- cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

open source drone autopilot
by Eugen Leitl 29 Aug '13

29 Aug '13

http://paparazzi.enac.fr/wiki/Lisa/S Lisa/S Lisa/S is a very small general purpose autopilot. The main goal of creating an autopilot of minimal size and weight, while providing a lot of functionality is achieved: Size: 20mm x 20mm x 5mm (0.787" x 0.787" x 0.197") Weight: 2.8g (0.1oz) Features 72MHz 32bit ARM Cortex M3 MCU with 16KB RAM and 512KB Flash Combined 3 Axis Gyroscope and 3 Axis Accelerometer 3 Axis Magnetometer Barometer (Altimeter) Onboard U-Blox GPS Pads to simply connect a Superbit CYRF RC and telemetry module Switching buck/boost converter allowing wide range of power input making it perfect and stable for operation from a 1S LiPO cell. 2 MOSFET switches connected to PWM output channels 6 PWM (servo) outputs 1 debug UART port 1 CAN interface 1 Bind/Boot tact switch SWD programming/debugging interface Size: 20mm x 20mm x 5mm (0.787" x 0.787" x 0.197") Weight: 2.8g (0.1oz) Pictures So if you are ready to make your tiny plane fly autonomously,you can already order one here.

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Running in overlay circles [was: Why_can't_email_be_secure]
by grarpamp 29 Aug '13

29 Aug '13

On 8/26/13, rysiek <rysiek(a)hackerspace.pl> wrote: > It's a seemingly unsolvable conundrum: > - start with a clean slate and create a new, "perfect" solution; > - start with something people already use and improve it as much as > possible. > > The former approach has the risk of the solution not being adopted; the > latter > -- of the new solution not being good enough due to technicalities of the > solution it is based on. > > But maybe it could be possible to get the best of both worlds? > > Had a new solution been created in a way that is usable via existing mail > clients (e.g. implementing IMAP for message retrieval and SMTP for message > submission) while designing and implementing a completely new way of > comminicating server-to-server -- it might achieve just that. When you cleanslate things you are not held back by the past. Napster, bittorrent, icq... all completely new and instant mass appeal, because they did something that people wanted. That overrode every other consideration the user had, including... now hang on, I know this will be hard for some to believe.... downloading and installing the app and actually learning how to use it. These days, there is a want for secure messaging. Thanks to recent news... I'm actually taking questions from morons off the street that now want to 'send secret messages'. I don't have time so the standard answer is usually 'read and pick something from prism-break.org.' There are already cleanslate systems cryptographically secure against content and internal addressing snooping. The resistance to global passive/active adversaries from connecting the realworld IP talkers needs work. And to truly replace traditional email (especially in the business world) you will need a community of powerful messaging clients... lots of spec decisions to be made there... lots of traction with existing thunderbird, mutt, etc UI/handling frontends. But can you save that and swap out their legacy smtp/imap network semantics. Then you have the userspace key management for end2end message security to work on as well. All of this is interconnected too... once you start designing a strong messaging system, it begins to look like a general purpose transport, possibly one with parameterized options. Then you start thinking how to plug other apps into it. So you're back to looking like another I2P, Tor, GnuNet, Phantom, Freenet, AnoNet, etc... lots of the same stuff under the hood. Will there ever be a generic, possibly modular, overlay to come along and handle it all? Or are we just running in overlay circles?

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Tin Can
by Frederic Jacobs 28 Aug '13

28 Aug '13

Mozilla released something that looks pretty good. Haven’t looked at the security yet. It’s peer to peer video that works in the browser with WebRTC and uses Persona to sign in. http://tincan.im/

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Metadata anonymization through time delayed email messaging.
by Jeff Scofield 28 Aug '13

28 Aug '13

We know that with or without data content analysis of actual email messages, lots of information can be inferred through various forms of metadata collection. Given this reality the question becomes, what can be done? One strategy might be to consider the adoption of a time delayed email system. The reason why the use of such a mechanism to allow someone the ability to write an email, and then have it sent off at a specified (or randomly generated unspecified) date is useful for multiple reasons. If a program could be coded in a way which could delay the actual transmission of data in such a manner that the original time of creation was adequately masked, it could hamper nefarious metadata collection of time-stamping and possibly geo-locating of user information. For example: A person walks into a computer café at 10am and sets an email to send at around 4am the following morning (via cloud or machine). The data gets sent at 4am when the building is empty. No CCTV photos/cameras are able to document who sent the message because the computer café is unoccupied at 4am. The software is designed in such a fashion that it is nearly impossible to unmask the original time when the message was instructed to send, thus hiding the metadata associated with time-stamping, and thus hiding the true identity of the computer user at the café at 10am the previous day. Any and all feed back regarding this idea is welcome.

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Geotemporal Public Key Distribution
by Rich Jones 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

This is a small, unfinished idea I had, but I'd be interested in hearing any feedback anybody here might have to offer. Normally we talk about cryptography to secure communications, but this is an idea rather about verifying the authenticity of media. [Quick backround: OpenWatch <https://openwatch.net> is a global citizen media network using mobile phones as the basis for a free worldwide press. We care very much about the authenticity of citizen media, and have designed some systems <https://github.com/Miserlou/CitizenMediaNotary>which attempt to improve the verifiability of citizen media.] The problem is that sometimes media artifacts are presented as a record of a current event, when in fact they from different events. An example of this was when images of a marathon race in Istanbul were presented as images<http://twitchy.com/2013/06/01/debunked-photo-of-occupygezi-crowds-crossing-…>of the recent Occupy Gezi protests. Now, imagine the globe divided into a grid coordinate system, say 100,000 units (or perhaps 232, if IP rather than physical address is to be used). Based on their physical location, reporters can contact a server and are assigned a key with which to sign or encrypt their media to. This then ties a media object to a physical space. This can be further improved to include both time and space by dividing a space-day into a number of units, suppose 1440, such that different keys would be handed out at different times of the day, thus further tying a document to a moment in time as well. Does anybody know if any systems like this have ever been discussed or designed in the past? I suppose this is somewhat similar to the RSA-keyfob system, although this allows for anonymous access without pre-arrangement as well. R

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[tahoe-dev] join us for the Tahoe-LAFS v.11 planning meeting tomorrow
by Eugen Leitl 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from Zooko Wilcox-OHearn <zooko(a)leastauthority.com> ----- Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 16:46:20 +0000 From: Zooko Wilcox-OHearn <zooko(a)leastauthority.com> To: Tahoe-LAFS development <tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org> Subject: [tahoe-dev] join us for the Tahoe-LAFS v.11 planning meeting tomorrow Folks: Everyone is invited to participate in a video conference using Google Hangouts tomorrow, Wednesday the 28th, at 15:00Z, for 1 hour. Here is more detail: https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/wiki/WeeklyMeeting The video conference will be recorded and posted to the public on youtube (if we can figure out how to make it do that). The topic will be: What is coming in Tahoe-LAFS v1.11! ☺ Regards, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn Founder, CEO, and Customer Support Rep https://LeastAuthority.com Freedom matters. _______________________________________________ tahoe-dev mailing list tahoe-dev(a)tahoe-lafs.org https://tahoe-lafs.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tahoe-dev ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [cryptography] NSA cracking UN videoconference - worried?
by John Young 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

It should be remembered that most, if not all, the UN members spy on one another. UN embassies and consulates in NYC bristle with antenna. The US embassy, a high-rise across from the UN, overlooks the mother ship and the wee boats huddling close. It was rebuilt a few years ago to get rid of the old tech and install new defenses and offenses. The area is a thick web of spy operations -- residences and offices, sidewalkers and waitpersons, limo and taxi drivers, maids and doormen, janitors and sex partners, UN staff and renovation teams, construction, health and environmental inspectors. A privtate TSCM wizard active in NYC and DC and several other spy nests, claims no spot on earth is as heavily spied as NYC -- the UN, finance, corporate HQs, FBI, DoJ, whorehouses, the lot -- that the spies respect each other's need for a bye if discovered, returning the favor by reporting few misses and many successes as a survival courtesy. And that that is the back-scratching MO in national and financial capitals and mil-econo-gov bastions everywhere. No secret to cryptographers and network operators. What, you think spies and govs and mil and comseckers really compete? Getthefuckoutahere. Sure they all cheat despite these tacit agreements which are pure baloney in the great tradition of fleecing dimwitted politicians and taxpayers who pretend dimwittedness as necessary warcraft, tradecraft, statecraft and citizenry. So who's the biggest and baddest of the spies of the moment. NSA and Google according to sacrificial goat Julian Assange. But, lord almighty, it is obvious who hired him to leak that: NSA and Google, fearing they would be outbid for his hermitage sagacity by Bears and Tigers, Microsoft and ATT, Verizon and Yahoo, IBM and RSA, Cisco and Apple, MIT and Rand, Stanford and Columbia, Koch and Soros, BBN and SAIC. Their marketing antennas ambitiously bristling, their whistleblowers and security researchers ablowing like comely prostitutes along 1st Avenue, a couple more dutiful transgender goats twisting in the wind to recruit those desiring life-changing cuddling with Bill Clinton and Colin Powell, Guardian and NYT, MacArthur, Rockefeller and Ford, Lockheed and Northrup. Syria heading to be the new Haiti, NGOs poised to nick carrion.

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Re: [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?
by Eugen Leitl 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from Peter Gutmann <pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz> ----- Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 00:28:54 +0000 From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001(a)cs.auckland.ac.nz> To: "cryptography(a)metzdowd.com" <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com> Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets? Ralph Holz <ralph-cryptometzger(a)ralphholz.de> writes: >There is a host of older literature, too - P2P research, however, has become >a cold topic. Although I expect that it will see a revival in the face of >surveillance. For people who are interested, the list I have (for a year or two back) is: "Security Considerations for Peer-to-Peer Distributed Hash Tables", Emil Sit and Robert Morris, Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Peer-to- Peer Systems (IPTPS'01), Springer-Verlag LNCS No.2429, March 2002, p.261. "A Survey of Peer-to-Peer Security Issues", Dan Wallach, Proceedings of the 2002 International Symposium on Software Security (ISSS'02), Springer-Verlag LNCS No.2609, November 2002, p.42. "Eclipse Attacks on Overlay Networks: Threats and Defenses", Atul Singh, Tsuen-Wan Ngan, Peter Druschel and Dan Wallach, Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM'06), April 2006, "The Index Poisoning Attack in P2P File Sharing Systems", Jian Liang, Naoum Naoumov and Keith Ross, Proceedings of the 25th Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM'06), April 2006, "Conducting and Optimizing Eclipse Attacks in the Kad Peer-to-Peer Network", Michael Kohnen, Mike Leske and Erwin Rathgeb, Proceedings of the 8th IFIP-TC 6 Networking Conference (Networking'09), Springer-Verlag LNCS No.5550, May 2009, p.104. "Combating Index Poisoning in P2P File Sharing", Lingli Deng, Yeping He and Ziyao Xu, Proceedings of the 3rd Conference and Workshops on Advances in Information Security and Assurance (ISA'09), Springer-Verlag LNCS No.5576, June 2009, p.358. "Hashing it out in public: Common failure modes of DHT-based anonymity schemes", Andrew Tran, Nicholas Hopper and Yongdae Kim, Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES'09), November 2009, p.71. "Poisoning the Kad Network", Thomas Locher, David Mysicka, Stefan Schmid and Roger Wattenhofer, Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Distributed Computing and Networking (ICDCN'10), Springer-Verlag LNCS No.5935, January 2010, p.195. If there's anything significant I've missed, feel free to fill in the gaps. Peter. _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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<nettime> Cryptome suffers brief take-down over Japanese 'terror' files
by Eugen Leitl 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from nettime's avid reader <nettime(a)kein.org> ----- Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 10:47:50 +0200 From: nettime's avid reader <nettime(a)kein.org> To: nettime-l(a)mx.kein.org Subject: <nettime> Cryptome suffers brief take-down over Japanese 'terror' files User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130803 Thunderbird/17.0.8 Reply-To: a moderated mailing list for net criticism <nettime-l(a)mail.kein.org> Cryptome suffers brief take-down over Japanese 'terror' files Bitten by attack dog, just a flesh wound By Richard Chirgwin, 26th August 2013 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/08/26/cryptome_suffers_brief_takedown_ove… Longstanding whistleblower site Cryptome.org is back online after a brief takedown, sparked by its hosting of a list of alleged Japanese terrorists. The takedown by host Network Solutions came as a result of a complaint signed Sima Jiro, who complained that the 114 documents in a file identified as jp-terrorist-files.zip contained “lots of personal information, such as named, DOBs, family structures, workplaces, phone numbers. And also containing lots of documents which are probably classified or confidential”. The complainant also hoped not to be identified to Cryptome: “I sincerely ask you to refrain from sending my request forward to your customer or administrator of “Cryptome” or the uploader of the ZIP file.” Network Solutions initially complied with the request. However – presumably following some discussion between John Young and Network Solutions – it has now been restored. Young is no stranger to takedowns. His site, an anonymous drop-box for whistleblowers which documents both corporate and government shenanigans, has been variously attacked with notices from Microsoft (taken down and then restored), Yahoo! (taken down and restored), and PayPal (banned then unbanned). In 2010, Young famously described Wikileaks' Julian Assange as a “narcissistic individual” who is willing to “sacrifice Bradley Manning* and anyone else to advance their own interests” (*now Chelsea Manning). The correspondence over the latest takedown is here. [1] [1] http://cryptome.org/2013/08/cryptome-suspended.htm # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)kein.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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[Cryptography] Is Traffic Analysis the problem (was Re: Good private email)
by Eugen Leitl 27 Aug '13

27 Aug '13

----- Forwarded message from "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> ----- Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2013 17:32:38 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> To: Richard Salz <rich.salz(a)gmail.com> Cc: "cryptography(a)metzdowd.com" <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com> Subject: [Cryptography] Is Traffic Analysis the problem (was Re: Good private email) X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.9.0 (GTK+ 2.24.20; x86_64-apple-darwin12.4.0) On Mon, 26 Aug 2013 14:53:54 -0400 Richard Salz <rich.salz(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > Traffic analysis is the problem > > Do you really think that for most people on the planet, that it is? Probably. If one's threat model is mass dragnet surveillance, traffic analysis is far too useful a way for the enemy to figure out who to subject to detailed analysis. The fact that quite so much traffic analysis data is being collected and saved right now should be a warning -- people who have huge budgets seem to think that it is an interesting way to snoop. Imagine you're the dictator of a country, and you want to figure out who all your political enemies are so you can throw them in camps. Simply producing the social network graph connecting up a few known activists to their tightest cluster of common contacts is going to give you loads of juicy information on who to spy on in detail and likely who to detain. Indeed, the traffic analysis information is probably the best way to figure out where to look for the needles in the haystack. > Hey folks, go off and design your perfect secure system. Build a > prototype or alpha-test even. And then watch while the millions of > people who could benefit from private email, and the few who could > use it as an infrastructure to build more services, ignore you. It doesn't have to be either-or. :) There are a lot of people in the community. Working on many different approaches is probably for the best. It is hard to tell, a priori, what will happen to take off. Perry -- Perry E. Metzger perry(a)piermont.com _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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