October 2015 - cypherpunks - lists.cpunks.org

Re: "Blackphone" said to be "a super-secure nsa-proof"
by Ulex Europae 14 Oct '16

14 Oct '16

At 05:25 AM 1/17/2014, Jim Bell forwarded: ><<http:///>http://www.yahoo.com/tech/startup-launching-a-super-secure-nsa-proof-735110…> It's been long enough, has anyone acquired one of these and tested it? Ulex

10 13

Re: [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked
by Eugen Leitl 07 Sep '16

07 Sep '16

----- Forwarded message from Brian Gladman <brg(a)gladman.plus.com> ----- Date: Sat, 07 Sep 2013 09:33:28 +0100 From: Brian Gladman <brg(a)gladman.plus.com> To: Cryptography Mailing List <cryptography(a)metzdowd.com> Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; WOW64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130801 Thunderbird/17.0.8 On 07/09/2013 01:48, Chris Palmer wrote: >> Q: "Could the NSA be intercepting downloads of open-source encryption software and silently replacing these with their own versions?" > > Why would they perform the attack only for encryption software? They > could compromise people's laptops by spiking any popular app. Because NSA and GCHQ are much more interested in attacking communictions in transit rather than attacking endpoints. Endpoint attacks cost more to undertake, only give access to a limited amount of data and involve much greater risks that their attack will either be discovered or their means of attack will leave evidence of what they have done and how they have done it. The internal bueaucratic costs of gaining approval for (adverarial) endpoint attacks also makes it a more costly process than the use of network based interception. There is significant use of open source encryption software in end to end encryption solutions, in file archivers, in wifi and network routers, and in protecing the communications used to manage and control such components when at remote locations. The open source software is provided in source code form and is compiled from source in a huge number of applications and this means that the ability to covertly substitute broken source code could provide access to a huge amount of traffic without the risks involved in endpoint attacks. I stress that I am NOT suggesting that this has happened (or is happening), simply that it has attractions from an NSA/GCHQ viewpoint. Fortunately, I think it is a difficult attack to mount covertly (that is, without the acqiecience of the author(s) of the software in question). On the more general debate here, in my view, 'security for the masses' through the deployment of encryption is a 'pipe dream' that isn't going to happen. Functionality (and the complexity that comes with it) is the enemy of security and it is very clear that the public places a much higher value on functionality than it does on security (or privacy). Every time a new device comes onto the market, it starts with limited functionality and some hope of decent security but rapidly evolves to be a high functionality product in which the prospect of decent security declines rapidly to zero. Raspberry Pis look interesting _now_ but I would be willing to bet that they won't buck the trend of increasing funtionality and declining security simply because this is what the majority in even this limited user community will want. To buck this trend we need an effort like the Raspberry Pi effort but one driven by our community with a strong commitment to simplicty and deliberately limited functionality in both hardware and software. Brian Gladman _______________________________________________ The cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)metzdowd.com http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

8 14

Re: [liberationtech] Interesting things in keyservers
by Eugen Leitl 17 Aug '16

17 Aug '16

----- Forwarded message from micah <micah(a)riseup.net> ----- Date: Sat, 20 Jul 2013 10:05:42 -0400 From: micah <micah(a)riseup.net> To: Micah Lee <micahflee(a)riseup.net>, 'liberationtech' <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Subject: Re: [liberationtech] Interesting things in keyservers User-Agent: Notmuch/0.15.2 (http://notmuchmail.org) Emacs/24.3.1 (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) Reply-To: liberationtech <liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu> Hi Micah! Micah Lee <micahflee(a)riseup.net> writes: > I'm working on a talk for OHM2013 about PGP. Can anyone send me examples > of interesting keys in key servers that you know of? Since you are preparing a talk about the subject, I'm going to be pedantic and correct your usage of "PGP", because it is important to get your terminology straight when giving a talk. I presume you aren't giving a talk about the commercial software, but instead you are actually giving a talk about OpenPGP which is the standard specified by RFC4880 that different programs like GnuPG, Seahorse, MacGPG, and PGP etc. all implement. If that is true, then you should refer to it as OpenPGP, and not PGP. I dont know what your talk will consist of, besides the funny enigmail XSS and goatse.cx stuff (thanks for that! always good to have some goatse early in the morning), but I would like to point out a few things that might be useful to mention. One is a wiki page that I created with some people: https://we.riseup.net/riseuplabs+paow/openpgp-best-practices - it contains some useful hints about using OpenPGP, maintaining a good key and some general good practices that people often dont know about (such as the importance of keeping your keys updated to get critical revocation and expiration extension certifications!) One thing mentioned on that page that I wanted to highlight, because you used pgp.mit.edu links in your original email, is that the keyserver pgp.mit.edu is not a good one to use/promote. Everyone uses it as their 'goto' keyserver, but it is a really bad idea! As a keyserver, it has been broken for years. For a long time it was just dropping revocations, subkey updates and expirations on the floor. That is *really* bad. Eventually, they upgraded their keyserver software, but it is *still* running an older version of SKS, a version that fails to handle 16-digit subkeyid lookups (among other failings). So, please don't rely on pgp.mit.edu for your security, and please don't include them in your slides! If you are looking for one to use, I highly recommend using the SKS pool address (hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net or http://hkps.pool.sks-keyservers.net/ - or if you want a more close geographical pool, have a look at http://sks-keyservers.net/overview-of-pools.php) Finally, there seems to be some amazing misconceptions about keyservers, keys and the web of trust. In particular this http://cryptome.org/2013/07/mining-pgp-keyservers.htm circulated recently and it pained me to see because it suggested various wreckless conclusions that were dangerously off the mark[0] (and used pgp.mit.edu, hah). While it is true that we've jokingly called the OpenPGP web of trust "the original social network" because of the exposed social relational graphing that can be done by querying keyservers, and it is for this reason that many activists I know do not want to have signatures uploaded to keyservers (and instead use the bulky local-only signature work-around)... ... but for some reason people seem to think that if it is on a keyserver, is true, or it means something that it doesn't. People don't realize critical things, such as the fact that I can create a key with the UID Nadim Kobeissi and upload it to the keyservers[1]. That doesn't mean that is the real Nadim's key (this is what exchanging key fingerprints and doing certifications is for, so you can know, with a certain degree of certainty, that this person is the person who controls that secret key material). Or people think that because I signed your key and that signature is on the keyserver that indicates: I trust you; we met in person at that date; we know each other; we are involved in a criminal conspiracy with each other; or many other wrong assumptions about what that certification means. I can sign Edward Snowden's key and send that to the keyservers[1]. Hell, I can sign Snowden's key with my fake Nadim Kobeissi key[1] and then send it to the keyservers. Does that mean that Nadim and Snowden have met in person?! No, it does not at all. Anyways, I can keep going... but I dont know what the focus of your OHM talk is about, so going on like this isn't particularly useful to you and your talk... however, I'd be happy to provide more feedback about your talk if you would like![2] After all, we Micahs need to stick together, micah 0. "the cryptome article just sounds like impenetrable bullshit from someone with no interest in actually understandning what's happening" - I'm not saying who said this... 1. no, I didn't do that, nor did I upload the edward snowden or bradly manning keys. -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at companys(a)stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://ativel.com http://postbiota.org AC894EC5: 38A5 5F46 A4FF 59B8 336B 47EE F46E 3489 AC89 4EC5

4 3

Re: [cryptome] Re: FOIPA adventures
by coderman 01 Mar '16

01 Mar '16

two new for DOCSIS tech @FBI, @CIA: "Any and all "DOCSIS" technology records, including cross-references and indirect mentions, including records outside the investigation main file. This is to include a search of each of the following record stores and interfaces: the Central Records System (CRS), the Automated Case Support system ("ACS") Investigative Case Management system ("ICM"), the Automated Case Support system ("ACS") Electronic Case File ("ECF"), and the Automated Case Support system ("ACS") Universal Index ("UNI"). I also request a search of "ELSUR", the database containing electronic surveillance information, for any and all records or activities related to "DOCSIS" or "DOCSIS intercept" or "DOCSIS access" technology. In addition, please extend the search criteria across any external storage media, including I-Drives, S-Drives, or related technologies used during the course of investigation involving Cable internet data services. DITU experimental technologies or research also within scope of this request. Please include processing notes, even if request is denied in part. Please identify individuals responsible for any aspect of FOIA processing in the processing notes, along with explanation of their involvement if not typically assigned FOIA responsibilities for the record systems above." - https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/indocsis-19725/ "Any and all records, receipts, training, technology transfer programs, research, evaluation technologies, or other materials relevant to "DOCIS" cable communication technology. This is to include "DOCSIS 1.0", "DOCSIS 2.0", "DOCSIS 3.0", and other relevant DOCSIS protocols." - https://www.muckrock.com/foi/united-states-of-america-10/indocsisxfer-19726/ On 7/12/15, coderman <coderman(a)gmail.com> wrote: > On 7/12/15, Douglas Rankine <douglasrankine2001(a)yahoo.co.uk> wrote: >> Are they giving reasons for the rejections? > > Glomar all around. see also: > > "What Is the Big Secret Surrounding Stingray Surveillance?" > - > http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-is-the-big-secret-surroundin… > > --- > > What Is the Big Secret Surrounding Stingray Surveillance? > > State and local law enforcement agencies across the U.S. are setting > up fake cell towers to gather mobile data, but few will admit it > By Larry Greenemeier | June 25, 2015 > > > Stung: Law enforcement agencies sometimes use a device called a > stingray to simulate a cell phone tower, enabling them to gather > international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI), location and other > data from mobile phones connecting to them. Pictured here is an actual > cell tower in Palatine, Ill. > > > Given the amount of mobile phone traffic that cell phone towers > transmit, it is no wonder law enforcement agencies target these > devices as a rich source of data to aid their investigations. Standard > procedure involves getting a court order to obtain phone records from > a wireless carrier. When authorities cannot or do not want to go that > route, they can set up a simulated cell phone tower—often called a > stingray—that surreptitiously gathers information from the suspects in > question as well as any other mobile device in the area. > > These simulated cell sites—which collect international mobile > subscriber identity (IMSI), location and other data from mobile phones > connecting to them—have become a source of controversy for a number of > reasons. National and local law enforcement agencies closely guard > details about the technology’s use, with much of what is known about > stingrays revealed through court documents and other paperwork made > public via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. > > One such document recently revealed that the Baltimore Police > Department has used a cell site simulator 4,300 times since 2007 and > signed a nondisclosure agreement with the FBI that instructed > prosecutors to drop cases rather than reveal the department’s use of > the stingray. Other records indicate law enforcement agencies have > used the technology hundreds of times without a search warrant, > instead relying on a much more generic court order known as a pen > register and trap and trace order. Last year Harris Corp., the > Melbourne, Fla., company that makes the majority of cell site > simulators, went so far as to petition the Federal Communications > Commission to block a FOIA request for user manuals for some of the > company’s products. > > The secretive nature of stingray use has begun to backfire on law > enforcement, however, with states beginning to pass laws that require > police to obtain a warrant before they can set up a fake cell phone > tower for surveillance. Virginia, Minnesota, Utah and Washington State > now have laws regulating stingray use, with California and Texas > considering similar measures. Proposed federal legislation to prevent > the government from tracking people’s cell phone or GPS location > without a warrant could also include stingray technology. > > Scientific American recently spoke with Brian Owsley, an assistant > professor of law at the University of North Texas Dallas College of > Law, about the legal issues and privacy implications surrounding the > use of a stingray to indiscriminately collect mobile phone data. Given > the invasive nature of the technology and scarcity of laws governing > its use, Owsley, a former U.S. magistrate judge in Texas, says the > lack of reliable information documenting the technology’s use is > particularly troubling. > > > [An edited transcript of the interview follows.] > > When and why did law enforcement agencies begin using international > cell site simulators to intercept mobile phone traffic and track > movement of mobile phone users? > > Initially, intelligence agencies—CIA and the like—couldn’t get local > or national telecommunications companies in other countries to > cooperate with U.S. surveillance operations against nationals in those > countries. To fill that void companies like the Harris Corp. started > creating cell site simulators for these agencies to use. Once Harris > saturated the intelligence and military markets [with] their products, > they turned to federal agencies operating in the U.S. So the [Drug > Enforcement Administration], Homeland Security, FBI and others started > having their own simulated cell sites to use for surveillance. > Eventually this trickled down further to yet another untapped market: > state and local law enforcement. That’s where we are today in terms of > the proliferation of this technology. > > > Under what circumstances do U.S. law enforcement agencies use cell > site simulators and related technology? > > There are three examples of how law enforcement typically use > stingrays for surveillance: First, law enforcement officials may use > the cell site simulator with the known cell phone number of a targeted > individual in order to determine that individual's location. For > example, officials are searching for a fugitive and have a cell phone > number that they believe the individual is using. They may operate a > stingray near areas where they believe that the individual may be, > such as a relative's home. > > Second, law enforcement officials may use the stingray to target a > specific individual who is using a cell phone, but these officials do > not know the cell phone number. They follow the targeted individual > from a site to various other locations over a certain time period. At > each new location, they activate the stingray and capture the cell > phone data for all of the nearby cell phones. After they have captured > the data at a number of sites they can analyze the data to determine > the cell phone or cell phones used by the targeted individual. This > approach captures the data of all nearby cell phones, including > countless cell phones of individuals unrelated to the criminal > investigation. > > Third, law enforcement officials have been known to operate stingray > at political rallies and protests. Using the stingray at these types > of events captures the cell phone data of everyone in attendance. > > > How does law enforcement get permission to perform this type of > surveillance? > > Federal law enforcement agencies typically get courts to approve use > of something like stingray through a pen register application [a pen > register is a device that records the numbers called from a particular > phone line]. With that type of application, essentially the government > says, we want this information. We think it’s going to be relevant to > an ongoing criminal investigation. As you can imagine, that’s a pretty > low bar for them to satisfy in the eyes of the court. Just about > anything could fit into that description. You don’t even have to show > that such an investigation would lead to an arrest or prosecution. Law > enforcement is telling the court, look, we’re in the middle of this > investigation. If we get this information, we think it might lead to > some other important information. > > Different court orders have different standards for approval. The > highest standard would be for a wiretap. A search warrant likewise has > a much higher standard than a pen register, requiring law enforcement > to prove probable cause before a judge will grant permission to use > additional means of investigation. The problem that I have with a pen > register to justify use of something like a stingray is that the > standard for a pen register is much too low, given the invasive nature > of a pen register. Instead, I think the use of a stingray should be > consistent with the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and pursuant > to a search warrant. > > > Why not explicitly state the type of technology being used and its > specific purpose when filing for a court order? > > [When] law enforcement agencies seek to obtain judicial authorization > through a pen register, they do not directly indicate that they are > applying for authorization to use a stingray. Doing so might cause > some courts to question whether the pen register statute [as opposed > to some higher standard] is the appropriate basis for authorizing a > stingray. In addition, law enforcement agencies typically have to sign > nondisclosure agreements with Harris Corp. in order to receive the > federal Homeland Security funding needed to purchase the technology. > So there’s this concern, at least at the local law enforcement level, > about revealing any information about it because that would violate > the agreement with Harris and maybe subject them to losing the > equipment or some other consequences. > > > Why would law enforcement agencies sign a nondisclosure agreement with > a technology company? > > I’m not sure whether the agreements are being driven by the FBI or by > Harris, but these agreements seem to be getting less relevant insofar > as [there is less] need to keep the public unaware of the existence of > this technology. In the last three or so years there’s been a lot more > awareness about the technology and its use. When agencies were first > signing these agreements years ago, use of this technology wasn’t > widely known. Now you are getting situations where criminal defense > attorneys learn about stingray and similar technologies and the role > they may be playing in the arrests of some of their clients. Defense > teams are starting to ask questions and require the government to > produce documentation such as court orders, and that’s creating the > confrontation you’re now seeing. > > > Why have law enforcement agencies kept their use of cell site > simulators so secretive? > > Some of it is the cloudy legal issues surrounding the legitimate uses > of this technology. Law enforcement agencies will also argue that the > more information that’s available about this technology, the harder it > is for them to use these devices to fight crime. Yet there’s a growing > knowledge of this technology, and a serious criminal enterprise is > already aware of it. People are already using prepaid disposable > phones [sometimes referred to as “burner phones”] to some extent to > defeat this technology. Sophisticated criminals are aware that there’s > electronic surveillance out there in myriad ways, and so they’re going > to take precautions. From a technology perspective, it’s sort of a > cat-and-mouse game. There’s also a device that locates cell site > simulators, something referred to as an IMSI catcher. There’s an arms > race back and forth to get the best technology and to get the edge. > > > What does it say to you about the whole process that a prosecutor or a > law enforcement agency is willing to sacrifice a conviction in order > to keep their methods a secret? > > I think it’s a very odd approach. You are throwing away some > convictions or potential convictions for the sake of secrecy. But it’s > even harder to understand now that knowledge of the technology is > becoming so common. There have been documented cases in Baltimore and > Saint Louis where stingray has supposedly been used. The use of > stingray and related technologies is a roll of the dice in the sense > that law enforcement is hoping that either the defense attorneys don’t > have enough savvy or wherewithal to find out about the technology and > ask the right questions or, even if that does happen, they’re hoping > that the judge that they have is favorable to their approach and not > going to order them to reveal information about its use. In the rare > occasions when things go against them, they just dismiss it. > > > You yourself denied a law enforcement application three years ago to > use a stingray. Under what circumstances would you approve its use? > > I want to make clear: I don’t have a problem with stingray itself—I > understand that this can be a valuable tool in law enforcement’s > arsenal. My problem is that I want it to be used pursuant to a high > standard of proof that it’s needed, and that I want the approval > process to be more transparent. One of the reasons I’d like to see > some more documentation of stingray applications and orders is because > I have this suspicion—but there’s no way of confirming it one way or > another—that some judges are signing approvals to use this technology > thinking that they’re just signing a pen register. If a judge thinks > it’s [just] another pen register application, they’re just going to > sign it without giving it much pause. > > > Now that the use of this stingrays and related technologies has been > made public, where will this issue be a year or a few years from now? > > A year from now I think we’re in the same position. You’re dealing > with outdated statutes concerning new and very different technology. > It’s possible in five years maybe that Congress will step in and do > something. More likely, state legislatures will take most of the > action to monitor this type of surveillance. Washington State, > California [and others] have already acted, and Texas is evaluating > the standards for approving stingray use. >

11 83

Possible crypto backdoor in RFC-2631 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method
by Georgi Guninski 18 Feb '16

18 Feb '16

Possible crypto backdoor in RFC-2631 Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method I am n00b at crypto so this might not make any sense. In DH, if one can select group parameters (g,q,p) he can break both parties private very fast time IMHO. The RFC: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2631 The main problem appears: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2631#section-2.2.2 2.2.2. Group Parameter Validation The ASN.1 for DH keys in [PKIX] includes elements j and validation- Parms which MAY be used by recipients of a key to verify that the group parameters were correctly generated. Two checks are possible: 1. Verify that p=qj + 1. This demonstrates that the parameters meet the X9.42 parameter criteria. 2. Verify that when the p,q generation procedure of [FIPS-186] Appendix 2 is followed with seed 'seed', that p is found when 'counter' = pgenCounter. The main problem appears MAY. As I read it, implementation MAY NOT verify it. Sketch of the attack: Chose $q$ product of small primes $p_i$. Solve the discrete logarithm modulo $p_i$ for the public keys. Apply the Chinese remainder theorem to get the privates keys. (This is well known method for DL and for this reason the group order must be prime [160 bits ;)]). Would be interested how implementations implement this MAY. Let me know if there is better list for this. -- georgi

4 44

Re: Fwd: Do ethnic Germans have the right to racial and cultural strength? - was Re: At a Berlin church, Muslim refugees converting in droves.
by Zenaan Harkness 17 Jan '16

17 Jan '16

On 9/11/15, Nathan wrote: > WTF? I've read this *twice* and I *still* don't get it..... Is this an > argument against multiculturalism? That's not the question - the question is, does each individual human of a nation have the right to protect their current, existing culture? Or at least to have a say, i.e. a vote about it? Some nations, through their power structures, go to extraordinary lengths to protect their rights to cultural and racial strength, Japan for example. Is this the right of the Japanese? Or are they doing the wrong thing? >From their perspective, they are doing what is required to protect their rights, to self determination as a people, a tribe, a race. It appears that the rights of individuals are determined (in practice) by those in power, and not by those who are directly affected by the decision makers (the people themselves). Is keeping such decisions in the hands of a few "educated elected" an elitist approach? If democracy be the will of the people manifested, then ought the people of any nation be asked directly (nation wide vote) on such questions as cultural dilution due to immigration and or asylum? Or is it appropriate for an "elected" few to impose their personal preference on a nation? Regards Zenaan

6 14

NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor
by John Young 17 Dec '15

17 Dec '15

Der Spiegel released largest single day number of Snowden docs today, 666 pages, on NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-documents-attacks-on-vpn-ssl-… We offer a RAR of the 44 docs: http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-spiegel-14-1228.rar (197MB)

8 9

Re: Shiny stuff and designer societies
by Shelley 04 Nov '15

04 Nov '15

On October 28, 2015 5:01:18 PM Zenaan Harkness <zen(a)freedbms.net> wrote: > On 10/28/15, Shelley <shelley(a)misanthropia.org> wrote: > > > Ever heard of voluntary simplicity? It's a concept I have embraced for all > > of my adult life. I don't have much money because I don't want it. I > > I support and respect your choices. > > I say money is not something a sane person should want or not want, > for itself. Money is a tool in our present "reality". > Sane...yes. Well that explains the Wall St vultures, then! > I don't "want any money", but I do want to travel here and there and > connect to the internet to type with you. At the moment I need certain > amounts of money to facilitate achieving these things. Right, and I do understand that. While I truly wish we lived in a world where could trade and barter for everything, the ISP and utility companies want actual payment for services ;) As was mentioned, nothing is pure or perfect. Doing the best we can, which will be different for everyone, is the goal. Some people really need to have a car. I don't, so I do not. A friend and I do our grocery shopping together. He has a car because of work; I very often take care of his cat. I'm not going to pretend that I can walk or bike home with an armload of groceries and 13 kg of cat litter, lol. We get to catch up and the chore of shopping goes by quickly. > > I don't have a TV - stopped watching 30+ years ago as a teenager as I > found so much awesome stuff to read and learn, including the > creativity I felt when learning to program a computer. Doing for the > sake of enjoyment - climbing a tree was as enjoyable as typing in the > next BASIC program, or some years prior, collecting a large pile of > golden treasure grass (hay). > Right on, Zenaan! (Sounds like we're about the same age, too.) It's been about as long since I watched tv on a regular basis as well. For my few indulgences, like The Walking Dead (yep, vegan pacifist likes zombie apocalypse. Hannibal, too! Save the animals, Eat the Rude :D ), I go watch with friends. More fun that way anyway. I, um, may have downloaded Mr Robot. Shhh. > > My conscience won't allow me to mindlessly consume at the > > expense of the planet and other people. > > A good thing of course. Perhaps a maker workshop within your travel > capability would appeal to you? > There are several hacker spaces and maker spaces in my city, and many informal gatherings. I'm very fortunate :) > ... > >> Preparing my own food is a waste of time, other people are cheaper, mass > >> production is cheaper, I'm very mediocre at cooking. > > > > It is not ANY of these things. Use that time on the bus to learn how to > > cook basic stuff! Cook on the weekend while hanging out with > > friends/family or rocking out to music and make your lunches and dinner > > main dishes for the entire next week. How is that not saving time, money > > and being good for your health? > > Is the essence of your point to "be mindful" - whether travel, food, > things? It is remotely conceivable to me that being mindful might > possibly contribute to a fuller and more meaningful and relaxed > existence. > Well, yes. Being mindful isn't always easy, but does lead to a more fulfilling existence. It's more of... just trying to be a decent human, as I see it? We're all stuck on this rock spinning in space. We may as well be decent to each other, things seem to be better that way. What other rational choice is there? Arbitrary boundaries of countries are drawn and redrawn like a game of Risk played in a dorm room, and with far less care; they mean nothing, in the humanistic sense. We're all in the same damn boat. We sink or swim, together. Note: boundaries of other countries never seem to matter to the jerks who run mine, for a much different reason. I am sorry, world. More than I can convey. So, yes. I feel that all of our choices have a global impact, one way or another. I try to tip the scales in favor of the greater good, when I can. > > > Wouldnt want my "fuck" counter to push me higher on the offensiveness list > > ;) > > Oh, yes, you, would :) > Z Well, fuck. Ya got me :p -S

10 52

Shiny stuff and designer societies
by Lodewijk andré de la porte 04 Nov '15

04 Nov '15

New threat, this is offtopic. So I think people took my meaning wrong. I meant to say "don't hate people for behaving as the system rewards them to do", and then to ask "what kind of system would make people behave as you like?". 2015-10-27 21:47 GMT+01:00 Shelley <shelley(a)misanthropia.org>: > > Suggestions, in no particular order: I feel like you are ignoring the cost of time, underestimating people's expenses, and arbitrarily hate cars and meat. > - Don't buy the newest iCrap (or car or tv) every time they shit one out: > you *don't * need it, I assure you. > For most "the latest iCrap" is not a significant expense. 200 euro's a month or so (phone + laptop) is quite doable, especially given how much time one spends with iCrap devices. Resale value is nonzero, too, so really, quite doable. > - Learn how to fix and repurpose things. Take good care of your things so > they last longer. > I know how to fix/repurpose most things. Actually fixing things often doesn't compare favorably with just buying a new one - time spent at 10 euro's per hour makes most repairs very borderline effective. > - Freecycle, trade with others > Trade what? I do secondhand shopping and selling when appropriate, that should be good too. > - Shop at second hand and thrift stores for most things. > Do, for the things it makes sense for. It takes more effort as you frequently will not find what you were looking for. (protip: great for amplifiers and speakers) > - Think before you buy. Try to support true fair trade/fair wages and buy > locally whenever possible. Hint: it's usually possible. > Fair trade/wages are determined by the capitalist market, not by me. I'm simply not that arrogant. If you don't believe in markts you have more work cut out for you than just buying fair trade branded products. (Protip: fairtrade is just another way for things to be shiny) Buying local is even more meaningless. If transport costs do not outweigh production costs, go ferry it in from Australia, China, Chile, etc. You're making the efficient choice by doing so. - Use a bike or public transit whenever possible. Get rid of your car and > use things like Zip Car for the few occasions when you need to use a > personal vehicle. Share a car with friends if you truly need it for > kids/work/whatever. > Public transport or Zip Carring add to stress, cost more time, are not reliable and are not portable storage. I'd like an electric car, but the initial purchase is so high it skews things like tax and insurance. Idk why you hate cars so much. They're pretty damn useful, give you lots of freedom and independence, and just help you get around so much better than public transport. Their prices also compare with other forms of transport. (bikes are slow and only really work in villages or compatible cities) > - Prepare your own damn food. Go vegan. > Preparing my own food is a waste of time, other people are cheaper, mass production is cheaper, I'm very mediocre at cooking. Going vegan is an interesting choice, all evidence points to it being much much much better for the environment, etc. but meat is still quite affordable and quite complimentary to meals. If it truly were 100x easier on the environment I'd expect to see that in the price, and I hardly do. I assume there's some sort of sponsoring going on, and until it stops I'll keep on eating delicious and healthy meat. (Hey, you asked for suggestions: these are mine.) Thanks for playing :) Razer mentioned a TV, I don't own one. I have a sizeable monitor. Much prettier than most TVs. I might get a projector someday, it's fun to watch movies together like that. Razer also fuzzes about collectivism vs individualism. They used to have collectivism in many nations. They all lost. I think a society design that involves individual incentives (the best of capitalism; advanced finance, legal persons, markets, competition), global optimization (the best of communism; managed competition, fine tuned production, >designed markets<), and collective ambition (the best of government/academia; being able to strife together and make deep, long term investments) would be ideal.

6 8

Such a democratic American
by Zenaan Harkness 03 Nov '15

03 Nov '15

"Ukrainian Wikileaks: McCain and Saakashvili are plotting to shoot down American plane in Syria to blame Russia [transcript]" http://fortruss.blogspot.ru/2015/10/ukrainian-wikileaks-mccain-and.html Can someone who reads Russian please let us know the dates on this conversation - the article has a date, and I can see a date on the Ukrainian wikileaks page but I cannot tell when this conversation happened. I would like to know if it was before MH-17 or in recent times. Thanks, Zenaan

2 2