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[Cryptography] EFF press release on latest FISA opinions release
by Eugen Leitl 11 Sep '13

11 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> ----- Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 19:12:32 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com Subject: [Cryptography] EFF press release on latest FISA opinions release X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.9.0 (GTK+ 2.24.20; x86_64-apple-darwin12.4.0) The documents haven't yet been completely processed, but they've already found some interesting features. Quoting: The NSA apparently believed that it had the authority to search the telephone records database in order to obtain the 'reasonable articulable suspicion' required to investigate those numbers. Essentially, they were conducting suspicionless searches to obtain the suspicion the FISA court required to conduct searches. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-… Note that the USG has misleadingly claimed that this document release was part of an effort to be "transparent" -- in fact, these are the result of an EFF FOIA and were released at court order. -- Perry E. Metzger perry(a)piermont.com _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [Cryptography] soft chewy center
by Eugen Leitl 11 Sep '13

11 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> ----- Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 19:05:40 -0400 From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry(a)piermont.com> To: bmanning(a)isi.edu Cc: bmanning(a)vacation.karoshi.com, cryptography(a)metzdowd.com Subject: Re: [Cryptography] soft chewy center X-Mailer: Claws Mail 3.9.0 (GTK+ 2.24.20; x86_64-apple-darwin12.4.0) On Tue, 10 Sep 2013 21:58:28 +0000 bmanning(a)vacation.karoshi.com wrote: > some years back, i was part of a debate on the relative value of > crypto - and it was pointed out that for some sectors, crypto > ensured _failure_ simply because processing the bits introduced > latency. for these sectors, speed was paramount. > > think HFT or any sort of "Flash Mob" event where you want in/out as > quickly as possible. The latency cost of a stream cipher implemented in hardware can be as little as the time it takes a single XOR gate to operate -- which is to say, low even by the standards of my friends who do high frequency trading (many of whom do, in fact, claim to encrypt most of their communications). Certainly crypto is not the only (or even most important) way to make systems secure. In breaking in to a system, implementation bugs are where you look, not cracking cipher keys. However, latency qua latency seems like a poor reason to avoid encrypting your traffic. It might, of course, be a reason to avoid certain architectural decisions in how you use the crypto -- a public key operation per packet would clearly add unacceptable latency in many applications. Perry -- Perry E. Metzger perry(a)piermont.com _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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WREN: The First Satellite YOU Can Fly
by Eugen Leitl 11 Sep '13

11 Sep '13

http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1467273745/wren-fly-a-real-spacecraft-b… The only satellite in Earth orbit that YOU can control DIRECTLY ! You are the pilot. Launch is this year! Even nowadays space is not opened to the public, but we will change that - this year ! We are four guys in a garage, and we have dedicated ourselves to open space for everyone. For that purpose we designed the miniaturized satellite WREN. It’s a so called Pocketqub-Femtosatellite. It has only 5x5x5cm³ of volume and 250g of mass, and fits perfectly into your hand, like a tennis ball. Despite of its size, it even has real thrusters. It can be remotely positioned by you in every direction and it has a camera onboard for taking pictures from outer space. It will be released into a polar orbit before the end of this year on board of the UNISAT-5 deployer, which is launched inside a DNEPR Rocket from Yasni in Russia. It will race around the globe every 98 minutes, passing every point of the earth during each day, seven days a week, just waiting for the command to be remotely flown by you. System overview WREN System Overview WREN is equipped with a camera, a gyro and a magnetic field sensor. Those three components will form an adaptive feedback guidance system which helps you to easily navigate the satellite by your own by using its momentum wheels and microthrusters. The camera is equipped with an image processing system which can find the position of the sun and the earth automatically. This technology will make the control of the satellite more easy. With the camera system you can of course remotely take pictures of the earth, the sun and other space objects. You can navigate the satellite directly in order to make your own picture. The communication up- and downlink will be performed at 437,405 MHz, a frequency in the 70cm amateur radio band which has been kindly assigned to us by the International Amateur Radio Union (IARU). Wren will be flying in a sun synchronous orbit at 700km of altitude at an incredible speed of 7500 m/second, so that it will take only 98 minutes to fly one time all around the planet. Practically, a link is possible for about 10 minutes from a single ground station, up to three times a day. The mission control software is equipped with prediction algorithms in order to predict the flyby- time according to your location, so you can prepare yourself for the upcoming communication window and take control over the satellite again. We hope that amateur radio enthusiasts will join our network and provide a link from time to time to use WRENs lifetime as long as possible. Send a message into deep space You can send a message into deep space. Of course it will be also receptable on earth. Everytime WREN sends his status to earth, it will also send out one of the saved messages. If WREN survives for years, your message will be sent several times into the deep far universe. Project Status The rocket launch is scheduled for November this year. Wren is currently in the final assembly process and will be integrated into the deployer in October this year, after the shaker test. We will be helped out with a professional ground station after launch for the first weeks, but we want to build our own mobile groundstation to be able to establish the link for you anytime. We will publish the plans for the groundstation as soon as it is ready and working, so everybody can build it! How do we get into space so cheaply? Bringing one kilogram of mass into orbit costs about 50000$. Rockets must carry their fuel all the way up, so the laws of physics make them big, heavy and expensive. So how do we fly so relatively cheaply? First, we are light, about 250 grams. And we fly piggyback on a bigger satellite called "UNISAT-5". This satellite, together with some others, are all stored in one rocket, so the costs for the launch will be shared according to the mass. Wren will be stored in a deployment unit called MRFOD. Wren will be waiting inside this MRFOD in the satellite "UNISAT-5" for his release into the open space The rocket will go up in November and will release UNISAT-5 and other satellites. Wren will be released into space out of Unisat about one month later. Please Spread the message We want to bring space into your living room. To achieve this we need your help, not only by asking you for backing us with money but also by telling the story to everybody you know who may be interested in space. We also need amateur radio guys who would like to take part in project and follow Wren all along its way around the planet by listening its beacon and messages you pledged for, being heard. Our blogs and webpages, reports and videos are just a few components of the whole message. You are the messengers, you are the carrier of the idea of transporting space into everybody's living room - and beyond!

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SPDZ, a practical protocol for Multi-Party Computation
by Eugen Leitl 11 Sep '13

11 Sep '13

http://www.mathbulletin.com/research/Breakthrough_in_cryptography_could_res… Breakthrough in cryptography could result in more secure computing (9/10/2013) Tags: computer science, research, security, cryptography Nigel Smart, Professor of Cryptology New research to be presented at the 18th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2013) this week could result in a sea change in how to secure computations. The collaborative work between the University of Bristol and Aarhus University (Denmark) will be presented by Bristol PhD student Peter Scholl from the Department of Computer Science. The paper, entitled 'Practical covertly secure MPC for dishonest majority - or: Breaking the SPDZ limits', builds upon earlier joint work between Bristol and Aarhus and fills in the missing pieces of the jigsaw from the groups prior work that was presented at the CRYPTO conference in Santa Barbara last year. The SPDZ protocol (pronounced "Speedz") is a co-development between Bristol and Aarhus and provides the fastest protocol known to implement a theoretical idea called "Multi-Party Computation". The idea behind Multi-Party Computation is that it should enable two or more people to compute any function of their choosing on their secret inputs, without revealing their inputs to either party. One example is an election, voters want their vote to be counted but they do not want their vote made public. The protocol developed by the universities turns Multi-Party Computation from a theoretical tool into a practical reality. Using the SPDZ protocol the team can now compute complex functions in a secure manner, enabling possible applications in the finance, drugs and chemical industries where computation often needs to be performed on secret data. Nigel Smart, Professor of Cryptology in the University of Bristol's Department of Computer Science and leader on the project, said: "We have demonstrated our protocol to various groups and organisations across the world, and everyone is impressed by how fast we can actually perform secure computations. "Only a few years ago such a theoretical idea becoming reality was considered Alice in Wonderland style over ambitious hope. However, we in Bristol realised around five years ago that a number of advances in different areas would enable the pipe dream to be achieved. It is great that we have been able to demonstrate our foresight was correct." The University of Bristol is now starting to consider commercialising the protocol via a company Dyadic Security Limited, co-founded by Professor Smart and Professor Yehuda Lindell from Bar-Ilan University in Israel. Note: This story has been adapted from a news release issued by the University of Bristol

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Re: [cryptography] Forward Secrecy Extensions for OpenPGP: Is this still a good proposal?
by Eugen Leitl 11 Sep '13

11 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Adam Back <adam(a)cypherspace.org> ----- Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 22:09:26 +0200 From: Adam Back <adam(a)cypherspace.org> To: "Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)" <lists(a)infosecurity.ch> Cc: Ian Brown <ian.brown(a)oii.ox.ac.uk>, cryptography(a)randombit.net Subject: Re: [cryptography] Forward Secrecy Extensions for OpenPGP: Is this still a good proposal? User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) You know coincidentally we (the three authors of that paper) were just talking about that very topic in off-list (and PGP encrypted:) email. I remain keen on forward-secrecy, and it does seem to be in fashion again right now. Personally I think we in the open community need to up our game an order of magnitude. We thought we won the last crypto wars when mandatory key escrow was abandoned, and US crypto export regs basically scrapped. But it turns out instead they just went underground and sabotaged everything they could gain influence over with a $250m/year black budget and limited regard for law, ethics and human rights. Apparently including SSL MITMs using CAs keys. You've got to think (NSA claims to be the biggest employer of mathematicians) that seeing the illegal activities the US has been getting up to with the fruits of their labour that they may have a mathematician retention or motivation problem on their hands. Who wants their life's work to be a small part in the secret and illegal creation of a surveillance state, with a real risk of creating the environment for a hard to recover fascist political regime over the next century if the events allow even worse governments to get in that further overthrow democratic pretense. How about this for another idea, go for TLS 2.0 that combines ToR and TLS, and deprecate HTTP (non TLS) and TLS 1.x and SSL. Every web server a ToR node, every server an encrypted web cache, many browsers a ToR node. Do something to up the game, not just blunder along reacting and failing year on year to deploy fixes for glaring holes. Adam On Tue, Sep 10, 2013 at 08:35:08PM +0200, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote: > Hi all, > > i just read about this internet draft "Forward Secrecy Extensions for > OpenPGP" available at > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brown-pgp-pfs-03 . > > Is it a still good proposal? > > Should it be revamped as an actual improvement of currently existing use > of OpenPGP technology? _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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[cryptography] ProPublica's Jeff Larson on the NSA Crypto Story and Another View
by Eugen Leitl 11 Sep '13

11 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> ----- Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 14:38:01 -0400 From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> To: cryptography(a)randombit.net, cyperhpunks(a)cpunks.org, cryptome(a)freelists.org Subject: [cryptography] ProPublica's Jeff Larson on the NSA Crypto Story and Another View X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 7.1.0.9 ProPublica's Jeff Larson on the NSA Crypto Story http://source.mozillaopennews.org/en-US/articles/propublicas-jeff-larson-ns… Describes two months of digging through the Snowden documents, using search tool Intella, finding code words, looking for references to those, scrambling to understand and explain the technology to experts and the public, traveling between New York and London, thrill of working with NYT, Guardian and others. Claims extraordinary security was laid on to protect the material. But doesn't say what it was or is. Pretty good gritty back story compared to the burnished fronts. Hard to tell if it is a front story as well due to admission of withholding materials. Nothing said about consulting with USG or HMG. Here's a much less polite viewpoint: http://ohtarzie.wordpress.com/2013/09/10/fuck-the-guardian-take-your-drip-a… _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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generating noisy samples at a high rate with RTLSDR
by Eugen Leitl 10 Sep '13

10 Sep '13

Just remembered another cheap option for generating a lot of noisy samples: http://sdr.osmocom.org/trac/wiki/rtl-sdr Especially, with wideband RF noise source.

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Re: [guardian-dev] OpenPGP Keychain 2.1 with new API
by Eugen Leitl 10 Sep '13

10 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from David Holl <david(a)ad5ey.net> ----- Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 12:29:17 -0400 From: David Holl <david(a)ad5ey.net> To: Natanael <natanael.l(a)gmail.com> Cc: k-9-dev(a)googlegroups.com, guardian-dev <guardian-dev(a)lists.mayfirst.org> Subject: Re: [guardian-dev] OpenPGP Keychain 2.1 with new API -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 On Tue, Sep 10, 2013 at 05:44:33PM +0200, Natanael wrote: > While mentioning smartcards, the Yubikey Neo seems to have an > OpenPGP smartcard mode (that needs to manually actiated in > firmware), could that work with this app? I would hope so. Does the Neo claim to be compatible with the open specification? http://g10code.com/docs/openpgp-card-2.0.pdf > Then you'd always have a hardware protected keypair (if you don't > lose your Yubikey), so even rootkits can't get your private key. Exactly! :) Rootkits or compromised firmware... And even if a compromised device does cache my pin and use my card (while briefly inserted), I hope to be alerted of any illicit accesses courtessy of the signature counter built into the card. There seem to be at least 3 potential "cards" that I'm aware of: OpenPGP SmartCard V2 Yubikey Neo Crypto Stick https://www.crypto-stick.com/ (I put "cards" in quotes, because the Crypto Stick includes a "thumb" form-factor USB interface. Though not as tiny as the Neo, it still supports 4096 bit keys.) - - David Aside: I selected the OpenPGP SmartCard V2 for my personal use, because the Crypto Stick has been out of stock for a while, and the Yubikey Neo appears to only support 2048 bit keys. If I really want the "thumb" form factor of the Crypto Stick, I may try popping out the ID-000 minicard from the OpenPGP SmartCard and putting it into a "Gemalto USB Shell Token V2" (aka the "IDBridge K30"). Otherwise, the "SCM SCR3500" reader is almost small enough for use on a key chain, and is widely available at reasonable prices. (about $40 total for a SmartCard V2 with a SCM SCR3500 reader.) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJSL0jdAAoJEDnNbkIYxVca7psP/1oJT7/IFofnfM8Qs4ugb7RJ 1P3jeZHKD7QtgGtRQk4kUYypvxZq56xGQd2k2hZSUtVYrmewj//Siyi9cpIRrdts h2XUi5RhOUCT6Rz/Zd8Mti0urcEghbxaDHjUa4JichEOlKRAjZsQjc0xnHsuyauw TBGCuOeAhw9gCuKrXOpHnzwnRtcmBRcxLrOn+q9cQCx8EkdEiQgklMl5qqzNpOa3 VnvvMNk5wZ144WUYd5F78Tn9ssDEO/Jt1DO6WtWEJq5DjTAZVxyRXVp1/7e6/se9 haiUJu8Zl8Co7HeLZBtJlNDG2pzqiQu5vCywZyprMFf0ZNpLwpvP7iLmuz2n5R16 0EYQJ5z3g5c2YLivIawxzUO+26gXEDLpFZZFzRf8zobnfYhvqjQFPNU3HtR/jp34 UPgg3urHlUIvGPns3/Z2pfIuyru7uUfLZEWHPiPx/g4pFBLrZAdzyRJZOJ9SWCtd eNdfNGtMf/XfRYyb4eYlEUxEdvt0qJ8M9u+/1jPupDYvVhn/feFgZE/cumlv+AM3 VFA8HvQ1grDgW9JL4KkUCuasEpAjJo9on7AGx0SrKiHyYKSjOCR183yzlckoOz8c O5hhbGb07hL4cfGAIDJ7rBwAliejyrZ2OBHpyLvJ3Eanwbdux72saIcEvmStDK5L MI3+5DeZoV0vBUVmkgxp =pa6I -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Guardian-dev mailing list Post: Guardian-dev(a)lists.mayfirst.org List info: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/listinfo/guardian-dev To Unsubscribe Send email to: Guardian-dev-unsubscribe(a)lists.mayfirst.org Or visit: https://lists.mayfirst.org/mailman/options/guardian-dev/eugen%40leitl.org You are subscribed as: eugen(a)leitl.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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Re: [cryptome] Interesting
by John Young 10 Sep '13

10 Sep '13

Security theater. Phony as thinking NSA and national spies spy from embassies, not the key internet exchanges and telecom hubs in Frankfurt and other locations around the globe. This is amply described in a slew of technical reports and popular articles and books. Although, tellingly, not much discussed on crypto and comsec fora where the telecom and internet experts blow smoke and jerk off one other about trivial arcana to conceal their role in helping the spies for handsome salaries and fees. NDAs behind the wanking are abundant, hopefully some to be revealed by Snowden if not quietly redacted by those very same wankers ostensibly helping spread the word of perfidy by TLAs as cover for crypto onanism. At 09:23 AM 9/10/2013, you wrote: >Colleagues, > ><http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-helicopter-searched-for-…>http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-helicopter-searched-for-… >-- >Best regards. > >Haim Barak >To Serve and Protect Our Community >In God We Trust >Israel#: 5353... >Email: <mailto:haim357@gmail.com>haim357(a)gmail.com >Skype: haim.357 ><http://haim357.wordpress.com/>http://haim357.wordpress.com/ > ><http://haim357.files.wordpress.com/2009/11/banner.jpg> >This e-mail is intended only for the named recipient(s) and may contain >information that is privileged, confidential and/or exempt from >disclosure under applicable law. No waiver of privilege, confidence or >otherwise is intended by virtue of communication via the Internet. Any >unauthorized use, dissemination or copying is strictly prohibited. >Thank you.

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Re: [Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite
by Eugen Leitl 10 Sep '13

10 Sep '13

----- Forwarded message from Jerry Leichter <leichter(a)lrw.com> ----- Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 07:42:55 -0400 From: Jerry Leichter <leichter(a)lrw.com> To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam(a)gmail.com> Cc: "cryptography(a)metzdowd.com" <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com>, ianG <iang(a)iang.org> Subject: Re: [Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1283) On Sep 9, 2013, at 12:00 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: > Steve Bellovin has made the same argument and I agree with it. Proliferation of cipher suites is not helpful. > > The point I make is that adding a strong cipher does not make you more secure. Only removing the option of using weak ciphers makes you more secure. I'm not so sure I agree. You have to consider the monoculture problem, combined with the threat you are defending against. The large burst of discussion on this list was set off by Perry's request for ways to protect against the kinds of broad-scale, gather-everything attacks that Snowden has told us the NSA is doing. So consider things from the side of someone attempting to mount this kind of attack: 1. If everyone uses the same cipher, the attacker need only attack that one cipher. 2. If there are thousands of ciphers in use, the attacker needs to attack some large fraction of them. As a defender, if I go route 1, I'd better be really, really, really sure that my cipher won't fall to any attacks over its operational lifetime - which, if it's really universal, will extend many years *even beyond a point where a weakness is found*. On the other hand, even if most of the ciphers in my suite are only moderately strong, the chance of any particular one of them having been compromised is lower. This is an *ensemble* argument, not an *individual* argument. If I'm facing an attacker who is concentrating on my messages in particular, then I want the strongest cipher I can find. Another way of looking at this is that Many Ciphers trades higher partial failure probabilities for lower total/catastrophic failure probabilities. Two things are definitely true, however: 1. If you don't remove ciphers that are found to be bad, you will eventually pollute your ensemble to the point of uselessness. If you want to go the "many different ciphers" approach, you *must* have an effective way to do this. 2. There must be a large set of potentially good ciphers out there to choose from. I contend that we're actually in a position to create reasonably good block ciphers fairly easily. Look at the AES process. Of the 15 round 1 candidates, a full third made it to the final round - which means that no significant attacks against them were known. Some of the rejected ones failed due to minor "certificational" weaknesses - weaknesses that should certainly lead you not to want to choose them as "the One True Cipher", but which would in and of themselves not render breaking them trivial. And, frankly, for most purposes, any of the five finalists would have been fine - much of the final choice was made for performance reasons. (And, considering Dan Bernstein's work on timing attacks based on table lookups, the performance choices made bad assumptions about actual hardware!) I see no reason not to double-encrypt, using different keys and any two algorithms from the ensemble. Yes, meet-in-the-middle attacks mean this isn't nearly as strong as you might naively think, but it ups the resource demands on the attacker much more than on the defender. Now, you can argue that AES - the only cipher really in the running for the One True Symmetric Cipher position at the moment - is so strong that worrying about attacks on it is pointless - the weaknesses are elsewhere. I'm on the fence about that; it's hard to know. But if you're going to argue for One True Cipher, you must be explicit about this (inherently unprovable) assumption; without it your argument fails. The situation is much more worse for the asymmetric case: We only have a few alternatives available and there are many correlations among their potential weaknesses, so the Many Ciphers approach isn't currently practical, so there's really nothing to debate at this point. Finally, I'll point out that what we know publicly about NSA practices says that (a) they believe in multiple ciphers for different purposes; (b) they believe in the strength of AES, but only up to a certain point. At this point, I'd be very leery of taking anything NSA says or reveals about it practices at face value, but there it is. -- Jerry _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

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