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'Weapon of Mass Transparency': a Script to FOIA the Files of 7,000 Dead FBI Officials
by Michael Best 29 Feb '16

29 Feb '16

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/an-activist-michael-best-wrote-a-script-to… http://that1archive.neocities.org/tools/FBIOFFICIALS.csv http://that1archive.neocities.org/tools/FOIA%20bash%20FBI - NOTE: use a text editor to replace "FIRST NAME LAST NAME" etc with your information before executing and verify the code before running the bash script -- Veritas aequitas liberabit vos Veri universum vici That 1 Archive <http://that1archive.neocities.org/> @NatSecGeek <https://twitter.com/NatSecGeek> -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: SKS 1.1.5 Comment: Hostname: pgp.mit.edu mQINBChG9zoBEADKzALG4UHCjY6L9OFUxWRVGGCW7LY71K2EAK/0jkRh1wPkJ4chPaVJ3vVD nJ0d8HxsyR5R3+y7GH6GCc/tK0IDPJah+xpQnraS1nWUvAlSaaxsBK4hJfuVGyfBg/joQVKU OhpqJLQhRIkUWk30QC94IbOKiCTb6V4pStLYyrLieewjT481vvRIYp/48IS5eiveZW0/IpcA HBON7xJw6P1murC8PNOJSWRCp9FJhcs3wIPG3cFTfsxSZnGcoivMgFLtGAfLbztpZkcHEMOR 4qamVvirzYGHma0UlOzyNr7xpxyLXFsU5kKzQ8Az2nP1GG7vuqXSjPNLIvvHFL+g+gKuCe9W xTa9Ac038RRSiBGdDrvTFpQ/h9h5GWIHP7nsA4TCeZSpL81aqp7Cb0MK3KPQmteTPIujVCnx jXXHrOe9Tj6iYUU8edApISyBEVFZMd+EtfDEDf/ZwDjzSGE85vv1dZ/ck7iJvS8FwM8hsRBG U9huCKiItGs26teUJ2Sum49YaEiDL4QLQhJ+FbsAusxJg+V3GE/4w75K/6/czT0p10Mf66Uo fRFTvYRE7S6CNDxzTI4q7+pnRlxMBduGC33KY4eq4Py/O3LWHBDxZ+LffIa/tWcB/7oZ6yDo bdWleNk5wnJdPGr6lUTHTM4tpDIEcXYpvjzyLcMtg4tFm/Dc0QARAQABtGVNaWNoYWVsIEJl c3QgKFByaXZhdGUsIG5vdCBzZWN1cmUuIEZvciBzZWN1cmUgZW1haWwsIHJlcXVlc3QgYSBv bmUtdGltZSBrZXkuKSA8dGhlbWlrZWJlc3RAZ21haWwuY29tPokCPQQTAQoAJwUCKEb3OgIb AwUJNXc1AAULCQgHAwUVCgkICwUWAgMBAAIeAQIXgAAKCRCiYH9hY4dAS3e+D/sFwyJER4/4 ZnHYC/1EzCpHeDikSmULEgsvNgzo73thOV9/Q2I8mCJTlQjsK4rZ2YiDzi4b0CN8kzjpxtVz BsBsxfyPLrdH4VoqeqeBVzbwHxSk7bYUI3vFt+e3gBgpAxbVfPXCnYUnWPRlr9dc/JZoPJH4 p8yRIqktehbAE3Fa3gkfrXJ5e6+/nKlQhikyvo9VuErrLpPMXBzOq4/2LVfurkcOzlp1RBjs hWr6B98EiOXs44ZGLEkINxJiW8koFhw/WDuON8LKi/DtLiqqtBVTjrkqKCuKzSAVncGGcEVO 3Om3aOIOvG0do/wQKYXnpbeGsHwx2PGrJ7H+lb2bIb5KhbZkbG4rMTjsVnuGN+IF4BxBhmGz MYoooWy4VCLL0o8keomU8JPXt+fZDqJ9sNjY/asTsjOa6aE3bIa6w3mWUeefGwA25oXur3Rr L3wmu1pPzCejumfA1X93dS9UZS3xni+7W34g6YbsREuaZ+YBxFLN227JXAx2pEdjLsuVOaqM 9CO7ARHsxDZoE9U7n0s3txnSw/2YYwjEK1wDhdLnHBL3ZzaAcaHnpzsTYQAVW7uXKKHhzeSK GP3O4ByCisM/7WLFvIIpaNNs85jI1PvKH0GutSTl9xXDfWuYMl9rwwbteBB/oGSxlIFe0pqq IDNfAJdR/HjTLqrTES2wdXJS1bkCDQQoRvc6ARAAmltXrhVfpePdIFrfEHCet4nkQvmRI+AX rUgiNlxQDW8M5FzlUfT2xpMXHMWuKehTYpFq7bNbFi+fwBhMajgvgDsTuLInftKSFp+sisbR n8psv7CpGB4jp0Xd4y1Wm/HejV/kga0kcUVVetaqyzgZedn1UnccQRzDBVWW2j2ed+hi/8g0 /d7mbVG81yzJo8tLidM90xFF7JGlijm0dBAqmhD4UgkxSnJQ3PK5onqdjdbx7HkP68RrkeTQ vhWK1978qzdSl9ljJ0jLnoAaDNPs5Dj/TyYCtqoKHUqMbTwU5nIQnJG7geMeSw/7OVnKlypF Rs/JesZzMBooZTRxZJuIB/q0wOfE/MYTwGSwLs2brUwJFJ6bSYmerZ+81S8W/Y4mehJ3o6Vl SabrrVN+LlBfUuRqd5U909WECzk6HVnwnRfL07zD+1y5cLU+e4MQs2227kLriTIxtDZ/umeG hKQgNgFGTAPHJxA96xGvQ8Ovv+XEivlO0jxBNMIiopNSlMDE+k3nigWHuavt9LUUCOd45aw7 0pgKstQQgpFfVAwV98LPpUKxa61q6wQiQHAcP7YxuQG0dsr4nUq2xids5l1IpOLzZJ3nRThM k7alkljBbqphbocV3FsSXOkpcSWns94k1QGmrPzEPLF0FHFBG6whWoaoEySMkdsN1zVu4GMU o2EAEQEAAYkCJQQYAQoADwUCKEb3OgIbDAUJNXc1AAAKCRCiYH9hY4dASzTaEACKXVgc8KmZ xWyYTUQgIwrj3J/re68uIilq0iBBDocgEZZpxyf6lD1V3IKBjAPpWyYHMrrrLY64rFDR+8DE Xyhm1Wv2S6YJuWJtyAlS4bciXjJE6evirIH5GoFq++vzsufRaudAoQ56hJ0+Z3dNMMWZ6YuP zWNNL2tvpdo3Nvd8bqiADWSffFdIPv5Yj/mZsXmaDN+7iWYlAdCrubGyGzFHlCh26Ghu6SS0 /u8x1/Oi7ma7fUMFnEsFiYjwBkD3pQKK1dm7j2f1OMxi8uky8vgBgx40aeJkoUgEvIHWsCIi CWVTyfiGeWIcKbK7tYP5jsjV5fUv+TaQ1pApt++Pyop1aogfQ8icNBQQkdX6E4gNhnPOPTM8 FTl69Tq5Ori5+TM8VM0iPGiydlcAXIAD3OyR4tZM12Ga1AtppKjx31EyDB4SPzUmDWRy5WgG NRH3+RgiK/iXVcvLdFIKj3/AvctSLdbayyaFD8zrE/wcMzLfie+iE231+rG/7gmcR3H1rcYE vxvmWAPikLQKiMUpPBNSvfLPUTrwNSGiZ5ieAAPgOooc3u5nohwZmEW1pg6HirZgIAgAYuyL aLgnikwH70guiQ4Ufsih3gy0ddsUwliUTtbYQyX0OBQoTUyaiXPy0Wu2FJfsxiW8X9Lu9pIH KOwU9K76VKot+UikGqeFQsS/Ig== =M+du -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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"ODNI trying to sneak through attack on MDR"
by Michael Best 29 Feb '16

29 Feb '16

$72 an hour fees, $0.50/page for copies http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=ODNI-2016-0001-0001 https://twitter.com/NSANate/status/704313004263870465 -- Veritas aequitas liberabit vos Veri universum vici That 1 Archive <http://that1archive.neocities.org/> @NatSecGeek <https://twitter.com/NatSecGeek>

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The Natseckers
by John Young 28 Feb '16

28 Feb '16

DoJ is required to cloak NSA-CIA capabilities by pretending full sharing does not take place. Redacted and excluded filings and decisions by DoJ, district, appeal, SCOTUS and FISA courts along with open and classified executive orders by and POTUS, and best of all, classified contracts, implements this. In olden days there was a fairy-land time when NSA-CIA were required to cull, select and "minimize" (except in wartime and emergencies) their take and capabilities with FBI and law enforcement, but no longer, the Patriot Act Dr Zeuss loosened the ties that never bound. Going to court melodramatizes and sanitizes the bung-holing (like USG v. Apple) with in camera, withholding, stonewalling and denying. It should be understood, Dear Dummies, that lawyers, security clearance holders, corporations, NGOs and and greeders who assist and abet spying understand how to play this rigged game to keep the public "safe and secure" in blissful passivity. Encryption, necessarily quietly compromised for dependable marketability, has always been a formulaic-algorithmic Faustian character in the comsec-infosec charade where official secrecy triumphs over chaotic rabble-empowering democracy. This big-budget high-profit Broadway performance is called "The Natseckers." At 08:06 PM 2/27/2016, you wrote: >isn't there supposed to be "sharing" when it comes to terrorism. >patriot act & such. > >Sent: Friday, February 26, 2016 at 2:15 PM From: "John Young" ><jya(a)pipeline.com> To: "Henry Baker" <hbaker1(a)pipeline.com>, >cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org, cryptome(a)freelists.org, >cryptography(a)metzdowd.com, cryptography(a)randombit.net Subject: Re: >[cryptography] [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate >Decrypt Order >At 11:13 AM 2/26/2016, Henry Baker wrote: >If this interpretation of >the All Writs Act is upheld, then the DOJ >will have to consult with >the intelligence community prior to >compelling companies like Apple >to decrypt phones. It would be quite >interesting for DOJ to >publicly stipulate that NSA could (or could >not) break into iOS 8 >or 9. This is truly a sticky wicket, since the >intelligence >community is generally prohibited from working on >domestic issues. >We asked for an opinion of Michael Froomkin, Law Professor at >University of Miami, on Henry Baker's comments: ><https://cryptome.org/2016/02/can-spies-break-apple-crypto.htm>https://cryptome.org/2016/02/can-spies-break-apple-crypto.htm >_______________________________________________ cryptography mailing >list cryptography(a)randombit.net ><http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography>http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

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OFFSystem
by grarpamp 28 Feb '16

28 Feb '16

On 2/25/16, Jerry Leichter <leichter(a)lrw.com> wrote: >> So let me understand: exactly *where* is my data? >> >> If I have a file full of random numbers in country #1 and another file >> full of random numbers in country #2 and another file full of random >> numbers in country #3 and so on, so I guess my "data" is in *all* of the >> countries. >> >> But only I know the function that will transform the data stored in all of >> these countries into a form that might actually be useful, so my "data" is >> also in *none* of the countries. > Congratulations. You've rediscovered the argument every kiddie comes up > with to protect themselves from copyright lawsuits: I don't actually have > your protect music on my server. I have a bunch of random numbers. So does > my friend across the street. It happens that if you XOR the two together > you get the music, but neither of us actually has your music.... > > It's nonsense. You're acting as if judges were idiots. They're not. > > If you encrypt your stuff locally before putting it in the cloud, and hold > the key yourself, you're protected against anything the cloud provider can > do. They can only deliver what they have (encrypted text that neither they > nor the government can read), not what they don't have (the corresponding > plaintext.) This is much safer than any hacks for spreading the stuff > around. > > Add integrity checks if you're concerned about modification attacks. Use > replicas and error correction to deal with failures of individual replicas. > > The rest is just noise. > -- Jerry https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OFFSystem http://offsystem.sourceforge.net/ Add https if you're concerned to make it better.

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Data storage for billions of years
by Cari Machet 28 Feb '16

28 Feb '16

https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/02/this-tiny-disc-can-preserve-human-hi…

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German BND targeted EU Rep Ashton and SecState Kerry
by Michael Best 28 Feb '16

28 Feb '16

http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bundesnachrichtendienst-hoerte-of… Sent from my iPhone

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Time for p2p, content addressed, pre-emptively cached web pages - Tor Project Accuses CloudFlare of Mass Surveillance, Sabotaging Traffic
by Zenaan Harkness 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

Perhaps someone can design something to counteract the CIA and NSA's Cloudflare tool? Evidently we need a better way to read our news and blogs. Cloudflare is getting to pervasive. http://yro.slashdot.org/story/16/02/26/1816211/tor-project-accuses-cloudfla… Tor Project Accuses CloudFlare of Mass Surveillance, Sabotaging Traffic >From the men-in-the-middle department An anonymous reader writes: Tensions are rising between Tor Project administrators and CloudFlare, a CDN and DDoS mitigation service that's apparently making the life of Tor users a living hell. Tor administrators are saying that CloudFlare is...

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Millennials' Dream Job
by John Young 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/28/magazine/the-new-dream-jobs.html No. 1 Google No. 4 Apple No. 5 FBI No. 8 CIA No. 19 NSA "The high ranking of national-security employers also speaks to millennials' hope to make a difference in the world."

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Michael Hayden's Treasonous Espionage
by John Young 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

Michael Hayden's Treasonous Espionage https://www.amazon.com/review/R18T6ASRBEC8Y3/ref=cm_cr_rdp_perm?ie=UTF8&ASI…

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Re: [cryptography] Apple's refusal, crypto wars shifting to OS/device wars
by John Young 27 Feb '16

27 Feb '16

It's good to see The Intercept and others smell a rat with the fake fight between Apple and the USG (hardly only the FBI). Crediting Snowden and his flacks with this phony crypto war is a bit much, though, opposition to government instrusions around the world have been persistent for decades, especially against the ever increasing digital violations and forever failing protections against them. "Strong crypto is hard to do while making it easy for users." What is most needed from the Snowden 90% still-secret wad are defenses against the USG now that alarms have been repeatedly clanged about redacted and incomplete offenses. Most peculiar that almost no defensive measures have been released, although Snowden may have insisted on not releasing those as threats to US national security. Snowden's alleged demand that outlets check with USG before releases to assure no national harm is institutionalized in national security reporting, but is also required by fear of prosecution of outlets and their investors such as Omidyar, Slim, Bezo, all the major media. Withholding the 90% of Snowden material which he claims was given to the public, is damnable betrayal of the public for monetary and professional benefits. In this way the Snowden material has been handled like the USG handles it, as if it is owned by the handlers, not by the ones who paid for it. It would not be off-base to accuse the Snowden handlers of what Apple and the USG are doing, engaging in a fake fight "in the public interest" for pecuniary gain. Privacy and civil liberties are being peddled as commercial products, cheered yesterday by Apple investors. The DNI's Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is as much a marketing scam as the American Civil Liberties Union, same kind of people populate both, testify in Congress, meet with POTUS, work the lecture circuit. At 11:05 AM 2/27/2016, you wrote: >John Young wrote: > USG is not USA. Apple is not >its buyers. USG v Apple is not about citizens >and privacy. It's about secretkeepers against >the public. Therefore, except for members of >âthe publicâ who have no secrets (no credit >card PINs, no private medical conditions, no >private relationships, no private future plans, >no private original ideas, no private and >unpopular political views, etc.), âitâs >about secretkeepersâ against themselves? I >suppose then we should all file amicus briefs on >both sides? John Young wrote: > Govs may concede >crypto public protection to assure other means >remain effective. Promoting public crypto as a >cloak appears to be the campaign underway, now >as in the 1990s, so beguiling to crypto >advocates to claim a win (for the >industry-org-edu to continue doing openly and >secretly what it does best). This has been >addressed previously and yesterday by an article >at The Intercept. >https://theintercept.com/2016/02/26/fbi-vs-apple-post-crypto-wars/ > > After the 2013 Snowden revelations, as >mainstream technology companies started >spreading encryption by putting it in popular >consumer products, the wars erupted again. Law >enforcement officials, led by FBI Director James >Comey, loudly insisted that U.S. companies >should build backdoors to break the encryption >just for them. > > That wonât happen because >what these law enforcement officials are asking >for isnât possible (any backdoor can be used >by hackers, too) and wouldnât be effective >(because encryption is widely available globally >now). Theyâve succeeded in slowing the spread >of unbreakable encryption by intimidating tech >companies that might otherwise be rolling it out >faster, but not much else. > > Indeed, as almost >everyone else acknowledges, unbreakable >encryption is here to stay. > > Tech privacy >advocates continue to remain vigilant about >encryption, actively pointing out the >inadequacies and impossibilities of the >anti-encryption movement, and jumping on any >sign of backsliding. > > But even as they have >stayed focused on defending encryption, the >government has been shifting its focus to >something else. > > The ongoing, very public >dispute between Apple and the FBI, in fact, >marks a key inflection point at least as far >as the puublicâs understanding of the >issue. > > You might say weâre entering the >Post-Crypto phase of the Crypto Wars. Think >about it: The more we learn about the FBIâs >demand that Apple help it hack into a >password-protected iPhone, the more it looks >like part of a concerted, long-term effort by >the government to find new ways around >unbreakable encryption rather than try to >break it. Withoutt Ed Snowdenâs >whistle-blowing, Glenn Greenwaldâs, Laura >Poitrasâ and Ewen MacAskillâs journalism, >reporting by the Intercept and by the Washington >Postâs Bart Gellman, and Appleâs refusal, >âthe publicâ would not be discussing this at >all. >_______________________________________________ >cryptography mailing list >cryptography(a)randombit.net >http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

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