- cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Cypherpunk revolution Vs the present military journalism system
by professor rat 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

"... Makes sense that pigshit shoveler Glenn Greenwald was the slop poisoner, Pierre Omidyar the wallowing pigmaster. ..." Like that time Omigod wrote he wanted to see ' 20 million mud-people ' killed and Glenin published it...oh wait...no, sorry... That was Tim " Mongo ' May and his mincing little poodle, John " Cryptome " Young.

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Re: Cypherpunk revolution Vs the present military journalism system
by professor rat 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

Self-redacted ERIC Hughes ran like a rabbit and died like a deserter. Every coward should go out like that. Right John? Then what about that joke called GILMORE! TSA activism so tepid it barely qualifies as liberal. This is how losers redact themselves. Right John? AMIRITE!? " Circle of Eunuchs ' is not just some abstract thing dreamed up by CJ.

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Re: Cypherpunk revolution Vs the present military journalism system
by professor rat 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

"... Had not considered that Tim May was literaturely assassinated ..." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZO2JhUI-6cI Here's mud in your eye then, John

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Spy vs Spy vs Everyone
by grarpamp 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JNrjKqrAn-I Secret Agent Man https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C-M2hs3sXGo How Not To Be Seen https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C4q09ZmeCF8 Spy Gadgets https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ro7vdOMmMSs Spy vs Spy http://www.montypython.50webs.com/scripts/Series_3/58.htm Old Lady Snoopers >From the Dept of Ignorably Obvious Dept... Intel/Actors/TLA's Using Cock.Li and Other Services https://www.vice.com/en/article/dyv87z/cockli-admin-russian-intelligence-sv… https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-116a 'Cock.li' Admin Says He’s Not Surprised Russian Intelligence Uses His Site A joint FBI-DHS-CISA report said that the SVR, the Russian foreign intelligence service behind the SolarWinds hack, uses Cock.li. Hacking. Disinformation. Surveillance. CYBER is Motherboard's podcast and reporting on the dark underbelly of the internet. On Monday the FBI, DHS, and CISA—the U.S. government agency focused on defensive cybersecurity—published a report laying out the tools, techniques, and capabilities of the SVR, the Russian foreign intelligence service that the U.S. has blamed for the wide-spanning SolarWinds supply chain hack. That report said that the SVR makes use of a specific anonymous email service called cock.li. The administrator of cock.li has now told Motherboard that this is the first time he has heard of the SVR using his service, but that "it's hard to surprise me nowadays." "This is the first time I've heard for sure that Russian intelligence is using cock.li, but it's not surprising, since the CIA uses it too," Vincent Canfield, the administrator of cock.li, said in a Twitter direct message. Canfield declined to provide evidence that American intelligence agencies use the service. Cock.li is an established, albeit obscure, meme email service. In 2015, Motherboard reported how Canfield said that German authorities had seized a hard drive from one of his servers after someone used the service to send a hoax bomb threat. Following the threat, all public schools in Los Angeles closed for a day. Two years later Canfield said SoundCloud removed audio of a phone call he had with the FBI concerning a bomb threat made against the Miami FBI office. The site allows users to also create XMPP accounts, which can be used for encrypted instant messaging, and lets them sign up while using the anonymity network Tor or other proxies. Many other email services block users who sign up using a VPN, for instance. Canfield claimed the service has over a million users, including with domains that aren't listed on the site's front page. The tagline of the service is "Yeah it’s email with cocks." Under the heading "General Tradecraft Observations," the joint FBI-DHS-CISA report says that "SVR cyber operators are capable adversaries." "FBI investigations have revealed infrastructure used in the intrusions is frequently obtained using false identities and cryptocurrencies," it continues. "These false identities are usually supported by low reputation infrastructure including temporary e-mail accounts and temporary voice over internet protocol (VoIP) telephone numbers. While not exclusively used by SVR cyber actors, a number of SVR cyber personas use e-mail services hosted on cock[.]li or related domains." Some of cock.li's other domains include "national.shitposting.agency" and "wants.dicksinmyan.us". "Anonymous e-mail is a necessary tool enjoyed by people across the world, including governments. It's a critical building block to a free Internet and if it's not provided by independent companies like ours these state actors are likely to operate their own e-mail providers, Crypto AG style," Canfield continued, referring to a historical case where the CIA secretly ran an encryption company in Switzerland in order to intercept others' communications. "We're proud to have worked with dozens of governments by educating them on the nature of anonymous e-mail, and while data is never handed over without legal obligation in our jurisdiction, these reports have still helped to stop thousands of bad actors and these governments have thanked us as a result," Canfield said, adding that those who have information about users violating cock.li's terms of service can contact an abuse address. Cock.li's terms of service says that users may be banned for "Conducting any activity that breaks the laws in which cock.li is governed," and "Encouraging others to break cock.li's rules or the law using cock.li." After publication of the joint report, Kyle Ehmke, a researcher with cybersecurity firm ThreatConnect, tweeted that "it's worth noting that 4400+ domains (current and historic) have been registered using a cock[.]li address. SVR registration among those almost certainly are a small percentage." Alert (AA21-116A) Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Cyber Operations: Trends and Best Practices for Network Defenders Original release date: April 26, 2021 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) assess Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) cyber actors—also known as Advanced Persistent Threat 29 (APT 29), the Dukes, CozyBear, and Yttrium—will continue to seek intelligence from U.S. and foreign entities through cyber exploitation, using a range of initial exploitation techniques that vary in sophistication, coupled with stealthy intrusion tradecraft within compromised networks. The SVR primarily targets government networks, think tank and policy analysis organizations, and information technology companies. On April 15, 2021, the White House released a statement on the recent SolarWinds compromise, attributing the activity to the SVR. For additional detailed information on identified vulnerabilities and mitigations, see the National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and FBI Cybersecurity Advisory titled “Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks,” released on April 15, 2021. The FBI and DHS are providing information on the SVR’s cyber tools, targets, techniques, and capabilities to aid organizations in conducting their own investigations and securing their networks. Threat Overview SVR cyber operations have posed a longstanding threat to the United States. Prior to 2018, several private cyber security companies published reports about APT 29 operations to obtain access to victim networks and steal information, highlighting the use of customized tools to maximize stealth inside victim networks and APT 29 actors’ ability to move within victim environments undetected. Beginning in 2018, the FBI observed the SVR shift from using malware on victim networks to targeting cloud resources, particularly e-mail, to obtain information. The exploitation of Microsoft Office 365 environments following network access gained through use of modified SolarWinds software reflects this continuing trend. Targeting cloud resources probably reduces the likelihood of detection by using compromised accounts or system misconfigurations to blend in with normal or unmonitored traffic in an environment not well defended, monitored, or understood by victim organizations. Technical Details SVR Cyber Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Password Spraying In one 2018 compromise of a large network, SVR cyber actors used password spraying to identify a weak password associated with an administrative account. The actors conducted the password spraying activity in a “low and slow” manner, attempting a small number of passwords at infrequent intervals, possibly to avoid detection. The password spraying used a large number of IP addresses all located in the same country as the victim, including those associated with residential, commercial, mobile, and The Onion Router (TOR) addresses. The organization unintentionally exempted the compromised administrator’s account from multi-factor authentication requirements. With access to the administrative account, the actors modified permissions of specific e-mail accounts on the network, allowing any authenticated network user to read those accounts. The actors also used the misconfiguration for compromised non-administrative accounts. That misconfiguration enabled logins using legacy single-factor authentication on devices which did not support multi-factor authentication. The FBI suspects this was achieved by spoofing user agent strings to appear to be older versions of mail clients, including Apple’s mail client and old versions of Microsoft Outlook. After logging in as a non-administrative user, the actors used the permission changes applied by the compromised administrative user to access specific mailboxes of interest within the victim organization. While the password sprays were conducted from many different IP addresses, once the actors obtained access to an account, that compromised account was generally only accessed from a single IP address corresponding to a leased virtual private server (VPS). The FBI observed minimal overlap between the VPSs used for different compromised accounts, and each leased server used to conduct follow-on actions was in the same country as the victim organization. During the period of their access, the actors consistently logged into the administrative account to modify account permissions, including removing their access to accounts presumed to no longer be of interest, or adding permissions to additional accounts. Recommendations To defend from this technique, the FBI and DHS recommend network operators to follow best practices for configuring access to cloud computing environments, including: Mandatory use of an approved multi-factor authentication solution for all users from both on premises and remote locations. Prohibit remote access to administrative functions and resources from IP addresses and systems not owned by the organization. Regular audits of mailbox settings, account permissions, and mail forwarding rules for evidence of unauthorized changes. Where possible, enforce the use of strong passwords and prevent the use of easily guessed or commonly used passwords through technical means, especially for administrative accounts. Regularly review the organization’s password management program. Ensure the organization’s information technology (IT) support team has well-documented standard operating procedures for password resets of user account lockouts. Maintain a regular cadence of security awareness training for all company employees. Leveraging Zero-Day Vulnerability In a separate incident, SVR actors used CVE-2019-19781, a zero-day exploit at the time, against a virtual private network (VPN) appliance to obtain network access. Following exploitation of the device in a way that exposed user credentials, the actors identified and authenticated to systems on the network using the exposed credentials. The actors worked to establish a foothold on several different systems that were not configured to require multi-factor authentication and attempted to access web-based resources in specific areas of the network in line with information of interest to a foreign intelligence service. Following initial discovery, the victim attempted to evict the actors. However, the victim had not identified the initial point of access, and the actors used the same VPN appliance vulnerability to regain access. Eventually, the initial access point was identified, removed from the network, and the actors were evicted. As in the previous case, the actors used dedicated VPSs located in the same country as the victim, probably to make it appear that the network traffic was not anomalous with normal activity. Recommendations To defend from this technique, the FBI and DHS recommend network defenders ensure endpoint monitoring solutions are configured to identify evidence of lateral movement within the network and: Monitor the network for evidence of encoded PowerShell commands and execution of network scanning tools, such as NMAP. Ensure host based anti-virus/endpoint monitoring solutions are enabled and set to alert if monitoring or reporting is disabled, or if communication is lost with a host agent for more than a reasonable amount of time. Require use of multi-factor authentication to access internal systems. Immediately configure newly-added systems to the network, including those used for testing or development work, to follow the organization’s security baseline and incorporate into enterprise monitoring tools. WELLMESS Malware In 2020, the governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States attributed intrusions perpetrated using malware known as WELLMESS to APT 29. WELLMESS was written in the Go programming language, and the previously-identified activity appeared to focus on targeting COVID-19 vaccine development. The FBI’s investigation revealed that following initial compromise of a network—normally through an unpatched, publicly-known vulnerability—the actors deployed WELLMESS. Once on the network, the actors targeted each organization’s vaccine research repository and Active Directory servers. These intrusions, which mostly relied on targeting on-premises network resources, were a departure from historic tradecraft, and likely indicate new ways the actors are evolving in the virtual environment. More information about the specifics of the malware used in this intrusion have been previously released and are referenced in the ‘Resources’ section of this document. Tradecraft Similarities of SolarWinds-enabled Intrusions During the spring and summer of 2020, using modified SolarWinds network monitoring software as an initial intrusion vector, SVR cyber operators began to expand their access to numerous networks. The SVR’s modification and use of trusted SolarWinds products as an intrusion vector is also a notable departure from the SVR’s historic tradecraft. The FBI’s initial findings indicate similar post-infection tradecraft with other SVR-sponsored intrusions, including how the actors purchased and managed infrastructure used in the intrusions. After obtaining access to victim networks, SVR cyber actors moved through the networks to obtain access to e-mail accounts. Targeted accounts at multiple victim organizations included accounts associated with IT staff. The FBI suspects the actors monitored IT staff to collect useful information about the victim networks, determine if victims had detected the intrusions, and evade eviction actions. Recommendations Although defending a network from a compromise of trusted software is difficult, some organizations successfully detected and prevented follow-on exploitation activity from the initial malicious SolarWinds software. This was achieved using a variety of monitoring techniques including: Auditing log files to identify attempts to access privileged certificates and creation of fake identify providers. Deploying software to identify suspicious behavior on systems, including the execution of encoded PowerShell. Deploying endpoint protection systems with the ability to monitor for behavioral indicators of compromise. Using available public resources to identify credential abuse within cloud environments. Configuring authentication mechanisms to confirm certain user activities on systems, including registering new devices. While few victim organizations were able to identify the initial access vector as SolarWinds software, some were able to correlate different alerts to identify unauthorized activity. The FBI and DHS believe those indicators, coupled with stronger network segmentation (particularly “zero trust” architectures or limited trust between identity providers) and log correlation, can enable network defenders to identify suspicious activity requiring additional investigation. General Tradecraft Observations SVR cyber operators are capable adversaries. In addition to the techniques described above, FBI investigations have revealed infrastructure used in the intrusions is frequently obtained using false identities and cryptocurrencies. VPS infrastructure is often procured from a network of VPS resellers. These false identities are usually supported by low reputation infrastructure including temporary e-mail accounts and temporary voice over internet protocol (VoIP) telephone numbers. While not exclusively used by SVR cyber actors, a number of SVR cyber personas use e-mail services hosted on cock[.]li or related domains. The FBI also notes SVR cyber operators have used open source or commercially available tools continuously, including Mimikatz—an open source credential-dumping too—and Cobalt Strike—a commercially available exploitation tool. Mitigations The FBI and DHS recommend service providers strengthen their user validation and verification systems to prohibit misuse of their services. Resources NSA, CISA, FBI Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Russian SVR Targets U.S. and Allied Networks CISA: Remediating Networks Affected by the SolarWinds and Active Directory/M365 Compromise CISA Alert AA21-008A: Detecting Post-Compromise Threat Activity in Microsoft Cloud Environments FBI, CISA, ODNI, NSA Joint Statement: Joint Statement by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the National Security Agency CISA Alert AA20-352A: Advanced Persistent Threat Compromise of Government Agencies, Critical Infrastructure, and Private Sector Organizations CISA Insights: What Every Leader Needs to Know about the Ongoing APT Cyber Activity FBI, CISA Joint Cybersecurity Advisory: Advanced Persistent Threat Actors Targeting U.S. Think Tanks CISA: Malicious Activity Targeting COVID-19 Research, Vaccine Development NCSC, CSE, NSA, CISA Advisory: APT 29 targets COVID-19 vaccine development Revisions April 26, 2021: Initial Version

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Queries for Jacob A
by professor rat 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

Dear Jacob Youse have been portrayed here as some sort of NSA tool and pentagon Jewboy for your Tor work ( By Batshit Crazy ) Would you care to comment on that? Also - when did you stop selling Snowden trove material to the Media?

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Re: Julian Assange needs killing ( My 20 sats )
by professor rat 08 Jul '21

08 Jul '21

Govt agent truthers that can't back up any of their bad-faith bullshit may be considered as agent provocateurs working - paid or unpaid - for the govt. Batshit Crazy is full of it - much like his BFF's Gramps and Semich. Their job - or calling - whatever is to spam this list with noise and drive out the signal. ASFAIK these three no-coiner's are also carpetbagger c-punks A decade late and a dollar short. Fuck their bs propaganda and all who encourage it. If they love Assmange so much they can join him.

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Public crypto audit report: lurch/OMEMO
by ROOT＠HardenedVault 07 Jul '21

07 Jul '21

Dear Cypherpunks, We're glad to kill off some 0days for open source crypto implementations. Here's public crypto audit report: lurch/OMEMO https://hardenedvault.net/files/lurch-audit.pdf Cheers, regards R@HardenedVault

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Re: Ross Ulbricht got 2xLife+40 for a Harmless Website
by coderman 07 Jul '21

07 Jul '21

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ On Wednesday, July 7th, 2021 at 2:23 PM, Punk-BatSoup-Stasi 2.0 punks(a)tfwno.gf wrote: > On Wed, 07 Jul 2021 21:18:20 +0000 > > coderman coderman(a)protonmail.com wrote: > >> look to china for the future: > > Did I ever mention that 'coderman' and 'grarpamp' are sockpuppets of the same turd? russia is in second place, but they could overtake china as authoritarian avant garde. (why focus on internet? because controlling internet access is how you control access to information in this modern future...) https://time.com/5951834/russia-control-internet/ How Russia Is Stepping Up Its Campaign to Control the Internet [Russias President Vladimir Putin is seen in his office in Novo-Ogaryovo during a video-conference meeting of Russias Council for Interethnic Relations on March 30, 2021.] Russias President Vladimir Putin is seen in his office in Novo-Ogaryovo during a video-conference meeting of Russias Council for Interethnic Relations on March 30, 2021. Alexei Druzhinin —TASS via Getty Images By [Madeline Roache](https://time.com/author/madeline-roache/) April 1, 2021 11:57 AM EDT On March 10, photos and videos on Twitter were loading more slowly than usual for users in Russia. It was not a network fault or server error but a deliberate move by Russia’s state internet regulator Roskomnadzor to limit traffic to the social media site, in what experts say was the first public use of controversial new technology that the Russian authorities introduced after 2019. The regulator throttled the U.S. platform in retaliation for what it described as a failure to remove thousands of posts that “encourage underage suicide and contain child pornography as well as information about drug use.” The action came after Russian authorities had accused Twitter and other social networks in January of failing to delete posts urging children to take part in anti-government protests. In January and February, Russia’s Anti-Corruption Foundation organized protests in dozens of cities on Facebook and Russian social network VKontakte against the arrest of its head, Alexei Navalny. Tens of thousands of people [protested](https://time.com/5932550/russia-protests-navalny/) in more than 100 cities across the country demanding the release of the opposition figure whose [YouTube investigation](https://time.com/5934092/navalny-putin-palace-investigation/) into alleged corruption by President Vladimir Putin received tens of millions of views upon its release. Navalny was sentenced on Feb. 2 to two years and eight months in prison for violating parole from an embezzlement case dating back to 2014 that he says was fabricated. In response to the slowdown, Twitter said it did not support any “unlawful behaviour” and was “deeply concerned” by the regulator’s attempts to block online public conversation. But on March 16 Roskomnadzor gave a fresh warning that if Twitter [refused to comply](https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4730504)with its removal requests within a month, the regulator will consider blocking access to the social network in Russia outright. Roskomnadzor, a federal executive body founded in 2008, is responsible for ensuring the media and communications follow Russian laws, and issuing warnings to media sources that violate these laws. Twitter has only 700,000 monthly active users in Russia, a fraction of the [68.7 million in the U.S](https://www.businessofapps.com/data/twitter-statistics/). Despite its use by opposition politicians and journalists the Kremlin doesn’t consider it “the most dangerous” platform, says Andrei Soldatov, a Russian cyber expert. Experts say that the authorities used the Twitter slowdown to test technology that could be used to disrupt other, more popular social networks like Facebook, which has an [estimated](https://webindex.mediascope.net/report?byGeo=1&byDevice=3&byDevi… million active monthly users in Russia. The manner in which Twitter was throttled opens up a new front in the war between the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin and the open internet. For a decade now, the Kremlin has sought to control online information by censoring or removing content and blocking mobile Internet access completely. Now, authorities are aggressively taking the fight to social media platforms, which are dominated by American-owned companies. The government passed a law in December to [increase](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-internet-lawmakers-fine… fines on online platforms and Internet providers for failing to remove material calling for extremist activity, information about recreational drugs and child sex abuse; companies can now be fined between 10% to 20% of their yearly turnover in Russia for repeatedly failing to remove content. A law passed the same month gave Roskomnadzor the power to restrict or fully block websites that, according to officials, discriminate against Russian state media. The widespread anti-government rallies earlier this year seem to have crossed a line for Putin. In recent months, the President has [said](https://time.com/5933666/putin-davos-agenda-speech/) tech companies are “competing with states” and that “society will collapse from the inside” if the Internet does not [obey](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-internet-idUSKCN2AW2D4)legal rules and society’s moral laws. As the government has ramped up its efforts to control what citizens can access online it also has several projects in the pipeline that experts say is part of a strategy to push foreign tech companies out of the Russian market completely. From April 1, Roskomnadzor [requires](https://www.raamoprusland.nl/dossiers/media/1829-can-russia-s-craving-for-digital-sovereignty-succeed) tech companies selling smartphones in Russia to prompt users to download government-approved apps, including search engines, maps and payment systems. The state “likely wants to see, and allow dissemination of, information that only reflects the official government point of view,” says Mike Tretyak, a partner with the Digital Rights Center law firm and expert with Roskomsvoboda, an NGO dedicated to digital rights. Could it be getting closer to succeeding? Ten years of attempting to take control For activists, this year looks like history repeating itself. Since mass demonstrations against electoral fraud began a decade ago—also organized by opposition figures using Facebook and VKontakte—the state has been developing a legal and technological toolkit to regulate online information, introducing content filters, block lists and fining or even jailing people for what they post online. In 2012, Russia began [blacklisting and forcing offline websites](https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-20096274) with the purported goal of protecting minors from harmful sites, including those that give details about how to commit suicide. In 2014 a law allowed Roskomnadzor to block access to media that calls for mass riots, extremist activities, or participation in unsanctioned mass public events. Government critics have been targeted; Navalny’s Live Journal blog, which published investigations about corruption in Russian politics, and other political [opposition sites](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-26578264) were blocked. (Roskomnadzor said they were banned for calling on people to illegally participate in mass events). More recently, Russia has initiated regional network blackouts. In October 2018, the Russian government [cut mobile data service](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-protests-internet/russia… in the Ingushetia region in southwestern Russia during political protests—the first such Internet outage in the country. In August 2019, the government blocked mobile Internet during protests in Moscow in what the Internet Protection Society, a digital rights group, said was the [first](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/08/07/authorities-jammed-moscows… shutdown of this kind in the capital. Then, in November 2019, the Kremlin made its most controversial move yet toward controlling the country’s Internet infrastructure with the so-called “sovereign Internet” law. A series of amendments to existing laws theoretically enabled the Russian authorities to isolate “RuNet”—the unofficial name for websites hosted in Russia and sites on Russian domain names— from the global web in vaguely defined times of crisis, giving the Russian authorities control over flows of data coming in and out of the country. In an explanatory [note](http://duma.gov.ru/news/44551/) about the new law, the Russian legislature said that it was created in light of the “aggressive nature of the U.S. National Cyber [Security Strategy](https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/N…, in which the U.S. threatened to punish countries including Russia, China, Iran and North Korea if they used cyber tools to “undermine” its economy and democracy, and steal its intellectual property. The Russia legislature claimed that Russia needs to take “protective measures to ensure the long term and stable operation of the Internet in Russia, and to increase the reliability of Russian internet resources.” The “sovereign Internet” law required Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to install Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) equipment, which has been used by some countries, like China, for censorship. DPI equipment enables Russia to circumvent providers, automatically block content the government has banned and reroute internet traffic. Russia’s major ISPs have now installed DPI equipment, according to Alena Epifanova, a researcher at the German Council on Foreign Relations. But no one knows if or when Russia will be able to cut off its Internet from the global web. “The information about its implementation process and its scope is kept under wraps,” says Treyak. What’s certain is that Russia does not yet have the technological capacity to create a Chinese-style Great Firewall. Unlike China, which brought ISPs under state control early on, Russia is deeply integrated in the global web having enjoyed a largely free Internet for decades. As the government has attempted to control information emerging from Russia, so has it tried to limit what is accessible in Russia from abroad. It has required search engines, including Google, to delete some results and social networks to store their user data on servers within Russia. Roskomnadzor hit Google with a [fine](http://themoscowtimes.com/2020/12/17/russia-fines-google-for-failing-… of three million rubles ($41,000) for not removing content banned by the authorities in 2020. Roskomnadzor [blocked LinkedIn in 2016](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-38014501)and fined Twitter and Facebook 4 million rubles ($53,000) in 2020 for failing to store user data in Russia. Although these fines are pocket change to these huge corporations, some have buckled under Roskomnadzor’s threats to block them if they don’t comply with censorship orders. In 2018, Facebook-owned Instagram, which has 54 million users in Russia, complied with the regulator’s requests to remove posts connected to corruption allegations by Navalny. In a [tweet](https://twitter.com/navalny/status/964107913831899137)Navalny accused Instagram of submitting to “illegal censorship orders”. “Shame on you Instagram!” he wrote. YouTube, where Navalny and his group post most of their investigative videos, refused to comply. But now, Russia has upped the stakes. After Roskomnadzor [threatened](https://vk.com/rkn?w=wall-76229642_232671) to prosecute social media sites for encouraging minors to join the January protests, the regulator [said](https://vk.com/rkn?w=wall-76229642_233129) TikTok deleted 38% of its related content, while YouTube and Russian social media site VKontakte removed half. This was not enough for the authorities. Earlier this month, Russia filed a [lawsuit](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-social-media-fi… against Twitter and four other tech companies for allegedly failing to delete enough of such posts. Twitter, Google, Facebook each have three cases against them and for each violation they face a fine of up to 4 million roubles ($54,000). Cases have also been filed against TikTok and Telegram. Russian apps for Russian Internet users The authorities are now moving not just to reduce the influence of foreign tech companies but also to force them to promote Russian services — as with the new regulation mandating government-approved apps on all new smartphones. Apple has agreed to this, the first time the company will offer users the ability to install outside software on its devices at setup. Tretyak, of the Roskomsvoboda digital rights group, says Apple’s compliance is understandable, a “mild” policy to protect Russian apps that are already used by the majority of Russians. But Soldatov says the idea is to discourage Russians from using foreign social networks such as TikTok, which many Russians were nudged into using during the Navalny protests. “It’s all about numbers. If you have 200,000 politically active people sharing videos about Navalny, that’s nothing. But if you have millions of ordinary Russians joining it, that’s a threat,” he says. That helps to explains why Russian companies are building alternatives to foreign services, he says. Gazprom Media Holding, a subsidiary of state-energy giant Gazprom, is building an[app](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/12/23/russia-to-launch-own-tikt… similar to TikTok. A [Russian Wikipedia](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/10/09/russia-plans-its-own-v… is expected to launch in 2023 to ensure Russians have access to more “detailed and reliable” information about their country. There is “a fine line between compliance with mild protectionist policies,” such as Apple listing Russian apps, and “compliance with removal of sensitive materials such as corruption allegations,” says Tretyak. “My belief is that each company should select its own behavioral strategy upon being approached by any government — not only the Russian one – possibly, according to its own internal moral code,” he says. The government is also working on a bill that aims to give Russian security services total access to communications over encrypted connections and the ability to see what sites people visit. Epifanova says that it’s very likely the law will be passed, but it’s unlikely that tech companies will comply with the measure. They have [rejected calls](https://www.wired.com/story/the-time-tim-cook-stood-his-ground-again… from law enforcement agencies around the world to provide access to encrypted information to assist in certain criminal investigations. The move is part of a “strategy to push out foreign tech companies while promoting Russian companies,” says Epifanova. How digital rights activists are fighting back Ordinary citizens in Russia are increasingly looking for ways to shrug off state Internet controls. The Moscow-based Roskomsvoboda and the Internet Protection Center are among the digital rights groups and activists dedicating resources to helping Russians get around new restrictions. Roskomsvoboda’s [website](https://reestr.rublacklist.net/) features a list of all the online resources blocked in Russia, instructions on how to get around online bans, and news about the country’s Internet regulation. The group also [keeps a public list](https://vpnlove.me/)of reliable Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), which allow users to gain access to blocked websites. However, the government has also required some popular providers to block[access](https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2017/11/01/russian-law-banning… to blacklisted websites. Individual activists offer advice too; Vladislav Zdolnikov, an IT specialist, runs a Telegram channel that explains the latest developments in Russia’s internet regulation and recommends circumvention tools. Free Internet activists also continue exploring new ways to democratize technology. On March 21 and 22, Roskomsvoboda ran a “hackathon,” Demhack 2, for 15 teams of developers across Russia. Their aim was “to find technical solutions aimed at protecting the rights and realizing the interests of citizens in the digital environment,” says Natalia Malysheva, the hackathon’s producer and Roskomsvoboda’s press secretary. There is no shortage of ideas. Roskomsvoboba says it receives about 100 proposals for each hackathon. The judging panel of digital experts chose two winners on March 22 for prizes that included the chance to put their projects in front of investors. The first winner was Security Addon, an app that can prevent information on a device from being accessed if it is hacked or stolen. The second, the Deep Silent app, helps users download information to their phones even if the signal is limited, making it a useful resource if the internet is restricted. As well as helping developers to build their technical solutions, Roskomsvoboda are building their own tools. Last year, they launched Censor Tracker, an extension for Google Chrome, that can help users to detect and bypass internet restrictions. In launching the extension tool, the group made it clear how high they believe the stakes now are. “We’re getting ready to confront the approaching sovereign Runet,” they wrote.

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[wrong][spam][bugs] git behaviors
by Karl 07 Jul '21

07 Jul '21

K. Slow trog. Right now I have a git repository checked out with a worktree open to a remote branch. The worktree head is a week out of date. The branch has been updated upstream, but when I type `git pull` it doesn't merge anything new. I'll try to make a terminal log. ... It's now 8:37a (-0400). Started this email at 7:12a . I'm having trouble directing my behavior. https://asciinema.org/a/C1jPRlmN5Nl582EaTPTk5s8sW

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Ross Ulbricht got 2xLife+40 for a Harmless Website
by grarpamp 07 Jul '21

07 Jul '21

While other people get less than 25y for Murder, Rape, etc, and nothing for War, Torture, Infinite Detention, Global Organized Theft, etc. Any questions? #FreeRoss #RIPJohnHurley #McAfeeDidntKillHimself BTW: People actually could buy, did buy, still can buy, and indeed should consider buying... a cannon. Or at least 3D-Print one :)

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