNOkv/y8vtLM8mkP VitLd6TOY5GJynUv6+q2EmFmtlC2gfZm0cB04R84TAgG29EyJc0GmKpjTpKIDC0I BQkBrzP0KvmkyIN3WehE =rNO6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

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Fwd: [tor-talk] Cicada 3301: 2016
by grarpamp 09 Feb '16

09 Feb '16

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: The Doctor <drwho(a)virtadpt.net> Date: Tue, Feb 9, 2016 at 1:37 PM Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Cicada 3301: 2016 To: tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Mon, 08 Feb 2016 22:13:10 +0000 Sean Lynch <seanl(a)literati.org> wrote: > I'm surprised anyone thinks this could possibly be anything besides a viral > marketing campaign. AR games are all the rage these days. Some AR games are run for fun and not as advertising (White Roses and Whence Comes the Time come immediately to mind). I suspect that Cicada 3301 is run by some old-time cypherpunks looking for more people who are interested in building and deploying tech and not just posting to a mailing list. The problems are way too technical for it to be 'just' an ARG. - -- The Doctor [412/724/301/703/415] [ZS] PGP: 0x807B17C1 / 7960 1CDC 85C9 0B63 8D9F DD89 3BD8 FF2B 807B 17C1 WWW: https://drwho.virtadpt.net/ Being wrong is not the same as lying. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJWujIFAAoJED1np1pUQ8RkZ1QP/3o2nNmJsLBCjdMOXfzLaf+d M/aYXGpAvPJWg8atJAnu0iZNlyj4gtHJtGVRGtUgj31PfRaIUS4SLxlPm2862JF/ WSatYV6VRBg3b7gGHtyaMNuqaOciotwWsxoZb8o9GJE3krZKEZSHcbOKg0Vzu2MZ Vn6s8Q0Vyp6NGJkl7etHyCPiXU38lOx52PyaP579Q4KuSF2Zm8XMmo8fHSSqsbxx ++GJkHcVzZZoAPZE0YrTbWzsha76JoYiBbxWR4zmEjPDJTTpL+kNcujb7qcusO+q 09dnWY3+SxZwgRp1uxDg26C1pH8FQYWTRdebY0z58k0i/sEvKn7nQLoKl47h96B9 lP56/QIFPLZ77Iz9hZKHE9Dh1NkVGLanqCpVWN1twlf38iZhhM/I+lg5SfFXECwS udFSzdUQJMBwQG8Fh0sFarwUtqh0CfEo5d/B22y4PqwvcRWV1ENa2CrIgDU0SjXX cASF/AuWsReYIqWnnkpCvmkfgdPEodUXobTF159EwFWxdJE9jDVMFAEYChHczw8h Iwapo7dXgICre407IPDdZA/MxxGPA6f0hYny+Jm+yV45zLv5GNOkv/y8vtLM8mkP VitLd6TOY5GJynUv6+q2EmFmtlC2gfZm0cB04R84TAgG29EyJc0GmKpjTpKIDC0I BQkBrzP0KvmkyIN3WehE =rNO6 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk

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Cicada 3301: 2016
by grarpamp 08 Feb '16

08 Feb '16

https://twitter.com/1231507051321/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cicada_3301 http://uncovering-cicada.wikia.com/

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Re: [tor-talk] Using SDR
by wirelesswarrior＠Safe-mail.net 08 Feb '16

08 Feb '16

-------- Original Message -------- From: Sean Lynch <seanl(a)literati.org> To: wirelesswarrior(a)safe-mail.net Cc: tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org, cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Using SDR Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2016 20:16:58 +0000 > On Mon, Feb 8, 2016 at 10:51 AM <wirelesswarrior(a)safe-mail.net> wrote: > > > > > > -------- Original Message -------- > > From: Sean Lynch <seanl(a)literati.org> > > Apparently from: cypherpunks-bounces(a)cpunks.org > > To: tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org > > Cc: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org > > Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Using SDR > > Date: Sat, 06 Feb 2016 20:40:21 +0000 > > > > > > > On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 7:23 PM coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 2/5/16, Sean Lynch <seanl(a)literati.org> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ... Radio is being used right now to provide anonymity, but it's being used[1] > > > > > to hide endpoints similar to the duct-taped payphone trick depicted in > > > > > Hackers, in order to avoid attacks like the one used to capture Ross > > > > > Ulbricht without giving him a chance to wipe his computer (they snuck up > > > > > behind him and pinned his arms, but they would have just rushed him had > > > > > that not been possible). If you use a device like the ProxyHam and you sit > > > > > somewhere where you can see it, there's a reasonable chance you'd spot > > > > > someone who's trying to find you, giving you a chance to hit your panic > > > > > button and escape. > > > > > > > > this assumes you're keeping it under constant supervision, of course :P > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Indeed. Having a spotter there is probably the best solution. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Alternatively, if you aren't too clumbsy or forgetful, is to have a some sort of hidden/innocuous band tied to you and to your device (e.g., a laptop) that when pulled too hard (like a grenade pin) starts the wiping process. So if you are jumped/pinned the process starts before the attackers realize it. > > > > > > > > > > > Yep, a dead-man switch of some kind is a good idea regardless of what other techniques you're using. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > A related LPI method is to use a separate, well disciplined, carrier (in-band, co-located or not) that participant devices listen to and use the sync their clocks and/or their codes. If used carefully Eve won't know about it and will find it too difficult to synch in time catch Alice and Bob's comms. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Sure, but if you have a very long (or effectively infinite) PN sequence, your carrier needs to be structured enough to recover some large counter. GPS qualifies, as probably does WWV and its non-US brethren. > > > > > > > > > How do you train out of band? By modelling the environment? That's an interesting thought, and I suspect Google Earth has enough data to be able to do it in a lot of places. Are you aware of free or inexpensive software packages for doing this? > > > > > > > > > > > synthetic aperature millimeter wave vision systems are also pushing > > > > along this boundary, for cross-pollination of suitable phased sync'ed > > > > UWB MIMO signal processing. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Aren't you just talking phased array for something like this though? Or do you mean using phase information from the receive antennas to reconstruct the environment rather than using phasing at the transmit side to steer your beam? That's a very interesting idea since it can give you a 360 degree view with no need to steer your beam, in the same way that some blind humans can use clicks to get a picture of their entire environment. (I use humans and not bats because I think bat sonar is pretty directional, whereas human ears can localize sound quite precisely without any need to turn one's head.) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Beam stearing be accomplished much cheaper than via a phased array using nearfield plasmas to block or steer the beam. For example, a vertical cluster of flourescent tubes surrounding a simple dipole can, with proper circuitry, quickly switched so that only one of the tubes is "off" (transparent) at a time allowing incoming/outgoing signasl to only propagate in that direction. The other tubes are "on" and reflect the signals. > > > > > > > > > > > Sure, if you don't care about MIMO, there are lots of ways to steer your beam using relatively cheap circuitry. You can have multiple transmit/receive antennas and just adjust their relative phase. AIUI this is how the LoJack locators operate. Switching reflectors on and off independently as you suggest here would allow multiple beams, though their relative phase would not be adjustable. It all goes toward the goal of minimizing the amount of energy you emit that isn't directed toward the receiver, though. > > For privacy in ptp links and a highly directional antenna (e.g., a parabolic dish) one can take a cue from covert radar tech. Alice geometrically moves around the transmit signal, and thus far-field phase, using a "matrixed" near-field feed that switches randomly at >> than the symbol rate. If you can adequately suppress the switching noise the phase shifts make it near impossible for an off-axis (> 0.5 degrees for a 32-element 2D feed) Eve to even detect that a signal exists. Bob, all other things being equal, using a standard receiver, should have no problem with receiving. This tech is practiced only at the antenna and, like Orbital Angular Momentum, should work with near any emission type or protocol without need modify other equipment. > > Thanks for posting the latest version of your slides. I read what I think was an earlier version previously. I am working on upgrading my amateur radio license, so soon I will get some experience with some of the weak signal modes you talk about. > >

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Re: [tor-talk] Using SDR
by wirelesswarrior＠Safe-mail.net 08 Feb '16

08 Feb '16

-------- Original Message -------- From: Sean Lynch <seanl(a)literati.org> Apparently from: cypherpunks-bounces(a)cpunks.org To: tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org Cc: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Using SDR Date: Sat, 06 Feb 2016 20:40:21 +0000 > On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 7:23 PM coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > On 2/5/16, Sean Lynch <seanl(a)literati.org> wrote: > > > ... Radio is being used right now to provide anonymity, but it's being used[1] > > > to hide endpoints similar to the duct-taped payphone trick depicted in > > > Hackers, in order to avoid attacks like the one used to capture Ross > > > Ulbricht without giving him a chance to wipe his computer (they snuck up > > > behind him and pinned his arms, but they would have just rushed him had > > > that not been possible). If you use a device like the ProxyHam and you sit > > > somewhere where you can see it, there's a reasonable chance you'd spot > > > someone who's trying to find you, giving you a chance to hit your panic > > > button and escape. > > > > this assumes you're keeping it under constant supervision, of course :P > > > Indeed. Having a spotter there is probably the best solution. > > Alternatively, if you aren't too clumbsy or forgetful, is to have a some sort of hidden/innocuous band tied to you and to your device (e.g., a laptop) that when pulled too hard (like a grenade pin) starts the wiping process. So if you are jumped/pinned the process starts before the attackers realize it. > > > > > > The older, lower-tech version of this trick is to use a high-gain antenna > > > like the Cantenna or a Yagi to use a public wifi AP from a stealthy, > > > defensible location. The problem with this is that this presents no > > > challenge to RDF (radio direction finding) equipment designed for WiFi. > > > That's the big advantage of the ProxyHam, since whoever is looking for you > > > probably won't know in advance what frequency you're using. And solving > > > that problem in a general way requires MUCH more expensive gear than just > > > locating WiFi clients. > > > > one of my favorite tricks, but rather rude in spectrum, > > is setting high power amplifier to maximum. DF tends to see this > > signal arriving from all around... *grin* > > > > this introduces it's own trade-offs, of course. > > > This is why you use an attenuator. I wouldn't think law enforcement DF equipment would be fooled by such a thing, since for example FCC will often be looking for people who are outputting too much power, which on the ham bands is going to be multiple kilowatts (I think they've mostly given up on CB except when it starts interfering with licensed users). > > > > > > It MAY be possible to use SDR to achieve LPI while still remaining within > > > > if you're building LPI, you don't give a fuck about the FCC (compliance). > > by definition, if they've found you, you fucked up! > > > > +1 > > > > > Perhaps, but I'm not about to suggest that anyone break the law. > > > > > > Actually, that gives me an idea: MIMO precoding[2] (versus spatial > > > multiplexing, which is useless for your purposes). MIMO precoding devolves > > > to beam-forming in the absence of reflectors like buildings, but in an > > > urban environment, you get a complex combination of signal paths, > > > > > > MIMO precoding requires a "training" phase where they discover one another > > > by transmitting some easily "locked-onto" signal so that each receiver can > > > find the other transmitter independently. > > > > it is now possible for a professional's budget to accodomate the SDR > > equipment necessary to do this type of phase sync'ed active beam > > forming MIMO transmission, and not all methods require the training > > phase. in fact, omission of this (by out of band training, in a sense) > > in a method of "keying" phased delivery of UWB MIMO in a way more > > likely to achieve LPI. > > > > A related LPI method is to use a separate, well disciplined, carrier (in-band, co-located or not) that participant devices listen to and use the sync their clocks and/or their codes. If used carefully Eve won't know about it and will find it too difficult to synch in time catch Alice and Bob's comms. > > > > > How do you train out of band? By modelling the environment? That's an interesting thought, and I suspect Google Earth has enough data to be able to do it in a lot of places. Are you aware of free or inexpensive software packages for doing this? > > > > > synthetic aperature millimeter wave vision systems are also pushing > > along this boundary, for cross-pollination of suitable phased sync'ed > > UWB MIMO signal processing. > > > Aren't you just talking phased array for something like this though? Or do you mean using phase information from the receive antennas to reconstruct the environment rather than using phasing at the transmit side to steer your beam? That's a very interesting idea since it can give you a 360 degree view with no need to steer your beam, in the same way that some blind humans can use clicks to get a picture of their entire environment. (I use humans and not bats because I think bat sonar is pretty directional, whereas human ears can localize sound quite precisely without any need to turn one's head.) > > Beam stearing be accomplished much cheaper than via a phased array using nearfield plasmas to block or steer the beam. For example, a vertical cluster of flourescent tubes surrounding a simple dipole can, with proper circuitry, quickly switched so that only one of the tubes is "off" (transparent) at a time allowing incoming/outgoing signasl to only propagate in that direction. The other tubes are "on" and reflect the signals. > > > > > i could go on, if you're curious, but perhaps on another list? :) > > > This is definitely an area I'm interested in, so I'd love to hear more of your ideas, as may Jeremy, so if it's beyond what is generally tolerated on this list, private email would be fine, or if you have a list in mind I'd be happy to subscribe if I'm not already. > >

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Assange to Surrender to Brits, Snowden was to be Rendered via Danes
by grarpamp 08 Feb '16

08 Feb '16

https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/695084493825273856 I shall exit the embassy at noon on Friday to accept arrest by British polic. http://www.thenational.scot/news/secret-us-flight-flew-over-scottish-airspa… N977GA was previously identified by Dave Willis in Air Force Monthly as an aircraft used for CIA rendition flights.

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