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Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service
by Eugen Leitl 16 Aug '13

16 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from zooko <zooko(a)zooko.com> ----- Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 23:11:22 +0400 From: zooko <zooko(a)zooko.com> To: Nico Williams <nico(a)cryptonector.com> Cc: cryptography(a)randombit.net Subject: Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 03:16:33PM -0500, Nico Williams wrote: > > Nothing really gets anyone past the enormous supply of zero-day vulns in their complete stacks. In the end I assume there's no technological PRISM workarounds. I agree that compromise of the client is relevant. My current belief is that nobody is doing this on a mass scale, pwning entire populations at once, and that if they do, we will find out about it. My goal with the S4 product is not primarily to help people who are being targeted by their enemies, but to increase the cost of indiscriminately surveilling entire populations. Now maybe it was a mistake to label it as "PRISM-Proof" in our press release and media interviews! I said that because to me "PRISM" means mass surveillance of innocents. Perhaps to other people it doesn't mean that. Oops! Regards, Zooko _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service
by Eugen Leitl 16 Aug '13

16 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from zooko <zooko(a)zooko.com> ----- Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 23:05:24 +0400 From: zooko <zooko(a)zooko.com> To: Nicolai <nicolai-cryptography(a)chocolatine.org> Cc: cryptography(a)randombit.net Subject: Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 01:52:38PM -0500, Nicolai wrote: > > Zooko: Congrats on the service. I'm wondering if you could mention on the site which primitives are used client-side. All I see is that combinations of sftp and ssl are used for data-in-flight. Thanks! I'm not sure what your question is. The available interfaces to the gateway -- i.e. the cleartext side that is marked in red on [1] -- are: * the "tahoe" command-line tool [2] * your unadorned web browser, even with JavaScript turned off, pointed at the gateway over localhost (or over SSL to a remote host, or whatever you want) * your FTP or SFTP client * FUSE (although in a Rube Goldberg-esque setup where FUSE is chained to the aforementioned SFTP server through the "sshfs" tool; Like a Rube Goldberg device, it actually does work once you get all the pieces set up next to each other.) The semantics of what you can do with this are described in summary here: https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/trunk/docs/about.rst#access-… And in much more detail in the documentation pages linked from there. Does that answer your question? Regards, Zooko [1] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/chrome/LAFS.svg [2] https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/browser/trunk/docs/frontends/CLI.rst P.S. This is a test of charset handling through GNU screen, mutt, and GNU mailman: ¹ (That should be a superscript "1".) _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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"Don't use LastPass"
by Kyle Maxwell 16 Aug '13

16 Aug '13

Anyone more qualified than me (read: nearly everyone on this list) wish to comment on this analysis of a crypto-related vulnerability disclosure in LastPass? http://tobtu.com/lastpass.php -- @kylemaxwell

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New Wikileaks insurance files
by Max R.D Parmer 16 Aug '13

16 Aug '13

Quite a lot. Around 400G. Initial tweets: https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/368411280622620672 https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/368411399053008896 https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/368411566229577728 Probably Snowden's collection, given the size. Maybe indicates the heat on WL/Snowden is cranking up? Did WL entrust the passphrase(s) to folks more or less likely to randomly publish them this time?[1] > $ for file in `cat dl.txt`; do echo $file; curl -I $file; done; > http://wlstorage.net/file/wlinsurance-20130815-A.aes256 > HTTP/1.1 200 OK > Server: nginx/0.7.67 > Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 17:05:09 GMT > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > Connection: keep-alive > Content-Length: 3565158464 > Last-Modified: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 20:38:46 GMT > X-CDN: a > Accept-Ranges: bytes > > http://wlstorage.net/file/wlinsurance-20130815-B.aes256 > HTTP/1.1 200 OK > Server: nginx/0.7.67 > Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 17:05:09 GMT > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > Connection: keep-alive > Content-Length: 49912218080 > Last-Modified: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 15:10:48 GMT > X-CDN: a > Accept-Ranges: bytes > > http://wlstorage.net/file/wlinsurance-20130815-C.aes256 > HTTP/1.1 200 OK > Server: nginx/0.7.67 > Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 17:05:15 GMT > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > Connection: keep-alive > Content-Length: 349385526464 > Last-Modified: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 19:08:57 GMT > X-CDN: a > Accept-Ranges: bytes [1]: http://www.wikileaks.org/Guardian-journalist-negligently.html -- @maximus_freeman 0x7D964D3361142ACF

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Re: [guardian-dev] An email service that requires GPG/PGP?
by Eugen Leitl 16 Aug '13

16 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from Tom Ritter <tom(a)ritter.vg> ----- Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 19:12:24 -0400 From: Tom Ritter <tom(a)ritter.vg> To: Richard <rz(a)linux-m68k.org> Cc: guardian-dev <guardian-dev(a)lists.mayfirst.org>, liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: Re: [guardian-dev] An email service that requires GPG/PGP? On 14 August 2013 18:01, Richard <rz(a)linux-m68k.org> wrote: > On the other end of the paranoia scale I would like to remind folks of the > the mixmaster remailer chaining technique which does much more than plain > encryption - as far as I can see it is theoretically completely untraceable. That statement is not correct. Mix networks require more effort to trace than normal packets or Onion Routing, but are not even close to "theoretically completely untraceable". I'll point to Syverson's papers (Why I'm not an entropist, and Sleeping dogs lie in a bed of onions) and Serjantov's "From a Trickle to a Flood." On 14 August 2013 10:17, Ralph Holz <holz(a)net.in.tum.de> wrote: > Hi Tom > >> Aside from StartCom (free) most CAs have roughly the same price and >> service. Since service is equivalent, you're free to choose a CA >> based on your political opinion, and not worry about missing out on >> 'features'. It's basically like voting in an election - elections are >> won by tens or hundreds of thousands of votes, so it seems like one >> vote doesn't matter. But it can add up. > > Not sure if you know this one, but this article paints a somewhat more > complex picture of the HTTPS economics. In particular, companies buy > from the big players because, alas and behold, they're too big to fail > and will never be removed from root stores: > > @INPROCEEDINGS{Asghari2013, > author = {Asghari, Hadi and van Eeten, Michel J. G. and Arnbak, Axel > M. and van Eijk, Nico A. N. M.}, > year = {2013}, > month = {March}, > title = {Security Economics in the {HTTPS} value chain}, > location = {Washington, D.C., USA}, > booktitle = {Proc. 12th Ann. Workshop on the Economics of Information > Security (WEIS 2013)}, > } I had not seen that paper, that's cool thanks. However, it seems they're observing data (EFF Observatory and Market Prices) and drawing conclusions about why companies make decisions. It would be easier and more reliable to just... ask the companies why they do what they do. They seem to omit that somewhat important step to support their conclusions. -tom _______________________________________________ Guardian-dev mailing list Post: Guardian-dev(a)lists.mayfirst.org List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian-dev To Unsubscribe Send email to: Guardian-dev-unsubscribe(a)lists.mayfirst.org Or visit: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/options/guardian-dev/eugen%40leitl.org You are subscribed as: eugen(a)leitl.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [liberationtech] Google confirms critical Android crypto flaw
by Eugen Leitl 15 Aug '13

15 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from Maxim Kammerer <mk(a)dee.su> ----- Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 15:38:56 +0300 From: Maxim Kammerer <mk(a)dee.su> To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Google confirms critical Android crypto flaw Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 2:34 PM, Nathan of Guardian <nathan(a)guardianproject.info> wrote: > The best description is here: > http://armoredbarista.blogspot.ch/2013/03/randomly-failed-weaknesses-in-jav… Unbelievable… It seems that PRNG implementers suffer from NIH syndrome. If you are going to use /dev/urandom, then use it all the time, and rely on code that's reviewed and maintained by thousands of kernel people, not just your favorite buggy seeded PRNG du-jour. And even sans the bugs, consider something like the following in Apache Harmony (precursor of Dalvik's class library) [1, p. 131]: iv = sha1(iv,concat(state, cnt)); cnt = cnt + 1; return iv; So they're essentially constructing a state-based bit stream that varies in each block, and hash it with SHA-1 — exposing each intermediate hash value in the middle. Who the hell told them it's safe from cryptanalysis POV? E.g., SP800-90A's Hash_DRBG [2, p. 40] resembles nothing of the sort. [1] http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36095-4_9 [2] http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf -- Maxim Kammerer Liberté Linux: http://dee.su/liberte -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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[tor-talk] Flattor: A practical crowdfunded Flattr-like incentive scheme for Tor relays
by Eugen Leitl 15 Aug '13

15 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> ----- Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 15:25:41 +0300 From: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> To: tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org Subject: [tor-talk] Flattor: A practical crowdfunded Flattr-like incentive scheme for Tor relays User-Agent: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2900.5843 Reply-To: tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org ==tldr (Too Long, Didn't Read) Where will Tor's bandwidth come from in 20 years? Will solo volunteers still exist, or will all the bandwidth come from Tor-friendly organizations? Tor incentive schemes are interesting. There are many proposed schemes but their crypto needs to be reviewed and lots of code/spec needs to be written before they can be deployed. This document describes the idea of a Flattr-like crowdfunding model for tor relays. ==Intro (skip if you know why Tor incentive schemes might be useful) One of the goals of Tor is to increase its reach and get tens of millions of Tor users. This makes sense from an anonymity point of view, since an increase on the number of users is also an increase on Tor's anonymity set. One of the problems of scaling Tor to tens of millions of users is that Tor's bandwidth capacity is finite. The current total relay bandwidth is about 4GB/s [0], and it's donated by kind volunteers and various organizations [1]. As the number of users increases, Tor's bandwidth must also increase. Lately the bandwidth coming out of Tor-friendly organizations (like torservers.net, universities, etc.) seems to increase. Currently, there is 50% chance of exiting from an org-controlled exit node, as can be seen in slide 30 of http://freehaven.net/~arma/slides-dimacs13.pdf If this trend continues, Tor might end up looking like the Bitcoin network -- where a number of organizations (mining pools) drive the network. Unfortunately, in contrast with the coin minting of Bitcoin, there is no incentives for organizations to contribute to the Tor network. At the moment, organizations and solo volunteers pay out of their own pocket (or accept donations) to maintain their Tor relays. There must be ways to help reimburse their costs. ==Incentive schemes (feel free to skip if you know this stuff) Incentive schemes for anonymous networks have been extensively researched and there are multiple papers for systems that apply specifically to Tor [2]. Most of those systems require to modify the code of the Tor network, to be able to give "contribution tokens" to relay operators. Then those tokens can be exchanged to get "premium Tor service" or other goods. These systems have a few issues that make them hard to implement and deploy: a) Baking anything inside Tor is a lengthy procedure. Secure designs and code must be written, time must pass for the new code to be deployed and used by the majority of the network, etc. b) These schemes might cause anonymity issues, since the set of people who have "contribution tokens" is smaller than the set of Tor users. The proposed incentive schemes try to fix these issues; for example, LIRA solves it by creating a lottery system (yes, on top of Tor) that rewards "contribution tokens" to random relays. c) Alternative currencies, like "contribution tokens", are not easy to get right. Baking them inside the Tor network is not a trivial task While these proposed "complex" schemes might be The Right Thing for the long-term, we might be able to create an incentive scheme based on already existing technologies; like the bandwidth authorities and Bitcoin. ==Flattor: A simple incentive scheme Flattor is (fictional) software (or a website) that given a Bitcoin wallet and a number of Bitcoins that the user is willing to spend, splits those Bitcoins in chunks and sends them to contributing relay operators. The idea assumes that there is some way to find the Bitcoin address of relay operators. There is no standard way to do so, but operators who are interested in getting reimbursed can put their address in the Contact field of their relay. Flattor uses the bandwidth estimations of Tor to find the contribution factor of each relay. We will assume that these estimates are accurate, since the security of Tor depends on them anyway. As a simplified example, if the Tor network has 4 relays with bandwidth contribution 0.05, 0.05, 0.3 and 0.6 respectively, and the user is willing to spend 1 bitcoin, Flattor will send 0.05, 0.05, 0.3 and 0.6 bitcoins to each relay operator respectively. Of course, this gets more complicated as the number of relays increases, or when only a subset of the relays have a registered bitcoin address, etc. ==Why this might be a good idea It's simple to implement and easy to understand, it doesn't require any Tor code to be written and it can even be started as an unofficial project. Furthermore, it doesn't cause anonymity issues, there are no middlemen, and it doesn't centralize bandwidth to a single relay operator. ==Why this might be a bad idea (This concern is based on a discussion with gmaxwell.) Incentivising Tor relay operators with money is not a good way to run an anonymity network Currently, (we want to believe that) the Tor network is run by a bunch of cypherpunks that are contributing bandwidth because they believe in the Cause. If relay operators start getting money for their bandwidth, we might end up with relay operators that are just in for the money. It might then be easier for a three-letter org to persuade those relay operators to snoop on their users (by giving them double the money they are currently getting). While I agree that this concern is legitimate, I would say that it's pretty far off at the moment: I doubt that anything like Flattor will ever generate a considerable income for anyone. Still, it's something that we should have in mind. (Furthermore, since the Bitcoin blockchain is public you can see how much money each relay operator has gotten so far. Maybe there should be some kind of limit on the number of money each operator should get per time period.) ==Final thoughts There are many details that must be sorted out before Flattr can be implemented. There are also multiple improvements that can be applied on top of the simple model described above. Also, there are ethical issues that spawn up when real money is given to relay operators. My plan was to expand on all these issues in this paragraph, but it seems like I've already spent too many hours writing this document. I'm not planning to implement this system before I hear some opinions from other people. To be honest, I'm not even sure if such an incentive scheme is a good idea, but posting bad ideas to mailing lists is what the Internet is for, right? Thoughts? [0]: https://metrics.torproject.org/network.html#bandwidth [1]: https://metrics.torproject.org/bubbles.html#contact [2]: https://blog.torproject.org/blog/two-incentive-designs-tor http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~jansen/papers/lira-ndss2013.pdf (see section 'VI. RELATED WORK' of the LIRA paper) -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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[guardian-dev] ChatSecure "Burner" accounts
by Eugen Leitl 15 Aug '13

15 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from Nathan of Guardian <nathan(a)guardianproject.info> ----- Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 08:38:09 -0400 From: Nathan of Guardian <nathan(a)guardianproject.info> To: Guardian Dev <guardian-dev(a)lists.mayfirst.org> Subject: [guardian-dev] ChatSecure "Burner" accounts User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130804 Thunderbird/17.0.8 One of the new features, I am finishing implementation on is the ability to quickly create "burner" accounts within ChatSecure v12. As of last nights alpha, you can now create new accounts directly from the app, on supported services such as Jabber.ccc.de and Dukgo.com. In the default mode, you choose a username, password, etc, yourself. The concept of a burner account is that you can quickly create a new clean account with no identifying or memorable details, and have that account only exist on your device, within the encrypted ChatSecure SQLCipher data store. In the burner mode, a random username and password will be generated, all registration and communication will be required to be done over Orbot/Tor, and possibly, we will only support using an XMPP service that has a Tor hidden service. One you are logged in, you can then use the typical invite/add contact feature to start a chat with someone, either on the same box, or any other federated XMPP service. Ideally, the other person is also using a burner account. Any other thoughts on this feature? Other similar implementations or concepts to consider? Perhaps this should be a Force OTR-only as well, and maybe the account auto-deletes after a time period or when you exit the app? Thanks for your feedback, and please, try the latest alpha if you have not yet moved onto v12. It is getting very close to stable, and we are very nearly done with all the new features. +n _______________________________________________ Guardian-dev mailing list Post: Guardian-dev(a)lists.mayfirst.org List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian-dev To Unsubscribe Send email to: Guardian-dev-unsubscribe(a)lists.mayfirst.org Or visit: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/options/guardian-dev/eugen%40leitl.org You are subscribed as: eugen(a)leitl.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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[liberationtech] We'll make ourselves a GNU Internet.. GADS, PSYC, distributed search
by Eugen Leitl 15 Aug '13

15 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from carlo von lynX <lynX(a)time.to.get.psyced.org> ----- Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 09:38:36 +0200 From: carlo von lynX <lynX(a)time.to.get.psyced.org> To: liberationtech(a)mailman.stanford.edu Subject: [liberationtech] We'll make ourselves a GNU Internet.. GADS, PSYC, distributed search User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.20 (2009-06-14) Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> You broke the Internet. We'll make ourselves a GNU one. https://gnunet.org/internetistschuld http://internetistschuld.de http://www.reddit.com/search?q=gnu+internet This is the video from the talks given by Christian Grothoff, Carlo von lynX, Jacob Appelbaum and Richard Stallman in Berlin on August 1st. The talks are in English, even though the welcoming words are in German. Christian Grothoff's talk summarized the recent revelations about PRISM and their implications for non-American citizens, industries and governments. It then presented technical solutions towards a secure and fully decentralized future Internet, which would address key challenges for self-determined life created by the world-wide police state. Interesting details on this: - A new cryptographic method for a privacy-capable DNS/DNSSEC replacement, called GADS. - A faster and smarter extensible messaging syntax than XML and JSON, called PSYC. - A strategy for distributed and liberated Internet search, called RegEx. Carlo von lynX gave a presentation on how secushare intends to provide messaging and Facebook-like functionality on top of GNUnet. Keywords: Scalability by multicast; Social graph vs. Onion routing; Unsafety of your own server. Richard Stallman and Jacob Appelbaum added closing notes of free software and free hardware and responded to questions. It's not about how much you want to make believe you got nothing to hide. It's about your civic duty to not be a predictable populace. Big thanks to the Pirate Party for providing the venue and the recording technology. -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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[Bitcoin-development] bitcoinj 0.10
by Eugen Leitl 15 Aug '13

15 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from Mike Hearn <mike(a)plan99.net> ----- Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 14:26:27 +0200 From: Mike Hearn <mike(a)plan99.net> To: Bitcoin Dev <bitcoin-development(a)lists.sourceforge.net> Subject: [Bitcoin-development] bitcoinj 0.10 Hello, I'm pleased to announce version 0.10 of bitcoinj, a Java library for writing Bitcoin applications. BitcoinJ has been used to create everything from end-user wallet apps to network crawlers to SatoshiDice. To learn how to obtain bitcoinj 0.10, please see the following page: https://code.google.com/p/bitcoinj/wiki/UsingMaven The v0.10 release is signed by Andreas Schildbach's GPG key. The git hash of the release is 777e6781d789. This paragraph is signed by the same Bitcoin key as with previous releases (check their release announcements to establish continuity). Signature: H9Nl7FPnmrUOmjhUZ0+xB4YW3q5F5gIkGdvllsDWmWYvOkNQHAE9jZE0I/qE1VfLPeMV+Rzo7geTB43uDSFSMek= *New in this release* - An implementation of *micropayment channels* was added. There have been many bugfixes and improvements since the first announcement. This feature allows you to set up a 1:1 payment relationship with a remote server and after a short setup process send very tiny payments, very rapidly. It's suitable for metered billing applications. An article, "Working with micropayments" explains how to use it. This work was a joint effort between Matt and myself. - A simple sublibrary has been added that provides async IO based client/server classes that transmit length prefixed protocol buffers. - Thanks to Matija Mazi, some classes have been added that implement *the BIP 32 deterministic wallet algorithm*. Note that these classes are not yet used elsewhere in the system and full deterministic wallet support is therefore not available, however, a low level API is available for experimentation. That API is very likely to change in future releases so don't get too attached to it. - Thanks to Gary Rowe, we have integrated *a new Maven plugin* that checks the SHA1 hashes of downloaded dependencies against a hard-coded list. This means that even if an upstream Maven repository or developer were to be compromised, library dependencies could not be switched out for corrupted versions without someone noticing. For 0.10 the dependency hashes were just initialised based on what was already downloaded. In future, reproducible builds of upstream dependencies and auditing of changes would provide better security. You can and should use Gary's plugin<https://github.com/gary-rowe/BitcoinjEnforcerRules> in your own projects to defend against a possible compromise of the bitcoinj repository. - *Callback handling* has been much improved. Each event listener can have an Executor specified which takes responsibility for running the callback. If you don't specify one they run by default on a single background thread, the "user thread", instead of the origin framework threads. This means your callbacks no longer need to be thread safe as they're always run serially. You can also change the default executor if you would like to control the thread on which callbacks run, for example to marshal them into your GUI toolkit thread automatically. This fixes some of the most painful parts of the pre-0.10 API, for instance that transaction confidence listeners were not allowed to re-enter the library. - *Exception handling* has also improved. You can assign a global Thread.UncaughtExceptionHandler which receives any exceptions thrown on the user thread (i.e. by your own event listeners), as well as any internal exceptions thrown by network threads (like inability to parse a message sent by a remote peer). Because your listeners now run on a separate thread by default, you can no longer accidentally cause internal data corruption or prevent other callbacks from running by leaking exceptions out of your callbacks; a subtle knife-edge in the previous API. - Support for *automatic wallet key rotation* has been added. - We now require Bloom-capable (0.8+) peers by default and will disconnect from older nodes. This avoids accidental bandwidth saturation on mobile devices. - The wallet now accepts timelocked transactions if it created them itself. - The wallet can be told to empty itself out, in which case the fee will be subtracted from the total amount instead of added. This simplifies the common case of wanting to send your entire balance whilst still including a fee. - Some JNI peers for event listeners were added. Auto-generated JNI bindings are experimental and not yet merged in to the mainline codebase: for now they are available as part of a separate project on github. This work allows you to access the bitcoinj API using relatively natural looking C++ code and an embedded JVM. - You can now register custom PeerFilterProvider implementors to add things to Bloom filters that aren't necessarily in wallets. - We have begun adding nullity annotations to the API. Combined with a strong static analysis engine like FindBugs or the IntelliJ Inspector, you can find cases where you aren't handling possible null pointers. Note that you should configure your static analysis system to understand the Guava Preconditions assertions, as otherwise you will get false positives. - You can now control how much information Wallet toString() dumps contain more precisely. Extensions can contribute to a wallets debug dump as well, and transaction data is now optional. - Documentation: The getting started tutorial and PingService example were rewritten. New articles were added that cover optimising chain sync and using the library from non-Java languages. Existing articles were also extended and refreshed. - Many bug fixes and new methods. You should upgrade as soon as possible to get the bug fixes, in particular, one that could cause transactions inside the same block to be incorrectly re-ordered when using Bloom filtering (which can affect the wallet). The library code now has more internal annotations to help static analysis engines, and several bugs were fixed as a result of that. *API Changes* - The ScriptBuilder class now takes TransactionSignature objects, these wrap a raw ECDSA signature and the SIGHASH flags together, with utility methods to work with them. - The Locks class has been renamed to Threading. The thread on which callbacks run has been changed, see above. - The WalletEventListener.onKeyAdded method became onKeysAdded and now takes a list, to make processing of bulk adds more efficient. - BitcoinURIParseException is now checked so you can't forget to handle bogus URIs. - The Wallet.toString(..) method has additional parameters now so you can control what is included in the dump. *Known issues* * * Please see the limitations and missing features<https://code.google.com/p/bitcoinj/wiki/Limitations> page. This page has been fleshed out since the last release with common issues and missing features. A few issues were also fixed and removed. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Get 100% visibility into Java/.NET code with AppDynamics Lite! It's a free troubleshooting tool designed for production. Get down to code-level detail for bottlenecks, with <2% overhead. Download for free and get started troubleshooting in minutes. http://pubads.g.doubleclick.net/gampad/clk?id=48897031&iu=/4140/ostg.clktrk _______________________________________________ Bitcoin-development mailing list Bitcoin-development(a)lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-development ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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