November 2015 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Russia's "eye-watering" military toys
by Zenaan Harkness 11 Jul '17

11 Jul '17

http://journal-neo.org/2015/11/16/do-we-really-want-a-new-world-war-with-ru… Enjoyable read. Reminds me of that immortal line in the Putin documentary where the Russian navy chief points at a radar screen saying something like 'look at that, I've never seen [a destroyer class battleship] do this figure-8 move before' as the USS Donald Cook first enters then hightails out of Crimean waters. International military sparring at its best :) Z

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Russia bans purchase of foreign non-niche software in Russian state agencies
by Zenaan Harkness 08 Jul '17

08 Jul '17

Import substitution applied to software... http://fortruss.blogspot.ru/2015/11/medvedev-bans-use-of-foreign-made.html Medvedev bans the use of foreign-made software in Russian state agencies Translated by Ollie Richardson for Fort Russ 20th November, 2015 novayagazeta.ru The Prime Minister of Russia, Dmitry Medevdev, has signed a decree prohibiting from 1 January 2016 the purchase of foreign-made software for state needs, reports the press service of the Cabinet. According to the document, customers will now be obliged to buy Russian-produced software. It notes that the initiative is a method of import substitution. The exception is when software has the necessary functional, technical or operational characteristics absent in Russia. To place an order on, for example Microsoft Windows, officials will have to justify the need for this operating system. As reported to "Kommersant" earlier, the official, who asked to remain anonymous, said that a German IT company began to discuss with the Ministry of economic development the possibility of a partial transfer of software production to Russia, in order thus to be able to sell it on government orders. A draft resolution was prepared and submitted by the Ministry of communications and mass communications of the Russian Federation. It was presented to Medvedev earlier in April.

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Recent Numbers Station Activity COLLAPSE (GnuRadio SDR)
by grarpamp 20 Oct '16

20 Oct '16

https://www.reddit.com/r/conspiracy/comments/3oswdt/unusual_happenings_with… On SKYKING (8992 or 11175 kHz USB) a call sign called "COLLAPSE" which has not been heard since 2001 has just broadcasted 4 messages to numbered stations/units in the last few minutes. "FUXEBOX" and "Reykjavik," have also broadcast in the last few days and they haven't been heard since 1991 (collapse of the Soviet Union). "COLLAPSE" has sent 3 messages in the last few minutes. COLLAPSE message one: http://vocaroo.com/i/s1hGyA2GR6HI Collapse message Two: http://vocaroo.com/i/s1ETZ3l9fp0G Collapse message Three: http://vocaroo.com/i/s03ZI6ui70LY Message Four from "FLATTOP!" (ANOTHER STATION NOT HEARD IN YEARS!): http://vocaroo.com/i/s01smhgkyNDL We do not know what these codes mean, but it considered These are alerts to "All Stations" before the codes are sent. I did my best to record all these but missed recording "the alert phrase" where they said "All stations, all stations." This has all happened in the last half hour (0230-0304 EST). I didn't record these or write this up btw, this was a thread from 4chan that popped up on /pol/ Edit: Go here for updates http://www.defconwarningsystem.com/phpBB3/viewtopic.php?f=22&t=3269&start=30

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Re: "Blackphone" said to be "a super-secure nsa-proof"
by Ulex Europae 14 Oct '16

14 Oct '16

At 05:25 AM 1/17/2014, Jim Bell forwarded: ><<http:///>http://www.yahoo.com/tech/startup-launching-a-super-secure-nsa-proof-735110…> It's been long enough, has anyone acquired one of these and tested it? Ulex

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Re: [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked
by Eugen Leitl 07 Sep '16

07 Sep '16

----- Forwarded message from Brian Gladman <brg(a)gladman.plus.com> ----- Date: Sat, 07 Sep 2013 09:33:28 +0100 From: Brian Gladman <brg(a)gladman.plus.com> To: Cryptography Mailing List <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com> Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130801 Thunderbird/17.0.8 On 07/09/2013 01:48, Chris Palmer wrote: >> Q: "Could the NSA be intercepting downloads of open-source encryption software and silently replacing these with their own versions?" > > Why would they perform the attack only for encryption software? They > could compromise people's laptops by spiking any popular app. Because NSA and GCHQ are much more interested in attacking communictions in transit rather than attacking endpoints. Endpoint attacks cost more to undertake, only give access to a limited amount of data and involve much greater risks that their attack will either be discovered or their means of attack will leave evidence of what they have done and how they have done it. The internal bueaucratic costs of gaining approval for (adverarial) endpoint attacks also makes it a more costly process than the use of network based interception. There is significant use of open source encryption software in end to end encryption solutions, in file archivers, in wifi and network routers, and in protecing the communications used to manage and control such components when at remote locations. The open source software is provided in source code form and is compiled from source in a huge number of applications and this means that the ability to covertly substitute broken source code could provide access to a huge amount of traffic without the risks involved in endpoint attacks. I stress that I am NOT suggesting that this has happened (or is happening), simply that it has attractions from an NSA/GCHQ viewpoint. Fortunately, I think it is a difficult attack to mount covertly (that is, without the acqiecience of the author(s) of the software in question). On the more general debate here, in my view, 'security for the masses' through the deployment of encryption is a 'pipe dream' that isn't going to happen. Functionality (and the complexity that comes with it) is the enemy of security and it is very clear that the public places a much higher value on functionality than it does on security (or privacy). Every time a new device comes onto the market, it starts with limited functionality and some hope of decent security but rapidly evolves to be a high functionality product in which the prospect of decent security declines rapidly to zero. Raspberry Pis look interesting _now_ but I would be willing to bet that they won't buck the trend of increasing funtionality and declining security simply because this is what the majority in even this limited user community will want. To buck this trend we need an effort like the Raspberry Pi effort but one driven by our community with a strong commitment to simplicty and deliberately limited functionality in both hardware and software. Brian Gladman _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [liberationtech] Interesting things in keyservers
by Eugen Leitl 17 Aug '16

17 Aug '16

----- Forwarded message from micah <micah(a)riseup.net> ----- Date: Sat, 20 Jul 2013 10:05:42 -0400 From: micah <micah(a)riseup.net> To: Micah Lee <micahflee(a)riseup.net>, 'liberationtech' <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Interesting things in keyservers User-Agent: Notmuch/0.15.2 (http://notmuchmail.org) Emacs/24.3.1 (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Hi Micah! Micah Lee <micahflee(a)riseup.net> writes: > I'm working on a talk for OHM2013 about PGP. Can anyone send me examples > of interesting keys in key servers that you know of? Since you are preparing a talk about the subject, I'm going to be pedantic and correct your usage of "PGP", because it is important to get your terminology straight when giving a talk. I presume you aren't giving a talk about the commercial software, but instead you are actually giving a talk about OpenPGP which is the standard specified by RFC4880 that different programs like GnuPG, Seahorse, MacGPG, and PGP etc. all implement. If that is true, then you should refer to it as OpenPGP, and not PGP. I dont know what your talk will consist of, besides the funny enigmail XSS and goatse.cx stuff (thanks for that! always good to have some goatse early in the morning), but I would like to point out a few things that might be useful to mention. One is a wiki page that I created with some people: https://we.riseup.net/riseuplabs+paow/openpgp-best-practices - it contains some useful hints about using OpenPGP, maintaining a good key and some general good practices that people often dont know about (such as the importance of keeping your keys updated to get critical revocation and expiration extension certifications!) One thing mentioned on that page that I wanted to highlight, because you used pgp.mit.edu links in your original email, is that the keyserver pgp.mit.edu is not a good one to use/promote. Everyone uses it as their 'goto' keyserver, but it is a really bad idea! As a keyserver, it has been broken for years. For a long time it was just dropping revocations, subkey updates and expirations on the floor. That is *really* bad. Eventually, they upgraded their keyserver software, but it is *still* running an older version of SKS, a version that fails to handle 16-digit subkeyid lookups (among other failings). So, please don't rely on pgp.mit.edu for your security, and please don't include them in your slides! If you are looking for one to use, I highly recommend using the SKS pool address (hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net or http://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net/ - or if you want a more close geographical pool, have a look at http://sks-keyservers.net/overview-of-pools.php) Finally, there seems to be some amazing misconceptions about keyservers, keys and the web of trust. In particular this http://cryptome.org/2013/07/mining-pgp-keyservers.htm circulated recently and it pained me to see because it suggested various wreckless conclusions that were dangerously off the mark[0] (and used pgp.mit.edu, hah). While it is true that we've jokingly called the OpenPGP web of trust "the original social network" because of the exposed social relational graphing that can be done by querying keyservers, and it is for this reason that many activists I know do not want to have signatures uploaded to keyservers (and instead use the bulky local-only signature work-around)... ... but for some reason people seem to think that if it is on a keyserver, is true, or it means something that it doesn't. People don't realize critical things, such as the fact that I can create a key with the UID Nadim Kobeissi and upload it to the keyservers[1]. That doesn't mean that is the real Nadim's key (this is what exchanging key fingerprints and doing certifications is for, so you can know, with a certain degree of certainty, that this person is the person who controls that secret key material). Or people think that because I signed your key and that signature is on the keyserver that indicates: I trust you; we met in person at that date; we know each other; we are involved in a criminal conspiracy with each other; or many other wrong assumptions about what that certification means. I can sign Edward Snowden's key and send that to the keyservers[1]. Hell, I can sign Snowden's key with my fake Nadim Kobeissi key[1] and then send it to the keyservers. Does that mean that Nadim and Snowden have met in person?! No, it does not at all. Anyways, I can keep going... but I dont know what the focus of your OHM talk is about, so going on like this isn't particularly useful to you and your talk... however, I'd be happy to provide more feedback about your talk if you would like![2] After all, we Micahs need to stick together, micah 0. "the cryptome article just sounds like impenetrable bullshit from someone with no interest in actually understandning what's happening" - I'm not saying who said this... 1. no, I didn't do that, nor did I upload the edward snowden or bradly manning keys. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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US drug policy -> maintains the class divide
by Zenaan Harkness 16 Aug '16

16 Aug '16

>From a comment on slashdot - I'm not American, but this sounds quite plausible to me: http://news.slashdot.org/story/15/11/27/1343243/lsd-microdosing-gaining-pop… " If you're a $100k/yr engineer (Score:4, Insightful) by rsilvergun (571051) on Friday November 27, 2015 @10:52AM (#51013395) such things don't apply. In America we have a multi-tiered justice system. It's pretty well documented. Wealthy and educated people get treatment programs, while poor (and let's face it, black) people get jail. It's because what we're really using our drug policy for is to keep the poors in check. Think of it this way. If your poor chances are you or one of your friends is using drugs to cope with poverty. Now, our drug laws, in particular our asset forfeiture laws are basically guilt by association. Combine that with juries that are inherently conservative (since you generally have to be well off to be able to afford to server on a jury for any length of time). So when poor people show up in wealthy neighborhoods they not only stick out like a swore thumb, but odds are good the cops can bust them for the drugs at least one of them is carrying. This keeps poor people out of wealthy school districts and parks, and lets the wealthy enjoy their (much, much better) public services. Basically, our drug policy is central to maintaining our class divide... "

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Philosohpical - Reading between the lines: the Great War of Continents, information wars, and multipolarity
by Zenaan Harkness 17 Mar '16

17 Mar '16

Speaking of agendas, of course we each tend to see the world, the struggles of the day, through particular lenses, preferences, agendas etc. This philosophical piece has an image which could make a great desktop background - but more importantly may help remind some (such as I) to take note of the breadth of viewpoints/ agendas from which we may couch any events of the day. Perhaps you might enjoy it too. http://fortruss.blogspot.ru/2015/11/reading-between-lines-great-war-of.html Regards, Zenaan

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Re: [cryptome] Re: FOIPA adventures
by coderman 29 Feb '16

29 Feb '16

two new for DOCSIS tech @FBI, @CIA: "Any and all "DOCSIS" technology records, including cross-references and indirect mentions, including records outside the investigation main file. This is to include a search of each of the following record stores and interfaces: the Central Records System (CRS), the Automated Case Support system ("ACS") Investigative Case Management system ("ICM"), the Automated Case Support system ("ACS") Electronic Case File ("ECF"), and the Automated Case Support system ("ACS") Universal Index ("UNI"). I also request a search of "ELSUR", the database containing electronic surveillance information, for any and all records or activities related to "DOCSIS" or "DOCSIS intercept" or "DOCSIS access" technology. In addition, please extend the search criteria across any external storage media, including I-Drives, S-Drives, or related technologies used during the course of investigation involving Cable internet data services. DITU experimental technologies or research also within scope of this request. Please include processing notes, even if request is denied in part. Please identify individuals responsible for any aspect of FOIA processing in the processing notes, along with explanation of their involvement if not typically assigned FOIA responsibilities for the record systems above." - https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/indocsis-19725/ "Any and all records, receipts, training, technology transfer programs, research, evaluation technologies, or other materials relevant to "DOCIS" cable communication technology. This is to include "DOCSIS 1.0", "DOCSIS 2.0", "DOCSIS 3.0", and other relevant DOCSIS protocols." - https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/indocsisxfer-19726/ On 7/12/15, coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On 7/12/15, Douglas Rankine <douglasrankine2001(a)yahoo.co.uk> wrote: >> Are they giving reasons for the rejections? > > Glomar all around. see also: > > "What Is the Big Secret Surrounding Stingray Surveillance?" > - > http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-the-big-secret-surroundin… > > --- > > What Is the Big Secret Surrounding Stingray Surveillance? > > State and local law enforcement agencies across the U.S. are setting > up fake cell towers to gather mobile data, but few will admit it > By Larry Greenemeier | June 25, 2015 > > > Stung: Law enforcement agencies sometimes use a device called a > stingray to simulate a cell phone tower, enabling them to gather > international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), location and other > data from mobile phones connecting to them. Pictured here is an actual > cell tower in Palatine, Ill. > > > Given the amount of mobile phone traffic that cell phone towers > transmit, it is no wonder law enforcement agencies target these > devices as a rich source of data to aid their investigations. Standard > procedure involves getting a court order to obtain phone records from > a wireless carrier. When authorities cannot or do not want to go that > route, they can set up a simulated cell phone tower—often called a > stingray—that surreptitiously gathers information from the suspects in > question as well as any other mobile device in the area. > > These simulated cell sites—which collect international mobile > subscriber identity (IMSI), location and other data from mobile phones > connecting to them—have become a source of controversy for a number of > reasons. National and local law enforcement agencies closely guard > details about the technology’s use, with much of what is known about > stingrays revealed through court documents and other paperwork made > public via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. > > One such document recently revealed that the Baltimore Police > Department has used a cell site simulator 4,300 times since 2007 and > signed a nondisclosure agreement with the FBI that instructed > prosecutors to drop cases rather than reveal the department’s use of > the stingray. Other records indicate law enforcement agencies have > used the technology hundreds of times without a search warrant, > instead relying on a much more generic court order known as a pen > register and trap and trace order. Last year Harris Corp., the > Melbourne, Fla., company that makes the majority of cell site > simulators, went so far as to petition the Federal Communications > Commission to block a FOIA request for user manuals for some of the > company’s products. > > The secretive nature of stingray use has begun to backfire on law > enforcement, however, with states beginning to pass laws that require > police to obtain a warrant before they can set up a fake cell phone > tower for surveillance. Virginia, Minnesota, Utah and Washington State > now have laws regulating stingray use, with California and Texas > considering similar measures. Proposed federal legislation to prevent > the government from tracking people’s cell phone or GPS location > without a warrant could also include stingray technology. > > Scientific American recently spoke with Brian Owsley, an assistant > professor of law at the University of North Texas Dallas College of > Law, about the legal issues and privacy implications surrounding the > use of a stingray to indiscriminately collect mobile phone data. Given > the invasive nature of the technology and scarcity of laws governing > its use, Owsley, a former U.S. magistrate judge in Texas, says the > lack of reliable information documenting the technology’s use is > particularly troubling. > > > [An edited transcript of the interview follows.] > > When and why did law enforcement agencies begin using international > cell site simulators to intercept mobile phone traffic and track > movement of mobile phone users? > > Initially, intelligence agencies—CIA and the like—couldn’t get local > or national telecommunications companies in other countries to > cooperate with U.S. surveillance operations against nationals in those > countries. To fill that void companies like the Harris Corp. started > creating cell site simulators for these agencies to use. Once Harris > saturated the intelligence and military markets [with] their products, > they turned to federal agencies operating in the U.S. So the [Drug > Enforcement Administration], Homeland Security, FBI and others started > having their own simulated cell sites to use for surveillance. > Eventually this trickled down further to yet another untapped market: > state and local law enforcement. That’s where we are today in terms of > the proliferation of this technology. > > > Under what circumstances do U.S. law enforcement agencies use cell > site simulators and related technology? > > There are three examples of how law enforcement typically use > stingrays for surveillance: First, law enforcement officials may use > the cell site simulator with the known cell phone number of a targeted > individual in order to determine that individual's location. For > example, officials are searching for a fugitive and have a cell phone > number that they believe the individual is using. They may operate a > stingray near areas where they believe that the individual may be, > such as a relative's home. > > Second, law enforcement officials may use the stingray to target a > specific individual who is using a cell phone, but these officials do > not know the cell phone number. They follow the targeted individual > from a site to various other locations over a certain time period. At > each new location, they activate the stingray and capture the cell > phone data for all of the nearby cell phones. After they have captured > the data at a number of sites they can analyze the data to determine > the cell phone or cell phones used by the targeted individual. This > approach captures the data of all nearby cell phones, including > countless cell phones of individuals unrelated to the criminal > investigation. > > Third, law enforcement officials have been known to operate stingray > at political rallies and protests. Using the stingray at these types > of events captures the cell phone data of everyone in attendance. > > > How does law enforcement get permission to perform this type of > surveillance? > > Federal law enforcement agencies typically get courts to approve use > of something like stingray through a pen register application [a pen > register is a device that records the numbers called from a particular > phone line]. With that type of application, essentially the government > says, we want this information. We think it’s going to be relevant to > an ongoing criminal investigation. As you can imagine, that’s a pretty > low bar for them to satisfy in the eyes of the court. Just about > anything could fit into that description. You don’t even have to show > that such an investigation would lead to an arrest or prosecution. Law > enforcement is telling the court, look, we’re in the middle of this > investigation. If we get this information, we think it might lead to > some other important information. > > Different court orders have different standards for approval. The > highest standard would be for a wiretap. A search warrant likewise has > a much higher standard than a pen register, requiring law enforcement > to prove probable cause before a judge will grant permission to use > additional means of investigation. The problem that I have with a pen > register to justify use of something like a stingray is that the > standard for a pen register is much too low, given the invasive nature > of a pen register. Instead, I think the use of a stingray should be > consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and pursuant > to a search warrant. > > > Why not explicitly state the type of technology being used and its > specific purpose when filing for a court order? > > [When] law enforcement agencies seek to obtain judicial authorization > through a pen register, they do not directly indicate that they are > applying for authorization to use a stingray. Doing so might cause > some courts to question whether the pen register statute [as opposed > to some higher standard] is the appropriate basis for authorizing a > stingray. In addition, law enforcement agencies typically have to sign > nondisclosure agreements with Harris Corp. in order to receive the > federal Homeland Security funding needed to purchase the technology. > So there’s this concern, at least at the local law enforcement level, > about revealing any information about it because that would violate > the agreement with Harris and maybe subject them to losing the > equipment or some other consequences. > > > Why would law enforcement agencies sign a nondisclosure agreement with > a technology company? > > I’m not sure whether the agreements are being driven by the FBI or by > Harris, but these agreements seem to be getting less relevant insofar > as [there is less] need to keep the public unaware of the existence of > this technology. In the last three or so years there’s been a lot more > awareness about the technology and its use. When agencies were first > signing these agreements years ago, use of this technology wasn’t > widely known. Now you are getting situations where criminal defense > attorneys learn about stingray and similar technologies and the role > they may be playing in the arrests of some of their clients. Defense > teams are starting to ask questions and require the government to > produce documentation such as court orders, and that’s creating the > confrontation you’re now seeing. > > > Why have law enforcement agencies kept their use of cell site > simulators so secretive? > > Some of it is the cloudy legal issues surrounding the legitimate uses > of this technology. Law enforcement agencies will also argue that the > more information that’s available about this technology, the harder it > is for them to use these devices to fight crime. Yet there’s a growing > knowledge of this technology, and a serious criminal enterprise is > already aware of it. People are already using prepaid disposable > phones [sometimes referred to as “burner phones”] to some extent to > defeat this technology. Sophisticated criminals are aware that there’s > electronic surveillance out there in myriad ways, and so they’re going > to take precautions. From a technology perspective, it’s sort of a > cat-and-mouse game. There’s also a device that locates cell site > simulators, something referred to as an IMSI catcher. There’s an arms > race back and forth to get the best technology and to get the edge. > > > What does it say to you about the whole process that a prosecutor or a > law enforcement agency is willing to sacrifice a conviction in order > to keep their methods a secret? > > I think it’s a very odd approach. You are throwing away some > convictions or potential convictions for the sake of secrecy. But it’s > even harder to understand now that knowledge of the technology is > becoming so common. There have been documented cases in Baltimore and > Saint Louis where stingray has supposedly been used. The use of > stingray and related technologies is a roll of the dice in the sense > that law enforcement is hoping that either the defense attorneys don’t > have enough savvy or wherewithal to find out about the technology and > ask the right questions or, even if that does happen, they’re hoping > that the judge that they have is favorable to their approach and not > going to order them to reveal information about its use. In the rare > occasions when things go against them, they just dismiss it. > > > You yourself denied a law enforcement application three years ago to > use a stingray. Under what circumstances would you approve its use? > > I want to make clear: I don’t have a problem with stingray itself—I > understand that this can be a valuable tool in law enforcement’s > arsenal. My problem is that I want it to be used pursuant to a high > standard of proof that it’s needed, and that I want the approval > process to be more transparent. One of the reasons I’d like to see > some more documentation of stingray applications and orders is because > I have this suspicion—but there’s no way of confirming it one way or > another—that some judges are signing approvals to use this technology > thinking that they’re just signing a pen register. If a judge thinks > it’s [just] another pen register application, they’re just going to > sign it without giving it much pause. > > > Now that the use of this stingrays and related technologies has been > made public, where will this issue be a year or a few years from now? > > A year from now I think we’re in the same position. You’re dealing > with outdated statutes concerning new and very different technology. > It’s possible in five years maybe that Congress will step in and do > something. More likely, state legislatures will take most of the > action to monitor this type of surveillance. Washington State, > California [and others] have already acted, and Texas is evaluating > the standards for approving stingray use. >

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Possible crypto backdoor in RFC-2631 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method
by Georgi Guninski 18 Feb '16

18 Feb '16

Possible crypto backdoor in RFC-2631 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method I am n00b at crypto so this might not make any sense. In DH, if one can select group parameters (g,q,p) he can break both parties private very fast time IMHO. The RFC: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2631 The main problem appears: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2631#section-2.2.2 2.2.2. Group Parameter Validation The ASN.1 for DH keys in [PKIX] includes elements j and validation- Parms which MAY be used by recipients of a key to verify that the group parameters were correctly generated. Two checks are possible: 1. Verify that p=qj + 1. This demonstrates that the parameters meet the X9.42 parameter criteria. 2. Verify that when the p,q generation procedure of [FIPS-186] Appendix 2 is followed with seed 'seed', that p is found when 'counter' = pgenCounter. The main problem appears MAY. As I read it, implementation MAY NOT verify it. Sketch of the attack: Chose $q$ product of small primes $p_i$. Solve the discrete logarithm modulo $p_i$ for the public keys. Apply the Chinese remainder theorem to get the privates keys. (This is well known method for DL and for this reason the group order must be prime [160 bits ;)]). Would be interested how implementations implement this MAY. Let me know if there is better list for this. -- georgi

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