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Fwd: [liberationtech] Geoblocking and Global Video Culture
by Rayzer 28 Jan '16

28 Jan '16

Online read. Download available with login via specific social mediaz or (apparently free) account creation -- RR "Through counter-intelligence it should be possible to pinpoint potential trouble-makers ... And neutralize them, neutralize them, neutralize them" Geoblocking and Global Video Culture Edited by Ramon Lobato and James Meese Theory on Demand #18 Published by the Institute of Network Cultures, Amsterdam, 2016 http://networkcultures.org/blog/publication/no-18-geoblocking-and-global-vi… How do global audiences use streaming platforms like YouTube, Netflix and iPlayer? How does the experience of digital video change according to location? What strategies do people use to access out-of-region content? What are the commercial and governmental motivations behind geoblocking? Geoblocking and Global Video Culture explores the cultural implications of access control and circumvention in an age of VPNs. Featuring seventeen chapters from diverse critical positions and locations – including China, Iran, Malaysia, Turkey, Cuba, Brazil, USA, Sweden and Australia. Contributors: Ramon Lobato, James Meese, Juan Llamas-Rodriguez, Cameran Ashraf, Marketa Trimble, Adam Rugg, Florian Hoof, Roland Burke, Jinying Li, Çiğdem Bozdağ, Chris Baumann, Aneta Podkalicka, Chris Baumann, Sandra Hanchard, Vanessa Mendes Moreira de Sa, Hadi Sohrabi, Fidel Alejandro Rodriguez, Evan Elkins. Copy-editing: Leonieke van Dipten. Editorial support: Miriam Rasch. Cover Design: Katja van Stiphout. DTP: Leonieke van Dipten. EPUB development: Leonieke van Dipten. Infographics: Sandra Hanchard. Printer: Print on Demand. ISBN: 978-94-92302-03-8. -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu.

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To understand what is in the elitist cookbook of the globalist psychopaths
by Александр 28 Jan '16

28 Jan '16

not a bad analysis: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s97Af1SrgjQ

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FBI wants $1, 000 to release 31, 250 pages on one of CIA's dirtiest officers.
by Michael Best 27 Jan '16

27 Jan '16

https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/thomas-clines-fede… He was central to Iran-Contra, the Cuban operations, Pinochet's coup and rise to power, the secret war in Laos, and EATSCO along with Ed Wilson - though he made a deal to escape prosecution.

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Opening up Dugway Proving Grounds, the military's secretive biological weapon testing unit
by Michael Best 27 Jan '16

27 Jan '16

https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2016/jan/27/look-inside-archives-dug… 2,321 pages of report listings GREAT FOIA fodder

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Silk Ulbricht... Lawfare Over The Fourth
by grarpamp 27 Jan '16

27 Jan '16

https://cryptome.org/2016/01/ulbricht-appeal-045.pdf For background, application to various, including surveillance... General Warrants, Writs Of Assistance, Particularity, ...

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Re: request for comment re "contributor-covenant.org"
by Jason McVetta 27 Jan '16

27 Jan '16

Honestly, I just don't want to contribute to any project that feels it necessary to impose a fucking "code of conduct" on participants. Really I have better ways to spend my time. On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 3:01 PM, Cari Machet <carimachet(a)gmail.com> wrote: > One persons code of conduct is another persons dicktator >

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Look ^^^up^^^ at your next intersection, vehicle surveillance abounds
by grarpamp 27 Jan '16

27 Jan '16

https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/no-cost-license-plate-readers-are-tur… "No Cost" License Plate Readers Are Turning Texas Police into Mobile Debt Collectors and Data Miners Vigilant Solutions, one of the country’s largest brokers of vehicle surveillance technology, is offering a hell of a deal to law enforcement agencies in Texas: a whole suite of automated license plate reader (ALPR) equipment and access to the company’s massive databases and analytical tools—and it won’t cost the agency a dime. Even though the technology is marketed as budget neutral, that doesn’t mean no one has to pay. Instead, Texas police fund it by gouging people who have outstanding court fines and handing Vigilant all of the data they gather on drivers for nearly unlimited commercial use. ALPR refers to high-speed camera networks that capture license plate images, convert the plate numbers into machine-readable text, geotag and time-stamp the information, and store it all in database systems. EFF has long been concerned with this technology, because ALPRs typically capture sensitive location information on all drivers—not just criminal suspects—and, in aggregate, the information can reveal personal information, such as where you go to church, what doctors you visit, and where you sleep at night. Vigilant is leveraging H.B. 121, a new Texas law passed in 2015 that allows officers to install credit and debit card readers in their patrol vehicles to take payment on the spot for unpaid court fines, also known as capias warrants. When the law passed, Texas legislators argued that not only would it help local government with their budgets, it would also benefit the public and police. As the bill’s sponsor, Rep. Allen Fletcher, wrote in his official statement of intent: ...

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What you won't hear at Davos
by Ryan Carboni 27 Jan '16

27 Jan '16

The elites at Davos like to talk about change and improving lives, but some fly by helicopter from a private jet. They could have collectively chartered a plane to Zurich, and then take a train to Davos. It does become reminiscent in which Russia supports American democracy groups, and the US supports Russian democracy groups... democracy has become a buzzword for elites to reduce the autonomy of other elites. In 1793, it took less then a year for Napoleon to raise an army of a million men. In WWII, it took America several years to build up it's fighting strength to a level capable of fighting the Nazis. Perhaps today, if we were to start a military from scratch, it will take fifteen years to do it (probably longer if you desire aircraft). The point I'm making is indirect, there is a lot of inertia today brought on by the complexity of technology. The decisions made today once fully implemented cannot be changed for a while. The elites have made wrong decisions, they have erred in the direction of mass surveillance instead of mass liberty, but it did not stop the success of terrorists. Now we are all less secure. Apparently Juniper routers were backdoored... some of which were used by US agencies. One seems to hear more about the OPM hack then the Obamacare website being totally insecure. Government IT policies and organizations have been totally inadequate for a long time. The GCHQ wants MIKEY-SAKKE, as opposed to MIKEY-DH, they don't just want to intercept and decrypt future communications, they want to decrypt past communications ( as if that has been a major obstacle to investigations prior to the computer). But I ramble, to be very clear, to make the internet itself secure, it will probably take ten years. While frequent derisions that people don't use encrypted databases are nonsensical, the solutions more likely to yield a result will take longer to implement. Basically ten years ago, all the elites made the wrong choice, and they don't even have the excuse of saying they properly weighed the issues.

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Darknets: Full of onions, and eeps, and other wondrous things
by grarpamp 27 Jan '16

27 Jan '16

> Email to tor-talk@ [0] made me wonder if (some of) these > are run by the same people that have been trying to hijack > Bitcoin transactions. In the first step, they could enumerate > services by crawling them That would be useful to get an early start in the spamming / seeding publication below. > and setting up an impersonation > site that has substituted Bitcoin addresses on it. There's no need to 'mirror' or 'clone' or 'set up a site', the good ones are just transparent cleartext proxies, one onion in front of another. They can be timed, but don't fall to the dynamic content and update differences that mirrors do. Regardless, the last step is publication of the proxy. This is done in wholesale on onionland services such as forums and the now tens of wannabe 'hidden wikis', many of which are run by the same actors, obviously adding to the attack surface. Users surf them, they and the links looks legit, they get bookmarked and that's that till they somehow find out. It's been going on that way for years. All onionland services should be considered suspect, even email, syndication and storage. > Finally, they are > running malicious exists that rewrite onion domains to their own > impersonation sites. Exit rewriting is an easy way to skim another fraction of users without needing to play with forums and wikis. As interesting as why, is that there are so many. Those willing to immerse themselves in the corners of onionland would probably find some insight, at least for that which comes from there. Topside ventures that reach down into onions would be different story. Databasing, crime, anti-crime, covert stuff, games, research, hacking, and even the overriding majority of everyday legitimate use by users around the globe.... The story and scaling over time of all these aspects is becoming quite interesting. > [0] <https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2016-January/040038.html>

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Network Analysis of Overlay Networks, Capabilities, Fill Traffic [was: VPN less safe?]
by grarpamp 26 Jan '16

26 Jan '16

On Tue, Jan 26, 2016 at 3:09 PM, juan <juan.g71(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On Mon, 25 Jan 2016 10:25:20 -0500 > Paul Syverson <paul.syverson(a)nrl.navy.mil> wrote: > > >> "20,000 In League Under the Sea: Anonymous Communication, Trust, >> MLATs, and Undersea Cables" available at >> http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/popets.2015.1.issue-1/popets-2015-0002/pope… > > > As far as I can see, most if not all of the paper deals with a > way to organize information about 'network topology' but > there's no concrete data regarding which > systems/relays/cables/people/IXPs/ASs/whatever are > 'compromised'. > > ...though the section on cables and cooperation between so > called nation states seems to suggest that virtually all the > world's infrastructure is 'compromised'? The USA and Soviets have decades experience tapping cables around the globe in a cold war sense. The USA/FVEY has top secret blackops and administrative via corp partnership and various legal and extralegal access to extensive cable, hardware, and organizational assets around the globe. It is simply foolish to not assume that the world is highly compromised by these actors. Snowden and all the other surveillance and bigdata news and political rhetoric have been telling you that for over a decade now. You might be safe if you are in a locale untouchable by these actors, conduct all your activities in that locale, and have no similar local adversaries. > Also, is there a more concrete analysis of what can be > achieved by monitoring traffic on those cables? Did you just push a bunch of packets over time into your ISP and have google send replies back? Well, they can see both ends, so they saw that traffic pattern in and out, and back in and out, so they know who's talking to who and when. > Specifically, > how easy it is for your government to find users and especially > servers in the tor network or similar networks (i2p, freenet > etc) In addition to simple taps, they can also deploy passive or active nodes in any of these networks at will. And use all the tools to perturb things in favor of their efforts. Tor and other networks are good at hiding endpoints (users, servers) from each other, keeping traffic content encrypted over the wire, letting you anonymously publish and consume stuff among other users that isn't really of interest to (against) such adversaries (and thus won't get you killed or jailed or disappeared (but will still get you databased for life)), and getting around some censorship. That's probably about it. However when it comes to such global (and regionally lucky) passive adversaries, and adversaries operating the networks themselves, I seriously doubt anyone can say with a straight face that these networks protect against network analysis... who is talking to who and when. It would be harder for that analysis to succeed against networks that filled between all the nodes with fill traffic when unused and not needed for user traffic. (And in the sense of Tor, between clients and some number of guards). But that's hard to design so that it is functional. And no one in the overlay network / messaging field really seems to be trying it. Mindset, OMG bandwidth, probably buzzkills most research before it gets started. Here's some recent mostly tor specific threads if anyone's interested, plus whatever else has come up whenever I've mentioned this. https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-January/010257.html https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2016-January/010290.html > There's also mention of 'user beliefs' and 'trust'. That > strikes me as weird. You seem to be saying that routes > can be choosen according to users' beliefs, not according to > real world facts? It doesn't matter if system X is hostile, > what matters is what the user believes about system X? Users often have better knowledge of the laws, operations and general feel in their countries and locales and areas of expertise than a handful of distant project maintainers largely based in one geopolitical exposure might have. You can download science, but you need more than that to win a street fight.

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