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"ODNI trying to sneak through attack on MDR"
by Michael Best 29 Feb '16

29 Feb '16

$72 an hour fees, $0.50/page for copies http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=ODNI-2016-0001-0001 https://twitter.com/NSANate/status/704313004263870465 -- Veritas aequitas liberabit vos Veri universum vici That 1 Archive <http://that1archive.neocities.org/> @NatSecGeek <https://twitter.com/NatSecGeek>

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The Natseckers
by John Young 28 Feb '16

28 Feb '16

DoJ is required to cloak NSA-CIA capabilities by pretending full sharing does not take place. Redacted and excluded filings and decisions by DoJ, district, appeal, SCOTUS and FISA courts along with open and classified executive orders by and POTUS, and best of all, classified contracts, implements this. In olden days there was a fairy-land time when NSA-CIA were required to cull, select and "minimize" (except in wartime and emergencies) their take and capabilities with FBI and law enforcement, but no longer, the Patriot Act Dr Zeuss loosened the ties that never bound. Going to court melodramatizes and sanitizes the bung-holing (like USG v. Apple) with in camera, withholding, stonewalling and denying. It should be understood, Dear Dummies, that lawyers, security clearance holders, corporations, NGOs and and greeders who assist and abet spying understand how to play this rigged game to keep the public "safe and secure" in blissful passivity. Encryption, necessarily quietly compromised for dependable marketability, has always been a formulaic-algorithmic Faustian character in the comsec-infosec charade where official secrecy triumphs over chaotic rabble-empowering democracy. This big-budget high-profit Broadway performance is called "The Natseckers." At 08:06 PM 2/27/2016, you wrote: >isn't there supposed to be "sharing" when it comes to terrorism. >patriot act & such. > >Sent: Friday, February 26, 2016 at 2:15 PM From: "John Young" ><jya(a)pipeline.com> To: "Henry Baker" <hbaker1(a)pipeline.com>, >cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org, cryptome(a)freelists.org, >cryptography(a)metzdowd.com, cryptography(a)randombit.net Subject: Re: >[cryptography] [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate >Decrypt Order >At 11:13 AM 2/26/2016, Henry Baker wrote: >If this interpretation of >the All Writs Act is upheld, then the DOJ >will have to consult with >the intelligence community prior to >compelling companies like Apple >to decrypt phones. It would be quite >interesting for DOJ to >publicly stipulate that NSA could (or could >not) break into iOS 8 >or 9. This is truly a sticky wicket, since the >intelligence >community is generally prohibited from working on >domestic issues. >We asked for an opinion of Michael Froomkin, Law Professor at >University of Miami, on Henry Baker's comments: ><https://cryptome.org/2016/02/can-spies-break-apple-crypto.htm>https://cryptome.org/2016/02/can-spies-break-apple-crypto.htm >_______________________________________________ cryptography mailing >list cryptography(a)randombit.net ><http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography>http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

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OFFSystem
by grarpamp 28 Feb '16

28 Feb '16

On 2/25/16, Jerry Leichter <leichter(a)lrw.com> wrote: >> So let me understand: exactly *where* is my data? >> >> If I have a file full of random numbers in country #1 and another file >> full of random numbers in country #2 and another file full of random >> numbers in country #3 and so on, so I guess my "data" is in *all* of the >> countries. >> >> But only I know the function that will transform the data stored in all of >> these countries into a form that might actually be useful, so my "data" is >> also in *none* of the countries. > Congratulations. You've rediscovered the argument every kiddie comes up > with to protect themselves from copyright lawsuits: I don't actually have > your protect music on my server. I have a bunch of random numbers. So does > my friend across the street. It happens that if you XOR the two together > you get the music, but neither of us actually has your music.... > > It's nonsense. You're acting as if judges were idiots. They're not. > > If you encrypt your stuff locally before putting it in the cloud, and hold > the key yourself, you're protected against anything the cloud provider can > do. They can only deliver what they have (encrypted text that neither they > nor the government can read), not what they don't have (the corresponding > plaintext.) This is much safer than any hacks for spreading the stuff > around. > > Add integrity checks if you're concerned about modification attacks. Use > replicas and error correction to deal with failures of individual replicas. > > The rest is just noise. > -- Jerry https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OFFSystem http://offsystem.sourceforge.net/ Add https if you're concerned to make it better.

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Data storage for billions of years
by Cari Machet 28 Feb '16

28 Feb '16

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/02/this-tiny-disc-can-preserve-human-hi…

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German BND targeted EU Rep Ashton and SecState Kerry
by Michael Best 28 Feb '16

28 Feb '16

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundesnachrichtendienst-hoerte-of… Sent from my iPhone

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Time for p2p, content addressed, pre-emptively cached web pages - Tor Project Accuses CloudFlare of Mass Surveillance, Sabotaging Traffic
by Zenaan Harkness 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

Perhaps someone can design something to counteract the CIA and NSA's Cloudflare tool? Evidently we need a better way to read our news and blogs. Cloudflare is getting to pervasive. http://yro.slashdot.org/story/16/02/26/1816211/tor-project-accuses-cloudfla… Tor Project Accuses CloudFlare of Mass Surveillance, Sabotaging Traffic >From the men-in-the-middle department An anonymous reader writes: Tensions are rising between Tor Project administrators and CloudFlare, a CDN and DDoS mitigation service that's apparently making the life of Tor users a living hell. Tor administrators are saying that CloudFlare is...

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Millennials' Dream Job
by John Young 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/magazine/the-new-dream-jobs.html No. 1 Google No. 4 Apple No. 5 FBI No. 8 CIA No. 19 NSA "The high ranking of national-security employers also speaks to millennials' hope to make a difference in the world."

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Michael Hayden's Treasonous Espionage
by John Young 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

Michael Hayden's Treasonous Espionage https://www.amazon.com/review/R18T6ASRBEC8Y3/ref=cm_cr_rdp_perm?ie=UTF8&ASI…

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Re: [cryptography] Apple's refusal, crypto wars shifting to OS/device wars
by John Young 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

It's good to see The Intercept and others smell a rat with the fake fight between Apple and the USG (hardly only the FBI). Crediting Snowden and his flacks with this phony crypto war is a bit much, though, opposition to government instrusions around the world have been persistent for decades, especially against the ever increasing digital violations and forever failing protections against them. "Strong crypto is hard to do while making it easy for users." What is most needed from the Snowden 90% still-secret wad are defenses against the USG now that alarms have been repeatedly clanged about redacted and incomplete offenses. Most peculiar that almost no defensive measures have been released, although Snowden may have insisted on not releasing those as threats to US national security. Snowden's alleged demand that outlets check with USG before releases to assure no national harm is institutionalized in national security reporting, but is also required by fear of prosecution of outlets and their investors such as Omidyar, Slim, Bezo, all the major media. Withholding the 90% of Snowden material which he claims was given to the public, is damnable betrayal of the public for monetary and professional benefits. In this way the Snowden material has been handled like the USG handles it, as if it is owned by the handlers, not by the ones who paid for it. It would not be off-base to accuse the Snowden handlers of what Apple and the USG are doing, engaging in a fake fight "in the public interest" for pecuniary gain. Privacy and civil liberties are being peddled as commercial products, cheered yesterday by Apple investors. The DNI's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is as much a marketing scam as the American Civil Liberties Union, same kind of people populate both, testify in Congress, meet with POTUS, work the lecture circuit. At 11:05 AM 2/27/2016, you wrote: >John Young wrote: > USG is not USA. Apple is not >its buyers. USG v Apple is not about citizens >and privacy. It's about secretkeepers against >the public. Therefore, except for members of >âthe publicâ who have no secrets (no credit >card PINs, no private medical conditions, no >private relationships, no private future plans, >no private original ideas, no private and >unpopular political views, etc.), âitâs >about secretkeepersâ against themselves? I >suppose then we should all file amicus briefs on >both sides? John Young wrote: > Govs may concede >crypto public protection to assure other means >remain effective. Promoting public crypto as a >cloak appears to be the campaign underway, now >as in the 1990s, so beguiling to crypto >advocates to claim a win (for the >industry-org-edu to continue doing openly and >secretly what it does best). This has been >addressed previously and yesterday by an article >at The Intercept. >https://theintercept.com/2016/02/26/fbi-vs-apple-post-crypto-wars/ > > After the 2013 Snowden revelations, as >mainstream technology companies started >spreading encryption by putting it in popular >consumer products, the wars erupted again. Law >enforcement officials, led by FBI Director James >Comey, loudly insisted that U.S. companies >should build backdoors to break the encryption >just for them. > > That wonât happen because >what these law enforcement officials are asking >for isnât possible (any backdoor can be used >by hackers, too) and wouldnât be effective >(because encryption is widely available globally >now). Theyâve succeeded in slowing the spread >of unbreakable encryption by intimidating tech >companies that might otherwise be rolling it out >faster, but not much else. > > Indeed, as almost >everyone else acknowledges, unbreakable >encryption is here to stay. > > Tech privacy >advocates continue to remain vigilant about >encryption, actively pointing out the >inadequacies and impossibilities of the >anti-encryption movement, and jumping on any >sign of backsliding. > > But even as they have >stayed focused on defending encryption, the >government has been shifting its focus to >something else. > > The ongoing, very public >dispute between Apple and the FBI, in fact, >marks a key inflection point at least as far >as the puublicâs understanding of the >issue. > > You might say weâre entering the >Post-Crypto phase of the Crypto Wars. Think >about it: The more we learn about the FBIâs >demand that Apple help it hack into a >password-protected iPhone, the more it looks >like part of a concerted, long-term effort by >the government to find new ways around >unbreakable encryption rather than try to >break it. Withoutt Ed Snowdenâs >whistle-blowing, Glenn Greenwaldâs, Laura >Poitrasâ and Ewen MacAskillâs journalism, >reporting by the Intercept and by the Washington >Postâs Bart Gellman, and Appleâs refusal, >âthe publicâ would not be discussing this at >all. >_______________________________________________ >cryptography mailing list >cryptography(a)randombit.net >http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

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Book review of Michael Hayden's new book, _Playing to the Edge_
by dan＠geer.org 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

Book review of Michael Hayden's new book, _Playing to the Edge_ http://www.wsj.com/articles/in-defense-of-snooping-1456184621 When Gen. Michael V. Hayden arrived at Fort Meade as the director of the National Security Agency in 1999, he made an alarming discovery: America's premier signals intelligence agency did not have email. Two years later, just as he was finally managing to modernize the agency's obsolescent technology, planes slammed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In _Playing to the Edge,_ a memoir of his decade at the apex of America's spy agencies -- he would head the CIA in 2006-09 -- Gen. Hayden offers a vivid account of his experience of the 9/11 attack and much else. The day began like any other. But as the reports flowed in from New York and Washington, routine gave way to the exigencies of war: evacuating thousands of employees, hanging blackout curtains, moving key teams to emergency stations. Gen. Hayden recollects how, at day's end, he returned home to his wife, embraced her and wept as they absorbed what had happened to our country. _Playing to the Edge_ offers a full excursion through the contemporary challenges facing American intelligence, including cyber warfare, Russian aggression, and armed conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. But it also presents an intimate personal portrait -- an account of how its author came to be the man he is, someone who entered the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps while in college in the late 1960s, who reveres his hometown of Pittsburgh (and its Steelers), and who prays weekly in church for the souls of his twin sisters, who died at birth when he was a boy of 10. Naturally, given the years in which he held high office, much of Gen. Hayden's book is devoted to the battle against terrorists. He makes it plain from the outset that though intelligence-gathering is often in tension with liberty and the rule of law, its purpose is to protect both. The tension is most acute in the effort to counter terrorism, for the mission is apprehending a class of people with whom our judicial system is not designed to grapple: the "not-yet guilty." The NSA has sought to do such grappling in a number of ways, perhaps most controversially with Stellarwind, a program designed to track the U.S.-routed telephone calls of foreign terror suspects. In 2005, the New York Times disclosed the program's existence, igniting a political firestorm, with critics charging that Stellarwind amounted to warrantless wiretapping and that it was nearly worthless as an intelligence tool. Unsurprisingly, Gen. Hayden rejects both contentions. He walks readers through the legal issues, acknowledging that the administration's reasoning was, as in football, "playing to the edge". But he concludes, relying on the opinions of executive-branch lawyers and FISA-court judges, that the operation was within the president's constitutional authority as commander in chief. As for the program's effectiveness, Gen. Hayden harbors no doubts: Stellarwind, he writes, "uncovered illicit financing networks, detected suspect travel, discovered ties to aviation schools, linked transportation employees to associates of terrorists, drew connections to the illicit purchases of arms, tied U.S. persons to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and discovered a suspect terrorist on the no-fly list who was already in the United States." It was precisely the program's utility as a counterterrorism tool that made its disclosure by the Times so damaging. In general, the numerous unauthorized news leaks of the post-9/11 era, Gen. Hayden reports, led some key intelligence sources to clam up; others were captured and executed. He does not supply any specific details to back up such claims, presumably because the CIA would not permit him to do so. While arguing for maximum possible openness, Gen. Hayden observes that "espionage thrives in the shadows, and secrecy is an essential component of its success." Particularly galling to Gen. Hayden was a 2006 New York Times scoop that compromised a top-secret program to track terrorist finances. Three years later, the newspaper's editorial page was complaining that American intelligence was failing to halt what it described as "still a seemingly limitless stream of cash flowing to terrorist groups". Pointing to the hypocrisy on display -- the editorial was titled "Follow the Money" -- Gen. Hayden wryly comments: "Thanks for the suggestion." The larger picture that Gen. Hayden draws makes vivid the extraordinary range of challenges facing American intelligence and the high level of uncertainty that the work entails. A case study: Roughly a decade ago, American intelligence observed that Syria was erecting an elaborate structure in the desert near a town called al-Kibar. CIA analysts puzzled over it but were unable to divine its purpose, labeling it "enigmatic". It was only when "a liaison partner" -- probably Israeli intelligence (although Gen. Hayden does not identify it as such) -- provided detailed photographs that the CIA identified a nuclear reactor of North Korean design. Without local help, U.S. intelligence would have missed a Syrian nuclear-bomb development project. Israel destroyed the site in a bombing raid in 2007. The lesson that Gen. Hayden takes from the Syrian affair is sobering. "We chalked this one up as intelligence success, after a fashion," he writes. But he strongly intimates that it was really Israel's success -- and America's failure. More broadly, he says, Syrian behavior "went beyond our understanding". Extrapolating from this mixed record, Gen Hayden is pessimistic that American intelligence will fare well in tracking covert Iranian nuclear activity. If his pessimism is well-founded -- and there are few people more qualified to judge -- the surprise we experienced on 9/11 may be a prelude to a catastrophe of far greater dimensions.

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