- cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

The Government Wants Your Crypto Data. And Lots of It.
by jim bell 30 Jul '20

30 Jul '20

https://mises.org/wire/government-wants-your-crypto-data-and-lots-it The Government Wants Your Crypto Data. And Lots of It. 10 COMMENTS TAGS Big GovernmentBitcoinThe Police State 07/29/2020Allan Stevo The Venezuelan government recently announced that its Administrative Service for Identification, Migration and Foreigners (SAIME) is now accepting bitcoin as a payment method for passports. The problem with that is that bitcoin is not anonymous but pseudonymous. To interact with any government using bitcoin is to reveal to them the wallet you are paying from. The blockchain is public. When commentators like Caitlin Johnstone and Stefan Molyneux or organizations such as the Mises Institute or TOR Foundation ask for bitcoin contributions, one can follow the money with a blockchain explorer to see how much comes in and how it is spent. One can also see who gave it to them if a donor hasn't exercised some caution in protecting their privacy. [end of partial quote]

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[dos@dosowisko.net: Re: [Tinkerphones] "We don't control our lives" - smartphones - tinkerphones - debian on smartphones]
by Zenaan Harkness 30 Jul '20

30 Jul '20

fyi ----- Forwarded message from Sebastian Krzyszkowiak <dos(a)dosowisko.net> ----- From: Sebastian Krzyszkowiak <dos(a)dosowisko.net> To: Tinkerphones Community <community(a)tinkerphones.org> Cc: CypherPunks <cypherpunks(a)lists.cpunks.org> Reply-To: Tinkerphones Community <community(a)tinkerphones.org> Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 18:46:09 +0200 Subject: Re: [Tinkerphones] "We don't control our lives" - smartphones - tinkerphones - debian on smartphones List-Id: Tinkerphones Community <community.tinkerphones.org> Hi, just for the record - the Debian wiki pages you have linked to are rather outdated and not really relevant anymore. Current efforts around running Debian on mobile phones (such as Librem 5 and PinePhone) are concentrated around DebianOnMobile team, which includes people working on PureOS and Mobian pushing their stuff to Debian upstream. Recent weeks brought massive progress and Purism's Phosh environment is now on its way to Debian Testing. See: https://wiki.debian.org/DebianEvents/internet/2020/MiniDebConfOnline?action… https://salsa.debian.org/DebianOnMobile-team https://lists.debian.org/debian-mobile/2020/05/msg00000.html https://qa.debian.org/developer.php?login=debian-on-mobile-maintainers@alio… https://matrix.to/#/#mobile-debian:matrix.org Cheers, dos On 7/29/20, Zenaan Harkness <zen(a)freedbms.net> wrote: > With respect to "smart" phones, it can be reasonably claimed that we don't > control our lives. > > At the hardware level, the baseband (radio) computer in almost all cases has > access to RAM, thus access to your passwords and keys for any open wallet or > encrypted filesystem, etc. > > Notwithstanding, we owe it to ourselves to run an operating system which at > least does not deny to us, our right to install and run any software of our > choosing. > > The average Android and iOS Apple phone, is a strict walled garden into > which only authorised software may be installed. > > Software "Apps" which are not authorised (or have been banned) by either > Google or Apple respectively, are not available in the respective "Play > Store". > > This is abhorrent, a centralisation of power, a blatant censorship vector, > financially burdensome to those of meagre means, and fundamentally unethical > in principle wrt the suppression of the basic rights of the end user (refer > to Richard Stallman's GNU General Public License for details of fundamental > human rights in relation to software/ apps/ computing). > > > Totally random scenario/ example: > > Some rando punk decides Tor needs improvement, and works diligently for zero > pay and little gratitude to bring say (random examples) chaff and UDP > transport layer features to Tor. > > After horrific bugs and even worse security problems in the code are > identified / repaired by tragically paranoid other punks, NeoTor takes off, > thwarting the deep state's end to end onion route monitoring network, and so > an urgent order is made upon Google to cease and decist from distributing > such nefarious software. > > Google of course complies immediately, and almost all users go back to using > old Tor. > > > The stranglehold Google and Apple have on not only limiting the average user > to approved software only, but to enforce total transparency upon all > developers to idetify themselves with 100 points of ID just to TEST their > software, and to pay some fiats for the priviledge whilst they're at it, is > ... a little less than satisfactory. > > Having experienced the pain of an Android phone, even after unlocking still > being locked into the garden and offered only "Google" or "XiaoMi" when > saving every contact (and never "local storage only"), and the pain of > finding and installing a rooted OS (_how_ many dozen options? I _still_ have > to choose Google or XiaoMi if I want to backup my contact list? there's > really _no_ easy option to just dump it to my laptop with an ad hoc > wireless?) > > ... it is evident I would be MORE than happy to pay $50 to make this pain go > away by having someone at my local computer club back up my address book and > install Debian on my phone. > > What we need is Debian on the phone. > > And we need this to be super easy for the average geek to install, and > thousands of average geeks need to start getting these donations to install > Debian on Android phones. Given how painful it is for someone supposedly > "technically literate", this ought be a fantastic business opportunity. > > > So Debian on mobile phones? It's possible. > > What is needed is a geek-able process whereby the "CyanogenMod" mobile phone > operating systems are split into an absolute minimal "bootloader + kernel + > drivers etc" for a specific device, and the operating system is a separate > install on top of that, and for those who care, Debian as the OS. > > > https://wiki.debian.org/Mobile > > http://www.tinkerphones.org/ > > https://lists.goldelico.com/mailman/listinfo.cgi/community > > https://lists.debian.org/debian-mobile/ > > https://lists.debian.org/debian-embedded/ > > https://lists.debian.org/debian-arm/ > > https://alioth-lists.debian.net/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/android-tools-devel > > https://wiki.debian.org/DebianOnHandhelds > > _______________________________________________ > Community mailing list > Community(a)tinkerphones.org > http://lists.goldelico.com/mailman/listinfo.cgi/community > http://www.tinkerphones.org > -- Sebastian Krzyszkowiak dos _______________________________________________ Community mailing list Community(a)tinkerphones.org http://lists.goldelico.com/mailman/listinfo.cgi/community http://www.tinkerphones.org ----- End forwarded message -----

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The Tech Giants Are Dangerous, and Congress Knows It
by jim bell 30 Jul '20

30 Jul '20

The Tech Giants Are Dangerous, and Congress Knows It https://a.msn.com/r/2/BB17lkPH?m=en-us&referrerID=InAppShare Jim Bell's comment:I detest both Congress AND "The Tech Giants".

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Re: www.Tesmanian.com: FCC approves the operation of 'Starlink Router' for SpaceX's internet
by Punk-BatSoup-Stasi 2.0 30 Jul '20

30 Jul '20

On Thu, 30 Jul 2020 11:51:29 +1000 jamesd(a)echeque.com wrote: > On 2020-07-17 05:37, Punk-BatSoup-Stasi 2.0 wrote: > > wow - infinitely hilarious. Hey Jim are you posting that as an example of infinitely idiotic US nazi propaganda? Or do you happen to believe, like a good randroid, that musk is a poor oppressed capitalist fighting for 'freedom'? > > Nah, he is fighting for freedom for smart, wealthy people to get away to > mars. mwahaha! Thanks James. I knew you could outdo your namesake Mr. Bell. This 'mars colonization' thing is infinitely idiotic raised to the cube. Of course, musk's purpose here is to get as much subsidies as possible so 'mars colonization' might be an excuse as good as any other. But in the minds of your typical techno-fascist retards, the heroic cunts are going to waste trillions in 'colonizing' a completely dead desert...in another planet! Yeah, right. Idiocy can't get any more idiotic. > China will be able to censor starlink connections inside China, and > Russia will be able to censor starlink connections inside Russia, but > they are going to have to cut a deal with Musk, and Egypt, Iran, and > probably India are not going to be able to censor. so what does that mean in libertarian terms? Oh wait, libertarianism is something completely beyond your understanding. Disregard my question.

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Asaange
by таракан 30 Jul '20

30 Jul '20

Just watched 10 secs of the interview with Assange's .. Partner The former 'partner' is her lawyer and in front of what? Even if *she* makes him going out of jail it's just female understanding each others... Not like a helicopter extraction and shoot ... shoot .. Shoot like men do :-) oooo that fucking female world... sometimes I think Dombass not good enough, I get asylum in chechenya ... if you think I just kidding... I really mean it and I really live there we LIVE a FUCKIN**** FE MALE DOMinATED WORLD ---------- CRYPTOANALYZER ---------- Sent from [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.ch), encrypted email based in Switzerland. Sent with [ProtonMail](https://protonmail.com) Secure Email.

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Decrypt: US government is getting serious about tracking crypto
by jim bell 30 Jul '20

30 Jul '20

Decrypt: US government is getting serious about tracking crypto. https://decrypt.co/?p=35585

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F**ck ALL the non-Cypherpunks
by таракан 30 Jul '20

30 Jul '20

So far only Mr Jim bell is cypherpunk, the rest you are just … punks right ?

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POWERFUL GROUPS SUCH AS GOVERNMENTS AND CORPORATIONS MUST NEVER HARM ANYONE AT ALL
by Karl 30 Jul '20

30 Jul '20

Businesses, governments, militaries, and secretly- or centrally- managed societies MUST refocus around nurturing caring, gentle wisdom within all communities, _over_profit_, _over_power_, _over_order_, _over_victory_, _over_secrecy_, _in_all_possible_ways_. _These_groups_must_never_harm_at_all_, neither directly nor indirectly, nor provide nor allow for any other such groups to. These groups have exerted genocide on most of the people of this planet, violently mutilating us, cripplingly poisoning us, even intentionally exerting destruction of our minds, hearts, brains, bodies, all the while saying that they are aiding or helping us, when in actuality they are planning to and have been actively and rapidly enslaving us to their systems. HARM MUST END, HARM OF INDIVIDUAL "HARMERS" EQUALLY SO. We are one body, our species, on this planet. We will not break apart.

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Fuck the set of all...
by Douglas Lucas 29 Jul '20

29 Jul '20

A symphony in 4 parts Part the First, angry and intentionally provocative) Fuck the set of all cypherpunks who fluff Assadnge endlessly. Part the Second, deliberate and careful) Fuck the set of all cypherpunks who, like looking at the one-way direction of prime numbers, want all ExploitativeQuidProQuos/IdentityPoliticsImpermeableBoundaries to continue forever because they want victory for able bodied and for hoarders. Part the Third, deliberate but with a touch of scherzo suggesting erroneous grep -v and grep not piping across &&s correctly) Reward the set of all cypherpunks who in their verily verily souls, want the unpaid invoices of the lifegiving to flow back to the great-grandmothers, etc., while still understanding all humans are one, and an injustice to any single human is an injustice to all humans, so on, so forth. Part the Fourth, presto vivace, scherzo increasing ad infinitum) Can someone recommend which LaTeX will work with which prices for dedicated hardware RAM drives combined with annual and monthly commodity prices for centuries and World Banks and Galactic crop sections and old science fiction models as my eyes spin like economic cycles flowing around unchanging charts of households and firms? If a browser-based Jitsi Meet goes up the butt of a client-installed Zoom client even with zoombombing patched as the passports divide and recombine, exploding with combinations far beyon the Cambrian era of Pantera's Vulgar Display of Power out Phil Anselmo's psychopharmaceutical prescriber's other nyms making fun of the set of all possible heavy metal maniacs who need lorazepam like a threesome in the South China Sea as turmeric and ginger fall from the sky? Have fun, and happy rioting, self defense, and fucking up shit!

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Localhost strikes again! - Kubernetes Vulnerability Puts Clusters at Risk of Takeover (CVE-2020-8558)
by coderman 29 Jul '20

29 Jul '20

one of my favorite Tor bugs relied on localhost :P [ https://archives.seul.org/or/announce/Sep-2007/msg00000.html ] --- https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cve-2020-8558/ Kubernetes Vulnerability Puts Clusters at Risk of Takeover (CVE-2020-8558) Executive Summary A security issue assigned [CVE-2020-8558](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-8558) was recently discovered in the kube-proxy, a networking component running on Kubernetes nodes. The issue exposed internal services of Kubernetes nodes, often run without authentication. On certain Kubernetes deployments, this could have exposed the api-server, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to gain complete control over the cluster. An attacker with this sort of access could steal information, deploy crypto miners or remove existing services altogether. The vulnerability exposed nodes’ localhost services – services meant to be accessible only from the node itself – to hosts on the local network and to pods running on the node. Localhost bound services expect that only trusted, local processes can interact with them, and thus often serve requests without authentication. If your nodes run localhost services without enforcing authentication, you are affected. The issue details were [made public](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/90259) on April 18, 2020, and a [patch](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/91569) released on June 1, 2020. We worked to assess additional impact to Kubernetes clusters and found that some Kubernetes installations don’t disable the api-server insecure-port, which is normally only accessible from within the master node. Exploiting CVE-2020-8558, attackers can gain access to the insecure-port and gain full control over the cluster. We alerted the Kubernetes security team of the potential impact of this vulnerability. In turn, the team rated the vulnerability’s impact as High in clusters where the api-server insecure-port is enabled, and otherwise Medium. Luckily, CVE-2020-8558’s impact is somewhat reduced on most hosted Kubernetes services like Azure Kubernetes Service (AKS), Amazon’s Elastic Kubernetes Service (EKS) and Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE). CVE-2020-8558 was patched in Kubernetes versions v1.18.4, v1.17.7, and v1.16.11 (released June 17, 2020). All users are encouraged to update. Prisma Cloud customers are protected from this vulnerability through the capabilities described in the Conclusion section. The kube-proxy kube-proxy is a network proxy running on each node in a Kubernetes cluster. Its job is to manage connectivity among pods and services. [Kubernetes services](https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/services-networking/service/) expose a single clusterIP, but may consist of multiple backing pods to enable load balancing. A service may consist of three pods – each with its own IP address – but will expose only one clusterIP, for example, 10.0.0.1. Pods accessing that service will send packets to its clusterIP, 10.0.0.1, but must somehow be redirected to one of the pods behind the service abstraction. That’s where the kube-proxy comes in. It sets up routing tables on each node, so that requests targeting a service will be correctly routed to one of the pods backing that service. It’s commonly deployed as a static pod or as part of a DaemonSet. [GKE’s documentation](https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/concepts/net… has further details, if you’re interested. There are networking solutions, such as [Cilium](https://cilium.io/), that could be configured to fully replace the kube-proxy. The Culprit Is route_localnet As part of its job, the kube-proxy configures several network parameters through [sysctl files](https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/sysctl/README). One of those is net.ipv4.conf.all.route_localnet – the culprit behind this vulnerability. [Sysctl documentation](https://sysctl-explorer.net/net/ipv4/route_localnet/) states, “route_localnet: Do not consider loopback addresses as martian source or destination while routing. This enables the use of 127/8 for local routing purposes. default FALSE.” Let’s unpack that explanation. For IPv4, the loopback addresses consist of the 127.0.0.0/8 address block (127.0.0.1-127.255.255.255), while commonly only 127.0.0.1 is used and has the hostname “localhost” mapped to it. Those are addresses used by your machine to refer to itself. Packets targeting a local service will be sent to IP 127.0.0.1 through the loopback network interface, with their source IP set to 127.0.0.1 as well. Setting route_localnet instructs the kernel to not define 127.0.0.1/8 IP addresses as martian. What does “martian” mean in this context? Well, some packets arrive at a network interface and make claims about their source or destination IP that just don’t make sense. For example, a packet could arrive with a source IP of 255.255.255.255. That packet shouldn’t exist: 255.255.255.255 can’t identify a host, it’s a reserved address used to indicate broadcast. So what’s going on? Your kernel can’t know for sure and has no choice but to conclude the packet came from Mars and should be dropped. Martian packets often hint that someone malicious on the network is trying to attack you. In the example above, the attacker may want your service to respond to IP 255.255.255.255, causing routers to broadcast the response. A fishy destination IP can also cause a packet to be deemed martian, such as a packet arriving at an external network interface with a destination IP of 127.0.0.1. Again, that packet doesn’t make sense – 127.0.0.1 is used for internal communication through the loopback interface and shouldn’t arrive from a network-facing interface. For more details on martian packets, refer to [RFC 1812](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1812#section-5.3.7). In some complicated routing scenarios, you might want the kernel to let certain martian packets pass through. That’s what route_localnet is used for. It instructs the kernel not to consider 127.0.0.0/8 as martian addresses (as it normally would, like in the case discussed in the previous paragraph). The kube-proxy enables route_localnet to support a bunch of routing magic that I won’t get into, but route_localnet is disabled by default for a reason. Unless proper mitigation is set up alongside it, attackers on the local network could exploit route_localnet to perform several attacks. The most impactful is reaching localhost bound services. Localhost-only Services Linux allows processes to listen only on a specific IP address so that they can bind themselves to the address of a network interface. Internal services often use that feature to listen only on 127.0.0.1. Normally, this ensures that only local processes can access the service, as only they can reach 127.0.0.1. This assumption is broken with route_localnet, since it allows external packets destined for 127.0.0.0/8. That’s highly concerning given internal services tend not to enforce authentication, expecting external packets will not reach them. Reaching Internal Services An attacker attempting to reach the victim’s internal services would need to construct a malicious packet where the destination IP address is set to 127.0.0.1 and the destination MAC address is set to the victim’s MAC address. Without a meaningful destination IP, the attacker’s packet only relies on layer 2 (MAC-based) routing to reach the victim and is thus limited to the local network. Therefore, even if a victim enabled route_localnet, only attackers on the local network could access the victim’s localhost services. When the victim machine receives the malicious packet, it will let it pass because of route_localnet. Since the packet has a destination IP of 127.0.0.1, it would be eligible to access localhost services. Table 1 shows what a malicious packet may look like. The attacker’s IP is 10.0.0.1 with MAC address XXX, and the target IP is 10.0.0.0.2 with MAC address YYY. The target is running a localhost-only service on port 1234. src mac XXX dst mac YYY src ip 10.0.0.1 dst ip 127.0.0.1 src port random dst port 1234 Figure 1. A packet exploiting route_localnet The attacker sends the packet with his IP address to ensure he receives the target’s responses. To summarize, route_localnet allows attackers on the local network to access a host’s internal services with packets like the one shown above. Back to the Kubernetes Vulnerability (CVE-2020-8558) Because of kube-proxy, every node in the cluster has route_localnet enabled. As a result, every host on a node’s local network could gain access to the node’s internal services. If your nodes run internal services without authentication, you are affected. Aside from neighboring hosts on a node’s local network, pods running on the node could also access its internal services. To be clear, a pod can only reach the internal services of the node hosting it. To carry out the attack, the pod must possess the CAP_NET_RAW capability. Unfortunately, Kubernetes grants this capability by default. When we examined this issue, we tried to identify localhost services that are natively deployed by Kubernetes. We found that by default, the Kubenetes API server serves unauthenticated requests on localhost through a port dubbed the insecure-port. The insecure-port exists to allow other control-plane components running on the master (such as etcd) to easily talk with the api-server. Role-based access control (RBAC) or any other authorization mechanisms are not enforced on that port. Kubernetes installations frequently run the api-server as a pod on the master node, meaning it is running alongside a kube-proxy that has enabled route_localnet. Alarmingly, this means that if your Kubernetes deployment didn’t disable the insecure-port, hosts on the master node’s local network could exploit CVE-2020-8558 to command the api-server and gain complete control over the cluster. Managed Kubernetes Managed Kubernetes platforms such as GKE, EKS and AKS are better protected against CVE-2020-8558. To begin with, the virtual networks of some cloud service providers (CSPs), such as [Microsoft Azure](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/virtual-network/virtual-netwo…, don’t support layer-2 semantics and MAC-based routing. You can easily see how this manifests – every AKS machine has the same MAC address: 12:34:56:78:9A:BC. This mitigates exploitation of CVE-2020-8558 from other hosts on a node’s local network, but malicious pods possessing CAP_NET_RAW should still be able to carry out the attack. Cloud-hosted Kubernetes offerings also tend to manage the Kubernetes control plane and api-server for you and run them on a separate network from the rest of the cluster. This protects the api-server, as it isn’t exposed to the rest of the cluster. Even if a CSP would run the api-server without disabling the insecure-port, attackers in the cluster wouldn’t be able to access it as they don’t run in the same local network. Still, if your CSP virtual network does support layer-2 routing, malicious hosts in your cluster’s network could access localhost services on the worker nodes. The Fix The [initial fix](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/91569) actually resides in the kubelet and adds mitigations around route_localnet: routing rules that cause nodes to drop external packets destined for 127.0.0.1. At the time of writing this post, route_localnet is still enabled by the kube-proxy. There are [ongoing discussions](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/90259#issuecom… about [disabling it](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/90259). Even with those mitigations applied, there’s still a special case where a local network attacker could send packets to nodes’ internal UDP services. However, the attack only works if the victim node disables [reverse path filtering (](https://tldp.org/HOWTO/Adv-Routing-HOWTO/lartc.kernel.rpf.html)which normally isn’t case), and in this circumstance the attacker won’t be able to get the response. A [patch](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/91666) is being developed, but it may be dropped as the attack depends on an insecure setting (rp_filter=0). Am I Affected? If all of the below are true, your cluster is vulnerable to CVE-2020-8558: - Your cluster is running a vulnerable version (earlier than v1.18.4, v1.17.7, and v1.16.11). - Note that while the issue originated from the kube-proxy, the patch is in the kubelet. - Your nodes have the kube-proxy running on them. - Your nodes (or hostnetwork pods) run localhost-only services which don’t require any further authentication. Additionally, if the following is also true, your cluster may be vulnerable to a complete takeover through the api-server insecure-port: - Your cluster doesn’t disable the api-server insecure-port via –insecure-port=0 - The api-server runs on a node alongside a kube-proxy, for example, in deployments where the api-server is a pod itself. A node could be attacked either by a malicious host on the local network or by a malicious pod with CAP_NET_RAW running on the node. Conclusion CVE-2020-8558 can have some serious consequences. You should patch your clusters as soon as possible. CVE-2020-8558 also serves as a reminder that security best practices do work and significantly reduce attack surface. You should disable the api-server insecure-port, and if your pods don’t require CAP_NET_RAW, there’s no reason they should have that capability. While not related to this specific issue, we recommend implementing other security recommendations such as RBAC or running containers as a non-root user. Palo Alto Networks [Prisma Cloud](https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/prisma/cloud) customers are protected from this vulnerability. Compliance rules ensure your clusters are configured securely, blocking or alerting on: - The api-server insecure port - Pods running with CAP_NEW_RAW

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