May 2015 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Re: "Blackphone" said to be "a super-secure nsa-proof"
by Ulex Europae 14 Oct '16

14 Oct '16

At 05:25 AM 1/17/2014, Jim Bell forwarded: ><<http:///>http://www.yahoo.com/tech/startup-launching-a-super-secure-nsa-proof-735110…> It's been long enough, has anyone acquired one of these and tested it? Ulex

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Re: [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked
by Eugen Leitl 07 Sep '16

07 Sep '16

----- Forwarded message from Brian Gladman <brg(a)gladman.plus.com> ----- Date: Sat, 07 Sep 2013 09:33:28 +0100 From: Brian Gladman <brg(a)gladman.plus.com> To: Cryptography Mailing List <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com> Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130801 Thunderbird/17.0.8 On 07/09/2013 01:48, Chris Palmer wrote: >> Q: "Could the NSA be intercepting downloads of open-source encryption software and silently replacing these with their own versions?" > > Why would they perform the attack only for encryption software? They > could compromise people's laptops by spiking any popular app. Because NSA and GCHQ are much more interested in attacking communictions in transit rather than attacking endpoints. Endpoint attacks cost more to undertake, only give access to a limited amount of data and involve much greater risks that their attack will either be discovered or their means of attack will leave evidence of what they have done and how they have done it. The internal bueaucratic costs of gaining approval for (adverarial) endpoint attacks also makes it a more costly process than the use of network based interception. There is significant use of open source encryption software in end to end encryption solutions, in file archivers, in wifi and network routers, and in protecing the communications used to manage and control such components when at remote locations. The open source software is provided in source code form and is compiled from source in a huge number of applications and this means that the ability to covertly substitute broken source code could provide access to a huge amount of traffic without the risks involved in endpoint attacks. I stress that I am NOT suggesting that this has happened (or is happening), simply that it has attractions from an NSA/GCHQ viewpoint. Fortunately, I think it is a difficult attack to mount covertly (that is, without the acqiecience of the author(s) of the software in question). On the more general debate here, in my view, 'security for the masses' through the deployment of encryption is a 'pipe dream' that isn't going to happen. Functionality (and the complexity that comes with it) is the enemy of security and it is very clear that the public places a much higher value on functionality than it does on security (or privacy). Every time a new device comes onto the market, it starts with limited functionality and some hope of decent security but rapidly evolves to be a high functionality product in which the prospect of decent security declines rapidly to zero. Raspberry Pis look interesting _now_ but I would be willing to bet that they won't buck the trend of increasing funtionality and declining security simply because this is what the majority in even this limited user community will want. To buck this trend we need an effort like the Raspberry Pi effort but one driven by our community with a strong commitment to simplicty and deliberately limited functionality in both hardware and software. Brian Gladman _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [liberationtech] Interesting things in keyservers
by Eugen Leitl 17 Aug '16

17 Aug '16

----- Forwarded message from micah <micah(a)riseup.net> ----- Date: Sat, 20 Jul 2013 10:05:42 -0400 From: micah <micah(a)riseup.net> To: Micah Lee <micahflee(a)riseup.net>, 'liberationtech' <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Interesting things in keyservers User-Agent: Notmuch/0.15.2 (http://notmuchmail.org) Emacs/24.3.1 (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Hi Micah! Micah Lee <micahflee(a)riseup.net> writes: > I'm working on a talk for OHM2013 about PGP. Can anyone send me examples > of interesting keys in key servers that you know of? Since you are preparing a talk about the subject, I'm going to be pedantic and correct your usage of "PGP", because it is important to get your terminology straight when giving a talk. I presume you aren't giving a talk about the commercial software, but instead you are actually giving a talk about OpenPGP which is the standard specified by RFC4880 that different programs like GnuPG, Seahorse, MacGPG, and PGP etc. all implement. If that is true, then you should refer to it as OpenPGP, and not PGP. I dont know what your talk will consist of, besides the funny enigmail XSS and goatse.cx stuff (thanks for that! always good to have some goatse early in the morning), but I would like to point out a few things that might be useful to mention. One is a wiki page that I created with some people: https://we.riseup.net/riseuplabs+paow/openpgp-best-practices - it contains some useful hints about using OpenPGP, maintaining a good key and some general good practices that people often dont know about (such as the importance of keeping your keys updated to get critical revocation and expiration extension certifications!) One thing mentioned on that page that I wanted to highlight, because you used pgp.mit.edu links in your original email, is that the keyserver pgp.mit.edu is not a good one to use/promote. Everyone uses it as their 'goto' keyserver, but it is a really bad idea! As a keyserver, it has been broken for years. For a long time it was just dropping revocations, subkey updates and expirations on the floor. That is *really* bad. Eventually, they upgraded their keyserver software, but it is *still* running an older version of SKS, a version that fails to handle 16-digit subkeyid lookups (among other failings). So, please don't rely on pgp.mit.edu for your security, and please don't include them in your slides! If you are looking for one to use, I highly recommend using the SKS pool address (hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net or http://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net/ - or if you want a more close geographical pool, have a look at http://sks-keyservers.net/overview-of-pools.php) Finally, there seems to be some amazing misconceptions about keyservers, keys and the web of trust. In particular this http://cryptome.org/2013/07/mining-pgp-keyservers.htm circulated recently and it pained me to see because it suggested various wreckless conclusions that were dangerously off the mark[0] (and used pgp.mit.edu, hah). While it is true that we've jokingly called the OpenPGP web of trust "the original social network" because of the exposed social relational graphing that can be done by querying keyservers, and it is for this reason that many activists I know do not want to have signatures uploaded to keyservers (and instead use the bulky local-only signature work-around)... ... but for some reason people seem to think that if it is on a keyserver, is true, or it means something that it doesn't. People don't realize critical things, such as the fact that I can create a key with the UID Nadim Kobeissi and upload it to the keyservers[1]. That doesn't mean that is the real Nadim's key (this is what exchanging key fingerprints and doing certifications is for, so you can know, with a certain degree of certainty, that this person is the person who controls that secret key material). Or people think that because I signed your key and that signature is on the keyserver that indicates: I trust you; we met in person at that date; we know each other; we are involved in a criminal conspiracy with each other; or many other wrong assumptions about what that certification means. I can sign Edward Snowden's key and send that to the keyservers[1]. Hell, I can sign Snowden's key with my fake Nadim Kobeissi key[1] and then send it to the keyservers. Does that mean that Nadim and Snowden have met in person?! No, it does not at all. Anyways, I can keep going... but I dont know what the focus of your OHM talk is about, so going on like this isn't particularly useful to you and your talk... however, I'd be happy to provide more feedback about your talk if you would like![2] After all, we Micahs need to stick together, micah 0. "the cryptome article just sounds like impenetrable bullshit from someone with no interest in actually understandning what's happening" - I'm not saying who said this... 1. no, I didn't do that, nor did I upload the edward snowden or bradly manning keys. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor
by John Young 16 Dec '15

16 Dec '15

Der Spiegel released largest single day number of Snowden docs today, 666 pages, on NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-documents-attacks-on-vpn-ssl-… We offer a RAR of the 44 docs: http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-spiegel-14-1228.rar (197MB)

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FOIPA adventures
by coderman 21 Aug '15

21 Aug '15

"you want me to consent to make my FBI file public? Are you fucking mad?" - https://twitter.com/thegrugq/status/563036665837789184 --- i am currently making requests through MuckRock.com which i recommend for their helpful and dedicated staff, as well as their time devoted to review and reporting on released information. i am using the professional service, which lets you set requests private until reviewed and ready to release publicly. this implies a bit of trust in MuckRock, and i hope it is not misplaced. few years back i asked for participants in a similar effort. some things resulted: 1) this also opens up the requester to risk; that is, whoever is filing must also potentially show some trust, if a falsified DOJ-361 is sent and used as pretext to "deter" you. i have not heard of this actually happening, but i was also not willing to push it. '''beware who you accept, coder, or they're setting you up for USC 18 fuckery. sure, it may in the end be ok. but you're in misery until cleared.'''' 2) the information is going to be public; if you've got a file because you're a privacy enthusiast, then filing to make your file public is the opposite of enjoying your privacy. there is merit in taking one for team earth human, however... --- as a first report, deliveries of USPS forms DOJ-361 to multiple, and a batch of three sent concurrently. two arrived promptly, but one got scrutiny before leaving town (forms to FBI, perhaps related to ? :) a) INTERPOL Washington FOIA Service Center (202)-616-0201 U.S. Department of Justice Washington, D.C. 20530 --- Form DOJ-361 sent, currently: February 4, 2015 , 11:41 pm - Arrived at USPS Facility - WASHINGTON, DC 20066 Tracking Number: 9405510200829494303833 b) U.S. Department of Justice United States Marshals Service Office of General Counsel Washington, DC 20530-1000 --- Form DOJ-361 sent, currently: February 4, 2015 , 11:40 pm - Arrived at USPS Facility - WASHINGTON, DC 20066 "Your item arrived at our USPS facility in WASHINGTON, DC 20066 on February 4, 2015 at 11:40 pm. The item is currently in transit to the destination." Tracking Number: 9405510200830593742348 c) Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) FBI-Records Management Division 170 Marcel Drive, Winchester, VA 22602-4843 --- Form DOJ-361 sent, currently: February 3, 2015 , 6:15 pm - Arrived at USPS Origin Facility - PORTLAND, OR 97218 "Your item arrived at our USPS origin facility in PORTLAND, OR 97218 on February 3, 2015 at 6:15 pm. The item is currently in transit to the destination." Tracking Number: 9405510200828494428195 [ i offered to send via FAX if mail was problematic and excessively latent. ]

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Jim Bell vindicated
by Seth 08 Jul '15

08 Jul '15

Reposted from http://morelibertynow.com/nypd-strike/ NYPD STRIKE SUGGESTS IT’S TIME FOR ASSASSINATION MARKETS IF WE WON'T ORGANIZE FOR NONVIOLENCE, WE'LL HAVE TO ORGANIZE FOR VIOLENCE We should use political violence (preemptive and generalized violence against a class of likely aggressors) against police. That’s what some libertarians have been saying for years. I continue to reject this idea but I have to give these folks their due – it worked in New York City. A gunman’s assassination of two NYC police officers while they sat in their cruiser on December 20 has led to chaos in the NYC government. Almost immediately: citations for traffic violations fell by 94 percent; summonses for low-level offenses dropped by 94 percent; parking violations were down by 92 percent; drug arrests by the NY Police Department (NYPD) Organized Crime Control Bureau plummeted 84 percent; cops received orders to only work in pairs and not even take breaks alone; police union officials told fellow officers to not make arrests “unless absolutely necessary” – thus calling into question the legitimacy of their normal arresting habits – and claimed they were on wartime footing; cops from across the country traveled to NYC to attend the funeral, evidence of the wide psychological impact of the assassinations; infighting between the NYPD and the NYC mayor escalated, damaging the effectiveness of the NYC government. THE DROP IN ARRESTS The overall drop in arrests, at 66 percent, in the week following the assassinations is nothing short of jaw-dropping. How is it that the NYPD could effectively go on strike and yet the city is not tearing itself apart? One reason may be that the general public is also horrified by the violence and people are behaving themselves better out of deference to the cops. Another is that people are on better behavior because they are afraid of overreaction on the part of paranoid police. Every cop out there may be ready to issue beatings and bullets for even the lowliest of infractions (as if they weren’t already). But I think the reality is actually that most of these arrests are for penny-ante, mostly-victimless crimes. They’re about making NYC a more pleasant place to live and visit for tourists and those who are well-off. The crimes people were being cited and caged for represent no real threat to the peace. Those minor infractions are also about filling the coffers of the NYC government revenue machine through fines and fees. INTRA-GOVERNMENTAL STRIFE John Robb’s first rule of open source warfare is to break networks. This lone gunman inadvertently did that by leading the NYPD and the mayor into greater confrontation, so much so that the cops turned their backs en masse on their boss, the mayor, in a public gathering that made headlines. What’s more, the gunman did this without any conscious attempt to maximize such damage and with the meager investment of a pistol, ammunition and transportation to NYC. Who knows how much the executions and their aftermath have cost the city of New York and police across the nation, but the return on investment (ROI) for this execution must be high. If the gunman spent $2,000 to carry this attack out, and the cost in financial outlays, loss of government revenue (due to reduced ticketing), police peace of mind and other intangibles is $20 million, that’s a 10,000 percent ROI. A LIBERTARIAN ANALYSIS In the short term, libertarians may feel the urge to cheer the gunman. But you shouldn’t. Executing members of a group for the perceived crimes of the whole, or of certain members of the group, is rank collectivism. It stinks. Libertarianism is individualism. Collectivism is the opposite of our philosophy. This kind of collectivist anti-cop vigilantism could easily get out of hand. Careless, suicidal vigilantes could shoot innocent bystanders. Paranoid cops could overreact even more than they already do and kill even more people than they already do. Then what? Civil war on the streets? Nobody wants that. DANGEROUS PRECEDENT FOR PUBLIC ORDER Even in a libertarian society, stateless or not, you need law and order. People need to know that those who break the rules will be stopped and made to pay for their destructive actions. Without that, society doesn’t work. The lawless cause more disturbances and the lawful look for other solutions or other places to go. Random murders and police going on strike or engaging in work slowdowns is a recipe for societal breakdown. Libertarians are wise to condemn both equally, while demanding the continued reduction in harassment of people accused of committing victimless crimes. WHAT ABOUT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY? In a stateless libertarian society, there are multiple police, or private defense, agencies in operation in a city the size of New York. If an employee of one agency is assassinated, it’s likely that employees of all of the agencies would engage in acts of solidarity with the fallen employee. But it’s unlikely that all of the agencies would go on strike, at least not all at the same time. Unlike the NYPD, which is centrally controlled by its commissioner and the mayor above him, private defense agencies are each independent and free from coercive outside control. Different agencies would likely make different decisions on the question of whether to strike or not. It’s possible that all of the individual employees of all of these agencies would be members of the same union, or a tight group of unions. That union could go on strike and force a work stoppage or slowdown similar to what is taking place in NYC. But, in a stateless society, the private defense agencies could just as easily fire or furlough their current employees and hire new ones who recognized the need to keep working, or just needed the work. These new ones could be experienced security agents from out of town or recently-retired former employees. The NYPD doesn’t enjoy that kind of flexibility. It is owned and controlled by the local government, the same entity that promulgates the laws that make it difficult, if not impossible to fire government employees for striking. Even without these troublesome laws, politicians dare not act definitively against a striking police union because the cops, their friends, family and supporters will vote against them in an upcoming election. Private defense agencies don’t have that concern, though they would have to worry about losing customers who disapproved of their mass firing or furloughing of their employees. It’s also likely that there would not be just one, massive police union, or tightly-coordinated group of unions. With multiple private defense agencies, the need for a unified negotiating position would likely be reduced. The bottom line is that a legal police monopoly – the NYPD – makes the residents of NYC more vulnerable to crime. This one organization can go on strike, or a slowdown, and it threatens the security of the entire city because there is no competition to pick up the slack – that competition is legally banned. In a stateless society, however, if one private defense agency shuts down, there is a strong incentive for the others to ramp up their operations, in order to collect the customers of the agency that shut down. This analysis doesn’t even take into account the fact that competitive private defense agencies will not enjoy de facto immunity from accountability for their crimes. Without that special privilege, bad cops will be held accountable for their actions. Societal rage against bad cops will be assuaged by removing this special protection and the motivation for collectivist vigilantism against cops will be removed. LESSONS FOR LIBERTARIANS The aftermath of the assassinations is a clear sign that assassination is an effective tool, at least in the short term, in the fight to control police abuse. Police activity is down, cops are scared and the cops and mayor are at war. I take no pleasure in saying that because it appears to validate the strategy of fellow libertarian activist Christopher Cantwell – not one of my favorite people. Given that cops across the country have shown themselves, time and time again, to be unaccountable killers, it makes no sense to take this kind of abuse lying down. It’s only reasonable to take steps to protect oneself from police abuse and fraud. I choose the nonviolent route because I am certain that the violent one will backfire. Already, family and friends of cops are organizing in support of police officers across the country. Violence is a polarizing tactic that you don’t come back from. But I believe in organization. If folks are going to advocate for political violence against police, then at least get the damned thing organized so it has a chance of success. Assassination Politics is essential reading in this area. In fact, an assassination marketplace already exists behind Tor on the Darknet. So, if people like Cantwell are serious about killing cops, why don’t they actively promote assassination marketplaces? Why don’t they create more marketplaces, add more targets and run marketing campaigns for them? Why the gratuitous chatter and the lack of sustained efforts toward their stated goal? It’s likely that at least a small amount of targeted violence will be required to take down governments, so that a more liberty-centric order can supplant them. If we accept that, as distasteful as it is, then assassination marketplaces become attractive. Unlike a traditional war, assassination marketplaces don’t require that you kill tens of thousands of cops, politicians and soldiers. In order for assassination marketplaces to end the age of the state, only a few targeted individuals need be killed. For the rest, active and well-funded threats may be sufficient to intimidate aggressors into remaining peaceful while an organized resistance takes voluntary civil institutions to the next level. This idea of keeping cops in check by placing bounties on their heads is nothing new. Pablo Escobar used it in Medellín to great effect. The IRA used it in Ireland. States are masters at this tactic, both against accused criminals and against insurgencies, such as Alvaro Uribe’s bounties on FARC members in Colombia in the last decade. It works. If the libertarian communities can ever get our collective acts together, someday we may be negotiating with police unions. We will want them to stop enforcing victimless crimes and to cooperate with the liberalization of their sector by accepting competition – the end to their monopoly. When negotiating with armed and dangerous paramilitary forces, it’s wise to operate from a position of strength. Assassination markets are one vector for gaining that kind of negotiating position. We would be wise to explore our options in that area. Violence is distasteful. But death and ignominious caging are worse. Libertarians have to be realistic. We can never secure our desired libertarian future from a position of weakness and disorganization. If we’re unable or unwilling to organize for nonviolent action, then we will have to organize for violent action. The alternative to either of these options, a wait-and-see, hemming-hawing, pacifistic apathy, is even more repugnant than violence. A PERSONAL NOTE It’s tasteless to rejoice in the death of other people, no matter the evil of their actions while alive. Every human life is precious, even those spent in misguided pursuits like being a US Marshal, a congressperson, bureaucrat or a NYC cop because any of those lives can be redeemed at any moment and put to great use. See, for example, retired Philadelphia police captain Ray Lewis. I am sympathetic to the families of the assassinated officers. No one wants to lose a loved one like that. No one wants to die like that, without even a chance to defend themselves. But such feelings must never get in the way of speaking the truth.

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Re: [cryptome] NYT on Nick Szabo and Bitcoin
by JS733NknRj6J 03 Jul '15

03 Jul '15

I seem to vaguely remember this profile (or one like it) but can't turn it up myself. Would be very grateful for the link if you do repost it. - JS7 Sent from [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.ch), encrypted email based in Switzerland. -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [cryptome] NYT on Nick Szabo and Bitcoin Time (GMT): May 18 2015 13:13:12 From: wilfred(a)vt.edu To: cryptome(a)freelists.org CC: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org, cryptography(a)metzdowd.com, cryptography(a)randombit.net We did a context profile on Satoshi with analysis of intel-based datacenter profiles and certain known paterns from the USSS (Treasury Fincen) crew you like so much at Yale and another specific MI5 ish unit whome you remember from Anguilla. The analysis clustered age and language patterns and identified a very tight range of character and background with institutional intent, then modeled the propaganda influence that gave rise to the BTC trend. The analysis was posted on the forums and pdf, but are missing from search. We will repost the original and add some current profile analysis. In short, the character is a 20s 2-year AS pre-law 1811 (police) with distinct interest in using US/UK and new international law *pyramid scheme policies to take over global legacy datacenters* in criminal forfeiture cases. Another party did a review of law&policy influencers of the same market and similarily isolated the core group. (no need to mention DEA+FINCEN.) On Sunday, May 17, 2015, John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> wrote: [ nytimes.com/2015/05/17/business/decoding-the-enigma-of-satoshi-nakamoto-and… Those around cypherpunks 1993-1998 will recall Szabo's emails on bitcoin early precursors along with Adam Back, Hal Finney, Tim May, Wei Dai, Lucky Green, Hettinga, many more burgeoning F-Cs. NYT piece credits cpunks as subversive birther, now being hyper-monetized by arch-cryptoanarchist Goldman Sachs and many more centralists. Szabo denies being Satoshi, but ... others rush to fill the gap

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Re: Threat Model: Parents
by Softy 02 Jun '15

02 Jun '15

Several responses have stated, and questioned, the children's rights accessing the Internet. Yes, with supervision. What all the responses have missed is the lack of distinction between communication and email. Claiming a child has a right to private extra-familial communications is as divided as the general access to the Internet. With supervision, without any more or less privacy than the child has in non-virtual communications. And, what hasn't been connected to deciding on the level of supervision, the developmental state of the child is highly relevant. Claiming a child merits access - with or without supervision - can only be made by the primary custodians of the child. We wish to ignore this subtlety because we wish to ignore Society's overbearing on all of us. The result in this specific scenario is, regardless of the child, the custodians require and merit a higher degree of technical faculty. To presume it is less than the childs is a mistake. Along with this ability comes the burden of communication: to provide an appropriate example. As with many non-virtual counterparts: many failure. such sad. Why should this medium of bits be different?

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Threat Model: Parents
by Gadit Bielman 01 Jun '15

01 Jun '15

Hi. I'm trying to help (probably badly, but..) a friend deal with parents that they expect are spying on them. I know that in general, it's impossible to secure a computer that you can't trust and don't necessarily have administrator privileges to. But their parents are not exactly the NSA -- any spying that's happening is almost definitely some sort of product, plus basic things like maybe looking through their history. (I don't know much about they're situation -- maybe they know more, so well-if-you-know-they-do-this-then-you-could-do-this type advice would still be helpful.) Would antivirus be able to detect spy-on-your-kids products? Would they be able to scan their computer with like Immunet or something, even if they didn't have administrator privileges? Tor would probably help -- unless the monitoring was looking at the RAM or something for website names, which would be way overkill on a commercial product, no? Or (more likely) if it was taking screenshots at regular intervals, which would also break running a VM or something. (Is there any way to detect taking screenshots?) I know probably the best thing would be running TAILS as a LiveCD -- the problem with that is that it's REALLY obvious over-the-shoulder. Um, thoughts about any of those? Any other things about parents as a threat model in general? I know this is pretty far from what is usually discussed on here, but I'm really interested in what you think/it would potentially help a lot of people.

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U.N. Leaning Towards Crypto
by grarpamp 01 Jun '15

01 Jun '15

https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/28/united-nations-encryption-ano… https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/28/u-n-report-asserts-encryption…

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