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Stealing Keys from PCs using a Radio
by grarpamp 13 Jul '15

13 Jul '15

http://www.tau.ac.il/~tromer/radioexp/ We demonstrate the extraction of secret decryption keys from laptop computers, by nonintrusively measuring electromagnetic emanations for a few seconds from a distance of 50 cm. The attack can be executed using cheap and readily-available equipment: a consumer-grade radio receiver or a Software Defined Radio USB dongle. The setup is compact and can operate untethered; it can be easily concealed, e.g., inside pita bread. Perhaps someday extensible to coffeeshop pretext: "hey, can you help me test my bitcoin, let's swap a satoshi..."

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UK Snoopers Charter could ban End to End Crypto
by grarpamp 13 Jul '15

13 Jul '15

http://www.ibtimes.com.au/uks-snoopers-charter-ban-whatsapp-imessage-snapch… WhatsApp is facing banning in the UK in the coming weeks. Prime Minister David Cameron is looking at a new legislation that could see the social media and online messaging services including Snapchat, Facebook Messenger and iMessage illegal in the country...

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Fwd: [Cryptography] Ad hoc "exceptional access" discussion at Crypto'15 ?
by grarpamp 12 Jul '15

12 Jul '15

---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Michael Kjörling <michael(a)kjorling.se> Date: Sun, Jul 12, 2015 at 11:16 AM Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Ad hoc "exceptional access" discussion at Crypto'15 ? To: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com On 11 Jul 2015 21:36 -0700, from hbaker1(a)pipeline.com (Henry Baker): > "Exceptional access" is the term used in the recent MIT "Keys under > Doormats" report. One reason for a discussion session is to come up > with better arguments to explain to non-tekkies what the issues are, > and why the FBI should be careful what it wishes for. There's always the possibility of just asking said non-tekkies: - If the government can't keep their secrets safe (even ignoring various insider attacks like Manning or Snowden, let alone that which happens at the hands of disgruntled law enforcement officers or curious medical practitioners; see e.g. the recent US _Office of Personnel Management_ breach, or the illicit telephone wiretapping mess in Greece a few years ago which AFAIK hasn't ever been attributed to anyone), - If the companies that make software designed to allow spying on people can't maintain security (see e.g. the recent _Hacking Team_ episode), - If large multinational corporations can't maintain security (see e.g. the recent _Sony_ episode), - _Then why_ should we trust any of those to, in addition to their own secrets, keep _our_ secrets safe? Why should _I_ trust them to keep _my_ secrets safe? I obviously might not be able to do _better_ (and frankly, am unlikely to be able to do significantly better) than any of the above, but at least I'm not creating an _additional_ extreme-value-target treasure trove which I then fail to adequately protect. I sometimes compare data encryption to locking your house. (Most people accept that, even though they aren't doing anything illicit in their homes, they don't want strangers rummaging through their belongings.) In that comparison, "exceptional access" would be a sort of global master key that allows trivial unlocking of _any_ locked door, in such a way that does not trigger any alarm system or anything else similar that the home owner might have installed. -- Michael Kjörling • https://michael.kjorling.se • michael(a)kjorling.se OpenPGP B501AC6429EF4514 https://michael.kjorling.se/public-keys/pgp “People who think they know everything really annoy those of us who know we don’t.” (Bjarne Stroustrup) _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography

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Re: progression of technologies
by wirelesswarrior＠Safe-mail.net 12 Jul '15

12 Jul '15

-------- Original Message -------- From: jim bell <jdb10987(a)yahoo.com> Apparently from: cypherpunks-bounces(a)cpunks.org To: Tom Ritter <tom(a)ritter.vg>, "dan(a)geer.org" <dan(a)geer.org> Cc: cpunks <cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org> Subject: Re: progression of technologies Date: Sun, 12 Jul 2015 18:53:15 +0000 (UTC) It would seem that a GPS jammer keyfob, that could be turned off when desired, would do the trick. The GPS signal at ground level is very weak and only works due to a huge process gain. Narrowband jamming will desensitize the closeby tracker's front end easily countering that process gain without jamming more distanrt GPS receivers. Building such a jammer from cheap and available components should be easy. > > > From: Tom Ritter <tom(a)ritter.vg> > On 10 July 2015 at 10:58, <dan(a)geer.org> wrote: > > >> Well, now we are into dueling Supreme Court cases; see > >> > >> http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/533/27.html > >> Kyllo v. United States (2001) > >> Despite the Court's attempt to draw a line that is "not only > >> firm but also bright," ante, at 12, the contours of its new rule > >> are uncertain because its protection apparently dissipates as > >> soon as the relevant technology is "in general public use," ante, > >> at 6-7. Yet how much use is general public use is not even hinted > >> at by the Court's opinion, which makes the somewhat doubtful > >> assumption that the thermal imager used in this case does not > >> satisfy that criterion. In any event, putting aside its lack > >> of clarity, this criterion is somewhat perverse because it seems > >> likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, > >> as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available. > > >Yes! That's the case I was obliquely referring to. Sorry, I kind of > >glazed over that part of your argument in the article. > > > That reads, to me, that what the public adopts limits what I can > > do or expect. > > >I guess where we quibble is I'm skeptical that the general public (as > >defined by the courts?) will (ever?) adopt the types of tools you > >refer to (uniquely identifying individuals based on electromagnetics, > >tracking tire pressure sensors.) I don't think the 'general public' > >has adopted thermal imagers. These will make their way into > >industry... (advertisers tracking WiFi probes in malls obviously). > > Months ago, FLIR announced an IR-imaging add-on for IPhones, which is tiny. However, just a month or two ago I saw a media reference to a (very tiny) T-shaped device, intended to plug into the micro-USB jack of a cell phone, that did IR imaging. As I recall, very economical, but even then the majority of the population won't buy, simply because they have no need for such a thing most of the time. > > > > > > >So my wonder now is if industry adopting a technology is sufficient > >for the courts to qualify as 'general public'. But this, at best, only > >affects exotic technology. We're already fighting this battle. > > >Automated license plate readers have never (?) been challenged > >(successfully?). They are an extension of "a police officer just > >watching a highway" which is legal. And the courts like extensions of > >things that are already done - see bulk collection of metadata! > > > This 'extension' principle doesn't always work. In 2012, the Supreme Court ruled (US v. Jones) https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/united_states_v._jones_%282012%29 that police could not place a GPS tracking device on a car without a warrant. One argument that has been rejected in lower-court cases was the idea that in principle, a car's movements could be tracked with an army of police, one per street corner, so that a GPS tracking bug simply automated that process. One problem that argument is that society not only doesn't have the resources to accomplish such a blanket coverage of an area, and that even if practical, society may not necessarily want such an intrusive system to exist. > > This issue was (secretly) quite relevant to me. Federal authorities apparently installed a tracking device on a car I used, probably in about April 2000, without a warrant. Presumably, if challenged they would have been claiming to follow a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals decision from 1999, U.S. v. McIver, which had allowed the placement of a GPS tracking device on a truck seen at the location of a marijuana growing operation. The problem with this justification, however, is that at least in McIver, there was an actual crime involved, and the truck was plausibly involved in that crime. In my case, after my release from prison in April 2000, nobody alleged that I was engaging in any crime. The McIver case didn't rule that police could simply choose to place a GPS tracking device on ANY car, for no reason, and even without 'probable cause' or 'reasonable suspicion'. > > What was particularly devious (and I call illegal) was that later, probably in October 2000, the Feds actually obtained a warrant for the placement of ANOTHER tracking device on the same car (which, of course, may have ended up being the same device!) WITHOUT telling the judge that a tracking device was already on the car, and had been so since at least as early as April 2000. Why the subterfuge? They later used the result of the tracking device (at least, the portion taken after the October warrant) against me in court. But they continued to conceal the fact that a GPS device had been placed since perhaps April 2000. Presumably, they concealed that because they would have had to explain, in court, why they were tracking me, without a warrant, and despite the fact that they had no 'probable cause' nor 'reasonable suspicion' to do so. To conceal that, they obtained the warrant, making it appear that the GPS surveillance started in October 2000. This was fraud, because in order to obtain a warrant, they have to explain WHY they need the GPS device installed. Clearly, since a GPS device was already installed in the car, there was no need to place one. THAT misrepresented the need to the judge. > > You might ask, "Jim, why didn't you complain about this during the trial". As you might know, I was given a long series of lawyers who, rather than being the first line of defense for me, were actually the first line of OFFENCE for the government. What the average person doesn't understand is that a defense attorney, colluding with the government, has virtually unlimited power to sabotage his client's case, and that was precisely what happened to me. The crooked attorney was Robert Leen. > > And it turned out that the government had a powerful motivation, or at least some of its employees: They had faked an 'appeal' case in the 9th Circuit, 99-30210, forging at least two filings as if I had done them 'pro se', as if I was bring that case. I did not, and I wasn't aware of the pre-May 2000 existence of that faked case until June 2003, when I first saw that case's docket. The crooked attorney who concealed this from me was Jonathan Solovy. > Jim Bell > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >

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Re: progression of technologies
by John Young 12 Jul '15

12 Jul '15

Jim aptly notes the cheating use of technology and law, practiced by lawyers and technologists, prosecution and defense, hardly limited to millions of secretkeepers, litigous-technologicus ubquitious, so to paraphrase Dr. Geer, we are all corner cutting opportunists, highly trained and credentialed dual hatted techno-legalistic tricksters now. Once IANAL prevailed, now IAATLT. At 02:53 PM 7/12/2015, you wrote: >From: Tom Ritter <tom(a)ritter.vg> >On 10 July 2015 at 10:58, <<mailto:dan@geer.org>dan(a)geer.org> wrote: > >> Well, now we are into dueling Supreme Court cases; see > >> > >> > <http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/533/27.html>http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/533/27.html > >> Kyllo v. United States (2001) > >> Despite the Court's attempt to draw a line that is "not only > >> firm but also bright," ante, at 12, the contours of its new rule > >> are uncertain because its protection apparently dissipates as > >> soon as the relevant technology is "in general public use," ante, > >> at 6-7. Yet how much use is general public use is not even hinted > >> at by the Court's opinion, which makes the somewhat doubtful > >> assumption that the thermal imager used in this case does not > >> satisfy that criterion. In any event, putting aside its lack > >> of clarity, this criterion is somewhat perverse because it seems > >> likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, > >> as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available. > > >Yes! That's the case I was obliquely referring to. Sorry, I kind of > >glazed over that part of your argument in the article. > > > That reads, to me, that what the public adopts limits what I can > > do or expect. > > >I guess where we quibble is I'm skeptical that the general public (as > >defined by the courts?) will (ever?) adopt the types of tools you > >refer to (uniquely identifying individuals based on electromagnetics, > >tracking tire pressure sensors.) I don't think the 'general public' > >has adopted thermal imagers. These will make their way into > >industry... (advertisers tracking WiFi probes in malls obviously). > >Months ago, FLIR announced an IR-imaging add-on for IPhones, which >is tiny. However, just a month or two ago I saw a media reference >to a (very tiny) T-shaped device, intended to plug into the >micro-USB jack of a cell phone, that did IR imaging. As I recall, >very economical, but even then the majority of the population won't >buy, simply because they have no need for such a thing most of the time. > > > > > > >So my wonder now is if industry adopting a technology is sufficient > >for the courts to qualify as 'general public'. But this, at best, only > >affects exotic technology. We're already fighting this battle. > > >Automated license plate readers have never (?) been challenged > >(successfully?). They are an extension of "a police officer just > >watching a highway" which is legal. And the courts like extensions of > >things that are already done - see bulk collection of metadata! > > >This 'extension' principle doesn't always work. In 2012, the >Supreme Court ruled (US v. Jones) ><https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/united_states_v._jones_%282012%29>https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/united_states_v._jones_%282012%29 >that police could not place a GPS tracking device on a car without a >warrant. One argument that has been rejected in lower-court cases >was the idea that in principle, a car's movements could be tracked >with an army of police, one per street corner, so that a GPS >tracking bug simply automated that process. One problem that >argument is that society not only doesn't have the resources to >accomplish such a blanket coverage of an area, and that even if >practical, society may not necessarily want such an intrusive system to exist. > >This issue was (secretly) quite relevant to me. Federal authorities >apparently installed a tracking device on a car I used, probably in >about April 2000, without a warrant. Presumably, if challenged they >would have been claiming to follow a 9th Circuit Court of Appeals >decision from 1999, U.S. v. McIver, which had allowed the placement >of a GPS tracking device on a truck seen at the location of a >marijuana growing operation. The problem with this justification, >however, is that at least in McIver, there was an actual crime >involved, and the truck was plausibly involved in that crime. In my >case, after my release from prison in April 2000, nobody alleged >that I was engaging in any crime. The McIver case didn't rule that >police could simply choose to place a GPS tracking device on ANY >car, for no reason, and even without 'probable cause' or 'reasonable >suspicion'. > >What was particularly devious (and I call illegal) was that later, >probably in October 2000, the Feds actually obtained a warrant for >the placement of ANOTHER tracking device on the same car (which, of >course, may have ended up being the same device!) WITHOUT telling >the judge that a tracking device was already on the car, and had >been so since at least as early as April 2000. Why the >subterfuge? They later used the result of the tracking device (at >least, the portion taken after the October warrant) against me in >court. But they continued to conceal the fact that a GPS device had >been placed since perhaps April 2000. Presumably, they concealed >that because they would have had to explain, in court, why they were >tracking me, without a warrant, and despite the fact that they had >no 'probable cause' nor 'reasonable suspicion' to do so. To conceal >that, they obtained the warrant, making it appear that the GPS >surveillance started in October 2000. This was fraud, because in >order to obtain a warrant, they have to explain WHY they need the >GPS device installed. Clearly, since a GPS device was already >installed in the car, there was no need to place one. THAT >misrepresented the need to the judge. > >You might ask, "Jim, why didn't you complain about this during the >trial". As you might know, I was given a long series of lawyers >who, rather than being the first line of defense for me, were >actually the first line of OFFENCE for the government. What the >average person doesn't understand is that a defense attorney, >colluding with the government, has virtually unlimited power to >sabotage his client's case, and that was precisely what happened to >me. The crooked attorney was Robert Leen. > >And it turned out that the government had a powerful motivation, or >at least some of its employees: They had faked an 'appeal' case in >the 9th Circuit, 99-30210, forging at least two filings as if I had >done them 'pro se', as if I was bring that case. I did not, and I >wasn't aware of the pre-May 2000 existence of that faked case until >June 2003, when I first saw that case's docket. The crooked >attorney who concealed this from me was Jonathan Solovy. > Jim Bell > > > > > > >

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progression of technologies
by dan＠geer.org 12 Jul '15

12 Jul '15

Paraphrasing Bonnie Raitt, let's give 'em something germane to argue about. In particular, what do I have wrong here: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2015/0617/Opinion-T… --dan

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Someone recommends the movie "Inequality for All"
by Georgi Guninski 12 Jul '15

12 Jul '15

Someone who watches a lot of movies recommends Inequality for All http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2215151/ === A documentary that follows former U.S. Labor Secretary Robert Reich as he looks to raise awareness of the country's widening economic gap. === I haven't watched it yet.

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speaking of Bitcoin ... the july4th split
by coderman 12 Jul '15

12 Jul '15

sometimes even consensus not enough, [ failure at 95% agreement! ] SPV is a compensating measure that addresses block size without reifying incompatibilities. however, with drawbacks and risk, as taken on chin in this one: https://bitcoin.org/en/alert/2015-07-04-spv-mining """ Summary: Some miners are currently generating invalid blocks. Almost all software (besides Bitcoin Core 0.9.5 and later) will accept these invalid blocks under certain conditions. The paragraphs that follow explain the cause more throughly. For several months, an increasing amount of mining hash rate has been signaling its intent to begin enforcing BIP66 strict DER signatures. As part of the BIP66 rules, once 950 of the last 1,000 blocks were version 3 (v3) blocks, all upgraded miners would reject version 2 (v2) blocks. Early morning UTC on 4 July 2015, the 950/1000 (95%) threshold was reached. Shortly thereafter, a small miner (part of the non-upgraded 5%) mined an invalid block--as was an expected occurrence. Unfortunately, it turned out that roughly half the network hash rate was mining without fully validating blocks (called SPV mining), and built new blocks on top of that invalid block. Note that the roughly 50% of the network that was SPV mining had explicitly indicated that they would enforce the BIP66 rules. By not doing so, several large miners have lost over $50,000 dollars worth of mining income so far. All software that assumes blocks are valid (because invalid blocks cost miners money) is at risk of showing transactions as confirmed when they really aren't. This particularly affects lightweight (SPV) wallets and software such as old versions of Bitcoin Core which have been downgraded to SPV-level security by the new BIP66 consensus rules. The immediate fix, which is well underway as of this writing, is to get all miners off of SPV mining and back to full validation (at least temporarily). As this progresses, we will reduce our current recommendation of waiting 30 extra confirmations to a lower number. """

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Re: progression of technologies
by John Young 11 Jul '15

11 Jul '15

This is productive discussion for addressing what's happening now and coming up in the race between law and technology, cartoonishly in the press as between whales and germs, more realisticly, the two swapping places, running different races, taking short-cuts, indicting, pleading, inforning, lying, bribing, cheating, rigging races, hiring assassins and stand-ins, dual hats, wild cards, lone wolves, entrapment, duplicity, megadeath threats, hacks, injections, implantations, porous treaties, incessant violations, and above all evergrowing heaping piles of dung of the devil. Concentration of wealth by lawful cheating is comparable to explosively squeezing the pit to see if the atmosphere ignites. At 03:19 PM 7/11/2015, you wrote: >On 10 July 2015 at 10:58, <dan(a)geer.org> wrote: > > Well, now we are into dueling Supreme Court cases; see > > > > http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/533/27.html > > > > Kyllo v. United States (2001) > > > > Despite the Court's attempt to draw a line that is "not only > > firm but also bright," ante, at 12, the contours of its new rule > > are uncertain because its protection apparently dissipates as > > soon as the relevant technology is "in general public use," ante, > > at 6-7. Yet how much use is general public use is not even hinted > > at by the Court's opinion, which makes the somewhat doubtful > > assumption that the thermal imager used in this case does not > > satisfy that criterion. In any event, putting aside its lack > > of clarity, this criterion is somewhat perverse because it seems > > likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, > > as the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available. > >Yes! That's the case I was obliquely referring to. Sorry, I kind of >glazed over that part of your argument in the article. > > > That reads, to me, that what the public adopts limits what I can > > do or expect. > >I guess where we quibble is I'm skeptical that the general public (as >defined by the courts?) will (ever?) adopt the types of tools you >refer to (uniquely identifying individuals based on electromagnetics, >tracking tire pressure sensors.) I don't think the 'general public' >has adopted thermal imagers. These will make their way into >industry... (advertisers tracking WiFi probes in malls obviously). > >So my wonder now is if industry adopting a technology is sufficient >for the courts to qualify as 'general public'. But this, at best, only >affects exotic technology. We're already fighting this battle. > >Automated license plate readers have never (?) been challenged >(successfully?). They are an extension of "a police officer just >watching a highway" which is legal. And the courts like extensions of >things that are already done - see bulk collection of metadata! > >You're right - collection of this data by personals or corporations, >and selling it, is indeed the right battleground. I'm don't think the >answer is correlation, but the collection, as you say in the last >paragraph. > >-tom

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Re: cypherpunks Digest, Vol 25, Issue 9
by ksenia bellman 11 Jul '15

11 Jul '15

on the topic of Bitcoin philosophical musings and pressures: There unusually a lot of btc discussion on the list lately: technical (the fork), philosophical and practical. On the philosophical/political side: btc is great, I like it, I use it, but, come on, we all know that by design (increasing difficulty of the chain and proof-of-work system) btc is determined to be a space race. Before you can maintain the network with simple hardware, and get btc for it, now you have to be a mining rig. We know that btc is good for P2P financial transactions, but the first important question now is: How do you earn bitcoin? (as an individual, you can't mine, if you are not a programmer or a designer, how do you earn btc?) It becomes less and less of a question how do you spend btc, but still, unless I mined a lot in the past or bought it for cash, where do I get it? Secondly, the rhetoric we hear often in the mainstream btc discussion is "it is a solution for banking the Unbanked" This talk is obviously dodgy - lets say "the unbanked wants to be banked" if you have an account with nothing in it, and no way of filling it in, there is no point. The only good thing about btc walled vs bank account when its empty is that there is no one is proposing you to get an overdraft or a loan. But still, empty btc wallet is pretty useless. Rather decent response to poitical btc frenzy I found in this post - https://blog.caseykuhlman.com/entries/2014/bitcoin-somaliland.html?utm_sour… Another mainstream talk is: its not about bitcooin, it is all about blockchain technology. Thats correct, it can be useful for some stuff. But what drives me up the walll is a hype around it mixed with vagueness. "We can build all this amazing socio-technical systems with it" and very rarely, amongst general public (not blockchain devs) you come across concrete ideas of a design. What exactly does this weird data structure does in a very specific social context? What are exact detailed functions it has, how does it integrates with other layers - software and hardware. So the talk "some devs will write cryptographically verifiable scripts for us which interact on the blockchain and it will give the world some cool ways of interaction" is just dangerous. Similar rhetoric brought humanity things such as Facebook. The only thing which i consider right in the blockchain discussion that "ok, it allows adding some features to a system that can be useful in some particular cases" On the technical side: fork, xt-code etc - I would like to organise and stream a panel discussion on WCN <http://www.worldcryptonetwork.com/> channel soon-ish. I dont want to turn cypherpunk list into a Bitcoin Talk :) but will ping a link here and the time we will schedule it. On 8 July 2015 at 01:22, <cypherpunks-request(a)cpunks.org> wrote: > Send cypherpunks mailing list submissions to > cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://cpunks.org/mailman/listinfo/cypherpunks > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > cypherpunks-request(a)cpunks.org > > You can reach the person managing the list at > cypherpunks-owner(a)cpunks.org > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of cypherpunks digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Bitcoin philosophical musings and pressures 7 years in > [drifted from: txrate, forking, etc] (grarpamp) > 2. "Google is to surveillance capitalism what GM was to > managerial capitalism" (Razer) > 3. Re: Bitcoin philosophical musings and pressures 7 years in > [drifted from: txrate, forking, etc] (Juan) > 4. Re: Hacking Team has been hacked (hard) (Razer) > 5. Re: Bitcoin philosophical musings and pressures 7 years in > [drifted from: txrate, forking, etc] (Sean Lynch) > 6. Re: Bitcoin philosophical musings and pressures 7 years in > [drifted from: txrate, forking, etc] (Lodewijk andré de la porte) > 7. Re: Bitcoin philosophical musings and pressures 7 years in > [drifted from: txrate, forking, etc] (Sean Lynch) > 8. Re: Bitcoin philosophical musings and pressures 7 years in > [drifted from: txrate, forking, etc] (Lodewijk andré de la porte) > 9. Re: Bitcoin philosophical musings and pressures 7 years in > [drifted from: txrate, forking, etc] (Juan) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2015 15:21:50 -0400 > From: grarpamp <grarpamp(a)gmail.com> > To: Cpunks List <cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org> > Cc: bitcoin-dev(a)lists.linuxfoundation.org > Subject: Bitcoin philosophical musings and pressures 7 years in > [drifted from: txrate, forking, etc] > Message-ID: > <CAD2Ti28Tw7Kz+RoW3DYqEPbB4KfS= > TiTSwbtneL7ps1QsKvzvw(a)mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 > > > Then again maybe I am missing the key reasoning for this fork. > > People often miss the fundamental reasons Bitcoin exists, > the various conjoined ethos behind its creation. This is to be > expected, it's so far ouside any thinking or life process they've > ever had to do or been exposed to. It's also partly why figuring > out what to do or code or adopt, is hard. And certainly not made > any easier by the long term need and the current value at stake. > > Creating a system in which a Botswanan can give a few bits > of their impoverished wages to their friend in Mumbai without > it being gated, permitted, hierarchied, middlemanned, taxed, > tracked, stolen and feed-upon until pointless... this simply > doesn't compute for these people. Their school of thought is > centralization, profit, control and oppression. So of course they > see txrate ramming up against an artificial wall as perfectly fine, > it enables and perpetuates their legacy ways. > > Regardless of whichever technical way the various walls are torn down, > what's important is that they are. And that those who are thinking > outside the box do, and continue to, take time to school these > legacy people such that they might someday become enlightened > and join the ethos. > > Otherwise might as well work for ICBC, JPMC, HSBC, BNP, MUFG > and your favorite government. Probably not as much fun though. > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 07 Jul 2015 13:32:35 -0700 > From: Razer <Rayzer(a)riseup.net> > To: cypherpunks(a)cpunks.org > Subject: "Google is to surveillance capitalism what GM was to > managerial capitalism" > Message-ID: <559C3763.1000205(a)riseup.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > > > Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information > > Civilization > > > > Shoshana Zuboff, Berkman Center for Internet & Society; Harvard > > Business School > > > > April 4, 2015 > > > > Abstract: > > This article describes an emergent logic of accumulation in the > > networked sphere, ‘surveillance capitalism,’ and considers its > > implications for ‘information civilization.’ Google is to surveillance > > capitalism what General Motors was to managerial capitalism. Therefore > > the institutionalizing practices and operational assumptions of Google > > Inc. are the primary lens for this analysis as they are rendered in > > two recent articles authored by Google Chief Economist Hal Varian. > > > > Varian asserts four uses that follow from computer-mediated > > transactions: ‘data extraction and analysis,’ ‘new contractual forms > > due to better monitoring,’ ‘personalization and customization,’ and > > ‘continuous experiments.’ > > > > An examination of the nature and consequences of these uses sheds > > light on the implicit logic of surveillance capitalism and the global > > architecture of computer mediation upon which it depends. This > > architecture produces a distributed and largely uncontested new > > expression of power that I christen: ‘Big Other.’ It is constituted by > > unexpected and often illegible mechanisms of extraction, > > commodification, and control that effectively exile persons from their > > own behavior while producing new markets of behavioral prediction and > > modification. Surveillance capitalism challenges democratic norms and > > departs in key ways from the centuries long evolution of market > > capitalism. > > > > Number of Pages in PDF File: 15 > > > > Keywords: surveillance capitalism, big data, Google, information > > society, privacy, internet of everything > > http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2594754 > >

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