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Re: [Cryptography] LibreSSL unaffected by DROWN
by grarpamp 03 Mar '16

03 Mar '16

On 3/2/16, Viktor Dukhovni <cryptography(a)dukhovni.org> wrote: > OpenSSL 1.1.0 (days away from beta), which does break compatibility > with 1.0.x, also removes SSLv2, and has many improvements that > LibreSSL does not. Neither is strictly better, there are surely > things that are better in LibreSSL than in OpenSSL 1.1.0. > > Theo is an avid marketer, the reality is a bit more complex. So then where is the link to an independant website which stays current and puts say Libre 2.2.[x] and Open 1.0.2[x] side by side in a feature / protocol / api review table?

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Re: [Cryptography] iPhone hardware attacks
by grarpamp 03 Mar '16

03 Mar '16

On 3/2/16, Perry E. Metzger <perry(a)piermont.com> wrote: > I keep wondering what the odds are that the NSA has no method > available to decap the chips within an iPhone and extract secret > keying material. I suspect they must be able to do that, even from one > of the more modern iPhones with hardware based security modules. If IBM can image and arrange single atoms, you can bet the NSA can do something as simple as ablate them. Got the shakes and cook a few extra along the way... no problem, chips still have much larger features. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IBM_(atoms) > The techniques for doing this sort of thing are both well known and in > the open literature. Even skilled amateurs manage such feats on older > hardware quite routinely -- I've personally witnessed chips being > decapped and put into university grade equipment for analysis. Given > the NSA's budget and mission, it seems highly, highly unlikely that > such methods are unavailable to them. > > This brings up another question. FBI officials have testified under > oath that there is no government agency that can extract such > information on their behalf. Is that very careful spin, willful > ignorance, or simple perjury? Doesn't matter, they just contract out to their good ole boys at IBM or their favorite university.

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fun with Tor
by Mirimir 02 Mar '16

02 Mar '16

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Just for fun, but maybe useful: Onion SSH Hosts for Login Chaining https://www.ivpn.net/privacy-guides/onion-ssh-hosts-for-login-chaining You too can chain multiple onion SSH logins, isolated by intervening multihop VPN links. Lots of latency and jitter, to annoy watchers. It hogs relays, I admit. But at least, there are no exit nodes involved. OpenVPN Onion VPS for Evading Discrimination Against Tor https://dbshmc5frbchaum2.onion/OpenVPN-Onion-VPS.html You look like typical VPN users. They get banned too. But you can easily change VPS. They're inexpensive. And again, there are no Tor exit nodes involved. Maybe there's a commercial opportunity here. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJW13IqAAoJEGINZVEXwuQ+aIoH/2eSqk9cDKqpkpdAgB0nx5Jt rptP3tkKxBjG9cZY8Pidy01vgtRGPx87/6nB7e8SABUugIrfct0uB6xaqfwjbfq6 bon3UsqImmd/jKZmOseGT4Z7nPweo7gk+cBrzCN/Wh8SCHv+bTe3EHU/au6hKs34 Xhm/ZWkERVl6+xWVny4OuIHn9qIpInilD09Sxm/KHCXa+cX5YfuLTN2l3WqJy4VP 03X3CeT7QVQEZZD85n5gjrmOOHY7DJ98NMikVygYvOqUeCxMhI0T9elrA3/akZ59 N/xMYXdhxJcgBx8zy7IQksYJpTIdB2QdvTnhuEpeMOrIcYh4vv1+h6X8DK+o/c4= =ezP3 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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zeronet.io
by grarpamp 02 Mar '16

02 Mar '16

https://www.reddit.com/r/trackers/comments/48d41h/play_worlds_first_serverl…

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Fwd: NSW. New cycling laws: One of the first bike riders hit with $319 fine for not wearing a helmet.
by Zenaan Harkness 02 Mar '16

02 Mar '16

Finally! For those who pine for the cozy safety of a modern democratic socialist nation, yes Australia is here for you. Razer (I think), your concerns about cycling safety have been answered in abundance, and are being enforced :D As folks round here already know, the government's right to legislate is absolute. At least now we'll bring appropriate pressure on all those irresponsible parents who fail to clip a helmet to their poor defenseless child as they hurtle off round the neighbourhood. Please, who will think of the children? The Australian government, that's who. And for those who have yet to experience the smallest of peaceful civil dissent or disobedience or peaceful political protest, and it's consequences, your protest will almost always be couched by the government solicitors as something like "The zero tolerance cycling safety laws are valid. They serve a legitimate object of government power, that is, the safety of its citizens." And so they strive, almost always successfully, to couch your case, not in terms of the rights you believe are unalienable, but in terms of the validity of their pathetic whining little bastard children of legislation making, the god almighty Statute Laws though shalt obey and praise the state! This "validity of the law" position that the govt takes is entirely deceptive: unless you really go into the depths of the invalidity of the government itself, the Australian states have given themselves catch-all power of "the power to pass any law for the good governance of the people." A loud and bombastic, indeed theatrical "OBJECTION!" is advised in such moments as the validity of the law is being raised and or pounded into your posterior... However! Hark, there is hope! The common law right has almost never been removed, and must be explicitly removed by an act for that common law right to be taken to be removed - the mere affirmation of a legislative power (e.g. for a concern of safety), in the guise of an almighty statute, does -not- by itself remove that common law right. Yes you heard me right. At least in Australia although the citation is forgotten just at the moment, this is the position of the High Court of Australia (HCA), comparable to SCOTUS. It's an intellectual deception the govt invariably runs against you and your dirty, dirty human rights, but you need to master this particular deception if you wish to prevail in the Australian courts on a common law civil liberties/ common law right legal ground. Oh, and you might also have to be willing to shoot up to the High Court on appeal. Which, unless you are bold enough to stand in front of the bench and speak your right by yourself, that is without a lawyer, barrister, solicitor or queens counsel (if you have a spare $80K lying around...), might be costly and/ or intimidating. And for those who -do- have the $80k just lying around, TAKE NOTICE: most legal representatives in -this- country will phrase -your- defence of the government's charge(s) against you (in your peaceful political protest), in terms of the validity of the law, thereby selling you out before you even get near enough to the HCA to realise you've been sold out because yes, "your" lawyer/barrister/etc asked the wrong damn question from the start, applying at each level of appeal, all the way to High Court where you case is resoundingly dismissed since "We find that this particular law is valid..." At that point it's too late to say wtf! Good luck, Zenaan ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Jim <jim.sovereign(a)optusnet.com.au> Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2016 19:17:01 +1100 Subject: NSW. New cycling laws: One of the first bike riders hit with $319 fine for not wearing a helmet. NSW's finest dropkick politicians have lost the plot again by imposing ridiculous fines against cyclists for victimless "offences." If stupidity was a criminal offence most Aussie politicians should be doing life in prison for multiple offences. Jim New cycling laws: One of the first bike riders hit with $319 fine for not wearing a helmet news.com.au Jim O’Rourke and Miles Godfrey, The Daily Telegraph March 2, 2016 Cyclist Ben Ackerley was fined for not wearing a helmet while riding his bike on the first day new cycling laws came into effect. Picture: Ross Schultz New cycling laws come into play Opinion: ‘New bike laws are a joke’ DESPITE the threat of the massive new fines for running red lights, not wearing helmets and riding dangerously, The Daily Telegraph witnessed cyclists continuing to flout the road rules. Ben Ackerley, who recently moved to Sydney from the United States, became possibly the first rider to be booked under the new fine regime. The restaurant manager from Darlinghurst was riding on Oxford St just before midday and was not wearing a helmet. Ben Ackerley was upset over being fined $319 for not wearing a helmet while riding his bike. Picture: Ross SchultzSource:News Corp Australia A police Highway Patrol officer on a motorcycle pulled Mr Ackerley over and hit him with the new $319 fine – up from just $71. “I’d just picked the bike up from the bike shop after getting it fixed,” he said. “It got wrecked in an accident with a taxi on Market St about three weeks ago. I knew about the no helmet laws but I was just riding about a mile and a half (1.6km) home. “I’ve just come from living in New York City. The cops there have got better things to do than worry about this sort of stuff.” Mr Ackerley said he may appeal for leniency. As part changes to cycling laws beginning Tuesday, fines for five offences have increased by up to 500 per cent. The $319 fine which Mr Ackerley said he may appeal, asking for leniency. Source: News Corp Australia As well as new fines for no wearing helmets, cyclists risk $425 fines for running a red light; riding dangerously and; not stopping at pedestrian crossings. Motorists who do not leave a 1m buffer between their vehicle and a bike when travelling up to 60km/h can be hit with a $319 fine and lose two demerit points. Those travelling more than 60km/h must leave a 1.5m space. During today’s morning peak, The Daily Telegraph saw riders shooting through on the red light at busy intersections along Oxford St, between Taylor Square at Darlinghurst and College St in the CBD. While the vast majority of cyclists kept to the left lane, some riders weaved among the traffic, coming less than a metre from vehicles moving slowly through the rush hour traffic. At the intersections with Flinders, Crown and Riley streets, a number of cyclists pushed to the front of the traffic queues stopped at red lights, leading to some distance issues between cars and bikes when the lights turned green. In Randwick, a number of cyclists were spotted riding in the middle lane of the three city-bound lanes, on Alison Rd. Ben Ackerley poses with his bike and his $319 fine. Picture: Ross Schultz Source: News Corp Australia Several weaved among the traffic even though a shared cycle/pedestrian path runs along the northern side of the road. On King St at Newtown, a rider, without a helmet, insisted on riding on the footpath. Along busy Bondi Rd at Bondi, several riders darted between vehicles slowing moving towards the city. Police could not confirm any other incidents of vehicle drivers being fined for not giving enough space to cyclists. On Monday, Traffic and Highway Patrol Commander John Hartley said his officers would use their discretion, but would book those who were obviously breaking the new laws. A spokesman for the police Highway Patrol said it had not scheduled a specific enforcement operation targeting cyclists to coincide with the first morning of the new laws. “Police, including our Motorcycle Response Teams, were undertaking their regular duties this morning,” the spokesman said. The government’s Transport Management Centre said it had not recorded any incidents involving cyclists during the morning peak. Bicycle NSW CEO Ray Rice said the majority of cyclists are keen to do the right thing and obey all road rules. While he strongly supports the new minimum passing distance rule, because it offers extra protection to riders, the cycling community is opposed to the increased fines and mandatory photo ID for bicycle riders. In the lead up to the law changes, Bicycle NSW handed a petition containing 10,000 signatures to the state government demanding the government immediately rescind the fine increases and photo ID sections of the legislation. Mr Rice said last month that regulation should be a last resort and described NSW as fast becoming Australia’s nanny state. Mr Rice said no other state has fines this high - and no other state will be introducing mandatory photo identification for bicycle riders. “These two measures do nothing to help the government achieve their aim of doubling the number of riders using bikes for transport,” he said. Mr Rice urged the government to mount a stronger and more sustained public education campaign to inform all road users of how the distance laws work. “We are just not getting the cut through required,” Mr Rice said. “But we know police are not going to be out there with a tape measure trying to work out the distance between cars and bikes.” The NRMA today said it supports the increase in fines. “We support the argument that cyclists should have to carry ID because what we know is that the overwhelming majority of cyclists do the right thing and this is targeting the ones who don’t,” spokesman Peter Khoury said. “They are putting their lives at risk and we don’t want that.” City of Sydney Liberal councillor Christine Forster said cyclists are road users so should be expected to obey the rules. “That should, I imagine, foster mutual respect among cyclists and drivers,” Ms Forster said. Originally published as The first cyclist hit with tough new laws http://www.news.com.au/national/nsw-act/news/new-cycling-laws-one-of-the-fi… -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- What the bell? New fines for cyclists a bloody joke news.com.au Matthew Dunn March 2, 2016 8:51am OPINION FOR as long as I can remember, I have been using a bicycle as my main source of transport. I love the feeling of doing something good for the environment and vastly improving my health and fitness levels at the same time. However, more than anything I love how much money I save using pedal power. Well, that was until New South Wales premier Mike Baird decided popping me $106 dollars for not having a bell on my bike was a good idea. This is just one of the many ridiculous new fines introduced today by the NSW Government, which appear to be a blatant attempt at revenue raising. Sorry, I shouldn’t be so cynical. Roads Minister Duncan Gay said the new laws were not targeting cyclists; they were targeting “risky behaviour”. Sh*t, I know not having a bell or horn on my bicycle is putting endless lives at risk. Without a bell, how would I ever be able to warn other pedestrians and road users that I am nearby? I should be ashamed at myself for acting with such reckless abandon. Please forgive me, Mr Gay. Oh wait, that’s right. I have this thing called a voice. You know that sound produced in a person’s larynx and uttered through the mouth, as speech or song. Yeah, that thing. NSW Police are making the world a better place catching this ruthless criminal riding with no bike helmet. Anyway, I am just sounding bitter. Surely there is a need to raise the fine for not wearing a helmet from $71 to $319, in order to match the penalty given to motorcyclists breaking the same law. It makes complete sense because we all know I am able to maintain the speed limits, while riding in the middle of heavy traffic. Oh, that’s right. It’s virtually impossible for me to match the power and speeds of a motorbike, even in the safe confines of a bicycle lane. Based on this justification, I am guessing there are some people in the NSW government that must have some powerful legs. Maybe they should sign up for the Commonwealth Games instead of worrying about making these changes to reduce “risky behaviours”. The next increase will see the fine for running a red light jumping from $71 to $425, so that it is equivalent to the penalty given to car drivers for the same offence. Seems fair, given a bicycle causes as much damage to the road infrastructure and emits as much pollution as a two-tonne vehicle. Plus, there is also the small fact that at many intersections bicycles are unable to trigger the traffic signal. It’s fine though, we will just sit there until a car comes up, so we can safely ride on. Don’t want to be partaking in “risky behaviour”. You boys were riding dangerously. Do you know what that means? No? Neither do we. There are also the dubious fines for “riding dangerously” which have increased from $71 to $425. What I want to know is precisely what constitutes “riding dangerously”. If I am facing fines of $425, it would be nice to know exactly what actions I need to avoid. In hoping to clear things up, I headed to the NSW Road Safety website for more information. Unfortunately, there are no specifics listed. I guess I just have to rely on the individual interpretations of police for what they define as riding dangerously. Seems really fair and totally justifiable. Oh, wait. This isn’t even to mention the heavy police presence expected to crack down on these laws. Don’t worry about solving crimes that are a real risk to community, you just put our tax payer money to good use and get dozens of police on the streets solving big issues, like people riding without bells. Why not let people take the risk themselves instead of babying them? And if you do need to fine people, surely there is no need to go to these extents. You should be implementing measures to get people to use alternate modes of transport, not making them scared to even leave the house. Wake up to yourself, NSW Government and get with the times. Continue the discussion on Twitter @mattydunn11 http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/motoring/nsw-has-introduced-ne… --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Chertoff Group's new 28-page report on Encryption
by grarpamp 01 Mar '16

01 Mar '16

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6HNnVcp6NYA ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Henry Baker <hbaker1(a)pipeline.com> Date: Tue, 01 Mar 2016 12:11:18 -0800 To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com FYI -- "The Ground Truth About Encryption, and The Consequences of Extraordinary Access" http://chertoffgroup.com/cms-assets/documents/238024-282765.groundtruth.pdf Abstract: U.S. policy makers are currently engaged in a debate regarding the merits of mandating a means of “extraordinary access” to encrypted data for U.S. law enforcement, what is sometimes referred to as an encryption “backdoor.” This paper examines modern encryption technologies, the feasibility of providing law enforcement with extraordinary access, the impact that encryption technology is currently having on U.S. law enforcement (which some have referred to as “going dark”), and the likely impacts that an extraordinary access requirement would have on U.S. national security, the technology sector, and continued innovation in the security field. We conclude that an extraordinary access requirement is likely to have a negative impact on technological development, the United States’ international standing, and the competitiveness of the U.S. economy and will have adverse long-term effects on the security, privacy, and civil liberties of citizens.

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Standard Operating Procedure 303
by Rayzer 01 Mar '16

01 Mar '16

On January 8 2016 the US Supreme Court will consider a petition for certiorari in the EPIC v. DHS "Standard Operating Procedure 303" FOIA suit. SOP 303 is also known as the 'National Emergency Wireless Kill-Switch' “Standard Operating Procedure 303,” is the protocol that codifies a “shutdown and restoration process for use by commercial and private wireless networks during national crisis.” Moreover, the justices are expected to clarify: “the scope of FOIA’s “Exemption 7(F),” which allows the government to withhold “records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information … could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.” The central question raised by Exemption 7(F) is whether the government has to be able to identify with any specificity the “individual” whose life or physical safety might be endangered by disclosure of the requested law enforcement records. In 2008, the Second Circuit answered that question in the affirmative in ACLU v. Dep’t of Defense. In its February 2015 decision affirming the government’s rejection of EPIC’s FOIA request, the D.C. Circuit held expressly to the contrary. As I explain in the post that follows, not only is this division of authority sufficiently important so as to justify the Supreme Court’s intervention no matter how the Court ultimately rules, but, in my view, the Second Circuit clearly has the better reading of Exemption 7(F) as a matter of statutory purpose, structure, and policy. I. The Second Circuit and the PNSDA The story begins with FOIA requests filed in 2003 by the ACLU and other organizations seeking records related to the treatment and death of detainees held in US custody overseas after September 11, and records related to the practice of “rendering” some of those detainees to countries known to use torture. The litigation over the ACLU’s request eventually reduced to a dispute over at least 29 (and perhaps thousands of) photographs of detainees and detainee abuse in Afghanistan and Iraq. In June 2006, the district court ordered the release of 21 of those photographs (with proper redactions to alleviate privacy objections), and the government appealed, arguing that the photographs were covered by Exemption 7(F) insofar as their release would likely incite violence against US personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq.” In full with links at Just Security https://www.justsecurity.org/28485/foia-circuit-split-supreme-court-resolve/ -- RR "You might want to ask an expert about that - I just fiddled around with mine until it worked..."

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Judge Orenstein denies USG motion to compel Apple decrypt
by John Young 29 Feb '16

29 Feb '16

Judge Orenstein denies USG motion to compel Apple decrypt. <https://t.co/3hx0rT40ja>https://cryptome.org/2016/02/usg-apple-edny-029.pdf This is older case than that in California but similar issues.

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Re: [cryptome] Re: FOIPA adventures
by coderman 29 Feb '16

29 Feb '16

two new for DOCSIS tech @FBI, @CIA: "Any and all "DOCSIS" technology records, including cross-references and indirect mentions, including records outside the investigation main file. This is to include a search of each of the following record stores and interfaces: the Central Records System (CRS), the Automated Case Support system ("ACS") Investigative Case Management system ("ICM"), the Automated Case Support system ("ACS") Electronic Case File ("ECF"), and the Automated Case Support system ("ACS") Universal Index ("UNI"). I also request a search of "ELSUR", the database containing electronic surveillance information, for any and all records or activities related to "DOCSIS" or "DOCSIS intercept" or "DOCSIS access" technology. In addition, please extend the search criteria across any external storage media, including I-Drives, S-Drives, or related technologies used during the course of investigation involving Cable internet data services. DITU experimental technologies or research also within scope of this request. Please include processing notes, even if request is denied in part. Please identify individuals responsible for any aspect of FOIA processing in the processing notes, along with explanation of their involvement if not typically assigned FOIA responsibilities for the record systems above." - https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/indocsis-19725/ "Any and all records, receipts, training, technology transfer programs, research, evaluation technologies, or other materials relevant to "DOCIS" cable communication technology. This is to include "DOCSIS 1.0", "DOCSIS 2.0", "DOCSIS 3.0", and other relevant DOCSIS protocols." - https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/indocsisxfer-19726/ On 7/12/15, coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On 7/12/15, Douglas Rankine <douglasrankine2001(a)yahoo.co.uk> wrote: >> Are they giving reasons for the rejections? > > Glomar all around. see also: > > "What Is the Big Secret Surrounding Stingray Surveillance?" > - > http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-the-big-secret-surroundin… > > --- > > What Is the Big Secret Surrounding Stingray Surveillance? > > State and local law enforcement agencies across the U.S. are setting > up fake cell towers to gather mobile data, but few will admit it > By Larry Greenemeier | June 25, 2015 > > > Stung: Law enforcement agencies sometimes use a device called a > stingray to simulate a cell phone tower, enabling them to gather > international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), location and other > data from mobile phones connecting to them. Pictured here is an actual > cell tower in Palatine, Ill. > > > Given the amount of mobile phone traffic that cell phone towers > transmit, it is no wonder law enforcement agencies target these > devices as a rich source of data to aid their investigations. Standard > procedure involves getting a court order to obtain phone records from > a wireless carrier. When authorities cannot or do not want to go that > route, they can set up a simulated cell phone tower—often called a > stingray—that surreptitiously gathers information from the suspects in > question as well as any other mobile device in the area. > > These simulated cell sites—which collect international mobile > subscriber identity (IMSI), location and other data from mobile phones > connecting to them—have become a source of controversy for a number of > reasons. National and local law enforcement agencies closely guard > details about the technology’s use, with much of what is known about > stingrays revealed through court documents and other paperwork made > public via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. > > One such document recently revealed that the Baltimore Police > Department has used a cell site simulator 4,300 times since 2007 and > signed a nondisclosure agreement with the FBI that instructed > prosecutors to drop cases rather than reveal the department’s use of > the stingray. Other records indicate law enforcement agencies have > used the technology hundreds of times without a search warrant, > instead relying on a much more generic court order known as a pen > register and trap and trace order. Last year Harris Corp., the > Melbourne, Fla., company that makes the majority of cell site > simulators, went so far as to petition the Federal Communications > Commission to block a FOIA request for user manuals for some of the > company’s products. > > The secretive nature of stingray use has begun to backfire on law > enforcement, however, with states beginning to pass laws that require > police to obtain a warrant before they can set up a fake cell phone > tower for surveillance. Virginia, Minnesota, Utah and Washington State > now have laws regulating stingray use, with California and Texas > considering similar measures. Proposed federal legislation to prevent > the government from tracking people’s cell phone or GPS location > without a warrant could also include stingray technology. > > Scientific American recently spoke with Brian Owsley, an assistant > professor of law at the University of North Texas Dallas College of > Law, about the legal issues and privacy implications surrounding the > use of a stingray to indiscriminately collect mobile phone data. Given > the invasive nature of the technology and scarcity of laws governing > its use, Owsley, a former U.S. magistrate judge in Texas, says the > lack of reliable information documenting the technology’s use is > particularly troubling. > > > [An edited transcript of the interview follows.] > > When and why did law enforcement agencies begin using international > cell site simulators to intercept mobile phone traffic and track > movement of mobile phone users? > > Initially, intelligence agencies—CIA and the like—couldn’t get local > or national telecommunications companies in other countries to > cooperate with U.S. surveillance operations against nationals in those > countries. To fill that void companies like the Harris Corp. started > creating cell site simulators for these agencies to use. Once Harris > saturated the intelligence and military markets [with] their products, > they turned to federal agencies operating in the U.S. So the [Drug > Enforcement Administration], Homeland Security, FBI and others started > having their own simulated cell sites to use for surveillance. > Eventually this trickled down further to yet another untapped market: > state and local law enforcement. That’s where we are today in terms of > the proliferation of this technology. > > > Under what circumstances do U.S. law enforcement agencies use cell > site simulators and related technology? > > There are three examples of how law enforcement typically use > stingrays for surveillance: First, law enforcement officials may use > the cell site simulator with the known cell phone number of a targeted > individual in order to determine that individual's location. For > example, officials are searching for a fugitive and have a cell phone > number that they believe the individual is using. They may operate a > stingray near areas where they believe that the individual may be, > such as a relative's home. > > Second, law enforcement officials may use the stingray to target a > specific individual who is using a cell phone, but these officials do > not know the cell phone number. They follow the targeted individual > from a site to various other locations over a certain time period. At > each new location, they activate the stingray and capture the cell > phone data for all of the nearby cell phones. After they have captured > the data at a number of sites they can analyze the data to determine > the cell phone or cell phones used by the targeted individual. This > approach captures the data of all nearby cell phones, including > countless cell phones of individuals unrelated to the criminal > investigation. > > Third, law enforcement officials have been known to operate stingray > at political rallies and protests. Using the stingray at these types > of events captures the cell phone data of everyone in attendance. > > > How does law enforcement get permission to perform this type of > surveillance? > > Federal law enforcement agencies typically get courts to approve use > of something like stingray through a pen register application [a pen > register is a device that records the numbers called from a particular > phone line]. With that type of application, essentially the government > says, we want this information. We think it’s going to be relevant to > an ongoing criminal investigation. As you can imagine, that’s a pretty > low bar for them to satisfy in the eyes of the court. Just about > anything could fit into that description. You don’t even have to show > that such an investigation would lead to an arrest or prosecution. Law > enforcement is telling the court, look, we’re in the middle of this > investigation. If we get this information, we think it might lead to > some other important information. > > Different court orders have different standards for approval. The > highest standard would be for a wiretap. A search warrant likewise has > a much higher standard than a pen register, requiring law enforcement > to prove probable cause before a judge will grant permission to use > additional means of investigation. The problem that I have with a pen > register to justify use of something like a stingray is that the > standard for a pen register is much too low, given the invasive nature > of a pen register. Instead, I think the use of a stingray should be > consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and pursuant > to a search warrant. > > > Why not explicitly state the type of technology being used and its > specific purpose when filing for a court order? > > [When] law enforcement agencies seek to obtain judicial authorization > through a pen register, they do not directly indicate that they are > applying for authorization to use a stingray. Doing so might cause > some courts to question whether the pen register statute [as opposed > to some higher standard] is the appropriate basis for authorizing a > stingray. In addition, law enforcement agencies typically have to sign > nondisclosure agreements with Harris Corp. in order to receive the > federal Homeland Security funding needed to purchase the technology. > So there’s this concern, at least at the local law enforcement level, > about revealing any information about it because that would violate > the agreement with Harris and maybe subject them to losing the > equipment or some other consequences. > > > Why would law enforcement agencies sign a nondisclosure agreement with > a technology company? > > I’m not sure whether the agreements are being driven by the FBI or by > Harris, but these agreements seem to be getting less relevant insofar > as [there is less] need to keep the public unaware of the existence of > this technology. In the last three or so years there’s been a lot more > awareness about the technology and its use. When agencies were first > signing these agreements years ago, use of this technology wasn’t > widely known. Now you are getting situations where criminal defense > attorneys learn about stingray and similar technologies and the role > they may be playing in the arrests of some of their clients. Defense > teams are starting to ask questions and require the government to > produce documentation such as court orders, and that’s creating the > confrontation you’re now seeing. > > > Why have law enforcement agencies kept their use of cell site > simulators so secretive? > > Some of it is the cloudy legal issues surrounding the legitimate uses > of this technology. Law enforcement agencies will also argue that the > more information that’s available about this technology, the harder it > is for them to use these devices to fight crime. Yet there’s a growing > knowledge of this technology, and a serious criminal enterprise is > already aware of it. People are already using prepaid disposable > phones [sometimes referred to as “burner phones”] to some extent to > defeat this technology. Sophisticated criminals are aware that there’s > electronic surveillance out there in myriad ways, and so they’re going > to take precautions. From a technology perspective, it’s sort of a > cat-and-mouse game. There’s also a device that locates cell site > simulators, something referred to as an IMSI catcher. There’s an arms > race back and forth to get the best technology and to get the edge. > > > What does it say to you about the whole process that a prosecutor or a > law enforcement agency is willing to sacrifice a conviction in order > to keep their methods a secret? > > I think it’s a very odd approach. You are throwing away some > convictions or potential convictions for the sake of secrecy. But it’s > even harder to understand now that knowledge of the technology is > becoming so common. There have been documented cases in Baltimore and > Saint Louis where stingray has supposedly been used. The use of > stingray and related technologies is a roll of the dice in the sense > that law enforcement is hoping that either the defense attorneys don’t > have enough savvy or wherewithal to find out about the technology and > ask the right questions or, even if that does happen, they’re hoping > that the judge that they have is favorable to their approach and not > going to order them to reveal information about its use. In the rare > occasions when things go against them, they just dismiss it. > > > You yourself denied a law enforcement application three years ago to > use a stingray. Under what circumstances would you approve its use? > > I want to make clear: I don’t have a problem with stingray itself—I > understand that this can be a valuable tool in law enforcement’s > arsenal. My problem is that I want it to be used pursuant to a high > standard of proof that it’s needed, and that I want the approval > process to be more transparent. One of the reasons I’d like to see > some more documentation of stingray applications and orders is because > I have this suspicion—but there’s no way of confirming it one way or > another—that some judges are signing approvals to use this technology > thinking that they’re just signing a pen register. If a judge thinks > it’s [just] another pen register application, they’re just going to > sign it without giving it much pause. > > > Now that the use of this stingrays and related technologies has been > made public, where will this issue be a year or a few years from now? > > A year from now I think we’re in the same position. You’re dealing > with outdated statutes concerning new and very different technology. > It’s possible in five years maybe that Congress will step in and do > something. More likely, state legislatures will take most of the > action to monitor this type of surveillance. Washington State, > California [and others] have already acted, and Texas is evaluating > the standards for approving stingray use. >

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'Weapon of Mass Transparency': a Script to FOIA the Files of 7,000 Dead FBI Officials
by Michael Best 29 Feb '16

29 Feb '16

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