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Re: [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - rumors
by Eugen Leitl 06 Sep '13

06 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Andy Isaacson <adi(a)hexapodia.org> ----- Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2013 12:34:54 -0700 From: Andy Isaacson <adi(a)hexapodia.org> To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - rumors User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 10:45:46AM -0700, Joe Szilagyi wrote: > Does anyone put any stock into the rumors floating lately that the > government may have influenced Intel and/or AMD into altering in > subtle ways that CPUs handle random number generation? I keep seeing > this possible FUD floating around in comments here and there on > other articles. I agree with some of your premises, but disagree with the conclusion you seem to be drawing. Yes, it's just a fear of uncertainty. We do not have evidence, nor even a claim based on knowledge, that HWRNG backdooring has occurred. However, I claim that the fear is well founded and should be taken into account by all threat models. HWRNG is a nearly-uniquely difficult security problem to crack. By definition it is impossible to prove that a black-box HWRNG is safe. This is different from the security properties of a blackbox AES or MODMUL accelerator, which can be demonstrated to conform to a known specification. If your AES instructions don't do AES, then testing against a software implementation will show it! The AES logic unit will have a hard time leaking the AES keybits since there's nowhere nondeterministic to put them. etc. By contrast, a properly functioning HWRNG cannot be tested in a way that distinguishes it from the output of a stream cipher seeded with a backdoor key. And there's no way to test the behavior of HWRNG on an ongoing basis; even if you had a test to run, it might switch to "stream cipher mode" under the covers. This is not to say that RdRand is completely unusable. Putting RdRand entropy into a software pool implementation like /dev/urandom (or preferably, a higher-assurance multipool design like Fortuna) is a cheap way to prevent a putative backdoor from compromising your system state. Now, there is a way that we can learn that a backdoor was included; if someone does a tear-down of a HWRNG and finds circuitry that has no purpose other than being a backdoor, that would be conclusive. AFAIK nobody has tried that experiment. Weighing towards distrusting HWRNG we have the fact that NSA is reported (yesterday) to have intentionally backdoored Dual_EC_DRBG, and to have spent significant amounts of money to backdoor chip implementations, with enough success that they brag about it in administrative summaries. So, I put a lot of credence in distrusting HWRNG black box implementations. But unfortunately we need a lot more reliable entropy. A fully open source, nothing up my sleeve hardware entropy source would be a huge improvement. -andy -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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[Cryptography] Matthew Green on BULLRUN
by Eugen Leitl 06 Sep '13

06 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> ----- Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2013 15:09:27 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com Subject: [Cryptography] Matthew Green on BULLRUN X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.9.0 (GTK+ 2.24.20; x86_64-apple-darwin12.4.0) Some interesting nuggets here, including the fact that he explicitly calls out the existence of NSA's new HUMINT division that infiltrates corporations for a living. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/on-nsa.html -- Perry E. Metzger perry(a)piermont.com _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Secrecy News -- 09/08/13
by Eugen Leitl 06 Sep '13

06 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Steven Aftergood <saftergood(a)fas.org> ----- Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2013 08:08:09 -0700 From: Steven Aftergood <saftergood(a)fas.org> To: eugen(a)leitl.org Subject: Secrecy News -- 09/08/13 Reply-To: saftergood(a)fas.org X-Mailer-LID: 1 X-Mailer-RecptId: 399049 X-Mailer-SID: 1873 X-Mailer-Sent-By: 2 Format Note: If you cannot easily read the text below, or you prefer to receive Secrecy News in another format, please reply to this email to let us know. SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2013, Issue No. 79 September 6, 2013 Secrecy News Blog: http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/ ** TRENDS IN INTELLIGENCE SPENDING, AND MORE FROM CRS ** RESOURCES ON CONFLICT IN SYRIA FROM CRS TRENDS IN INTELLIGENCE SPENDING, AND MORE FROM CRS The rise and fall (and rise) of intelligence spending over the past three decades is traced in a newly updated report from the Congressional Research Service. "Limited publicly available data suggests intelligence spending, measured in constant 2014 dollars, has roughly doubled since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and, before declines over the last three years, was almost double spending at its peak at the end of the cold war," the CRS report notes. The report does not explicitly deal with the latest disclosure of a classified intelligence budget document in the Washington Post. "Because the document leaked to the news media is classified, CRS is unable to provide a discussion of the specific detail of that budget submission." But the report provides a useful compilation of previously disclosed intelligence budget data, along with some sensible extrapolations to round out the picture. CRS also reviews proposals to restructure the intelligence budgeting process. See "Intelligence Spending and Appropriations: Issues for Congress," September 5, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R42061.pdf But any proposals to modify current intelligence budget practices face strong opposition in Congress. In its report on the FY2014 defense authorization act, the House Armed Services Committee included language to prohibit efforts by the Secretary of Defense to create a new budget account for the National Intelligence Program. (Section 924) http://gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-113hrpt102/html/CRPT-113hrpt102.htm The Committee also said that the Defense Department has been secretly maneuvering to promote a consolidated National Intelligence Program budget within the Department of Defense as a separate budget category -- a step favored by the 9/11 Commission, among others, as a way to increase clarity and accountability in intelligence spending. "The committee is concerned that the executive branch has failed to notify the appropriate congressional committees about its continuing efforts to pursue consolidation of the portion of the Department of Defense budget designated as part of the National Intelligence Program," the House report said. The Committee directed the Department of Defense to submit a report to Congress on "any planning [for future intelligence budget consolidation] that has occurred during the past two years." Some other noteworthy new reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has withheld from online public distribution include the following. War in Afghanistan: Campaign Progress, Political Strategy, and Issues for Congress, August 29, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R43196.pdf Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-2013, August 30, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, September 3, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33741.pdf Banning the Use of Racial Preferences in Higher Education: A Legal Analysis of Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, September 3, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43205.pdf Wildfire Management: Federal Funding and Related Statistics, August 30, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43077.pdf U.S. Farm Income, August 30, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40152.pdf Proposed U.S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement: Background and Issues for Congress, August 29, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43204.pdf Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, August 30, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-690.pdf Climate Change and Existing Law: A Survey of Legal Issues Past, Present, and Future, August 28, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42613.pdf RESOURCES ON CONFLICT IN SYRIA FROM CRS Here are some new and updated reports on the conflict in Syria prepared by the Congressional Research Service: Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress, September 3, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43201.pdf Syria: Overview of the Humanitarian Response, September 4, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43119.pdf Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress, August 30, 2013: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R42848.pdf _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/subscribe/ To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/unsubscribe/ OR email your request to saftergood(a)fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: https://members.fas.org/donate _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood(a)fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: cypherpunks Digest, Vol 3, Issue 15
by Joseph Tag 06 Sep '13

06 Sep '13

The govt uses red/black switches and KG-n, KIV7hs, KIV19,(boxes) and KOV9 and more PCMIA cards to protect themselves. Semiconductor firms useto make DES chips. Boeing made an MLS server. Isn't Crypto supposed to be incorporated into firmware of Routers? Yes, bribery of network managers ( personnel security and trust ) is a big concern. 576-bit Group Keys / Key Encrypting Keys interest me. Thank you. Best wishes.

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Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"
by Eugen Leitl 06 Sep '13

06 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Benjamin Kreuter <brk7bx(a)virginia.edu> ----- Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2013 11:28:22 -0400 From: Benjamin Kreuter <brk7bx(a)virginia.edu> To: John Kelsey <crypto.jmk(a)gmail.com> Cc: Jerry Leichter <leichter(a)lrw.com>, "cryptography(a)metzdowd.com List" <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com>, Jon Callas <jon(a)callas.org>, Peter Gutmann <pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz> Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.9.0 (GTK+ 2.18.9; i686-redhat-linux-gnu) On Fri, 6 Sep 2013 01:19:10 -0400 John Kelsey <crypto.jmk(a)gmail.com> wrote: > I don't see what problem would actually be solved by dropping public > key crypto in favor of symmetric only designs. I mean, if the > problem is that all public key systems are broken, then yeah, we will > have to do something else. But if the problem is bad key generation > or bad implementations, those will be with us even after we abandon > all the public key stuff. Not necessarily. A bad implementation of a block cipher will be probably spotted quickly if you need it to interoperate with a good implementation; a bad implementation of a public key cipher might interoperate just fine with good implementations. Public key systems often have parameters or requirements that affect security without affecting the correctness of encryption or decryption. ElGamal encryption might appear to work even though you are using a group where the DDH assumption does not hold. Elliptic curve systems have even more parameters that need to be set correctly for security. I am not saying that we should abandon public key cryptography, I am just saying that there a number of ways for public key systems to go wrong that do not apply to symmetric ciphers. Just my 2 cents, Ben -- Benjamin R Kreuter UVA Computer Science brk7bx(a)virginia.edu KK4FJZ -- "If large numbers of people are interested in freedom of speech, there will be freedom of speech, even if the law forbids it; if public opinion is sluggish, inconvenient minorities will be persecuted, even if laws exist to protect them." - George Orwell _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"
by Eugen Leitl 06 Sep '13

06 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from arxlight <arxlight(a)arx.li> ----- Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2013 00:46:15 +0200 From: arxlight <arxlight(a)arx.li> To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130620 Thunderbird/17.0.7 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 What surprises me is that anyone is surprised. If you believed OpenBSD's Theo de Raadt and Gregory Perry back in late 2010, various government agencies (in this specific case the FBI- though one wonders if they were the originating agency) have been looking to introduce weaknesses wholesale into closed AND open source software and OS infrastructures for some time. Over a decade in his example. (See: http://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=129236621626462&w=2) Those of us old enough might marvel at the fact that going back to the late 1980s a huge dust up was caused by the allegations that Swiss firm "Crypto AG" introduced backdoors into their products at the behest of Western (read: United States and the BND) intelligence agencies, products that, at the time, were in widespread use by foreign governments who, one presumes, could not afford to field their own national cryptology centers to protect their own infrastructure (or were just lazy and seduced by a Swiss flag on the corporate domicile of Crypto AG). For the unwashed on the list, Wikipedia (and Der Spiegel) relate the story of (probably) hapless Crypto AG salesman Hans Buehler's 1992 arrest by the Iranian authorities after those allegations came to light, and the fact that Crypto AG paid a $1m ransom for him (but then later billed him for the $1m--you stay classy, Crypto AG). (See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crypto_AG) But fear not. Governments and NGOs around the world will be pleased to know that Crypto AG lives on and continues to provide superior crypto and security solutions to foreign institutions of all kinds, including: "National security councils, national competence centres, e-government authorities, encryption authorities, national banks, ministries of defence, combined/joint commands, cyber commands, air forces, land forces, naval forces, special forces, military intelligence services, defence encryption authorities, ministries of foreign affairs and numerous international organisations, ministries of the interior, presidential guards, critical infrastructure authorities, homeland security authorities, intelligence services, police forces, and cyber forces." (See: http://www.crypto.ch/ - The inclusion of a shot of the Patrouille Suisse is an especially nice touch. I often drive by their offices in Steinhausen and was stunned to realize a few years ago that they are thriving- I can only imagine what the mortgage on that place costs). I expect that today many of us feel quite naive at being shocked by those penetration revelations (sorry, allegations) given that it seems highly probable now that anyone using any sort of Microsoft, Cisco, Google, Facebook, Yahoo, YouTube, Skype, AOL or Apple product has now been elevated to a collection priority that seemed confined to the Irans of the world in the 1990s and early 2000s. Perry wondered after the "unpardonable carelessness" of the NSA in giving 50,000 Snowden's access to a Powerpoint with all the Prism partners. I would argue that the NSA had good cause to think no one would notice or care given how many people who should know MUCH MUCH better still send Crypto AG scads of money. And going back to the days of toad.com hasn't this always been the story? Security is expensive. Most people (and some governments) are cheap. There's something about the present political climate in the United States that really interests me. Mere mention of the word "fascism" in any context other than sarcasm seems to brand one quite instantly as a tin-foil nutjob. Granted, I think the world "fascism" is as overused as the word "communism," but it bears mentioning that the usurpation of corporate entities and industry by the state to its own purposes is one of the classic tenants of fascism. I'm sure the list's readers sense where I'm going with this by now. It is hard to escape noticing that the NSA and its sister and orbital agencies have long since broken the traditional firewall and morphed themselves into domestic surveillance agencies. But the United States is late to the party here. In the world of finance it was long understood that certain state-dominated Russian firms were front-running a number of U.S. economic indicators prior to release. The rumor at the time was that this activity stopped cold after a security audit at the offending U.S. agencies. It's possible that the story was apocryphal, but I sort of doubt it. The economic intelligence apparatus of foreign intelligence services was the place to be if you wanted to find yourself in the good graces of your nation-state. (It's not an accident that Nikolay Patolichev, once the Soviet Union's Foreign Trade Minister, led the pack having been awarded the Order of Lenin twelve times). Of course, drafting otherwise independent-appearing private enterprises to the purposes of the state was popular then (the CIA would routinely interview U.S. businessmen and businesswomen after trips to jurisdictions of interest, and leverage their presence in foreign lands to their own advantage), and appears even more popular now. I won't belabor the point (made long ago and loudly by Kate Martin, only to fall upon decidedly deaf ears) that U.S. Courts generally refuse to examine the legality of collection of inculpatory evidence that is dropped into their lap- but it is important to at least acknowledge. Again, those of us shocked by those revelations (that evidence of domestic crimes "accidentally" collected by intelligence agencies would not necessarily be inadmissible) might feel awfully stupid now that it seems that the NSA expressly retains or passes on evidence of crimes unrelated to foreign intelligence activities or terrorism, and that the DEA (presumably among others) routinely engages what could fairly be called wholesale perjury to conceal the source of such evidence from courts and defense counsel when it is presented in support of criminal prosecutions. Finally returning to the original topic (please forgive the diversion) I think what is the most important element to understand is that what was once opportunistic synergy between national intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies (here the War on Drugs was clearly the camel's nose) has become Fusion Center level integration- and bilateral information flow. Don't take my word for it, just read some of the Fusion Center testimony to various congressional committees- this is their bread and butter. Whichever asshole it was who first blamed 911 on a lack of cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence did a great deal of damage to the United States, but the trend was already pressing forward. What seems even more daunting is the new path of information from the bottom up. Now that you have local law enforcement humming around in cars collecting position and "metadata" on every license plate within 20m of a cop car prowling around on its beat, federal agencies are just a "Fusion Center query" away from access to... well... nearly everything. Look at this model (local collection at local expense re-purposed to federal exploitation), basic "exception processing," and the impact of the last decade and a half of "crony capitalism" and it is suddenly pretty hard not to credit BULLRUN with far more access than is public even given the latest revelations. Certainly, I don't run the NSA, but it doesn't take much more than a middling operations professional to tell you that exception processing is the key. Attacking this stuff is a question of priorities. Though experiment: What order of difficulty would you assign: Catch it in the clear. Compromising a vendor (including keys and users passwords- which might be reused). Injecting poor RNG (with vendor cooperation). Stealing a master key. Stealing a session key. Stealing a password to master or session key. Dictionary-attacking a password. Brute-forceing a weak password. Compromising an endpoint. Compromising a physical machine. Rubber-hoseing a password. Brute-forceing a strong password. Brute-forceing a weak key. Brute-forceing a strong key. Include in your analysis the cost of bending (or breaking) constitutional protections in the post-911 era (if any). Just look at the leverage an unwieldy, all-encompassing central government has on large US based firms (See e.g. Qwest post-cooperation refusal) and reflect on the bi-lateral Fusion Center model and then try to speculate that BULLRUN is overstated. I don't think you need a major factoring breakthrough to have FANTASTIC success in accessing the vast majority of (for example) SSL "protected" internet traffic. Anyone know what the market penetration of Microsoft IIS is? No, quite the contrary. I'll be amazed to find that the NYT piece isn't UNDERstated. To coin a phrase with reference to large and medium sized Western IT firms: They're all Crypto AG now. - - uni -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (Darwin) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJSKQm3AAoJEAWtgNHk7T8QJOEQALI381nUcAHtALvqw/ac/k84 Tdn+Zd2+T54stDJPwJvOQXkeIJJKAURyhPgG+oGkXHbzjLnwTp6zpB9+et4pM5n7 PRc8X/9fAF8+X8EzDwQA90wYEZaAaSmnnaXi034faw0kKw0T0EDenDBgJ6J9fHGa DtsQECUlYenj2Evm0cY60Uz52/zJcXryWS5vRS4IU+i4ELCC3CbY6cX3MAT6Y6jc reh1B8Wf1fbmaXYR5Ws+Dd5VE4+9T2VkB2MZQN9T+/NbS9abe+lFVZkqjNx28RT4 OHC9VVqG0rGgn3a7tiLY2StmPSIxyV08LRmoz89CU0smdjb8pZDc+08V29anIH+Q E6xo+pJdc+SF34wHurCBRYqeH4TLowB2Bl/pLQ05FUFCcj6bIGO1lwf5sHaPpsKU 3mAC4HnQwlgd61epbLVbNcltp40nz5Soz/tfyyRM2T2VNdkxcriJUezKQRwu+t6d pCbQow9KEpcrdL3TlaQgcvNH0btU5HRnz7EJSrctL+FfZBKUj4jcRCUgASt6gRBd cnrzFcFAYoSgBBR/wJBxUATpzxMl+xZ74zPKJPdaIiA0XPd1F9ZIUe+mzDL+IxHT b08+gUgME9OMpjwToSkoopYL02AkK/GRirC14C2cXieC8JwjrevIoBQmCLUutNK6 XC4sOGrFZ7Z37sXL+1jT =4NbV -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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<nettime> Report of Tangible Gifts Furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency
by Eugen Leitl 06 Sep '13

06 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from nettime's avid gift giver <nettime(a)kein.org> ----- Date: Thu, 05 Sep 2013 23:36:35 +0200 From: nettime's avid gift giver <nettime(a)kein.org> To: nettime-l(a)mx.kein.org Subject: <nettime> Report of Tangible Gifts Furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130803 Thunderbird/17.0.8 Reply-To: a moderated mailing list for net criticism <nettime-l(a)mail.kein.org> Gifts to Federal Employees from Foreign Government Sources Reported to Employing Agencies in Calendar Year 2012 https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/08/30/2013-21264/office- of-the-chief-of-protocol-gifts-to-federal-employees-from-foreign-gover nment-sources-reported#t-5 Agency: Central Intelligence Agency Revolving desk clock barometer/thermometer. Rec'd—1/8/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Silver double-spouted presentation teapot. Rec'd—1/19/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Bronzed composition of a soldier. Rec'd—1/20/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Bronze dagger blade, circa 930-586 BCE, with a silver wreath mount. Rec'd—1/26/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Steel kilij-style blade saber with copper mounted leather scabbard. Rec'd—2/2/2012. Est. Value—$700.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration White Fendi wristwatch. Rec'd—2/10/2012. Est. Value—$1,000.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Large check Burberry cashmere scarf. Rec'd—2/10/2012. Est. Value—$395.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Silver Valentino wristwatch. Rec'd—2/10/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Large, framed lithograph of a seated figure, unsigned. Rec'd—2/10/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Maple Walnut two-string lahuta in a fitted walnut case. Rec'd—2/13/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Gold overlaid opaque white glass vase. Rec'd—3/12/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Coral studded filigree silver single-edge dagger. Rec'd—3/13/2012. Est. Value—$1,500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Coral-studded filigree silver model of a four-masted ship. Rec'd—3/14/2012. Est. Value—$3,500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Three Roman-Byzantine pottery vessels, circa 1st Century A.D.—5th Century B.C. Rec'd—3/19/2012. Est. Value—$750.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Silver model of a two-masted ship. Rec'd—4/16/2012. Est. Value—$1,500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration 6′ x 4′ silk rug, red ground with a red and navy blue border. Rec'd—4/23/2012. Est. Value—$1,200.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Bronze commemorative monument. Rec'd—5/9/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Single-edged steel saber in a brass mounted scabbard. Rec'd—6/5/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Silver and pink glazed coffee set. Rec'd—6/5/2012. Est. Value—$400.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Gilt metal hilted commemorative replica of Khan Kubrat's sword. Rec'd—6/6/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Silver mounted black leather scabbard and steel blade saber. Rec'd—6/7/2012. Est. Value—$1,500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Silver presentation bowl. Rec'd—6/12/2012. Est. Value—$700.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Large golden falcon with a clock insert. Rec'd—7/9/2012. Est. Value—$1,500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Small golden falcon with a clock insert. Rec'd—7/9/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Petrus Pomerol Grand Vin, 2001. Rec'd—7/9/2012. Est. Value—$1,700.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration 6.8′ x 4.4′ silk rug, ivory with a light blue and beige background. Rec'd—7/10/2012. Est. Value—$8,000.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Rolex gentleman's stainless steel automatic chronometer wristwatch. Rec'd—7/10/2012. Est. Value—$6,500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration 5′ x 3′ silk rug, ivory background with beige and rose accents. Rec'd—8/2/2012. Est. Value—$700.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration 6.6′ x 4.1′ silk rug, red background with a beige ground guard border. Rec'd—9/3/2012. Est. Value—$5,000.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Filigree silver scabbard with short sword. Rec'd—9/7/2012. Est. Value—$2,500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Sheep's horn bow and arrow. Rec'd—11/11/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Woven fabric in a commemorative metal mounted red stained wood stand. Rec'd—2/21/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—On Display in the Deputy Director's Suite for Official Use Only Cartier silver men's watch. Rec'd—2/21/2012. Est. Value—$9,000.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Black steel barrel and walnut stock shotgun. Rec'd—3/4/2012. Est. Value—$700.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Filigree silver double-edged short sword and scabbard. Rec'd—3/4/2012. Est. Value—$2,500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration One medium plate with semi-precious stones inlaid and one matching small plate. Rec'd—4/25/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—On Display in the Deputy Director's Suite for Official Use Only Six silver commemorative medallions. Rec'd—6/17/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration 8′ x 5′ silk rug, navy blue ground with three vertical rows of stylized flowers. Rec'd—6/19/2012. Est. Value—$2,000.00. Disposition—On Display in the Deputy Director's Suite for Official Use Only Hamilton Jazzmaster watch. Rec'd—7/9/2012. Est. Value—$1,500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Filigree silver double-edged dagger. Rec'd—9/28/2012. Est. Value—$1,500.00. Disposition—On Display in the Deputy Director's Suite for Official Use Only Gold bullion presentation coin. Rec'd—2/1/2008. Est. Value—$2,000.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Two silk rugs, one brown and one yellow. Rec'd—6/1/2010. Est. Value—$800.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Cartier Roadster fountain pen. Rec'd—1/5/2012. Est. Value—$750.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration 18″ brown wood grain M1 rifle. Rec'd—1/18/2012. Est. Value—$699.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Chess set and a silk rug. Rec'd—4/16/2012. Est. Value—$1,080.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Cartier ink pen. Rec'd—4/30/2012. Est. Value—$395.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Sterling silver cufflinks and silver fountain pen. Rec'd—5/25/2012. Est. Value—$800.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Baum and Mercier quartz watch. Rec'd—5/25/2012. Est. Value—$1,190.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Romanson Trofish edition Swiss wristwatch. Rec'd—6/15/2012. Est. Value—$1,000.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Romanson Trofish edition Swiss wristwatch. Rec'd—6/15/2012. Est. Value—$1,000.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Romanson Trofish edition Swiss wristwatch. Rec'd—6/15/2012. Est. Value—$1,000.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Romanson Trofish edition Swiss wristwatch. Rec'd—6/15/2012. Est. Value—$1,000.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Femini-T Tissot lady's watch. Rec'd—6/28/2012. Est. Value—$850.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Cartier ink pen. Rec'd—7/7/2012. Est. Value—$395.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Hamilton Jazzmaster Watch. Rec'd—7/9/2012. Est. Value—$1,500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Hamilton stainless steel wristwatch with brown leather band. Rec'd—7/10/2012. Est. Value—$1,500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Pierre Balmain Swiss quartz men's watch. Rec'd—7/16/2012. Est. Value—$700.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Raymond Weil watch. Rec'd—7/18/2012. Est. Value—$750.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration EOS 60D SLR camera with 18-135MM lens. Rec'd—7/27/2012. Est. Value—$1,150.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Rolex gold and stainless steel wristwatch. Rec'd—7/30/2012. Est. Value—$14,000.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Silk rug. Rec'd—9/16/2012. Est. Value—$500.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Rado Centrix men's wristwatch. Rec'd—10/18/2012. Est. Value—$1,250.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Six encased displays with various historical items including rare stamps, currencies, and prayer books. Rec'd—11/6/2012. Est. Value—$6,000.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration 3′ x 5′ silk rug. Two bottles of cologne. An iPhone 5. Rec'd—12/20/2012. Est. Value—$3,375.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration Chopard cufflinks. Chopard ballpoint pen. Chopard money clip. Rec'd—12/29/2012. Est. Value—$1,000.00. Disposition—Pending Transfer to General Services Administration # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)kein.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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FBI OpenBSD Backdoors and RSA Cipher Vulnerability
by John Young 06 Sep '13

06 Sep '13

12 January 2012. FBI OpenBSD Backdoors and RSA Cipher Vulnerability: <http://cryptome.org/2012/01/0032.htm>http://cryptome.org/2012/01/0032.htm

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Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"
by Eugen Leitl 06 Sep '13

06 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam(a)gmail.com> ----- Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2013 16:58:07 -0400 From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam(a)gmail.com> To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> Cc: "cryptography(a)metzdowd.com" <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com> Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" On Thu, Sep 5, 2013 at 4:41 PM, Perry E. Metzger <perry(a)piermont.com> wrote: > On Thu, 5 Sep 2013 15:58:04 -0400 "Perry E. Metzger" > <perry(a)piermont.com> wrote: > > I would like to open the floor to *informed speculation* about > > BULLRUN. > > Here are a few guesses from me: > > 1) I would not be surprised if it turned out that some people working > for some vendors have made code and hardware changes at the NSA's > behest without the knowledge of their managers or their firm. If I > were running such a program, paying off a couple of key people here > and there would seem only rational, doubly so if the disclosure of > their involvement could be made into a crime by giving them a > clearance or some such. > Or they contacted the NSA alumni working in the industry. > 2) I would not be surprised if some of the slow speed at which > improved/fixed hashes, algorithms, protocols, etc. have been adopted > might be because of pressure or people who had been paid off. > > At the very least, anyone whining at a standards meeting from now on > that they don't want to implement a security fix because "it isn't > important to the user experience" or adds minuscule delays to an > initial connection or whatever should be viewed with enormous > suspicion. Whether I am correct or not, such behavior clearly serves > the interest of those who would do bad things. > I think it is subtler that that. Trying to block a strong cipher is too obvious. Much better to push for something that is overly complicated or too difficult for end users to make use of. * The bizare complexity of IPSEC. * Allowing deployment of DNSSEC to be blocked in 2002 by blocking a technical change that made it possible to deploy in .com. * Proposals to deploy security policy information (always send me data encrypted) have been consistently filibustered by people making nonsensical objections. 3) I would not be surprised if random number generator problems in a > variety of equipment and software were not a very obvious target, > whether those problems were intentionally added or not. > Agreed, the PRNG is the easiest thing to futz with. It would not surprise me if we discovered kleptography at work as well. > 4) Choices not to use things like Diffie-Hellman in TLS connections > on the basis that it damages user experience and the like should be > viewed with enormous suspicion. > > 5) Choices not to make add-ons available in things like chat clients > or mail programs that could be used for cryptography should be viewed > with suspicion. I think the thing that discouraged all that was the decision to make end user certificates hard to obtain (still no automatic spec) and expire after a year. -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/ _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"
by Eugen Leitl 06 Sep '13

06 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> ----- Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2013 16:41:18 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN" X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.9.0 (GTK+ 2.24.20; x86_64-apple-darwin12.4.0) On Thu, 5 Sep 2013 15:58:04 -0400 "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> wrote: > I would like to open the floor to *informed speculation* about > BULLRUN. Here are a few guesses from me: 1) I would not be surprised if it turned out that some people working for some vendors have made code and hardware changes at the NSA's behest without the knowledge of their managers or their firm. If I were running such a program, paying off a couple of key people here and there would seem only rational, doubly so if the disclosure of their involvement could be made into a crime by giving them a clearance or some such. 2) I would not be surprised if some of the slow speed at which improved/fixed hashes, algorithms, protocols, etc. have been adopted might be because of pressure or people who had been paid off. At the very least, anyone whining at a standards meeting from now on that they don't want to implement a security fix because "it isn't important to the user experience" or adds minuscule delays to an initial connection or whatever should be viewed with enormous suspicion. Whether I am correct or not, such behavior clearly serves the interest of those who would do bad things. 3) I would not be surprised if random number generator problems in a variety of equipment and software were not a very obvious target, whether those problems were intentionally added or not. 4) Choices not to use things like Diffie-Hellman in TLS connections on the basis that it damages user experience and the like should be viewed with enormous suspicion. 5) Choices not to make add-ons available in things like chat clients or mail programs that could be used for cryptography should be viewed with suspicion. Perry -- Perry E. Metzger perry(a)piermont.com _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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